Automatic Verification of Systems Final Project - Symbolic Model Checker

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1 Abstract

2 Introduction

Throughout the course we studied LTL and CTL model checking and algorithms used to solve this problem. Though we thoroughly learned the theoretical approach to the model checking problem and the algorithms used to solve them, we did not go into detail regarding the verification tools available to solve these problems. One verification tool that we came across during the course was the SMV model checker and its expansion to LTL formulae found in [2]. Although the SMV model checker is a very useful tool for model checking, it is written in a pseudo-code language that is not very common to most programmer.

In our project we created a new model checker in python that allows verification of both temporal logics LTL and CTL. The model checker we implemented is symbolic in order to be efficient and uses the algorithms shown in class for model checking. Our intention was to create a model checker that is both efficient and easy to use and expand. We have developed the relevant modules to simply translate a logical model M into a symbolic representation and use this symbolic representation in order validate LTL and CTL formulae. We tested our model checker on the snooping cache coherence protocol as found in [3].

In this paper we describe the relevant algorithms and theory needed to understand the implementation of our model checker. We also describe the main modules of the model checker and the results it achieved on the cache coherence model.

3 CTL and LTL Model Checking

3.1 CTL*, LTL and CTL

Let us begin by describing the temporal logic CTL*, and from there continue to describe both Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic(LTL). CTL* contains two types of formulae: state formulae which hold for specific states and path formulae which hold along a specific path. State formulae are given by the following rules [2]:

- If $p \in AP$ (Atomic propositions) then p is a state formula.
- If f, g are state formulae then $\neg f, f \lor g$ are state formulae.
- If f is a path formula, then Ef ("for some computation path") is a state formula.

Path formulae are defined by the following rules:

- If f is a state formula, it is also a path formula.
- If f, g are path formulae then $\neg f, f \lor g, Xf$ and fUg are also path formulae.
- If f is a path formula, then Ef ("for some computation path") is a state formula.

Let M = (S, R, L) be a Kripke structure where S is the set of states, R is the transition relation (we assume there is a total transition relation) and L be the labeling function.

Definition 1 A path in Kripke structure M is an infinite sequence of states $\pi = s_0, s_1, \ldots$ such that for every $i \geq 0$, $(s_i, s_{i+1}) \in R$.

The notation $M, s \models f$ is used to state that f holds for state s in the Kripke structure M, and similarly for $M, \pi \models f$ for path π in M.

Definition 2 Let f_1, f_2 be state formulae and g_1, g_2 path formulae. The relation \models is defined recursively as follows:

$$M, s \models p \iff p \in L(s)$$
 (1)

$$M, s \models \neg f_1 \iff M, s \not\models f_1$$
 (2)

$$M, s \models f_1 \lor f_2 \iff M, s \models f_1 or M, s \models f_2$$
 (3)

$$M, s \models Eg_1 \iff there \ is \ a \ path \ \pi \ starting \ at \ s \ such \ that \ M, \pi \models g_1$$
 (4)

$$M, \pi \models f_1 \iff s \text{ is the first state of } \pi \text{ and } M, s \models f_1$$
 (5)

$$M, \pi \models \neg g_1 \iff M, \pi \not\models g_1 \tag{6}$$

$$M, \pi \models g_1 \lor g_2 \iff M, \pi \models g_1 \text{ or } M, \pi \models g_2$$
 (7)

$$M, \pi \models Xg_1 \iff M, \pi^1 \models g_1$$
 (8)

$$M, \pi \models g_1 U g_2 \iff \exists k \ge 0 \text{ s.t. } M, \pi^k \models g_2 \text{ and } \forall 0 \le j \le k M, \pi^j \models g_1$$
 (9)

Definition 3 CTL is the subset of CTL^* obtained by specifying the path formulae using the following rules [2]:

ullet If f, g are state formulae, then Xf and fUg are path formulae.

• If f is a path formulae, then so is $\neg f$.

From the definition we can see that CTL is a subset of CTL* that only permits branching operators. Therefore, in this new logic, all linear-time operators can only appear if they are immediately preceded by path quantifiers.

