

STUDYING DELIBERATED JUDGMENTS

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Context and goal of this poster

Context

- Deliberation facing a decision problem
- Considering an individual i


Goal

- Introduce the notion of Deliberated Judgment
- Motivate studying it
- Sketch how


Deliberated judgment: a missing conception of “preference”

- Descriptive approach
 - Observe people’s epistemic position / choice without interference
- Normative approach
 - How you ought to reason / choose
 - Can’t be validated through observation of individuals
- *Deliberated* judgment (or preference)
 - i ’s position after having considered all arguments

Deliberation can change your mind



- First observation (Bernouilli): don’t be content with maximizing (untransformed) expected revenue!
 - Second observation: i could be intuitively attracted by $L1 \succ L2$ and $L3 \succ L4$ (Allais’s problem)
 - Including Savage
 - And might change her mind when given a reasoning pro expected utility
 - “There is, of course, an important sense in which preferences, being entirely subjective, cannot be in error”
 - ... “but in a different, more subtle sense they can be.” (Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics*)
- ⇒ Systematic decision principles might help deliberate



Study deliberated judgment

The proposed research program aims at the following.

1. Define Deliberated Judgment (DJ) of i formally
 - Given a set of arguments

⇒ The position that is stable facing counter-arguments
2. Define the concept of a model of i ’s DJ

⇒ A model articulates claims concerning i ’s DJ and argues for its claim
3. Define validity of a model

⇒ Correctly captures i ’s DJ
4. Study conditions for falsifying models using observable data only

⇒ Let models debate, use i as a judge

We obtain a theorem of the following form.

If the decision situation $(T, S, \rightsquigarrow, \triangleright_{\exists}, \ntriangleright_{\exists})$ satisfies conditions 1 to 4: an operationally valid model exists; and any operationally valid model is valid.

Example of a situation and a model of it

Notation	Here	Description
T	$\{t\}$	The topic, containing propositions about which i deliberates
S	$\{s, s_1, s_2, s_3\}$	The arguments
$\rightsquigarrow \subseteq S \times T$	$\{(s, t), (s_1, t)\}$	Support as considered by i
$\triangleright_{\exists} \subseteq S \times S$	$\{(s_2, s_1)\}$	$s_2 \triangleright_{\exists} s_1$ iff i sometimes considers that s_2 trumps s_1
$\triangleright_{\eta} \subseteq S \times S$	$\{(s_3, s_2)\}$	Trump situations as considered by the model η

weather f. predicts so $(s_1) \rightsquigarrow$ rain tomorrow $(t) \rightsquigarrow$ complex arg. (s)

\triangleright_{\exists}

weather forecast is often wrong (s_2)

\triangleright_{η}

weather forecast is more often right (s_3)

Application: test axioms of decision theory

- Axioms considered appropriate normatively?
 - But some (Allais, Ellsberg) disagree
- Proposal: build models resting on those axioms
- Test models: their convincing power will give us indications about the reasonableness of the axioms for “normal” people (meaning, not scientists studying decision theory)

Application: test conceptions of justice

- Philosophers have proposed sophisticated conceptions of justice (Rawls, Nozick, ...)
- Individual’s shallow intuitions about justice are observed and used to confront Rawls or others (Experimental Social Choice)
- Proposal: study reactions of individuals to arguments of philosophers rather than just shallow intuitions
- Move towards Reflective equilibrium (Goodman, Rawls)