

FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EXTENDED UTxO MODEL


LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SMART CONTRACTS

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INPUT | **OUTPUT**

INTRODUCTION

- A lot of blockchain applications recently
- Sophisticated transactional schemes via **smart contracts**
- Reasoning about their execution is:
 1. *necessary*, significant funds are involved
 2. *difficult*, due to concurrency
- Hence the need for automatic tools that verify no bugs exist
 - This has to be done **statically**!

Bitcoin

- Based on *unspent transaction outputs* (UTxO)
- Smart contracts in the simple language SCRIPT

Ethereum

- Based on the notion of accounts
- Smart contracts in (almost) Turing-complete Solidity/EVM

Cardano (IOHK)

- UTxO-based, with several extensions
- Due to the extensions, smart contracts become more expressive

- Keep things on an abstract level
 - Setup long-term foundations
- Fully mechanized approach, utilizing Agda's rich type system
- Fits well with IOHK's research-oriented approach



EXTENDED UTxO

BASIC TYPES

module *UTxO.Types* (*Value* : *Set*) (*Hash* : *Set*) **where**

record *State* : *Set* **where**

field *height* : \mathbb{N}

\vdots

record *HashFunction* (*A* : *Set*) : *Set* **where**

field $_ \#$: $A \rightarrow Hash$

injective : $\forall \{x\ y\} \rightarrow x \# \equiv y \# \rightarrow x \equiv y$

postulate

$_ \#$: $\forall \{A : Set\} \rightarrow HashFunction\ A$

INPUTS AND OUTPUT REFERENCES

record *TxOutputRef* : *Set* **where**

constructor *_* @ *_*

field *id* : *Hash*

index : \mathbb{N}

record *TxInput* : *Set* **where**

field *outputRef* : *TxOutputRef*

R D : \mathbb{U}

redeemer : *State* \rightarrow *el R*

validator : *State* \rightarrow *Value* \rightarrow *PendingTx* \rightarrow *el R* \rightarrow *el D* \rightarrow *Bool*

- \mathbb{U} is a simple type universe for first-order data.

module *UTxO* (*Address* : *Set*) ($-\#_a : \text{HashFunction } \text{Address}$)
 ($-\overset{?}{=}_a - : \text{Decidable } \{A = \text{Address}\} \text{ } - \equiv -$) **where**

record *TxOutput* : *Set* **where**

field *value* : *Value*
address : *Address*
Data : \mathbb{U}
dataScript : *State* \rightarrow *el Data*

record *Tx* : *Set* **where**

field *inputs* : *List TxInput*
outputs : *List TxOutput*
forged : *Value*
fee : *Value*

Ledger : *Set*

Ledger = *List Tx*

validate : *PendingTx*

→ (*i* : *TxInput*)

→ (*o* : *TxOutput*)

→ *D i* ≡ *Data o*

→ *State*

→ *Bool*

validate ptx i o refl st =

validator i st (value o) ptx (redeemer i st) (dataScript o st)

UNSPENT OUTPUTS

$unspentOutputs : Ledger \rightarrow Set\langle TxOutputRef \rangle$

$unspentOutputs [] = \emptyset$

$unspentOutputs (tx :: txs) = (unspentOutputs txs \setminus spentOutputsTx\ tx) \cup unspentOutputsTx\ tx$

where

$spentOutputsTx, unspentOutputsTx : Tx \rightarrow Set\langle TxOutputRef \rangle$

$spentOutputsTx = (outputRef\ \langle \$ \rangle _) \circ inputs$

$unspentOutputsTx\ tx = (tx \# \textcircled{_})\ \langle \$ \rangle\ indices\ (outputs\ tx)$

record *IsValidTx* (*tx* : *Tx*) (*l* : *Ledger*) : *Set* **where**
field

validTxRefs : $\forall i \rightarrow i \in \text{inputs } tx \rightarrow$

Any ($\lambda t \rightarrow t \# \equiv \text{id } (\text{outputRef } i)$) *l*

validOutputIndices : $\forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in \text{inputs } tx) \rightarrow$

index (*outputRef* *i*) <

length (*outputs* (*lookupTx* *l* (*outputRef* *i*) (*validTxRefs* *i* *i*)))

validOutputRefs : $\forall i \rightarrow i \in \text{inputs } tx \rightarrow$

outputRef *i* \in *unspentOutputs* *l*

validDataScriptTypes : $\forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in \text{inputs } tx) \rightarrow$

