

Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items

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Abstract


In practice, items are not always allocated once and for all, but often repeatedly. For example, when the items are recurring chores to distribute in a household. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of the **repeated fair division of indivisible items**.

Applications


- ▶ Fairly distributing household chores between a couple
- ▶ Allocating teaching duties to professors over the semesters
- ▶ Granting employees daily access to a common infrastructure

Main Idea

We want to allocate a single item \blacktriangle between two agents, $\color{red}\bullet$ and $\color{blue}\bullet$. Problem:



What if we share them **over time**?




Each day's allocation is not fair, but the **overall allocation** is!

Formal Model

We have n agents ($\color{red}\bullet$, $\color{blue}\bullet$, $\color{yellow}\bullet$, ...) that need to share some items (\blacktriangle , \blacksquare , \star , ...). Agents have additive utilities:

	$\color{red}\bullet$	$\color{blue}\bullet$	$\color{yellow}\bullet$
\blacktriangle	1	3	4
\blacksquare	5	2	1
\star	-3	-4	-2

We have k time-steps at our disposal. Example:



Axioms

An axiom can be satisfied **overall** (while looking globally at the whole bundle, over all time-steps) or **per round** (if it is satisfied individually by all time-steps).

- ▶ **Envy-freeness** (EF): No agent prefers someone else's bundle
- ▶ **Envy-freeness up to one item** (EF1): If an agent envies some other agent, we can eliminate envy by removing one item from the bundle of one of the two agents
- ▶ **Proportionality** (PR): Each agent receives at least $1/n$ of the value of the whole set of items
- ▶ **Pareto-optimality** (PO): We cannot find an allocation that is better for some agents, and worse for none

Repetition: Why Bother?

In the one-shot setting, we can't always find a **PR** (let alone EF) and **PO** allocation. Our main goal:


Can we guarantee **better fairness** and **efficiency** properties by looking at the **repeated allocation** of items?

Results: General Case

Under certain conditions, envy-freeness is always achievable:

*If k is a multiple of n , an **overall EF** allocation can always be found (in polynomial time).*

To achieve this, we can rotate the items at each time-step, e.g.:



What about efficiency? Even if k is a multiple of n , an overall EF and PO allocation might not exist. Still:

*If k is a multiple of n , an **overall PR** and **PO** allocation always exists.*

Results: Two-agent Case

For two agents, we have stronger fairness guarantees:

*For two agents, if k is even, an **overall EF** and **PO** allocation always exists.*

What about the individual time-steps? We cannot have envy-freeness in every round. However:

*For two agents, if k is even, an allocation which is **overall EF** and **EF1 per round** can always be found (in polynomial time).*

Can we additionally have efficiency? Not if $k > 2$, but:

*For two agents, if $k = 2$, we can always find an **overall EF** and **PO** allocation that is **EF1 per round**.*

Conclusions and Future Work

We have found that, by taking time into consideration, we might be able to distribute items **more fairly** and **more efficiently**.

We leave open a number of interesting questions, mainly about the **complexity** of finding fair and efficient allocations.

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