

# ADP 3-07

## STABILITY



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# STABILITY

## Contents

	Page
<b>PREFACE.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO STABILITY IN OPERATIONS.....</b>	<b>1-1</b>
Goals of Stability.....	1-1
Fundamentals of Stabilization .....	1-1
Legitimacy and Stabilization .....	1-4
National Strategy .....	1-6
Defense Policy.....	1-6
The Fragile States Framework .....	1-7
Stabilization Framework .....	1-8
End State Conditions in Stabilization Efforts .....	1-9
Conclusion.....	1-13
<b>Chapter 2 STABILITY IN UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS.....</b>	<b>2-1</b>
Unified Land Operations.....	2-1
The Army in Joint Operations .....	2-2
Linking Military and Civilian Efforts.....	2-5
Six Army Stability Operations Tasks .....	2-11
<b>Chapter 3 UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS IN OTHER OPERATIONS.....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
Considerations for Operations.....	3-1
Military Role in Prevention Activities .....	3-1
Peace Operations .....	3-2
Transitions .....	3-4
Security Sector Reform .....	3-4
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration .....	3-5
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance .....	3-6
Foreign Internal Defense .....	3-6
Counterinsurgency .....	3-7
Information Operations in Stability .....	3-8
Protection of Civilians .....	3-9
Women, Peace, and Security .....	3-11
Nonlethal Actions.....	3-11
Intelligence .....	3-12
Sustainment.....	3-13

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## **Contents**

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<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>PLANNING FOR STABILITY IN OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>4-1</b>
Planning .....	4-1	
Stability Planning Considerations .....	4-1	
The Commander's Role in Planning .....	4-3	
Operational Art and Stability in Operations.....	4-4	
Stability and Defeat Mechanisms.....	4-6	
Force Organization.....	4-8	
Assessments.....	4-9	
<b>GLOSSARY .....</b>	<b>Glossary-1</b>	
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>References-1</b>	
<b>INDEX .....</b>	<b>Index-1</b>	

## **Figures**

Introductory figure-1. Stability underlying logic .....	vi
Figure 1-1. Joint operations and whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches .....	1-3
Figure 1-2. The fragile states framework .....	1-7
Figure 1-3. The stabilization framework.....	1-9
Figure 2-1. Unified land operations.....	2-1
Figure 2-2. Stability operations across the range of military operations.....	2-2
Figure 2-3. An integrated approach to stability operations tasks.....	2-7
Figure 2-4. Sample subordinate task to establish civil security .....	2-13
Figure 2-5. Sample subordinate task to establish civil control.....	2-15
Figure 2-6. Sample subordinate task to restore essential services .....	2-16
Figure 2-7. Sample subordinate tasks to support to governance .....	2-17
Figure 2-8. Sample subordinate task to support to economic and infrastructure development ..	2-19
Figure 2-9. Sample subordinate task to conduct security cooperation.....	2-20

## **Tables**

Introductory table-1. Modified Army terms .....	vi
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## Preface

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability*, is the Army's doctrine for stability operations tasks. ADP 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations in operations. It establishes the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrinal publications. See the introductory figure on page iv for an illustrated overview of ADP 3-07. ADP 3-07 provides the doctrine for the conduct of stability operations, just as ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*, provides doctrine for the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. The doctrine in ADP 3-07 provides a foundation for the Army's operational concept of unified land operations. This publication also forms the foundation for training and Army education curricula on stability operations tasks in operations.

The principal audience for ADP 3-07 is members of the profession of arms who command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanders. It also applies to Army Civilian leaders and theater support personnel, including contractors. This publication is also intended to serve as a resource for the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities who seek to better understand the role of the military in broader stability efforts. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ADP 3-07 supports the North Atlantic Treaty Organization letter of promulgation for Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

ADP 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 3-07 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (\*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text, terms for which ADP 3-07 is the proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and definitions are boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. The following uses of the term are not italicized.

ADP 3-07 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 3-07 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 3-07), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil](mailto:usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil); or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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# Introduction

Throughout U.S. history, the U.S. Army has learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace. U.S. forces can only achieve sustainable peace through a comprehensive approach in which military objectives nest in a larger cooperative effort of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, the private sector, and the host nation. **Stability operations outlined in this manual are necessary toward achieving sustained peace.** The U.S. Army has devoted much of its time, over its history beginning in 1775, executing those tasks and on conducting operations focused on them.


This version of ADP 3-07, *Stability*, remains generally consistent with the 2012 version of ADRP 3-07 on the principles and foundations for stability in operations. ADP 3-07 contains four chapters. The introductory figure-1 on page vi illustrates the underlying logic of stability discussed in this publication.

**Chapter 1**, “Introduction to Stability in Operations,” discusses the strategic context and emphasizes military operations. The chapter renames the stability principles as the stability tenets to be in line with JP 3-07, Stability. It discusses the fragile states framework and explains its importance in planning and executing stability operations.

**Chapter 2**, “Stability in Unified Land Operations,” discusses the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations as it applies to stability. It links military and civilian efforts as part of unified action to stabilize a host nation. This chapter updates the discussion of the Army stability operations tasks to align with ADP 3-0 by adding a sixth Army stability task: “Conduct Security Cooperation.”

**Chapter 3**, “Unique Considerations of Stability Operations in Other Operations,” discusses considerations of stability operations unique to other activities and types of operations.

**Chapter 4**, “Planning for Stability in Operations,” discusses planning for stability in operations and aligns the discussion with ADP 3-0, *Operations*, and ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*. It elaborates on planning considerations, the commander’s role in planning, and operational art in stability in operations. Finally, the chapter discusses assessments.



**Introductory figure-1. Stability underlying logic**

Terms for which ADP 3-07 is proponent have not been modified for purposes of this publication. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. Introductory table-1 identifies modified terms.

**Introductory table-1. Modified Army terms**

Term	Remarks
reintegration	Proponency moved from ADRP 3-07 to ADP 3-07.
stability task	No longer a defined term.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction to Stability in Operations

### GOALS OF STABILITY

1-1. Ultimately, stability is the set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable. Actions to maintain or reestablish stability first aim to lessen the level of violence. These actions also aim to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, these actions encourage the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.

1-2. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). A stability operation occurs as part of decisive action in a joint operation or as an activity (often in peacetime). Stability operations tasks are those tasks executed by an Army commander to successfully accomplish stability operations. These tasks may be the focus of the operation's mission, be performed as tasks (specified or implied) in an operation focused on combat, or be performed as activities (often in peacetime).

really?

1-3. Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. Instability may be caused by catastrophic event, humanitarian crisis, foreign power-instigated violence, insurgency, domestic rebellion, and civil war. First, instability stems from decreased support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their government. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements, which usually occurs when locals see spoilers as helping to solve the priority grievance. Lastly, instability stems from the undermining of the normal functioning of society where the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.

1-4. Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. Stabilization also includes efforts to counter an adversary's attempts to consolidate its gains in a region or to reassert its influence. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability operations tasks focus on identifying, targeting, and mitigating the root causes of instability to set the conditions for long-term development by building the capacity of local institutions.

### FUNDAMENTALS OF STABILIZATION

1-5. Across the range of military operations, Army units use the fundamentals of stabilization with the principles of joint operations to perform stability operations tasks, which lay the foundation for long-term stability. Effective commanders understand the joint principles in the context of stability operations as part of decisive action and in the context of how to use the fundamentals. (Further discussion of the principles of joint operations in relation to stability activities can be found in JP 3-0, *Operations*, and JP 3-07, *Stability*.)

1-6. Any integrated approach to stability operations requires a framework that applies across the range of military operations, from military engagement to large-scale combat operations. It must frame purposeful intervention at any point along that range, reflecting the execution of a wide range of stability operations tasks performed in various operational environments, including stability operations tasks—

- Supporting a partner nation during military engagement in peacetime for self-defense and multi-national operations.
- Providing humanitarian aid after a natural or man-made disaster as part of a humanitarian-based limited intervention.
- During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements.

Will the average soldier understand the wording of this?

- Supporting a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare.
- During large-scale combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict objectives.
- Following the general cessation of organized hostilities.
- Building defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.

1-7. Executing stability operations supports the fundamentals of stabilization. Army stability operations are part of broader efforts by other agencies and organizations, including the United States Government (USG), international governments, or nongovernment agencies and organizations to set and maintain conditions for stability in an unstable area or to reestablish enduring peace and stability after open hostilities end. When involved, military forces execute stability operations continuously throughout all joint operations. Executed early enough and in support of broader national policy goals and interests, stability operations effectively reduce the risk of partner nations or occupied territories descending into politically motivated violence by addressing the sources of instability before hostilities begin. In post-conflict interventions, effectively executing stability operations mitigates the risk of lengthy military peacetime engagements. The following fundamentals of stabilization create the foundation for long-term stability:

- Conflict transformation.
- Unity of effort.
- Building host-nation capacity and capabilities.
- Host-nation ownership and legitimacy.


## CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

1-8. Conflict transformation is the process for addressing the underlying causes of violent conflict while developing viable, peaceful alternatives for people to meet their needs and pursue their political and socioeconomic aspirations. Conflict transformation guides a strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing sources of instability and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building host-nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means. (For more discussion of conflict transformation, see JP 3-07.)

## UNITY OF EFFORT

1-9. Uniting all the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability operations requires collaboration and cooperation that focus those diverse capabilities toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in stability operations. This is the essence of *unified action*: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). *Unity of effort* is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). To accomplish unity of effort, forces use both a whole-of-government and a comprehensive approach. (See figure 1-1.)

1-10. Unity of effort cannot be attained without trust among all participants. Developing mutual trust and working partnerships among all the various organizations—especially the key leaders and staff of host-nation and international actors—is essential to the success of stability operations. Trust begins at the personal level. Partnerships between a donor nation and the host nation are important, but partnerships among host-nation actors are just as important. Trusted Army professionals understand that the combined military expertise that their organizations bring and their own adherence to the Army Ethic make the greatest positive contribution to the mission. Interpersonal relationships of key actors at the local, regional, and national levels—built on shared understanding, mutual respect, and personal trust—effectively enable accomplishing stability operations, to include security cooperation efforts. Trust also contributes to the legitimacy of the operation and those critical personal relationships assist in achieving the desired end states.



**Figure 1-1. Joint operations and whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches**

### A Whole-of-Government Approach

1-11. A **whole-of-government approach** guides the development, integration, and coordination of all instruments of national power and integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. This approach enables achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation. Civilian and military efforts often encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Military forces must coordinate efforts with USG departments and agencies and host-nation and other government civilian agencies to mitigate these challenges. These challenges may include differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes. In practice, USG civil-military interaction is often not as robust or complete as desired. To encourage collaboration and to coordinate the myriad of stability operations tasks among military forces, host nations, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners force establish a civil-military operations center. Additionally, USG civilian departments and agencies may not be able to participate until the operational environment is conducive and resources are available. Joint force commanders may have to temporarily assume responsibility for tasks outside those normally associated with the joint stability functions. The **Joint force commander** must work with the chief of mission, Department of State (DOS), and **other interagency entities to integrate civil-military operations with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power in unified action**. Additionally, the whole-of-government approach **must address the root causes of the instability**. Other USG departments and agencies may remain after military forces have departed. (For more on the whole-of-government approach, see JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)

## A Comprehensive Approach

1-12. A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG and, to the extent possible, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach builds from the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. Successful operations involve actors participating at their own discretion or present in the operational area but not acting as a member of a multinational coalition. Integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of actors involved, and may vary significantly given the degree of overlap between each actor's priorities and goals. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain but still critical to achieving success in an operation with a wide representation. (For more on the comprehensive approach, see JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)

## BUILDING HOST-NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY

1-13. The primary role of external military forces during stabilization efforts may be to build host-nation military force capability and capacity. Additionally, military forces may be asked to support the comprehensive efforts of interagency and intergovernmental entities, which are in place to develop host-nation capacity to execute critical government functions. Unified action is an indispensable feature of building host-nation capacity. In stability operations, unified action to enhance the ability of the host nation for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions exemplifies building host-nation capacity. (See JP 3-07 and JP 3-20 for additional information on building host-nation capacity).

1-14. Developing specific host-nation capabilities and capacity for security and defense addresses their internal security and their participation or coordination in operations with U.S. forces or multinational operations and assists with building partnerships and strengthening alliances. Building host-nation capacity in the security sector includes foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. When directed, the Department of Defense (DOD) can also support appropriate host-nation civilian authorities to strengthen civil sector capacity at the national and local levels. Depending on the USG and host-nation relationship, building host-nation capacity can range from individual education and training to ballistic missile defense. Host-nation capacity can be described as an existing yet limited capability (of forces, skills, or functions) within a host nation's security or civil sector that can be improved and employed on a national level. Building host-nation capacity requires a long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and when necessary, the employment of that host-nation capacity in support of USG strategic objectives.

## HOST-NATION OWNERSHIP AND LEGITIMACY

1-15. Ultimate responsibility for stability rests with the host nation. Commanders must clearly respect the views and interpretations of the host nation regarding what it perceives the stability solution should be. The host nation takes ownership of its stability based on its perception of threats and its broader security needs. Stability activities nest within existing host-nation social, political, and economic institutions and structures. Commitment and constructive engagement by the host nation's leaders ensures that institutions, capabilities, and forces developed in stability operations will endure, fit the needs of the host nation, and have trust from the host-nation government and its population. Legitimacy builds trust and confidence in the host-nation government among its people. Additionally, stability helps develop partnerships that encourage and enable a host nation to act in support of aligned U.S. objectives. (See JP 3-07 for a detailed discussion of host-nation ownership.)

## LEGITIMACY AND STABILIZATION

1-16. Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. The operational principle of legitimacy is closely associated with trust—the bedrock of the Army Profession. Legitimacy during stabilization has two aspects. One is the legitimacy of the host-nation government and is principally conferred by the local populace. The other is legitimacy of the mission which

is derived from four factors: **mandate**, **manner**, **consent**, and **expectations**. Treating the local populace with dignity and respect is how leaders and Soldiers earn the legitimacy and trust of the host nation. Serving honorably, conducting operations ethically, effectively and efficiently to the extent possible is how the Army maintains the trust of the American people and our allies. The joint operations principle of legitimacy impacts every aspect of operations from every conceivable perspective. Legitimacy of the host-nation government and mission enables success characterized by conduct of stability operations.

1-17. Legitimacy comes from the legality of the existence of the government, the credibility that the government will act in accordance with the law and its stated mission, and the capability of the institution to execute its mandate. Legitimacy reflects legality but also the will and perceptions of the population. It reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but also the foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. It reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups—the local populace, individuals serving in the civil institutions of the host nation, neighboring states, the international community, and, when the USG is involved, the American public. In a stability context, legitimacy can have specific local or subnational contexts. The perceived effectiveness, fairness, or justness of governance—including distribution of national wealth, economic opportunities, or dispute resolution—can vary from place to place or social group to social group. When negative, the perception can drive instability; when functioning well, it can become resilient and help foster stability. In addition to the formal characteristics of state legitimacy, the government providing services effectively and fairly builds credibility that fosters stability among communities.

1-18. Local ownership that capitalizes on that support and participation is fundamental to legitimacy. The principles, policies, laws, and structures that form a government are rooted in the host-nation's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions. Notably, the needs, priorities, and circumstances driving stability differ substantially from one country to another. Forces support local civil authorities, processes, and priorities to ensure the sustainability of stabilization activities. (See JP 3-07 for a more detailed discussion of legitimacy.)

## LEGITIMACY OF A MISSION AND OF HOST-NATION OWNERSHIP

1-19. The **legitimacy of a mission is sensitive to perceptions**. Legitimacy and host-nation ownership depend on local civilians supporting and participating in the processes that compose a mission. The authority of the state, intervening forces, or intervening organizations depend on the successful amalgamation and interplay of four factors: **mandate**, **manner**, **consent**, and **expectations**. **seems like a redundant paragraph**

### MANDATE

1-20. A **mandate** is the **perceived legitimacy that establishes the intervening authority and the state authority of the host nation**, whether through the principles of universal suffrage or a recognized and accepted caste or tribal model. The mandate or authority that establishes a mission often determines the initial perceptions of legitimacy. Multilateral missions with the broad approval of the international community have a higher degree of legitimacy than unilateral missions do. These might include missions conducted by a multinational coalition under a United Nations' mandate.

### MANNER

1-21. The **manner** is the **perceived legitimacy of the way in which those exercising a mandate conduct themselves, both individually and collectively**. The credible manner in which intervening forces conduct themselves and their operations builds legitimacy as the operation progresses. Highly professional forces are disciplined, trained, and culturally aware. They carry with them an innate perception of legitimacy further strengthened by consistent performance conforming to the standards of national and international law. For military forces, a clearly defined commander's intent and mission statement establish the initial focus that drives the long-term legitimacy of their mission. American Soldiers, Department of the Army Civilians, and supporting contractors must demonstrate to the host nation and international community their character, competence, and commitment in actions that adhere to and uphold the Army Ethic. Military forces also make every effort to minimize harm to civilians. When harm to civilians does occur, they address it in a culturally appropriate way. (See ATP 3-07.6 for additional information on civilian casualty mitigation.)

## CONSENT

1-22. Consent is the extent to which factions, local populations, and others comply with or resist the authority of those exercising a mandate. Consent ranges from active resistance through unwilling compliance to freely given support. Consent is essential to the legitimacy of a mission. No mission is perceived as legitimate without the full consent of the host nation or an internationally recognized mandate. An exception is an intervention to depose a regime that significantly threatens national or international security or puts a population at risk from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Locals rarely perceive unilateral missions to impose regime change as legitimate however well-intentioned they are. Military leaders consider this exception in the analysis of the local context and in planning operations.

Has this exception ever been applied honestly? Has it ever been successful? If not, what's the point of making this statement? False motivation? Is being better informed about the truth of Army success/failure better/worse for individual performance?

