The ABCs of Information Security

CST-407 Application Security Foundations

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| Problem | C.I.A. Issue(s) Involved | Reason(s) for Your Decision | Source Used to Make Your Decision (APA Citation) |
|-------------------|--------------------------|--|---|
| 1. Yahoo | Confidentiality | The breach exposed personal information such as names, email addresses, and security questions, which violates the confidentiality of their user's data. | Larson, S. (2017, October 3). Every single Yahoo account was hacked – 3 billion in all. CNN Business. https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/03/technology/breach-3-billion-accounts/index.html |
| 2. Equifax | Confidentiality | Sensitive personal and financial information, including Social Security numbers and credit card details, was stolen. | Fruhlinger, J. (2020, February 12). Equifax data breach FAQ: What happened, who was affected, what was the impact? CSO. https://www.csoonline.com/article/567634/equidata-breach-faq-what-happened- who-was-affected-what-was-the- impact.html |
| 3. Target | Confidentiality | The attackers stole credit and debit card information along with personal details of millions of customers. | United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. (2014). <i>A "Kill Chain" Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach</i> . U.S. Senate. https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/file12f4-4468-a4e9-18f3a3a4e9bf |
| 4. NASA | Integrity | The loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter was due to a data mismatch between metric and imperial units, which is a failure of data integrity. | NASA. (n.d.). System Failure Case Studies – Lost in Translation. https://www.nasa.gov/ |
| 5. Knight Capital | Integrity | A software glitch caused by corrupted data led to erroneous trades, which is a failure in data integrity. | Heusser, M. (2012, August 8). Software testing lessons learned from Knight Capital fiasco. CIO. https://www.cio.com/article/2393228/software testing-lessons-learned-from-knight-capital-fiasco.html |

| Problem | C.I.A. Issue(s) Involved | Reason(s) for Your Decision | Source Used to Make Your Decision (APA Citation) |
|----------------------|--------------------------|---|--|
| 6. Colonial Pipeline | Availability | The ransomware attack forced the shutdown of the pipeline, making it unavailable and affecting fuel supply. | Kerner, S. M. (2022, June 6). Colonial Pipeline hack explained: Everything you need to know. TechTarget. https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/ColonPipeline-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to-know |
| 7. SolarWinds | Integrity | The attackers compromised the software build process to insert malicious code. | U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2021, July 28). SolarWinds Cyberattack Demands Significant Federal and Private-Sector Response. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao- 21-105558 |
| 8. AT&T | Confidentiality | A data breach exposed the personal information of millions of customers. | Hauari, A. (2024, July 12). How to know if you were affected by the AT&T data breach and what to do next. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2024/07/12 data-breach-who-affected-what-to-do/74379292007/ |
| 9. Ticketmaster | Confidentiality | The data breach involved the theft of customer and credit card information. | Alger, M. (2024, May 31). Security leaders respond to Ticketmaster breach. Security Magazine. https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/1010 security-leaders-respond-to-ticketmaster-breach |
| 10. CrowdStrike | Availability | The faulty software update caused a global outage, making them unavailable for users. | Sato, M. (2024, July 19). CrowdStrike and Microsoft: All the latest news on the global IT outage. The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/2024/7/19/24199411/cmicrosoft-windows-it-outage-bsodairlines-banks-down |

| Factor Most Obvious in the Story | Company Involved | Reason(s) for Your Decision | Source Used to Make Your Decision (APA Citation) |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|---|--|
| Motive | Colonial Pipeline | The attackers' primary motive was financial gain, the ransomware attackers demanded a multi-million dollar payment. | Kerner, S. M. (2022, June 6). Colonial Pipeline hack explained: Everything you need to know. TechTarget. https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Coloni Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything- you-need-to-know |
| Opportunity | Equifax | Equifax was aware of a critical vulnerability in its system for months but failed to patch it. | Fruhlinger, J. (2020, February 12). Equifax data breach FAQ: What happened, who was affected, what was the impact? CSO. https://www.csoonline.com/article/567634/equifa data-breach-faq-what-happened- who-was-affected-what-was-the- impact.html |
| Method | Ticketmaster | The breach was carried out using SQL injection attacks. | Alger, M. (2024, May 31). Security leaders respond to Ticketmaster breach. Security Magazine. https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/1010/security-leaders-respond-to-ticketmaster-breach |

