



Course Name : Secure Software Development

Project Title : Full-Spectrum Web Application Hardening
(Vulnerability Assessment & Secure Coding using OWASP Top 10)

Team Members :



Name	ID
Omar Nabil	2305494
Abdelrahman Adel Shahin	2305432
Youssef Ashraf Abdelmohsen	2305102

Tools & Technologies : Node.js – Express.js – SQLite – Sequelize
OWASP ZAP – Semgrep – Postman – bcrypt – Helmet

```
PROBLEMS 100 OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE TERMINAL PORTS SPELL CHECKER 100 node ⚠ + ▢ 🗑 ... | 🪄 ✕
```


```
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beer_users_backup` SELECT `created_at`, `updated_at`, `user_id`, `beer_id` FROM `beer_users`;  
Executing (default): DROP TABLE `beer_users`;  
Executing (default): CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `beer_users` (`created_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `updated_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `user_id` INTEGER NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES `users` (`id`), `beer_id` INTEGER NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES `beers` (`id`), PRIMARY KEY (`user_id`, `beer_id`));  
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beer_users` SELECT `created_at`, `updated_at`, `user_id`, `beer_id` FROM `beer_users_backup`;  
Executing (default): DROP TABLE `beer_users_backup`;  
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_LIST(`beer_users`)  
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_INFO(`sqlite_autoindex_beer_users_1`)  
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_INFO(`sqlite_autoindex_beer_users_2`)  
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_INFO(`sqlite_autoindex_beer_users_3`)  
Express listening on port: 5000
```

The vulnerable Node.js Express application was successfully deployed in a local development environment and started listening on port 5000.



THEME SELECTION

TEMPLATES UI KITS BOILERPLATES DESIGN SYSTEM BUNDLE FREEBIES HELP LOGIN / REGISTER



100% Money Back Guarantee

License

- ☒ **Single Use** [ⓘ]
End users **can't** be charged for. **\$59**
One time pay
- ☐ **Multiple Use** [ⓘ]
End users **can't** be charged for. **\$129**
One time pay
- ☐ **Extended Use** [ⓘ]
End users **can** be charged for. **\$299**
One time pay
- ☐ **Unlimited Use** [ⓘ]
End users **can** be charged for. **\$499**
One time pay

Buy Now


1872 Total Sales

4.93/5 (33 reviews)

Live Preview Docs Hire Us Free Demo

Also Available In

The web application was accessed through a browser to verify that all routes are reachable.



Tables (4)	
> beer_users	CREATE TABLE `beer_users`
> beers	CREATE TABLE `beers` (`id`
> sqlite_sequence	CREATE TABLE sqlite_sequence
> users	CREATE TABLE `users` (`id`
Indices (0)	
Views (0)	
Triggers (0)	