## EXPECTATIONS

1-23. Expectations are the extent to which those exercising a mandate manage or meet the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations, and others. Expectations are the final arbiter of legitimacy. Realistic, consistent, and achievable expectations—in terms of goals, time, and resources—help ensure legitimacy during a lengthy operation. Progress is a measure of expectations and an indirect determinant of trust. Missions that do not achieve a degree of progress consistent with expectations inevitably erode the trust of the host nation, host-nation populace, the international community, and the American people. Without the sustained trust of the people, the legitimacy of any mission decreases.

## NATIONAL STRATEGY

1-24. The body of security strategy that shapes the conduct of stability operations includes the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (known as the *National Military Strategy*). A related strategy is the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America*. Together with national policy, a national strategy provides the broad direction necessary to conduct operations to support national interests.

see above comment

## DEFENSE POLICY

1-25. Consistent with the *National Defense Strategy*, U.S. defense policy focuses on achieving unity of effort through an integrated approach. This approach, echoed throughout the defense policy, is fundamental to unified action. Through this approach, the nation synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates diplomatic, informational, military, and economic dimensions of power toward a common goal—supporting American interests. American foreign policy seeks to assist fragile states that are aligned with those interests. With American assistance, fragile states may avoid failure, recover from devastating disasters, and improve governance, rule of law, security, and sustainable development.

1-26. In 2018, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed **DODD 3000.05**. It provides military forces with guidance on conducting stabilization activities. It outlines Department of Defense policy and assigns responsibility for planning, preparing for, and executing stability operations as a component of joint operations.

1-27. **DODD 3000.05** emphasizes that many stability operations should be executed by, with, and through the host nation, other external partners, or USG departments and agencies, with U.S. military forces providing support as required. However, the directive clearly states that the “DoD will be prepared to lead U.S. government stabilization efforts ... in extreme situations and less permissive environments until feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies.”

1-28. DODD 3000.05 also describes the DOD contribution to USG stabilization efforts. The DOD core responsibilities are to provide security, provide basic public order, and provide for the immediate needs of the population. When required to achieve U.S. stabilization objectives, DOD will support other USG departments and agencies with logistics, services, supplies, support, and other enabling capabilities.

1-29. **DODD 3000.05** stresses the importance of civil-military teaming in operations. Stabilization efforts require sustained civilian and military integration at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to achieve unity of effort. DOD will optimize civil-military teams that can integrate key instruments of national power


in a way that complements indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and other private capabilities to achieve objectives.

## THE FRAGILE STATES FRAMEWORK

1-30. A **fragile state** is a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. These weaknesses arise from several root causes, including ineffective governance, criminalization of the state, economic failure, external aggression, and internal strife due to disenfranchisement of large sections of the population. Fragile states frequently fail to achieve any momentum toward development. They can cause tremendous human suffering, create regional security challenges, and collapse into wide, ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists and criminal organizations.

1-31. **Fragile state** refers to the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states. The distinction among these states is rarely clear, as fragile states do not follow a predictable path to failure or recovery. The difference between a failed and recovering state may be minimal, as the underlying conditions, such as insurgency or famine, may drive a state to collapse in a relatively short period.

1-32. Fragile states are sub-categorized as either **vulnerable** or **crisis** states. The U.S. Agency for International Development uses the term **crisis** to refer to those states where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk. The U.S. Agency for International Development uses the term **vulnerable** to refer to those states unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question. This includes states that are failing or recovering from crisis. (See figure 1-2.)



**Figure 1-2. The fragile states framework**

1-33. The **fragile states framework**, developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, provides a model for applying U.S. development assistance in fragile states. This framework serves to inform understanding for intervening actors and provides a graphic tool that describes the conditions of an operational environment. The fragile states framework may be used to understand how far and quickly a state is moving away from or toward stability.

1-34. During stabilization, engagement and intervention activities are better defined in terms of the progress toward stabilizing operational environments. The fragile states framework illustrates conditions that characterize an operational environment during such operations, and it defines the environment according to two quantifiable, complementary scales: decreasing violence and increasing normalization of the state. These scales are the fundamental measures of success in conflict transformation. These measures relate directly to the Army's strategic role of consolidation of gains: area security (to reduce violence) and stability operations (to increase the stability of the state). Although fragile states do not recover from conflict or disaster according to a smooth, graduated scale, this framework provides a means with which to gauge conditions of an operational environment, formulate an engagement method, and measure progress toward success.

1-35. Military forces can engage at any point along this framework. In each case, achieving the end state requires quickly reducing the level of violence through area security tasks, creating conditions that support safely introducing other government agencies and intergovernmental organizations, and securing critical humanitarian access for nongovernmental organizations by performing stability operations tasks. Consolidation of gains focuses on conditions or variables within the operational environment and transforming conditions toward stability. In a failed or failing state, conditions typically require performance of more area security and civil security tasks to eliminate threats and reduce violence. As conditions of the environment begin to improve, constructive capabilities of military forces, by performing other stability operations tasks, focus on building host-nation capacity and encouraging sustained development. (For more discussion of the fragile states framework, see JP 3-07 and the U.S. Agency for International Development's *Fragile States Strategy*.)

## STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK

1-36. The fragile states framework forms the basis for the stabilization framework which is a tool for understanding and prioritizing the broad range of activities that embody unity of effort in an operational environment characterized by a fragile state. These activities occur within distinct categories—initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability—that collectively represent the tasks of area security and stability for consolidation of gains necessary to achieve security and reestablish stable, lasting peace. (See paragraphs 2-28 through 2-35 for a discussion of the stability task matrix.) Together, the fragile states framework and the essential stability task matrix categories provide a framework for the consolidation of gains. This framework characterizes an operational environment, identifies distinct categories for stability activities, and defines the types and ranges of tasks performed in that environment. (See figure 1-3.)

1-37. This framework aims to encompass all the tasks performed by military and civilian actors throughout the range of military operations. It guides the understanding of the effort and commitment necessary to shape military engagement activities during peacetime to prevent conflict and to rebuild a nation torn by conflict or disaster. The missions, tasks, and activities that make up these actions fall into three broad categories:

- Initial response.
- Transformation.
- Fostering sustainability.

1-38. These missions, tasks, and activities can be conducted during the Army's efforts to shape and win as well as during consolidation of gains. They describe the focus within an area of operations where consolidation of gains occurs.

1-39. Initial response generally reflects tasks executed to stabilize an operational environment in a crisis state. Military forces conduct stability operations during or after a conflict or disaster when the security situation hinders the introduction of civilian personnel. Military forces perform tasks during an initial response to provide a safe, secure environment through area security. Performing these tasks allows military forces to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the host-nation population, focusing on minimum-essential stability operations tasks. Military forces support efforts to reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to participate safely in ongoing efforts to stabilize an operational environment.




Figure 1-3. The stabilization framework

1-40. Transformation represents the broad range of post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity building tasks. Transformation is essentially a consolidation of gains. Military forces perform these tasks under conditions relatively free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. Military forces often perform transformation tasks in either vulnerable or crisis states. Military forces perform these tasks to build host-nation capacity across multiple sectors. While establishing conditions that facilitate broad unified action to rebuild the host nation and its supporting institutions, performance of these tasks facilitates the continued stability of the operational environment. Transformation in a stability context involves multiple types of transitions, and many of these transitions can occur concurrently.

1-41. Fostering sustainability encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish stable conditions so forces can transition control to legitimate civil authorities. Military forces usually perform tasks during the fostering of sustainability but only with conditions stable enough to support their efforts. Fostering sustainability efforts implement long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation. Often military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.

1-42. The stabilization framework helps to emphasize the training and organization of forces for consolidation of gains prior to initial deployment and later during force generation. It spurs Army design methodology and planning, serving as an engagement paradigm. This paradigm frames response efforts and guides the development of tasks to accomplish a mission. In simplest terms, it is a guide to action in stability operations. (For more on the stabilization framework, see JP 3-07.)

## END STATE CONDITIONS IN STABILIZATION EFFORTS

1-43. To achieve conditions that ensure a stable and lasting peace, stability operations capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These complementary civil-military efforts strive to strengthen legitimate governance, restore or maintain rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, and foster a sense of national unity. These

complementary efforts also seek to reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security as well as create conditions for transitioning control to legitimate civil authorities.

1-44. Successful efforts require an overarching framework that guides development of a strategy in pursuit of broader national or international policy goals. The purpose-based framework is founded on five broad conditions that describe the desired end state of a successful operation focused on stability actions. In turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to that end state.

1-45. The purpose-based framework provides the underpinnings for strategic, whole-of-government planning, yet it also serves as a focal point for integrating operational- and tactical-level tasks. It is flexible and adaptive enough to support activities across the range of military operations, but it relies on concrete principles and tenets in application. Within the framework, the end state conditions include the following:

- A safe and secure environment.
- An established rule of law.
- Social well-being.
- Stable governance.
- A sustainable economy.

(For a more detailed discussion of the purpose-based framework, see the *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* by the United States Institute for Peace.

## SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT

1-46. Security is the most immediate concern of a military force, a concern typically shared by the local populace. A safe and secure environment is one in which civilians can conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence. Host-nation populace do not generally trust a foreign armed force to protect them. That trust must be earned by commanders and Soldiers consistently conducting their duties in the right way—adhering to and upholding the moral obligations of the Army Ethic in all they do. Protection of noncombatants and their property helps provide a safe and secure environment, enhancing trust and legitimacy. Achieving security requires extensive collaboration with civil authorities, the trust and confidence of the local population, immediate attention to any reported harm to civilians as a result of operations, and strength of perseverance.

1-47. In areas after conflict, fought over during large-scale combat, or hit by natural disaster, conditions often create a significant security vacuum within a state. In these situations, government institutions rarely can or want to provide security. In many cases, these institutions do not operate within internationally accepted norms. They may be corrupt, abusing the power entrusted to them by the state. Sometimes these institutions actually embody the greatest threat to the populace. In other cases, large-scale combat may have destroyed or severely reduced the capacity and capability of these institutions. These conditions often weaken the foundation of a host-nation's stability.

1-48. Many challenges threaten a safe and secure environment. Generally, the immediate threat to a safe and secure environment comes from former warring parties returning to combat. However, insurgent forces, criminal elements, and terrorists may also significantly threaten the safety and security of the local populace. The following objectives support a safe and secure environment:

- Cessation of large-scale violence.
- Establishment of public order.
- Establishment of physical security.
- Establishment of territorial security.
- Development of strong ties and interoperability between the host nation and USG.

1-49. However, these objectives are not mutually independent, and they often exist in tension with one another. Immediate security or humanitarian concerns can create a need for short-term solutions with negative impacts for longer-term objectives, such as in establishing stable governance or a sustainable economy. Commanders consider these trade-offs when making decisions regarding a safe and secure environment.

## ESTABLISHED RULE OF LAW

1-50. Establishing effective rule of law typically requires an international review of the host-nation legal framework, a justice reform agenda, and general justice reform programs. Many societies emerging from conflict also require a new constitution. All efforts to establish and support the rule of law account for the customs, culture, and ethnicity of the local populace. The following objectives support rule of law:

- Just legal frameworks established.
- Law and order enforced.
- Accountability to the law promoted.
- Access to justice ensured.
- Citizen participation promoted.
- Culture of lawfulness promoted.
- Public security maintained.
- Legitimate state monopoly over means of violence established.
- Education in anti-corruption practices and honest public service for host-nation leaders promoted.

1-51. Without a national framework of laws, local government has no authority or control. The rule of law cannot exist, particularly in a nation with no history of a democratic government, without first establishing the legal framework enacted by the host-nation's elected leaders. Until that occurs, U.S. or multinational actors must establish and enforce an interim rule of law based upon international legal principles. Military forces may be tasked to do this. Meanwhile, USG agencies and coalition partners, as well as U.S. forces (if tasked to do so), must educate and train host-nation counterparts on ways to implement a restored, modified, or new legal system during the transition.

1-52. While military forces strive to establish a safe and secure environment by establishing civil security and support to civil control, the rule of law requires much more, including detaining and trying individuals accused of committing crimes. These basic elements enable a broader culture of rule of law to exist in a society emerging from conflict. A broad effort integrates activities of many actors, focusing civilian, customary, and military law and order capabilities to support host-nation civil institutions in establishing and supporting the rule of law. These hybrid justice systems often form the intermediate step between the temporary detention and adjudication that occurs under "Establishing Security" and the more mature, civilian-led efforts to build a sustainable and capable criminal justice system. These activities come from a shared sense of confidence among the population that the justice sector focuses on serving the public rather than pursuing narrow interests. Planning, preparing, and executing the transfer of responsibility from military to host-nation control for rule of law—although critical for building public confidence—often proves the most difficult and complex transition conducted in stability operations. Failure to ensure continuity of rule of law through this transition threatens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and impedes long-term development and achieving the desired end state.

## SOCIAL WELL-BEING

1-53. The needs of a host-nation population emerging from instability due to a failed or failing states, conflict, or disaster generally consist of a lack of security, food, water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. During a disaster or conflict, international aid agencies typically respond quickly, often due to their presence in, or proximity to, an affected area. If allowed, and once forces stabilize and secure the situation, local and international aid organizations provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the people, establish sustainable assistance programs, and assist with displaced civilians.

1-54. However, forces also must attend to long-term requirements: developing educational systems, avoiding inadvertent harm to civilians, addressing past abuses, and promoting peaceful coexistence among the host nation population. These requirements most appropriately get supported from civilian actors, including other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Resolving issues of truth and justice are paramount to this process, and systems of amends, compensation, and reconciliation are essential. These objectives support social well-being:

- Access to and delivery of basic needs ensured.
- Right of return ensured.

- Instances of civilian harm investigated and appropriately addressed.
- Transitional justice promoted.
- Peaceful coexistence supported.

## STABLE GOVERNANCE

1-55. Governance is the ability to serve a population through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. Participation is a process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make rules and by which those rules are enforced and modified. Participation also refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. These rules and processes must be seen as predictable and tolerable by the population to be deemed legitimate. They are manifested in three core functions: representation, security, and welfare.

1-56. Most international interventions strive to establish democratic forms of governance that are viewed as legitimate by those governed. Legitimacy in this context is a condition based upon the perception by the host-nation population of the legal or moral rightness of a set of actions, and the propriety as well as authority of the individuals or organizations taking them. The fundamental pretext is that if governing institutions reflect the will of the governed and respond to their needs, then fewer segments of the population will go unserved and driven to, or be susceptible to, recruitment by destabilizing actors. Legitimate, stable governance provides economic activity, a public sector strategy, public sector management, a governmental structure, civil society participation and voice, and political accountability. These items form the foundation on which rule of law and economic activity are drivers of security and stability. Legitimate, stable governance maintains certain qualities, including promotion of equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, and accountability. Legitimate, stable governance includes legitimate systems of political representation at the national, regional, and local levels. In legitimate, stable governance institutions, the host-nation populace regularly elects a representative legislature according to established rules and in a manner generally recognized as free and fair. Legislatures must be designed consistently with a legal framework and a legitimate constitution. Officials must be trained, processes created, and rules established. In practice, legitimate, stable governance translates into things such as free, fair, and frequent elections; a representative legislature that makes laws and provides oversight; and an independent judiciary that interprets laws in accordance with agreed upon constitutions. Legitimate, stable governance ensures that civil society plays an active role in setting priorities and making the needs of the most vulnerable people in society known. Sound governance supports a society in which people can expand their choices in the way they live, and it promotes freedoms.

1-57. While democratic forms of governance are the ideal, early elections immediately following conflict or a military intervention sometimes cause harm. They can leave a society highly polarized, or empower elites, senior military leaders, and organized criminal elements potentially harming that society in the long-term. However, the local populace often seeks early and visible signs of progress. Effective reform processes begin with elections at the provincial or local level to minimize the likelihood of national polarization and reemergence of violent divisions in society. Popular leaders—capable of delivering services and meeting the demands of their constituents—and effective processes can emerge. Since elections can also become flashpoints for violence and instability between groups, U.S. forces, along with the host-nation's security forces and coalition forces, consider security measures as part of an election process.

1-58. Successful governance systems also require effective executive institutions. Capacity building generally requires a long-term commitment of effort from the international community to reestablish effective ministries and a functional civil service at all levels of government. Legitimate, stable governance also requires free and responsible media, multiple political parties, and a robust civil society. Further, in many countries, formal systems of governance exist alongside informal governance systems, such as tribal elders. Such informal systems can play an important stabilization role, acting as an enduring and effective alternative to formal structures, which may have limited reach within a country. These informal governance systems have the potential to be more popular than the formal government. However, the host-nation formal government may perceive them as a threat or an obstacle. As with informal justice systems—often closely related to informal governance—U.S. forces ensure the efforts of these systems remain consistent with international humanitarian norms. These objectives support a legitimate, stable governance.

- Accountability of leadership and institutions.
- Stewardship of state resources.
- Civic participation and empowerment.
- Provision of government services.

## SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY

1-59. Following a conflict or a major disaster, economies may break down. They often suffer from serious structural problems that need immediate attention. However, these economies also possess significant growth potential. Commerce—both legitimate and illicit—previously inhibited by circumstances emerges quickly to fill market voids and provide entrepreneurial opportunities. International aid and the requirements of intervening military forces often infuse the economy with abundant resources, stimulating rapid growth across the economic sector. However, much of this growth is temporary. It tends to highlight increasing income inequalities, a host-nation government's lagging capacity to manage and sustain growth, and expanding opportunities for corruption.

1-60. Rather than focus efforts toward immediately achieving economic growth, intervening elements strive to build on those aspects of an economic sector that enable that economy to become self-sustaining. The desired end state of a sustainable economy is defined as the ability of people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bounded by law. A viable physical infrastructure, a sound fiscal and monetary policy, an effective and predictable regulatory and legal situation, a viable workforce, business development, increased access to capital, effective management of natural resources, and strong human capacity building systems, including education and vocational training programs support achievement of a sustainable economy. These objectives support a sustainable economy:

- Price and currency stabilization (also called macroeconomic stabilization).
- Control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace.
- Market economy sustainability.
- Employment generation.
- Individual economic security.

