FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EXTENDED UTXO MODEL

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Introduction

MOTIVATION

- A lot of blockchain applications recently
- Sophisticated transactional schemes via smart contracts
- Reasoning about their execution is:
 - 1. necessary, significant funds are involved
 - 2. difficult, due to concurrency
- Hence the need for automatic tools that verify no bugs exist
 - This has to be done statically!

BACKGROUND

Bitcoin

- Based on unspent transaction outputs (UTxO)
- Smart contracts in the simple language SCRIPT

Ethereum


- · Based on the notion of accounts
- Smart contracts in (almost) Turing-complete Solidity/EVM

Cardano (IOHK)

- · UTxO-based, with several extensions
- · Due to the extensions, smart contracts become more expressive

METHODOLOGY

- · Keep things on an abstract level
 - Setup long-term foundations
- · Fully mechanized approach, utilizing Agda's rich type system
- Fits well with IOHK's research-oriented approach



EXTENDED UTXO

BASIC TYPES

```
module UTxO. Types (Value: Set) (Hash: Set) where
record State: Set where
  field height : N
record HashFunction (A : Set) : Set where
  field \# : A \rightarrow Hash
         injective : \forall \{x y\} \rightarrow x \# \equiv y \# \rightarrow x \equiv y
postulate
  \#: \forall \{A: Set\} \rightarrow HashFunction A
```

INPUTS AND OUTPUT REFERENCES

```
record TxOutputRef : Set where
   constructor _ @ _
   field id · Hash
          index: \mathbb{N}
record TxInput: Set where
  field outputRef : TxOutputRef
          RD: \mathbb{U}
          redeemer: State \rightarrow el R
          validator : State \rightarrow Value \rightarrow PendingTx \rightarrow el R \rightarrow el D \rightarrow Bool
```

ullet U is a simple type universe for first-order data.

TRANSACTIONS

```
module UTxO (Address: Set) (-\#_a: HashFunction Address)
               (\_\stackrel{?}{=}_a \_: Decidable \{ A = Address \} \_ \equiv \_) where
record TxOutput: Set where
  field value : Value
        address : Address
               : U
        Data
        dataScript: State \rightarrow el \ Data
record Tx: Set where
  field inputs: List TxInput
        outputs: List TxOutput
       forge : Value
       fee : Value
Ledger: Set
```

Validation

```
validate : PendingTx
 \rightarrow (i : TxInput)
 \rightarrow (o : TxOutput)
 \rightarrow D i \equiv Data o
 \rightarrow State
 \rightarrow Bool
validate ptx i o refl st =
validator i st (value o) ptx (redeemer i st) (dataScript o st)
```

UNSPENT OUTPUTS

```
\begin{array}{ll} \textit{unspentOutputs}: \textit{Ledger} \rightarrow \textit{Set} \langle \; \textit{TxOutputRef} \; \rangle \\ \textit{unspentOutputs} \; [\;] &= \varnothing \\ \textit{unspentOutputs} \; (\textit{tx} :: \; \textit{txs}) = (\textit{unspentOutputs} \; \textit{txs} \; \rangle \; \textit{spentOutputsTx} \; \textit{tx}) \\ & \cup \; \textit{unspentOutputsTx} \; \textit{tx} \\ \hline \textbf{where} \\ \textit{spentOutputsTx} \; , \; \textit{unspentOutputsTx} : \; \textit{Tx} \rightarrow \textit{Set} \langle \; \textit{TxOutputRef} \; \rangle \\ \textit{spentOutputsTx} \; &= (\textit{outputRef} \; \langle \; \$ \rangle_{\_}) \; \circ \; \textit{inputs} \\ \textit{unspentOutputsTx} \; \textit{tx} = (\textit{tx} \# \; @_{\_}) \; \langle \; \$ \rangle \; \textit{indices} \; (\textit{outputs} \; \textit{tx}) \\ \end{array}
```

VALIDITY I

```
record IsValidTx (tx : Tx) (l : Ledger) : Set where
field
   validTxRefs: \forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs\ tx \rightarrow i
      Any (\lambda t \rightarrow t \# \equiv id (outputRef i)) l
   validOutputIndices: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
       index (outputRef i) <
           length (outputs (lookupTx \ l \ (outputRef \ i) \ (valid<math>TxRefs \ i \ i \in )))
   validOutputRefs : \forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs tx \rightarrow
       outputRefi \in unspentOutputsl
   validDataScriptTypes: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
       D i \equiv D (lookupOutput \ l (outputRef \ i) \dots)
```

VALIDITY II

```
preserves Values:
  forge tx + sum (lookupValue l ... \langle \$ \rangle inputs tx)
      \equiv
  fee tx + sum (value \langle \$ \rangle outputs tx)
noDoubleSpending:
   noDuplicates (outputRef \langle \$ \rangle inputs tx)
allInputsValidate: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
  let out = lookupOutput l (outputRef i) . . .
       ptx = mkPendingTx l tx validTxRefs validOutputIndices
   in T (validate ptx i out (validDataScriptTypes i i \in) (getState l))
validateValidHashes: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
  let out = lookupOutput l (outputRef i) . . .
   in (address\ out) \# \equiv validator\ i \#
```

