

# IMT4116 - Mandatory Assignment 2

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## 1 Advanced Static Analysis

### 1.1 Find Function

- How many times is the function fopen called?

**Answer:** We locate the fopen function in IDA by looking at the 'Names' window. Highlighting the unique name IDA has given the function we can press 'x' to bring up the 'Xref' window for the function. Here we can see that the 'fopen' function is called 7 times in total, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: IDA Result: xref to fopen

- Go to the first (lowest address) fopen in the list? State the address. (The next 4 questions are related to this specific instance of fopen)

**Answer:** We find and go to the lowest address of 'fopen' by double clicking on the upmost 'fopen' in the list seen in Figure 1. The lowest (first) address for 'fopen' is 00403149 as seen in Figure 2.



Figure 2: IDA Result: address of first fopen call

- What is a prologue in general and specific for this instance of call fopen?

**Answer:** A prologue in general is the preparation of the stack and registers for transfer of control to a function. Before a function is called the values that are going to be used by the function are pushed on

the stack so that they are ready to be used. Often these values are results from previous operations. The prologue then pushes the current base pointer (ebp) on to the stack. This way it can be stored for later and used to return to the correct address in the code that the function was called from. Next the value of the base pointer is assigned to the stack pointer (esp) to have the base pointer pointing at the top of the stack, which is where the next execution of the code takes place. Then, the base pointer might be moved down (in x86) to make room for the local variables that are going to be used by the function.

For the instance of the first fopen call at address 00403149 we can see that the offset 'aw' is pushed on the stack before address, resulting from 'ebp' + a local variable, is loaded into 'eax'. 'eax' is then pushed on the stack before the function call to 'fopen' (see Figure 3).

<pre> • .text:00403131 • .text:00403137 • .text:00403138 • .text:0040313D • .text:00403142 • .text:00403148 • .text:00403149 • .text:0040314E </pre>	<pre> lea     eax, [ebp+var_AD4] push    eax call    sprintf push    offset aAw      ; "aw" lea     eax, [ebp+var_AD4] push    eax call    fopen add     esp, 18h </pre>
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Figure 3: IDA Result: prologue of first fopen call

If we know that the syntax for fopen is: FILE \*fopen(const char \*filename, const char \*mode), we can deduce (remembering that the last value pushed on the stack is the first read) that the filename is stored at the address location [ebp+var\_AD4], and that the access mode that is requested is 'aw', where 'a' appends text to the end of an existing file and 'w' opens an empty i.e. new file for writing. In short, a file is created if it does not already exist and appended to if it does.

Looking at the assembly code before 'fopen', we can see that the 'GetSystemDirectoryA' function and 'sprintf' are called. The result of the first function returns the length of the string (the system directory path) that is copied to a buffer. The second function formats and stores characters and values to a buffer. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the value at ebp+var\_AD4 equates to full path of the 'keylog.txt' file that the malware wants to create. The prologue for this instance of 'fopen' pushes these two variables on the stack.

- What is an epilogue in general and specific for this instance of call fopen?

**Answer:** In general, the epilogue restores the stack and registers to the state before the function call so that we can return to the correct place in the previous code. It starts by cleaning up the stack by removing the added values used by the function, usually by adding some value to 'esp' i.e. 'esp+4'. Effectively freeing up the space. Then it sets the value of 'esp' to the value of 'ebp', before it pops 'ebp' to return to the correct place on the stack i.e. the value it had before the prologue. It then gets rid of the current stack frame and puts the stack frame of the caller back into effect. Lastly, it returns to the calling function by popping the value that is on top of the stack.

In our instance we can see in Figure 3 that the clean up is done after the function call by adding 18 hex *esp* i.e. moving the stack pointer.

- What calling convention is used here? Explain how you found your answer.

**Answer:** Looking at the epilogue in Figure 3 we see that the clean up is done outside of the function i.e. the caller is the one who cleans up the stack. The calling convention that does that is the C declaration called CDECL. We can double check this as is stated when we enter on 'fopen' function in the function list.

- Explain the purpose of the 4 next assembly instructions, after "call fopen"?

**Answer:** Looking at Figure 4:

- The *add* instruction is used to clean up the stack after the function call.

