




# Actors in the Underground

## Exploit developers

- Very smart people who reverse-engineer software
- \$ Develop and sell exploits packs and kits



# Actors in the Underground




## Botnet masters

- Develop software and control vast numbers of zombie machines
- \$ Rent out their botnet to other actors



# Actors in the Underground




## Spammers

- Advertise links for other actors



# Actors in the Underground



## Phishers

- Setup scam sites to steal information
- Work with spammers to spread the attack



# Actors in the Underground




## Counterfeitors

- \$ Run websites selling fake goods
- Must be able to clear credit cards



# Actors in the Underground




## “Bulletproof” Hosting Providers

- \$ Offer dedicated servers to other actors
- Hosted in lawless parts of the Internet



# Actors in the Underground




## Carders, Cashiers, and Mules

- \$ Turn stolen bank accounts and credit cards into cash
- \$ Help launder money




# Actors in the Underground




## Crowdturfers

- \$ Create, verify, and manage fake accounts
- \$ Solve CAPTCHAS for a fee




# Structure of the Underground





# Underground Forums




Today, underground forums are ubiquitous

- Many operate in plain site; they're just a Google search away
- Large volume of illicit goods and services are available



## Underground Forums




Law enforcement often targets forums/IRC rooms

- In some cases, forums have been law enforcement sting operations



# Underground Forums



Black market forums are hugely valuable for security professionals

- Give researchers a view into the underworld
- Allow white-hats to observe trends and detect unfolding attacks



# Underground Forums



Populated by buyers,  
sellers, and rippers

- Administrators verify trustworthy buyers
- Rippers steal from naïve buyers or sell fraudulent goods



# Underground Forums



Some participants ask for  
good or services

I have BOA, Wells, and  
Barclays bank logins...

I have hacked hosts,  
mail lists, PHP mailer  
send to all inbox

I need one MasterCard I  
give one Linux hacked root



# Underground Forums



I have verified PayPal accounts  
with good balance...and I can  
cash out PayPals


Some participants ask for  
good or services



# Underground Forums



Others offer samples to prove they have specific data



# Exploits-as-a-Service: Decoupling and Specialization



In the old days, compromise and monetization were coupled


- Criminals would develop exploits, use them to launch attacks, and then use the hacked machines to make money

# Exploits-as-a-Service: Decoupling and Specialization



Monetization and Compromise are Decoupled:


- Exploit developers sell exploits kits or packers
- Other actors leverage the kits to attack hosts
- Often via spam and/or compromised web servers
- Compromised hosts are then sold on the black market



Pay-per-install model of malware



# Exploits-as-a-Service



A malware distribution modelers

- Relies on drive-by-download attacks against browsers
- Blackhole, MPack, and other exploit kits



# Exploits-as-a-Service

Two styles of attacks:




A miscreant can buy an exploit kit and deploy it themselves



A miscreant can rent access to an exploit server that hosts an exploit kit



# Exploits-as-a-Service




In exploits-as-a-service:

- Miscreants are responsible for acquiring traffic
- And directing victims to the exploit kits using spam or phishing




# Exploits-as-a-Service



Traffic-PPI (Pay-per-install) services simplify this process

Bundle a traffic acquisition mechanism and an exploit server



# Dark Web Quiz


Match the term with its definition:

Attacks:


- B Deep web
- C Dark web
- A Surface web

Descriptions:

- A. Readily available to the public, and searchable with standard search engines
- B. It is not indexed by standard search engines
- C. Web content that exists on darknets




# Dark Web Quiz




## What is the Deep Web?

The Deep Web is the part of the Internet that is hidden from view.

# 🔊 Traffic PPI Example





# PPI Quiz

Match the term with its definition:

Attacks:

4 Doorway pages

1 Crypters

3 Blackhat Search Engine Optimizer


2 Trojan Download Manager

Descriptions:

1. A program that hides malicious code from anti-virus software
2. Software that allows an attacker to update or install malware on a victim's computer.
3. It increases traffic to the attacker's site by manipulating search engines.
4. A webpage that lists many keywords, in hopes of increasing search engine ranking. Scripts on the page redirect to the attackers page.



