

Culture and Social Psychology

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Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between culture and social psychology, focusing on how internalized cultural meanings connect to action. It argues that social psychological constructs like knowledge activation, identity prominence, implicit knowledge, and third-order knowledge can help clarify the vexing issue of “cultural depth” in cultural analysis. By examining how individuals internalize culture through both declarative and nondeclarative modes, the chapter offers a more differentiated understanding of when internalized culture strongly or weakly influences action. The chapter concludes by arguing that a comprehensive explanation of cultural dynamics requires linking micro-level cognitive processes with meso-level situational mechanisms and macro-level institutional processes.

Keywords: Culture, Social Psychology, Internalization, Action, Cultural Depth, Knowledge

12.1 Introduction

The past decade and a half has seen repeated calls to strengthen the links between the study of culture in sociology—hereafter referred to as “cultural analysis”—and social psychology (Collett & Lizardo, 2014; Dimaggio & Markus, 2010). Analysts have noted that the divide between the two fields no longer makes much thematic or practical sense, given convergent perspectives on the nature of culture and mind and the nature of explanation. From the now mutually informing perspectives, cultural analysts and social psychologists are in the shared business of providing explanations linking cultural meanings and action at multiple analytic scales, from the micro to the meso to the macro. The rise of culture and cognition studies in sociology as a growing subspecialty in its own right has facilitated this convergence (Cerulo et al., 2021; Kaidesoja et al., 2022), as sociologists now commonly refer to and use social psychological constructs like schemas, identities, and frames in their explanatory efforts (Hunzaker, 2016; Hunzaker & Valentino, 2019; Miles, 2014). Conversely, social psychologists seek to connect processual analyses of action and interaction at the micro-level with the broader distribution of cultural meanings in groups, networks, and institutions (Burke & Stets, 2015; Ridgeway, 2011).

Nevertheless, much of the synthetic work done so far has been high-level and mainly concentrated on either noting broad analytic convergences between the fields or arguing for how a focus on social psychological processes can help refine the explanatory efforts of cultural analysts (Collett & Lizardo, 2014; Dimaggio & Markus, 2010). A less explored avenue has been whether focusing on social psychological processes can help solve or clarify perennial problems in cultural analysis. This chapter focuses on one such problem: how internalized cultural meanings and frameworks link—or fail to connect, for that matter—to action; this is an

outstanding issue in cultural analysis, usually glossed under the “cultural depth” problem, which has yet to be given a satisfactory solution (Sewell, 1992; Swidler, 2001b). In what follows, I show that focusing on four core social psychological constructs—knowledge activation, the link between identity prominence, implicit knowledge, and third-order knowledge—can help us better conceptualize how people internalize culture in sharper and more generative ways. Specifically, I show that the interplay between the four social psychological processes helps us theorize when we should expect internalized culture to be strongly or weakly coupled with action. Importantly, linking social psychological constructs to the problem of internalization and “depth” in cultural analysis highlights how a satisfactory explanation of a given phenomenon requires linking dynamics across multiple levels of analysis, from the micro to the meso to the macro.

Before we begin, the reader might be skeptical about whether we can disaggregate cultural dynamics at multiple analytic levels. After all, the traditional formulation sociologists inherited from anthropology has been criticized for conceptualizing culture as if it were in Gary Alan Fine’s (1979, p. 733) memorable words, “an amorphous, indescribable mist which swirls around society members.” Two decades later, Ann Swidler (2000) echoed the same sentiment, noting that culture continued to be treated as some “mist” that envelops persons and contexts, is both everywhere and nowhere, but also somehow manages (somehow) to get inside people, and influences their action. Most cultural theorists understand the problems that beset this conceptualization of culture, but the optimal solutions are few and far between (Ghaziani, 2009).

Recent theoretical and methodological work in cultural analysis has focused on disaggregating cultural dynamics across distinct levels (Lizardo, 2017; Patterson, 2014; Rinaldo & Guhin, 2022; Turner, 2010, 2012); particularly, both Lizardo (2017) and Patterson (2014)

analytically separate cultural processes located at the “public” macro-level of institutions, codes, and widely shared cultural worldviews from the “personal” micro-level where culture is internalized and mobilized by individuals in cognitive, affective, and interactional processes. For their part, Rinaldo & Guhin (2022) analytically isolated “mesolevel” cultural processes located in specific organizational and recurrent situational settings, standing in between widely shared and pervasive macro-level public culture and micro-level cultural dynamics. As we will see, social psychological processes are crucial in linking cultural dynamics across these levels, particularly micro-level cognition and affect with situational and institutional processes.

Note that while the following discussion focuses on one—admittedly influential—approach in cultural analysis, namely, Swidler’s Culture-in-Action model as developed in a series of publications (e.g., Swidler 2000, 2001a, 2001b), the general *analytic* issue concerning the way internalized cultural elements come to play a role in action, and thought cut across pretty much every contemporary paradigm in cultural analysis today, from the “strong program” developed by Jeffrey Alexander and colleagues for the last three decades or so to the “Zerubavel School” of cultural cognitive sociology to analysts interested in the more processual and interactive mechanisms that generate cultural meanings in *situ*, such as Iddo Tavory and Gary Alan Fine. The reason for this is that the problem of cultural internalization (or the status of culture in persons) and the role of such internalized elements in action crops up whenever analysts try to establish the causal “power” of culture in a way that links external cultural patterns (distributed at the macrolevel) to people, their actions, and interactions (at the micro and mesolevel). Internalization, along with its many variants, is the only mechanism available to forge this linkage. Accordingly, we see such cultural theorists as Jeffrey Alexander (2003) chiding sociologists for failing to emphasize “...the power of the symbolic to shape

interactions from within, *as normative precepts or narratives that carry internalized moral force*” (p. 16 italics added; see also Pp. 152-153 of the same book on the internalization of cultural codes).

Similarly, the cognitive sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel (1999) notes that:

[t]he logic of classification is something we must learn. Socialization involves learning not only a society’s norms but also its distinctive classificatory schemas. Being socialized or acculturated entails knowing not only how to behave, but also how to perceive reality in a socially appropriate way. By the time she is three, *a child has already internalized the conventional outlines of the category ‘birthday present’* enough to know that, if someone suggests that she bring lima beans as a present he must be kidding (p. 77, italics added).

Thus, rather than being some sort of ancient holdover from functionalism, a model close to Parsons’s (1964) Durkheimian Freudianism continues to be used by contemporary theorists whenever those theorists wish to make a case for enculturation as a form of mental modification via experience which has lasting consequences for cognition, motivation, and behavior (Strauss & Quinn, 1997), and whenever theorists wish to claim that there is some process (however mysterious) whereby (some) cultural kinds end up located in people. Accordingly, cultural theorists today find themselves in the awkward position of needing some account of cultural learning and internalization, but with very few workable ones at their disposal beyond the Durkheimianized Freudian metaphors we just saw (Lizardo, 2021a). A key argument in this chapter is that analytic tools from social psychology can help cultural sociologists conceptualize how culture can carry internal (and external) causal import for acculturated agents without relying on obscure or outdated formulations.