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|----------------------------------|-------------------|--|---|
| Prevention | Equifax | The company's failure to apply a known patch for a critical vulnerability shows a lack of prevenative code maintenance. | Fruhlinger, J. (2020, February 12). Equifax data breach FAQ: What happened, who was affected, what was the impact? CSO. https://www.csoonline.com/article/567634/equifa data-breach-faq-what-happened- who-was-affected-what-was-the- impact.html |
| Deterrence | Colonial Pipeline | The attack shows a failure of deterrence, as attackers were not discouraged from targeting critical infrastructure. | Wood, Z. (2023, April 18). Cybersecurity Policy Responses to the Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/04/18/cybersecupolicy-responses-to-the-colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack/ |
| Detection | Target | Target's security systems successfully detected the malware, but the company failed to act on the alerts. | Chiacu, D. (2014, March 26). Target missed many warning signs leading to breach: U.S. Senate report. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/ustarget-breach-senate/target-missedmany-warning-signs-leading-to-breach-u-s-senate-report-idUSBREA2P13920140326 |
| Mitigation | Target | After detection, Target isolated compromised POS systems to contain further spread of malware, showing partial mitigation efforts. | Chiacu, D. (2014, March 26). <i>Target missed many warning signs leading to breach: U.S. Senate report.</i> Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/ustarget-breach-senate/target-missedmany-warning-signs-leading-to-breach-u-s-senate-report-idUSBREA2P13920140326 |
| Recovery | CrowdStrike | The global outage required a massive recovery effort, with companies manually removing the faulty update and airlines taking over a week to restore normal operations. | Sato, M. (2024, July 19). CrowdStrike and Microsoft: All the latest news on the global IT outage. The Verge. https://www.theverge.com/2024/7/19/24199411/cmicrosoft-windows-it-outage-bsodairlines-banks-down |

| State of Data Most Relevant to the Story | Company Involved | Reason(s) for Your Decision | Source Used to Make Your Decision (APA Citation) |
|--|-------------------|--|--|
| Data in Transit (Data in Motion) | Target | Attackers installed malware on point-of-sale systems to capture and exfiltrate payment card data as it was being processed and transmitted. | U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. (2014, March 26). <i>A</i> 'Kill Chain' Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach. https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2014/3/a-kill-chain-analysis-of-the-2013-target-data-breach |
| Data at Rest (Data in Storage) | Equifax | The breach involved hackers accessing and stealing a massive volume of sensitive personal and financial data stored in Equifax's databases. | Federal Trade Commission. (2024). Equifax Data Breach Settlement. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases- proceedings/refunds/equifax-data- breach-settlement |
| Data in Use (in Process) | Knight Capital | The financial loss was caused by an error in an automated trading system while it was actively processing trades, demonstrating a vulnerability in data in use. | Heusser, M. (2012, August 8). Software testing lessons learned from Knight Capital fiasco. CIO. https://www.cio.com/article/2393228/software-testing-lessons-learned-from-knight-capital-fiasco.html |
| Data Life Cycle Management | AT&T | AT&T retained older customer records that were later breached, showing weak data life cycle management practices. | Caltrider, R., & MacDonald, M. (2024, July 12). AT&T had a huge data breach: Here's what you need to know. Mozilla Foundation. https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/privacynotincluhad-a-huge-data-breach-heres-what-you-need-to-know/ |
| Data Integrity | NASA | The Mars Climate Orbiter was lost due to a unit conversion error, a data integrity failure where incorrect data led to mission failure. | Think Reliability. (n.d.). <i>Root</i> Cause Analysis - The Loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter. https://www.thinkreliability.com/cases/root-cause-analysis-the-loss-of-the-mars-climate-orbiter/ |
| Data Masking/Obfuscation | Yahoo | Yahoo relied on weak hashing that failed to mask user passwords effectively, showing inadequate obfuscation. | Stempel, J., & Finkle, J. (2017, October 3). <i>Yahoo says all 3 billion accounts hacked in 2013 data theft.</i> Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-all-3-billion-accounts-hacked-in-2013-data-theft-idUSKCN1C82O1 |
| Data Ownership and Stewardship | Equifax | Equifax failed to demonstrate responsible stewardship of SSNs and other personal data, resulting in significant harm. | Federal Trade Commission. (2024). Equifax Data Breach Settlement. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases- proceedings/refunds/equifax-data- breach-settlement |
| Data Backups and Recovery | Colonial Pipeline | The ransomware attack encrypted the company's data, making their data backup and recovery strategy central to the incident and their decision to pay the ransom. | Wood, Z. (2023, April 18). Cybersecurity Policy Responses to the Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/04/18/cybersecupolicy-responses-to-the-colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack/ |

