

Controlling Software Environments with GNU Guix

Ludovic Courtès

Inria Bordeaux Sud-Ouest
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The difficulty of keeping software environments under control.

#1. Upgrades are hard.

Distribution Upgrade of all the files:



WARNING

Following the upgrade instructions found in the  [release notes](#) is the best way to ensure that your system upgrades from one major Debian release to another (e.g. from lenny to squeeze) without breakage!

These instructions will tell you to do a `dist-upgrade` (instead of `upgrade`) in the case of `apt-get` or `full-upgrade` (instead of `safe-upgrade` in the case of `aptitude`) at least once. So you would have to type something like

```
# aptitude full-upgrade
```

- 4.1.4. Prepare for recovery
 - 4.1.5. Prepare a safe environment for the upgrade
- 4.2. Checking system status
 - 4.2.1. Review actions pending in package manager
 - 4.2.2. Disabling APT pinning
 - 4.2.3. Checking packages status
 - 4.2.4. The proposed-updates section
 - 4.2.5. Unofficial sources
- 4.3. Preparing sources for APT
 - 4.3.1. Adding APT Internet sources
 - 4.3.2. Adding APT sources for a local mirror
 - 4.3.3. Adding APT sources from optical media
- 4.4. Upgrading packages
 - 4.4.1. Recording the session
 - 4.4.2. Updating the package list
 - 4.4.3. Make sure you have sufficient space for the upgrade
 - 4.4.4. Minimal system upgrade
 - 4.4.5. Upgrading the system
- 4.5. Possible issues during upgrade
 - 4.5.1. Dist-upgrade fails with “Could not perform immediate configuration”
 - 4.5.2. Expected removals
 - 4.5.3. Conflicts or Pre-Depends loops

#2. Stateful system management is intractable.

\$DISTRO

\$DISTRO

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

↓ apt-get install foo

state 2_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 2_b

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

↓ apt-get install foo

state 2_a

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 3_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 2_b

↓ apt-get install foo

state 3_b

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_a

↓ apt-get install foo

state 2_a

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 3_a

\$DISTRO

↓ apt-get update

state 1_b

↓ apt-get remove bar

state 2_b

↓ apt-get install foo

state 3_b

= ?

#3. Entropy keeps increasing.

Here is an example of loading a module on a Linux machine under bash.

```
% module load gcc/3.1.1
% which gcc
/usr/local/gcc/3.1.1/linux/bin/gcc
```

Now we'll switch to a different version of the module

```
% module switch gcc gcc/3.2.0
% which gcc
/usr/local/gcc/3.2.0/linux/bin/gcc
```

- [Anaconda](#) - a package manager for Python
- [Assembly](#) - a partially [compiled](#) code library for use in [Common Language Infrastructure](#) (CLI) deployment, versioning and security.
- [Biicode](#) [↗](#) - a file-focused dependency manager for C/C++ languages and platforms (PC, Raspberry Pi, Arduino).
- [Bower](#) - a package manager for the web.
- [UPT](#) [↗](#) - a fork of Bower that aims to be a universal package manager, for multiple environments and unlimited kind of package
- [Cabal](#) - a programming library and package manager for [Haskell](#)
- [Cargo](#) [↗](#) - a package manager for [Rust \(programming language\)](#)
- [CocoaPods](#) - Dependency Manager for [Objective-C](#) and [RubyMotion](#) projects
- [Composer](#) - Dependency Manager for [PHP](#)
- [CPAN](#) - a programming library and package manager for [Perl](#)
- [CRAN](#) - a programming library and package manager for [R](#)
- [CTAN](#) - a package manager for [TeX](#)
- [DUB](#) [↗](#) - a package manager for [D](#)

As of **npm@2.6.1** , the **npm update** will only inspect top-level packages. Prior versions of **npm** would also recursively inspect all dependencies. To get the old behavior, use **npm --depth 9999 update** , but be warned that simultaneous asynchronous update of all packages, including **npm** itself and packages that **npm** depends on, often causes problems up to and including the uninstallation of **npm** itself.