Having distinguished between multiple analytic levels of cultural analysis and clarified the general scope of the argument, the rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. In the next section, I

outline the most influential model of how culture links to action in cultural sociology, developed by Ann Swidler, detailing its strengths and limitations. I then point to fundamental ambiguities in Swidler's model that revolve around the issue of cultural depth. I then draw on selected insights from culture and cognition studies and contemporary social psychology, showing that incorporating their associated meso and micro-level constructs and distinctions can help us develop a better and more explanatorily coherent model of how culture is internalized, one that genuinely links social psychological and cultural dynamics at all three levels of analysis. I conclude by pointing to some implications of the arguments in the chapter.

12.2 Swidler's Model of Culture in Action

A vital issue in cultural analysis is whether culture becomes a causal factor in social action as an internalized force “from the inside-out” (Strauss & Quinn, 1997; Vaisey, 2008) or as part of the external environment; “from the outside-in” (Swidler, 2001a). Essentially, this is a problem of the preponderance of “bottom-up” or “top-down” causation in the link between culture and action (Archer, 1996). Are micro-mechanisms connected to internalized cultural meanings and beliefs more critical than meso-level situational mechanisms or macro-level institutional processes?

One of the most persuasive arguments for the causal role of culture in action from the outside-in (e.g., macro to micro) has been put forth by Swidler (1986, 2001a, 2001b). In one of the most recent statements (Swidler, 2001a), Swidler argues that culture is most relevant for explaining action when it is constitutive of the external environment regardless of how “deeply” the culture has been internalized or held, either as a normative commitment or as a conceptual presupposition. The most common external forms of culture are public “codes,” “contexts,” and “institutions” (pp. 160–180). Swidler thus provides a powerful skeptical counterpoint against

equating the causal power of culture with the cognitive-emotional “depth” at which it has been internalized by actors (C. Smith, 2003; Spiro, 1987; Vaisey & Lizardo, 2016). In this respect, Swidler’s approach focuses decidedly on the meso-level, looking at such dynamics as the extent to which specific cultural codes (e.g., dress codes, calendrical holidays, gendered styles of self-presentation) are institutionalized and taken-for-granted and shared as “third order” knowledge (Swidler, 2001a, p. 160ff). Micro-mechanisms connected to affective commitment to cultural ideas and proximity to identity—the traditional conception of “deep internalization”—are given a more subsidiary role.

Despite the apparent promise of Swidler’s meso-level outside-in approach, the concept of *cultural depth* remains too convenient a foil and an underdeveloped explanatory resource in her account, meaning that the micro-mechanisms of cultural internalization and expression are not well-specified. In Swidler’s rendering, the notion of “depth” refers to the degree to which available cultural understandings have become an inherent, pervasive component of a person’s cultural endowment, corresponding to the micro-level notion of “internalization” in classical cultural theory (e.g., Parsons, 1951). As Swidler (2001a, p. 160) has noted, “[o]ur usual metaphors for thinking about culture’s influence involve ‘depth.’ Some culture is deeper, more embedded, closer to the core of a society or a self.” For Swidler, the conceptual metaphor of depth invites the (misleading) inference “that the deeper the culture—either deeply internalized in the self or deeply embedded in society—the more powerfully it will affect action.” One of the primary goals of Swidler’s intervention is to force us to reexamine this automatic equation of depth with the level of influence culture is presumed to have on action.

Swidler’s main proposal is that externalized culture in the form of *codes*, *contexts*, and *institutions* can modulate action from the outside-in regardless of the “depth” at which it has

been internalized; the meso (and macro) level trumps micro-level processes when it comes to the culture-action link. Because of this, we do not need to use “depth” to explain how culture works. Instead, people can take cultural conventions, rituals, and public expectations as taken-for-granted objectified and sedimented realities, revealing the more plausible courses of action available to them; this is the standard macro-level process of *institutionalization* (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). For instance, public codes (modes of dress, widespread norms) constrain action from the outside-in when the public meaning of a possible course of action (or inaction) is widely shared by others, creating what the philosopher John Searle (2003, p. 170) calls “desire-independent reasons” for the performance of an action, without requiring deep internalization of a normative commitment to that line of activity.

To take a variation of one of Swidler’s favorite examples, the existence of holidays like Mother’s Day, reproduced via shared macro-level cultural expectations and common knowledge about others’ expectations, creates perceived external pressure for people who live far away from their parents to call their mother, regardless of whether they feel like it or not. Failure to call on Mother’s Day has desire-independent semiotic import; not calling “means” you do not appreciate your mother, regardless of your actual feelings. The result is that most people make the call on Mother’s Day, independently of how deeply they have internalized the meanings of Mother’s Day as personal values. Culture has the same effects for those who have internalized calling on Mother’s Day as a “deep” norm and for those who have not. In this type of case, which Swidler takes as paradigmatic, the causal effect of culture on action comes from what public codes mean to *others* (possibly about us), not what they mean to us (Correll et al., 2017). Thus, regardless of your stance towards an institution or set of codes, your actions will carry meanings *independently* of those feelings or stances, and this consideration will be decisive in the course of

action you take. Culture works like a traffic light rather than an internal engine, directing us hither and thither from the outside.

12.2.1 Rethinking the Role of Micro-Level Dynamics in Cultural Explanation

Even though Swidler's model privileges macro and meso-level "outside-in" mechanisms in cultural explanation, it would be a mistake to think this is because a coherent conception of how culture can operate from the inside-out at the micro-level is lacking in her account (as suggested by C. Smith, 2003, pp. 133–134). Instead, Swidler's extended argument contains a more or less coherent formulation of how culture can operate as an internalized force at the micro-level, going beyond the limitations of classical attempts to develop one in American Sociology. Accordingly, one of Swidler's main contributions has been to provide a more variegated conceptualization of how people use internalized culture than that inherited from the functionalist tradition (e.g., Parsons, 1937, 1951).

Swidler's point is not that people cannot internalize culture because of memory limitations—as Martin (2010) once intimated. Instead, her point is that pure inside-out mechanisms are *insufficient* to account for the most interesting behavioral outcomes. According to Swidler, people internalize a lot of culture. Nevertheless, this trove of internalized culture is causally inert compared to the power of institutionalized or highly codified extra-personal culture (Swidler, 2001b). In this way, Swidler uses the "inside-out" conception of culture internalized by people to ultimately support the "outside-in" argument as the main explanatory game in town. For Swidler, the classical story is limited because it conflates questions of cultural acquisition, learning, and exposure ("internalization") with questions of cultural *process* (the way culture "works") and questions of cultural *effects* on action (Swidler, 2001b).

In the classical account, either culture is internalized as deeply held beliefs and affectively-laden understandings—thus playing a role in action—or it fails to be internalized and, therefore, does not influence action. The only way people can fail to use culture in action is if they do not have it available in the first place; this can happen via “faulty” or “incomplete” internalization. Because the external cultural system is conceived as systematic and coherent, it is presumed that people have no choice but to use the culture they internalized, as the internalization of a fragmentary or incoherent cultural system is thought of as a pathological state. The classical approach led to an empirical program in which analysts compared whole “groups” or “societies,” that presumably internalized distinct normative or value systems (Inkeles, 1969; Parsons, 1951; Schwartz, 2006). Differences in typical action patterns across societies or historical eras were traced to differences in distinct value configurations and institutionalized norms at the macro-level of the social system.