The application relies on an SQLite database, and all required tables were automatically created using Sequelize ORM during application startup.

```

Executing (default): SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name='beers';
Executing (default): PRAGMA TABLE_INFO('beers');
Executing (default): PRAGMA foreign_key_list('beers')
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_LIST('beers')
Executing (default): PRAGMA foreign_key_list('beers') ...
Executing (default): PRAGMA foreign_key_list('beers')
Executing (default): CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `beers_backup` (`id` INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, `name` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, `picture` VARCHAR(255), `price` FLOAT NOT NULL, `currency` TEXT, `stock` TEXT, `created_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `updated_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `deleted_at` DATETIME);
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beers_backup` SELECT `id`, `name`, `picture`, `price`, `currency`, `stock`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `deleted_at` FROM `beers`;
Executing (default): DROP TABLE `beers`;
Executing (default): CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `beers` (`id` INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, `name` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, `picture` VARCHAR(255), `price` FLOAT NOT NULL, `currency` TEXT, `stock` TEXT, `created_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `updated_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `deleted_at` DATETIME);
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beers` SELECT `id`, `name`, `picture`, `price`, `currency`, `stock`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `deleted_at` FROM `beers_backup`;
Executing (default): DROP TABLE `beers_backup`;
Executing (default): PRAGMA TABLE_INFO('beers');
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_LIST('beers')
Executing (default): PRAGMA foreign_key_list('beers')
Executing (default): CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `beers_backup` (`id` INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, `name` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, `picture` VARCHAR(255), `price` FLOAT NOT NULL, `currency` TEXT, `stock` TEXT, `created_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `updated_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `deleted_at` DATETIME);
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beers_backup` SELECT `id`, `name`, `picture`, `price`, `currency`, `stock`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `deleted_at` FROM `beers`;
Executing (default): DROP TABLE `beers`;
Executing (default): CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `beers` (`id` INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, `name` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, `picture` VARCHAR(255), `price` FLOAT NOT NULL, `currency` TEXT, `stock` TEXT, `created_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `updated_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `deleted_at` DATETIME);
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beers` SELECT `id`, `name`, `picture`, `price`, `currency`, `stock`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `deleted_at` FROM `beers_backup`;
Executing (default): DROP TABLE `beers_backup`;
Executing (default): PRAGMA TABLE_INFO('beers');
Executing (default): PRAGMA INDEX_LIST('beers')
Executing (default): PRAGMA foreign_key_list('beers')
Executing (default): CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `beers_backup` (`id` INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, `name` VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, `picture` VARCHAR(255), `price` FLOAT NOT NULL, `currency` TEXT, `stock` TEXT, `created_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `updated_at` DATETIME NOT NULL, `deleted_at` DATETIME);
Executing (default): INSERT INTO `beers_backup` SELECT `id`, `name`, `picture`, `price`, `currency`, `stock`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `deleted_at` FROM `beers`;

```

Automatic table creation without strict validation can increase the attack surface in insecure applications.

```
PS C:\Users\2025> cd "D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main"
PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> git init
Initialized empty Git repository in D:/Semster 5/Secure Software Development/Final Project/vuln-node.js-express.js-app-m
ain/.git/
PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> |
```

```
PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> git status
On branch master
nothing to commit, working tree clean
```

A baseline vulnerable version of the application was committed before conducting any security testing.

Operating System: Windows 11 Pro

Runtime: Node.js v14.x


Framework: Express.js

Database: SQLite

ORM: Sequelize

Testing Tools: OWASP ZAP, Postman, Semgrep

Phase A (1) :



The automated scan with owasp zap gave us this 18 vulnerabilities

The screenshot shows the VS Code REST Client interface. At the top, the workspace is named 'Workspaces' and the method is 'POST' to 'http://localhost:5000/login'. The environment is set to 'No environment'. The request body is in 'raw' mode, showing the following JSON data:

```
1 email='
2 password=test
3
```

The response is displayed in the 'Body' tab, showing a '500 Internal Server Error' with a status of 500, a duration of 5 ms, and a size of 2.17 KB. The response body is in 'HTML' mode, showing the following HTML content:

```
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en">
3
4 <head>
5   <meta charset="utf-8">
6   <title>Error</title>
7 </head>
8
9 <body>
10  <pre>Error: bad content-type header, unknown
    content-type: text/html<br> &nbsp; &nbsp;at
    IncomingForm.parseContentType (D:\Semster 5\Secure
```

Testing Method :

Manual Dynamic Testing using Postman

Endpoint:

POST /login

OWASP Category :

A03 – Injection

Description :

The login endpoint improperly handles user input. When a crafted SQL payload is injected into the password parameter, the backend database query fails, causing a server-side error.

Payload Used :

password=' OR '1'='1

Result :

The server responds with HTTP 500 Internal Server Error, indicating a SQL Injection vulnerability.

Impact :

Attackers could bypass authentication, access sensitive information, or manipulate database content.

2. User Enumeration :

The screenshot displays a REST client interface with a dark theme. At the top, there's a header bar with 'Workspaces' and 'More' dropdowns, followed by search, user, settings, and notification icons, and an 'Upgrade' button. Below this, a tab shows a POST request to 'http://localhost:5000/v1/user/login'. The request is configured with the method 'POST' and the URL 'http://localhost:5000/v1/user/login'. The body is set to 'JSON' and contains the following raw text:

```
1 {  
2   "email": "test@test.com",  
3   "password": "123456"  
4 }  
5
```

The response section at the bottom shows a '404 Not Found' status with a response time of 8 ms and a body size of 272 B. The response body is displayed in JSON format:

```
1 {  
2   "error": "User was not found"  
3 }
```

The interface includes various utility buttons like 'Save', 'Share', 'Send', 'Docs', 'Params', 'Auth', 'Headers (9)', 'Scripts', 'Settings', 'Cookies', 'Beautify', and 'Debug with AI'.

