International Economics II: course notes *

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1.1 Set up

- $U(\bar{c}) = \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} u(c_i)$, with $\bar{c} = \{c_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq n}$

- $u(0) = 0, u'(0) > 0, u''(0) < 0$

- Elasticity of demand of good i: $\epsilon_i = \frac{\partial c_i}{\partial p_i} \frac{p_i}{c_i}$, we assume $\epsilon_i < -1$

- Define $\sigma(c_i) = -\epsilon_i$, thus $1 < \sigma(c_i)$

- Increasing Return to Scale (IRS): workload required for producing q_i units is $l_i = f + q_i/\varphi$; f the fixed cost, φ the productivity

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1.2 Consumption

- From Lagrangien for utility maximization subject to revenue constraint, we obtain $u'(c_i) = \lambda p_i$

- $d\lambda p_i + \lambda dp_i = u''(c_i)dc_i$

- We assume $\frac{d\lambda}{dp_i} = 0$ (large number of varieties), whence $\lambda = u''(c_i)\frac{dc_i}{dp_i}$

- Thus, $u'(c_i)/p_i = u''(c_i)\frac{dc_i}{dp_i}$

- We obtain $\sigma(c_i) = -\frac{u'(c_i)}{u''(c_i)c_i} > 0$

1.3 Production

- Cost of producing q_i units is wl_i; w the wage

- L identical consumers thus $q_i = Lc_i$; whence $\sigma(c_i) = -\frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i}\frac{p_i}{q_i}$

- Marginal Cost is $MC = \frac{w}{\varphi}$

- Revenue of the firm on product i is $R_i = p_i q_i$ (and $R = \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} p_i q_i$)

- Marginal Revenue is $MR_i = \frac{dp_i}{dq_i}q_i + p_i = p_i(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma(c_i)})$

- To optimize profit $\pi_i = p_i q_i - wf - \frac{w}{\varphi}q_i$, set $MR_i = MC$

- We obtain the Profit max condition (PP): $\frac{p_i}{w} = \frac{\sigma(c_i)}{\sigma(c_i)-1}\frac{1}{\varphi}$

- (Average Cost is $AC_i = f/q_i + w/\varphi$)

1.4 Solving

- From $\pi_i = 0$, we obtain the Free entry condition (ZZ): $\frac{p_i}{w} = \frac{f}{Lc_i} + \frac{1}{\varphi}$

- $L = \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} l_i = nf + \frac{\sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} q_i}{\varphi}$

- By symmetry, $c_i = c$, $q_i = q$, $p_i = p$

- $L = nf + \frac{nLc}{\varphi}$ thus $n = \frac{L}{f + \frac{Lc}{\varphi}} = \frac{1}{\frac{f}{L} + \frac{c}{\varphi}}$

1.5 In the $(c, p/w)$ space

ZZ curve:

- strictly decreasing

- higher consumption, higher production, lower average costs, lower p/w

- with c constant, bigger L, more sales, lower p/w

PP curve:

- Flat iff $\sigma'(c) = 0$

- Strictly increasing if $\sigma'(c) < 0$ ($\frac{\sigma(c_i)}{\sigma(c_i)-1} = 1 + \frac{1}{\sigma(c_i)-1}$, $\frac{1}{\sigma(c_i)-1}$ composes two decreasing functions)

- $\sigma'(c) < 0$ behaviorally reasonable: bigger consumers are richer thus less sensitive to prices

- Higher consumption, less elastic demand, higher markup, more market power, higher prices

1.6 Doubling market size

Let's double L

- ZZ curve shifts downwards

- $c_1 < c_0$

- More varieties: $n_0 = \frac{1}{\frac{f}{L} + \frac{c_0}{\varphi}} < \frac{1}{\frac{f}{2L} + \frac{c_1}{\varphi}} = n_1$

- Under assumption $\sigma'(c) < 0$, $\sigma(c_0) < \sigma(c_1)$ thus $(\frac{p}{w})_1 < (\frac{p}{w})_0$

- Under assumption $\sigma'(c) < 0$, some firms exit: $n_1 = \frac{1}{\frac{f}{2L} + \frac{c_1}{\varphi}} < \frac{1}{\frac{f}{2L} + \frac{c_0}{2\varphi}} = 2n_0$, equivalently, $c_0 < 2c_1$. Proof: let $(c_1, (\frac{p}{w})_1)$ be the equilibrium after doubling L, thus $(2c_1, (\frac{p}{w})_1)$ is on the ZZ curve before doubling L, and all points with $c \geq 2c_1$ are strictly below the PP curve (because its derivative is positive) and not below the ZZ curve (because its derivative is negative) so not equilibrium points.