Swidler goes beyond this conceptually hamstrung functionalist legacy in three significant ways. First, external cultural systems at the macro-level, namely, the public reservoirs of cultural understandings, beliefs, and symbols potentially available for internalization, are not coherent, systematic wholes. Instead, even within the same “society,” culture comprises fragmentary and only loosely coherent meso-level domains (DiMaggio, 1997; Rinaldo & Guhin, 2019; Sewell, 2005). This situation is hardly a pathological or dysfunctional state because the internalization of loosely coherent cultural systems at the micro-level, rather than being a roadblock to the use of culture to forge lines of action, provides people with much-needed flexibility and leeway to deal with practical and interactional problems in everyday life as they arise (Swidler, 2001a). Empirically, this implies that cross-individual (or even within-individual across situations) and cross-group comparisons within the same society are as analytically central as the cross-societal

or historical comparisons inspired by classical functionalism (Harding, 2010).

Second, Swidler separates the issue of cultural internalization from the question of “strength of commitment” to those internalized cultural elements. Indeed, people can and do deeply internalize micro-level beliefs and understandings through “faith, commitment, and ideological conviction” (Swidler, 2001a, p. 7). Nevertheless, people also internalize many cultural elements to which they are not deeply committed. In this respect, “[p]eople *vary* in the ‘stance’ they take toward [the] culture [they have internalized]—how seriously versus lightly they hold it” (italics added). This within-and-between-person variation is of crucial analytical importance. Some people are Parsonian “true believers,” deeply committed to the cultural stances they have internalized as part of their upbringing and social experience. Yet, for a great many others, the stance toward the culture they have internalized is more likely to range from ritualistic adherence to repeated expression of platitudes and clichés taken to be “common sense” to indifference, cynicism, and even insincere affirmation (Swidler, 2001a, pp. 43–44).

For most people, superficially internalized culture, thus, takes the form of *familiarity* with well-established beliefs, norms, and cultural practices. While this superficial culture does not elicit deeply held private acts of commitment, it may elicit equally binding and empirically decisive public acts of conformity, thus having a causal effect on action uncorrelated with the depth of internalization. Because deeply internalizing culture is complex and labor-intensive and superficially internalizing culture is easy, people carry around more superficially internalized culture than deeply internalized elements; this means that even “true believers” can only be so committed to a relatively small subset of the culture they have internalized. The same person who behaves as a true believer in one realm (e.g., “marriage”) may shift stances and act more like a superficial conformist in another (e.g., “business”). Most people thus change from deep to

shallow cultural stances as they move across settings, domains, and situations in everyday life.

Third, Swidler separates questions of cultural *availability* from questions of *use*. The critical observation here is that people “know much more culture than they use” (Swidler, 2001a, p. 160), meaning there is no one-to-one mapping between internalization and use. People don’t use much of the culture they have internalized, so use is not a direct function of internalization. For Swidler, constraints on cultural use in the functionalist tradition were mainly “social-psychological.” People were forced to use the culture they had deeply internalized after a history of socialization because this culture functioned as a pervasive motivational force; not utilizing the culture was associated with both internal sanctions (in the form of guilt) and external sanctions and even punishment from significant others and institutionalized authorities (Wrong, 1961).

In contrast to functionalism, constraints on cultural use in Swidler’s model are *pragmatic*: People select the culture they use from a more extensive (and not necessarily globally coherent) repertoire of potentially available options depending on external conditions (DiMaggio, 1997; Vaisey, 2008). These last take the form of recurrent problem-solving situations brought forth by specific institutional arrangements or elicited by strongly structured interaction contexts (Gross, 2009). Availability and proficiency are arguably the only inside-out mechanisms Swidler gives some partial autonomy. According to Swidler, “[t]he cultural repertoire a person has available constrains the strategies...[they] can pursue so that people tend to construct strategies of action around things they are already good at” (Swidler, 2001a, p. 7). In this way, Swidler’s conceptualization of culture from the inside-out at the micro-level leads, in an analytically elegant fashion, to meso-level outside-in mechanisms as having an explanatory prevalence in the explanation of action.

12.2.2 Ambiguities in Swidler's Model

Swidler's "outside-in" model is a significant advance over classical models of the causal role of culture in action as emanating exclusively from the inherent "motivational force" of deeply internalized commitments (Lizardo & Strand, 2010). However, Swidler's outside-in model suffers from at least two pivotal sets of ambiguities, which limit its potential to provide a unified account of the relevant empirical phenomena.

First, Swidler does not specify which *type* of internalized "cultural elements" the outside-in argument applies to, with the implication being that the argument covers all cultural elements capable of being internalized. However, as has been noted by other analysts in cognitive sociology and anthropology (Lizardo, 2017; Patterson, 2014; Strauss & Quinn, 1997), "culture," even at the personal level, is a motley notion referring to a panoply of internalized beliefs, norms, values, frames, narratives, schemas, practices, skills, and the like (for a recent discussion of this issue in sociology, see C. Smith, 2016). Swidler acknowledges that culture can be internalized in multiple ways, sometimes speaking of "understandings," "beliefs," "conceptions," and "worldviews," and on other occasions speaking of "skills," "habits," "strategies," and "capacities." However, because this implicit distinction is never explicitly elaborated, Swidler mixes differently internalized modalities of what Strauss and Quinn (1997) and Lizardo (2017) call "personal culture." By resorting to the over-generalized notion of "cultural elements," Swidler introduces critical ambiguities in the model due to a reliance on a concept of personal culture that is never fully elaborated.

Second, the concept of "cultural depth," while better developed compared to previous formulations, remains under-theorized and under-specified. As a result, it is unclear what Swidler is trying to get at when arguing that some cultural elements are either deeply or superficially

held. As such, Swidler operates with a largely implicit, or “folk” theory of cultural depth (Sewell, 1992), or what in contemporary psychological anthropology is still called cultural “internalization” (Lizardo, 2021a; Quinn et al., 2018; Strauss & Quinn, 1997).¹ However, it remains unclear what precisely this dimension refers to, especially in terms of empirical and conceptual criteria, in considering a cultural element to be “deeply” versus “superficially” internalized (Miles, 2014). Due to the first ambiguity, it is also unclear whether the criteria for counting something as “deeply” versus “superficially” held are presumed to be the same for all internalized cultural elements. Ultimately, a coherent theory of the effects of culture on action requires clarifying what is meant by the *depth* dimension of culture.

I propose a reconceptualization and elaboration of the notion of cultural depth, using theoretical tools from social psychology, that resolves these two problems. I suggest a more differentiated account of how people internalize culture to deal with the first ambiguity. To deal with the second ambiguity, I develop analytically distinct models of cultural depth and levels of internalization for each type, linking dynamics at multiple analytic levels from the micro to the mese to the macro. As such, this chapter advances theory and research in cultural analysis by linking recently developed understandings of how culture is internalized (Lizardo, 2017, 2021a; Patterson, 2014; Quinn et al., 2018) with a novel, more refined conceptualization of cultural depth, that links theory and research in the sociology of culture and social psychology.

12.3 Incorporating Social Psychological Mechanisms

12.3.1 Two Modes of Internalized Culture

¹ In sociology, the term “internalization,” as a micro-level mechanism accounting for how people became acquainted with cultural patterns at the meso and macrolevels, fell into disrepute with the rejection of the functionalist theory of socialization, something that Swidler's work (e.g., 1986) had a big hand in. This does not mean that cultural analysis in general, or Swidler's model in particular, can do without some version of this notion (Guhin et al., 2021).