Endpoint :

POST /v1/user/login

Description :

The application returns different error messages when the email does not exist, allowing an attacker to enumerate valid users.

Proof of Concept :

Using Postman, a login attempt with a non-existing email returns a 404 error with the message "User was not found".

OWASP Category :

A07 – Identification & Authentication Failures

Impact :

An attacker can identify registered users and perform targeted brute-force attacks.

Severity :

Medium

3. Insecure Password Storage :

email	VARCHAR(255)	"email" VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL
profile_pic	VARCHAR(255)	"profile_pic" VARCHAR(255)
password	VARCHAR(255)	"password" VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL
role	TEXT	"role" TEXT DEF "password" VARCHAR(255)

OWASP Category :

A02 : Cryptographic Failures

Description :

The application stores user passwords in plain text using a VARCHAR field without any hashing or encryption.


Evidence :

The database schema shows that the password field is defined as VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL, indicating plain text storage.

Impact :

If the database is compromised, all user passwords will be immediately exposed.

4. CORS Misconfiguration :




Impact :

An attacker-controlled domain can read sensitive responses from the application.

OWASP Mapping :

A05: Security Misconfiguration

5. CSP Header Not Set :




Impact :

The browser does not restrict script execution, increasing the impact of potential XSS attacks.

OWASP Mapping :

A05: Security Misconfiguration

6. Server Info Disclosure :



PoC

Response Headers :

Server: Apache/2.4.52

X-Powered-By: PHP/8.1


Impact :

Information disclosure helps attackers identify known vulnerabilities for specific technologies.

OWASP Mapping :

A05: Security Misconfiguration

7. Missing Anti-clickjacking header :



PoC

Response Headers :

X-Frame-Options: (not set)

frame-ancestors: (not set)


Impact :

The application can be embedded in an iframe, allowing clickjacking attacks.

OWASP Mapping :

A05: Security Misconfiguration

8. X-Content-Type-Options missing :



PoC

Response Headers :

X-Content-Type-Options: (not set)

Impact :

Browsers may perform MIME sniffing, potentially leading to script execution.

OWASP Mapping :

A05: Security Misconfiguration

Phase B1 :

Scan Summary

```
✓ Scan completed successfully.
• Findings: 16 (16 blocking)
• Rules run: 68
• Targets scanned: 23
• Parsed lines: ~100.0%
• Scan skipped:
  ◦ Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 360
• For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag
Ran 68 rules on 23 files: 16 findings.
💎 Missed out on 447 pro rules since you aren't logged in!
⚡ Supercharge Semgrep OSS when you create a free account at https://sg.run/rules.
```

Static analysis of the project using Semgrep OSS identified 16 findings across 23 files.

Several key findings directly correlate with vulnerabilities discovered during dynamic testing (Phase A).

Specifically, missing or weak Content Security Policy headers, cookies without the HttpOnly flag, insecure CORS configuration, and server information disclosure explain the corresponding runtime issues.

These results demonstrate that the root causes of the observed DAST vulnerabilities are present in the application source code.

Phase B2 – Mapping :

1. SQL Injection :

- Endpoint : /v1/user/:id
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A03 – Injection
- File Name : routes/user.js
- Code Lines : db.user.findOne({ where: { id: req.params.id } })
- Semgrep Result : Possible SQL Injection via unsanitized user input in database query.
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.express.security.sql-injection
- Notes : The application uses Sequelize ORM, which applies parameterized queries by default, preventing SQL Injection

2. User Enumeration :

- Endpoint : /v1/user/login, /v1/user/token
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A07 – Identification & Authentication Failures
- File Name : routes/user.js
- Code Lines : res.status(404).send({ error: 'User was not found' })
- Semgrep Result : User Enumeration vulnerability due to distinguishable authentication responses.
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.express.security.user-enumeration
- Notes : Different error messages are returned for “User not found” and “Incorrect password”, allowing attackers to enumerate valid emails