2 CES utility

2.1 Consumer

2.1.1 Set up

- A single consumer utility is $U(\bar{c}) = (\sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} c_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}})^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$ (a country utility is $U(L\bar{c}) = LU(\bar{c})$)

- Revenue constraint is $w = \sum p_i c_i$

2.1.2 Demand

- From the Lagrangian we obtain $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} U(\bar{c})^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} c_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}-1} - \lambda p_i = 0$ (because $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} - 1 = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{1}{\sigma}$), thus $c_i = \lambda^{-\sigma} p_i^{-\sigma} U(\bar{c})$, so that $\sum p_i c_i = w = \sum p_i^{1-\sigma} \lambda^{-\sigma} U(\bar{c})$

- Thus, $\lambda^{-\sigma} U(\bar{c}) = \frac{w}{\sum p_i^{1-\sigma}}$, then $c_i = p_i^{-\sigma} \frac{w}{\sum p_k^{1-\sigma}}$, and using $q_i = L c_i$, we obtain $q_i = p_i^{-\sigma} \frac{wL}{\sum p_k^{1-\sigma}}$

2.1.3 Price index

- $U(\bar{c}) = (\sum p_i^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \lambda^{-\sigma} U(\bar{c})$, whence $\lambda^{-\sigma} = (\sum p_i^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}}$, and using $\frac{w}{U(\bar{c})} = \sum p_i^{1-\sigma} \lambda^{-\sigma}$, we get $\frac{w}{U(\bar{c})} = (\sum p_i^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$

- Define the ideal price index as $P = \frac{w}{U(\bar{c})} = (\sum p_i^{1-\sigma})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$: it increases in the same way that the welfare decreases (price-index elasticity of utility is minus one); it is the cost of one unit of happiness

- We can write $q_i = \left(\frac{p_i}{P}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{wL}{P}$

- We obtain elasticity of demand $\epsilon_i = \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} \frac{p_i}{q_i} = \left(-\sigma q_i \left(\frac{p_i}{P}\right)^{-1} \frac{\partial}{\partial p_i}\left(\frac{p_i}{P}\right)\right) \frac{p_i}{q_i}$, and, approximating P as constant with respect to p_i (does this make sense?), $\epsilon_i \approx -\sigma$

- Given goods $i \neq j$, elasticity of substitution $\epsilon_{ij} = \frac{\partial ln(q_i/q_j)}{\partial ln(p_j/p_i)} = -\sigma$ (using $\frac{q_i}{q_j} = \left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right)^{-\sigma}$)

- Using symmetric prices, $P = n^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} p$

- We have $U_j(\bar{q}) = \frac{Lw}{p} n^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}$ thus $\frac{\partial \log U}{\partial \log n} = \frac{1}{\sigma-1}$

- When varieties increase, welfare increases at rate $\frac{\partial \log U}{\partial \log n} = \frac{1}{\sigma-1}$

2.2 Producer

- As above, $l_i = f + q_i/\varphi$; to optimize profit set $MR_i = \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial q_i} q_i + p_i = \frac{p_i}{\epsilon_i} + p_i = MC = \frac{w}{\varphi}$, obtain $\frac{p_i}{w} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}\frac{1}{\varphi}$

- At zero profit $\frac{\pi_i}{w} = \frac{p_i}{w} q_i - f - \frac{1}{\varphi} q_i = 0$, we obtain a constant output per variety, $q_i = \varphi f(\sigma - 1)$

