Children, Household Specialization and Relationship Quality

Belén Rodríguez Moro¹

Olatz Román¹ (Job Market Paper)

¹European University Institute

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Children increase responsibilities ⇒ Parents reorganize how they use time

- Mothers reduce labor market time [Kleven et al., 2019; Goldin, 2021]
- Parents spend more time in home production [Aguilar-Gomez et al., 2019; Siminski and Yetsenga, 2022]
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How do children and the associated time readjustments affect couples' relationship quality?

Proxy **non-material gains** from being in a couple

- Incorporated in models of couple formation, dissolution and fertility decisions
 [e.g., Browning et al., 2014; Chiappori, 2020; Greenwood et al., 2017]
- With limited empirical guidance [Weiss and Willis, 1997; Bertrand et al., 2015]

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 - → Formation, dissolution and fertility [e.g., Browning et al., 2014]
 - → Investments in child education, household specialization... [Chiappori and Weiss, 2007]
- 3. Children's well-being
 - → Exposure to bad relationship [Piketty, 2003; Björklund and Sundström, 2006]

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- Introduce a novel measure of relationship quality (RQ)
 - → Questionnaire about relationship with partner (e.g., happiness, arguments)
 - → Extract RQ using factor analysis
 - → Validate measure: marital transition prediction and correlation between partners
- Study the causal effect of children on RQ
 - ightarrow Perform a dynamic difference-in-differences estimation around first child birth

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 - ightarrow Perform a dynamic difference-in-differences estimation around first child birth
 - ▶ First child birth significantly and persistently reduces RQ
 - \rightarrow By age four \downarrow 1/2 standard deviation
 - Impact both mothers and fathers equally

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Can changes in household specialization explain this decrease?

- Classify couples based on pre-birth division of labor market and housework time
- Study impact of childbirth on RQ by couple type
 - ▷ Gender-based **specialization** after birth, regardless of pre-birth arrangement
 - → Women increase housework and reduce labor market time
 - ▶ Larger time rearrangement associated with larger decrease in RQ

Models of family formation and dissolution [Blasutto, 2024; Brien et al., 2006; Browning et al., 2014; Chiappori, 2020; Eckstein et al., 2019; Gemici and Laufer, 2011; Goussé et al., 2017; Greenwood et al., 2017; Low et al., 2018; Voena, 2015; Weiss and Willis, 1997]

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Consequences of having children [Adda et al., 2017; Albanesi et al., 2023; Ahammer et al., 2023; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Bertrand et al., 2015; Bertrand, 2020; Clark et al., 2008; Cortés and Pan, 2020; Goldin, 2021; Kleven et al., 2019; Lillard and Waite, 1993; Svarer and Verner, 2008]

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Household time allocation [Aguilar-Gomez et al., 2019; Alon et al., 2020; Del Boca et al., 2020; Farré et al., 2020; Hupkau and Petrongolo, 2020; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Lundberg, 2005; Sevilla and Smith, 2020; Siminski and Yetsenga, 2022]

Document child-induced specialization regardless of ex-ante roles & implications for RQ

Data and Measure

Dataset and sample

- Dataset: Understanding Society, UK longitudinal household survey
 - * Relationship history since 1991 (British Household Panel Survey)
- Population of interest:

Individuals in a couple that become parents

Sample:

Summary Statistics

Individuals cohabiting with their partners that had their 1st child in 2009-2021 observed at least once before and after birth

ightarrow Panel of 1,760 individuals and up to 6 waves

Measure of Relationship Quality

Partner Questionnaire to both cohabiting partners **individually**:

(a) Subjective assessments	(b) Couple time use
How often do you? consider splitting regret getting married quarrel get on each others nerves	How often do you? work together on a project stimulating exchange of ideas calmly discuss something kiss partner
What is the? degree of happiness w/ couple	Do you and your partner? engage in outside interests

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Factor analysis to construct RQ using *all* available information


- Retain first factor \rightarrow One-dimensional measure
- Explains 40.61% of the variation in the items





Distribution of the RQ measure in the sample

- Standardized
 - Coefficients in standard deviations
- Higher values indicate better relationships








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Never parents

Rank

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 ightarrow\,$ No jumps in average profiles
- Association with partners' observable characteristics
 - ightarrow Confirm associations drawn in the literature (marriage, assortative matching)