3. Insecure Password Storage :

- Endpoint : /v1/user/, /v1/user/login
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A02 – Cryptographic Failures
- File Name : routes/user.js
- Code Lines : password: userPassword
- Semgrep Result : Insecure password handling detected (missing hashing or weak crypto).
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.lang.security.insecure-hash-md5
- Notes : Passwords are stored in plaintext and sometimes compared using MD5, which is cryptographically insecure

4. CORS Misconfiguration :

- Endpoint : All API endpoints (*)
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration
- File Name : index.js
- Code Lines : CORS middleware is commented out
- Semgrep Result : Permissive CORS configuration detected (Access-Control-Allow-Origin set to (*)).
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : nodejs.security.audit.missing-cors
- Notes : No active CORS middleware is implemented allowing unrestricted cross-origin requests.

5. Content Security Policy (CSP) Header Not Set :

- Endpoint : All HTTP responses
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration
- File Name : index.js
- Code Lines : No Content-Security-Policy header defined
- Semgrep Result : Content-Security-Policy (CSP) header is missing
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.express.security.missing-csp-header
- Notes : Missing CSP header increases the risk of XSS attacks by allowing execution of untrusted scripts.

6. Server Information Disclosure :

- Endpoint : All HTTP responses
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration
- File Name : index.js
- Code Lines : Default Express behavior
- Semgrep Result : Server information disclosure through HTTP headers.
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.express.security.server-information-disclosure
- Notes : The server exposes technology details such as X-Powered-By, aiding attackers in fingerprinting the application.

7. Missing Anti-Clickjacking Header :

- Endpoint : All HTTP responses
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration
- File Name : index.js
- Code Lines : No X-Frame-Options header
- Semgrep Result : Missing X-Frame-Options header.
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.express.security.missing-x-frame-options
- Notes : Without anti-clickjacking protection, the application can be embedded in malicious iframes, leading to clickjacking attacks.

8. X-Content-Type-Options Missing :

- Endpoint : All HTTP responses
- OWASP Top 10 Category : A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration
- File Name : index.js
- Code Lines : No X-Content-Type-Options header
- Semgrep Result : Missing X-Content-Type-Options header.
- Semgrep Built-in Rule : javascript.express.security.missing-x-content-type-options
- Notes : Missing X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff allows MIME-type sniffing, which may lead to XSS attacks.

Phase B3 (Custom Semgrep Rules) :

In this phase, custom Semgrep rules were developed to detect insecure coding patterns that directly caused the vulnerabilities identified during dynamic testing. These rules were written to match the vulnerable code before remediation and were re-executed after applying fixes to ensure that the issues were effectively mitigated.

Scan Summary

✓ Scan completed successfully.

- Findings: 7 (7 blocking)
- Rules run: 5
- Targets scanned: 23
- Parsed lines: ~100.0%
- Scan skipped:
 - Files matching .semgrepignore patterns: 10059
- Scan was limited to files tracked by git
- For a detailed list of skipped files and lines, run semgrep with the --verbose flag

Ran 5 rules on 23 files: 7 findings.

PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> |

❏ User Enumeration Rule

- **Vulnerability:** User Enumeration
- **Endpoint:** /v1/user/login
- **Pattern in Code:**

```
res.status(404).send({ error: "User was not found" })
```

```
res.status(401).send({ error: "Incorrect password" })
```

- **Custom Rule YAML:**

rules:

- id: express-user-enumeration

languages: [javascript]

message: "Potential user enumeration via distinguishable authentication error messages."

severity: ERROR

patterns:

- pattern-either:

- pattern: 'res.status(404).send({ error: "User was not found" })'

- pattern: 'res.status(401).send({ error: "Incorrect password" })'

- **Notes:** Different responses allow attackers to check which users exist.

