FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EXTENDED UTXO MODEL

LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SMART CONTRACTS

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Introduction

Motivation

- · A lot of blockchain applications recently
- Sophisticated transactional schemes via smart contracts
- Reasoning about their execution is:
 - 1. necessary, significant funds are involved
 - 2. difficult, due to concurrency
- Hence the need for automatic tools that verify no bugs exist
 - This has to be done statically!

BACKGROUND

Bitcoin

- Based on unspent transaction outputs (UTxO)
- Smart contracts in the simple language SCRIPT

Ethereum


- · Based on the notion of accounts
- Smart contracts in (almost) Turing-complete Solidity/EVM

Cardano (IOHK)

- · UTxO-based, with several extensions
- · Due to the extensions, smart contracts become more expressive

METHODOLOGY

- · Keep things on an abstract level
 - Setup long-term foundations
- Fully mechanized approach, utilizing Agda's rich type system
- · Fits well with IOHK's research-oriented approach



EXTENDED UTXO

BASIC TYPES

```
module UTxO. Types (Value : Set) (Hash : Set) where
record State: Set where
  field height: N
record HashFunction (A : Set) : Set where
  field \# : A \rightarrow Hash
         injective : \forall \{x y\} \rightarrow x \# \equiv y \# \rightarrow x \equiv y
postulate
  \#: \forall \{A: Set\} \rightarrow HashFunction A
```

INPUTS AND OUTPUT REFERENCES

```
record TxOutputRef: Set where
  constructor _ @
  field id : Hash
         index · N
record TxInput: Set where
  field outputRef : TxOutputRef
         RD:\mathbb{U}
         redeemer: State \rightarrow el R
         validator : State \rightarrow Value \rightarrow PendingTx \rightarrow el R \rightarrow el D \rightarrow Bool
```

• \mathbb{U} is a simple type universe for first-order data.

Transactions

module UTxO (Address: Set) (
$$_{-}\#_{a}$$
: HashFunction Address) ($_{-}\overset{?}{=}_{a}$: Decidable { $A = Address$ } $_{-}\equiv$ _) where

record TxOutput: Set where

field value : Value

address : Address

Data : U

 $dataScript: State \rightarrow el \ Data$

record Tx: Set where

field inputs : List TxInput

outputs: List TxOutput

forge : Value fee : Value

Ledger: Set

Ledger = List Tx

VALIDATION

Unspent Outputs

```
unspentOutputs: Ledger \rightarrow Set \langle TxOutputRef \rangle
unspentOutputs \ [\ ] \qquad = \varnothing
unspentOutputs \ (tx :: txs) = (unspentOutputs \ txs \setminus spentOutputsTx \ tx)
\cup \ unspentOutputsTx \ tx
\  \textbf{where}
spentOutputsTx \ , \ unspentOutputsTx : Tx \rightarrow Set \langle TxOutputRef \rangle
```

unspentOutputsTx $tx = (tx \# @) \langle \$ \rangle$ indices (outputs tx)

 $spentOutputsTx = (outputRef \langle \$ \rangle) \circ inputs$

Validity I

```
record IsValidTx (tx: Tx) (l: Ledger): Set where
field
   validTxRefs: \forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs\ tx \rightarrow
       Any (\lambda t \rightarrow t \# \equiv id (outputRef i)) l
   validOutputIndices : \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
       index (outputRef i) <
          length (outputs (lookupTx \ l \ (outputRef \ i) \ (validTxRefs \ i \ i \in)))
   validOutputRefs : \forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs tx \rightarrow
       outputRef i \in unspentOutputs l
   validDataScriptTypes: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
       D i \equiv D (lookupOutput \ l (outputRef \ i) \dots)
```

Validity II

```
preserves Values:
  forge tx + sum (lookupValue l ... \langle \$ \rangle inputs tx)
  fee tx + sum (value \langle \$ \rangle outputs tx)
noDoubleSpending:
   noDuplicates (outputRef \langle \$ \rangle inputs tx)
allInputsValidate: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
   let out = lookupOutput l (outputRef i) . . .
       ptx = mkPendingTx l tx validTxRefs validOutputIndices
   in T (validate ptx i out (validDataScriptTypes i i \in) (getState l))
validateValidHashes: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
   let out = lookupOutput l (outputRef i) . . .
   in (address\ out)\#\equiv validator\ i\#
```

Valid Ledgers

We do not want a ledger to be any list of transactions, but a "snoc"-list that carries proofs of validity:

```
data ValidLedger: Ledger → Set where

· : ValidLedger []

\_ \oplus \_ \dashv \_ : ValidLedger l

 \rightarrow (tx : Tx)

 \rightarrow IsValidTx \ tx \ l

 \rightarrow ValidLedger \ (tx :: l)
```