## CONCLUSION

1-61. The stabilization framework does not attempt to be all-inclusive; no two situations are the same and the development of a stabilization strategy adapts to the specific conditions of an operational environment. A detailed conflict assessment and thorough analysis of economic needs and assets provide the foundation upon which to build a strategy for engagement. That assessment and analysis underpin conflict transformation efforts, addressing the root causes of conflict and leveraging local assets while building host-nation ownership and institutional capacity to sustain effective governance, economic development, and rule of law.


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## Chapter 2

# Stability in Unified Land Operations

### UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

2-1. **Unified land operations** is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to unified action. **Unified land operations** is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). This represents the core of Army doctrine. In unified land operations, the emphasis on each of the individual elements of the combinations varies with echelon, time, and location. (See figure 2-1.)



**Figure 2-1. Unified land operations**

2-2. While offensive and defensive operations focus on the destructive effects of combat power against enemy forces, and stability operations focus on restoring host-nation capacity and capability, no single element is more important than another. Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously to achieve decisive results as part of an interdependent joint force, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities. Units engaged in close operations will generally focus on offensive or defensive tasks, although they will consider stability. Avoiding civilian casualties and unnecessary destruction of infrastructure and supporting host-nation police forces are examples of stability considerations that all units account for during planning. (See ADP 3-0 for more detailed information on unified land operations.)

### OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

2-3. **Offensive and defensive operations** emphasize employing the lethal effects of combat power against an enemy force, yet they are also critical to success in some operations that emphasize stability operations. The side better able to leverage speed, surprise, and shock defeats its opponent quickly and incurs fewer losses. Victories create opportunities for an exploitation. Offensive tasks compel enemy forces to react, creating or revealing weaknesses that an attacking force can exploit. Defensive tasks counter the offensive actions of enemy or adversary forces. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. In some operations, the effects of speed, surprise, and shock suffice to collapse organized resistance.

### STABILITY ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

2-4. **Stability operations** are a part of every type of operation; however, the proportion of stability operations in relation to offensive and defensive operations may change. Stability operations enable forces to establish civil security and support civil control; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and economic institutions; facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority; and build security relationships. Stability operations may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. They can also

support the efforts of a legitimate government faced with its inability to maintain security and control due to capacity shortfalls or its inability to meet the needs of its population because of a natural or man-made disaster. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. When this is not possible, military forces may provide security and essential civil services to a local populace until a civil authority or the host nation can provide these services. In this capacity, military forces perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting the activities of other agencies, organizations, institutions, and the host nation. Stability operations require many inter-organizational activities. Tasks from across different sectors are integrated into coherent, carefully synchronized lines of effort organized around objectives.

2-5. Stability operations are a key component of unified land operations conducted as part of global, theater, and operational shaping; during conflict; or in a post-conflict situation. (See figure 2-2.) Usually U.S. forces conduct stability operations to support a host-nation government. However, stability operations may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. Security cooperation tasks in fragile states act as preventative measures and reinforce multinational partners and support for more stable nations. U.S. forces conduct such engagements as part of a whole-of-government approach involving other unified action partners.



**Figure 2-2. Stability operations across the range of military operations**

2-6. During conflict, stability operations enable the U.S. Army to consolidate gains and set the conditions for post-conflict operations. Plans and execution of those tasks must consider the joint principle of restraint and the ethical application of force. (See JP 3-0 for the principles of operations and ADP 6-22 for ethics.) Commanders also consider the results of lethal or nonlethal actions on an area of operations and their effect on the intended end state. Actions taken during conflict may assist a force in seizing the initiative for post conflict phases. Army forces consolidate gains to set the conditions that enable the actions of other unified action partners to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict transformation. Establishing civil security and supporting civil control stabilizes an area of operations. These efforts then provide a foundation for transitioning to civilian control and, eventually, to the host nation.

## THE ARMY IN JOINT OPERATIONS

2-7. The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force in four strategic roles: shape operational environments, prevent conflict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the U.S. Army is organized, trained, and equipped.

### SHAPE

2-8. Army shaping operations bring together all the activities intended to promote regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a military confrontation. Army shaping operations help dissuade adversary activities designed to achieve regional goals short of military conflict. Army shaping operations are continuous throughout a geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility and occur before, during, and after a joint operation within a specific joint operations area. As part of shaping

operations, the Army provides trained and ready forces to geographic combatant commanders in support of their theater campaign plan. The theater army and subordinate Army forces conduct stability activities most often in the form of security cooperation to assist the geographic combatant commanders in building partner capacity to promote stability across an area of responsibility.

## PREVENT

2-9. Army operations to prevent include all activities to deter an adversary's undesirable actions. These operations are an extension of operations to shape. They are designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit positions of relative advantage by raising the potential costs to adversaries of continuing activities that threaten U.S. interests. Prevent activities are generally weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. As part of a joint force, Army forces may have a significant role in the execution of directed flexible deterrent options. Stabilization activities to prevent include conflict assessments and actions that foster host-nation legitimacy.

## CONDUCT LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT

2-10. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability operations, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives. Divisions and corps are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations and are organized, trained, and equipped to enable subordinate organizations. Army forces should consider stabilization and consolidate gains objectives while defeating enemy ground forces. Those same ground forces may be critical in restoring stability not only to the country, but also to the region. For instance, it may be best to bypass or co-opt police forces that have marginal capability against Army units as they may prove critical to establishing civil security. Key infrastructure may be important to protect to facilitate basic public services to the population.

## CONSOLIDATE GAINS

2-11. Army operations to consolidate gains include activities to make enduring any temporary operational success, to set the conditions for a transition of control to legitimate civil authorities, and ultimately to transform military victory to political success. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation conducted while other operations are ongoing. They enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span. Army forces conduct these activities with unified action partners. In some instances, Army forces will be in charge of integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other situations, Army forces will be in support. Army forces may conduct stability operations for a sustained period over large land areas. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded. Consolidating gains also prevents adversary forces from re-imposing their will in the region.

2-12. Consolidate gains is not a mission. It is an Army strategic role defined by the purpose of the tasks necessary to achieve enduring political outcomes to military operations and, as such, represents a capability that Army forces provide to the joint force commander.

2-13. The consolidation of gains includes—

- **Area security:** Forces perform security tasks to protect friendly forces, installation routes, critical infrastructure, populations, and actions within an assigned area of operations. When consolidating gains, commanders ensure forces can establish and sustain security throughout transition.
- **Stability operations:** Forces first perform minimum-essential stability operations tasks, then maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

## Consolidating Gains and Stability Operations Tasks

2-14. During consolidating gains, stability activities often become the primary Army tasks. Military forces quickly seize the initiative to improve the civil situation while preventing conditions from deteriorating further. Army units protect the population from violence and restore public order while providing for immediate needs. Consolidate gains is demonstrated by the execution of tasks that address the needs of the host nation and its population. It is often the transition from the occupation of territory and control of populations by land component forces, gained as a result of military operations, to control by legitimate authorities.

2-15. Army forces determine who can provide services. These forces analyze the host nation's capability to provide services. They also determine the ability of other agencies of government (both host nation and U.S.), international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and contractors to provide services that can enable, complement or conduct as needed. A capable organization can address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security by transitioning capabilities to local authorities and returning to peacetime engagement characterized by security cooperation. During actions to consolidate gains, Army forces are responsible for accomplishing both minimum-essential stability operations tasks and Army stability operations tasks.

## Minimum-Essential Stability Operations Tasks

2-16. All operations morally and legally require forces to conduct minimal-essential stability operations tasks to provide for the protection and well-being of civilian populations. Every operation order implies forces or organizations conduct the minimum-essential stability operations tasks. These tasks provide for minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment. The Army has two minimum-essential stability operations tasks:

- Establish civil security which requires Army units to protect the population from violence and restore public order. (For further information on establishing civil security, see paragraph 2-64.)
- Provide immediate needs which requires Army units to ensure the population has food, water, shelter, and emergency medical treatment.

2-17. These actions are a legal responsibility of Army forces. However, commanders may not need to have Army forces conduct all these essential actions. When a military unit or appropriate civilian organizations exist that can adequately conduct those tasks, commanders should allow them to conduct these actions. For example, sometimes sufficient civilian or military governance and services exist to ensure that the population has adequate food and medical care.

2-18. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. Morally and legally, all operations require U.S. forces to conduct minimal-essential stability operations tasks to provide for the protection and well-being of civilian populations. Depending on the executing echelon, this normally occurs as part of consolidation of gains. Leaders make every effort to ensure that if no civilian or host-nation agency is present, capable, and willing, then the U.S. forces or organizations conduct the tasks.

2-19. Commanders must resource minimum-essential stability operations tasks. When a demand for resources exceeds an organization's capability, commanders provide additional resources. Sometimes commanders provide the chain of command with the necessary information to provide additional resources to meet the requirements. At other times they request higher commanders provide follow-on forces to conduct the tasks expeditiously. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how best to conduct these minimum-essential stability operations tasks and what risk they can accept. HA.

2-20. Generally in the offense, brigades and lower echelons pass requirements to conduct minimum-essential stability operations tasks in their areas of operations to the next higher echelon headquarters. Executing these tasks may require movement of the forward brigades' rear boundary to allow for the necessary area required to conduct stability operations. In some situations, a follow and support brigade conducts the minimum-essential stability operations tasks. However, once an operation becomes more static, responsibility for the forward brigades to conduct minimum-essential stability operations tasks increases along with the other elements of consolidation of gains. The minimum-essential stability operations tasks provide the environment for the successful execution of the other Army stability operations tasks.

## Army Stability Operations Tasks

2-21. Army forces continue consolidating gains by conducting the Army's stability operations tasks: establish civil security, support civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation. The tasks associated with the Army stability operations tasks will evolve over time. Army forces will retain the lead for conducting security cooperation, primarily by conducting of security force assistance. Eventually, the lead for the other five tasks will transfer to another military or civilian organization although Army forces may retain a supporting role.

## WIN

2-22. Winning is the achievement of the purpose of an operation and the fulfillment of its objectives. The Army wins when it successfully performs its roles as part of the joint force during operations. It wins when it effectively shapes an operational environment for combatant commanders and when it responds rapidly with enough combat power to prevent war through deterrence during crisis. When required to conduct combat operations, the Army's ability to prevail in ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking an enemy force's will to continue resistance. The Army wins when an enemy force is defeated to such a degree that it can no longer effectively resist, and it agrees to cease hostilities on U.S. terms. To ensure that the military results of combat are not temporary, the Army follows through with its unique scope and scale of capabilities to consolidate gains and win enduring outcomes favorable to U.S. interests.

## LINKING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EFFORTS

2-23. Leaders link military and civilian efforts to achieve true unity of effort. With unity of effort, leaders overcome internal discord, inadequate structures and procedures, incompatible or underdeveloped communications infrastructure, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations. Within the USG, the *National Security Strategy* guides the development, integration, and coordination of the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives. At the national level, the DOS leads the effort to support interagency coordination and integration.

2-24. During stability operations, leaders achieve unity of effort across the stability sectors by focusing all activities toward a common set of objectives and a shared understanding of the desired end state. The end state focuses on the conditions required to support a secure, lasting peace; a viable market economy; and a legitimate host-nation government capable of providing for its populations' essential needs. Together, the stability sectors, joint stability functions, and the Army stability operations tasks constitute a single, integrated model essential to achieving unity of effort. Leaders foster unity of effort by applying these concepts:

- Agreed to by authorities.
- Assigned support relationships.
- Joint planning.
- Structure and mechanisms to execute.

2-25. Linking the basic civilian and military task frameworks creates a single model that forms the basis for developing lines of effort. (See chapter 4 for more detail on using lines of effort in stability operations.) This model serves as the foundation for an integrated approach based on unity of effort and coordinated engagement. Thus, the conduct of unified land operations to support a broader effort contributes toward the shared end state established by the actors involved. The execution of discrete military tasks links to a coordinated, comprehensive effort. This ensures that the efforts of military forces integrate with broader engagement activities. These efforts work toward a common goal and shared understanding of the desired end state. A clear delineation and understanding of the formal lines of authority enhances unity of effort. Together, with the activities of the other participants, these tasks contribute to unity of effort with actors involved in any collaborative effort.

## STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION ESSENTIAL TASK MATRIX

2-26. DOS developed a detailed list of stability-focused, stabilization and reconstruction essential tasks (hereafter referred to as the *essential stability task matrix*). The essential stability task matrix helps planners

identify specific requirements to support host nations in transition so host nations can prevent armed conflict, prevent civil strife to sustaining stability, or restore stability post-conflict. It serves as a detailed planning resource, and it continues to develop as forces implement it during operations. Forces can apply this matrix as a resource for both peacetime and conflict situations. (For more information see the *Post Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix* at <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm>.)

2-27. The matrix is designed as a starting point to help frame analysis of a stabilization and reconstruction activity, not as a checklist or as a comprehensive analysis tool. Effective planning in stabilization begins with robust analysis of the underlying drivers of conflict and resiliencies to mitigate them. Not all the tasks outlined in the matrix work for every situation, and many situations may have key or critical dynamics not captured by the matrix.

2-28. The essential stability task matrix divides the tasks conducted during operations and their relative duration for execution across five broad technical areas:

- Security.
- Justice and reconciliation.
- Humanitarian assistance and social well-being.
- Governance and participation.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.


These areas are referred to as stability sectors. Figure 2-3 shows the interrelationship of the end state conditions (discussed in chapter 1), the stability sectors, the joint functions (discussed later in chapter 2) and the six Army stability operations tasks (also discussed later in chapter 2).

2-29. Stability sectors—similar in purpose and application to lines of effort—help to focus and unify reconstruction and stabilization efforts within specific functional areas of society. (Chapter 4 discusses the use of lines of effort in stability operations.) These sectors define and encompass integrated task areas across a broad spectrum of interagency engagement, including the DOD. The essential stability task matrix addresses many requirements necessary to support host nations transitioning from armed conflict or civil strife. The matrix serves as a means to leverage functional knowledge and systemic thinking into planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. The essential stability task matrix ensures that—

- The execution of tasks focuses on achieving the desired end state.
- Tasks executed by actors outside the USG are highlighted, and responsibility for these tasks within the international community is identified.
- Sector specialists understand the diversity of tasks in other sectors and the interdependence among the sectors.

2-30. The assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among these tasks depends on the conditions of an operational environment. The essential stability task matrix facilitates visualizing the conduct of an operation, sequencing necessary activities within an operation, and developing appropriate priorities and resource allocation for those activities. Depending on the scope, scale, and context of an operation, these priorities help to deconflict activities, focus limited resources, and delineate specific responsibilities. Detailed planning enables staffs to integrate and synchronize activities in time and space, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and prioritize efforts within and across the stability sectors.

2-31. The essential stability task matrix provides a foundation for thinking systemically about tasks in stability operations. Many tasks create effects across multiple sectors. In this respect, the essential stability task matrix facilitates integration by allowing sector specialists to establish and understand links among the stability sectors. When intervening actors lack the capability or capacity to perform certain functions, the essential stability task matrix facilitates identifying gaps that require building or leveraging specific capabilities within the international community.



**Figure 2-3. An integrated approach to stability operations tasks**

2-32. The stability sectors form a framework for executing stability operations that represents the five key areas in which civil-military efforts focus on building host-nation capacity. Individually, they encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute reform activities in a functional sector. Collectively, they are the pillars upon which the government frames the possible reconstruction tasks required for nations torn by conflict or disaster. Although U.S. forces execute some tasks sequentially, success necessitates an approach that focuses on simultaneous actions across an operational area. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one sector depend on successfully integrating and synchronizing tasks across other sectors.

### Security Sector

2-33. Security sector efforts focus on establishing civil security, developing legitimate institutions, and restoring infrastructure. Civil security creates a safe and predictable environment in which citizens and communities are protected from rampant threats and violence. Security activities include the restoration of political boundaries and local law enforcement. It forms the foundation for progress in other reform sectors and the transition to host-nation civilian authority.

2-34. In the most pressing conditions, land forces assume responsibility for all efforts in the security sector. These efforts typically assemble under the activities reflected in the Army stability task, establish civil security, and complement and reinforce parallel efforts in other sectors. For results of these efforts to last, host-nation forces—acting on behalf of a host nation and its people—provide security.

### Justice and Reconciliation Sector

2-35. The justice and reconciliation sector encompasses far more tasks than policing, civil law and order, and the court systems of a state. Within the sector, efforts provide for a fair, impartial, and accountable justice system while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster.

Tasks most closely associated with justice focus on reestablishing a fair and impartial judiciary and effective justice system. This system ensures public safety, helps to resolve disputes, and helps enforce established contracts. Those tasks relating to reconciliation address grievances and crimes, past and present, in hopes of forging a peaceful future for an integrated society.

2-36. An integrated approach to justice and reconciliation is central to broader reform efforts across the other sectors. The justice and reconciliation sector is supported by eight key elements:

- An impartial, transparent, and accountable judiciary and justice system.
- A fair, representative, and equitable body of law.
- Effective and scrupulous police institutions responsive to civil authority and respectful of human rights and dignity.
- Mechanisms for monitoring and upholding human rights.
- A humane, reform-based corrections system.
- Reconciliation and accountability mechanisms for resolving past abuses and grievances arising from conflict.
- An effective and ethical legal profession.
- Public knowledge and understanding of rights and responsibilities under the law.

2-37. Successful interventions address the most critical gaps in capability and capacity as soon as possible. Initial response forces that immediately account for vital issues of justice and reconciliation typically maintain the initiative against subversive and criminal elements seeking to fill those gaps. Host-nation involvement in planning, oversight, and monitoring of justice and reconciliation sector reforms is essential. Generally, intervention in the justice and reconciliation sector encompasses three categories:

- Restored initial response activities to institute essential interim justice measures that resolve the most urgent issues of law and order until host-nation processes and institutions can.
- An established system of reconciliation to address grievances and past atrocities.
- Long-term actions to establish a legitimate, accountable host-nation justice system and supporting infrastructure.