Recent efforts in cultural theory insist on distinguishing between two broad types of internalized cultural elements at the micro-level (Lizardo, 2017; Patterson, 2014). These analysts propose that different forms of internalized culture operate according to other principles, with people acquiring and connecting them to their experience in distinct ways (analytically and empirically). Because micro-level personal culture does not operate from the inside-out in just one way, Swidler's arguments concerning the muted explanatory status of inside-out mechanisms can apply to one form of personal culture but may not apply to the other.

For instance, culture internalized as declarative conceptions, beliefs, or norms could be less relevant than external codes or conventions in explaining action without the argument applying to *non-declarative* competencies, skills, and know-how. The declarative/non-declarative distinction, borrowed from the cognitive psychology of memory systems, has been central to recent theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions to cultural analysis (Cerulo, 2018; e.g., Lizardo, 2017; Patterson, 2014; Rinaldo & Guhin, 2022). I will argue that Swidler's main propositions do not apply to these two types of cultural elements in the same way and that, therefore, a model of culture in action that exclusively privileges outside-in mechanisms, especially one disallowing the independent role of nondeclarative culture to operate from the inside-out, faces severe explanatory limitations.

12.3.2 Declarative Culture

Following Lizardo (2017), I refer to internalized cultural understandings that can be expressed or externalized explicitly in talk and discourse as *declarative culture*. The primary symbolic medium through which people are exposed to declarative culture is thus spoken or written language (Tomasello, 2005). However, other public non-linguistic semiotic systems (e.g.,

audiovisual codes, iconic symbols, ritual performance, and the like) may also serve as a conduit for its transmission and internalization. Declarative culture thus comprises the total stock of “know-thats” stored in a “semantic” (and when including auto-biographical life experience “episodic”) memory system (Patterson, 2014, p. 11), thus making up (lay or folk) *knowledge* in the phenomenological sense (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

In its semantic form, declarative knowledge is experienced as “impersonal” and thus capable of being stated as propositions about the “world,” at varying degrees of abstraction, without necessary reference to individual experience (e.g., “in the United States, doing well in school leads to better jobs”). However, as Swidler notes, this cultural knowledge can also be “personalized” by individuals when linked to their autobiography and used to construct and make sense of experience (e.g., “If I do well in school, I will get a good job”). In the limiting case, previously impersonal declarative culture can become so personalized as to become part of an individual’s *self-identity* as an “owned” attitude, worldview, belief, or value (Swidler, 2001a, p. 87) strongly linked to autobiography (e.g., “I’ve been successful in life because of my commitment to hard work”). This micro-level link between internalized cultural knowledge and self-identity is an essential way social psychological mechanisms can help shed light on what cultural sociologists mean by “deeply” internalized culture.

As emphasized in contemporary dual-process models in sociology (Lizardo et al., 2016), declarative culture is accessed in a deliberate (“slow”), linear fashion (as in the construction of life narratives or motivational justifications). It can be used for reasoning, evaluation, judgment, and categorization tasks. In using declarative culture to guide action, people are aware of applying deliberative criteria or “rules” or linking particular means to well-specified and consciously conceived goals (Parsons, 1937). Declarative culture is also involved in the chaining

together of a series of cultural chunks (as in the “logical logic” of deductive reasoning) to produce a judgment (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Examples of such judgments are evaluating actions (of self or others) as proper or improper (e.g., moral judgment) or deciding that a given object or person belongs to a specific category (e.g., social inference). People also use declarative culture when producing “offline” justifications for their public stances and commitments, spinning out vocabularies of motive and generating justificatory rationalizations for their actions (Mills, 1940), publicly reporting on their normative commitments, deliberating about different courses of action, or forming explicit expectations about their future projects (Swidler, 2001a; Vaisey, 2008, 2009).

12.3.3 Nondeclarative Culture

On the other hand, people may internalize culture via a “slow learning” pathway in the form of implicit cognitive-emotive associations and dispositions built from repeated long-term exposure to consistent patterns in experience (Lizardo, 2017). This culture retains little detail of each exposure episode, keeping only the abstract experiential structure shared across each episode. The resulting knowledge produced by this enculturation process is not structured according to logical links among explicit symbolic elements but by associative linkages based on patterns of physical and perceptual similarity and spatial and temporal contiguity (E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). This form of cultural knowledge comprises the total number of “know-hows” stored in a “procedural” or “associative” memory system; accordingly, I refer to it as *nondeclarative culture* (Patterson, 2014, p. 11).

The internalization and use of nondeclarative culture differ from its declarative counterpart in analytically essential ways. In terms of the mechanisms of internalization, people

can only acquire nondeclarative culture via slow learning (habituation and enskilment) mechanisms after a relatively large number of repeated exposures; this differs from declarative understandings and beliefs, which may be acquired via fast memory binding even after a single experience (E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Furthermore, nondeclarative culture may be internalized without explicit symbolic mediation directly via experiential correlations or manipulation of the body (Bourdieu, 1990; Cohen & Leung, 2009); this differs from the bulk of declarative culture, which generally requires interaction mediated via linguistic symbols to be internalized and expressed. Nondeclarative culture is stored as a complex multimodal and multidimensional network of associations between many subsymbolic elements (Arseniev-Koehler & Foster, 2022), each of which has a close link to experience; this differs from declarative culture, which can be internalized in relatively abstract linguistic formats removed from direct experience (Bloch, 1991).

Finally, nondeclarative culture has the potential to be accessed and deployed, ultimately affecting action, cognition, emotion, and judgment via “automatic” pathways (Lizardo et al., 2016), even though some forms of nondeclarative culture, such as high-level skills, are typically used in a “controlled” manner (Lizardo, 2021b). Once internalized, nondeclarative culture exists as a potential resource applicable to action in contexts similar to those in which it was acquired, as long as context activates it. In contrast, skill acquisition is the prototypical example of the nondeclarative internalization of culture (Wacquant, 2013). Similar internalization mechanisms lie behind the acquisition of much nondeclarative knowledge about the social world, such as the implicit associations and implicit attitudes that have become the bread and butter of social and cognitive psychology in the last two decades (Gawronski et al., 2008; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Nosek et al., 2011).

Ultimately, the two forms of internalized culture reflect distinct ways people relate to the cultural knowledge they acquire. Declarative culture consists of (potentially) *reflective knowledge* in the phenomenological sense (Heiskala, 2011); that is, people not only “know” declarative culture, but they also “know that they know it” and therefore can report this fact in a survey or an interview. By contrast, nondeclarative culture consists of *tacit knowledge* extracted from experience (Reber, 1993), reminding us that people internalize more culture than they can linguistically report (Polanyi, 1966).² Systematic, repetitive experiences leave traces as nondeclarative skills, dispositions, and associations (both conceptual and affective), resulting in internalized culture that people “have” and even “deeply hold” without *necessarily* having reflective access to this having or holding (Gawronski et al., 2008; Nosek & Hansen, 2008). In this respect, this culture may retain a phenomenologically “impersonal” cast and thus not be part of an individual’s reflexive identity, even though it can be implicated in action. Overall, it immediately becomes clear, even from this brief discussion, that any criteria we use to decide whether internalized non-declarative culture is “deep” will be systematically different from those applying to declarative culture.