Decision Procedures

```
validOutputRefs? : \forall (tx : Tx) (l : Ledger)
    \rightarrow Dec (\forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs \ tx \rightarrow outputRef \ i \in unspentOutputs \ l)
validOutputRefs?tx l =
   \forall? (inputs tx) \lambda i \_\rightarrow outputRef i \in? unspentOutputs l
   where
       \forall? : (xs : List A)
             \rightarrow \{P: (x:A) \ (x \in x \in xs) \rightarrow Set\}
             \rightarrow (\forall x \rightarrow (x \in : x \in xs) \rightarrow Dec(Pxx \in X))
             \rightarrow Dec (\forall x x \in \rightarrow P x x \in)
```

Extension: Multi-currency

- 1. Generalize values from integers to maps: $Value = List (Hash \times \mathbb{N})$
- 2. Implement additive group operators (on top of AVL trees):


```
open import Data.AVL \ \mathbb{N}-strictTotalOrder
\_+^c \_: Value \to Value \to Value
c+^c c' = toList (foldl go (fromList c) c')
where
go: Tree \ Hash \ \mathbb{N} \to (Hash \times \mathbb{N}) \to Tree \ Hash \ \mathbb{N}
go \ m \ (k, v) = insertWith \ k \ ((\_+v) \circ fromMaybe \ 0) \ m
sum^c: Values \to Value
sum^c = foldl \ \_+^c \ []
```

MULTI-CURRENCY: FORGING CONDITION


We now need to enforce monetary policies on forging transactions:

```
record IsValidTx (tx: Tx) (l: Ledger): Set where
:
forging:
\forall \ c \rightarrow c \in keys \ (forge \ tx) \rightarrow
\exists [i] \ \exists \lambda \ (i \in : i \in inputs \ tx) \rightarrow
let out = lookupOutput \ l \ (outputRef \ i) \dots
in (address \ out) \# \equiv c
```

Example: Transaction Graph



EXAMPLE: TRANSACTION GRAPH + MONETARY POLICY



EXAMPLE: SETTING UP

$Address = \mathbb{N}$

 \mathbb{A} , \mathbb{B} , \mathbb{C} : Address

A = 1 -- first address

 $\mathbb{B} = 2$ -- second address

 $\mathbb{C} = 3$ -- third address

open import *UTxO Address* $(\lambda x \rightarrow x) \stackrel{?}{=}$

B-validator : $State \rightarrow ... \rightarrow Bool$

B-validator (record { height = h}) ... = (h \equiv b 1) \vee (h \equiv b 4)

EXAMPLE: SMART CONSTRUCTORS

```
mkValidator: TxOutputRef \rightarrow (... \rightarrow TxOutputRef \rightarrow ... \rightarrow Bool)
mkValidator o \dots o' \dots = o \equiv^b o'
B = : \mathbb{N} \to Value
\mathbb{B} \ v = [(\mathbb{B}\text{-validator}\#, v)]
with Scripts: TxOutputRef \rightarrow TxInput
with Scripts \ o = \mathbf{record} \ \{ \ output Ref = o \}
                                : redeemer = \lambda \rightarrow 0
                                : validator = mkValidator tin
with Policy: TxOutputRef \rightarrow TxInput
withPolicy tin = record { outputRef = tin
                                  : redeemer = \lambda \rightarrow tt
                                  validator = B-validator
\_ @ \_ : Value \rightarrow Index addresses \rightarrow TxOutput
v \otimes addr = \mathbf{record} \{ value = v; address = addr; dataScript = \lambda \longrightarrow tt \}
```

Example: Definitions of Transactions

```
c_0, t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5, t_6: Tx
c_0 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [ ] \}
                ; outputs = [B \ 0 \ @ \ (B-validator \#) \ , B \ 0 \ @ \ (B-validator \#)]
                ; forge = B 0
                ; fee = \mathbb{B} \ \mathbf{0}
t_1 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [ with Policy c_{0,0} ] \}
                : outputs = [₿ 1000 @ A]
                ; forge = B 1000
                ; fee = \beta 0
t_6 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [with Scripts \ t_{5,0}, with Scripts \ t_{5,1}] \}
                ; outputs = [B 999 @ C]
                ; forge = B 0
                ; fee = B 1
```

EXAMPLE: REWRITE RULES

Our hash function is a postulate, so our decision procedures will get stuck...

```
{-# OPTIONS -rewriting #-}
postulate
eq_{10}: (mkValidator\ t_{10})\# \equiv \mathbb{A}
\vdots
eq_{60}: (mkValidator\ t_{60})\# \equiv \mathbb{C}
{-# BUILTIN REWRITE \_ \equiv \_ \# -}
{-# REWRITE eq_0, eq_{10}, \ldots, eq_{60} \# -}
```

