# THE UTXO MODEL AND THE BITML CALCULUS

A FORMAL INVESTIGATION IN AGDA

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#### **OVERVIEW**

 $1. \ UTxO \ (github.com/omelkonian/formal-utxo)$ 

Transactions/Ledgers

Validity

Example

Weakening Lemma

2. BitML (github.com/omelkonian/formal-bitml)

Contracts

**Small-step Semantics** 

Example

3. Next Steps

# **UTxO**

# **BASIC TYPES**

```
\begin{array}{ll} \textit{Address} &= \mathbb{N} \\ \textit{Value} &= \mathbb{N} \\ \\ \textit{record State} : \textit{Set where} \\ & \textit{field height} : \mathbb{N} \\ & \vdots \\ \\ \textit{postulate} \\ & \_\# : \forall \; \{A : Set\} \rightarrow A \rightarrow \textit{Address} \\ & \#\textit{-injective} : \forall \; \{x \, y : A\} \rightarrow x \, \# \equiv y \, \# \rightarrow x \equiv y \end{array}
```

#### INPUTS AND OUTPUT REFERENCES

```
record TxOutputRef: Set where constructor _{\mathbb{Q}} _{\mathbb{Q}} field id: Address index: \mathbb{N} record TxInput \{RD:Set\}: Set where field outputRef: TxOutputRef redeemer: State \rightarrow R validator: State \rightarrow Value \rightarrow R \rightarrow D \rightarrow Bool
```

#### **Transactions**

```
module UTxO (addresses: List Address) where
record TxOutput { D : Set } : Set where
  field value : Value
       address : Index addresses
       dataScript: State \rightarrow D
record Tx: Set where
  field inputs : Set( TxInput )
       outputs: List TxOutput
       forge : Value
       fee : Value
Ledger: Set
Ledger = List Tx
```

#### **Unspent Outputs**

```
unspentOutputs : Ledger \rightarrow Set\langle TxOutputRef\rangle
unspentOutputs []
                      =\varnothing
unspentOutputs (tx :: txs) = (unspentOutputs txs \setminus spentOutputsTx tx)
                              \cup unspentOutputsTx tx
  where
     spentOutputsTx, unspentOutputsTx: Tx \rightarrow Set\langle TxOutputRef \rangle
     spentOutputsTx = (outputRef < \$ > )inputs
     unspentOutputsTx tx = ((tx \#) @) < $ (indices (outputs tx))
runValidation : (i: TxInput) \rightarrow (o: TxOutput)
                \rightarrow D i \equiv D o \rightarrow State \rightarrow Bool
runValidation i o refl st =
  validator i st (value o) (redeemer i st) (dataScript o st)
```

#### Validity I

```
record IsValidTx (tx: Tx) (l: Ledger): Set where
field
   validTxRefs: \forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs \ tx \rightarrow i
      Any (\lambda t \rightarrow t \# \equiv id (outputRef i)) l
   validOutputIndices : \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
      index (outputRef i) <
          length (outputs (lookupTx l (outputRef i) (validTxRefs i i \in )))
   validOutputRefs : \forall i \rightarrow i \in inputs \ tx \rightarrow i
      outputRef i \in unspentOutputs l
   validDataScriptTypes: \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
      D i \equiv D (lookupOutput \ l (outputRef \ i) (validTxRefs \ i \ i \in)
                                                            (validOutputIndices i \in )
```

#### Validity II

```
preserves Values:
  forge tx + sum (mapWith \in (inputs \ tx) \ \lambda \{ i \} \ i \in \rightarrow
      lookupValue\ l\ i\ (validTxRefs\ i\ i\in)\ (validOutputIndices\ i\ i\in))
  fee tx + sum (value <$> outputs tx)
noDoubleSpending:
   noDuplicates (outputRef <$> inputs tx)
allInputsValidate : \forall i \rightarrow (i \in : i \in inputs\ tx) \rightarrow
   let out = lookupOutput l (outputRef i) (validTxRefs i i \in)
          (validOutputIndices i \in)
   in \forall (st: State) \rightarrow
              T (runValidation i out (validDataScriptTypes i i \in ) st)
       \times to \mathbb{N} (address out) \equiv (validator i) #
```