Definition 4 LTL is a subset of CTL restricted to all formulae of the form Af where f is a path formula in which the only state sub-formulae are atomic propositions[2]. More precisely, path formulae here are defined in the following recursive manner:

- An atomic proposition.
- If f, g are path formulae, then $\neg f$, $f \lor g$, Xf and fUg are also path formulae.

3.2 Symbolic CTL Model Checking

Let us first begin by describing the usage of reduced, ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs). The names BDD (binary decision diagrams) and ROBDDs will be used iterchangealy throughout the paper. BDDs are a canonical form representation of boolean formulas[1].

BDDs are very similar to binary decision trees and hold the following properties:

- The BDDs are directed acyclic graphs (DAG) rather than tree trees.
- There is a total order on the occurrence of the variables in the BDD when transversing the diagram from the root to the leaf.
- Each subgraph represents a unique boolean formula.
- The BDD representation of a boolean formula is unique given a certain variable ordering.

BDDs are very efficient in boolean function representation and can be easily manipulated and thus can be very useful in model checking.

The objective of CTL model checking is to find the set of states in a given model for which a CTL formula holds. Symbolic CTL model checking uses BDDs in order to represent the states int he model and its transitions. That is, the transition relation in the Kripke structure is given by a boolean formula R(v, v') representing if there is a relation from the set of state v to the set of states v'. For each subformula, the algorithm computes the states satisfying it in a bottom up manner and returns a BDD that represents the relevant states.

3.3 LTL Model Checking Using Tableaus

As taught in class, and also shown in [2], we can use tableaus in order to perform LTL model checking. In this section we present the construction of the tableau and how to use in order to create the product model. We also explain how the product model can be used in order to find every path that satisfies f in formula Ef given model M.

Let us begin by describing the tableau. Let AP be the set of atomic propositions in formula f. We define the set of elementary formulae in the following inductive manner:

- $el(p) = \{p\} \text{ if } p \in AP$
- $el(\neg g) = el(g)$
- $el(g \lor h) = el(g) \cup el(h)$
- $el(\mathbf{X}g) = {\mathbf{X}g} \cup el(g)$
- $el(gUh) = \{X(gUh)\} \cup el(g) \cup el(h)$

From the elementary formulae defined above, we create the states of the tableau by looking at the states $2^{el(f)}$. The labeling function for the tableau gives each state the atomic propositions found in the elementary formulae that makes up the state.

We also define the set sat(g) for each subformula g to be the set of states that satisfy g. The set is defined in the following inductive manner:

- $sat(g) = \{ \sigma \mid g \in \sigma \}$ where $g \in el(f)$
- $sat(\neg q) = \{ \sigma \mid \sigma \not\in sat(q) \}$
- $sat(q \lor h) = sat(q) \cup sat(h)$
- $sat(gUh) = sat(h) \cup (sat(g) \cap sat(X(gUh)))$

The transition relation of the tableau is given by the following formula:

$$R_T(\sigma, \sigma') = \bigwedge_{Xg \in el(g)} \sigma \in sat(Xg) \iff \sigma' \in sat(g)$$

The transition relation above does not guarantee that the eventually property holds; for example in the case of the subformula aUb - the transition relation leading to a path where a always holds and b is never reached is also valid.

In order to overcome this problem we need to add more conditions on the paths accepted by the tableau. We do this by adding the fairness constraint matching the eventually property described above. That is, for every subformula qUh, we add the fairness constraint

$$\{sat(\neg(gUh) \lor h \mid gUhinf\}$$

This concludes the construction of the tableau; we now move to describing the product model created from the tableau above, T and the original model M. The product is defined as the following Kripke structure:

- $S = \{(\sigma, \sigma') \mid \sigma \in S_T, \sigma' \in S_M \text{ and } L_M(\sigma') \cap AP = L_T(\sigma)\}$
- $R((\sigma, \sigma'), (\tau, \tau'))$ iff $R_T(\sigma, \tau)$ and $R_M(\sigma', \tau')$
- $L((\sigma, \sigma')) = L_T(\sigma)$

Finally, all that is left to do is apply CTL model checking to the product to find the set of states that satisfy EGtrue under the fairness constraints described above.