D *i* \equiv *Data* (*lookupOutput* *l* (*outputRef* *i*) ...))

preservesValues :

forged tx + sum (lookupValue l ... <\$> inputs tx)

\equiv

fee tx + sum (value <\$> outputs tx)

noDoubleSpending :

noDuplicates (outputRef <\$> inputs tx)

allInputsValidate : $\forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in \text{inputs tx}) \rightarrow$

let *out* = *lookupOutput l (outputRef i) ...*

ptx = *mkPendingTx l tx validTxRefs validOutputIndices*

in *T (validate ptx i out (validDataScriptTypes i i) (getState l))*

validateValidHashes : $\forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in \text{inputs tx}) \rightarrow$

let *out* = *lookupOutput l (outputRef i) ...*

in *(address out) # \equiv validator i #*

We do not want a ledger to be any list of transactions, but a “snoc”-list that carries proofs of validity:

data *ValidLedger* : *Ledger* \rightarrow *Set* **where**

• $\quad \quad \quad$: *ValidLedger* []

$_ \oplus _ \dashv _$: *ValidLedger* *l*

\rightarrow (*tx* : *Tx*)

\rightarrow *IsValidTx* *tx l*

\rightarrow *ValidLedger* (*tx* :: *l*)

DECISION PROCEDURES

⋮

$\text{validOutputRefs?} : \forall (tx : Tx) (l : Ledger)$

$\rightarrow Dec (\forall i \rightarrow i \in \text{inputs } tx \rightarrow \text{outputRef } i \in \text{unspentOutputs } l)$

$\text{validOutputRefs? } tx \ l =$

$\forall? (\text{inputs } tx) \lambda i _ \rightarrow \text{outputRef } i \in? \text{unspentOutputs } l$

⋮

where


$\forall? : (xs : List A)$

$\rightarrow \{ P : (x : A) (x \in : x \in xs) \rightarrow Set \}$

$\rightarrow (\forall x \rightarrow (x \in : x \in xs) \rightarrow Dec (P \ x \ x \in))$

$\rightarrow Dec (\forall x \ x \in \rightarrow P \ x \ x \in)$

EXAMPLE: TRANSACTION GRAPH



EXAMPLE: DEFINITIONS OF TRANSACTIONS

$t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5, t_6 : Tx$

$t_1 = \text{record} \{ \text{inputs} = [\text{withPolicy } c_{00}]$
 $; \text{outputs} = [\text{B } 1000 @ \text{A}]$
 $; \text{forge} = \text{B } 1000$
 $; \text{fee} = \text{B } 0 \}$

\vdots

$t_6 = \text{record} \{ \text{inputs} = [\text{withScripts } t_{50}, \text{withScripts } t_{51}]$
 $; \text{outputs} = [\text{B } 999 @ \text{C}]$
 $; \text{forge} = \text{B } 0$
 $; \text{fee} = \text{B } 1 \}$

EXAMPLE: REWRITE RULES

Our hash function is a postulate, so our decision procedures will get stuck...

{-# **OPTIONS** -rewriting #-}

postulate

$eq_{10} : (mkValidator\ t_{10}) \# \equiv \mathbb{A}$

\vdots

$eq_{60} : (mkValidator\ t_{60}) \# \equiv \mathbb{C}$

{-# **BUILTIN REWRITE** $_ \equiv _$ #-}

{-# **REWRITE** $eq_0, eq_{10}, \dots, eq_{60}$ #-}

EXAMPLE: CORRECT-BY-CONSTRUCTION LEDGER

$ex\text{-}ledger : ValidLedger [t_6, t_5, t_4, t_3, t_2, t_1]$

$ex\text{-}ledger =$

$\ast t_1 \dashv \text{record} \{ \text{validTxRefs} = \text{toWitness} \{ Q = \text{validTxRefs?} t_1 l_0 \} \text{ } tt$
 $\quad \quad \quad \dots \}$