2-38. The justice and reconciliation sector closely relates to the security and governance sectors; activities in one sector often complement or reinforce efforts in another. These relationships are further reinforced by the inseparable nature of the tasks subordinate to each sector, which reflects the dynamic interaction between security and justice. Due to the close relationships among the activities and functions that compose the security, governance, and justice and reconciliation sectors, failure to act quickly in one sector can lead to the loss of momentum and gains in the other sectors.

## Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being Sector

2-39. Instability could result from a failed or failing states, or man-made or natural disasters. Lack of a functioning government and events such as disasters significantly stress how well a state can provide for the essential humanitarian needs of its people. The ability of a host nation to maintain security and rule of law relates directly to effective social well-being and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, during a conflict or disaster, the inability of states to provide institutions of security and governance that enable functioning public services often leads to widespread internal strife and humanitarian crisis. In some areas, the intense competition for limited resources explodes into full-blown conflict, possibly leaving pervasive starvation, disease, and death as obvious outward indications of a fragile state in crisis.

2-40. After a conflict or disaster, conditions often create a significant security vacuum within the state. Any intervention effort is incomplete if it fails to alleviate immediate suffering. Generally, this suffering includes the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation. Intervening militaries also address harm to civilians when it has occurred.

2-41. In addition, solutions that focus on ensuring sustainable access to basic needs also prevent the recurrence of systemic failures while ensuring the social well-being of the population. Sustainable solutions establish the foundation for long-term development. They address the root or underlying causes of a conflict that result in issues such as famine, dislocated civilians, and human trafficking. They also ensure the lasting effects of an intervention effort by institutionalizing positive change in society.

## Governance and Participation Sector

2-42. Tasks in the governance and participation sector address the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure. At the national level, governance is a state's ability to serve its citizens through rules, processes, and behavior. A state serves its citizens by articulating interests, managing resources, and exercising power in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. Effective governance involves establishing rules and procedures for political decision making; strengthening public sector management, administrative institutions, and practices; providing public services in an effective and transparent manner; and providing civil administration that supports lawful private activity and enterprise. Participation includes procedures that actively, openly involve the local populace in forming their government structures and policies that, in turn, encourage public debate and the generation and exchange of new ideas.

2-43. While governance is traditionally provided by a formal central government, governance functions may be carried out by various actors in an operational environment with considerable local variation. Even in areas where a central government lacks influence, governance will still occur when different groups compete for control over a population. The terms government and governance are not synonymous. Depending on conditions in the operational area and the USG strategic goal, the Army may need to deal with a variety of governance actors that may include both formal (central, regional, and local governments) and informal (tribal and clan structures, religious and spiritual leaders, associations, as well as criminal or insurgent organizations) structures.

2-44. Efforts to strengthen civil participation foster achieving a positive, lasting change in society. Achieving this change enables a local population to influence its government decision making and hold its public leaders accountable for their actions. Activities that develop social capital help local communities influence policies and institutions at national, regional, and local levels. With this assistance, communities establish processes to identify problems, develop proposals to address critical issues, build capabilities and capacities, mobilize the community, rebuild social networks, and develop advocacy. These social capital development activities are founded on three pillars:

- Human rights by promoting and protecting social, economic, cultural, political, civil, and other basic human rights.
- Equity and equality by advancing equity and equality of opportunity among citizens in terms of gender, social and economic resources, political representation, ethnicity, and race.
- Democracy and self-determination by supporting participation and involvement in public forums and self-determination in human development.

2-45. Response efforts that seek to build local governance and participation capacity ensure host-nation responsibility for these processes. Even when civilians are deprived of authority or the right to vote, they must be encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding their own government. Establishing successful, enduring host-nation government institutions requires this lead. Even when external actors perform certain governance functions temporarily, the process to build host-nation capacity—complemented by a comprehensive technical assistance program—is vital to long-term success.

2-46. Military forces may assume the powers of a sovereign governing authority under two conditions: when military forces intervene in the absence of a functioning government or when military operations prevent a government from administering to the public sector and providing public services. Transitional military authority is an interim solution. It continues only until the host-nation institutions and infrastructure can resume their functions and responsibilities. (See FM 3-07 for more information on transitional military authority.)

## Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Sector

2-47. Much of the broader success achieved in stability operations begins at the local level as intervening actors engage the populace with modest economic and governance programs. These programs set the building blocks for comprehensive national reform efforts. These efforts strive to build the institutions and processes to ensure the sustained viability of the state. To support the progress of the state from disarray to development, external actors work with host-nation leaders to—

- Establish the fiscal and monetary policies and regulatory framework that support basic economic activity and development.
- Secure and protect the natural resources, energy production, and distribution infrastructure of the host nation.
- Engage and involve the private sector in reconstruction and economic development.
- Implement programs that encourage trade and investment with initial emphasis on host-nation and regional investors, followed at a later stage by foreign investors.
- Rebuild or reform essential economic governance institutions.
- Reconstruct or build essential economic infrastructure.
- Enable sustained achievement of all these items by strengthening host-nation human capacity building systems, including education and vocational training programs.

2-48. Although conflict and disaster cause significant economic losses and disrupt economic activity, they also **create opportunities for economic reform and restructuring**. In fragile states, elites who benefit from the existing state of the economic situation can discourage the growth of trade and investment, stifle private sector development, limit opportunities for employment and workforce growth, and weaken or destroy emerging economic institutions. Intervening actors work to legitimize the host nation's economic activities and institutions. Legitimate institutions provide an opportunity to stimulate reconstruction and stabilization by facilitating assistance from the international community. This community helps develop comprehensive, integrated humanitarian and economic development programs required to achieve sustained success. Ultimately, such success can reduce the likelihood of a return to violent conflict while restoring valuable economic and social capital to the host nation.

2-49. The **economic recovery of the host-nation is directly related directly to effective governance**. Sound economic policy supported by legitimate, effective governance fosters recovery, growth, and investment. Recovery begins at the local level as markets and enterprises are reestablished, the workforce is engaged, and public and private investment are restored. These events help to stabilize the host-nation currency and reduce unemployment, thus providing the tax base necessary to support the recovery of the host nation's treasury. In turn, this enables the host-nation government to fund public institutions and services that provide for the social and economic well-being of the population. Also, resilient and capable transportation infrastructure can more effectively link the population with its government, security forces, economic assets, essential services, and social networks.

## JOINT STABILITY FUNCTIONS

2-50. Assigning and prioritizing specific tasks depends on the mission and conditions of an operational environment. The **joint stability functions, as a framework**, are a tool to help visualize the conduct of an operation, sequence necessary activities within an operation, and develop and resource appropriate priorities for those activities. Individually, the functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a functional sector.

2-51. The joint functions are based upon the sectors developed in the essential stability task matrix by the DOS. Figure 2-3 (on page 2-7) depicts how the Army stability operations tasks—establish civil security, support to civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation—are nested within this framework:

- Security.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.
- Rule of law.
- Governance and participation.

## SIX ARMY STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

2-52. Six Army stability operations tasks correspond to the stability sectors adopted by the DOS. The subordinate tasks performed by military forces under the stability operations tasks directly support broader efforts within the stability sectors executed as part of unified action. None of these Army stability operations tasks is performed in isolation. When integrated within their complementary stability sectors, they represent a cohesive effort to reestablish the institutions that provide for the civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and the state. At the operational level, Army stability operations tasks serve as lines of effort or simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. (See the discussion on the lines of effort beginning in paragraph 4-29.) Each Army stability task and stability sector contains a number of related subordinate tasks. In any operation, the Army stability operations tasks, and the subordinate tasks included within each area, are integrated with offensive and defensive tasks. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on unified land operations.)

### Army Stability Tasks

- Establish civil security.
- Support to civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct security cooperation.

2-53. Army stability operations tasks are fundamental to unified land operations and are performed across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. Military forces execute Army stability operations tasks before, during, or after conflict to support a legitimate host-nation government, to assist a fragile state, or in the absence of a functioning civil authority. Each situation is unique. Assessment and analysis support planning and execution to determine the ends, ways, and means appropriate to the conditions of an operational environment.

2-54. Each Army stability task applies to the stabilization framework. Each discussion illustrates the application of the stability operations tasks to the stabilization framework. Paragraph 1-36 begins the discussion of the stabilization framework.

## IDENTIFYING STABILITY OPERATIONS TASKS

2-55. Stability operations strive to stabilize an operational environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Consolidation of gains seeks to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.

2-56. The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the situation in an operational area. When a functional, effective host-nation government exists, military forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order and sometimes reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case engagement scenario, the security environment is in chaos, and the state is in crisis or has failed altogether. In these situations, international law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. These situations require a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in an operational area that enable the success of other actors.

2-57. In an operational environment with unstable security conditions in which the host-nation government either has failed or cannot function effectively, a military force may be the only substantial stabilizing presence. In these situations, the force prepares to perform all the tasks essential to establishing and maintaining security and order while providing for the essential needs of the populace. Often, local and international aid organizations have bases in the operational area but limited access to the population. Military forces can significantly contribute to increasing the access of these aid organizations, allowing them to provide essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. In turn, this reduces a substantial logistic burden on military forces, allowing them to focus on providing a safe, secure environment.

2-58. Success in the stability component of an operation often depends on the commander's ability to identify, prioritize, and sequence the tasks essential to mission success. Commanders prioritize and sequence the performance of those tasks with available combat power, the diverse array of actors participating, and the ability of the host nation to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and defense, stability operations require commanders demonstrate cultural awareness and a clear understanding of stability operations to determine those truly essential to mission success.

2-59. The commander and staff identify essential stability operations tasks based on consideration of relevant mission variables. (See ADP 5-0 for a discussion of mission variables.) Military forces must successfully execute stability operations tasks to accomplish specific missions. These essential tasks may include specified and implied tasks required to establish the end state conditions that define success. They include stability operations and supporting information operations that communicate to a wide array of audiences. Some stability operations are executed simultaneously and some sequentially.

2-60. For commanders and staffs, stability operations require a unique combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and cultural awareness. Military forces have a finite amount of combat power to apply to the tasks associated with a given operation. Stability operations lay the foundation for the success of the instruments of national power. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future viability of a state. Establishing this foundation depends on applying combat power to the essential stability operations tasks identified during the initial assessment of the situation and the framing of the basic problem. Decisions about using combat power are more than a factor of the size and composition of the force, the strategic mission, and long-term objectives. Commanders and staffs also consider the ethical consequences of those decisions and the signals those actions send to the government and local population of the host nation, as well as to the American people. Resources will never be adequate to cover all stability requirements; thus, essential tasks must be prioritized by leaders at all levels.

## USING THE STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK

2-61. Military forces provide support to facilitate the performance of tasks for which the host nation is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component performed by military forces. However, military forces sometimes provide logistic, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These tasks generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with an operation focused on stability activities:

- Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces are prepared to execute.
- Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

2-62. This section only addresses some examples of those tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility or must be prepared to execute. (FM 3-07 and ATP 3-07.5 discuss additional essential tasks.) Within each stability sector, Army stability operations tasks focus effort toward the desired end state conditions for a specific execution time frame. For example, initial response tasks executed in the security sector typically focus on establishing civil security and supporting civil control. The six Army stability operations tasks divide into major subcategories that facilitate integration and synchronization of related activities.

2-63. The Army stability operations tasks reflect a myriad of interrelated activities conducted across the five stability sectors. Tasks executed in one sector inevitably affect another sector; planned and executed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce these effects. Achieving a specific objective or establishing certain conditions often requires performing a number of related tasks among different stability sectors. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local populace, safety and security are broad effects. Military forces achieve these effects by ending hostilities, isolating belligerents and criminal elements, demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order and safety. Sustaining security over time requires the execution of even more tasks across all the stability sectors.

## Establish Civil Security

2-64. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. This is essential to providing a safe and secure environment. Without a reasonable level of civil security, other stability operations tasks are not effective. Civil security requires four necessary conditions:

- Cessation of large-scale violence.
- Public order.
- Physical protection.
- Territorial security.

(See ATP 3-07.5 for a detailed discussion of these conditions.)

2-65. Civil security includes a diverse set of activities. These range from enforcing peace agreements to conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. If a legitimate civil government cannot assume responsibility for the security sector, military forces perform the tasks associated with civil security. Normally, the responsibility for establishing and maintaining civil security belongs to military forces from the onset of operations through transition, when host-nation security and police forces assume this role.

2-66. Civil security is resource intensive. As an Army stability task, establish civil security requires more manpower, materiel, and monetary support than any other task. However, civil security is a necessary precursor to success in the other Army stability operations tasks. Civil security provides the foundation for unified action across the other stability sectors. Well-established and maintained civil security enables efforts in other areas to achieve lasting results.

2-67. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment for the local populace fosters long-term stability. Such an environment facilitates introducing civilian agencies and organizations whose efforts ensure long-term success by fostering development. For political and economic reform efforts to be successful, people, goods, and livestock need a safe and secure environment to travel within the region. Establish civil security subordinate tasks are discussed in ATP 3-07.5. (See figure 2-4 for an example.)

### **Establish Transitional Public Security**

Transitional public security is a military-led effort to restore civil security, protect the civilian population, and maintain public order until the joint force transfers that responsibility to a competent authority.

Transitional public security tasks, by their nature, are often performed by police; however, because of the conditions and capacity required to conduct them, will likely be performed by combat forces. Army forces may be tasked to execute transitional public security when the rule of law has broken down or no longer exists, when the host nation police force no longer works or exists, or when directed by the joint task force headquarters. Transitional public security tasks are essential to consolidating gains.

Key transitional public security tasks include—

- Establish civil security and public order.
- Conduct interim detention.
- Conduct interim adjudication.

Transformation tasks may include support to host-nation or other forces, such as stability police, as they assume more responsibility (and eventual control) for civil security and public order. Similarly, as part of transformation, military forces will transition interim detention and adjudication to other competent authorities.

**Figure 2-4. Sample subordinate task to establish civil security**

## Support to Civil Control

2-68. Support to civil control centers on justice reform, the rule of law, and public order, underpinned by efforts to rebuild the host-nation judiciary, police, and corrections systems. It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, including police, investigative services, prosecutorial arm, and public defense. Civil control tasks, along with oversight, accountability, and transparency of the justice sector deters corruption that threatens security, justice, and governance institutions. Impartiality of

judges in their application of the law to incarcerate convicted individuals is essential to building public trust in due process and a just system. Civil control tasks focus on building temporary or interim capabilities to pave the way for host-nation or international organizations to implement permanent capabilities. Civil control includes the following necessary conditions:

- Just legal frameworks.
- Public order.
- Accountability to the law.
- Access to justice.
- Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence.
- Culture of lawfulness.

(See ATP 3-07.5 for a detailed discussion of these conditions.)

2-69. In a fragile state, the justice system often ceases to function altogether with absent judges and legal professionals, looted or destroyed courts and prisons, damaged or destroyed records, and any surviving vestiges of the justice system stripped of essentials. With a transitional military authority, intervening forces may perform both judicial and correctional functions. Promoting the rule of law requires that Army forces abide by the law and are held accountable for their actions.

2-70. To successfully provide for the safety of the populace, an effective judiciary branch and a functioning corrections system must complement the state's police institutions. Together with governance and civil security, civil control is a core element of security sector reform. This reform sets the foundation for broader government and economic reform and successful humanitarian relief and social development. Supporting the establishment of civil control protects the integrity of the security sector reform program. Civil control tasks prevent corruption that threatens security institutions when institutions lack the support of judges to apply law and prisons to incarcerate the convicted.

2-71. Building host-nation capacity for civil control is paramount to establishing the foundation for adherence to the rule of law. Police organizations operating under civil control are essential to long-term success. Civil police organizations dealing with crime and security concerns within a population indicates success in achieving stability. The host nation decides on an appropriate policing model, often with the advice and support of police expert intervenors. If required and authorized, military police provide technical skills necessary to support developing host-nation police capability and capacity. (See ATP 3-39.10 for additional information.)

2-72. Long-term development strives to institutionalize a rule of law culture within the government and society. Establishing this culture often relies on the delicate balance between retribution and reconciliation in a state recovering from the effects of collapse. Successful development depends on the ability of the host nation to reconcile with its past—determining whom to punish, whom to forgive, whom to exclude, and whom to accept within the new order of the state. Host-nation justice system actors who participated with a corrupt or authoritarian regime and continued their service in such capacities are inconsistent with institutional reform programs. As with other elements of the civil security and governance sectors, an appropriate authority vets the judiciary, police, and corrections staffs and oversees their activities as part of the security sector reform program. Conducted in parallel with other reform processes, near-term efforts focus on building host-nation capacity by restoring the components of the justice system.

2-73. Civil control uses tasks to regulate selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. It reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Within the justice and reconciliation stability sector, initial response tasks seek to develop interim mechanisms for establishing rule of law. Transformation tasks focus on restoring the justice system and processes for reconciliation. Fostering sustainability tasks establishes a legitimate, functioning justice system founded on international norms. These conditions define success within the justice and reconciliation stability sector while reflecting the end state necessary to ensure the foundation for enduring stability and peace. Support to civil control subordinate tasks are discussed in ATP 3-07.5. (See figure 2-5 for an example.)

### ***Support to Criminal Justice System***

Military forces may be required to support civilian institutions as they establish an interim criminal justice system. When possible, the host nation's existing criminal justice system will be used; however, in extreme cases this is not possible. Except in rare circumstances, the U.S. Departments of State and Justice and other competent international authorities perform these tasks. If the Department of Defense is required to support, rule of law sections in civil affairs brigades and commands can advise and support commanders' requirements.

Tasks to support an interim criminal justice system include the following:

- During initial response, military forces can—
  - Assess the current legal framework.
  - Provide interim justice personnel.
  - Assess host-nation capabilities.
- During transformation, military forces can—
  - Support development of host-nation institutions.
  - Support expansion of justice systems as necessary.
- During fostering sustainability, military forces can—
  - Transfer responsibility to other competent authority.
  - Monitor and report.
  - Support training programs.

