

Reproducible and Customizable Deployments with GNU Guix

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**The difficulty of keeping
software environments
under control.**

#1. Upgrades are hard.

Distribution Upgrade of all the files:



WARNING

Following the upgrade instructions found in the  [release notes](#) is the best way to ensure that your system upgrades from one major Debian release to another (e.g. from lenny to squeeze) without breakage!

These instructions will tell you to do a `dist-upgrade` (instead of `upgrade`) in the case of `apt-get` or `full-upgrade` (instead of `safe-upgrade` in the case of `aptitude`) at least once. So you would have to type something like

```
# aptitude full-upgrade
```

- 4.1. Preparing for the upgrade
 - 4.1.1. Back up any data or configuration information
 - 4.1.2. Inform users in advance
 - 4.1.3. Prepare for downtime on services
 - 4.1.4. Prepare for recovery
 - 4.1.5. Prepare a safe environment for the upgrade
- 4.2. Checking system status
 - 4.2.1. Review actions pending in package manager
 - 4.2.2. Disabling APT pinning
 - 4.2.3. Checking packages status
 - 4.2.4. The proposed-updates section
 - 4.2.5. Unofficial sources
- 4.3. Preparing sources for APT
 - 4.3.1. Adding APT Internet sources
 - 4.3.2. Adding APT sources for a local mirror
 - 4.3.3. Adding APT sources from optical media
- 4.4. Upgrading packages
 - 4.4.1. Recording the session
 - 4.4.2. Updating the package list
 - 4.4.3. Make sure you have sufficient space for the upgrade
 - 4.4.4. Minimal system upgrade
 - 4.4.5. Upgrading the system
- 4.5. Possible issues during upgrade
 - 4.5.1. Dist-upgrade fails with "Could not perform immediate configuration"
 - 4.5.2. Expected removals
 - 4.5.3. Conflicts or Pre-Depends loops
 - 4.5.4. File conflicts
 - 4.5.5. Configuration changes
 - 4.5.6. Change of session to console

#2. Stateful system
management is intractable.

\$DISTRO

\$DISTRO

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

↓ apt-get install foo

state 2_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 2_b

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

↓ apt-get install foo

state 2_a

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 3_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 2_b

↓ apt-get install foo

state 3_b

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

↓ apt-get install foo

state 2_a

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 3_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 2_b





↓ apt-get install foo

state 3_b

= ?

#3. It's worse than this.

Application-level package managers [[edit](#)]

- [Anaconda](#) - a package manager for Python
- [Assembly](#) - a partially [compiled](#) code library for use in [Common Language Infrastructure](#) (CLI) deployment, versioning and security.
- [Biicode](#)  - a file-focused dependency manager for C/C++ languages and platforms (PC, Raspberry Pi, Arduino).
- [Bower](#) - a package manager for the web.
- [UPT](#)  - a fork of Bower that aims to be a universal package manager, for multiple environments and unlimited kind of package
- [Cabal](#) - a programming library and package manager for [Haskell](#)
- [Cargo](#)  - a package manager for [Rust \(programming language\)](#)
- [CocoaPods](#) - Dependency Manager for [Objective-C](#) and [RubyMotion](#) projects
- [Composer](#) - Dependency Manager for [PHP](#)
- [CPAN](#) - a programming library and package manager for [Perl](#)
- [CRAN](#) - a programming library and package manager for [R](#)
- [CTAN](#) - a package manager for [TeX](#)
- [DUB](#)  - a package manager for [D](#)

As of **npm@2.6.1** , the **npm update** will only inspect top-level packages. Prior versions of **npm** would also recursively inspect all dependencies. To get the old behavior, use **npm --depth 9999 update** , but be warned that simultaneous asynchronous update of all packages, including **npm** itself and packages that **npm** depends on, often causes problems up to and including the uninstallation of **npm** itself.

To restore a missing **npm** , use the command:

```
curl -L https://npmjs.com/install.sh | sh
```

Giving up?

Giving up?

→ “app bundles” (Docker images)

*“Debian and other distributions
are going to be **that thing you
run docker on**, little more.”*

— Jos Poortvliet, ownCloud developer

 **tianon** Update to 7.0.12, 8.1.5, and 8.2.22 contributors  

50 lines (40 sloc) | 1.58 KB

```
1 FROM php:5.6-apache
2
3 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
4     bzip2 \
5     libcurl4-openssl-dev \
6     libfreetype6-dev \
7     libicu-dev \
8     libjpeg-dev \
9     libmcrypt-dev \
10    libpng12-dev \
11    libpq-dev \
12    libxml2-dev \
13    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
14
```

It's also that thing
you run *inside*
Docker!



