

Localisation and Sensor Privacy Using the Extended Information Filter and Secure Weighted Aggregation

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Version July 23, 2020 submitted to *Sensors*

Abstract: Distributed state estimation and localisation methods have become increasingly popular with the rise of ubiquitous computing, and have led naturally to an increased concern regarding data and estimation privacy. Traditional distributed sensor navigation methods involve the leakage of sensor information or navigator location during localisation protocols and fail to preserve participants' data privacy. Secure existing methods fail to address sensor and navigator privacy in some common model-based non-linear measurement localisation methods forfeiting broad applicability. We define a modified, cryptographically secure, weighted aggregation scheme which we apply to the Extended Kalman Filter with range-sensor measurements, and show that navigator location, sensor locations and sensor measurements can remain private during navigation. The requirements and cryptographic proof are given for the weighted aggregation scheme, and simulations of the private filter are used to evaluate the accuracy and performance of the method. Our approach defines a novel, computationally plausible and cryptographically private, model-based localisation filter with direct application to environments where nodes may not be fully trusted and data is considered sensitive.

Keywords: Extended Kalman Filter; Secure Localisation; Private Aggregation

1. Introduction

Introduce localisation, filtering and the need for privacy.

Examples of environments where privacy is relevant and concrete examples where lack of privacy could have large costs

Methods for introducing security and privacy include differential privacy methods and encryption methods.

Differential privacy involves using statistical noise as security to make individual users' information cannot be deduced. Often requires a trusted aggregator, although secure aggregation methods exist. always requires noising result such that the outcome is not exact (a problem in localisation).

Encryption schemes involve formal indistinguishability proofs typically over bits or integers. They rely on computationally hard problems involving security parameters of a sufficiently large size; therefore the additional computational requirements of using encryption schemes should be pointed out and what this means in a real-time distributed sensor system. Continuing, explain public-key cryptography applicability to distributed systems; difference to symmetric schemes. Homomorphic encryption power and use case. Why FHE isn't used often, why additive partially homomorphic encryption is.

Advancements in function providing encryption schemes such as homomorphic encryption have also led to several other types of schemes which have found uses in signal processing. Private aggregation schemes allow the secure computation of the sum of encrypted values originating from

different parties, leaking only the final result. When considering such multi-party encryption protocols, formal security definitions must now also incorporate the added dangers of colluding malicious parties, and lead to new notions of security. For example Aggregator Obliviousness (AO) is typically proven for private aggregation schemes, while alternatives such as Private Weighted Secure Aggregator Obliviousness (pWSAO) exist for other specific use-cases.

Another example of function providing encryption, and a generalisation of private aggregation, is called functional encryption (FE) and its distributed extension, multi-client functional encryption (MCFE), which allow the unencrypted result of an arbitrary function to be computed from encrypted inputs. General FE and MCFE are known to be quite computationally expensive (from meeting with ITI and student Johannes - need ref.) but alternatives providing only a subset of possibly computable function exist; for example, inner product encryption.

Several of the aforementioned encryption schemes have found uses in secure localisation, estimation, and control.

1.1. Relevant Literature on Encrypted Localisation and Estimation

Model-free localisation using homomorphic encryption examples include polygon thing, WSN examples which protect against adversaries but in the case of the WSN paper. don't preserve anchor privacy. Importantly, model-based filtering and localisation provide more accurate estimates and these are not applicable there.

Model-based estimation examples include Aristov paper (which requires a linear model, and a hierarchy of sensors), Farokhi paper (which requires the controller compute entirely in encrypted space and send input back to actuator - supporting only cloud as a service type architectures) and Alexandru paper (which implements a distributed control environment but requires a constant gain matrix K)

pWSAO achieved in Alexandru weighted aggregation, but requires redistributing keys at every timestep resulting in a costly operation, and a complicated communication protocol.

In addition to applying suitable encryption schemes to signal processing tasks, care must be taken when converting sensor output into an encryptable homomorphic format. As is the case with our proposed localisation method, real number sensor output doesnot trivially encode to integers such that the homomorphic properties provided by an additive encryption scheme over integers keep the underlying real numbers consistent. Methods for handling the encoding of real numbers such that they can be used in homomorphic encryption exist. Google bignum adds power but risks overflow and leaks exponents, Farokhi leaks no information but allows only a single multiplication (extendable to more but each further multiplication limits the real number size and increases the risk of overflow).

Briefly describe navigator scenario and our contributions

Section Summary

1.2. Notation

Notation

2. Problem Statement

Restate the scenario but more formally. Give concrete example - plane and signal towers.

Exact security guarantees we aim for, as well as the definitions for these guarantees (pWSAO and indistinguishability but in context of localisation as well). Note that learning only the sum in aggregation (as is normal in AO) would in this case tell the navigator the average location and measurements of all sensors, which is fine as it does not disclose any exact sensor.