**Figure 2-5. Sample subordinate task to establish civil control**

## Restore Essential Services

2-74. Efforts to restore essential services ultimately contribute to achieving a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. In failing or failed states or in the aftermath of armed conflict and major disasters, military forces support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. The immediate humanitarian needs and security for local populace are always a foremost priority. Provision of essential services includes these necessary conditions:

- Access to and delivery of basic needs and services.
- Access to and delivery of education.
- Return and resettlement of dislocated civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons.

(See ATP 3-07.5 for a more detailed discussion of these conditions.)

2-75. Subordinate tasks associated with these Army stability operations tasks extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center their efforts on the initial response tasks that provide for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Typically, local and international aid organizations already provide assistance, although the security situation or obstacles to free movement may limit their access to all populations. By providing a secure environment, military forces enable these organizations to expand their access to the entire populace and ease the overall burden on the force to provide this assistance.

2-76. Commanders must recognize that a host-nation populace may perceive these tasks as political or as favoring one group over another. In patronage-based societies, tasks often favor an ethnic group or a group where the political power of actors correlate with how many favors or dollars they can deliver to their populace. In these circumstances, the host-nation populace's perceptions of even simple assistance tasks as favoritism potentially fuels conflict. Further, commanders should carefully avoid crowding out local economic and service networks.

2-77. Transformation tasks establish the foundation for long-term development, resolving the root causes of conflict that lead to events such as famine, displaced civilians, refugee flows, and human trafficking.

Fostering sustainability tasks ensures the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society.

2-78. Military forces often support host-nation and civilian relief agencies with efforts to restore essential services including opening or re-opening vital transportation routes, airfields, and helicopter landing zones to enable access for essential services restoration and delivery. However, when a host nation cannot perform its roles, military forces often execute these tasks directly or support other civilian agencies and organizations. Effective forces properly scale these activities to local capacity for sustainment. Proper scaling also creates the best opportunity for the local populace to create small-scale enterprises to provide as many of these essential services as possible through the private economy. Effective military forces delay initiating large-scale projects requiring complicated host-nation efforts until the necessary infrastructure exists to support such effort. Restore essential services subordinate tasks are discussed in ATP 3-07.5. (See figure 2-6 for an example.)

#### **Provide Essential Civil Services**

Although closely related to establishing and supporting effective local governance, efforts to provide essential civil services to the host-nation population involve developing the capacity to operate, maintain, and improve those services. This broader focus involves a societal component that encompasses long-range education and training, employment programs, and economic investment and development.

At the tactical level, military forces meet the immediate humanitarian needs of the people by providing the food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Once their immediate needs are satisfied, efforts to restore basic services and transition control to civil authorities typically progress using lines of effort. These lines of effort are vital to integrating efforts to reestablish local civil services with similar, related actions to establish a safe, secure environment. Military forces, specifically functional units or functional specialists, may support the effort to provide essential civil services by conducting detailed infrastructure reconnaissance. Essential civil services include an initial response in which military forces can—

- Provide for immediate humanitarian needs of the population (food, water, shelter, and medical support) when and where independent humanitarian organizations are not able.
- Ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.
- Provide interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services.

In transformation, military forces build host-nation capacity to operate and maintain essential civil services. In fostering sustainability, military forces identify modernization needs and the means to achieve them.

**Figure 2-6. Sample subordinate task to restore essential services**

### **Support to Governance**

2-79. Governance is the process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function; effective, legitimate governance ensures that these are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Military efforts to support governance help to build progress toward achieving effective, legitimate governance. Military support to governance focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. The support provided by military forces helps to shape the environment for extended unified action by other partners. Their efforts eventually enable the host nation to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks. Good governance includes the following necessary conditions:

- Provision of essential services.
- Stewardship of state resources.
- Political moderation and accountability.
- Civic participation and empowerment

(See ATP 3-07.5 for a more detailed discussion of these conditions.)

2-80. Ultimately, stability operations strive to leave a host nation at peace with itself and its regional neighbors as well as sustainable without the support of external actors. However, these objectives do not

necessarily equate to democratization, especially when interpreted to mean direct elections, despite it often being an end state condition in planning or directed by mandate. In societies already divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Generally, representative institutions (and there can be a wide array of representative structures depending on local context) offer the best means of reconstituting a government acceptable to the majority of the citizens. This is the broad intent of developing host-nation governance.

2-81. When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions, for whatever reason, some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A state's legitimacy among its people is related to its perceived ability to provide these essential services. In extreme cases, where civil government is completely dysfunctional or absent altogether, international law requires military forces to provide the basic civil administration functions of the host-nation government under the auspices of a transitional military authority. (See FM 3-07 for a detailed discussion of transitional military authority.) Support to governance subordinate tasks are discussed in ATP 3-07.5. (See figure 2-7 for an example.)

#### ***Support Anticorruption Initiatives***

Providing legal guidance and assistance to the transitional government mitigates the near-term effects of corruption. Long-term measures ensure lasting success. Corruption and graft can hinder efforts to establish governance, restore rule of law, or institute economic recovery. While some level of corruption is common to many cultures, its existence can unhinge reform efforts and put an entire mission at risk. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response in which military forces create mechanisms to curtail corruption across government institutions. During an initial response, military forces can—

- Implement or reaffirm government employee oaths of office.
- Develop and disseminate ethical standards for civil servants.
- Ensure transparency in dispersing government resources.
- Implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation.
- Support witness protection programs.
- Incorporate anticorruption efforts into their procurement systems and not act in ways that may unwittingly support local corruption.

**Figure 2-7. Sample subordinate tasks to support to governance**

### **Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development**

2-82. Military tasks executed to support the host-nation economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a state is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelm the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, unemployment, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the state's ability to support the well-being of the people. Economic problems inextricably relate to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others often follow.

2-83. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize a host-nation economy. It focuses on a society's physical assets and supporting services that enable the state's economic viability. These include construction services, engineering, and physical infrastructure in the following sectors:

- Transportation, such as roads, bridges, railways, airports, ports, and waterways.
- Telecommunications.
- Energy (such as natural resources, the electrical power sector, and energy production) and distribution.
- Municipal and other public services.

2-84. Accurate, detailed assessment is a key to formulating long-term plans for economic and infrastructure development. Military forces often possess the capability to conduct reconnaissance of the host nation's economy and state's physical infrastructure and can effectively inform planning efforts. Infrastructure reconnaissance gathers technical information on the status of large-scale public systems, services, and

facilities necessary for economic activity. This reconnaissance facilitates restoring essential services as well as spurring economic and infrastructure development. Infrastructure reconnaissance is accomplished in two stages: infrastructure assessment—associated with the restoration of essential services—and infrastructure survey—that supports economic and infrastructure development. Infrastructure reconnaissance supports the operations process by providing vital information on the quality of the local infrastructure or problems within it. It also supports how those infrastructure issues impact military operations and the population. (See paragraph 4-51 and ADP 5-0 for more detailed discussions on assessments. See ATP 3-34.81 for more information on infrastructure assessment.)

2-85. Commanders, when pursuing local economic development projects, consider the host-nation population and its government's ability to sustain the effort. Sustainability involves the local ability to maintain a project and the capability to use it after an operation. Developing new local capacities can be substantially more complex than simply restoring capabilities that existed before a conflict. Existing capabilities, though perhaps not as effective as new capabilities, may have more support from local means.

2-86. Sound economic policies promote equitable, sustainable growth. Economic policies are the key to remedying underlying tensions in society. These policies allow a state to progress toward recovery and eventually long-term economic development. Therefore, any effort to establish economic stabilization closely links to similar efforts in other stability sectors. Linking these efforts expands the possibilities for changing the underlying social, economic, and political conditions that led to the collapse of the state. Synchronizing reform efforts among the economic, governance, and security sectors decreases the chance of continued or renewed conflict. Development of the economic sector includes these necessary conditions:

- Employment generation.
- Price and currency stabilization (also called macroeconomic stabilization).
- Market economy sustainability.
- Control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace.
- Individual economic security.

(See ATP 3-07.5 for a more detailed discussion of economic policies and stabilization.)

2-87. Building host-nation capacity within the economic sector requires an integrated approach to achieve sustainable growth. Appropriate civilian or host-nation organizations can accomplish much of this effort at the macro level through development mechanisms, but they may look to military forces for security or other types of assistance, including access to agricultural development expertise and enablers. Therefore, military forces must maintain and share a comprehensive understanding of the economic sector, the impact of their activities on the economy, and the proper method to lay a stabilizing foundation that will support future sustainability and development with relevant partner organizations. (See figure 2-8 for an example of a subordinate task from ATP 3-07.5.)

2-88. At the local level, military forces significantly support economic stabilization and infrastructure development. The building blocks for broad national recovery and development are set at the local level. At this level, recovery and development focus on generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through private sector development, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure. However, military forces must avoid causing unintended disruptions to local markets by suddenly stimulating the economy, particularly by agreeing to pay prices significantly above the market rate. This demand on local markets may cause prices to spike, thus making products cost prohibitive for the population. A price spike may cause resentment and undermine broader efforts, particularly if the military force is only in the area for a short time and market activity collapses after its departure. Thus, members of the force understand the economic fundamentals of the area—key markets, revenue producers, unemployment, and price trends—to gauge the impact of military activities.

2-89. At the national or regional level, efforts focus on comprehensive economic and infrastructure improvements or on supporting the efforts of other agencies to strengthen the economy or foster development. Intergovernmental organizations—such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development—help set sound economic policies and establish conditions for long-term development and investment. Support to economic and infrastructure development subordinate tasks are discussed in ATP 3-07.5. (See figure 2-8 for an example.)

### **Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation**

When a military force occupies an operational area, the demand for local goods, services, and labor creates employment opportunities for the local populace. Local projects, such as restoring public services, rebuilding schools, or clearing roads, offer jobs for local laborers. Drawing on local goods, services, and labor offers a military force the opportunity to infuse cash into the local economy, thus stimulating market activity. However, this initial economic infusion rarely translates into sustainable capital availability, jobs, and local economic growth.

Nevertheless, this initial stimulus may be required to jumpstart a local economy, including efforts to implement employment programs and manage local projects. Understanding local pay scales is essential to establishing jobs programs with appropriate wages. Inflated pay scales may divert critical professionals from their chosen field in pursuit of short-term financial gains. Additionally, military forces can help create long-term employment by incorporating on-the-job training and apprenticeships for local people to learn new skills.

Host-nation small business creation is essential to creating jobs that are sustainable for themselves, their families, and their neighbors after other actors depart. Host-nation enterprises may provide various goods and services, including essential services such as small-scale sewerage, water, electricity, transportation, health care, and communications. Access to financing through banking or micro finance institutions is essential to enterprise creation and growth.

Local jobs programs require a complementary vetting program to ensure the reliability of the workforce. Linking vetting actions with efforts to support economic generation mitigates risk to the force and the local populace.

#### **During initial response, military forces can—**

- Implement initiatives to provide immediate employment.
- Create employment opportunities for all ages and genders.
- Assess the labor force for critical skills requirements and shortfalls.
- Assess the labor market for critical skills requirements and shortfalls as well as pay norms.

#### **During transformation, military forces can—**

- Implement public works projects.
- Provide start-up capital for small businesses through small-scale enterprise grants.
- Encourage the creation of small lending institutions.
- Enable the development of financial institutions.

**Figure 2-8. Sample subordinate task to support to economic and infrastructure development**

## **Conduct Security Cooperation**

2-90. Establishing or reestablishing competent host-nation security forces is fundamental to providing lasting safety and security for the host nation and its population. These forces primarily counter external threats. However, they also assist in other key missions including disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and some other internal military threats. Developing host-nation security forces is integral to successful stability operations and includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of host-nation security forces.

2-91. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). Security cooperation is often coordinated by the U.S. military's security cooperation organization in a country. These interactions include all DOD-administered security assistance programs that build defense and security relationships promoting specific U.S. security interests. Such interests include all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities to—

- Develop friendly, partner, and allied military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Build partnership capacity and enhance or establish relationships with regional national militaries that promote bilateral and coalition interoperability, strategic access, and regional stability.

- Gain operational access that supports U.S. strategic requirements in a theater providing freedom of movement and freedom of action during military operations. Access also facilitates other means of support to include information and intelligence sharing and technology.

2-92. Security cooperation activities seek to promote stability, develop alliances, and gain and maintain access through security relationships that build both partner capacities and capabilities. The capacities and capabilities of partners directly correlate to the type of activities undertaken. Security cooperation goals range from creating a positive relationship that allows freedom of movement to creating global security interoperability with core partners to addressing regional security organizations and alliance organizations. A broad range of interconnected and integrated security cooperation activities accomplishes security cooperation. (See FM 3-22 for more detailed information on security cooperation.)

2-93. Security cooperation primarily focuses on interoperability programs with both core partners and the fledgling security forces of a failed or failing host nation. Military forces use security cooperation efforts to achieve mid- to long-term objectives with partners. Although military forces may require short-term activities, they take extreme care not to put long-term objectives, nationally and regionally, at risk. The size of security cooperation offices vary from country to country based on the size and complexity of the security cooperation program needed to achieve the joint force commander's and country team's objectives.

2-94. Each security cooperation activity is distinct based on context and changes over time. Security cooperation activities and their purposes adapt as conditions change and as resource availability changes. The nature of the many security cooperation activities, which often span multiple objectives and outcomes, contributes to the geographic combatant commands' theater campaign plans.

2-95. The Army supports security cooperation through security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. The Army often uses Title 10, United States Code authorities—which direct training, manning, and equipping of U.S. forces—to support security cooperation. As such, security cooperation is sustained activities executed discretely or in concert with each other across the range of military operations consolidating many requirements, authorities, and force structures.

2-96. Security cooperation may directly support multiple stability end states. For example, defense institution building supports the establishment of stable governance or security assistance, and security force assistance supports the establishment of a safe and secure environment and a sustainable economy. (See figure 2-9 for an example.)

#### Conduct Security Force Assistance

**Security force assistance** is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Security force assistance encompasses joint force activities conducted within unified action to train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist foreign security forces. These activities support the host nations' efforts to plan and resource, generate, employ, transition, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces and their supporting institutions. Activities range from the ministry level to the tactical units to the national security sector.

Some examples of security force assistance which may occur in initial response, transformation, or fostering sustainability include—

- Develop foreign security force doctrine with a host nation.
- Develop foreign security force organizational structure.
- Develop formalized training programs and conduct train the trainer programs.
- Train leaders at all organizational levels and assist with formalized leader development.
- Evaluate materiel capabilities and assist with equipping host-nation forces.
- Augment host-nation units with specialized capabilities.
- Emphasize human rights, rule of law, and support of civilian authorities.

**Figure 2-9. Sample subordinate task to conduct security cooperation**

## Chapter 3

# Unique Considerations of Stability Operations in Other Operations

### CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS

3-1. Stability operations—whether conducted before, during, or after a conflict—require a unique application of some considerations common to operations. Some types of operations feature stability operations relative to offensive and defensive operations. However, these operations, as with most decisive action, have elements of offense and defense as well.

3-2. Military support to stability efforts during peacetime generally takes the form of presence, peace operations (specifically conflict prevention), and security cooperation. During military engagement, security deterrence activities and stability activities support the objectives of geographic combatant commanders' theater campaign plans and country teams' integrated country strategies (formerly mission strategic resource plans). (See JP 3-07.3 for more information on conflict prevention. See FM 3-22 for more information on security cooperation.)

3-3. During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the balance of stability and combat tasks vary widely. Some crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance, may not require combat. Others, such as strikes and raids, may not require any stability operations. Still others, such as peace operations, require a delicate balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout. (See JP 3-07.3 for more information on peace operations.)

3-4. Major operation and campaign plans appropriately balance offensive, defensive, and stability operations in all phases. An exclusive focus on offensive and defensive operations without planning for consolidation of gains will limit development of basic and supporting plans to consolidate gains and ultimately strategic success. Even while large-scale combat operations continue, divisions and corps must consolidate gains in consolidation areas. Stability operations during consolidation of gains entail minimum levels of shelter, food, water, and medical care as succeeding areas are occupied, bypassed, or returned to a transitional authority or host-nation control. (See paragraph 2-16 that begins a discussion on minimum-essential stability operations tasks. See also ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for discussions of consolidation areas.)

3-5. During major operations and campaigns, military forces particularly emphasize consolidation of gains and attendant stability operations after achieving major combat objectives. In a transition to a post-conflict situation, initial response activities dominate stability operations. A military force first focuses on establishing the minimum-essential levels of civil security to protect both military and civilian populations and simultaneously ensures access to water, shelter, food, and medical treatment. Military forces begin conducting stability operations supporting transformation and fostering sustainability as resources allow.

### MILITARY ROLE IN PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

3-6. Stability is at the foundation of prevention efforts. Military preventative tasks often support USG diplomatic efforts before, during, or after a crisis. Taken before a potential crisis, these tasks prevent or limit violence and interfere with U.S. interests. Prevention tasks during a conflict prevent the spread or escalation of conflict. Taken after a conflict, they stop a return to violence. Prevention tasks include security cooperation efforts designed to reform a country's security sector and deployment of forces designed to prevent a dispute or contain it from escalating to hostilities. Other potential prevention activities include—

- Military fact-finding missions.
- Military-to-military consultations and warnings.
- Inspections.

- Observation missions.
- Monitoring.

3-7. Army forces in the prevent role focus on support to political and developmental efforts to lessen the causes of tension and unrest. Military forces tailor these activities to meet political and developmental demands. In stability operations, including those where lethal actions are not likely, commanders understand that any accidental harm to civilians—traffic accidents, collateral damage, and so on—can severely impact their mission success. Commanders proactively plan for civilian casualty mitigation. (See ATP 3-07.6 for more information on protection of civilians.)