We want to estimate the impact of first child birth on RQ

Dynamic difference-in-differences: two-way fixed effects specification

$$\mathbf{y}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \mu_t + \sum_j \mathbb{1}\{j = t - G_i\} \delta_j + u_{i,t}$$

- $\triangleright t G_i$: time since i's first child was born (event time)
- \triangleright G_i : year when *i*'s first child was born (treatment cohort)

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- \triangleright $t G_i$: time since *i*'s first child was born (event time)
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- ⇒ Issues estimating through OLS: "forbidden comparisons" with already treated may result in biased estimates

[e.g., De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Roth et al., 2023]

Using Callaway and Sant'Anna [2021] method

1. Compute "good" 2×2 difference-in-differences comparisons for each treatment cohort and event-time period

e.g., Compare 2010 cohort w/ 2011-2020 cohorts at event-time o, 2016-2020 cohorts at event-time 5...

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
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2. Aggregate ATT at the event-time level to obtain $\hat{\delta}_i$

Homogeneity Illustrate aggregation

Impact of first child birth on Relationship Quality

First child birth significantly and persistently reduces RQ




The results are not driven by...

- changes in time use items only or in item valuation after birth
 - → Larger impact on subjective assessment items (happiness)
- parents of more than one child
 - → Parents of +1 child experience smaller decrease
- attrition due to couple dissolution
 - ightarrow Same magnitude excluding couples that end up dissolving
- timing of birth, in terms of age and relationship tenure
 - → Similar impact regardless of age/tenure at birth



The results are not driven by changes in time use items only


Construct separate measures for each block of items




The results are not driven by parents of more than one child

Separately by total amount of children at the end of the observation period


Second child






The results are not driven by separating couples

Exclude individuals observed separating by the end of the observation period




The results are not driven by differences in timing of birth


Average RQ at each event-time period by age and tenure at birth



(b) Tenure bins



What are the implications of this result?




Implications - Back-of-the-envelope calculations on divorce

	Dependent variable: Couple dissolution				
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
Lagged RQ	-0.0106*** (0.002)	-0.00833*** (0.002)	-0.00698* (0.003)		
Controls Individual FE		✓	√ √		
R-squared 0.007 Observations 17228		0.054 15555	0.050 15555		

- Around 2% of the existing couples dissolve yearly in our sample
- 1/2 std dev \downarrow in RQ associated w/ 17.5% higher probability of separation

Implications - General happiness and RQ




- "Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?"
- Very different from RQ:
 - Adapt to life events over time
 - Benefits of children balance out drawbacks in RQ

Other shocks: Unemployment

Notes: Using event-time t=-2 as baseline.

Similar impact on mothers and fathers

- Child penalty: Impact mothers' outcomes only
 - Labor market
 - Housework time
 - Mental health
- Fathers' RQ decreases to a similar magnitude as mothers'