- The *mov* instruction moves the value stored in *eax* to *ebx*. *eax* is often used to store the return value from functions. In the case of *fopen*, the return value is the pointer to the open file (given no errors).
- The *or* instruction executes a bitwise or operation on *ebx* with itself. Or'ing a value with itself just returns the value. This is way to check if the value is 0.
- The *jz* instruction checks the zero flag (ZF) and if it is set (1), jumps to the location at address 004031CD. In this case that would only happen if the result of *fopen* was zero, due to the previous or operation. What this means is that we continue to execute the next instruction below address 00403155 (see Figure 4) unless we have an error with opening the file.

```

* .text:00403149
* .text:0040314E
* .text:00403151
* .text:00403153
* .text:00403155
      call    fopen
      add     esp, 18h
      mov     ebx, eax
      or      ebx, ebx
      jz      short loc_4031CD

```

Figure 4: IDA Result: 4 next assembly instructions

## 1.2 Opcode Knowledge

Explain the single instructions found at the following addresses. You do not have to find the actual value of arguments used, e.g. if *eax* is involved, it is enough to state that “the value of *eax*...”.

- 403109: Moves the value of *eax* into the memory location pointed to by *[ebp+var\_AD8]*.
- 403142: Loads the effective address from *[ebp+var\_4AD]* into *eax*, i.e. the value resulting from the addition is loaded as an address into *eax*.
- 403231: The value of *eax* is or'ed with FFFFFFFFh. Possibly to mask the value.
- 403270: Pushes the dword stored in the data segment (ds) on the stack. This is a global variable.
- 403258: Adds the hex-value C to the *esp* register. Seems to be a clean up after a function call.
- 4032FD: The test instructions runs a bitwise AND operation on the 16-bit value stored in the *di* register and the hex-value 8000 (might be to test for signed value/non-negative). If the values match i.e. returns 1 the ZF is set to 0, while it is set to 1 if there is no match. Test also modifies the OF, CF, SF, and PF flags, which can be used for tests, however ZF is most relevant to the next line in the code as it uses the *jz* instruction.
- 403342: Compares the value stored in *eax* with the hex-value 42.
- 403345: The *jle* instruction is a conditional jump following a test. If the result of the test of the destination operand is less than or equal to the source operand it will jump to *loc\_40335C* address.

## 1.3 Key Logging

- At what addresses are keys examined?

**Answer:** Looking at the functions in the ‘Name window’ we can identify 4 that concerns keys: *GetKeyState*, *GetAsyncKeyState*, *MapVirtualKey*, and *keybd\_event*. However, looking at the code it is evident that the examination of keys are done by *GetKeyState*, *GetAsyncKeyState*:

- *GetKeyState*: 4032DB, 403306, 403332
- *GetAsyncKeyState*: 4032F3

- What keys are examined?

**Answer:** *GetAsyncKeyState* checks if a key is down or up, and if it has been pressed since the last iteration. The iteration goes through 92 keys (5Ch). *GetKeyState* checks for caps lock and shift.

- Goto loc: 403579. The conditional jump at 403580 defines two loops.
  - What is the purpose of ebp+var\_4?  
**Answer:** ebp+var\_4 is a counter for the loop. If the value is less than 5Ch (92) the program jumps to loc\_4032D9.
  - What is the purpose of the short loop?  
**Answer:** The short loop registers the key that are pressed by polling the key defined by ebp+var\_4, as well as checking the for caps lock, shift, and windows. It does also have code to write to the 'keylog.txt' file (becomes evident by entering the function calls).
  - What is the purpose of the longer loop?  
**Answer:** The longer loop checks if the window is changed and writes the change to the 'keylog.txt' file. This happens when the short loop is done. It sleeps a short period before polling for keys again.
  - How often are keys polled?  
**Answer:** We can see that the keys are polled every 8 milliseconds. This is given in 40320D where the PUSH instruction is used put 8 on the stack before the 'sleep' function is called.

## 1.4 Mutex

We suspect this sample to use mutex (also known as mutant)

- Why do we suspect this?  
**Answer:** The functions window shows that there is a CreateMutexA function loaded. By using xref to see where it is used we can identify that it is used once in the malicious code in address 4014C6.
- What is the most likely purpose of using mutex/mutant?  
**Answer:** The mutex is likely used to avoid infecting the system twice. This is a common method used by malware authors.
- What is the mutex/mutant for this sample?  
**Answer:** Looking in address 4014BD, we can see that the string 'krnel' is pushed on the stack as an argument for the mutex function. This is likely the name it uses.
- Identify the address where the mutex is created.  
**Answer:** Assuming created refers to where the call function for CreateMutexA is called: 4014C6. Otherwise the name can be found hardcoded in memory in 412074.
- How is the mutex used?  
**Answer:** The malicious code tries to create the mutex. Checks error code. If the error return value is '0B7h' (ERROR\_ALREADY\_EXISTS) it exits the process. Otherwise it continues to import libraries before installing the malware. The mutex checks whether the computer is already infected, and if it is it exits the process to not infect the computer twice.

