Tugrul Yatagan 504161551

LTE Arch:



NAS: UE-MME
AS: UE-eNB (Radio Res. Cont.)
HSS: auth, loc. man
MME: control plane, intermediate auth NAS security idle mobility hand.
P6W: user plane UE IP@ allocation
S6W: user plane inter eNB mobility
eNB: connection mobility MgMt RB control

IMSI → MCC (3) + MNC (2-3) + MSIN (5-10)
PLMN-ID

6UTI → globally uniq. temp.
C-RNTI → cell-rad. net. temp.



6TP-C tunnel (S6W-P6W)

attach goal → obtain ip, authen. author.

OFDM → 1 subframe=1ms, 10subframe → radio frame

6TP



Sending node → correspondent Node
Moving node → MN, UE

Mobility provide "seamless"

Identifier → does not change as MN moves
Locator → current point of attachment, topol. correct addr

IP layer solution: 1) routing-update 2) Tunneling/Mapping (6TP, MIP)
Transport layer solution: mp TCP (connection over multip. interface).
1) IP unchanged, routing table update↑ 2) routing isn't impacted



A) CN-HA
B) HA-MN
C) MN-HA
D) HA-CN



IP isn't designed with mobility
Identifier-Locator seperation protocols, rendezvous

handovers are prepared. source eNB decides. S1 and X2 handov
service continity.

S1 ↓ MME degisir SGW belki
X2 ↓ MME sabit SGW degisebilir

1) Connected mode → tx/rx on / can handover
2) idle mode → rx period. on. / can TA update / paging broadcast channel
1 → network(mme) knows cell / 2 → network(mme) knows TA
UE and MME keep track of state.

1 → P6W S5 SGW S11 MME NAS UE (S1-U eNB)

2 → P6W S5 SGW S11 MME



MME has UE info, eNB hasn't UE info

↑ #TA = less signal but ↑ # eNBs that UE paged in
TAI → MCC + MNC + TAC

SFN mod T = (T/N).(UE_ID mod N) | i_s = floor(UE_ID/N) mod Ns
T = min(Tc, Tue) | N = min(T, Nf.T) | Ns = max(1, Nf)

Security:
- ID authentication, verify who you are (MS)
- Data authentication, data came from the source
- Data integrity protection, nobody alters data
- confidentiality, encryption only src and dst can unders.
- authorization, access resource only you can
- privacy, keeping your id secret
- non-repudiation: undeniable evidence that msg is from sender

man in the midde can listen, delay, delete, modify, replay, create

symmetric key: shared, private key scheme $Enc_K(P)=C$; $Dec_K(C)=P$

asymmetric key: puplic key scheme $Enc_{PK}(P)=C$; $Dec_{SK}(C)=P$

$Enc_{SK}(P)=C$; $Dec_{PK}(C)=P$

IMSI → send over air only during attach, GUTI is used instead

IMEI → only sent to MME (in NAS), not eNB

MSISDN → CC + NDC + SN
+90 533 1234567



GTP-V



eNB

SRB (signaling) | DRB (data radio)
UE header)

TEID → Tunnel endpoint identifier