Mechanism: Changes in Household Specialization

How parents use their time changes after birth


Leave policies

(a) Paid market work hours

(b) Unpaid housework hours



Pre-birth: Men 32 hours, women 27 hours



Pre-birth: Men 5 hours, women 8 hours

Compute share out of household total done by women for each type of work *l*:

```
\textit{female share}_l = \frac{\text{woman's hours}_l}{\text{man's hours}_l + \text{woman's hours}_l} \quad ; \quad l \in \{\text{market, house}\}
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- Traditional: Women specialize in housework and men in labor market work
 - \rightarrow female share_{market} \leq 0.45 and female share_{house} \geq 0.55

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- Traditional: Women specialize in housework and men in labor market work
- Unbalanced: Women take a larger share of both types of work
 - \sim female share_{market} \geq 0.55 and female share_{house} \geq 0.55

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- **Unbalanced**: Women take a larger share of both types of work
- Egalitarian: No specialization, 50-50 split of both work types
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
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- Unbalanced: Women take a larger share of both types of work
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- Counter-traditional: Men take a larger share of housework
 - \rightarrow female share_{house} \leq 0.45


Gender-based specialization after childbirth



(a) Labor market work hours

(b) Housework hours








(a) Paid market work hours


(b) Unpaid housework hours






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






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
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




(a) Paid market work hours

(b) Unpaid housework hours





	Market	Home	
Traditional	No role change		
Unbalanced	To fathers	No change	
Egalitarian	Adopt specialization		
Counter-traditional	No change	To mothers	

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Traditional	No role change		
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Egalitarian	Adopt specialization		
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Not behaving according to revealed comparative advantages pre-birth

- → Frictions in the labor market or identity considerations [Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Ichino et al., 2019]
- ightarrow Become prevalent after parenthood and **unanticipated** [Kuziemko et al., 2018]

Couples experiencing largest changes suffer the most

Static diff-in-diff estimates by couple type, using Callaway and Sant'Anna [2021]

	Traditional	Unbalanced	Egalitarian	Counter-traditional
Baseline RQ	0.345	0.424	0.568	0.459
	(0.993)	(0.749)	(0.633)	(0.784)
ATT	-0.107	-0.0992	-0.175*	-0.243**
	(0.180)	(0.086)	(0.069)	(0.075)
Observations	273	876	611	856

- Larger changes in housework associated with larger decreases in RQ
- Unanticipated changes: zero effect of second child birth









Other mechanisms

Conclusions

- 1. Having a child reduces Relationship Quality significantly and persistently
- 2. Parents change how they use their time
 - Gender-based household specialization
 - ightharpoonup Larger reallocation of paid and unpaid work ightarrow Larger RQ decrease

Email: olatz.roman@eui.eu

Conclusions

- 1. Having a child reduces Relationship Quality significantly and persistently
- 2. Parents change how they use their time
 - Gender-based household specialization
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Implications? Policies encouraging a more egalitarian distribution of tasks post-birth could mitigate the negative impact on RQ

Email: olatz.roman@eui.eu

Conclusions

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- 2. Parents change how they use their time
 - Gender-based household specialization
 - lacktriangle Larger reallocation of paid and unpaid work ightarrow Larger RQ decrease

Implications? Policies encouraging a more egalitarian distribution of tasks post-birth could mitigate the negative impact on RQ

Next project: Integrate empirical evidence into model of fertility and couple dissolution decisions

→ Which policies can mitigate negative impact on RQ?

Email: olatz.roman@eui.eu

Future Research Plans

Olatz Román¹

¹ European University Institute