# From Malware to Botnets




Infected machines have many other valuable resources

- Unique IP addresses and bandwidth
- Spare CPU cycles



# From Malware to Botnets




Botnets allow criminals to aggregate and control infected machines

- Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure for controlling bots
- Swaths of bots are often rented out to other actors for various purposes




# Command and Control : IRC Channels






# Command and Control : P2P Botnets






# Command and Control : Fast Flux DNS







# Command and Control : Fast Flux DNS




# Command and Control : Random Domain Generation



# Command and Control : Random Domain Generation







## Spam Quiz

What are the two defining characteristics of internet spam?

Inappropriate or irrelevant

Large number of recipients





# Spam


It is estimated that > 90% of all email sent each day is spam



Hundreds of billions of spam messages per day

Spammers are key players in the cybercrime underground

- Build, curate, buy, and sell lists of email addresses
- Send mail on behalf of other actors for a fee
- Traffic-PPI services looking to acquire traffic and infections
- Phishers looking to steal personal information



## Spam

It is estimated that > 90% of all email sent each day is spam




Hundreds of billions of spam messages per day



Spammers rent access to botnets to send bulk email



Need a large number of IP addresses to circumvent spam filters



# Spam Affiliate Marketing


Huge amounts of spam are related to affiliate marketing schemes

- Scammers set up websites selling counterfeit goods

Knockoffs:  
Rolex, Gucci,  
Louis Vuitton,  
Nike, Microsoft,  
Adobe, etc.

Pharma:  
Viagra, Cialis,  
Vicoden, etc.

Fake Anti-Virus:  
*"Warning, your  
computer is  
infected! Pay  
\$49.99..."*




# Spam Affiliate Marketing




Scammers are responsible for delivering products and collecting payments

- Access to credit card processing infrastructure is crucial
- Many scams have legitimate customer service departments!




How can I scam you today?






# Spam Affiliate Marketing



Spammers sign-up as “affiliates” with scam campaigns

- Spammers advertise the scams, and collect commission on successful sales
- Commission is typically 30-50% of the final sale price



# Spam Conversion




Big questions:

- Why do spammers continue to send spam?
- How many messages get past spam filters?
- How much money does each successful “txn” (transaction) make?



Measurement technique:

Infiltrate the spam generation/monetizing process and find out answers



# Spam Filter Effectiveness



A case study (Storm botnet):




What percentage of spam got through the filters?

SPAM FILTER	PHARMACY	POSTCARD	APRIL FOOL
Gmail	0.00683%	0.00176%	0.00226%
Yahoo	0.00173%	0.000542%	None
Hotmail	None	None	None
Barracuda	0.131%	N/A	0.00826%

- Average: 0.014%


- 1 in 7,142 attempted spams got through




# Spam Filter Effectiveness



A case study (Storm):





# Spam Filter Effectiveness



A case study (Storm):

STAGE	PHARMACY	POSTCARD	APRIL FOOL
A - Spam Targets	347,590,389 100%	83,655,479 100%	40,135,487 100%
B - MTA Delivery (est.)	82,700,00 23.8%	21,100,000 25.2%	10,100,000 25.2%
C - Inbox Delivery	48,662 0.014%	11,711 0.014%	5,618 0.014%
D - User Site Visits	10,522 0.00303%	3,827 0.00457%	2,721 0.00680%
E- User Conversions	28 0.0000081%	316 0.000378%	225 0.000561%

1 in 1,737


1 in 37

1 in 25



# Storm: Pharmaceutical Revenue

1.5% of the sales were tracked  
\$140/day (seems small)



The total for all sales \$3.5 million/year (Maybe not so small after all!)


28 purchases in 26 days, average price ~\$100

But: study only controlled ~1.5% of workers!