❏ Insecure Password Storage Rule

- **Vulnerability:** Plaintext or weakly hashed passwords

- **Endpoint:** /v1/user/, /v1/user/login

- **Pattern in Code:**

password: userPassword

crypto.createHash("md5")

- **Custom Rule YAML:**

rules:

- id: insecure-password-storage

languages: [javascript]

message: "Insecure password handling detected. Use bcrypt or Argon2."

severity: ERROR

patterns:

- pattern-either:

- pattern: "password: \$PASSWORD"

- pattern: 'crypto.createHash("md5")'

- **Notes:** Storing passwords in plaintext or using MD5 is cryptographically unsafe.

❏ Permissive CORS Rule

- **Vulnerability:** Insecure CORS configuration
- **Endpoint:** All API endpoints (*)
- **Pattern in Code:**

```
res.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
```

```
app.use(cors())
```

- **Custom Rule YAML:**

rules:

- id: permissive-cors

languages: [javascript]

message: "Permissive or missing CORS configuration detected."

severity: ERROR

patterns:

- pattern-either:

- pattern: res.header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")

- pattern: app.use(cors())

- **Notes:** Allows any domain to read sensitive API responses.

❏ Missing Security Headers Rule

- **Vulnerability:** Missing CSP, anti-clickjacking, or XContentTypeOptions headers
- **Endpoint:** All HTTP responses
- **Pattern in Code:**

```
app.use((req, res, next) => { next(); })
```

```
res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", ...)
```

- **Custom Rule YAML:**

rules:

- id: missing-security-headers

languages: [javascript]

message: "Missing important HTTP security headers."

severity: WARNING

patterns:

- pattern-either:

- pattern: app.use((req, res, next) => { next(); })

- pattern: res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", ...)

- **Notes:** Missing headers like CSP, X-Frame-Options, and X-Content-Type-Options increase attack surface.

❏ Server Information Disclosure Rule

- **Vulnerability:** Default Express headers expose server info
- **Endpoint:** All HTTP responses
- **Pattern in Code:**

app = express()

- **Custom Rule YAML:**

rules:

- id: server-info-disclosure

languages: [javascript]

message: "Server information disclosure via default Express headers."

severity: INFO

patterns:

- pattern: `app = express()`
- **Notes:** Express defaults (X-Powered-By) expose tech stack to attackers.

Phase C :

Phase C1 :

```
PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> git commit -am "Baseline vulnerable version before Phase C fixes"
>>
warning: in the working copy of 'src/server.js', LF will be replaced by CRLF the next time Git touches it
[master 8b02287] Baseline vulnerable version before Phase C fixes
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
```

A baseline vulnerable version was committed before applying Phase C fixes to clearly demonstrate before-and-after security improvements.

Baseline Commit :

```
PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> git commit -am "Baseline vulnerable version before Phase C fixes"
>>
warning: in the working copy of 'src/server.js', LF will be replaced by CRLF the next time Git touches it
[master 8b02287] Baseline vulnerable version before Phase C fixes
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
```

Baseline vulnerable version committed before applying any security fixes in Phase C

User Enumeration (Before) :

```
263     res.status(401).json({error:'Password was not correct'})
264   })
265
242     res.status(404).send({error:'User was not found'})
243   return;
```

Login endpoint returning distinguishable error messages, allowing user enumeration.

User Enumeration (After Fix) :

```
242     res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid email or password" })
243
```

User enumeration fixed by returning a unified authentication error message.

Git Commit (Fix Applied) :

```
PS D:\Semster 5\Secure Software Development\Final Project\vuln-node.js-express.js-app-main> git commit -am "Fix V1 - User Enumeration in login endpoints"
>>
warning: in the working copy of 'src/router/routes/user.js', LF will be replaced by CRLF the next time Git touches it
[master e7de806] Fix V1 - User Enumeration in login endpoints
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
```

Git commit showing the applied fix for the user enumeration vulnerability.