12.4 Types of Culture and Cultural Depth

As noted, a crucial part of Swidler’s conceptualization of culture centers on its subjective phenomenological status as either deeply or superficially held. Swidler’s talk of people “holding” culture in either of these forms is central to the argument for the relative preponderance of outside-in mechanisms in linking culture and action. Despite its pivotal status in Swidler’s discussion, the distinction between deeply versus superficially held culture is stated at a mostly

² Lizardo (2021a) introduces a third type of internalized culture, referred to as “knowledge-what” consisting of general conceptual knowledge, partaking of both reflective and tacit components. To keep matters from getting overly complicated, I restrict myself to Lizardo’s original declarative/nondeclarative typology.

impressionistic level (Swidler, 2001a, p. chaps. 3 and 8). The result is that Swidler's model rests on shaky microfoundations regarding how people mobilize culture in action and interaction. Incorporating relevant social psychological mechanisms can help us shore these aspects of Swidler's model and contribute to cultural analysis more generally.

The first thing to note is that the distinction between internalizing culture superficially versus deeply is multidimensional, encompassing a variety of intentional stances that a person may have toward the culture they internalized. As such, it would be a mistake to think of the superficial versus deep cultural internalization distinction in the mold of a simple bipolar dichotomy. What are the different dimensions of cultural internalization implicit in Swidler's account? At the social-psychological level, we can distinguish at least three.

The first is *cognitive*, encompassing how central a given set of beliefs and practices may be within a more encompassing belief system or ideology. Another is *affective*, dealing with how emotionally committed people may be toward certain beliefs and practices central to their self-concept. Some are *metacognitive* and reflect the level of conviction with which a person may hold a belief or the degree to which they endorse a habit or practice. I distinguish between two broad criteria implicit in Swidler's discussion, which I see as most important, via which we may conclude that a given cultural element is deeply or superficially held. These criteria converge nicely with recent work aimed at rethinking the notion of cultural internalization from the perspective of psychological anthropology and cultural models theory (e.g., Quinn et al., 2018), lines of work emphasizing the cognitive and social psychological micro-foundations of larger cultural patterns.

12.4.1 Availability versus Accessibility

The first dimension of cultural depth concerns the relative pervasiveness with which a given cultural element, such as a value, belief, or practice, is “ready to hand” to be *potentially* used by people. Drawing on social psychological work on knowledge activation and use (Higgins, 1996), I refer to this dimension of depth as the *accessibility* of the cultural element for the person.³ Knowledge activation theory was developed in the cognitive social psychology of impression formation to explain how the salience of given knowledge structures helps explain the sort of information people use in making trait and other inferences about others but was later extended to the study of attitudes, motivations, and a host of other topics (Förster & Liberman, 2007).

Accordingly, a cultural element is accessible if it is “first in line” regarding its probability of being drawn upon by the person for a particular purpose (Higgins, 1996). We have already seen that Swidler’s (2001a, p. 70) approach to culture-in-action from the “inside-out” distinguishes availability and accessibility. For instance, Swidler notes that “people keep ‘on tap’ much more culture than they use. Thus, people possess culture of very different sorts—that which is actively part of current experience and that which is held in reserve, so to speak.” In our terms, culture people have “in reserve” is merely available. In contrast, the subset of available culture, which is used and mobilized to deal with everyday problems, is accessible. While all accessible culture is available culture, the reverse is not the case; the storehouse of potentially *available* elements is more extensive (Higgins, 1996). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that because a cultural element is available (e.g., has been internalized by people as part of cultural learning), it will play a role in action; only elements that are also accessible will do so. Analytic attention then shifts to the meso and macrolevel mechanisms determining the accessibility of

³ I also draw on the work of Orlando Patterson (2015), who provides a pioneering application of knowledge activation theory to examine the “cultural matrix” of contemporary Black youth, and which informs much of what I have to say here.

internalized cultural elements (Patterson, 2015).

12.4.2 Chronically Accessible Culture

Additionally, we will make a further distinction within the subset of accessible culture. We may refer to the subset of available cultural elements that are repeatedly and routinely used by people—to the point of becoming habitual—as being in an elevated state of accessibility for further use relative to other accessible elements. These internalized cultural elements are *chronically accessible* (Higgins, 1996). Chronically accessible culture is, therefore, the subset of accessible cultural elements that, due to repeated use and activation (e.g., habituation), are most likely to be used in the future. This distinction allows us to develop an analytical criterion defining different points in the cognitive dimension of cultural depth. Cultural elements that are merely accessible but not chronically so are less deeply held than ones that are chronically accessible, while cultural elements that are simply available but not accessible are the most “superficially” held. The chronic accessibility criterion for cultural depth applies equally to declarative and nondeclarative cultural elements.

Chronically accessible declarative culture consists of those beliefs, values, and explicit precepts that first come to mind when people reflect on their experiences (or are queried about those experiences by the survey research or qualitative interviewer). Thus, they are most likely drawn upon to make sense of everyday events and occurrences, plan for the future, justify a course of action, or produce a vocabulary of motive (Mills, 1940). For instance, Schulz (2012) shows that a particular form of “hard work” talk, dissociating work effort from the intrinsic rewards of the job, is chronically accessible declarative culture for high-level professionals in the U.S. as a vocabulary of motive justifying long hours and excessive effort at work, but not so for

people in similar strata in Norway and France. In contrast to chronically accessible declarative culture, merely available culture consists of the entire panoply of “dispositional” beliefs, stances, opinions, or normative orientations that may only come to mind in exceptional or unusual circumstances (DiMaggio 1997). Chronically accessible declarative culture is deeply internalized, while that which is only available but not accessible is superficially internalized in Swidler’s sense.

Similarly, chronically accessible nondeclarative culture consists of those practices, skills, and know-how most likely to be activated and drawn upon in context for purposes of everyday coping and problem-solving (Dreyfus & Spinoza, 1999); that is, this is nondeclarative culture that is *habitual* in the sense of being repeatedly used by the person in similar contexts to solve similar problems, and which due to this repeated mobilization becomes more likely to be mobilized in the future (Lizardo, 2021b). For instance, Patterson (2015) shows that a particular form of hyper-masculine bodily and verbal self-presentation, emphasizing toughness, dominance, aggressiveness, and distance from feeling and emotion, is chronically accessible non-declarative culture among poor inner-city Black men in the U.S. (a cultural complex that also contains many declarative elements).

Note that the storehouse of practices and dispositions that is chronically accessible does not exhaust a person’s total “know how,” since the person may keep in store as merely available a whole panoply of nondeclarative skills. Thus, the distinction between availability and accessibility also applies to nondeclarative culture, as does the distinction between accessibility and chronic accessibility. A person may know how to play the piano (and thus have the ability available to them) without being in the *habit* of playing the piano regularly.⁴ Accessible

⁴ Note, however, that since nondeclarative culture has a “use it or lose it” quality, nondeclarative culture that is only available but seldom drawn upon may likely degrade regarding proficiency and subsequent ease of use.

nondeclarative culture consists of those practices, dispositions, skills, and habits we rely upon often; chronically accessible nondeclarative culture is the subset regularly manifested across many contexts and situations, sometimes becoming part of people's "personality," partially transcending contexts and conditions, or interacting reliably with particularly contexts (Shoda et al., 1993).