Total: \$2,731.88, \$140/day

\$9500/day (and 8500 new bot infections per day) \$3.5 million a year

However, this is split with the affiliate program 40% cut for Storm operators via Glavmed ➔ \$1.7 million a year




## Spam Revenue Quiz


Name the top three countries where spam directed visitors added items to their shopping cart:

United States

Canada

Philippines





# Spam Revenue Quiz


Country	Visits	Cart Additions	Added Product
United States	517,793	3,707	0.72%
Canada	50,234	218	0.43%
Philippines	42,441	39	0.09%
United Kingdom	39,087	131	0.34%
Spain	26,968	59	0.22%
Malaysia	26,661	31	0.12%
France	18,541	37	0.20%
Germany	15,726	56	0.36%
Australia	15,101	86	0.57%
India	10,835	17	0.16%
China	8,924	30	0.34%
Netherlands	8,363	21	0.25%
Saudi Arabia	8,266	36	0.44%
Mexico	7,775	17	0.22%
Singapore	7,586	17	0.22%

Table 2: The top 15 countries and the percentage of visitors who added an item to their shopping cart.





# Scamming Ain't Easy



The scamming ecosystem

Infrastructure and the key role of payment processors



Example: pharmaceutical scams



# Scamming Ain't Easy



Suppose you want to setup  
[www.canadianpharma.com](http://www.canadianpharma.com)

What sort of hosting  
infrastructure do you need?



# Scamming Ain't Easy

Infrastructure	Problem	Solution
Domain name(s)	Legit registrars will take down your name if they receive complaints	Some registrars are known to ignore complaints, but they charge more ;)



# Scamming Ain't Easy

Infrastructure	Problem	Solution
DNS servers	DNS servers are an obvious choke-point for law enforcement	“Bulletproof” DNS is available on the market, but its expensive



# Scamming Ain't Easy

Infrastructure	Problem	Solution
Web servers	Web servers are an obvious choke-point for law enforcement	“Bulletproof” servers are available, but they’re expensive



# Scamming Ain't Easy



Some services offer resilient hosting with distributed web servers, domain randomization, and DNS fast-flux.



But obviously, it's expensive!



# Scamming Ain't Easy



To sell products, you need to be able to accept payments



You'll need:


- Merchant bank account to deposit your payments
- Relationship with a payment processing service
  - Handles credit card payments
  - Withdraws money from the buyers account via a card association network (e.g. Visa)



# Scamming Ain't Easy



[www.canadianpharma.com](http://www.canadianpharma.com)



Downfall: Most banks and processors won't do business with scammers




# Scamming Ain't Easy

Scam sites almost always ship products to customers

Why?