ifo Institute January 23, 2025 How do gendered behaviors and geographic factors influence...

1. Family decisions and outcomes

2. Labor market and mobility decisions

How do gendered behaviors and geographic factors influence...

1. Family decisions and outcomes

→ Job Market Paper

2. Labor market and mobility decisions

How do gendered behaviors and geographic factors influence...

1. Family decisions and outcomes

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2. Labor market and mobility decisions

2. Labor market and mobility decisions

What are the consequences of gender differences in occupational choices?

- 1. Ongoing: "The Geography of Jobs and Couple Migration"
- 2. "Earnings Gender Gap and Occupations over the Life-Cycle" (with Alexander Monge-Naranjo)
- 3. "Occupational Sorting, Gendered Urban Wage Premia and Local Marriage Markets" (with Yannick Reichlin)

The Geography of Jobs and Couple Migration 1/2

Summary

Motivation: Decreasing couple migration and changes in women's labor market behavior

Women: Not-participate \rightarrow Enter "female" occ. \rightarrow Enter all occ. Couples: Single earner \rightarrow Double earner, mobile \rightarrow Double earner, immobile

The Geography of Jobs and Couple Migration 1/2

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Question: How does the geography of occupations affect couple migration?

- Measure joint geographic constraints of couples
- Study relation between occupation geography and couple migration decisions

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Question: How does the geography of occupations affect couple migration?

- Measure joint geographic constraints of couples
- Study relation between occupation geography and couple migration decisions

Main findings: Joint geographic constraints shape couple migration patterns

- Couples in highly concentrated occupations migrate less than other couples (1/2)
- Geographic overlap between partners' occupations is associated with higher migration
 - → Almost fully mitigates the negative effect of concentration

The Geography of Jobs and Couple Migration 2/2

Next steps

Empirically: Estimate causal effect of joint geographic constraints on couple migration

- Idea: Exploit shocks to joint geographic constraints through staggered introduction of state-level occupational licensing requirements
- Status: Waiting for historical licensing data availability

Theoretically: How much of the decrease in couple migration can be explained by occupational patterns? Can schemes like working from home encourage couple migration?

- Idea: Model of endogenous location choices with heterogeneous occupations
- Status: Set up preliminary 2-location \times 3-occupation model

"Earnings Gender Gap and Occupations over the Life-Cycle", with Alexander Monge-Naranjo

- How has the gender gap in earnings evolved over time and across cohorts?
 What is the role of occupations in determining this gap?
 - Entry occupations and occupational **transitions** over the life cycle
- Idea: Using a model à la Hsieh-et-al-2019, examine the role of gender-life cycle-cohort differences in occupational choices on the earnings gender gap
- Status: Gathering descriptive evidence

"Occupational Sorting, Gendered Urban Wage Premia and Local Marriage Markets", with Yannick Reichlin

- Does occupational gender segregation create a wedge in urban wage premia? How does this affect the composition of local marriage markets?
- Idea: Using German employer-employee data...
 - Compute real urban wage premia by occupation over time
 - Document gender imbalances in city composition induced by gender unequal urban wage premia
 - Study the consequences of the resulting gender imbalances in: couple formation/dissolution, political inclinations, etc.

1. Family decisions and outcomes

What is the role of relationship quality?

- 1. Ongoing: "Measuring Relationship Quality", with Belén Rodríguez-Moro
- 2. Ongoing: "Children, Household Specialization and Relationship Quality", with Belén Rodríguez-Moro
- 3. Ongoing: "Until the City Do Us Part: Relationship Quality and Marriage Market Size", with Ana Moreno-Maldonado and Belén Rodríguez-Moro
- 4. "Parental Relationship Quality and Child Development", with Belén Rodríguez-Moro

"Until the City Do Us Part: Relationship Quality and Marriage Market Size", with Ana Moreno-Maldonado and Belén Rodríguez-Moro