## 2 Advanced Dynamic Analysis

In this section we use OllyDbg to answer the following questions.

- What is the input and output of the function call to 402B81, done twice early in the execution?

**Answer:** The function takes two inputs arguments. The first is a memory address pointing to scrambled ASCII text. The second is an offset used in the operation to de-scramble the ASCII text at the memory location. The output from the functions are registry paths resulting from the de-scrambled ASCII text in the input.

```

00401280 | . 6A 21 | PUSH 21
00401282 | . 68 98254100 | PUSH 00412598
00401287 | . E8 F5180000 | CALL 00402B81
0040129C | . 6A 21 | PUSH 21
0040129E | . 68 CA254100 | PUSH 004125CA
00401293 | . E8 E9180000 | CALL 00402B81

```

Figure 5: OllyDbg result: function call to 402B81

*Input function 1*

- arg1: address 412598 (ASCII data is stored here but looks scrambled)
- arg2: 21 (offset value used to de-scramble ASCII values)

*Output function 1*

- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

*Input function 2*

- arg1: address 4125CA (ASCII data is stored here but looks scrambled)
- arg2: 21 (offset value used to de-scramble ASCII values)

*Output function 2*

- SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

- Show all filenames that are used in CopyFileA at 401452. Confirm the creation on your filesystem also.

**Answer:** The function is inside a loop. During the loop an existing filename and new filename is used by the CopyFileA function. The filenames that occur during the loop is listed below. After executing the call we validate that the file is created in C:\Windows\system32\kazaabackupfiles\ by checking the folder as the loop progresses as seen in Figure 6.

*Existing filename:* C:\Users\rev\_eng\Desktop\assignemnet2.exe.exe

*New filename:* zoneallarm\_pro\_crack.exe, AVP\_Crack.exe, Porn.exe, Norton\_Anti-Virus\_2002\_Crack.exe, GeneralsNo-CD\_Crack.exe, Renegade\_No-CD\_Crack.exe, Red\_Faction\_2\_No-CD\_Crack.exe, Postal\_2\_Crack.exe, FlashFXP\_Crack.exe, DreamweaverMX\_Crack.exe, PlanetSide.exe, Winamp\_installer.exe, Sitebot.exe, EDU\_Hack.exe,

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
AVP_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
DreamweaverMX_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
EDU_Hack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
FlashFXP_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Generals_No-CD_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Norton_Anti-Virus_2002_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
PlanetSide	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Porn	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Postal_2_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Red_Faction_2_No-CD_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Renegade_No-CD_Crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Sitebot	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
Winamp_Installer	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB
zoneallarm_pro_crack	1/8/2014 9:52 PM	Application	44 KB

Figure 6: OllyDbg result: Files created by CopyFileA

- Show what happens to the filename in 40134D if it already exists.

**Answer:** Normally, if it does not exist, it jumps to the PUSH instruction in 40133D and creates ‘wuamqr.exe’. If it exists, it does not jump and enter the code section from the CALL function in 4012F8 to the PUSH instruction in 40133D. In this section the filename is scrambled to a random sequence of letters. We simply changed the value of EAX used in the jump test after the function call in 40134D to simulate that the file already existed. This resulted in the filename: ‘obzqjnk.exe’ as seen in Figure 7. We verified that the file was created in the system32 directory.