12.4.3. Reflective Endorsement

The second dimension of cultural depth combines the *affective* and *metacognitive* aspects distinguished earlier. It concerns how close a cultural element is to an individual's set of prominent identities (and thus their self-concept) and the extent to which that element is deemed to have personal validity (Burke & Stets, 2023; Miles, 2014). This reflective "personalization" of culture allows people to "name their own experience in cultural terms" (Swidler, 2001a, p. 44). As such, I propose we consider cultural elements that are *reflectively endorsed as emanating from or "belonging" to the person* as deeply internalized in this dimension, which is consistent with the way that deeply internalized attitudes are conceived in contemporary social and cognitive psychology (Gawronski et al., 2008).⁵ All the other indicators of cultural depth Swidler alludes to (e.g., affective intensity, conviction, subjective centrality, sincerity, and the like) are better understood as correlates of reflective endorsement and proximity to prominent identity meanings (Burke & Stets, 2023). All else equal, reflectively endorsed culture consistent with prominent identity meanings is more affectively intense, sincerely held, and elicits signals of more substantial behavioral commitment on people's part.

When declarative culture is deeply internalized in the reflective endorsement sense,

⁵ This is stated here as a binary for argumentative simplicity. Elements can exist on a continuum in this dimension, with the midpoint being those (declarative) elements that people are "ambivalent" about (Cunningham et al., 2007).

people appropriate explicit cultural understandings initially encountered in the form of “extra-personal” beliefs, sayings, norms, precepts, and the like and make them their own (Quinn, 2018; Spiro, 1987); declarative culture relevant for making sense of everyday experience and constructing a sense of self (Callero, 2003). In this dimension, superficially held declarative culture comprises cultural understandings not endorsed as valid, deemed irrelevant to the typification and specification of everyday experience, or even thought of as antithetical to self-conceptions and prominent identity meanings. This culture may consist of well-worn platitudes, mores, and beliefs (even stereotypes) about various domains of life and social groups. In essence, the entire panoply of overt “prejudices” that constitute “common sense” (Geertz, 1983). People are repetitively exposed to these platitudes to the point that they become chronically accessible and even automatically elicited in context. Despite being chronically accessible cultural knowledge, people may fail to *subscribe* to these tenets as a matter of *personal* belief (instead prefacing with “others think...”), speaking to the analytical independence of the two dimensions of cultural internalization.

12.4.4 Third-Order Belief

For instance, a person may hold as an abiding, identity-relevant, chronically accessible belief the idea that “hard work leads to success,” counting as a reflectively endorsed belief (Schulz, 2012), thus more “deeply” internalized than if a person were to report that “*other people say* hard work leads to success *but* in my experience....” This dissociation between beliefs held as “personal” versus those reported as that which “others” believe has been called in the social-psychological literature “third-order belief.” To illustrate this concept, Correll et al. (2017, p. 301) note, “public discourse tends to specify a common code for how actors and institutions

are categorized and ranked in a given social domain, thereby providing a ready basis for coordination among participants who are aware of the code...When salient, a widely shared status belief that ranks the relevant choices is a “focal point”...that facilitates coordination...This happens not because the common code is widely endorsed as a *personal conviction*, but because it is what everyone knows that everyone knows.”

This formulation, mostly in line with Swidler’s outside-in model in almost all respects, gives us a more precise way of stating the point that cultural depth is not necessarily correlated with how strongly culture affects action. In essence, Swidler is pointing to systematic instances in which chronically accessible (e.g., due to high levels of publicity and institutionalization) culture at the macro-level, such as the precept to give mom a call on Mother’s Day, can have substantial effects on action *independently* of its depth of internalization in the reflective endorsement dimension (Swidler, 2001a, pp. 160–166). In this case, the social-psychological mechanism that generates depth of internalization via proximity to prominent self-identities (which indicates a deeply held cultural belief) comes uncoupled from the macro-level distribution and institutionalization of cultural patterns (what the person knows other people believe).

Chronically accessible *and* reflectively endorsed declarative culture (e.g., precepts, beliefs, norms, values, and the like) comes close to the functionalist tradition’s ideal-typical “deeply internalized” elements. This form of personal culture can be central for people to construct and make sense of their experiences and lives (Swidler 2001a, chap. 3). By the same token, declarative culture can be readily accessible—thus affecting action by being ready-to-hand—without being reflectively endorsed or central to experience and identity. This form of personal culture may comprise collectively established (and therefore non-negotiable

from the perspective of the individual) understandings of what it is right or wrong to believe, the best ways of doing things, and the like. This form of internalized culture may also be composed of a host of “third-order beliefs” about what “most people” believe or deem appropriate, even if these differ from personal (reflectively endorsed) beliefs. In this sense, while this culture is personal (in the sense of being internalized), it can feel “extra-personal” in terms of relevance to self-identity (Gawronski et al., 2008), operating mainly via “social validity” (Correll et al., 2017, p. 302) than via personal conviction of linkage to prominent identities. When these codes (or narratives, scripts, schemas) are also chronically accessible, they are potentially “powerful” in structuring the way individuals construe their experiences and situations independently of how proximate they are to their self-conceptions (Swidler, 2001b).

As noted earlier, chronically accessible nondeclarative culture consists of those practices, tastes, skills, and know-how the person has picked up as part of recurrent cultural learning (Arseniev-Koehler & Foster, 2022), and which are recurrently put into practice, making them first in line to be mobilized in the future. When the person reflectively endorses these practices as central and representative of their most cherished identities, we may speak of *deeply internalized nondeclarative culture*. This nondeclarative culture “aligns” with the cognitive and meta-cognitive dimensions of depth of internalization. People are motivated (either intrinsically or extrinsically) to foster, cultivate, and enhance their mastery of the deeply internalized nondeclarative culture, which may thus be considered as either personal “talents” or even personal *virtues* in the moral sense (Guhin & Klett, 2022). These are the “cultured competencies” people are proud to have mastered and which play a central role in securing membership in formal and informal groups and associations—supporting the verification of group and role identities (Burke & Stets, 2015)—that are key to belonging, such as churches, occupations,

recreational groups, and the like (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; Simmel, 1949).

12.4.5 Implicit Culture

Notably, there may be forms of deeply internalized nondeclarative culture, in the *cognitive* sense of being chronically accessible, *not* deeply internalized in the *meta-cognitive* reflective endorsement sense; namely, nondeclarative culture regularly elicited and activated in context (due to its chronic accessibility) but which the person would not endorse as valid or reflective of their identity. This type of internalized nondeclarative culture could even be *antithetical*—in terms of relevant identity meanings—to the declarative culture that has been deeply internalized in the sense of being reflectively endorsed as being relevant for identity verification. Nondeclarative culture high in chronic accessibility but low in reflective endorsement may seem paradoxical (Gendler, 2008). Why would people chronically and habitually mobilize nondeclarative culture that could potentially clash with their most deeply held self-conceptions and interfere with identity verification? Despite its seemingly paradoxical status, these are precisely the nondeclarative cultural elements that have captured the imagination of social psychologists for the last two decades in the wake of the so-called “implicit-measure” revolution (Nosek et al., 2011). Thus, internalized nondeclarative cultural elements high in chronic accessibility but low in reflective endorsement are psychologically real and sociologically significant (Madva & Brownstein, 2018; Melamed et al., 2019; Olsson, 2023).