Example: Correct-by-construction Ledger

```
ex-ledger: ValidLedger [t_6, t_5, t_4, t_3, t_2, t_1, c_0]
ex-ledger =
    • c_0 \dashv \mathbf{record} \{\ldots\}
   \oplus t_1 \dashv \mathbf{record} \{ validTxRefs = toWitness \{ Q = validTxRefs? t_1 l_0 \} \ tt \}
                        ; forging = toWitness \{Q = forging?...\} tt
   \oplus t_6 \dashv \mathbf{record} \{\ldots\}
utxo: list (unspentOutputs ex-ledger) \equiv [t_{60}]
utxo = refl
```



Weakening via Injections

module Weakening

```
(\mathbb{A} : Set) \ (\_\#^a : HashFunction \mathbb{A}) \ (\_\stackrel{?}{=}^a \_ : Decidable \ \{A = \mathbb{A}\} \_ \equiv \_)
(\mathbb{B} : Set) \ (\_\#^b : HashFunction \mathbb{B}) \ (\_\stackrel{?}{=}^b \_ : Decidable \ \{A = \mathbb{B}\} \_ \equiv \_)
(A \hookrightarrow B : \mathbb{A}, \_\#^a \hookrightarrow \mathbb{B}, \_\#^b)
```

where

import
$$UTxO.Validity \mathbb{A} _{-}\#^{a} _{-}\stackrel{?}{=}^{a} _{-}$$
 as A import $UTxO.Validity \mathbb{B} _{-}\#^{b} _{-}\stackrel{?}{=}^{b} _{-}$ as B

WEAKENING LEMMA

After translating addresses, validity is preserved:

 $weakening: \forall \{tx: A.Tx\} \{l: A.Ledger\}$

 \rightarrow A.IsValidTx tx l

 \rightarrow B.IsValidTx (weakenTx tx) (weakenLedger l) weakening = . . .

Inspiration from Separation Logic

- · One wants to reason in a modular manner
 - Conversely, one can study a ledger by studying its components, that is we can reason *compositionally*
- In concurrency, P * Q holds for disjoint parts of the memory heap
- In blockchain, *P* * *Q* holds for disjoint parts of the ledger
 - · But what does it mean for two ledgers to be disjoint?

DISJOINT LEDGERS

Two ledgers l and l' are disjoint, when

- 1. No common transactions: *Disjoint l l'* = $\forall t \rightarrow (t \in l \times v \in l')$
- 2. Validation does not break:

```
PreserveValidations: Ledger \rightarrow Ledger \rightarrow Set

PreserveValidations l \ l'' = \\ \forall \ tx \rightarrow tx \in l \rightarrow tx \in l'' \rightarrow \\ \forall \ \{ ptx \ i \ out \ vds \} \rightarrow validate \ ptx \ i \ out \ vds \ (getState \ (upTo \ tx \ l')) \\ \equiv validate \ ptx \ i \ out \ vds \ (getState \ (upTo \ tx \ l))
```

COMBINING LEDGERS

- $_\leftrightarrow _\dashv _: \forall \{l \ l'l'' : Ledger\}$
 - \rightarrow ValidLedger l
 - \rightarrow ValidLedger l'
 - \rightarrow Interleaving l l'l"
 - × Disjoint l l'
 - × PreserveValidations l l"
 - × PreserveValidations l'l"

→ ValidLedger l"

Future Work

NEXT STEPS: UTXO

- 1. Multi-currency: non-fungible tokens
 - 2-level maps that introduce intermediate layer with tokens
- 2. Integrate James Chapman's work on plutus-metatheory
 - Plutus terms instead of their denotations (i.e. Agda functions)
- 3. Support for multi-signature schemes

NEXT STEPS: OTHERS

- 1. Proof automation via domain-specific tactics
 - Accommodate future formalization efforts
- 2. Featherweight Solidity
 - · Provide proof-of-concept model in Agda
 - Perform some initial comparison with UTxO
- 3. Investigate Chad Nester's work on monoidal ledgers
 - This leads to another reasoning device: string diagrams

NEXT STEPS: CERTIFIED COMPILATION

- BitML: Idealistic process calculus for Bitcoin smart contracts
- We already have instrinsically-typed BitML contracts in Agda, as well as its small-step semantics and corresponding meta-theory
- Plan: Certified compilation from BitML to (extended) UTxO
 - Any attack possible at the transaction level, will also manifest itself in the higher-level BitML semantics
- Come check my poster for more details on formalizing BitML!



Conclusion

- Formal methods are a promising direction for blockchain
 - Especially language-oriented, type-driven approaches
- Although formalization is tedious and time-consuming
 - Strong results and deep understanding of models
 - Certified compilation is here to stay! (c.f. CompCert, seL4)
- · However, tooling is badly needed....
 - We need better, more sophisticated programming technology for dependently-typed languages