# Valid Ledgers

# **data** $ValidLedger : Ledger \rightarrow Set$ where

```
• _ ⊢ _: (t:Tx)

\rightarrow IsValidTx t []

\rightarrow ValidLedger [t]


_ ⊕ _ ⊢ _ : ValidLedger l

\rightarrow (t:Tx)

\rightarrow IsValidTx t l

\rightarrow ValidLedger (t::l)
```

#### **Example: Transaction Graph**



#### **EXAMPLE: SETTING UP**

```
addresses: List Address
addresses = 1 :: 2 :: 3 :: []
open import UTxO addresses
with Scripts : TxOutputRef \rightarrow TxInput
with Scripts \ tin = \mathbf{record} \ \{ \ output Ref = tin \}
                                : redeemer = \lambda \rightarrow 0
                                ; validator = \lambda \_ \_ \_ \to true}
\mathbb{B} \mathbb{Q} : Value \to Index addresses \to TxOutput
\beta \ v @ addr = \mathbf{record} \{ value \}
                            : address = addr
                            ; dataScript = \lambda _{-} \rightarrow 0}
```

# **Example: Definitions of Transactions I**

```
t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4, t_5, t_6: Tx
t_1 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [] \}
               ; outputs = [B 1000 @ 0]
               ; forge = B 1000
               : fee = B 0
t_2 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [with Scripts \ t_{10}] \}
               ; outputs = \beta 800 @ 1 :: \beta 200 @ 0 :: []
               ; forge = \beta 0
               : fee = B 0
t_3 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [with Scripts \ t_{21}] \}
               ; outputs = [B 199 @ 2]
               ; forge = \beta 0
               ; fee = \beta 1
```

## **Example: Definitions of Transactions II**

```
t_4 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = [with Scripts \ t_{30}] \}
                 ; outputs = \begin{bmatrix} \beta & 207 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}
                 ; forge = \beta 10
                 ; fee = \beta 2
t_5 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = with Scripts \ t_{20} :: with Scripts \ t_{40} :: [] \}
                 ; outputs = \beta 500 @ 1 :: \beta 500 @ 2 :: []
                 ; forge = \beta 0
                 : fee = B 7
t_6 = \mathbf{record} \{ inputs = with Scripts \ t_{50} :: with Scripts \ t_{51} :: [] \}
                 ; outputs = [B 999 @ 2]
                 ; forge = \beta 0
                 : fee = B 1
```

#### **Example: Correct-by-construction Ledger**

utxo = refl

```
ex-ledger: Ledger
ex-ledger = \bullet t_1 \vdash \mathbf{record} \{ validTxRefs \}
                                                      =\lambda i()
                                 ; validOutputIndices = \lambda i ()
                                 ; validOutputRefs = \lambda i ()
                                 ; validDataScriptTypes = \lambda i ()
                                 ; preservesValues = refl
                                 ; noDoubleSpending = tt
                                 ; allInputsValidate = \lambda i()
               \oplus t_2 \vdash \mathbf{record} \{ \dots \}
               \oplus t_6 \vdash record \{\ldots\}
utxo : list (unspentOutputs ex-ledger) \equiv [t_{60}]
```

#### Weakening Lemma

```
Ledger': List Address \rightarrow Set
Ledger' as = Ledger where open import UTxO as
weakenTxOutput: Prefix as bs \rightarrow TxOutput' as \rightarrow TxOutput' bs
weakenTxOutput pr txOut = txOut \{ address = inject \leq ... \}
  where open import UTxO bs
weakening: \forall { as bs: List Address} { tx: Tx' as} { l: Ledger' as}
   \rightarrow (pr: Prefix as bs)
   \rightarrow IsValidTx' as tx 1
   \rightarrow IsValidTx' bs (weakenTx pr tx) (weakenLedger pr l)
weakening = \dots
```