3-8. Security cooperation encourages regional stability. Security cooperation tasks are key peacetime military preventative actions that enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Security cooperation in peacetime comprises all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape an operational environment. It includes programs and exercises that the U.S. military conducts with unified action partners to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Military engagement activities support a combatant commander's objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. These activities may be long term, such as training teams and advisors assisting land forces, or short term, such as multinational exercises. Commanders may not expect combat, although terrorist attacks against deployed forces are always possible. Policy, regulations, and security cooperation plans—rather than doctrine—typically govern military engagement activities in peacetime. Units usually conduct bilateral military engagement activities, but they may involve multiple nations. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under security cooperation in peacetime include the following:

- Multinational training events and exercises.
- Security assistance.
- Joint combined exchange training.
- Recovery operations.
- Arms control.
- Counterdrug activities.

## PEACE OPERATIONS

3-9. Peace operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations. These operations frequently include international military missions to contain conflict, restore peace, and shape an environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations, another international organization, within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally. They often require a higher emphasis on stability operations than on offense and defense operations.

### TYPES OF PEACE OPERATIONS

3-10. Peace operations strive to keep violence from spreading, contain violence that has occurred, and reduce tension among factions. Accomplishing these objectives creates conditions in which military force supplements other unified action partner activities to reduce the level of violence and achieve a stable peace. Peace operations are usually interagency and multinational efforts requiring a balance of diplomatic, military, economic, and other resources. (See JP 3-07.3 and FM 3-07 for doctrine on peace operations.)

3-11. Army forces conduct the following types of peace operations:

- Peacekeeping.
- Peace enforcement.
- Peacemaking.
- Peace building.
- Conflict prevention.

(See JP 3-07.3 for more information on peace operations.)

3-12. *Peacekeeping* consists of military operations undertaken, with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (JP 3-07.3). Peacekeeping operations may seek to interpose a peaceful third party between belligerents, allowing diplomacy an opportunity to resolve the conflict. Military forces only use force for self-defense or defense of a peacekeeping mandate.

3-13. *Peace enforcement* consists of coercive measures, including the employment or threat of military force, to restore peace and security or for humanitarian and civilian protection purposes. *Peace enforcement* is application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (JP 3-07.3). Peace enforcement operations are normally pursuant to international authorization and may include enforcing sanctions and restoring order. These operations try not to destroy or defeat an adversary, instead they use force or threat of force to establish a safe and secure environment so that peace building can succeed.

3-14. *Peacemaking* is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it (JP 3-07.3). In peacemaking, military forces do not have the lead, but military personnel may provide expertise in negotiating the military aspects of a peace agreement.

3-15. *Peace building* is the long-term post-conflict process of creating conditions for a lasting peace. It strengthens host-nation capacities to address the root causes of conflict, rebuild institutions, infrastructure, and civic life, and maintain effective and harmonious political and societal order. *Peace building* is stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society's institutions, infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07.3). Stability operations promote reconciliation, strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict.

3-16. *Conflict prevention* consists of diplomatic and other actions taken before a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement before armed hostilities begin. It also may include efforts designed to reform a country's security area of operations and make it more accountable to civilian control. Conflict prevention may require deploying forces to contain a dispute or prevent it from escalating into hostilities.

## CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

3-17. Military forces often conduct peace operations in complex, ambiguous, and uncertain conditions with military forces from other nations. In a war-torn nation or region, peace operations ease the transition to a stable peace by supporting reconciliation and rebuilding. Military forces often conduct peace operations under international authorization. U.S. military forces may conduct peace operations under the sponsorship of the United Nations, another intergovernmental organization, as part of a multinational coalition, or unilaterally. Army forces provide specialized support to other government agencies as necessary.

3-18. An operational environment for a peace operation may include any or all of the following characteristics:

- Hybrid threats.
- Failing or failed states.
- Absence of the rule of law.
- Terrorism and terrorist organizations.
- Gross violations of human rights.
- Collapse of civil infrastructure.
- Presence of displaced civilians.

3-19. Army forces in peace operations strive to create a safe and secure environment, primarily through conduct of stability operations. Army forces use their offensive and defensive capabilities to deter external and internal adversaries from overt actions against each other, the population, or the peace operations force. Establishing security and control enables civilian agencies to address the underlying causes of a conflict and create a self-sustaining peace.

3-20. Peace operations require opposing parties to cooperate with the international community, including international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. In most peace operations, this cooperation is voluntary. However, peace enforcement involves the threat or use of military force to compel cooperation. Consolidation of gains and its associated stability operations will be required. The likelihood of combat declines, and, when it occurs, it is usually at the small-unit level. Military forces involved in peace operations prepare for sudden engagements even while executing operations to prevent them.

3-21. Successful peace operations also require support from the local populace and host-nation leaders. As with most stability operations, commanders emphasize the use of information activities, particularly information used to inform and influence various audiences in an area of operations. Peace operations require perseverance to achieve the desired end state. (See JP 3-07.3 for more information on peace operations.)

## TRANSITIONS

3-22. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. The shift in relative priority between the elements of decisive action—such as from an offense to stability—also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution. The staff identifies potential transitions during planning and accounts for them throughout execution; assessment ensures that the staff measures progress toward such transitions and takes appropriate actions to prepare for and execute them. In a stability context, operations can involve multiple types of transitions, and they often occur concurrently. Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and host nations.

3-23. Transfer of control of stability operations requires detailed planning as well. These transitions may be from U.S. military forces to another multinational military force or civilian organization, to another USG organization or agency, or to a host-nation military or government agency. The role of a military force may also change from leading the conduct of stability operations to supporting a new organization executing stability operations.

3-24. An unexpected change in conditions often requires commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of a military force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning also accounts for changes in the mission. Commanders attuned to sudden changes can better adapt their forces to dynamic conditions. They continuously assess the situation and task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. They strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

3-25. Transitions create unexpected opportunities; they especially make forces vulnerable to enemy threats or unanticipated changes to a situation. Because a military force is vulnerable during transitions, commanders establish clear conditions for execution. Each transition involves inherent risk. That risk is amplified when a military force manages multiple transitions simultaneously or conducts a series of transitions quickly. Planning anticipates these transitions, and careful preparation and diligent execution ensures they occur without incident. Commanders identify transitions as decisive points on lines of effort. They typically mark a significant shift in effort and signify the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of a host nation.

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

3-26. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). Security sector reform (SSR) is an umbrella term that addresses beneficial security reforms for a host nation. A host-nation government undertakes SSR to improve rule of law, security, and stability. SSR includes whole-of-government programs to cultivate the following reform programs: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; defense and other security forces ministerial-level advising; rule of law (for example, constitutional reform); civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, border management; intelligence reform; strategic defense planning system; and establishment of security and stability as needed. In SSR, Army forces primarily support reforming, restructuring, or reestablishing the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations. The establishment of border police, coast guard, and customs officials is integral to SSR. Border control seeks to prevent illicit activities, such as the arms trade, human trafficking,

smuggling, and insurgent transit. SSR recognizes the interdependence of the security sector with institutional reform and rule of law. (See JP 3-07 and FM 3-07 for more detailed discussions of security sector reform.)

3-27. SSR should not be confused with security sector assistance. Security sector assistance is the USG strategic policies, programs, and activities to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice from ministerial level down to tactical units. **What's the difference?**

## DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

3-28. The complex disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has dimensions that include culture, politics, security, humanity, and socioeconomics. DDR is a confidence-building program to induce government and anti-government forces to conduct peace negotiations, resulting in a peace agreement, the dissolution of rebel forces, and the partial demobilization of government forces. DDR efforts strive to increase stability by disarming and demobilizing former combatants (for example, government and rebel forces). These former combatants are then reintegrated through reintegration either into civil society or the new armed forces and police. **Reintegration** is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace. A successful DDR program helps establish sustainable stability. A failed or partially implemented DDR effort can stall SSR, disrupt peace processes, and destabilize communities socially and economically. Such failure potentially leads to a renewal of conflict. (See JP 3-07 for more information on DDR.)

3-29. As a confidence-building program, DDR is designed to assist with the end of hostilities between government and rebel factions. Ideally, it includes a signed peace agreement, a DDR program for both government and rebel forces, the constitution of new security forces (military and police), and power sharing arrangements in the new government. DDR is often key to successful SSR. If DDR is conducted haphazardly or incompletely, SSR can face severe obstacles.

3-30. DDR draws on multiple stability sectors for success. The Army stability operations tasks of establish civil security and conduct security cooperation are key to reaching the DDR objectives. However, all six Army stability operations tasks can play a role in the DDR effort.

3-31. The DDR program is a critical component of peace and restoration processes, and it is accounted for in initial planning. Often, bilateral, African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations, or other special envoys or representatives negotiate the terms of this program in a cease fire or peace accords. DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and belligerent groups. DDR sets the foundation for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals live as contributing, law-abiding citizens. The DDR program is a central contributor to long-term stability, security, and development.

3-32. DDR dictates, and is dictated by, a variety of priority areas in planning for unified land operations and SSR. The promise of DDR to former fighting forces often enables achieving a peace agreement. DDR planning directly relates to SSR, determining the potential size, composition, and scope of military, police, and other security structures. In addition, reintegration of former combatants into their communities sets the foundation for—and determines the success of—long-term peace building and development programs.

3-33. The success of DDR depends on integrating strategies and planning in all the sectors. For example, extending vocational training and employment opportunities to former combatants results from an effectively governed, viable economy with an active market sector. Further, teaching life skills and basic education is paramount for DDR participants to function in society. If the DDR program expires without providing alternative economic opportunities, life skills, and basic education to former combatants, the likelihood of a return to violence increases. Through truth and reconciliation trials, combatants who have committed atrocities are permitted to acknowledge their crimes and ask for forgiveness. This process reduces the likelihood of overwhelming the nascent judicial system. DDR efforts closely coordinate with reform efforts in all sectors to ensure an integrated approach that synchronizes activities toward a common end state. (For more information on DDR, go to the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre Website that discusses DDR in detail at <http://unddr.org>.)

**Has the U.S. ever successfully implemented DDR?**

3-34. DDR, encompassing the processes that safely transitions combatants back to civilian life, and SSR, involving the reconstitution and professionalization of security institutions and actors, are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Working in tandem, they can enable countries emerging from conflict to provide for their own security and uphold the rule of law, an essential precondition of sustainable development and part of the exit strategy for costly peacekeeping missions. As such, politically, they rise or fall together.

3-35. Without a monopoly on the use of force, a state has few ways to uphold the rule of law and protect the inalienable rights of citizens. By definition, conflict-affected states have lost this monopoly, and the joint purpose of DDR and SSR programs is to restore or establish it by disbanding nonstate, armed actors and reconstituting statutory forces. Does the U.S. government truly have a monopoly on use of force within U.S.?

3-36. Beyond their shared political objectives, DDR and SSR are linked, as the failure of one risks failure of the other. Ex-combatants not properly reintegrated into civil society through DDR often complicate and potentially compromise SSR. Ex-combatants who do not successfully transition to civilian life may take up arms again or form criminal gangs, challenging newly created security institutions and military forces that may lack sufficient capacity to control such threats. As the population thus becomes vulnerable to violence, the state's inability to protect its citizens undermines its legitimacy.

## FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

3-37. Instability may result from man-made or natural disasters. Such disasters often quickly overwhelm a host-nation and other organizations' abilities to provide essential services and security to its citizens. With civil security, the provision of humanitarian assistance fulfills the basic requirements of human security (including food, personal security, health, and survival). Human security includes protection from deprivation and disease as well as protection from violence. Instability may bring the legitimacy of the host-nation government into question and potentially lead to larger issues, conflict, and regional instability. When such disasters threaten to be of sufficient severity and magnitude, U.S. foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or intergovernmental organizations may be required.

3-38. Foreign humanitarian assistance is the DOD's contribution to USG efforts to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. This military contribution normally supports the United States Agency for International Development or DOS. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. Army forces during man-made or natural disasters is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided supplements or complements efforts from host-nation civil authorities, USG departments and agencies, and various international organizations and nongovernmental organizations that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. In most cases, The United States provides military support to foreign humanitarian assistance only at the request of civilian agencies and limits such support to those activities for which the military has a unique capability that would otherwise be unavailable. This short-term aid to the host nation or other agencies and organizations helps to stabilize conditions and may transition to longer-term stability activities, when directed. (See JP 3-29 for more information on foreign humanitarian assistance.)

## FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

3-39. *Foreign internal defense* is participation by civilian and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the action programs and activities undertaken by a host-nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense involves all instruments of national power. Primarily a series of programs, it supports friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. Foreign internal defense promotes regional stability by helping a host nation respond to its population's needs while maintaining security. Participating Army forces normally advise and assist host-nation forces while refraining from combat operations. Military necessity determines if U.S. forces train host-nation security forces under a foreign internal defense. Necessity increases when negative cultural and social consequences affect host nation security forces and their relationships with indigenous populations. USG support normally requires a host nation to positively apply the rule of law and legitimate governance.

3-40. Foreign internal defense involves civilian and military agencies of a government participating in action programs taken by another government or other designated organization. Foreign internal defense strives to

free and protect a society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. U.S. foreign internal defense efforts involve all instruments of national power to support host-nation internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. (See JP 3-22 and ADP 3-05 for more information on foreign internal defense.)

3-41. *Internal defense and development* is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). IDAD involves a cyclic interaction of execution, assessment, and adaptation. U.S. forces use IDAD to focus on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Not all countries use IDAD. Ideally, it is a preemptive strategy. However, if an insurgency or other threat develops, it becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. As directed, Army forces provide support to other USG departments and agencies focused on IDAD or those foreign security forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. IDAD blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization. (See JP 3-22 for detailed information on IDAD and its functions.)

3-42. Stability considerations are inherent to the multidimensional, interagency, and multinational approach of U.S. foreign internal defense activities. The Army stability operations tasks of establish civil security and conduct security cooperation, especially security force assistance, are often critical to reaching foreign internal defense objectives. However, all six can play a role in the effort. Foreign internal defense requires conduct of an evolving combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The military role in foreign internal defense often includes indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations. Foreign internal defense is often a part of irregular warfare or security cooperation in peacetime. Security force assistance activities support foreign internal defense activities where DOD organizes, trains, equips, rebuilds, builds, and advises a partner nation's security forces. Foreign internal defense focuses on helping a host nation address the root causes of instability and emphasizes that joint force efforts are intended to support IDAD programs that accommodates a host-nation's culture and politics. Planners are directed to consider the capability of a host-nation government and leadership, existing treaties and social infrastructure, and the possibility that the best solution from the U.S. perspective may not be the best solution for the supported host nation. In fact, the best solution may be entirely outside the realm of foreign internal defense and be better accomplished through other means.

## COUNTERINSURGENCY

3-43. *Counterinsurgency* is comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes (JP 3-24). In counterinsurgency, host-nation forces and their partners operate to defeat armed resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the host-nation government's legitimacy. Counterinsurgency was the dominant joint operation in OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. (See JP 3-24 and FM 3-24 for more information on counterinsurgency.)

3-44. Stability activities aimed at increasing host-nation government legitimacy by providing services and security to the local populace are critical to successful counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency operations use whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches to ensure civil and military efforts synchronize with one another to provide unity of effort and purpose where appropriate.

3-45. While each insurgency is distinct, similarities among them exist. Insurgencies occur more often in states with a lack of national cohesion or with weak, inefficient, unstable, or unpopular governments. Internal conflicts may be racial, cultural, religious, or ideological. Additional factors, such as corruption and external agitation, may also fuel an insurgency. Successful insurgencies develop a unifying leadership and organization and an attractive vision of the future.

3-46. Most operations in counterinsurgencies are conducted at the small-unit level—squad, platoon, or company; however, larger operations also occur. Larger units, such as brigades and divisions, provide direction and consistency to operations and mass resources and forces to make operations more effective. They also respond to any threat large enough to imperil the smaller units distributed throughout the areas of operations. Commanders prepare a consistent, long-range plan to defeat an insurgency. They carefully assess the negative effects of violence on the populace and strictly adhere to the rules of engagement. Operations

reflect and promote the host-nation government's authority and legitimacy, thus undermining insurgent attempts to establish an alternative authority.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN STABILITY

3-47. Successfully executing stability operations depends on informing the local populace and, when applicable, influencing behaviors. Although more tangible objectives mark the success of stability activities, the final measure of success or failure often rests with the perceptions and behaviors of the population. Military forces must go beyond defeating an enemy—they must secure the trust and confidence of the population. This requires a mastery of *information operations*—the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). Since forces conduct operations within a broader global and regional context, success often depends on the integration of information efforts among military forces and the various agencies and organizations participating in the operation. Based on mission objectives, commanders may employ themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific foreign audiences for various purposes that support current or planned operations. Information themes are overarching and apply to the capabilities of public affairs, military information support operations, and Soldier and leader engagements. A *message* is a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme (JP 3-61). Information efforts must support and complement those of higher echelon headquarters, national interests, and broader USG policy. (See FM 3-13 for more information on information operations.)

Why is "message" not mentioned in ADP 2-0?

Does info. ops. have its own ADP/FM?  
Is it distinct from intel.?

### INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

3-48. Military forces conduct operations among a population, in the spotlight of international news media, and under the umbrella of international law. The actions of Soldiers communicate American values and beliefs more effectively than words alone. Therefore, military forces ensure consistency in their actions and messages. They provide the media with prompt, factual information to quell rumors and misinformation. They grant media representatives access to information within the limits of operations security. Finally, they understand the culture of each audience and tailor messages appropriately.

3-49. No other military activity has as significant a human component as operations that occur among the people. Human beings capture information and form perceptions based on inputs received through all the senses. They see actions and hear words. They compare gestures and expressions with the spoken word. They weigh the messages presented to them with the conditions that surround them. Even when local and national news media are available, people often rely on other sources. They use word of mouth to gain information or turn to the Internet, where unverified information flows freely at unimaginable speeds. Populations will formulate perceptions and will often embrace and act upon those perceptions, regardless of contrary evidence. To create favorable perceptions, commanders consider the psychological motivations of the population and shape messages according to how the population absorbs and interprets information to ensure broad appeal and acceptance.

### INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

3-50. Although not considered stability operations, information operations are fundamental to each stability sector. Information operations are deliberately integrated with tasks in each stability sector and Army stability operations tasks to complement and reinforce the success of operations. Forces carefully sequence information operations with other tasks and support them with thorough risk assessments. Commanders exploit the initiative within the information environment with effective integration and synchronization of information-related capabilities. Combined with broad efforts to reduce the drivers of conflict and build host-nation capacity, information operations facilitate achieving decisive results: the recovery of the host-nation government and the attainment of a lasting, stable peace.

3-51. In executing stability operations, military forces focus on people. They strive to gain the cooperation and support of the populace. Stability operations that improve their safety, security, and livelihood help to shape perceptions that supporting objectives of an operation is in the people's best interest. Shaping perceptions that an operation is legitimate using information operations increases support for that operation.

Performing these tasks can further the populace's and the international community's understanding of the commander's objectives:

- Identify or establish rapport with international, national, and local news media.
- Provide factual, accurate information to the media to control rumors and misinformation.
- Issue effective press releases and prompt information in local languages.
- Assist transitional civil or military authorities with public information programs.
- Synchronize messages with operations; ensure messages are consistent with actions.
- Assess media capability and capacity of the host nation; tailor the strategy of information operations to its ability to receive messages.
- Integrate cultural understanding into information operations.
- Prepare a civilian casualty mitigation plan (including tracking, investigating, and responding mechanisms). Ensure that military forces promptly and appropriately address any allegations or actual civilian casualties and that harmed civilians receive the help they need to recover.

3-52. In stability operations, Soldier and leader engagement is a highly effective information-related capability synchronized by information operations. This sustained engagement of the host-nation population most directly influences the perceptions and shapes the behaviors of the population. Soldier and leader engagement amplifies positive actions, counters enemy propaganda, and increases support among the host-nation population. It begins with the direct interaction between Soldiers and the local populace, where the consistency among words, images, and deeds is most important. It includes meetings conducted with key communicators, civilian leaders, or others whose perceptions, decisions, and actions affect mission accomplishment. Conducted with detailed preparation and planning, both activities often prove crucial in building local support for military operations, providing an opportunity for persuasion, and reducing friction and mistrust. Such actions are essential to gaining the trust and confidence of the local populace.

3-53. Military information support operations exert significant influence on foreign target audiences and are often the primary capability for affecting behaviors among these audiences. During stability operations, psychological operations forces advise commanders and staffs on the psychological effects of their operations, provide public information to the target audience to support humanitarian assistance, and assess adversary propaganda. Although public affairs is only authorized to inform audiences, whereas military information support (psychological operations) forces are also authorized to influence approved target audiences, forces can leverage both of these information-related capabilities to counter adversary propaganda and misinformation. For example, public affairs may present factual, verified information that counters false or misleading claims and unfounded rumors. Effective military information support operations support communications with the local populace, reduce civil interference with military operations, support efforts to establish and maintain rule of law, and influence the host-nation attitude toward external actors. The approved objectives and themes of military information support operations are integrated through the operations process to ensure military forces effectively and efficiently apply limited resources. When supporting a friendly host-nation government, local key leaders and key communicators in whom the populace has confidence should help disseminate messages to enhance message legitimacy in public perception. Furthermore, persons from the same society as the target audience can also better communicate in the cultural context, phrasing messages in a manner that will better resonate with the target audience.

3-54. Commanders and their staffs are not limited to Soldier and leader engagement and military information support operations to achieve stability objectives. Information operations use any capability necessary to generate effects in and through the information environment that support attainment of the desired end state. Other capabilities include but are not limited to civil affairs and civil-military operations; combat camera; public affairs; and presence, posture, and profile. (See FM 3-13 for more information on information operations.)

## **PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS**

3-55. The protection of civilians refers to efforts that reduce civilian risks from physical violence, protect civilian access to essential services and resources, and contribute to stabilizing conditions for civilians over the long-term. Protection of civilians is a moral, legal, and strategic priority during land operations. Communities throughout the world expect military personnel to protect local populations; failure to do so

jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of an operation and can undermine other objectives. Protection of civilians is often important when Army units are involved in stability operations, peace operations, combat operations, or security cooperation during peacetime. In some operations such as counterinsurgencies, a population's support may be the center of gravity or may be otherwise indispensable for mission accomplishment. In any military operation, the ultimate political objectives often include security, sustainable stability, and other conditions that support civilian well-being.

3-56. Army forces support civilian protection in two general ways. First, they act in accordance with the law of armed conflict and other relevant bodies of law to minimize harm to civilians during their own military operations. Moreover, they avoid actions that undermine efforts by other actors to improve civil security. Second, Army forces may conduct deliberate actions to protect civilians, including stability operations intended to create conditions conducive to civilian security. The second is especially true during consolidation of gains by providing area security, performing the minimum-essential security tasks, and performing the Army stability operations tasks, especially the establishment of civil security and civil control. (See JP 3-0, JP 3-07.3, and ATP 3-07.6 for detailed discussions on protection of civilians.)

## UNDERSTANDING CIVILIAN RISKS

3-57. Army leaders must have an understanding of an operation's purpose with respect to the protection of civilians as well as the strategy to achieve it. They must also understand civilian vulnerabilities, threats to civilians, relevant military and nonmilitary factors in an operational environment, the positive or negative role of host-nation and other significant actors, and conflict dynamics. Army forces should pay particular attention to vulnerable groups such as women and children. To maintain a current appreciation of civilian risks, Army forces must conduct information collection activities, collect and manage information from a variety of sources, share information as necessary, and conduct accurate assessments.

## PROTECTING CIVILIANS DURING OPERATIONS

3-58. In some situations, such as during a mass atrocity response operation, Army units plan, prepare, and execute operations specifically to protect civilians from risks caused by military operations and risks caused by others. In other circumstances, they conduct unified land operations to achieve other purposes, but their operations have an impact on the protection of civilians. The operations process accounts for the protection of civilians and reduces risks to civilians. It is important for Army forces to incorporate considerations to their planning and operations to protect civilians, mitigate civilian casualties, and anticipate unintended consequences.

If not now, then  
WHEN?

## SHAPING A PROTECTIVE ENVIRONMENT

3-59. It is important to set conditions that provide enduring protection of civilians. Army units help establish stable conditions by performing the six essential stability operations tasks. This enhances civilian well-being and reduces grievances that can result in renewed conflict. Recognizing that this requires contributions from various actors (including the host-nation government and security forces, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and others), Army units adopt a comprehensive approach to achieve unified action with these organizations.

## MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

3-60. Army units may be required to participate in a mass atrocity response operation that includes military activities conducted to prevent or halt hostile activities, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. A mass atrocity response operation may be directed for the specific purpose of mitigating such activities, or it may occur within the context of other complex situations such as civil wars or insurgencies. Mass atrocity response operations efforts include offensive, defensive, and stability operations to protect vulnerable populations or neutralize perpetrators. (See JP 3-07.3 and ATP 3-07.6 for additional information on mass atrocity response operations.)

## WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

3-61. Women, peace, and security is an internationally recognized term that includes protective and participatory dimensions and addresses the disproportionate and unique impact of conflict on women. Sexual violence and other gender-based violence frequently occurs during conflict and in fragile societies. It is usually, but not always, directed against women and girls. The protective dimension mitigates harm, exploitation, discrimination, abuse, conflict-related sexual violence, and human trafficking while holding perpetrators accountable. This protective dimension also addresses access to humanitarian assistance, relief, and recovery and protection of human rights. Gender issues also include women's participation in a nation's political, economic, and security sectors and institutions, as women are vital to establishing peace and maintaining future stability. This participatory dimension helps to safeguard women's interests and results in greater stability.

3-62. When appropriate, Army forces integrate the following five objectives from the 2016 *The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*:

- National integration and institutionalization. Army forces contribute to gender-responsive policies in conflict-affected environments and support integrating women into host-nation positions of responsibility.
- Participation in peace processes and decision-making. Army forces support prospects for an inclusive, just, and sustainable peace by promoting and strengthening women's rights, effective leadership, and substantive participation in peace processes, conflict prevention, peace building, transitional processes, and decision-making institutions in conflict-affected environments.
- Protection from violence. Army forces protect women and children from harm, exploitation, discrimination and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence and trafficking in persons, and hold perpetrators accountable in conflict-affected environments.
- Conflict prevention. Army forces support the promotion of women's roles in conflict prevention; improve conflict early-warning and response systems by integrating gender perspectives; and assist efforts to invest in women's and girls' health, education, and economic opportunity to create conditions for stable societies and lasting peace.
- Access to relief and recovery. Army forces support the distinct needs of women and children in conflict-affected disasters and crises. This includes ensuring safe, equitable access to humanitarian assistance.

## NONLETHAL ACTIONS

3-63. Nonlethal actions are those actions which strive to minimize fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. This includes the use of nonlethal weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel.

3-64. An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. Though each situation requires a different mix of violence and constraint, lethal and nonlethal actions used together complement each other and create dilemmas for opponents. Lethal actions enable the performance of offensive and defensive tasks. However, nonlethal actions also contribute to operations, regardless of which element dominates. Finding ways to accomplish a mission with an appropriate mix of lethal and nonlethal force remains an important consideration for every commander. Commanders analyze situations carefully to balance lethal and nonlethal actions.

3-65. Often, the presence of military forces alone influences human behavior; demonstrating the potential for lethal action helps to maintain order. Maintaining order is vital to establishing a safe, secure environment. Even though stability operations emphasize nonlethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a sound deterrent and a key to success. The successful application of lethal capabilities in stability operations requires a thorough understanding of when the escalation of force is necessary and when it might be counterproductive. It requires discretionary professional judgment supported by a constant assessment of the security situation and an intuitive sense of timing with respect to the actions of enemies and adversaries. Adversaries may curtail their activities to avoid engaging military forces that they perceive as capable and willing to use lethal force. This allows military forces to extend the scope and tempo of nonlethal actions.

3-66. Perception is also a major factor for military forces. The actions of Soldiers, both positive and negative, influence how a local populace perceives military forces and, by association, the host-nation government and governance institutions allied with U.S. forces. In this way, the actions of commanders can directly impact the legitimacy of host-nation institutions. Exercising the principle of *restraint* by judiciously determining a prudent balance between lethal and nonlethal actions ensures a local populace perceives military forces as legitimate. An over-reliance on lethal actions often leads to an increase in harm to civilians, leading a civilian populace to believe military forces are not acting in the best interests of the host nation or host-nation stability.

3-67. Army forces employ a variety of nonlethal means in stability operations. These operations often involve using military capabilities to perform stability operations tasks such as restoring essential services. Some tasks provide constructive support to host-nation civil authorities. However, demonstrating the potential for lethal action (by actions such as increased military presence in an area) often contributes to maintaining order. Other examples include pre-assault warnings and payments for collateral damage.

3-68. Stability operations emphasize nonlethal, constructive actions by Soldiers working among noncombatants. Civil affairs personnel have a major role. In these operations, they work with and through host-nation agencies and other organizations to enhance the host-nation government's legitimacy. Commanders employ information operations, shaped by intelligence, to engage with and influence relevant foreign audiences in accordance with U.S. law and designated authorities. Commanders' information operations contribute directly to tactical and operational success and support objectives at the strategic level. Commanders also integrate information operations with stability operations to counter false and distorted information and propaganda. Nonlethal, constructive actions can persuade a local populace to withhold support from enemy forces and provide information to friendly forces. Loss of popular support presents enemy forces with two bad choices: stay and risk capture, or depart and risk exposure to lethal actions in less populated areas.

3-69. Commanders exercise the joint operations principles of restraint by using nonlethal means to manage a local population's security expectations and counter rumors. However, they recognize that their Soldiers' actions, positive and negative, most strongly sway a populace's perception of Army forces. Trust from a host-nation populace must be developed; it is not assumed or attained without concerted effort. That trust must be earned, one ethical decision and one Soldier at a time. The moral advantage provided by the presence of well-trained, disciplined, well-equipped, and well-led forces can be a potent nonlethal capability. It creates fear and doubt in the minds of enemy forces and may deter adversaries. This effect is important in many stability-dominated operations. Even though stability operations emphasize nonlethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a strong deterrent. Enemy commanders may curtail activities and avoid combat if they perceive Army forces as highly capable and willing to use precise, lethal force. This permits Army forces to extend the scope and tempo of nonlethal actions.

## INTELLIGENCE

3-70. Intelligence is a key component of successful stability operations. However, if forces perform intelligence tasks in a sovereign nation, then commanders have important considerations. Those considerations can include bilateral agreements, host-nation coordination, potential limitations and restrictions on the exchange of information and intelligence, restrictions on the ability of intelligence to operate within the host nation, and the other complexities inherent in stability operations. (See ADP 2-0 for detailed information on intelligence.)

3-71. Obtaining required information is often more complex and requires leveraging the national to tactical intelligence capabilities. For stability operations, commanders often require more detailed intelligence and intelligence preparation of the battlefield products to determine how best to conduct operations and influence the local populace to enhance stability. The identification and analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are critical in determining the most effective missions, tasks, and locations in which stability operations are conducted. Therefore, diverse and detailed intelligence products are important to support stability operations. Intelligence and civil affairs will work together to identify key influencers and understand societal fault lines and grievances, both relating to current operations and those that originally contributed to fragility or violence to ensure successful stabilization. Civil affairs operations strive to ensure that existing grievances are not exacerbated.

3-72. A key intelligence activity to support stabilization is to include criminal organizations, cells, networks and known activities (or tactics, techniques and procedures) into intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (See ATP 2-01.3 for more on intelligence preparation of the battlefield.) Success staffs understand what criminal groups existed prior to arrival of Army forces and how the crisis has shaped the criminal networks during stability operations. Information collection during stability operations includes specific tasks for military police units focused on criminal activities.

## **SUSTAINMENT**

3-73. Sustainment unit activities significantly contribute to the performance of the Army's stability operations tasks by providing sustainment support to U.S. and host-nation forces and by conducting institutional development of a host-nation population. Sustainment support consists of logistics, personnel services, and health service support. Institutional development conducted by U.S. sustainment units include selecting, training, advising, mentoring, and supporting a host nation. (See ADP 4-0 for more sustainment information.)

3-74. Sustainment activities during stability facilitate the establishment of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. For example, U.S. sustainment forces provide the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain a host-nation population until local civil services are restored. U.S. sustainment forces may also assist a host nation with instituting the rule of law in order to eliminate the inequalities in the administration of the law that contribute to instability. U.S. sustainment forces may also provide sustainment support to stability in construction activities to build infrastructure for transportation, distribution, warehousing, and power generation. U.S. forces can plan and execute many sustainment actions via operational contract support to augment or substitute for U.S. logistic and engineering forces. Finally, U.S. sustainment forces may train, advise, and assist teams that build host-nation capacity by providing training for sustainment operations.

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## Chapter 4

# Planning for Stability in Operations

### PLANNING

4-1. *Planning* is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning helps commanders understand and develop solutions to problems resulting in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

4-2. Planning is both a continuous and a cyclical activity of the operations process. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. During preparation and execution, a plan is continuously refined as the situation changes. Through assessment, subordinates and others provide feedback as to what is working, what is not working, and how the military force can do things better. Sometimes, commanders may determine that the current order (including associated branches and sequels) is no longer relevant to the situation. In these instances, instead of modifying the current plan, commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the Army's planning methodologies.)

### STABILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4-3. Operations focused on maintaining or reestablishing stability are often protracted and involve numerous military and civilian organizations. The multifaceted drivers of instability are difficult to identify. In addition to the principles of the operations process described in ADP 5-0, when planning for stability commanders and staffs—

- Recognize complexity.
- Balance resources, capabilities, and activities.
- Recognize planning horizons.
- Avoid planning pitfalls.

### RECOGNIZE COMPLEXITY

4-4. Military operations are conducted in operational environments that are both complex and ever changing. Complexity describes situations with many parts and subparts (structural complexity) as well as the behaviors and resulting relationships among those parts and subparts (interactive complexity). How the many entities behave and interact with each other within an operational environment is difficult to discern. No two operational environments are the same. While some aspects of an operational environment may be less complex than other aspects, an operational environment as a whole is both structurally and interactively complex.

4-5. Given the inherently complex and uncertain nature of operations, particularly those operations dominated by stability, commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology to help them understand the root causes of instability and approaches to solving problems. The *Army design methodology* is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design methodology is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve identified problems. (See the discussion beginning in paragraph 4-19 on selected elements of operational art used in stability planning. See ADP 5-0 and ATP 5-0.1 for detailed discussions on the Army design methodology.)

## BALANCE RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES, AND ACTIVITIES

4-6. Planning ensures that a force employs limited resources and capabilities according to priority of effort and assessed risks. Often requirements for stability operations outpace available resources and capabilities necessary to reestablish conditions of peace and stability. Planning involves focusing efforts toward accomplishing a mission while carefully balancing resources, capabilities, and activities across multiple lines of effort. While commanders typically focus resources on the decisive operation, they also provide sufficient resources to capitalize on unforeseen opportunities and to provide impetus for other efforts. The numerous stability operations tasks involved in the consolidation of gains of any operation require specific capabilities, and the availability of these capabilities is often limited. An effective plan judiciously applies these capabilities where and when forces need them most. Commanders synchronize the application of these capabilities in time and space to create the greatest effect, one that achieves broad success in one line of effort while reinforcing progress in the others.

4-7. Planning for the performance of minimum-essential stability operations tasks and the Army stability operations tasks is integral for all operations. Commanders must balance their conduct of stability operations with existing organizations during the consolidation of gains. Commanders may need to task organize follow and support units to perform minimum-essential stability operations tasks and, if necessary, begin performing Army stability operations tasks. Additionally, commanders must plan for the transition of all units into consolidation of gains after large-scale combat operations cease.

4-8. Stability operations increasingly involve multilateral and diverse actors and stakeholders that can provide different and useful resources and capabilities to an effort. Effective planning accounts for these capabilities and activities. In some cases, these actors achieve cooperation towards common goals or even share resources. In other cases, such cooperation is not practical given divergent goals and objectives. Effective commanders understand the multiple actors and their potential (or lack of potential) for cooperation and mutual support. This understanding helps focus resources or even identify areas in which to apply resources to augment other activities that support stabilization objectives.