ruby:latest

722 mb

Layers: 17

python:latest

689 mb

Layers: 13

golang:latest

725 mb

Layers: 14

ADD file:e5a3d20748c5d3dd5fa11542dfa4ef8b72a0bb78ce09f6da

125 mb

CMD "/bin/bash"

0 bytes

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl wget && rm -f

44 mb

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends bzip2 git mercurial openssh-client subversion pro

123 mb

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends

RUN apt-get update && apt



Füllgewicht: e 700g
Einsavage: 2 Stück
2 x 45 g = 90 g

Bei -18 °C mindestens halber
bis ganze Einfrierzeit

Over 30% of Official Images in Docker Hub Contain High Priority Security Vulnerabilities

[Docker Hub](#) is a central repository for Docker developers to pull and push container images. We performed a detailed study on Docker Hub images to understand how vulnerable they are to security threats. Surprisingly, we found that more than 30% of images in [official repositories](#) are highly susceptible to a variety of security attacks (e.g., Shellshock, Heartbleed, Poodle, etc.). For general images – images pushed by docker users, but not explicitly verified by any authority – this number jumps up to ~40% with a sampling error bound of 3%.





Functional package management.

$\text{gimp} = f(\text{gtk+}, \text{gcc}, \text{make}, \text{coreutils})$

where $f = ./\text{configure} \ \&\& \ \text{make} \ \&\& \ \text{make} \ \text{install}$


```
gimp = f(gtk+, gcc, make, coreutils)
gtk+ = g(glib, gcc, make, coreutils)
```

```
gimp = f(gtk+, gcc, make, coreutils)
gtk+ = g(glib, gcc, make, coreutils)
gcc = h(make, coreutils, gcc0)
...
```

```
gimp =  $f$ (gtk+, gcc, make, coreutils)  
gtk+ =  $g$ (glib, gcc, make, coreutils)  
gcc =  $h$ (make, coreutils, gcc0)
```


...

the complete DAG is captured

```
$ guix build hello
```

isolated build: chroot, separate name spaces, etc.

```
$ guix build hello  
/gnu/store/ h2g4sf72... -hello-2.10
```



hash of **all** the dependencies

```
$ guix build hello  
/gnu/store/h2g4sf72...-hello-2.10
```

```
$ guix gc --references /gnu/store/...-hello-2.10  
/gnu/store/...-glibc-2.22  
/gnu/store/...-gcc-4.9.3-lib  
/gnu/store/...-hello-2.10
```

```
$ guix build hello  
/gnu/store/h2g4sf72...-hello-2.10
```

```
$ guix gc --references /gnu/store/...-hello-2.10  
/gnu/store/...-glibc-2.22  
/gnu/store/...-gcc-4.9.3-lib  
/gnu/store/...-h
```

(nearly) bit-identical for everyone

```
$ guix package -i gcc-toolchain coreutils sed grep
```

```
...
```



demo

```
$ eval 'guix package --search-paths'
```

```
...
```

```
$ guix package --manifest=my-software.scm
```

```
...
```


Want to get started hacking
on GIMP?

Want to get started hacking on GIMP?

A simple matter of installing the deps, right?



```
$ guix environment --container gimp
```

```
...
```

```
$ guix environment --container gimp \  
    --ad-hoc git autoconf automake gdb
```

```
...
```

**Whole-system
deployment.**

```
(operating-system
  (host-name "pluto")
  (timezone "Europe/Paris")
  (locale "en_US.utf8")

  (bootloader (grub-configuration
    (device "/dev/sda"))))
```

```
(mapped-devices (list (mapped-device
  (source "/dev/sda3")
  (target "home")
  (type luks-device))
```

GuixSD: declarative OS config

```
(file-systems (cons* (file-system
  (device "root")
  (title 'label)
  (mount-point "/")
  (type "ext3"))
  (file-system
  (device "/dev/mapper/ home")
  (mount-point "/home")
  (type "ext3"))
```

Linux-libre

Linux-libre



initial RAM disk

Linux-libre



initial RAM disk

Guile

Linux-libre



initial RAM disk



PID 1: GNU Shepherd
services...

Guile

Linux-libre



initial RAM disk



PID 1: GNU Shepherd
services...

Guile

Guile

Linux-libre



initial RAM disk

Guile



PID 1: GNU Shepherd
services...

Guile



applications

Trustworthiness.

