

# Goals for this lecture



## Brief overview of HTTPS:


- How the SSL/TLS protocol works (very briefly)
- How to use HTTPS




## Integrating HTTPS into the browser:

- Lots of user interface problems to watch for

# HTTPS




HTTPS: Hyper Text Protocol Secure= all communication between your browser and a website is encrypted.




# HTTP

Sends Password


Receives Password



"helloworld"




"helloworld"



Hacker hacks the link  
and gets your password  
"helloworld"

# HTTPS

Sends Password  
"helloworld"




encrypted

"Xu587Fyus)"

encrypted

Receives Password  
"helloworld"



Hacker hacks the link  
and gets your password as  
"Xu587Fyus)"




# HTTPS


- Creates a secure channel over an insecure network
- Is reasonable protection against man-in-the-middle attacks
- Can still provide security even when only one side of the communication is secure

# Why is HTTPS not used for all web traffic?

- Crypto slows down web servers (but not by much if done right.)
- Some ad-networks do not support HTTPS (2015 stats: 20%)
  - Reduced revenue for publishers



August 2014: Google boosts ranking of sites supporting HTTPS



# HTTPS Quiz

HTTPS can encrypt the underlying HTTP protocol which means quite a bit of data can be encrypted.

Select all of the items that can be encrypted by HTTPS:

- ☒ Request URL
- ☒ Query parameters
- ☒ Headers
- ☒ Cookies
- ☐ Host Addresses
- ☐ Port numbers
- ☐ The amount of transferred data
- ☐ Length of the session

# Threat Model: Network Attacker



## Network Attacker:


- Controls network infrastructure: Routers, DNS
- Eavesdrops, injects, blocks, and modifies packets

## Examples:

- Wireless network at Internet Café
- Internet access at hotels (untrusted ISP)





# SSL/TLS overview



Bob: generates  $(SK_{Bob}, PK_{Bob})$

Alice: using  $PK_{Bob}$  encrypts messages and only Bob can decrypt

☞ How does Alice (browser) obtain  $PK_{Bob}$ ?




## Important Fields:

Serial Number	5814744488373890497	←
Version	3	
Signature Algorithm	SHA-1 with RSA Encryption (1.2.840.113569.1.1.5)	
Parameters	none	
Not Valid Before	Wednesday, July 31, 2013 4:59:24 AM Pacific Daylight Time	
Not Valid After	Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:59:24 AM Pacific Daylight Time	

### Public Key Info:


Algorithm	Elliptic Curve Public Key (1.2.840.10045.2.1)	
Parameters	Elliptic Curve secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7)	
Public Key	65 bytes: 04 71 6C DD E0 0A C9 76...	←
Key Size	256 bits	
Key Usage	Encrypt, Verify, Derive	
Signature	256 bytes: 8A 38 FE D6 F5E7 F6 59 ...	←



# Certificate Examples

Equifax Secure Certificate Authority  
↳ GeoTrust Global CA  
↳ Google Internet Authority G2  
↳ mail.google.com

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 **mail.google.com**  
Issued by: Google Internet Authority G2  
Expires: Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:59:24 AM Pacific Daylight Time  
✓ This certificate is valid

▼ **Details**

Subject Name	
Country	US
State/Province	California
Locality	Mountain View
Organization	Google Inc
Common Name	mail.google.com

Issuer Name

Country	US
Organization	Google Inc
Common Name	Google Internet Authority G2



# Certificates on the Web



Subject's CommonName can be:

- An explicit name, e.g. cc.gatech.edu
- A wildcard cert, e.g. \*.gatech.edu


## Matching Rule:

- “\*” must occur in leftmost component, does not match “.” For example: “\*.a.com” matches “x.a.com” but not “y.x.a.com”

# Certificates on the Web

 Browsers accept certificates from a large number of CAs:


- Top level CAs  $\approx$  60
- Intermediate CAs  $\approx$  1200



# SSL/TLS Overview

Browser

Server



# HTTPS in the Browser: The Lock Icon



## Intended Goal:

- Provide the user with identity of page origin
- Indicate to user that page contents were not viewed or modified by a network attacker



In Reality: Many problems



# When is the lock icon displayed?



☞ All elements on the page fetched using HTTPS.

