



Aalto University

NFC ticket application

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Memory lay-out



Total memory:

48 pages = 192 bytes

Free memory:

26 pages = 104 bytes

Page number	Content
1 - 3	UID + check bits
4	Application tag
5	Version Number
6	Initial counter
7	Ride counter
8 - 9	Validity date
10-11	Expiry date
12	MAC ₁
13	MAC ₂
14 - 39	Empty
40	Lock bits
41	16bit one-way counter
42	auth0
43	auth1
44 - 47	authentication key



Validity Date <=> Expiry Date

Validity Date:

Updated on issue / topping up of unused card

For bookkeeping reasons

Expiry Date:

Set on first use of ticket

Shorter than validity date!

Security measures

- Password:
 - Unique: $\text{hmac}(\text{master secret} \mid \text{UID})$
- MITM prevention:
 - Using MAC
- Tearing protection
- Rollback prevention (monotonic counter)
- Replay attacks
- Cloning
- Passback prevention
- Checking safe limits
- No error messages on reader

→ hard for attacker to know what goes wrong

MAC codes

Truncate MAC to 4 bytes (= 1 page) → tearing protection

We use 2 MAC codes:

- Mac1:
 - Issuing ticket | Topping up card before first use
 - Create MAC of pages 6-9 (no expiry date)
- Mac2:
 - Written when first using ticket
 - Add new/updated expiry date into MAC
 - Create MAC of pages 6-11
 - Note: Also written when topping up a used card, but tearing protection is no concern then!

Security measures: Tearing prevention

Writing multiple pages → risk of tearing

Only an issue when using card

↔ issuing is done by professional

Use of first ticket → write multiple pages

Only consider it valid if counter has been updated (= last step!)

Demo + Questions