Debian's dirtiest secret:
Binary packages built by developers
are used in the archive

— Lucas Nussbaum, FOSDEM 2015

binary/source deployment

```
alice@foo$ guix package --install=emacs
```

The following package will be installed:

```
emacs-24.5 /gnu/store/...-emacs-24.5
```

The following files will be downloaded:

```
/gnu/store/...-emacs-24.5
```

```
/gnu/store/...-libxpm-3.5.10
```

```
/gnu/store/...-libxext-1.3.1
```

```
/gnu/store/...-libxaw-1.0.11
```

binary/source deployment

```
alice@foo$ guix package --install=emacs
```

The following package will be installed:

```
emacs-24.5 /gnu/store/...-emacs-24.5
```

The following files will be downloaded:

```
/gnu/store/...-libxext-1.3.1
```

```
/gnu/store/...-libxaw-1.0.11
```

The following derivations will be built:

```
/gnu/store/...-emacs-24.5.drv
```

```
/gnu/store/...-libxpm-3.5.10.drv
```



```
(define foo (package ...))
```

user

```
(define foo (package ...))
```

test



```
guix build foo  
/gnu/store/...-foo-1.0
```

user

```
(define foo (package ...))
```


user

test

```
guix build foo  
/gnu/store/...-foo-1.0
```

git push

git.sv.gnu.org



```
(define foo (package ...))
```

test

```
guix build foo  
/gnu/store/...-foo-1.0
```

git push

user

hydra.gnu.org
build farm

pull

git.sv.gnu.org

pull

```
(define foo (package ...))
```

test

```
guix build foo  
/gnu/store/...-foo-1.0
```

git push

user

get binary

hydra.gnu.org
build farm

pull

git.sv.gnu.org

pull

```
(define foo (package ...))
```

test


```
guix build foo  
/gnu/store/...-foo-1.0
```

git push

user

pull

git.sv.gnu.org



```
(define foo (package ...))
```

user

test


```
guix build foo  
/gnu/store/...-foo-1.0
```

no “maintainer
uploads”

no single
point of trust

```
git push
```

git.sv.gnu.org





```
(define emacs (package ...))    /gnu/store/...-emacs-24.5
```


towards greater user control

1. Bit-reproducible builds
2. No single binary provider
3. Tools for users to challenge binaries

towards greater user control

1. Bit-reproducible builds

- ▶ we have **isolated build environments!**
- ▶ ... but we need builds to be **deterministic**
- ▶ <http://reproducible-builds.org>

2. No single binary provider

3. Tools for users to challenge binaries

towards greater user control

1. Bit-reproducible builds

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2. No single binary provider

- ▶ guix publish
- ▶ P2P publishing over GNUnet? (GSoC 2015)

3. Tools for users to challenge binaries

towards greater user control

1. Bit-reproducible builds

- ▶ we have **isolated build environments!**
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- ▶ <http://reproducible-builds.org>

2. No single binary provider

- ▶ guix publish
- ▶ P2P publishing over GUNet? (GSoC 2015)

3. Tools for users to challenge binaries

```
$ guix challenge --substitute-urls="http://hydra.gnu.org ht  
/gnu/store/...-openssl-1.0.2d contents differ:  
  local hash: 0725122...  
  http://hydra.gnu.org/...-openssl-1.0.2d: 0725122...  
  http://guix.example.org/...-openssl-1.0.2d: 1zy4fma...  
/gnu/store/...-git-2.5.0 contents differ:  
  local hash: 00p3bmr...  
  http://hydra.gnu.org/...-git-2.5.0: 069nb85...  
  http://guix.example.org/...-git-2.5.0: 0mdqa9w...  
/gnu/store/...-pius-2.1.1 contents differ:  
  local hash: 0k4v3m9...  
  http://hydra.gnu.org/...-pius-2.1.1: 0k4v3m9...  
  http://guix.example.org/...-pius-2.1.1: 1cy25x1...
```

Status.

timeline

- ▶ Nov. 2012 — dubbed GNU
- ▶ Jan. 2013 — **0.1**
- ▶ ...
- ▶ Apr. 2014 — **0.6**, signed binaries, guix system
- ▶ July 2014 — **0.7**, **installable operating system**
- ▶ ...
- ▶ 29 Jan. 2015 — **0.8.1**, **ARMv7 port**
- ▶ ...
- ▶ 5 Nov. 2015 — **0.9.0**, new service framework, etc.
- ▶ Jan. 2016 — successful **fundraiser** for new **build farm**



status

- ▶ full-featured package manager
- ▶ 3,000+ packages, 4 platforms
- ▶ **Guix System Distribution^β**
- ▶ binaries at <http://hydra.gnu.org>
- ▶ tooling: auto-update, “linting”, etc.

- ▶ ≈ 25 contributors per month
- ▶ ... and lots of friendly people!
- ▶ ≈ 400 commits per month
- ▶ 200–500 new packages per release

your help needed!

- ▶ **install the distribution**
- ▶ **use it**, report bugs, add packages
- ▶ help with the **infrastructure** + admin
- ▶ **donate** hardware/money
- ▶ share your **ideas!**



GuixSD

`ludo@gnu.org`

`http://gnu.org/software/guix/`

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