4 Implementation

In our project we implemented a symbolic CTL and LTL model cheker in python using python. Throughout our entire implementation we used the python module **pyeda** which allows easy use of BDDs, as explained in the previous section. In the following sections we present the main modules in our implementation and how they are used to create the model checker.

4.1 Logical model parsing

The first module we implemented is the **SymbolicModel** class; a python class used in order to represent a the symbolic version of a given logical model. The class' conststructor receives an integer specifying the number of states in the model, and uses that in order to create the variables v_1, \ldots, v_n representing the states in the states. It also has two interface methods, add_atomic , $add_relation$ used to specify the atomic propositions that hold in each state and the transition relation between the states in the model. As explained in the previous sections, both the labeling and the transition relation of the model are also given as BDDs. The SymbolicModel is used to represent the model that we wish to check, and thus this class is used throught the entire project.

4.2 Tableau construction

The next module we implemented is a module in charge of creating the tableau for a given LTL formual. In order to create this module we began by implementing a formula parser in charge of parsing the given formula for later uses such as parsing the elementary formulae for the tableau or iterating over subformulae.

The next step of implementing the tableau was to create a list of all elementary formulae. This was done using the **get_elementary_formulas** method we implemented. This method

uses the aforementioned formula parser in order to iterate over all parts of the formula and for each quantifier found in the formula it creates the relevant elementary formulae. For each of the elementary formulae we create a BDD variable that will late be used to indicate whether this elementary formula is satisfied.

The next part of creating the tableau is to find its initial states. As explained in the previous section, the initial states of the tableau are all states that satisfy the given formula. In order to find these states, we implemented the **sat** module. This module implements the method **get_sat(formula, el_bbds)** (where el_bdds is the set of BDDs explained above) and returns a new BDD using logical operands on the received BDDs according to the construction of the given formula.

The elementary BDDs and the **sat** module described above are then used in order to create the transition relation of the tableau itself. Again, in order to make this a symbolic model checker and not explicitly describe all of the states and transitions, the transition relation is also given as a BDD. The fairness constraints of the tableau are also given as a BDD and constructed in a similar manner to the statisfaction BDD.

All the methods described above are encapsulated inside a **Tableau** class object that we created. This object receives the formula and its atomic propositions as parameters for the constructor and uses all the methods and modules described above in order to create the tableau.

4.3 Product structure construction

Using the tableau construction above we now implemented the product of the tableau and the given logical model. We implemented this as a method of the tableau class described above. This method receives as input the symbolic model described earlier and using its relations, atomic propositions and the relations and states of the tableau creates the product model.

The use of BDDs makes this operation very simple, as we can see in the implementaion presented below.

Algorithm 1 Product model creation

procedure PRODUCT(self,model)

assert isinstance(model, SymbolicModel)

 $product_relations = model.relations \& self.relations \& model.atomic \& model.atomic.compose(global_compose)$

return Graph(global_compose, product_relations)

The use of global_compose is in order to create a new set of variables used for the product model. The Graph object used in the code above is a data structure we created in order

to create a symbolic representation of the product including both its vertices and the edges between them based on the relation BDD.

4.4 Finding maximal SCCs

As taught in class, in order to assert that there is a fair path in the product structure, we need to find a strongly connected component (SCC) that is reachable from the initial state and that intersects with each one of the fairness constraints.

In this section we will present the algorithm use to find the SCCs in a given model using BDDs. Our algorithm is based the algorithm explained in [4]. The algorithm presented in the paper, and implemented in our project uses reachability analysis in order to find the set of SCCs in a graph. This idea will also be useful late when we analyse the number of reachable states in our product structure.

We first begin by creating two very crucial methods allowing use to find the successor and predecessor states of a set of states in the graph when searching for them int a given bound. These two methods are presented below.