Question: Is there a city size premium to marriage markets in terms of RQ, couple formation and dissolution, analogous to that in local labor markets?

Main findings:

- Larger cities have more singles and lower stability in newly formed couples compared to smaller cities
- However, couples in bigger cities experience faster decreases in dissolution probabilities and slower deterioration in RQ with relationship tenure

Next steps: Disentangle size effects vs. composition effects

- AKM-style decomposition
- Dynamic quantitative model of couple formation and dissolution with endogenous location decisions

"Parental Relationship Quality and Child Development", with Belén Rodríguez-Moro

- How does parental separation affect children's long-term outcomes?
- Idea: Matching parental couples on observables and RQ, disentangle negative effects of
 - exposure to a bad relationship
 - separation

on child develompent outcomes, comparing couples with similar RQ trajectories who separate and who do not

Future Research Plans

Olatz Román¹

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ifo Institute January 23, 2025



Models of couple formation and dissolution



Two types of gains from being in a couple [Becker, 1991]:

- material: being in a couple financially beneficial (economies of scale, risk sharing)
- non-material: more subjective and match specific

Theoretical treatments of non-material component, or match quality:

- 1. Stochastic component, non-persistent shocks at each period [Chiappori and Weiss, 2006, 2007; Gemici and Laufer, 2011; Bruze et al., 2015; Voena, 2015; Greenwood et al., 2017; Low et al., 2018]
- 2. Deterministic but unobserved, noisy signal updated each period [Brien et al., 2006; Blasutto et al., 2020; Antler et al., 2022; Blasutto, 2024]
- ⇒ Limited empirical guidance on how match quality determines couple decisions

Empirical studies of match quality



- In Economics:
 - observed partner characteristics [Eckstein et al., 2019; Low, 2021; Weiss and Willis, 1997]
 - well-being, happiness and conflict [Bertrand et al., 2015; Chiappori et al., 2018]
 - → Incorporate relationship-specific information
- In Psychology:
 - propose and test measures of marital satisfaction and stress [Spanier, 1976; Busby et al., 1995; Norton, 1983; Funk and Rogge, 2007; Joel et al., 2020]
 - → Comprehensive measure parsimoniously summarizing
- Other disciplines associate match quality with
 - marital transitions, childbirth, health, financial resources, happiness, etc. [Perelli-Harris and Blom, 2022; Carlson and VanOrman, 2017; Rijken and Liefbroer, 2009; Fernandes-Pires et al., 2023; Halliday Hardie and Lucas, 2010; Meadows and Arber, 2015]
 - → Overcome data shortcomings: longitudinal, own responses, present values

Summary statistics the period before birth



	(1) Fathers	(2) Mothers		(3) Couples
Age	32.00	28.38	Tenure	4.186
	(6.323)	(6.058)		(3.311)
College educated (%)	33.77	36.34	Married (%)	42.56
	(47.30)	(48.11)		(49.20)
Active in labor mkt (%)	86.97	84.25	Female share of paid work	0.472
	(33.65)	(36.42)	·	(0.210)
Employed (%)	82.48	78.09	Monthly household income	4045.0
	(37.98)	(41.35)	•	(2988.5)
Weekly work hours	31.43	27.34	Female share of housework	0.630
	(17.04)	(16.11)		(0.204)
Gross monthly income	2213.5	1569.2		
•	(1620.7)	(1220.5)		
Weekly housework hours	5.157	8.583		
-	(4.044)	(6.258)		
RQ	0.351	0.385		
	(0.860)	(0.895)		
Observations	2714	3260	Observations	4124

Summary statistics of parents and never parents




	(1) Parents	(2) Childless*		(3) Parents	(4) Childless
Age	32.08	40.10	Tenure	6.600	11.32
	(7.719)	(12.72)		(4.357)	(11.38)
College educated (%)	30.91	33.61	Married (%)	44.72	41.16
	(45.03)	(46.94)		(45.91)	(48.08)
Active in labor mkt (%)	75.23	84.63	Female sh. paid work	0.393	0.469
	(34.08)	(33.41)	•	(0.224)	(0.266)
Employed (%)	68.56	79.95	Monthly hh income	3852.6	4546.5
	(37.50)	(37.21)	,	(2240.4)	(2703.9)
Weekly work hours	23.17	27.66	Female sh. housework	0.672	0.649
•	(15.41)	(16.23)		(0.170)	(0.239)
Gross monthly income	1833.2	1975.6		(() ()
•	(1355.0)	(1511.2)			
Weekly housework hours	9.662	9.096			
•	(7.301)	(8.275)			
RQ Distribution	0.00597	0.0995			
	(0.869)	(0.963)			
Observations	9573	7578	Observations	6871	6469

^{*}Individuals never having cohabiting own children, observed before age 45

Scree plot of factor analysis