- Using symmetric goods and market clearing condition $L = nf + n\frac{q}{\varphi}$, we obtain $n = \frac{L}{\sigma f}$

2.3 Solving, in autarky

- We get $P = (\frac{\sigma f}{L})^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{w}{\varphi}$

- We see that increasing n, or increasing L, decreases the price index, thus increases welfare

2.4 Iceberg trading

Two countries $\{D, X\}$ with same parameters except for sizes L_j ($j \in \{D, X\}$) open up and starts trading; we write their initial variable levels (in autarky) as $v_j^{(A)}$ and resulting variable levels (under exchange) as $v_j^{(E)}$; given $j \in \{D, X\}$, let $\bar{j}$ denote the other country.

- Prices of goods produced and sold in a given country $j \in \{D, X\}$ are still $p_j = p_j^{(A)} = p_j^{(E)} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{w_j}{\varphi}$ (Does this make sense? If wages change, prices should change. If so, do slides refer to old or new prices? What's even the meaning of prices changing, as they set the unit of the scale? Should we assume $p_j^{(A)}, p_j^{(E)}, p_{\bar{j}}^{(A)}$ fixed but $p_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}$ variable?)

- Iceberg type trading cost: goods sold in the other country have price $p_{j\to\bar{j}} = p_{j\to\bar{j}}^{(E)} = \tau p_j$, with $1 \leq \tau$

- Total production of a good produced in j becomes $q_j^{(E)} = q_{j\to j} + \tau q_{j\to\bar{j}}$, with $q_{j\to\bar{j}} = q_{j\to\bar{j}}^{(E)}$ the quantity that effectively arrives abroad

- Thus the enterprise sells $q_j^{(E)}$ at price p_j, equivalently, $q_{j\to j}$ at price p_j domestically and $q_{j\to\bar{j}}$ at price τp_j abroad

- It makes profit $\pi_j^{(E)} = p_j q_j^{(E)} - w_j(f + \frac{q_j^{(E)}}{\varphi}) = \frac{1}{\sigma-1} \frac{w_j q_j^{(E)}}{\varphi} - w_j f$

- From $\pi_j^{(E)} = 0$ we obtain $q_j = q_j^{(E)} = \varphi f(\sigma - 1) = q_j^{(A)}$

- Using $L_j = n_j^{(E)} f + n_j^{(E)} \frac{q_j^{(E)}}{\varphi}$, we obtain $n_j = n_j^{(E)} = \frac{L_j}{\sigma f} = n_j^{(A)}$

- $P_j^{(E)} = [n_j p_j^{1-\sigma} + n_{\bar{j}}(\tau p_{\bar{j}})^{1-\sigma}]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$

- With $\tau = 1$ and $n_j = n_{\bar{j}}$, we get $P_j^{(E)} = \frac{P_j^{(A)}}{2^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}}$: price index decreases

- No pro-competitive effect: σ fixed, does not contribute to lowering prices

- From above, $q_{j\to\bar{j}} = \left(\frac{p_{j\to\bar{j}}}{P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{w_{\bar{j}} L_{\bar{j}}}{P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}}$, thus $q_{j\to\bar{j}} = \left(\frac{\tau p_j}{P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}}\right)^{-\sigma} \frac{w_{\bar{j}} L_{\bar{j}}}{P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}}$

- It follows that the value $X_j = \tau p_j n_j q_{j \to \bar{j}}$ of aggregate exports (the gravity equation) depends linearly on $L_j L_{\bar{j}}$ (shouldn't account for P which depends on n which depends on L?) and on $\tau^{1-\sigma}$ (note also that $0 \le \tau^{1-\sigma} \le 1$)