Passive attacks only from sensors to learn navigator position (Otherwise could do some kind of attack that would send fake measurement and note the change in it's own measurements - possible this would give away average of other sensors' measurements but unclear). Any largely incorrect inputs from sensors may also be detectable by comparison to alternative navigator onboard sensors (GPS etc.). Justify by saying sensors need to behave for localisation to work in the first place.

Active attacks from navigator to find sensor location allowed, but assume that weights sent to all sensors are the same. In a wireless setting all sensors would receive all broadcast weights anyway. While special hardware which would support directional broadcasting and receiving could be used to locate sensors individually this is beyond the scope of what is considered in our problem.

Point out that learning the aggregation of sensor outputs, which contains measurement and location information also means that the average location and measurement of the sensors may be leaked, and is accepted as a part of the leakage as it is inferable from the aggregation scheme and any functioning model-based localisation where measurements are not known

Rough computational capabilities expected by parties

Fixed sensor subsets of which only whole subsets can be used at once. Maybe a picture of what this might look like in a high level distributed localisation diagram. Should consider that this sub grouping would also mean the leakage of the average sensor/measurement of each subset not all sensors at once. This should be considered when choosing sensor subsets and locations.

3. Private Weighted Aggregation Preliminaries

3.1. Paillier Encryption Scheme

3.2. Joye-Libert Privacy-Preserving Aggregation

4. Private Weighted Aggregation

Explain it in overview

4.1. Proof

Give the reduction proof here for pWSAO and implicit indistinguishability of weights. alternatively sketch it out here and give reduction in appendix.

5. Private Localisation Preliminaries

5.1. Integer Encoding for Real Numbers

5.2. Extended Information Filter

6. Private Localisation with Privacy-Preserving Sensors

Explain it in overview. How is the aggregation scheme used, what does this require from the measurement model, why can this be a problem for normal distance sensors.

Explain how leakage of the final aggregation sum to the navigator means leakage of the average sensor location and measurement to the navigator. This is the reason for the acceptance of this leakage, as we pointed out in the problem statement section.

6.1. Requirements for Measurement Model

6.2. Localisation Measurement Modification

Show here the weighted integrals that give mean and variance of the new noise. If wanting to show more working, do this in appendix section, but probably not needed.

Point out here that the further away the sensor is when it makes its distance measurement (the larger the measurement) the more Gaussian the noise and the better the filter. Give flight navigation as an applicable example with typically high distances.

Additionally increased range accuracy may be possible when sensors know the process model of the navigator, allowing them to run their own filter (more accurate than only measurements but not as accurate as the navigator's estimate from multiple sensors) and use their filtered estimated distance as the scaling factor when computing the modified measurement variance.

6.3. Expanding Aggregation for Multi-dimensional Inputs

Give 1D example that's intuitive (with a^2b) and then reduce the equivalent ND case (A^TBA) to a set of weighted sums.

Ensure that timestamps are concatenated with position so that no aggregation values are blinded by the same noise.

6.4. Algorithm

Piece together the whole algorithm here. Give the algorithm as a pseudocode (including encoding and encryption)

7. Results

Decide on what kind of simulations and which plots to make. run times would be nice this time around

8. Conclusion

Future work can include hardware implementations, measurement handling which preserves Gaussian noise, or non-Gaussian noise methods. Can also consider ways of sending less information from the navigator to the sensors at each time step.

<Rest is template>

9. How to Use this Template

The template details the sections that can be used in a manuscript. Note that the order and names of article sections may differ from the requirements of the journal (e.g., the positioning of the Materials and Methods section). Please check the instructions for authors page of the journal to verify the correct order and names. For any questions, please contact the editorial office of the journal or support@mdpi.com. For LaTeX related questions please contact latex@mdpi.com.

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Bulleted lists look like this:

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Text

Text

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entry 1	data	data
entry 2	data	data

Text

Text

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This is an example of an equation:

$$a + b = c \quad (1)$$

Please punctuate equations as regular text. Theorem-type environments (including propositions, lemmas, corollaries etc.) can be formatted as follows:

Theorem 1. *Example text of a theorem.*

The text continues here. Proofs must be formatted as follows:

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:

MDPI	Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
DOAJ	Directory of open access journals
TLA	Three letter acronym
LD	linear dichroism

Appendix A

Appendix A.1

The appendix is an optional section that can contain details and data supplemental to the main text. For example, explanations of experimental details that would disrupt the flow of the main text, but nonetheless remain crucial to understanding and reproducing the research shown; figures of replicates for experiments of which representative data is shown in the main text can be added here if brief, or as Supplementary data. Mathematical proofs of results not central to the paper can be added as an appendix.

Appendix B

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References

1. Author1, T. The title of the cited article. *Journal Abbreviation* **2008**, *10*, 142–149.
2. Author2, L. The title of the cited contribution. In *The Book Title*; Editor1, F., Editor2, A., Eds.; Publishing House: City, Country, 2007; pp. 32–58.

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