


Sessions

☞ A sequence of requests and responses from one browser to one (or more) sites

- Session can be long (e.g., Gmail) or short
- Without session management, users would constantly re-authenticate

☞ Session management: authorize user once; all subsequent requests are tied to user

Session Tokens



Storing Session Tokens

Browser cookie:

- Set-Cookie: SessionToken=fduhye63sfdb

Embed in all URL links:

- [https://site.com/checkout ? SessionToken=kh7y3b](https://site.com/checkout?SessionToken=kh7y3b)

In a hidden form field:

- `<input type="hidden" name="sessionid" value="kh7y3b">`

Storing Session Tokens



Best Method: a combination of all 3:

- Browser cookie, embed in URL, hidden form field

The HTTP Referer Header

Shows the page you are coming from- your referer

```
Host      slogout.espncricinfo.com
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/5.0
Accept    text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate
Accept-Charset ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Connection keep-alive
Referer   http://slogout.espncricinfo.com/index.php?page=index.php?page
=index&level=login
```

The HTTP Referer Header



Problem:

Referer leaks URL session token to 3rd parties



Solution: Referer Suppression

not sent when HTTP site refers to an HTTP site
in HTML5: ``

Session Token Security- Logout Procedure

Web sites must provide a logout function:



Functionality

- Let user login as different user.



Security

- Prevent others from abusing content


Session Token Security- Logout Procedure

What happens during a logout:

- 1 Delete SessionToken from client
- 2 Mark session token as expired on server

 Problem: Many web sites do 1 but not 2!

Especially risky for sites who fall back to HTTP after login



Session Token Quiz Solution

Check all the statements that are true:



The token must be stored somewhere




Tokens expire, but there should still be mechanisms to revoke them if necessary



Token size, like cookie size, is not a concern

Session Hijacking



Session Hijacking



Victim

Session ID= ACF3D35F216AAEFC



Web Server

Session ID= ACF3D35F216AAEFC



Attacker

Session Hijacking

Beware of predictable tokens!



Example 1: Counter:

User logs in, gets counter value, can view sessions of other users

Example 2: Weak MAC token:

Weak MAC exposes secret key from a few cookies, gets counter value, can view sessions of other users

Apache Tomcat: `generateSessionId()`

Returns random session ID

[server retrieves client state based on session-id]



Session Hijacking

Session tokens must be unpredictable to attacker

To generate: Use underlying framework
(e.g., ASP, Tomcat, Rails)


Rails: $\text{Token} = \text{MD5}(\text{current time}, \text{random nonce})$

Session Token Theft

 Example 1: Login over HTTPS, but subsequent HTTP

- Enables cookie theft at wireless café (e.g., Firesheep)
- Other ways network attacker can steal token:
 - Site has mixed HTTPS/HTTP pages- token sent over HTTP
 - Man-in-the-middle attacks on SSL

Session Token Theft





Example 2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) exploits:

- Amplified by poor logout procedures
 - Logout must invalidate token on server


Session Hijacking

Binding SessionToken to client's computer




A common idea: embed machine specific data in SID

Session Hijacking



Session Hijacking



SID=Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux
x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/
20100101 Thunderbird/38.2.0
Lightning/4.0.2

Session Fixation Attacks


☞ Suppose attacker can set the user's session token:



For URL token, trick user into clicking URL



For cookie tokens, set using XSS exploits



Session Fixation Attacks

Attack: (say, using URL tokens)

- 1 Attacker gets anonymous session token for site.com
- 2 Sends URL to user with attacker's session token
- 3 User clicks on URL and logs into site.com
- 4 Attacker uses elevated token to hijack user's session


Session Fixation: Lesson

When elevating user from anonymous to logged-in:

☞ always issue a new session token

After login, token changes to value unknown to attacker

- Attacker's token is not elevated



Session Hijacking Quiz Solution

Check all the statements that are true:



Active session hijacking involves disconnecting the user from the server once that user is logged on. Social engineering is required to perform this type of hijacking.




In **Passive session hijacking** the attacker silently captures the credentials of a user. Social engineering is required to perform this type of hijacking.

Session Management Summary



Always assume cookie data retrieved from client is adversarial



Session tokens are split across multiple client state mechanisms.

- Cookies, hidden form fields, URL parameters
- Cookies by themselves are insecure (CSRF, cookie overwrite)
- Session tokens must be unpredictable and resist theft



Ensure logout invalidates session on server