# ВітМЬ

#### **BASIC TYPES**

module Types (Participant: Set) (Honest: List\* Participant) where

```
Time = \mathbb{N}
Value = \mathbb{N}
Secret = String
Deposit = Participant \times Value
data Arith: List Secret \rightarrow Set where ...
[\![ ]\!]_n: Arith \ s \to \mathbb{N}
[\![ \ ]\!]_n=\ldots
data Predicate: List Secret \rightarrow Set where ...
[ ]_b : Predicate s \rightarrow Bool
\| \cdot \|_b = \dots
```

#### **CONTRACT PRECONDITIONS**

```
data Precondition: List Value -- volatile deposits
                      → List Value -- persistent deposits
                      \rightarrow Set where
   -- volatile deposit
  \_?\_: Participant \rightarrow (v: Value) \rightarrow Precondition [v] []
   -- persistent deposit
  : Participant \rightarrow (v: Value) \rightarrow Precondition [] [v]
   -- committed secret
  \_\#\_: Participant 	o Secret 	o Precondition [] []
   -- conjunction
  \_ \land \_: Precondition vs_v vs_p \rightarrow Precondition vs_v' vs_p'
          \rightarrow Precondition (vs_v + vs_v') (vs_p + vs_p')
```

#### Contracts I

```
data Contract: Value -- the monetary value it carries
                    \rightarrow Values -- the (volatile) deposits it presumes
                    \rightarrow Set where
    -- collect deposits and secrets
   put _ reveal _ if _ \Rightarrow _ \vdash _ :
      (vs: List\ Value) \rightarrow (s: Secrets) \rightarrow Predicate\ s'
       \rightarrow Contract (v + sum \ vs) \ vs' \rightarrow s' \subseteq s
       \rightarrow Contract v (Interleave vs' vs)
    -- transfer the remaining balance to a participant
```

withdraw : Participant  $\rightarrow$  Contract v vs

#### Contracts II

```
-- split the balance across different branches
split: (cs: List (\exists [v] Contract v vs))
    \rightarrow Contract (sum (proj<sub>1</sub> <$> cs)) vs
-- wait for participant's authorization
: : Participant \rightarrow Contract \ v \ vs \rightarrow Contract \ v \ vs
 -- wait until some time passes
after : : Time \rightarrow Contract \ v \ vs \rightarrow Contract \ v \ vs
```

#### Advertisements

```
record Advertisement (v: Value) (vs<sup>c</sup> vs<sup>v</sup> vs<sup>p</sup>: List Value): Set where
  constructor ( ) \vdash (
  field G: Precondition vs^{\vee} vs^{p}
          C: List (Contract v vs<sup>c</sup>)
          valid : length vs^c \leq length vs^v
                  \times participants<sup>g</sup> G + participants^c C
                     (participant < \$ > persistent Deposits^p G)
                  \times v \equiv sum vs^p
```

#### **EXAMPLE ADVERTISEMENT**

```
open BitML\ (A \mid B)\ [A]^+
ex-ad: Advertisement\ 5\ [200]\ [200]\ (3::2::[])
ex-ad = \langle\ B \mid 3 \land A \mid 2 \land A \mid 200\ \rangle
split\ (\ 2 \multimap withdraw\ B
\oplus\ 2 \multimap after\ 42: withdraw\ A
\oplus\ 1 \multimap put\ [200] \Rightarrow B: withdraw\ \{\ 201\}\ A
)
\vdash \dots
```

#### **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: ACTIONS I**

 $\rightarrow$  Set where

```
AdvertisedContracts = List \ (\exists [\ v\ , \dots, vs^p\ ]\ Advertisement\ v\ \dots vs^p)
ActiveContracts = List \ (\exists [\ v\ , vs\ ]\ List\ (Contract\ v\ vs))
\mathbf{data}\ Action\ (p: Participant) \ -- \ the\ participant\ that\ authorises\ this\ action
:\ AdvertisedContracts \  \  -- \ the\ contract\ advertisments\ it\ requires
\to ActiveContracts \  \  -- \ the\ active\ contracts\ it\ requires
\to Values \  \  -- \ the\ deposits\ it\ requires\ from\ this\ participant
\to List\ Deposit \  \  -- \ the\ deposits\ it\ produces
```