VALID LEDGERS

We do not want a ledger to be any list of transactions, but a "snoc"-list that carries proofs of validity:

```
data ValidLedger : Ledger \rightarrow Set where
```

```
 \begin{array}{ll} \cdot & : ValidLedger [\ ] \\ \_ \oplus \_ \dashv \_ : ValidLedger \ l \\ & \rightarrow (tx:Tx) \\ & \rightarrow IsValidTx \ tx \ l \\ & \rightarrow ValidLedger \ (tx::l) \end{array}
```

Decision Procedures

```
validOutputRefs? : \forall (tx : Tx) (l : Ledger)
    \rightarrow Dec (\forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs \ tx \rightarrow outputRef \ i \in unspentOutputs \ l)
validOutputRefs?tx l =
    \forall? (inputs tx) \lambda i \_\rightarrow outputRef i \in? unspentOutputs l
    where
       \forall? : (xs : List A)
             \rightarrow \{P: (x:A) \ (x \in x \in xs) \rightarrow Set\}
             \rightarrow (\forall x \rightarrow (x \in : x \in xs) \rightarrow Dec(Pxx \in X))
             \rightarrow Dec (\forall x x \in \rightarrow P x x \in)
```

Extension: Multi-currency

- 1. Generalize values from integers to maps: $Value = List (Hash \times \mathbb{N})$
- 2. Implement additive group operators (on top of AVL trees):

```
open import Data.AVL N-strictTotalOrder
\_+^{c}\_: Value \rightarrow Value \rightarrow Value
c +^{c} c' = toList (foldl go (fromList c) c')
  where
     go: Tree Hash \mathbb{N} \to (Hash \times \mathbb{N}) \to Tree Hash \mathbb{N}
     go m(k, v) = insertWith \ k((+v) \circ fromMaybe 0) \ m
sum^c: Values \rightarrow Value
sum^c = foldl + c
```

MULTI-CURRENCY: FORGING CONDITION

We now need to enforce monetary policies on forging transactions:

```
record IsValidTx\ (tx:Tx)\ (l:Ledger):Set\ where

:

forging:


\forall\ c \to c \in keys\ (forge\ tx) \to

\exists [i]\ \exists \lambda\ (i\in:i\in inputs\ tx) \to


let out = lookupOutput\ l\ (outputRef\ i)\ \dots

in (address\ out)\ \# \equiv c
```

Example: Transaction Graph



EXAMPLE: TRANSACTION GRAPH + MONETARY POLICY



Example: Setting Up

```
Address = \mathbb{N}
\mathbb{A}, \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{C}: Address
A = 1 -- first address
\mathbb{B} = 2 -- second address
\mathbb{C} = 3 -- third address
open import UTxO Address (\lambda x \rightarrow x)
B-validator : State \rightarrow ... \rightarrow Bool
B-validator (record { height = h}) ... = (h \equiv^b 1) \lor (h \equiv^b 4)
```

Example: Smart Constructors

```
mkValidator: TxOutputRef \rightarrow (... \rightarrow TxOutputRef \rightarrow ... \rightarrow Bool)
mkValidator o \dots o' \dots \equiv o \equiv b o'
\mathbb{B}: \mathbb{N} \to Value
B v = [(B-validator \#, v)]
with Scripts: TxOutputRef \rightarrow TxInput
with Scripts \ o = \mathbf{record} \ \{ output Ref = o \}
                                : redeemer = \lambda \rightarrow 0
                                : validator = mkValidator tin
with Policy: TxOutputRef \rightarrow TxInput
with Policy tin = record \{ outputRef = tin \}
                                 : redeemer = \lambda \longrightarrow tt
                                 : validator = B-validator}
\_ @ \_: Value \rightarrow Index addresses \rightarrow TxOutput
```

Example: Definitions of Transactions

```
c_0, t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5, t_6: Tx
c_0 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [ ] \}
                ; outputs = [B \ 0 \ @ \ (B-validator \#), B \ 0 \ @ \ (B-validator \#)]
                ; forge = B 0
                ; fee = \mathbb{B} \ \mathbf{0}
t_1 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [ with Policy c_{0.0} ] \}
                ; outputs = [B 1000 @ A]
                ; forge = B 1000
                : fee = B 0
t_6 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [withScripts \ t_{50}, withScripts \ t_{51}] \}
                : outputs = [₿ 999 @ ℂ]
                ; forge = B 0
                \cdot fee = \ddot{R} 1
```