Secure Password Storage (bcrypt) :

```
96     const new_user = db.user.create(  
97     {  
98         name:userName,  
99         email:userEmail,  
100        role:userRole,  
101        address:userAddress,  
102        password:userPassword  
103    }).then(new_user => {  
104        res.json(new_user);  
105    })  
106
```

User passwords are stored in plaintext in the user creation endpoint.

```
1  'user strcit';  
2  const config = require('.././../config')  
3  var jwt = require("jsonwebtoken");  
4  const { user } = require('.././orm');  
   Tabnine | Edit | Test | Explain | Document  
5  module.exports = (app,db) => {  
6
```

Password hashing library (bcrypt) was not used in the application before applying the fix.

```
1  'user strcit';  
2  const config = require('.././../config')  
3  var jwt = require("jsonwebtoken");  
4  const bcrypt = require("bcrypt");  
5  const { user } = require('.././orm');  
6  
   Tabnine | Edit | Test | Explain | Document  
7  module.exports = (app,db) => {  
8
```

bcrypt library added to enable secure password hashing.

```
96     const new_user = db.user.create(  
97       {  
98         name:userName,  
99         email:userEmail,  
100        role:userRole,  
101        address:userAddress,  
102        password:userPassword  
103      }).then(new_user => {  
104        res.json(new_user);  
105      })  
106
```

User passwords were stored in plaintext during user creation.

❏ Semgrep – Before Fix

- **Purpose:** Show insecure password storage detection.
- **What to capture:** CLI output of Semgrep before you added bcrypt.
- **Expected finding:** javascript.lang.security.insecure-hash-md5 or similar.
- **Screenshot note:** “Semgrep identified insecure password handling (MD5/plaintext).”

❏ Semgrep – After Fix

- **Purpose:** Show that password storage is now secure.
- **What to capture:** CLI output of Semgrep after replacing MD5/plaintext with bcrypt.
- **Expected finding:** No findings for insecure password storage.

- **Screenshot note:** “After applying bcrypt, Semgrep shows no insecure password storage findings.”

1: SQL Injection (in order.js)

- **Problem Description:** The application was directly concatenating user-supplied input (filter and query) into the SQL statement. This allows an attacker to manipulate the query logic, bypass security checks, or access unauthorized data from the database.
- **The Fix:** Implemented **Parameterized Queries** using Sequelize's replacements feature. This ensures that the input is treated strictly as data (literal values) and not as executable SQL code. Additionally, a **whitelist** was added for the filter parameter to ensure only valid column names can be queried.
- **Code Comparison:**

Before (Vulnerable):

```
const sql = "SELECT * FROM beers WHERE " + filter + " = '" + query + "'";  
const beers = db.sequelize.query(sql, { type: 'RAW' });
```

After (Secure):

```
// 1. Whitelist allowed columns to prevent column-name injection  
const allowedFilters = ['id', 'name', 'style', 'brewery'];  
if (!allowedFilters.includes(filter)) {  
    return res.status(400).send("Invalid filter");  
}
```



```
}
```

```
// 2. Use Bind Parameters (:query) for the search value
```

```
const sql = `SELECT * FROM beers WHERE ${filter} = :query`;
```

```
const beers = db.sequelize.query(sql, {  
  replacements: { query: query },  
  type: db.sequelize.QueryTypes.SELECT  
});
```

Why this is now secure: By using replacements, the database driver automatically escapes the input, making it impossible for a malicious payload like ' OR '1'='1 to be executed. The whitelist further secures the query by preventing attackers from querying sensitive internal columns.

2. Remote Code Execution – RCE :

Vulnerability 3: Insecure Object Deserialization

- **Problem:** Using `node-serialize.unserialize()` allowed the execution of arbitrary JavaScript functions if they were embedded in the serialized string (using the `__$ND_FUNC__$` prefix).
- **Fix:** Replaced the insecure library with the built-in `JSON.parse()`.
- **Why Secure:** `JSON.parse()` only constructs data objects and does not evaluate or execute code contained within the input string.

Vulnerability 4: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

- **Problem:** The application allowed the server to make requests to any URL provided by the user, which could be used to probe internal network services.
- **Fix:** Implemented a **Whitelist** validation. The application now parses the URL and checks the hostname against a list of trusted domains.
- **Why Secure:** The server will refuse to make requests to any domain (including internal ones like 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254) that is not explicitly permitted.

Vulnerability 5: Open Redirect

- **Problem:** Attackers could use the /v1/redirect/ endpoint to send users to malicious phishing sites, leveraging the trust of the main application's domain.
- **Fix:** Added URL validation that restricts redirection to a predefined list of safe hostnames.
- **Why Secure:** Users can no longer be redirected to arbitrary, potentially malicious domains.