## **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: ACTIONS II**

```
-- commit secrets to stipulate an advertisement
\# \triangleright : (ad : Advertisement \ v \ vs^{\circ} \ vs^{\vee} \ vs^{p})
        \rightarrow Action p [v, vs<sup>c</sup>, vs<sup>v</sup>, vs<sup>p</sup>, ad] [] []
 -- spend x to stipulate an advertisement
\triangleright^{s}: (ad: Advertisement v vs<sup>c</sup> vs<sup>v</sup> vs<sup>p</sup>)
           \rightarrow (i: Index vs<sup>p</sup>)
           \rightarrow Action p [v, vs<sup>c</sup>, vs<sup>v</sup>, vs<sup>p</sup>, ad] [] [vs<sup>p</sup>!! i] []
 -- pick a branch
\triangleright^b: (c: List (Contract v vs))
          \rightarrow (i: Index c)
           \rightarrow Action p [] [v, vs, c] [] []
```

#### **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: ACTIONS EXAMPLE**

```
ex-spend : Action A [5, [200], [200], 3 :: 2 :: [], <math>ex-ad] [] [2] [] ex-spend = ex-ad \rhd^s 1
```

## **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: CONFIGURATIONS I**

```
data Configuration': -- current \times required
                            AdvertisedContracts × AdvertisedContracts
                         → ActiveContracts × ActiveContracts
                         \rightarrow List Deposit \times List Deposit
                         \rightarrow Set where
   -- empty
  \varnothing: Configuration' ([], []) ([], []) ([], [])
   -- contract advertisement
   '_ : (ad: Advertisement v vs vs vs vs)
     \rightarrow Configuration' ([v, vs<sup>c</sup>, vs<sup>v</sup>, vs<sup>p</sup>, ad], []) ([], []) ([], [])
   -- active contract
  \langle \_, \_ \rangle^{c} : (c : List (Contract \ v \ vs)) \rightarrow Value
             \rightarrow Configuration' ([], []) ([v, vs, c], []) ([], [])
```

### **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: CONFIGURATIONS II**

```
-- deposit redeemable by a participant
\langle \_, \_ \rangle^{d} : (p : Participant) \rightarrow (v : Value)
           \rightarrow Configuration' ([], []) ([], []) ([p has v], [])
-- authorization to perform an action
[\ ]: (p: Participant) \rightarrow Action p ads cs vs ds
           \rightarrow Configuration' ([], ads) ([], cs) (ds, ((p has _) < $> vs))
-- committed secret
\langle : \# \rangle : Participant \rightarrow Secret \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \uplus \bot
              \rightarrow Configuration' ([], []) ([], []) ([], [])
 -- revealed secret
: # : Participant 	o Secret 	o \mathbb N
          \rightarrow Configuration' ([],[]) ([],[]) ([],[])
```

#### **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: CONFIGURATIONS III**

# -- parallel composition

```
 \begin{array}{l} -\mid \_: \quad \textit{Configuration'} \; (\textit{ads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \;, \textit{rads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \; (\textit{cs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \;, \textit{rcs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \; (\textit{ds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \;, \textit{rds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \\ \rightarrow \quad \textit{Configuration'} \; (\textit{ads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \;, \textit{rads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \; (\textit{cs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \;, \textit{rcs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \; (\textit{ds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \;, \textit{rds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \\ \rightarrow \quad \textit{Configuration'} \; (\textit{ads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \# \; \textit{ads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \; \; \; \; \; ; \textit{rads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \# \; (\textit{rads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \setminus \; \textit{ads}^{\scriptscriptstyle |})) \\ & \qquad \qquad (\textit{cs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \# \; \textit{cs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \; \; \; \; \; \; ; \textit{rcs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \# \; (\textit{rcs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \setminus \; \textit{cs}^{\scriptscriptstyle |})) \\ & \qquad \qquad ((\textit{ds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \setminus \; \textit{rds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |}) \; \# \; \textit{ds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; ; \; \textit{rds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \# \; (\textit{rds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |} \; \setminus \; \textit{ds}^{\scriptscriptstyle |})) \end{array}
```