\vdots

$\oplus t_6 \dashv \text{record} \{ \dots \}$

$utxo : list (unspentOutputs \text{ } ex\text{-}ledger) \equiv [t_{60}]$

$utxo = refl$

META-THEORY

WEAKENING VIA INJECTIONS

module *Weakening*

$(\mathbb{A} : \text{Set}) \ (_ \#^{\mathbb{A}} : \text{HashFunction } \mathbb{A}) \ (_ \stackrel{?}{=}^{\mathbb{A}} _ : \text{Decidable } \{A = \mathbb{A}\} _ \equiv _)$
 $(\mathbb{B} : \text{Set}) \ (_ \#^{\mathbb{B}} : \text{HashFunction } \mathbb{B}) \ (_ \stackrel{?}{=}^{\mathbb{B}} _ : \text{Decidable } \{A = \mathbb{B}\} _ \equiv _)$
 $(A \hookrightarrow B : \mathbb{A} , _ \#^{\mathbb{A}} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{B} , _ \#^{\mathbb{B}})$

where

import *UTxO.Validity* $\mathbb{A} _ \#^{\mathbb{A}} _ \stackrel{?}{=}^{\mathbb{A}} _ \text{ as } A$

import *UTxO.Validity* $\mathbb{B} _ \#^{\mathbb{B}} _ \stackrel{?}{=}^{\mathbb{B}} _ \text{ as } B$

After translating addresses, validity is preserved:

$$\text{weakening} : \forall \{tx : A.Tx\} \{l : A.Ledger\}$$
$$\rightarrow A.IsValidTx \ tx \ l$$

$$\rightarrow B.IsValidTx \ (\text{weakenTx } tx) \ (\text{weakenLedger } l)$$
$$\text{weakening} = \dots$$

- One wants to reason in a modular manner
 - Conversely, one can study a ledger by studying its components, that is we can reason *compositionally*
- In concurrency, $P * Q$ holds for disjoint parts of the memory heap
- In blockchain, $P * Q$ holds for disjoint parts of the ledger
 - But what does it mean for two ledgers to be disjoint?

DISJOINT LEDGERS

Two ledgers l and l' are disjoint, when

1. No common transactions: $\text{Disjoint } l \ l' = \forall t \rightarrow (t \in l \times v \in l')$
2. Validation does not break:

$\text{PreserveValidations} : \text{Ledger} \rightarrow \text{Ledger} \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$\text{PreserveValidations } l \ l'' =$

$\forall tx \rightarrow tx \in l \rightarrow tx \in l'' \rightarrow$

$\forall \{ptx \ i \ out \ vds\} \rightarrow \text{validate } ptx \ i \ out \ vds \ (\text{getState } (\text{upTo } tx \ l''))$

$\equiv \text{validate } ptx \ i \ out \ vds \ (\text{getState } (\text{upTo } tx \ l))$

COMBINING LEDGERS

$l \leftrightarrow l' : \forall \{l'' : \text{Ledger}\}$

$\rightarrow \text{ValidLedger } l$

$\rightarrow \text{ValidLedger } l'$

$\rightarrow \text{Interleaving } l \ l''$

$\times \text{Disjoint } l \ l'$

$\times \text{PreserveValidations } l \ l''$

$\times \text{PreserveValidations } l' \ l''$

$\rightarrow \text{ValidLedger } l''$

FUTURE WORK

1. Integrate James Chapman's work on **plutus-metatheory**
 - Plutus terms instead of their denotations (i.e. Agda functions)
2. Support for **multi-signature** schemes

NEXT STEPS: CERTIFIED COMPILATION

- **BitML:** Idealistic process calculus for Bitcoin smart contracts
- We already have intrinsically-typed BitML contracts in Agda, as well as its small-step semantics and corresponding meta-theory
- **Plan:** Certified compilation from BitML to (extended) UTxO
 - Any attack possible at the transaction level, will also manifest itself in the higher-level BitML semantics
- Come check my poster for more details on formalizing BitML!

CONCLUSION

- Formal methods are a promising direction for blockchain
 - Especially language-oriented, type-driven approaches
- Although formalization is tedious and time-consuming
 - Strong results and deep understanding of models
 - Certified compilation is here to stay! (c.f. *CompCert*, *seL4*)
- However, tooling is badly needed....
 - We need better, more sophisticated programming technology for dependently-typed languages

QUESTIONS?