Algorithm 2 Predecessor procedure Predecessor(base, bound, relation, other_compose) result = ignore_prims(relation & base.compose(other_compose), other_compose.values()) other_compose.values()) return result bound Algorithm 3 Successor procedure Successor(base, bound, relation, other_compose) result = ignore_prims(relation & base, other_compose.values()).compose(other_compose) return result bound

Next, use reachability analysis in order to find the backward_set and forward_set of each node in the graph. The backward_set is the set of all states in the graph from which we have a path that reaches our desired and node. The forward_set is defined in a similar manner and contains all the nodes to which there exists a path from the specified base node.

Besides the forward and backward sets described above, the algorithm also introduces finite maximal distance (FMD) predecessors. These predecessors to a given node which can traverse through a finite distance path on the way to the node. These FMDs are used in order to find SCCs, as each FMD predecessor is not part of an SCC connected the node that it is a predecessor to. Below we present the algorithm found in [4] which we used in order to find all SCCs in the graph.

Algorithm 4 SCC Decomposition

```
procedure SCC_DECOMP(N,V)
V' \leftarrow V
while V' \neq 0 do
v \leftarrow random\_take(V')
B(v) \leftarrow backward_set(v, V', N)
SCC\_DECOMP\_RECUR(v, B(v), N)
V' \leftarrow V' \wedge \overline{v \vee B(v)}
```

Algorithm 5 Finite maximum distance predecessors

```
procedure FMD_PRED(W, U, N)
```

return pred

```
\begin{split} &pred \leftarrow 0 \\ &front \leftarrow W \\ &bound \leftarrow U \\ &\textbf{while } front \neq 0 \textbf{ do} \\ &x \leftarrow \exists_Y front(Y) \land N(X,Y) \land bound(X) \\ &y \leftarrow \exists_Y bount(Y) \land N(X,Y) \land bound(X) \\ &front \leftarrow x \land \overline{y} \\ &pred \leftarrow pred \lor front \\ &bount \leftarrow bounts \land \overline{front} \end{split}
```

Algorithm 6 Recursive method to find SCCs

```
procedure SCC_DECOMP_RECUR(v, B(v), N)
    F(v) \leftarrow forward\_set(v, B(v), N)
    if F(v) \neq 0 then
         report F(v) an SCC
    else
         report v non- SCC
    x \leftarrow F(v) \lor v
    R \leftarrow B(v) \wedge \overline{x}
    y \leftarrow \text{FMD\_PRED}(x, R, N)
    report y non-SCC
    R \leftarrow R \wedge \overline{y}
    IP \leftarrow \exists_Y (y \lor x)(Y) \land N(X,Y) \land R(X)
    while R \neq 0 do
         v \leftarrow random\_take(IP)
         B(v) \leftarrow backward_set(v, R, N)
         SCC\_DECOMP\_RECURE(v, B(v), N)
         R \leftarrow R \land \overline{v \lor B(v)}
         IP \leftarrow IP \land \overline{v \lor B(v)}
```

4.5 Finding fair paths

As explained in the previous section, in order to check the model, we need to assert that there is a fair path in the product. In order to do so, we need to check that each of the fairness constraints is satisfied in one of the strongly connected components we found earlier. This will tell us if there is a fair SCC in the graph. If no such SCC exists, we can conclude that no fair path exists in the graph. Otherwise, we continue to check that this SCC is reachable from one of the initial states in the graph.

The logic described above is implemented in the module **FairPathFinder**. We use the method **find_fair_path** that returns a python generator with possible initial states from which there exist fair paths.

4.6 CTL model checking

In order to implement CTL model checking we implemented the CTL model checking algorithms shown in class when solving the find the set of nodes satisfying the temporal quantifiers EX, EGEU.

When implementing these algorithm we used many of the methods already described in the previous section; mostly the modules that are relevant to reachability analysis. For example, when solving EX we used the successor method described earlier in order to find all the successor of a given node.

- 5 Experiments and Results
- 6 Further Work

References

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