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|----------------------------------|------------------|---|--|
| Broken Access Control | Yahoo | Weak account recovery questions and insufficient access control allowed attackers to access accounts. | Nelson, J. (2024, February 21). 10 Years After Yahoo Breach, What's Changed? (Not Much). Dark Reading. https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/10-years-after-yahoo-breach-whats-changed-not-much- |
| Cryptography Failure | Yahoo | The sheer scale of the breach (3 billion accounts) and the exposure of hashed passwords suggest weaknesses in their cryptographic implementation. | Stempel, J., & Finkle, J. (2017, October 3). <i>Yahoo says all 3 billion accounts hacked in 2013 data theft.</i> Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-all-3-billion-accounts-hacked-in-2013-data-theft-idUSKCN1C82O1 |
| Injection | Ticketmaster | The provided source states that the breach involved SQL injection attacks on the company's databases. | Security Magazine. (2024, May 31). Security Leaders Respond to Ticketmaster Breach. https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/10107 security-leaders-respond-to- ticketmaster-breach |
| Insecure Design | Target | The network design allowed third-party vendor credentials to access POS systems, a design flaw exploited by attackers. | U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. (2014). <i>A 'Kill</i> Chain' Analysis of the 2013 Target Data Breach. https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/212f4-4468-a4e9-18f3a3a4e9bf |
| Misconfiguration of Security | АТ&Т | Outdated system configurations and insufficient protections exposed legacy data, a misconfiguration issue. | Hauari, A. (2024, July 12). How to know if you were affected by the AT&T data breach and what to do next. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2024/07/12/data-breach-who-affected-what-to-do/74379292007/ |

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|---|-------------------|---|--|
| Vulnerable and Outdated Software | Equifax | The breach was due to Equifax's failure to patch a known vulnerability in the Apache Struts web application framework. | O'Brien, S. (2017, September 8). Giant Equifax data breach: 143 million people could be affected. CNN Business. https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/budata-breach/index.html |
| Identification and Authentication Failure | Colonial Pipeline | The attackers gained initial access using a single leaked password for an inactive VPN account, a failure of authentication controls. | Kerner, S. M. (2022, June 6). Colonial Pipeline hack explained: Everything you need to know. TechTarget. https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Coloni Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything- you-need-to-know |

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| Data Integrity Failure | SolarWinds | Attackers compromised the software supply chain by inserting malicious code into trusted software updates, a data and software integrity failure. | U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2021, July 28). SolarWinds Cyberattack Demands Significant Federal and Private-Sector Response. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao- 21-105558 |
| Security Logging and Detection Failure | Yahoo | The fact that a breach went undetected for over two years indicates a failure in security logging and monitoring. | Nelson, J. (2024, February 21). 10 Years After Yahoo Breach, What's Changed? (Not Much). Dark Reading. https://www.darkreading.com/cyberatta data-breaches/10-years-after-yahoo- breach-whats-changed-not-much- |
| Server-Side Request Forgery | SolarWinds | The supply chain compromise showed attackers leveraging trusted update mechanisms, resembling SSRF-like internal resource exploitation. | U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2021, July 28). SolarWinds Cyberattack Demands Significant Federal and Private-Sector Response. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao- 21-105558 |