EXAMPLE: REWRITE RULES

Our hash function is a postulate, so our decision procedures will get stuck...

```
{-# OPTIONS -rewriting #-}
postulate
eq_{10}: (mkValidator\ t_{10})\# \equiv \mathbb{A}
\vdots
eq_{60}: (mkValidator\ t_{60})\# \equiv \mathbb{C}
{-# BUILTIN REWRITE \_ \equiv \_ \# -}
{-# REWRITE eq_0, eq_{10}, \ldots, eq_{60} \# -}
```

Example: Correct-by-construction Ledger

```
ex-ledger: ValidLedger[t_6, t_5, t_4, t_3, t_2, t_1, c_0]
ex-ledger =
    • c_0 \dashv \mathbf{record} \{\ldots\}
   \oplus t_1 \dashv \mathbf{record} \{ validTxRefs = toWitness \{ Q = validTxRefs? t_1 l_0 \} \ tt \}
                        ; forging = toWitness \{Q = forging?...\}\ tt\}
   \oplus t_6 \dashv \mathbf{record} \{\ldots\}
utxo: list (unspentOutputs ex-ledger) \equiv [t_{60}]
utxo = refl
```



UTxO: Meta-theory

Weakening via Injections

module Weakening

(
$$\mathbb{A}$$
 : Set) ($_\#^a$: HashFunction \mathbb{A}) ($_\stackrel{?}{=}^a$ $_$: Decidable { $A = \mathbb{A}$ } $_\equiv _$) (\mathbb{B} : Set) ($_\#^b$: HashFunction \mathbb{B}) ($_\stackrel{?}{=}^b$ $_$: Decidable { $A = \mathbb{B}$ } $_\equiv _$)

$$(A \hookrightarrow B : \mathbb{A}, \#^a \hookrightarrow \mathbb{B}, \#^b)$$

where

import UTxO. Validity
$$\mathbb{A} = \#^a = \mathring{=}^a = as A$$

import UTxO. Validity $\mathbb{B} = \#^b = \mathring{=}^b = as B$

WEAKENING LEMMA

After translating addresses, validity is preserved:

weakening: $\forall \{tx : A.Tx\} \{l : A.Ledger\}$

 \rightarrow A.IsValidTx tx l

 \rightarrow B.IsValidTx (weakenTx tx) (weakenLedger l)

 $weakening = \dots$

Inspiration from Separation Logic

- · One wants to reason in a modular manner
 - Conversely, one can study a ledger by studying its components, that is we can reason
 compositionally
- In concurrency, P * Q holds for disjoint parts of the memory heap
- In blockchain, P * Q holds for disjoint parts of the ledger
 - But what does it mean for two ledgers to be disjoint?

DISJOINT LEDGERS

Two ledgers l and l' are disjoint, when

- 1. No common transactions: *Disjoint* l $l' = \forall t \rightarrow (t \in l \times v \in l')$
- 2. Validation does not break:

```
PreserveValidations: Ledger \rightarrow Ledger \rightarrow Set

PreserveValidations l \ l'' = \\ \forall \ tx \rightarrow tx \in l \rightarrow tx \in l'' \rightarrow \\ \forall \ \{ ptx \ i \ out \ vds \} \rightarrow validate \ ptx \ i \ out \ vds \ (getState \ (upTo \ tx \ l')) \\ \equiv validate \ ptx \ i \ out \ vds \ (getState \ (upTo \ tx \ l))
```

COMBINING LEDGERS

- $_\leftrightarrow_\dashv_:\forall\{l\ l'l'': Ledger\}$
 - \rightarrow ValidLedger l
 - \rightarrow ValidLedger l'
 - \rightarrow Interleaving l l'l"
 - \times Disjoint $l \ l'$
 - × PreserveValidations l l"
 - × PreserveValidations l'l"

→ ValidLedger l"

Future Work

NEXT STEPS: UTXO

- 1. Multi-currency: non-fungible tokens
 - 2-level maps that introduce intermediate layer with tokens
- 2. Integrate James Chapman's work on plutus-metatheory
 - Plutus terms instead of their denotations (i.e. Agda functions)
- 3. Support for multi-signature schemes

NEXT STEPS: OTHERS

- 1. Proof automation via domain-specific tactics
 - · Accommodate future formalization efforts
- 2. Featherweight Solidity
 - · Provide proof-of-concept model in Agda
 - Perform some initial comparison with UTxO
- 3. Investigate Chad Nester's work on monoidal ledgers
 - This leads to another reasoning device: string diagrams

NEXT STEPS: CERTIFIED COMPILATION

1. ... BitML ...

Conclusion

Conclusion

- Formal methods are a promising direction for blockchain
 - Especially language-oriented, type-driven approaches
- Although formalization is tedious and time-consuming
 - · Strong results and deep understanding of models
 - Certified compilation is here to stay! (c.f. CompCert, seL4)
- However, tooling is badly needed....
 - We need better, more sophisticated programming technology for dependently-typed languages