- The 1st factor explains 41% of the variation in the items
- The 1st and 2nd factors jointly explain 55% of the variation
- Jumps in the percentage explained are decreasing in size

Factor loadings of RQ




(a) Subjective assessment		(b) Couple time use			
How often do you ?		How often do you ?			
consider splitting	0.647	work together on a project	0.653		
regret getting married	0.701	stimulating exchange of ideas	0.707		
quarrel	0.618	calmly discuss something	0.526		
get on each others nerves	0.674	kiss partner	0.510		
What is the ?		Do you and your partner ?			
degree of happiness w/ couple	0.633	engage in outside interests	0.672		

- Factor loadings are the correlation coefficient between an item and the factor
- RQ (factor 1) has eigenvalue 4.06, the next factor 1.46, the rest are below 1
- RQ explains 40.61% of the variation

Factor loadings of RQ




◆ Back to results




Distribution of RQ for never parents

◆ Back to distribution

 Individuals never having cohabiting own children, observed before age 45






Validity: Informativeness


Behavior Prediction

(a) Marital transitions



◆ Back to measure

(b) Fertility decisions



Validity: Informativeness



Behavior Prediction

	Sepa	ration	Marriage			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
Lagged RQ	-0.00876*** (0.001)	-0.00634*** (0.001)	0.00309*** (0.001)	-0.000371 (0.001)		
Controls Individual FE	√	√ ✓	√	√		
R-squared Observations	0.003 93854	0.029 84586	0.000 93854	0.025 84586		

Validity: Interpersonal comparability Within Couple Correlation




	Woman RQ		
	(1)	(2)	
Man RQ	0.613*** (0.008)	0.594*** (0.008)	
$ \begin{array}{l} \text{Controls} \\ \text{Age} \times \text{Tenure} \times \text{Wave} \end{array} $		✓ ✓	
R-squared Observations	0.320 42889	0.334 39525	

Validity: Interpersonal comparability

◆ Back to measure

Rank-Rank Correlation



Validity: Interpersonal comparability

■ Back to measure

Couple correlation by item

	Woman									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	cons. split	reg. marry	quarrel	on nerves	happy	work tog.	ideas	discuss	kiss	interests
Man	0.418***	0.323***	0.464***	0.401***	0.289***	0.327***	0.276***	o.286***	0.544***	0.448***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(o.oo6)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Cont.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
R2	0.192	0.104	0.227	0.175	0.112	0.141	0.116	0.109	0.354	0.226
Obs.	50314	50284	50282	50273	49519	50142	50089	50183	50107	41394

Validity: Interpersonal comparability



Couple correlation of subjective and time $\ensuremath{\mathsf{RQ}}$


			Woman	outcome		
	R	Q.	Subj. RQ		Time RQ	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Man outcome	0.613*** (0.007)	0.594*** (0.008)	0.570*** (0.008)	0.557*** (0.009)	0.486*** (0.006)	0.455*** (0.007)
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Age} \times \text{Tenure} \times \text{Wave} \\ \text{Controls} \end{array}$		√ √		√		√ √
R-squared Observations	0.320 42889	0.334 39525	0.281 53135	0.291 49137	0.218 44046	0.242 40542

RQ measure: Life- and relationship-cycle profiles




$$\mathbf{y}_{i,t} = \phi_i + \lambda_t + \sum_a \mathbb{1}\{a = \mathsf{age}_{i,t}\}\alpha_a + \sum_d \mathbb{1}\{d = \mathsf{tenure}_{i,t}\}\gamma_d + \mathbf{u}_{i,t}$$

(a) Life-cycle: α_a



(b) Relationship cycle: γ_d





RQ measure: Life- and relationship-cycle profiles

∢ Back to measure

(a) Life-cycle: α_a

(b) Relationship cycle: γ_d





RQ measure: Observable characteristics



-0.109*** (0.007) 0.111*** (0.012) 0.066*** (0.014) 0.014**	-0.016 (0.033) 0.008 (0.010) 0.000
0.111*** (0.012) 0.066*** (0.014) 0.014**	(0.033) 0.008 (0.010)
(0.012) 0.066*** (0.014) 0.014**	(0.033) 0.008 (0.010)
0.066*** (0.014) 0.014**	0.008 (0.010)
(0.014) 0.014**	(0.010)
0.014**	, ,
	0.000
(0.004)	(0.003)
O.257***	0.062**
(0.018)	(0.020)
-o.248***	-o.o78***
	(0.013)
	-0.010
(0.013)	(0.021)
√	√
	\checkmark
0.046	0.074
106826	106826
	(0.004) 0.257*** (0.018) -0.248*** (0.015) -0.058*** (0.013) \$\sqrt{0.046}\$

RQ measure: Observable characteristics



	(1)	(2)
Woman	-0.092***	-0.112***
Woman college	(0.009) 0.049* (0.022)	(0.012) 0.028 (0.024)
Man college	(0.022) 0.043 (0.026)	(0.024) -0.000 (0.029)
Both college	0.020) 0.152*** (0.020)	0.139*** (0.022)
$Woman \times Woman \; college$	(0.020)	0.042
$Woman \times Man \; college$		(0.024) 0.085** (0.027)