Unhappy  
customers




Processor  
shuts down  
account



Bank account  
seized



# Example: Pharmacy Express





# Example: Pharmacy Express

Affiliate Program		Distinct Domains	Received URLs	Feed Volume	
RxPrm	RX-Promotion	10,585	160,521,810	24.92%	
Main	Mainen	14,444	69,901,207	23.49%	0.79%
PhEx	Pharmacy Express	14,381	69,959,629	23.48%	0.48%
EDEx	ED Express	63	1,578	0.01%	0.61%
ZCashPh	ZedCash (Pharma)	6,976	42,282,943	14.54%	0.24%
DrMax	Dr. Maxman	5,641	32,184,860	10.95%	<0.01%
Grow	Viagrow	382	5,210,668	1.68%	2.12%
UShC	US HealthCare	167	3,196,538	1.31%	4.56%
MaxGm	MaxGentleman	672	1,144,703	0.41%	3.55%
VgREX	VigREX	39	426,873	0.14%	0.37%
Stud	Stud Extreme	42	68,907	0.03%	
MaxXt	MaxXtreme	22	50,204	0.02%	
GlvMd	GlavMed	2,933	28,313,136	10.32%	
OLPh	Online Pharmacy	2,897	17,220,271	5.10%	
Eva	EvaPharmacy	11,281	12,795,646	8.7%	
WldPh	World Pharmacy	691	10,412,850	3.55%	
PHOL	PH Online	101	2,971,368	0.96%	
Aptke	Swiss Apotheke	117	1,586,456	0.55%	
HrbGr	HerbalGrowth	17	265,131	0.09%	
RxPnr	RX Partners	449	229,257	0.21%	
Stmul	Stimul-cash	50	157,537	0.07%	
Maxx	MAXX Extend	23	104,201	0.04%	
DrgRev	DrugRevenue	122	51,637	0.04%	
UltPh	Ultimate Pharmacy	12	44,126	0.02%	
Green	Greenline	1,766	25,021	0.36%	
Vrlty	Virility	9	23,528	0.01%	
RxRev	RX Rev Share	299	9,696	0.04%	
Medi	MediTrust	24	6,156	0.01%	
ClFr	Club-first	1,270	3,310	0.07%	
CanPh	Canadian Pharmacy	133	1,392	0.03%	
RxCsh	RXCash	22	287	<0.01%	
Staln	Stallion	2	80	<0.01%	
<b>Total</b>		54,220	346,993,046	93.18%	

RX-Promotion and GlavMed account for around 35% of all affiliate scams...remember them, we'll see them again :)

Exqst	Exquisite Replicas	128	620,642	0.22%
DmdRp	Diamond Replicas	1,307	506,486	0.27%
Prge	Prestige Replicas	101	382,964	0.1%
OneRp	One Replica	77	20,313	0.02%
Luxry	Luxury Replica	25	8,279	0.01%
AffAc	Aff. Accessories	187	3,669	0.02%
SwsRp	Swiss Rep. & Co.	15	76	<0.01%
WchSh	WatchShop	546	2,086,891	0.17%
<b>Total</b>		7,530	15,330,404	4.73%
<b>Grand Total</b>		69,002	365,395,278	100%

Data collected from spam feeds, botnet infiltration, and various types of honeypots in Fall 2010



# Pharmaleaks

In 2012, the databases for GlavMed, SpamIt, and RX-Promotion were breached, dumped, and publicly released

The databases contained complete logs of sales, customers, and affiliate relationships

Program	Period	Affiliates	Customers	Billed orders	Revenue
GlavMed	Jan 2007 – Apr 2010	1,759	584,199	699,516	\$81M
SpamIt	Jun 2007 – Apr 2010	484	535,365	704,169	\$92M
RX-Promotion	Oct 2009 – Dec 2010	415	59,769 – 69,446	71,294	\$12M




Source: *PharmaLeaks: Understanding the Business of Online Pharmaceutical Affiliate Programs*




# Pharmaleaks

Transaction  
Volume





# Pharmaleaks




New vs. Repeat  
Customers



# Pharmaleaks

Types of Products





# Profit

Payments to  
affiliates

Bulletproof  
hosting

Spammers and  
botnet operators

RX-Promotion March – September 2010	
<b>Gross revenue</b>	\$7.8M
<b>Direct costs</b>	\$5.5M (70.8%)
Commissions	\$3M (38.1%)
Suppliers <sup>a</sup>	\$1.4M (17.6%)
Processing	\$1M (13.2%)
Other direct	\$148.3K (1.9%)
<b>Indirect costs</b>	\$1004K (12.8%)
Administrative	\$197K (2.5%)
Customer service	\$124K (1.6%)
Fines	\$107K (1.4%)
IT expenses	\$202K (2.6%)
Domains	\$114K (1.5%)
Servers, hosting	\$66K (0.8%)
Selling expenses	\$315K (4%)
Marketing	\$105K (1.3%)
Lobbying	\$157K (2%)
Other indirect	\$134K (1.7%)
<b>Net revenue</b>	\$1.3M (16.3%)

<sup>a</sup> Costs of goods and shipping are combined.