☞ For all elements:

- HTTPS cert issued by a CA trusted by browser
- HTTPS cert is valid (e.g., not expired)

Domain in URL matches:

CommonName or SubjectAlternativeName  
in cert.

# When is the lock icon displayed?




fetched using HTTPS.

Extension	Subject Alternative Name (2.5.29.17)
Critical	No
DNS Name	*.google.com
DNS Name	*.android.com
DNS Name	*.appengine.google.com
DNS Name	*.cloud.google.com
DNS Name	*.google-analytics.com
DNS Name	*.google.ca
DNS Name	*.google.cl
DNS Name	*.google.co.in
DNS Name	*.google.co.jp
DNS Name	*.google.co.uk
DNS Name	*.google.com.ar
DNS Name	*.google.com.au

by a CA trusted by browser  
(e.g., not expired)

es:

SubjectAlternativeName



# HTTPS Disadvantages Quiz

Which of the following are real disadvantages to using HTTPS

- ☐ Browser caching won't work properly
- ☒ You need to buy an SSL certificate
- ☒ Mixed modes issue- loading insecure content on a secure site
- ☐ HTTPS uses a lot of server resources
- ☒ Proxy caching problems- public caching cannot occur
- ☐ HTTPS introduces latencies

# Problems with HTTPS and the lock icon



➡ Upgrade from HTTP to HTTPS

➡ Forged certs

➡ Mixed content: HTTP and HTTPS on the same page

# Problems with HTTPS and the lock icon



Upgrade from HTTP to HTTPS

SSL\_strip attack: prevent the upgrade [Moxie '08]



User




Attacker



Web Server

# Problems with HTTPS and the lock icon



Upgrade from HTTP to HTTPS

Strict Transport Security (HSTS)




User

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31 \*10<sup>6</sup>;  
includeSubDomains (ignored if not over HTTPS)



Web Server

# Problems with HTTPS and the lock icon



Upgrade from HTTP to HTTPS

Strict Transport Security (HSTS)

- Header tells browser to always connect over HTTPS
- Subsequent visits must be over HTTPS (self signed certs result in an error)
  - Browser refuses to connect over HTTP or if self-signed cert, requires that entire site be served over HTTPS
- HSTS flag deleted when user “clears private data”: security vs. privacy



## Certificates: wrong issuance



2011

Comodo and DigiNotar  
CAs hacked, issue certs  
for Gmail Yahoo!, Mail...

2013

TurkTrust issued cert  
for gmail.com (discovered  
by pinning)

2014

Indian NIC (intermediate CA  
trusted by the root CA India  
CCA) issue certs for Google  
and Yahoo! Domains

2015

MCS (intermediate CA  
cert issued by CNNIC)  
issued certs for Google  
Domains





# Man in the middle attack using rogue cert

GET https://bank.com

BadGuyCert

BankCert





# Solutions to Certificate Issues

1

Dynamic HTTP public-key pinning (RFC 7469)

- Let a site declare CAs that can sign its cert (similar to HSTS)
- On Subsequent HTTPS, browser rejects certs issued by other CAs
- TOFU: Trust on First Use


# Solutions to Certificate Issues

HPKP example (HTTP header from server)

Public-Key-Pins: max-age=2592000;

- pin-sha256="E9CZ9INDbd+2eRQozYqqbQ2yXLVKB9+xcprMF+44U1g=";
- pin-sha256="LPJNul+wow4m6DsqxbinhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ=";
- report-uri="https://example.net/pkp-report"

 Examine browser's pinning DB: <chrome://net-internals/#hsts>



# Solutions to Certificate Issues

2

## Certificate Transparency: [LL'12]

- Idea: CAs must advertise a log of all certs they issued
- Browser will only use a cert if it is published on log server  
Efficient implementation using Merkle hash trees
- Companies can scan logs to look for invalid issuance