$Woman \times Both \ college$		0.024 (0.020)
$\begin{array}{l} \text{Age} \times \text{Tenure} \times \text{Wave} \\ \text{Controls} \end{array}$	√ √	√ √
R-squared Observations	0.054 54160	0.055 54160




- Issue: The usual specification carries out forbidden comparisons: uses already treated as controls
- Proposed method:
 - 1. Compute cohort ATT estimates using only not-yet treated as controls in pairwise comparisons:

$$\mathsf{ATT}(g,t) = \mathbb{E}[\mathsf{Y}_{i,t} - \mathsf{Y}_{i,g-1}|\mathsf{G}_i = g] - \mathbb{E}[\mathsf{Y}_{i,t} - \mathsf{Y}_{i,g-1}|g' > t \geq g]$$

- \rightarrow Controls: cohorts g' that were treated after the period t
- 2. Aggregate ATTs at the event-time level using as weights the share of each cohort at every event-time

Illustration of comparisons - Consider 3 individuals:








A1. No anticipation - RQ does not predict when individuals have their first child

Formally: If a unit is untreated in period *t*, its outcome does not depend on when it will be treated in the future

$$\mathsf{Y}_{i,t}(g) = \mathsf{Y}_{i,t}(\infty)$$
 for all i and $t < g$

First child birth is not preceded by changes in RQ



A2. Conditional parallel trends - In absence of treatment, RQ would have evolved in parallel for all cohorts g

Formally: All adoption groups would have evolved in parallel in absence of treatment. For all $t \neq t'$ and $g \neq g'$:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathsf{Y}_{i,t}(\infty) - \mathsf{Y}_{i,t'}(\infty)|\mathsf{G}_i = g] = \mathbb{E}[\mathsf{Y}_{i,t}(\infty) - \mathsf{Y}_{i,t'}(\infty)|\mathsf{G}_i = g']$$

 Compare individuals that already had children with individuals that did not have children yet


A1. No anticipation - Checks


No large variation in pre-birth year-to-year changes

(a) RQ levels

Back to empirical strategy

(b) Deviations from individual mean






A2. Conditional parallel trends - Checks

Back to empirical strategy


No differences with delayed fertility



A2. Conditional parallel trends - Checks

◆ Back to empirical strates


Comparisons among individuals with similar ex-ante RQ





A3. Homogeneous treatment effects - Checks

◆ Back to empirical strateg

No differences across cohorts









1. Time invariance of RQ: by item block

◆ Back to results



(b) Couple time use





Factor Loadings


Distribution

By item: subjective assessment

By item: time use


1. Time invariance of RQ: using parent scores

◆ Back to results




2. Subsequent fertility

◆ Back to results



(b) More than one child



2. Subsequent fertility

◆ Back to results


Individuals observed at the end of their fertility cycle

	(1) One child	(2) More than one
ATT	-0.360*** (0.102)	-0.212* (0.101)
Observations	693	1041

2. Subsequent fertility


◆ Back to results

Second child birth




3. Selected sample

◆ Back to results




(b) Non-separating couples




4. Timing of birth: Average RQ by age and tenure bin

◆ Back to results

(a) Age bins




(b) Tenure bins



4. Timing of birth: Control for baseline







4. Timing of birth: Using Kleven et al. [2019]




$$y_{i,t} = \sum_{j \neq -1} \mathbb{1}\{j = t - G_i\} \delta_j + \sum_a \mathbb{1}\{a = \mathsf{age}_{i,t}\} \alpha_a + \sum_d \mathbb{1}\{d = \mathsf{tenure}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \gamma_d + \sum_w \mathbb{1}\{w = \mathsf{period}_t\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}\} \psi_w + \mathsf{v}_{i,t}$$
















Robustness: Psychology measures

◆ Back to results

(a) Satisfaction RDAS




(b) Cohesion RDAS




Distribution of Subjective and Time RQ

◆ Back to result


(a) Subjective RQ




(b) Time RQ





















(a) work together on a project (b) calmly discuss something





• On average, 1.44% of the married couples in fertility ages (20-45) living in England and Wales divorce every year in 2009-2021 [Office for National Statistics, 2022]

General happiness: "Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?" Impact on mothers and fathers



General happiness and RQ




Association in sample of never parents

	Dependent variable: General Happiness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
RQ	0.222***	0.206***	0.185***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Controls		√	√
Individual FE			\checkmark
R-squared	0.047	0.069	0.033
Observations	18231	14953	14953

