Protocol Audit Report

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Protocol Summary

A smart contract application for storing a password. Users should be able to store a password and then retrieve it later. Others should not be able to access the password.

Disclaimer

The YOUR_NAME_HERE team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
Likelihood	High Medium Low	High H H/M M	Medium H/M M M/L	Low M M/L L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond to the following commit hash:

2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990

Scope

```
./src/
#-- PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read the passowrd.

Issues found

Severity	Number of Issues Found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0

Severity	Number of Issues Found
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible tp anyone and no longer private.

Description: All the data stored on-chain is visible to anyone and can be read directly from the blockchain. The PasswordStore::s_password variable is intented to be a private variable and only accessed through the PasswordStore::getPassword function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

Likelihood and Impact:

-Impact:HIGH -Likelihood:HIGH -Severity:HIGH

Proof of Concept: The below test case shows anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain

1. Create a locally running chain

make anvil

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

make deploy

3. Run the storage tool We use 1 because that's the storage slot of s_password in the contract.

cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc url http://127.0.0.1:854

You'll get an output that looks like this

You can then parse that hex to a string with

ANd you get

myPassword

Recommended Mitigation:

Due to this, the overall architecture of the blockchgain should be rethought. One

could encrypt the password offchain and then store the encrypted password onchain. This will require the user to remember another password offchain to decrypt the password. However, you would also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't wantthe user to accidentally send a transaction with password that decrypts your password.

[H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword has no access controls. A non-owner can change the password.

Description: Since there is no check for the owner of the contract in the PasswordStore::setPassword function, a non-owner can change the password. Which is intended to be called by only the owner of the contract.

```
function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
   s_password = newPassword;
   emit SetNetPassword();
}
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract severely breaking the contract intended functionality.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to the PasswordStore.t.sol test file.

Code

```
function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public{
    vm.assume(randomAddress!=owner);
    vm.prank(randomAddress);

    string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
    passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);

    vm.prank(owner);
    string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();

    assertEq(expectedPassword,actualPassword);
}
```

Recommended Mitigation:

Add an access control to the PasswordStore::setPassword funtion.

```
if(msg.sender != s_owner){
    revert PasswordStore_onlyOwner();
}
```

Informational

[I-1] PasswordStore::getPassword indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect.

Description

```
/*
  * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
  * @param newPassword The new password to set.
  */

function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
   if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
      revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
   }
   return s_password;
}
```

The Password::getPassword function signature is getPassword while the natspec says it should be getPassword(string)

Recommended Mitigation Remove natspec line

* @param newPassword The new password to set.