To restore a missing **npm** , use the command:

```
curl -L https://npmjs.com/install.sh | sh
```

```
#!/bin/bash
```

```
pip install "$1" &  
easy_install "$1" &  
brew install "$1" &  
npm install "$1" &  
yum install "$1" & dnf install "$1" &  
docker run "$1" &  
pkg install "$1" &  
apt-get install "$1" &  
sudo apt-get install "$1" &  
steamcmd +app_update "$1" validate &  
git clone https://github.com/"$1"/"$1" &  
cd "$1";./configure;make;make install &  
curl "$1" | bash &
```


Giving up?

Giving up?

→ “app bundles” (Docker images & co.)

*“Debian and other distributions are going to be
that thing you run docker on, little more.”*

— Jos Poortvliet, ownCloud developer

 **tianon** Update to 7.0.12, 8.1.5, and 8.2.2

2 contributors  

50 lines (40 sloc) | 1.58 KB

It's also that thing
you run *inside*
Docker!

```
1 FROM php:5.6-apache
2
3 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
4     bzip2 \
5     libcurl4-openssl-dev \
6     libfreetype6-dev \
7     libicu-dev \
8     libjpeg-dev \
9     libmcrypt-dev \
10    libpng12-dev \
11    libpq-dev \
12    libxml2-dev \
13    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
```

[ruby:latest](#)

722 mb

Layers: 17

[python:latest](#)

689 mb

Layers: 13

[golang:latest](#)

725 mb

Layers: 14

[java:latest](#)

642 mb

Layers: 14

ADD file:e5a3d20748c5d3dd5fa11542dfa4ef8b72a0bb78ce09f6dae30eff5d045c67aa in /
125 mb

CMD "/bin/bash"
0 bytes

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl wget && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
44 mb

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends bzip2 git mercurial openssh-client subversion procps && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
123 mb

RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends

RUN apt-get update && apt-

RUN apt-get update && apt-



PIZZA ST
Tiefgefroren

Nettogewicht e 700g
je Thunfisch
= 90g
je Thunfisch

Over 30% of Official Images in Docker Hub Contain High Priority Security Vulnerabilities

Docker Hub is a central repository for Docker developers to pull and push container images. We performed a detailed study on Docker Hub images to understand how vulnerable they are to security threats. Surprisingly, we found that more than 30% of images in **official repositories** are highly susceptible to a variety of security attacks (e.g., Shellshock, Heartbleed, Poodle, etc.). For general images – images pushed by docker users, but not explicitly verified by any authority – this number jumps up to ~40% with a sampling error bound of 3%.



October 20, 2016

Container App 'Singularity' Eases Scientific Computing

Tiffany Trader




HPC container platform Singularity is just six months out from its 1.0 release but already is making inroads across the HPC research landscape. It's in use at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), where Singularity founder Gregory Kurtzer has worked in the High Performance Computing Services (HPCS) group for 16 years, and it's going into other leading HPC centers, including the Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC), the San Diego Supercomputing Center (SDSC) and many more sites, large and small.

TECHNOLOGY LAB —

Adios apt and yum? Ubuntu's snap apps are coming to distros everywhere

More secure replacement for debs coming to Fedora, Arch, Debian, and more.

JON BRODKIN - 6/14/2016, 7:00 PM



THE FUTURE OF APPLICATION DISTRIBUTION

The days of chasing multiple Linux distributions are over. Standalone apps for Linux are here!

[FIND OUT HOW](#)

“app bundles” are headed wrong

- ▶ difficulty to **compose** software packages
- ▶ wrong **abstraction level**: image vs. package
- ▶ **hardly reproducible**: we have the bits, not the source
- ▶ makes it hard to **customize & experiment**



A conceptual image featuring two dark silhouettes of hands reaching from the left and right sides of the frame. The hands are positioned to hold a large, three-dimensional word "HOPE" in the center. The background is a bright, hazy sky with soft clouds, suggesting a sunrise or sunset. A subtle rainbow is visible in the lower-left corner. The overall mood is one of optimism and hope.

HOPE

Make packaging great again!



Guix

1. transactional package manager
2. software environment manager
3. APIs & tools to customize environments
4. packaging tools

```
$ guix package -i gcc-toolchain coreutils sed grep
```

```
...
```

```
$ eval 'guix package --search-paths'
```

```
...
```


```
$ guix package --manifest=my-software.scm
```

```
...
```


Want to get started hacking on
hwloc?