# **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: CLOSED CONFIGURATIONS**

 $\textit{Configuration ads cs ds} = \textit{Configuration'}\left(\textit{ads}\,,[\,]\right)\left(\textit{cs}\,,[\,]\right)\left(\textit{ds}\,,[\,]\right)$ 

## SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: INFERENCE RULES I

**data** 
$$\_ \longrightarrow \_$$
 : Configuration ads cs ds  $\rightarrow$  Configuration ads' cs' ds'  $\rightarrow$  Set where

# DEP-AuthJoin:

$$\langle\, A\,,\, v\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle d} \mid \langle\, A\,,\, v'\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle d} \mid \Gamma \longrightarrow \langle\, A\,,\, v\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle d} \mid \langle\, A\,,\, v'\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle d} \mid A\, [0 \leftrightarrow \textbf{1}] \mid \Gamma$$

# DEP-Join:

$$\langle\, A\,,\, v\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle{d}} \mid \langle\, A\,,\, v'\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle{d}} \mid A\, [{\color{red}0} \leftrightarrow {\color{blue}1}] \mid \Gamma \longrightarrow \langle\, A\,,\, v+v'\,\rangle^{\scriptscriptstyle{d}} \mid \Gamma$$

*C-Advertise* :  $\forall \{ \Gamma \ ad \}$ 

$$ightarrow \exists [\ p \in participants^{g}\ (G\ ad)\ ]\ p \in Hon$$

$$\rightarrow \Gamma \longrightarrow `ad \mid \Gamma$$

## SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: INFERENCE RULES II

```
C-AuthCommit : \forall { A ad \Gamma}
      \rightarrow secrets (G ad) \equiv a_1 \ldots a_n
      \rightarrow (A \in Hon \rightarrow \forall [i \in 1 \dots n] a_i \not\equiv \bot)
      \rightarrow 'ad | \Gamma \longrightarrow 'ad | \Gamma | \dots \langle A : a_i \# N_i \rangle \dots | A [\# ad]
C-Control : \forall \{ \Gamma \ C \ i \ D \}
      \rightarrow C!! i \equiv A_1 : \dots : A_n : D
      A \rightarrow \langle C, v \rangle^{c} \mid \dots \mid A_{i} \mid C \triangleright^{b} i \mid \dots \mid \Gamma \longrightarrow \langle D, v \rangle^{c} \mid \Gamma
```

# **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: TIMED INFERENCE RULES I**

```
record Configuration<sup>t</sup> ads cs ds: Set where
    constructor @
   field cfg : Configuration ads cs ds
             time: Time
data \longrightarrow_{t} : Configuration ads cs ds \rightarrow Configuration ads cs' ds'
                        \rightarrow Set where
   Action : \forall \{ \Gamma \Gamma' t \}
         \rightarrow \Gamma \longrightarrow \Gamma'
        \rightarrow \Gamma @ t \longrightarrow_{+} \Gamma' @ t
    Delay : \forall \{ \Gamma \ t \ \delta \}
        \rightarrow \Gamma \otimes t \longrightarrow_{+} \Gamma \otimes (t + \delta)
```

# **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: TIMED INFERENCE RULES II**

```
Timeout: \forall \{\Gamma \Gamma' \ t \ i \ contract\}
-- all time constraints are satisfied

→ All (_ \leq t) (timeDecorations (contract!! i))
-- resulting state if we pick this branch

→ \langle [contract!! \ i], v \rangle^c | \Gamma \longrightarrow \Gamma'

→ (\langle contract, v \rangle^c | \Gamma) @ t \longrightarrow_t \Gamma' @ t
```

#### SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: REORDERING I

```
\_\approx\_: Configuration ads cs ds \rightarrow Configuration ads cs ds \rightarrow Set c \approx c' = cfgToList c \leftrightarrow cfgToList c' where open import Data.List.Permutation using (\_ \leftrightarrow \_) cfgToList \varnothing = [] cfgToList (l \mid r) = cfgToList l + cfgToList r cfgToList \{p_1\} \{p_2\} \{p_3\} c = [p_1, p_2, p_3, c]
```

# **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: REORDERING II**

# DEP-AuthJoin:

Configuration ads cs 
$$(A \text{ has } v :: A \text{ has } v' :: ds) \ni \Gamma' \approx \langle A, v \rangle^d \mid \langle A, v' \rangle^d \mid \Gamma \rightarrow \text{Configuration ads cs } (A \text{ has } (v + v') :: ds) \ni \Gamma'' \approx \langle A, v \rangle^d \mid \langle A, v' \rangle^d \mid A [0 \leftrightarrow 1] \mid \Gamma$$

$$\rightarrow \Gamma' \longrightarrow \Gamma''$$

# SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: EQUATIONAL REASONING

```
data \_ \twoheadrightarrow \_: Configuration ads cs ds \rightarrow Configuration ads' cs' ds' \rightarrow Set
   \Box: (M: Configuration ads cs ds) \rightarrow M \rightarrow M
   \_ \rightarrow \langle \_ \rangle_- : \forall \{ L' M M' N \} (L : Configuration ads cs ds)
         \rightarrow \{ L \approx L' \times M \approx M' \}
         \rightarrow I' \longrightarrow M'
         \rightarrow M \rightarrow N
         \rightarrow I \rightarrow N
begin : \forall \{MN\} \rightarrow M \rightarrow M \rightarrow M \rightarrow M
```

## **SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: EXAMPLE I**

```
tc: Advertisement 1 [] [] (1 :: 0 :: [])

tc = \langle A \mid 1 \land A \# a \land B \mid 0 \rangle

reveal [a] \Rightarrow withdraw A \vdash \dots

\oplus after t: withdraw B
```

## SMALL-STEP SEMANTICS: EXAMPLE II

```
tc-semantics: \langle A, 1 \rangle^d \rightarrow \langle A, 1 \rangle^d | A: a \# 6
tc-semantics = \langle A, 1 \rangle^d
 \rightarrow \langle C-Advertise \rangle 'tc |\langle A, 1 \rangle<sup>d</sup>
 \rightarrow \langle C-AuthCommit \rangle 'tc \mid \langle A, 1 \rangle ^d \mid \langle A: a \# 6 \rangle \mid A [\# \triangleright tc]
 \rightarrow \langle C-AuthInit \rangle 'tc |\langle A, 1 \rangle^d |\langle A : a \# 6 \rangle |A [\# \triangleright tc] |A [tc \triangleright^s 0]
 \rightarrow \langle C\text{-Init} \rangle \qquad \langle tc, 1 \rangle^c \mid \langle A: a \# inj_1 6 \rangle
 \rightarrow \langle C-AuthRev \rangle \qquad \langle tc, 1 \rangle^c \mid A: a \# 6
 \rightarrow \langle C\text{-}Control \rangle \qquad \langle [reveal ...], 1 \rangle^c \mid A : a \# 6
 \rightarrow \langle C\text{-PutRev} \rangle \qquad \langle [withdraw A], 1 \rangle^c \mid A : a \# 6
 \rightarrow \langle C\text{-Withdraw} \rangle \quad \langle A, \mathbf{1} \rangle^d \mid A: a \# \mathbf{6}
```

NEXT STEPS

## **NEXT STEPS: UTXO**

- 1. Multi-currency support
- 2. Integrate plutus-metatheory

# **NEXT STEPS: BITML**

- 1. Further formalization of the meta-theory
  - Traces, Strategies
- 2. Compilation correctness
  - Compile to abstract UTxO model instead of concrete Bitcoin transactions?

## **NEXT STEPS: OTHERS**

- 1. Proof automation via domain-specific tactics
- 2. Featherweight Solidity
  - · Provide proof-of-concept model in Agda
  - Perform some initial comparison