The now well-established distinction between “self-reports” and “implicit measures” reflects the realization that people may internalize discrepant versions of declarative and nondeclarative culture (Fazio & Olson, 2003). That is, everyday experience and the nondeclarative culture internalized from it can push in a different direction from the explicit

cultural teachings transmitted via symbolic media and internalized as declarative commitments (Nosek & Hansen, 2008). This phenomenon typically appears in so-called “dissociations” between explicit self-reports and implicit measures in research on attitudes and stereotypes in cognitive social psychology (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). For instance, a self-identified white person raised in the United States may report favorable attitudes towards Black people at the declarative level. These affective and cognitive states, in turn, are chronically accessible (the first ones to come to mind) and reflectively endorsed as central to the person’s “tolerant” or “liberal” identity. These cultural elements are, in Swidler’s terms, “sincerely held” and thus “personalized” as reflective of an individual’s self-conception as tolerant and unprejudiced. Accordingly, this is also declarative culture that is “deeply internalized” by the meta-cognitive criteria previously outlined. However, the same person can be shown to implicitly associate Black people as a group, as do large swaths of white people in the U.S. (Melamed et al., 2019), with a host of negative concepts (such as violence, lack of intelligence, or laziness) at the nondeclarative level.

Presented with such evidence, most white Americans would reject the implicit associations as not reflective of their “personal” values, thus counting as culture that has been internalized, perhaps as the inevitable result of everyday cultural experience in a racist society (Dasgupta, 2013), but which is phenomenologically experienced as “extra-personal.”⁶ This culture is only “weakly coupled” to the deeply internalized declarative commitments espoused by the person.⁷ It is important to note that, despite such dissociations existing in a subset of the population, the normal state of affairs is *correspondence* (positive correlations) between

⁶ For a discussion of the measurement problems and conceptual issues, this poses for attitudes research see Gawronski et al. (2008).

⁷ Accordingly, it is thus a fundamental mistake to treat implicit measures as reflecting people’s “true” selves. The opposite is the case; while implicit measures reflect the outcome of systematic exposure to racialized experiences, when these experiences clash against reflectively endorsed conceptions, they are unlikely to be thought of as “true” of the self (regardless of their effects on behavior).

self-report and implicit measures (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011), speaking to the fact that for most people, the culture they reflectively endorse at the declarative level is consistent with that enacted nondeclarative in the form of habits and practices.

We get an even more complex situation if “outside-in” processes of familiarity with an external cultural code perceived as binding but *not* reflectively endorsed drive the initial declarative statement of value or belief. For instance, let us say another white American person is explicitly queried about their attitude towards Black people, responding in ways indistinguishable from the case considered earlier (e.g., “unprejudiced” responses reflective of positive explicit attitudes) while, when tested using indirect measures, showing the traditional negative nondeclarative associations held by most of the white population. In this case, the person produced the explicit response not by drawing on deeply internalized cultural commitments but by recognizing the situation as one that required them to submit to the externally imposed self-presentational strictures of a code of “political correctness” (Plant & Devine, 2001). Here, the existing declarative commitments that the individual holds are falsified for self-presentation in context, with people having internalized and even reflectively endorsing, as private beliefs, a panoply of anti-Black attitudes. Here, the revelation that the person also harbors nondeclarative dispositions to view Black people negatively counts as both weakly coupled, relative to the “insincere” and even “cynical” allegiance to the public code of political correctness, and strongly connected to the person’s deeply internalized, but covert, cultural commitments.

12.5 Culture and Social Psychology Across Levels

12.5.1 A Typology of Internalized Personal Culture

The different ways people internalize culture are summarized in Table 12.1. The table

distinguishes six types of internalized cultural elements by cross-classifying the reflective endorsement dimension (yes/no) against the availability/accessibility dimension for declarative and nondeclarative culture, as discussed earlier. People reflectively endorse the most deeply internalized cultural elements as part of their prominent roles and group identities, self-concepts, and stated commitments. These elements are *also* habitually and reliably deployed in talk, action, and interaction with regularity across settings and situations. For instance, in an interview setting aimed at observing declarative culture, these would be the first to come to mind (accessibility) and endorsed by people as their true convictions (reflective endorsement). In ethnographic, experimental, or focus group settings, the aim is to observe nondeclarative culture in action (Jerolmack & Khan, 2014); these would be those actions, gut reactions, competencies, skills, and dispositions that an outside observer can ascertain are indeed driving people's actions and responses in context *and* that the same people would endorse as part of their identity, let us say as part of an ethnographic field interview (Rinaldo & Guhin, 2022).

Table 12.1. Analytic typology of internalized cultural elements

	Reflective Endorsement?	(Chronically) Accessible	Available
Declarative Culture	Yes	Deeply Internalized Declarative Culture	Superficially Internalized Declarative Culture
	No	Strongly Binding External Code	
Nondeclarative Culture	Yes	Deeply Internalized Nondeclarative Culture	Nondeclarative Culture In Abeyance
	No	Loosely Coupled Nondeclarative Culture	

By contrast, weakly internalized cultural elements are those not reliably and habitually

deployed in action and talk. Whether these cultural elements influence action and interaction becomes more of a context-dependent question, linking the micro and macro cultural levels (Payne et al., 2017). Note that because these weakly internalized cultural elements operate in the “background,” the reflective endorsement dimension is less critical in ascertaining their empirical relevance. Thus, in the case of declarative culture, this is the storehouse of merely available sayings, half-hearted (usually contradictory) beliefs, stereotyped vocabularies of motive, and the like that people *could* draw on but seldom do in their everyday lives. The subset of reflectively endorsed declarative elements merges into the ones superficially internalized as part of the larger cultural “commonsense.” In the case of so-called third-order belief, the environmental input shows itself in situations requiring high-level coordination with the presumed preferences and wishes of others (Correll et al., 2017). In this case, even a superficially internalized declarative element, one endowed with low levels of reflective endorsement as a “personalized” aspect of internalized culture, can come to strongly constrain action in the standard outside-in manner described by Swidler (2001a).

Similarly, weakly internalized nondeclarative culture consists of skilled abilities and cultured competencies people acquire via the slow habituation and enskilment pathway, which are seldom used or drawn upon. These are encultured abilities that people *could* use but seldom *do* use, given their current life circumstances. Note that because these dispositions are infrequently manifested (or skills practiced), reflective endorsement matters less here since they are, by implication, less central to personal identity meanings (so even a disposition that a person may find noxious and reject as reflecting their commitments seldom rears its ugly head). Drawing an analogy from social movement theory (Taylor, 1989), we may call this “nondeclarative culture in abeyance.”⁸

⁸ Note that if there is a change in context, it is possible for some cultural elements to “travel” from the weakly

Finally, the typology accommodates cultural elements of problematic, ambiguous, or “in-between” internalization status (Schwitzgebel, 2010), such as so-called “implicit” racist, homophobic, transphobic, and misogynist dispositions and practices enacted by people who see themselves as tolerant are clear examples of contradictorily internalized cultural elements. Dispositions to behave contrary to declaratively professed beliefs are chronically accessible (and thus deployed in action habitually and frequently despite minor or sporadic awareness) without being reflectively endorsed by the person. The same goes for declarative beliefs chronically deployed in talk by people in public situations requiring particular forms of self-presentation or motive justification but which are personally rejected as part of their self-identity, as with codes of “political correctness” seen as imposed by external authorities. Both cases feature powerful outside-in effects of societal context on action but via different mechanisms, some more consistent with Swidler’s original formulation than others.