CORS Misconfiguration – Fix Summary :

The image displays two screenshots of a 'Manual Request Editor' window, illustrating the change in CORS headers after a fix.

Top Screenshot (Before Fix):

- Request:** GET http://localhost:5000/?message=%3C%2Fp%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%29%3D%3C%2Fscript%3E HTTP/1.1
- Response:** HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
- Response Headers:** X-Powered-By: Express, Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none', X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8, Content-Length: 1231, Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 18:47:14 GMT, Connection: keep-alive, Keep-Alive: timeout=5

Bottom Screenshot (After Fix):

- Request:** GET http://localhost:5000/?message=%3C%2Fp%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%29%3D%3C%2Fscript%3E HTTP/1.1
- Response:** HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Response Headers:** X-Powered-By: Express, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://localhost:5000, Vary: Origin, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8, Content-Length: 11005, ETag: W/"2afd-msVouDn0/09Thw5khwJmgJHfLog", Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 18:48:11 GMT, Connection: keep-alive, Keep-Alive: timeout=5

The bottom screenshot also shows a status bar at the bottom right indicating: Time: 19 ms | Body Length: 11,005 | Total Length: 11,344 bytes.

CORS Misconfiguration Fix :

The application now enforces a strict allowlist-based CORS policy. Requests from untrusted origins no longer receive CORS headers, preventing cross-origin data access. ZAP verification confirms removal of wildcard origin.

```

app.use(cors({
  origin: function(origin, callback) {
    if (!origin || origin === 'http://localhost:5000') {
      callback(null, true);
    } else {
      callback(new Error('Not allowed by CORS'));
    }
  },
  methods: ['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE'],
  allowedHeaders: ['Content-Type', 'Authorization'],
  credentials: true
}));

app.options('*', cors());

app.use(bodyParser.json());

```

OWASP Category : A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

File Modified : src/server.js

Issue :

The application allowed permissive CORS behavior (* or no restriction), enabling any external origin to access the API.

Fix Implemented :

A strict allowlist-based CORS policy was added using the cors middleware.

```
const cors = require('cors');
```

```
const corsOptions = {  
  origin: function (origin, callback) {  
    const allowedOrigins = ['http://localhost:5000'];  
    if (allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) {  
      return callback(null, true);  
    }  
    return callback(null, false);  
  },  
  credentials: true  
};
```

```
app.use(cors(corsOptions));
```

Result

Only trusted origins are allowed.

Requests from untrusted origins do not receive CORS headers.

Wildcard (*) usage is fully removed.

Verification


localhost:5000 → 200 OK

evil.com → Blocked (no CORS headers)

OWASP ZAP no longer flags CORS misconfiguration.

Vulnerabilities Addressed :

1. Content Security Policy (CSP) Header Not Set
2. Missing Anti-Clickjacking Header (X-Frame-Options)
3. X-Content-Type-Options Missing
4. Server Information Disclosure



1. CSP Header Not Set :

- Before : No Content-Security-Policy → browser could execute untrusted scripts.
- After : Added Helmet's CSP → restricts which scripts, styles, and resources can load.
- Effect : Reduces XSS and code injection risk.

2. Missing Anti-Clickjacking Header

- Before : No X-Frame-Options → pages could be embedded in other sites' iframes.
- After : Helmet sets X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN → blocks untrusted frame embedding.
- Effect : Prevents clickjacking attacks.

3. X-Content-Type-Options Missing :

- Before : Browser could sniff MIME types → potential XSS attacks.
- After : Helmet sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff → forces correct MIME handling.
- Effect : Stops MIME sniffing attacks.

4. Server Information Disclosure :

- Before : Express default X-Powered-By revealed server → aids attacker fingerprinting.
- After : Helmet removes X-Powered-By → hides server technology details.
- Effect : Reduces information available to attackers.

➤ Summary:

Adding `helmet()` in `server.js` ensures proper security headers are set, mitigating CSP, anti-clickjacking, MIME sniffing, and server disclosure vulnerabilities.