Timing around unemployment event






Gender differences in impact on RQ

◆ Back to result

RQ difference = Wife RQ - Husband RQ



Parental leave schemes in the United Kingdom

Back to mechanisr

Leave with employment rights protected: pay rises, holidays, return to work

Statutory Maternity Leave (SML):

- Leave: Up to 52 weeks, 2 compulsory
- When: Up to 11 weeks before expected week of birth
- Pay: Up to 39 weeks, 6 weeks at 90% and rest at £184.03 or 90% (lowest)

Statutory Paternity Leave:

- Leave: 1 or 2 weeks, continuously or separately since Apr-2024
- When: Within 56 days after birth
- Pay: £184.03 or 90% (lowest)


Shared Parental Leave:

- Leave: Up to 50 weeks from SML
- When: From 2 weeks after birth (compulsory SML)
- Pay: Up to 37 weeks from SML, £184.03 or 90% of household average (lowest)


Distribution of female shares

◆ Back to mechanism

(a) Before birth



(b) After birth



Summary statistics by couple type, before birth



	Traditional	Unbalanced	Egalitarian	Counter-tradit.
Age	30.31	31.34	31.31	31.33
	(5.746)	(5.139)	(4.870)	(5.383)
College educated (%)	32.75	41.00	46.15	45.80
	(46.98)	(49.21)	(49.90)	(49.87)
Active in labor mkt (%)	92.03	95.65	99.83	94.74
	(27.01)	(20.40)	(4.181)	(22.35)
Employed (%)	87.66	94.23	98.95	92.92
	(32.84)	(23.33)	(10.20)	(25.67)
RQ	0.258	0.165	0.520	0.391
	(1.006)	(0.736)	(0.585)	(0.853)
Tenure	4.539	4.824	4.679	4.749
	(3.267)	(3.085)	(2.816)	(2.995)
Married (%)	65.73	70.36	65.68	68.23
	(46.99)	(45.09)	(47.28)	(46.25)
Monthly household income	3866.9	4220.8	4631.9	4500.1
	(2290.6)	(2253.4)	(2266.8)	(2425.8)
Observations	458	1058	572	551


Household specialization: Impact of first child birth




Using Callaway and Sant'Anna [2021] separately by group

(a) Paid work hours

(b) Unpaid housework hours







Household specialization: Changes in time use

◆ Back to mechanism

(a) Paid work hours

(b) Unpaid housework hours





Post-birth separation and female LFP




	Traditional	Unbalanced	Egalitarian	Counter-tradit.
Separate after birth (%)	21.18	17.75	16.73	15.93
Female LFP at base $t=-$ 1 (%)	89.18	99.81	99.65	96.39
Female LFP right after birth, $t=$ 1 (%)	67.83	86.74	93.33	83.82
Female LFP at school age, $t=5$ (%)	79.57	93.37	96.14	87.87

$$\mathbf{y}_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \mu_t + \delta D_{i,t} + \mathbf{u}_{i,t}$$

- $D_{i,t} = 1$ if i has already had the first child in period t
- Estimated through Callaway and Sant'Anna [2021] separately by couple type
- Assume: Treatment effect homogeneity with time relative to event
 - ► Not plausible in this context

Impact of second child birth on RQ






Female share changes after second child birth


◆ Back to mechanism


(a) Labor market work



Event-time (years)

(b) Housework





Coefficient as a percentage of the pre-birth mean



	Traditional	Unbalanced	Egalitarian	Counter-traditional
Baseline RQ	0.345	0.424	0.568	0.459
	(0.993)	(0.749)	(0.633)	(0.784)
ATT	-0.107	-0.0992	-0.175*	-0.243**
	(0.180)	(0.086)	(0.069)	(0.075)
Percentage	31.01	23.40	30.81	52.94
Post level	0.238	0.325	0.393	0.216
Observations	273	876	611	856

Controlling for observables



Education, labor force activity, employment, household income, marital status

	Traditional	Unbalanced	Egalitarian	Counter-traditional
Baseline RQ	0.345	0.424	0.568	0.459
	(0.993)	(0.749)	(0.633)	(0.784)
ATT	0.314	-0.0750	-0.862*	-0.546***
	(0.191)	(0.092)	(0.337)	(0.149)
Observations	273	876	611	856

Separately for men and women Classify by baseline housework split



	Traditional		Egalitarian	
	(1) Fathers	(2) Mothers	(3) Fathers	(4) Mothers
Baseline RQ	0.350	0.459	0.415	0.423
ATT	-0.0562 (0.116)	-0.239* (0.117)	-0.270*** (0.061)	-0.377*** (0.082)
Observations	499	524	1635	1782

Other potential mechanisms and post-birth outcomes

◆ Back to mechanism

Baseline breadwinner gender

See

Baseline household income quartile

See

Fathers taking paternity leave


See


Mothers return to work

See

Baseline breadwinner gender

◆ Back to other mechanisms







Baseline household income quartile



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Bottom	Second	Third	Top
ATT	-0.341*	-0.196**	-0.328***	-0.262***
	(0.147)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.070)
Baseline RQ	0.212	0.444	0.477	0.490
Observations	941	1198	1163	1146





References:

◆ Back

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