In the case of the “implicit” prejudiced actions and judgments produced by reflectively unprejudiced people, we find the imprint on practice resulting from being tacitly enculturated in sexist, racist, homophobic, and transphobic social systems (Payne et al., 2017) and internalized as habituated chronically available non-declarative culture (a macro to micro pathway). Here, culture comes from the “outside-in” but, as a result of tacit learning and implicit habituation (Arseniev-Koehler & Foster, 2022), becomes the sort of nondeclarative practice that operates from the “inside out” as in the influential “strong practice theory” formulation of Bourdieu (1990). In contrast, whenever a person expresses a commitment they do not personally abide by, we see a more Swidlerian “outside in” impact of highly codified and consensually established social codes that create “conformity” to their expectations even when there is no “deep”

internalized boxes to the more deeply internalized one. Accordingly, cultured competencies seldom put to use, can become habitual elements (a skilled singer can join a church choir), or a half-hearted or superficially internalized belief can become a central part of personal identity after joining a particular group that deems it non-negotiable.

internalization of declarative culture in the form of reflective commitment and centrality to identity. “Speech codes” or “public norms” in specific institutional settings may have this effect on some members (producing stereotyped declarations of conformity with public codes), but *not* for the true believers or enforcers of the norms for whom it counts as deeply internalized in the traditional sense. Note that insofar as conformity with some public codes—as in Swidler’s example of gift-giving during prescribed holidays like Valentine’s Day—has both declarative *and* behavioral implications, public codes may also generate a type of reflectively non-endorsed but intentionally produced practices (e.g., routinely buying chocolate for a spouse every year even if “romantic” is not a highly valued part of personal identity). This type of weakly internalized nondeclarative culture, produced by classic “outside in” mechanisms, is distinct from that manifested as implicit prejudice by reflectively tolerant people, namely, reflectively unendorsed practices that are *also* partially independent of intention.

12.5.2 Toward A Multilevel Model Of Culture In Action

In this chapter, I have outlined the strengths and limitations of Swidler’s “outside-in” model of how culture comes to affect action. Swidler’s model presents itself as an attractive and economical alternative to classical understandings of how culture can be influential in bringing systematicity to action, emphasizing its functional role operating from the “inside-out.” A vital contribution of the outside-in perspective is to point to recurrent social mechanisms that can account for systematic patterns of action without “deep” internalization in the form of pervasive declarative commitments central to personal identity. The model can also account for another puzzle besetting the functionalist explanatory tradition: that sometimes we can find people have deeply internalized personal culture without this leading to its having systematic or consistent

effects on action.

I argued that, as initially formulated (Swidler, 2001a, pp. 160–180), the outside-in model suffers from fundamental ambiguities preventing the analyst from ascertaining the overall applicability of some key propositions to critical empirical phenomena. Mainly, Swidler was ambiguous as to what exactly was meant by the notion of “deep” internalization and, relatedly, regarding whether we need to emphasize different dimensions of this notion when dealing with the two distinct ways culture can be internalized. I showed that analytic attention to four core social psychological processes, namely, dynamics of knowledge accessibility and availability, reflective endorsement emerging from proximity to prominent identity meanings and the self-concept, awareness of societally binding third-order beliefs, and internalization of implicit cultural knowledge, can help us unpack the complex ways in which culture can be internalized and ultimately link to action (or not).

The model can also help us conceptualize how cultural and social psychological dynamics link across levels of analysis, more or less as depicted in Figure 12.1. The Figure distinguishes three levels of cultural analysis (or distribution): a macrolevel of widely shared explicit understandings, narratives, and codes, what has recently been referred to as “public culture,” along with pervasive institutional arrangements, codified systems of conventions and understandings, and systematic experiences, which may or may not be noticed explicitly (Payne et al., 2017). This culture can be considered widely shared and more or less evenly experienced at the societal level. There is also a “mesolevel” public culture that is more unevenly distributed among more or less institutionally bounded institutional and organizational domains (e.g., schools, neighborhoods, formal and informal organizations, down to specific “group cultures”). Finally, there are microlevel dynamics of cultural acquisition, interaction, and expression, where

deeply and not-so-deeply internalized cultural patterns link to action and interaction in context (as in the multiple upwards arrows in the Figure), thus helping to reproduce meso and macrolevel public culture.




Figure 12.1. Multi-level model of culture in action

Two dynamics link culture across levels, accounting for both “outside-in” and “inside-out” dynamics, contributing to the reproduction of dominant macrolevel cultural patterns. From an outside-in perspective, culture operates primarily via awareness and availability of widely shared cultural codes, vocabularies of motive, and common knowledge of general preferences. When contexts demand interpersonal coordination or imply monitoring or surveillance by established authorities, these codes become salient, subsequently driving patterns of talk, self-presentation, action, and interaction independently of whether the person has deeply internalized these cultural elements. The macro-micro link here operates mainly via the external constraint offered by the dominant codes, which define the situation and help people align with

their perception of the established consensus. For instance, people may orient themselves to the reigning critical consensus around a cultural object when considering buying it (e.g., a book) as a gift rather than for personal enjoyment (Sharkey & Kovács, 2018). Or they may take for granted as a social fact the “code of the street” that governs interactional patterns in the inner city, whether they approve of it or not (Patterson, 2015). The key social-psychological mechanism, as detailed earlier, is an orientation to “third-order” beliefs, which tend to reproduce status order independently of first-order beliefs about the merits or demerits of members of societally recognized categories.

That said, macrolevel culture can also be reproduced from microlevel dynamics in mesolevel contexts via more traditional mechanisms, involving systematic (and sometimes even “deep”) internalization of external cultural patterns encountered in experience or reflected via widely shared cultural beliefs, narratives, and schemata. Here, microlevel dynamics dictate which aspects of this merely “available” culture become accessible to regulate action (sometimes chronically so) and which subset of this accessible culture becomes available for reflection and incorporation into prominent role and group identities and the self-concept. When these two conditions are satisfied, this deeply internalized culture is routinely mobilized in talk, action, and interaction in groups, organizations, and institutions, helping reproduce the macrolevel cultural patterns that gave rise to it. Notably, while reflective endorsement, affective commitment, and proximity to identity are powerful social psychological mechanisms accounting for some aspects of cultural reproduction from the “inside out” (Burke & Stets, 2015; Miles, 2014), habituation and cultural accessibility mechanisms operating outside of awareness (as in the case of implicit attitudes) and independent of reflective endorsement can, under relatively common circumstances, be sufficient to guide action and interaction. Thus, there are multiple ways

microlevel culture operates to reproduce extant cultural patterns via distinct but sometimes interacting social-psychological mechanisms.

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