- From trade balance $X_j = X_{\bar{j}}$, $\frac{p_j}{p_{\bar{j}}} = \frac{w_j}{w_{\bar{j}}}$, $\frac{n_j}{n_{\bar{j}}} = \frac{L_j}{L_{\bar{j}}}$ and $\frac{q_{j \to \bar{j}}}{q_{\bar{j} \to j}} = \frac{w_j^{-\sigma} w_{\bar{j}} L_{\bar{j}} P_j^{(E)\,1-\sigma}}{w_{\bar{j}}^{-\sigma} w_j L_j P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)\,1-\sigma}}$, it follows

  that $\frac{X_j}{X_{\bar{j}}} = 1 = \frac{w_j^{-\sigma} P_j^{(E)\,1-\sigma}}{w_{\bar{j}}^{-\sigma} P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)\,1-\sigma}}$, whence $\left(\frac{w_j}{w_{\bar{j}}}\right)^{\sigma} = \left(\frac{P_j^{(E)}}{P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}}\right)^{1-\sigma}$

- Recall that largest country had smaller prices (Sl. 20, do we mean higher real wages $\frac{w_j^{(A)}}{P_j^{(A)}}$? Can we compare utilities? True even with $\tau = 1$, right?); trade balance obliges to keep wages higher in the biggest country, which lower its exports (unless $\tau = 1$, why?)

- With $\tau = 1$, we get that $P_j^{(E)} = P_{\bar{j}}^{(E)}$ and thus $w_j = w_{\bar{j}}$

- With $1 < \tau$ (thus $\tau^{1-\sigma} < 1$), we should obtain that largest country has higher wages

- With $\tau = \infty$ (thus $\tau^{1-\sigma} = 0$), we obtain that $\left(\frac{w_j}{w_{\bar{j}}}\right)^{\sigma} = \frac{n_j}{n_{\bar{j}}} \left(\frac{p_j}{p_{\bar{j}}}\right)^{1-\sigma} = \frac{L_j}{L_{\bar{j}}} \left(\frac{w_j}{w_{\bar{j}}}\right)^{1-\sigma}$,

  thus $\frac{w_j}{w_{\bar{j}}} = \left(\frac{L_j}{L_{\bar{j}}}\right)^{\frac{1}{2\sigma-1}}$: largest country has higher wages

Mechanisms through which trade increases:

τ **finite** Trade increases through extensive margins: countries start exchanging every varieties

τ **reduces** Trade increases through intensive margins: higher export in quantity but constant number of varieties

2.5 Example

- Set $p = 1$, $\varphi = \sigma = 2$ and $f = 1/2$

- Producer: $w^{(A)} = 1$, $q = 1$

- Solving: $n_j = L_j$, $P_j^{(A)} = 1/L_j$

- Consumer: $c_j = 1/L_j$, $U(c_j) = L_j$

- Set $L_D = 1$ and $L_X = 2$

- $n_D = P_D^{(A)} = c_D = U(c_D) = 1$

- $n_X = U(c_X) = 2$, $P_X^{(A)} = c_X = 1/2$

- $p_{j \to \bar{j}} = \tau$

- $P_D^{(\mathrm{E})} = 1/(1 + 2/\tau) = \tau/(\tau + 2)$

- $P_X^{(\mathrm{E})} = 1/(2 + 1/\tau) = \tau/(2\tau + 1)$

3 Melitz

3.1 Various notes

Problem is that more productive firms seem to export, which the model does not say; this is not solvable even with different trading costs (not sure why)

Here we implicitly normalize by setting $w = 1$.

We write φ_d the equivalent of φ_a under non-autarky so actually $\varphi_a^{(1)}$ as compared to $\varphi_a^{(0)}$

Note that $\pi(\varphi)$ is the profit of a single firm of the type φ; to get the profit of the whole type φ we'd need to consider the density g.

Note that there is no aggregate profit to redistribute because the total profit is precisely the total entry cost (zero entry condition).

3.2 Set up

- We normalize the wage to $w = 1$

- Productivity $\gamma : \Omega \to (0, \infty)$ is a positive random variable on Ω associated with probability P (thus with $P(\emptyset) = 0$ and $P(\Omega) = P(\gamma \in (0, \infty)) = 1$), CDF defined as $G(\varphi) = P(\gamma \leq \varphi)$ (thus $G(0) = 0$), assumed differentiable, and PDF defined as $g(\varphi) = G'(\varphi)$ (thus $G(a) = \int_0^a g(\varphi)d\varphi$)