004012D8	>	E8 47690000	CALL <JMP.&KERNEL32.GetTickCount>	<b>C</b> KERNEL32.GetTickCount
004012DD	•	50	PUSH EAX	
004012DE	•	E8 1D6C0000	CALL <JMP.&CRTDLL.srand>	Jump to CRTDLL.srand
004012E3	•	59	POP ECX	
004012E4	•	31F6	XOR ESI,ESI	
004012E6	•	EB 1C	JMP SHORT 00401304	
004012E8	>	E8 EF6B0000	CALL <JMP.&CRTDLL.rand>	Jump to CRTDLL.rand
004012ED	•	89 1A000000	MOV ECX,1A	
004012F2	•	99	CDQ	
004012F3	•	F7F9	IDIV ECX	
004012F5	•	9D07	MOV EDI,EDX	
004012F7	•	89C7 61	MOV EDI,61	
004012FA	•	89FA	MOV EDX,EDI	
004012FC	•	8B1435 38204	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI+412038],DL	
00401303	•	46	INC ESI	
00401304	>	8D0D 3820410	LEA ECX,[412038]	ASCII "obzqjnk.exe"
0040130A	•	83C8 FF	OR EAX,FFFFFFFF	
0040130D	>	40	INC EAX	
0040130E	•	80BC01 00	CMF BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+ECX],0	
00401312	•	75 F9	JNE SHORT 0040130D	
00401314	•	89C7	MOV EDI,EAX	
00401316	•	83E8 04	SUB EDI,4	
00401318	•	39FE	CMPL ESI,EDI	
0040131B	•	72 CB	JB SHORT 004012E8	
0040131D	•	68 38204100	PUSH 00412038	ASCII "obzqjnk.exe"
00401322	•	8B85 F8DFFFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.130]	
00401328	•	50	PUSH EAX	
00401329	•	68 0D3A4100	PUSH 00413A0D	ASCII "%s%s"
0040132E	•	8D85 60F9FFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.424]	
00401334	•	50	PUSH EAX	
00401335	•	E8 BA6B0000	CALL <JMP.&CRTDLL.sprintf>	Jump to CRTDLL.sprintf
0040133A	•	83C4 10	ADD ESP,10	
0040133D	•	6A 00	PUSH 0	
0040133E	•	8D85 60F9FFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.424]	
00401345	•	50	PUSH EAX	NewFileName = "C:\Windows\system32\obzqjnk.exe"
00401346	•	8D85 FCFEFFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.65]	
0040134C	•	50	PUSH EAX	ExistingFileName => OFFSET LOCAL.65
0040134D	•	E8 0E690000	CALL <JMP.&KERNEL32.CopyFileA>	Jump to kernel32.CopyFileA
00401352	•	09C0	OR EAX,EAX	

Figure 7: OllyDbg result: Filename modification in 40134D

- Show what directory is created in 4013A5 by CreateDirectoryA

**Answer:** The created directory is: C:\Windows\system32\kazaabackupfiles\ as seen in Figure 8. We verified it by checking the system32 directory before and after running the function.

00401369	•	8D85 F8DFFFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.130]	
0040136F	•	50	PUSH EAX	
00401370	•	68 F8394100	PUSH 004139F8	ASCII "%s\kazaabackupfiles\"
00401376	•	8D85 5CF8FFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.489]	
0040137B	•	50	PUSH EAX	
0040137C	•	E8 736B0000	CALL <JMP.&CRTDLL.sprintf>	Jump to CRTDLL.sprintf
00401381	•	4085 5CF8FFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.489]	
00401387	•	50	PUSH EAX	
00401388	•	68 EE394100	PUSH 004139EE	ASCII "012345;%s"
0040138D	•	8D85 54F7FFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.555]	
00401393	•	50	PUSH EAX	
00401394	•	E8 5B6B0000	CALL <JMP.&CRTDLL.sprintf>	Jump to CRTDLL.sprintf
00401399	•	83C4 10	ADD ESP,10	
0040139C	•	6A 00	PUSH 0	pSecurity = NULL
0040139E	•	8D85 5CF8FFF	LEA EAX,[LOCAL.489]	PathName = "C:\Windows\system32\kazaabackupfiles\"
004013A4	•	50	PUSH EAX	<b>K</b> ERNEL32.CreateDirectoryA
004013A5	•	E8 CE690000	CALL <JMP.&KERNEL32.CreateDirectoryA>	

Figure 8: OllyDbg result: Directory created in 4013A5

- How do we get the debugger to move past ExitProcess in 40147D and get to 401482?

**Answer:** To get past the ‘ExitProcess’ function we can simply replace it by ‘NOP’ instructions as seen in Figure 9. This way the code that is replaced is not executed and the ‘NOP’ instructions does not affect the code in a negative way (in terms of debugging).

00401476	•	E8 A9650000	CALL <JMP.&SHELL32.ShellExecuteA>	<b>L</b> SHELL32.ShellExecuteA
0040147B	•	6A 00	PUSH 0	ExitCode = 0
0040147D	•	90	NOP	
0040147E	•	90	NOP	
0040147F	•	90	NOP	
00401480	•	90	NOP	
00401481	•	90	NOP	
00401482	>	8D8D FCFEFFF	LEA ECX,[LOCAL.65]	
00401488	•	83C8 FF	OR EAX,FFFFFFFF	

Figure 9: OllyDbg result: Nop-sled in 40147D