Want to get started hacking on hwloc?

A simple matter of installing the deps, right?



```
$ guix environment --container hwloc
```

```
...
```


```
$ guix environment --container hwloc \  
    --ad-hoc git autoconf automake gdb
```

```
...
```

```
$ guix build hello
```

isolated build: chroot, separate name spaces, etc.

```
$ guix build hello  
/gnu/store/ h2g4sf72... -hwloc-1.11.2
```



hash of **all** the dependencies

```
$ guix build hello  
/gnu/store/h2g4sf72... -hwloc-1.11.2
```

```
$ guix gc --references /gnu/store/...-hwloc-1.11.2  
/gnu/store/...-glibc-2.24  
/gnu/store/...-gcc-4.9.3-lib  
/gnu/store/...-hwloc-1.11.2
```

```
$ guix build hello  
/gnu/store/h2g4sf72... -hwloc-1.11.2
```

```
$ guix gc --references /gnu/store/...-hwloc-1.11.2  
/gnu/store/...-glibc-2.24  
/gnu/store/...-gcc-4.9.3-lib  
/gnu/store/...-hwloc-1.11.2
```

(nearly) bit-identical for everyone

Can we go
beyond mere reproducibility
and support **experimentation?**

Reproducible and User-Controlled Software Environments in HPC with Guix

Ludovic Courtès¹ and Ricardo Wurmus²

¹ Inria, Bordeaux, France

² Max Delbrück Center for Molecular Medicine, Berlin, Germany

Abstract. Support teams of high-performance computing (HPC) systems often find themselves between a rock and a hard place: on one hand, they understandably administrate these large systems in a conservative way, but on the other hand, they try to satisfy their users by deploying up-to-date tool chains as well as libraries and scientific software. HPC system users often have no guarantee that they will be able to reproduce results at a later point in time, even on the same system—software may have been upgraded, removed, or recompiled under their feet, and they have little hope of being able to reproduce the same software environment elsewhere. We present GNU Guix and the functional package management paradigm and show how it can improve reproducibility and sharing among researchers with representative use cases.

<https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01161771/en>

Creating package variants at the
command line

```
$ guix build hwloc \  
  --with-source=./hwloc-42.0rc1.tar.gz  
...
```

```
$ guix build hwloc \  
  --with-source=./hwloc-42.0rc1.tar.gz
```

...

```
$ guix package -i mumps \  
  --with-input=scotch=pt-scotch
```

...

Your personal packages or variants
in `GUIX_PACKAGE_PATH`!

```
(timezone "Europe/Paris")  
(locale "en_US.utf8")
```

```
(bootloader (grub-configuration  
  (device "/dev/sda")))
```

```
(mapped-devices (list (mapped-device  
  (source "/dev/sda3")
```

GuixSD: declarative OS config

```
(file-systems (cons* (file-system  
  (device "root")  
  (title "label")  
  (mount-point "/")  
  (type "ext3"))
```

```
(file-system  
  (device "/dev/mapper/home")  
  (mount-point "/home")
```

Status.

- ▶ started in 2012
- ▶ **4,400+ packages**, all free software
- ▶ **4 architectures**:
x86_64, i686, ARMv7, mips64el
- ▶ binaries at <https://hydra.gnu.org>
- ▶ 0.11.0 released in August 2016

cluster deployments & usage

- ▶ **Max Delbrück Center** (DE): 250-node cluster + workstations
- ▶ **Utrecht Bioinformatics Center** (NL): 68-node cluster (1,000+ cores)
- ▶ **GeneNetwork**, “framework for web-based genetics”

30 Day Summary

Oct 4 2016 — Nov 3 2016

630 [Commits](#)

41 [Contributors](#)

*including 5 new
contributors*

12 Month Summary

Nov 3 2015 — Nov 3 2016


6490 [Commits](#)

*Up + 1434 (28%) from
previous 12 months*

106 [Contributors](#)

*Up + 53 (100%) from
previous 12 months*

Contributors per Month



Wrap-up.

Summary

- ▶ Guix supports **reproducible software environments**
- ▶ ... can be extended with **personal packages**
- ▶ ... allows for **experimentation** through customization
- ▶ ... is entirely **programmable**



`ludo@gnu.org`

`https://gnu.org/software/guix/`

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