## RECOGNIZE PLANNING HORIZONS

4-9. A *planning horizon* is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization's planning efforts to shape future events (ADP 5-0). Uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in an environment. Commanders use planning to attempt to anticipate and influence the future; the farther into the future that plans reach, the more time commanders have for preparation. However, the farther into the future that plans reach, the wider the range of possibilities, and the more uncertain the forecast. A fundamental tension thus exists between the desire to plan in detail and the lack of certainty in future events. The farther plans reach into the future to facilitate preparation and coordination, the less certain events may be, and the less relevant detailed preparations become.

4-10. A fundamental tension in planning for stability operations is the tension between short-term needs and long-term objectives. Immediate security or humanitarian concerns can create a need for short-term solutions with negative impacts for longer-term objectives. For example, paying more money to local vendors for fresh produce could negatively affect establishing a sustainable economy.

## AVOID PLANNING PITFALLS

4-11. Successful commanders avoid planning pitfalls. Planning often proves a time-consuming and frustrating endeavor. Planning pitfalls generally stem from a common cause: the failure to appreciate the unpredictability and uncertainty of military operations. Inherently, planning for stability operations must include consideration of the local populations and their cultures. Planning for stability operations also includes collaborative efforts with many diverse participants, such as other USG organizations and agencies and nongovernmental organizations, causing more uncertainty and unpredictability. The four common planning pitfalls discussed in ADP 5-0 are—

- Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future.
- Trying to plan in too much detail.

- Using the plan as a script for execution.
- Institutionalizing rigid planning methods.

## THE COMMANDER'S ROLE IN PLANNING

4-12. Commanders are the most important participants in effective planning. They focus the planning effort by providing their commander's intent, issuing planning guidance, and making decisions throughout the planning process. Commanders apply discipline to the planning process to meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, simplicity, level of detail, and desired outcomes. Commanders ensure that all operation plans and orders adhere to the moral principles of the Army Ethic and comply with domestic and international laws. They also confirm that their plan or order reflects the commander's intent and is understood by subordinates. Generally, the more involved commanders are in planning, the faster staffs can plan. Commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing during planning.

### UNDERSTANDING

4-13. Understanding is fundamental to a commander's ability to establish a situation's context. It is essential to ethical and effective decision making and the development of plans. Analysis of the operational and mission variables provides the information used to develop understanding and frame a problem. In planning for stability operations, active collaboration with military and civilian partners assists commanders in developing their initial understanding of an operational environment and problem. Civil affairs capability is designed to understand and engage the factors and actors that comprise the civilian component of the operational environment. Thus, civil affairs is integral to a commander's ability to conduct stability planning. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on the operational and mission variables.)

4-14. In operations conducted among a local population, understanding is informed by sustained engagement with a host-nation population. This is the essence of Soldier and leader engagement, the face-to-face interaction of military personnel with the local populace of a host nation. Such interaction not only informs understanding, it shapes the perceptions of the population among whom military forces operate. Engagement increases understanding of sociocultural factors that characterize a host-nation population.

4-15. Commanders consult widely with various stakeholders and actors, including the local populace, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations. They work with others to gain knowledge and, when appropriate, include outside participants in their planning process. They recognize differences and separate operational spheres. Consultation and planning involve many different agencies, sometimes separately from operational planning. Understanding involves partners and other actors operating in an area. As these actors bring diverse capabilities and resources, they also bring broadly differing views on situations, priorities, and objectives.

4-16. Commanders need to understand the capabilities, views, and priorities of other actors and how they converge or diverge with the U.S. effort. Other actors, who sometimes are partners in stabilization, do not always have the same understanding of an environment as U.S. forces have. Commanders often have to develop and foster a common understanding, which in turn leads to common objectives and approaches to the extent possible. They use information sharing while understanding the assumptions of partners. Building a common understanding for planning purposes involves partners in the planning process as early as possible, so that commanders and partners can develop a common assumption and situational understanding. Once they achieve a common, or more common understanding, they need to maintain it. They foster common understanding by regular information sharing, communication, coordination, and involvement in follow-on planning processes.

### VISUALIZING

4-17. As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and problem, they start visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the problem. Collectively, this is known as *commander's visualization*—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0). Assignment of a mission provides the focus for developing the commander's visualization that, in turn, provides the basis for developing plans and orders.

## DESCRIBING

4-18. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate a shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the original order. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it, as circumstances require. Commanders express their visualization in terms of—

- Commander's intent.
- Planning guidance, including an operational approach.
- Commander's critical information requirements.
- Essential elements of friendly information.

## OPERATIONAL ART AND STABILITY IN OPERATIONS

4-19. In applying operational art during stability, commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an operational environment as well as visualize and describe their operational approach. An *operational approach* is a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). The elements of operational art are essential to identifying tasks and objectives that tie stability missions to achieving the desired end state. They help refine and focus the concept of operations forming the basis for developing a detailed plan or order. During execution, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational art as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds.

4-20. Planning for stability in operations draws on all elements of operational art. However, certain elements are more relevant than others are, and some in particular are essential to successful stability operations. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of the operational art. See the discussion beginning in paragraph 4-21 concerning those elements applicable to stability in operations.)

## END STATE AND CONDITIONS

4-21. Generally, the end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. The end state is thus an image of an operational environment consistent with the commander's visualization of the operation. Ultimately, the end state shapes the operation's character. Commanders include it in their planning guidance and commander's intent. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort and unity of purpose, facilitates integration and synchronization, and helps mitigate risk.

4-22. In operations dominated by offensive and defensive tasks, the end state is generally quantifiable and well defined in terms of enemy forces and time. However, in stability operations, the concept of an end state is much more difficult to quantify. Stabilization is a long-term effort and can only be achieved by integrating the collective activities of all the instruments of national power, not by any single instrument applied in isolation. Clearly describing an end state associated with stabilization requires an understanding of the nature of an operational environment and the political objectives of the USG in that environment. Commanders must account for the different time horizons associated with offensive, defensive, and stability related end states.

4-23. During stability operations, integrating military and nonmilitary capabilities is the only way to achieve success. These efforts focus on a shared understanding of the conditions that support a stable, lasting peace. Due to the interrelated nature of the Army stability tasks, these efforts are fundamentally complementary and contribute toward shaping enduring political objectives.

4-24. When executing stability operations, commanders integrate and synchronize military and nonmilitary tasks through collaborative planning. Therefore, every operation focuses on clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives. However, these objectives may evolve over the course of an operation, as strategic and operational guidance is refined, conditions of operational environment change, and understanding increases. Hence, all commanders continuously monitor operations and assess their progress against measures of effectiveness and the end state conditions. These conditions form the basis for decisions that ensure stability operations progress consistently toward the desired end state.

4-25. Effective stability operations are related to how they either mitigate drivers of conflict or support resiliencies in their end states. Commanders articulate their expectations of the logic of how to achieve these effects as part of their plan.

4-26. **Stabilization requires a long-term commitment.** Most stability objectives will last well beyond the scope of U.S. military-led stability efforts. While commanders require clear objectives for planning, they also recognize that stability objectives ultimately support a much longer-term political end state.

## DECISIVE POINTS

4-27. A *decisive point* is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). While conducting stability operations, decisive points will likely be less tangible and more closely associated with important events and conditions, and typically relate to the human dimension of the problem. Examples include—

- Securing national borders.
- Repairing a vital water treatment facility.
- Obtaining the political support from key tribal leaders for a transitional authority.
- Establishing a training academy for national security forces.
- Securing a major election site.
- Reducing crime.

4-28. For stability operations, commanders identify the decisive points (including events and conditions) that most directly influence the end state conditions. Effective decisive points enable commanders to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Ceding control of a decisive point may exhaust friendly momentum, force early culmination, or expose a force to undue risk. Decisive points shape the design of operations. They help commanders select clearly decisive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to establishing the end state.

## LINES OF EFFORT

4-29. The third element of operational art applicable to stability operations is **line of effort**. A line of effort links multiple tasks to focus efforts toward establishing conditions that define the desired objective. Lines of effort are essential for stability operations where physical and positional references to an enemy force or adversary are less relevant. In stability operations, where the human dimension typically becomes the focus of a stability force, lines of effort often work best to link tasks, effects, and conditions to an objective. Lines of effort are essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They prove particularly valuable where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical, and when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian agencies and organizations.

4-30. Lines of effort combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability operations with the cyclic, short-term events typical of offensive or defensive operations. Commanders at all levels use lines of effort to develop tasks, identify complementary and reinforcing actions, and allocate resources appropriately. Commanders may designate actions on one line of effort as the decisive operation and others as shaping operations. They synchronize sequence-related actions across multiple lines of effort. Lines of effort are interdependent and often a specific line cannot begin until forces meet certain intermediate objectives. Similarly, lines of effort do not necessarily progress nor achieve the desired objectives simultaneously.

4-31. Commanders typically visualize operations along lines of effort. At the corps and division levels, commanders may link Army stability tasks to the corresponding stability sectors in the essential stability task matrix. These stability operations link military actions with the broader interagency effort across the levels of war. (Paragraph 2-28 begins a detailed discussion on the stability sectors.) A full complement of lines of effort may also include lines focused on offensive and defensive activities, as well as a line that addresses the information element of combat power. Tasks along an information line of effort typically produce effects across multiple lines of effort.

4-32. Together, the stability sectors and the six Army stability operations tasks provide a framework for identifying the individual tasks that exert the greatest influence on an operation when stability is the major focus. The sectors and tasks help to identify the breadth and depth of relevant civil-military tasks and emphasize the relationships among them. The stability sectors form the basis for the collaborative interagency planning that leads to developing lines of effort that synchronize the actions of all instruments of national power.

4-33. At the brigade echelon and below, the Army stability operations tasks and corresponding stability sectors are often too broad to focus effort appropriately. At lower tactical echelons, lines of effort may be best designed using assigned tasks, based on thorough analysis of the drivers of conflict, resiliencies, and adversary actions. Lines of effort may focus on specific aspects of the local situation, such as the activities of host-nation security forces, local development projects, and essential services restoration. For example, efforts to restore those services are often shaped using lines of effort based on sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (known as SWEAT-MSO) while addressing the need to provide emergency food aid and shelter. When designing activities, commanders consider the processes the host nation had in place before the instability and the sustainability of changes introduced by stabilization activities. As operations progress, commanders often modify lines of effort after assessing conditions and collaborating with partners.

## OPERATIONAL APPROACH

4-34. Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an operational environment with the problem analyzed through the Army design methodology. This understanding enables commanders to develop an operational approach to guide their military forces in establishing those conditions for lasting success. Commanders use common doctrinal terms to visualize and describe their operational approach. The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to a desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.

4-35. An operational approach conceptualizes the commander's visualization for establishing the conditions that define a desired end state. Commanders who conduct operations among a population accept military interaction with the local population as part of the mission. In those operations, the most effective operational approach achieves decisive results through combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms. While the stability mechanisms leverage the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, the defeat mechanisms allow commanders to focus the coercive capabilities of U.S. forces to provide security, public order, and safety for the local population.

4-36. The conditions of an operational environment ultimately determine the operational approach. During planning, as commanders and staffs frame the problem, they determine the appropriate combination of stability and defeat mechanisms necessary to resolve the situation. This begins the process that ends with an integrated, synchronized plan for an operation that achieves the desired end state. At times, military forces intervene in an unstable situation with an actively violent security environment. In these cases, military forces may initially use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions sufficiently to protect the civil populace. In a relatively benign environment where military forces primarily assist or facilitate civil efforts, stability mechanisms dominate.

## STABILITY AND DEFEAT MECHANISMS

4-37. Commanders consider methods combining stability and defeat mechanisms when developing an operational approach. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive tasks; stability mechanisms relate to stability operations, security, and consolidating gains in an area of operations.

### STABILITY MECHANISMS

4-38. Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ their forces to conduct stability operations in unified land operations. A *stability mechanism* is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). Some of these mechanisms recover quickly from change in terms of conflict transformation, as they can mitigate drivers of conflict. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing

effects that help shape the human dimension of operational environments more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

4-39. Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements. Compliance is related to legitimacy. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance itself depends on how a local populace perceives a military force's ability to exercise force to accomplish a mission. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in stability operations; it closely ties to legitimacy. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of a mission or the military instrument of national power. Lethal force is only used in accordance with the laws of land warfare and the rules of engagement authorized for an operation. (See FM 27-10 for more information on the law of land warfare.)

4-40. Control involves establishing civil order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities. As a stability mechanism, control closely relates to the Army stability task—establish civil security. Control is fundamental to effective, enduring security. When combined with the stability mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that compose disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and broader security sector reform programs. Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—including efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts.

4-41. Influence involves altering the opinions; attitudes; and, ultimately, the behaviors of the host-nation population—friendly, neutral, and adversarial—and other actors through information operations, presence, and conduct. Influence applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms. Influence strives to effect behavioral change through nonlethal means. It is more a result of public perception of legitimacy and trust than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of military forces to operate successfully among the population of a host nation, interacting with the population while consistently adhering to the moral principles of the Army Ethic to accomplish the mission. Here, consistency of actions and messages is vital. Influence requires legitimacy. Military forces earn the trust and confidence of a population through the constructive capabilities inherent in the ethical application of combat power. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and compliance. It contributes to success across the lines of effort and engenders support among the population. Once attained, military forces best maintain influence by consistently demonstrating the moral-ethical principles of the Army Ethic by exhibiting respect for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local population.

4-42. Support involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power of the host-nation government to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with host-nation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Support is vital to a comprehensive approach to stability operations. The military instrument of national power brings unique expeditionary and campaign capabilities to stability operations. These capabilities enable the military force to address the immediate needs of the host nation and local populace quickly. In extreme circumstances, support may require committing considerable resources for a protracted period. However, easing the burden of support on military forces requires enabling civilian agencies and organizations to fulfill their respective roles. Typically, commanders ease the burden by combining the effects of the stability mechanisms compel, control, and influence to reestablish security and control; restoring essential civil services to the local populace; and helping to secure humanitarian access necessary for aid organizations to function effectively.

## DEFEAT MECHANISMS

4-43. Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADP 3-0). They are defined in terms of the broad operational and tactical effects they produce—physical or

psychological. Commanders translate these effects into tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to defeat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Military forces prove most successful when applying deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms. As with stability mechanisms, this produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism.

4-44. The four defeat mechanisms are **destroy**, **dislocate**, **disintegrate**, and **isolate**. **Destroy** is physically rendering an enemy force combat ineffective. It may be attained by sequentially applying combat power over time or with a single, decisive attack. **Dislocate** involves employing forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering an enemy force's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. It requires enemy commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning. **Disintegrate** involves disrupting the enemy's command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy force's capabilities or will to fight. It typically follows destruction and dislocation, coupled with the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding. **Isolate** requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy force from sources of support, deny the enemy force freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces. It exposes enemy forces to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat mechanisms.

## COMBINING STABILITY AND DEFEAT MECHANISMS

4-45. Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning and the Army design methodology by providing focus in framing complex problems; they offer the conceptual means to solve them. By combining these mechanisms, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of a problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore, one element of a military force can focus on reestablishing security and control while another element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. Focusing on security and humanitarian needs is essential in operations conducted among a civilian population. Thus, early and deliberate combinations of the stability and defeat mechanisms are vital to success, especially in situations where actors may face active opposition. Combinations of these mechanisms serve to inhibit threats to stability, create conditions that people can live in some sort of normalcy, and set conditions for military forces to appropriately transition stability operations to other partners, the host nation, and or other actors in order to achieve USG objectives and preserve national interests.

## FORCE ORGANIZATION

4-46. For stability in operations, commanders organize forces using force tailoring and task-organizing.

### FORCE TAILORING

4-47. *Force tailoring* is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). Force tailoring involves selecting the right force structure from available units. Commanders then sequence the selected forces into an operational area as part of force projection. Commanders request and receive forces for each phase of an operation, both for combat and stability actions tasks, adjusting the quantity and capabilities of forces to match the weight of effort required. Commanders must carefully consider forces required for executing stability operations, especially during consolidation of gains, and plan accordingly.

4-48. Force tailoring is continuous: as new forces rotate into an operational area, forces with excess capabilities return to the supporting combatant and Army Service component commands. Tailoring the force to conduct stability operations may require commanders to assign subordinate units tasks not normally considered to be their primary mission.

### TASK-ORGANIZING

4-49. *Task-organizing* is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). Characteristics commanders and staffs examine when task-organizing a military force include, but are not limited to, training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operational environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it includes allocating

available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Task-organizing occurs within a previously tailored force package as commanders organize groups of units for specific stability operations. Task organization must be considered when assigning a unit a follow and support mission, which includes execution of stability operations. Task-organizing continues as commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets operational and tactical commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to rapidly match unit capabilities to priorities.

4-50. As an operation changes from one emphasizing combat operations to one emphasizing stability operations, commanders only have the forces immediately available to conduct those stability operations. Commanders sometimes assign their forces to conduct stability operations within their capabilities that often differ from their exact function. Commanders and staffs try to visualize when unexpected opportunities might arise and adapt their forces to exploit such opportunities.

## ASSESSMENTS

4-51. *Assessment* is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and guides planning and other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps commanders determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating an operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations. Assessment is vital to successful stability operations.

4-52. Three measurement tools assist commanders and staffs with assessments: measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and indicators. Measures of performance assess proper performance of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness assess progress toward changing the state of an operational environment envisioned in the commander's intent. Indicators are subordinate measures that provide insight into measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. (See ADP 5-0 and JP 3-0 for information on measurement tools.)

4-53. For stability operations, commanders use measures of performance. A *measure of performance* is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). Examples of measures of performance include the construction of a training facility for host-nation security forces or an increased border presence by friendly forces.

4-54. In stability operations, measures of performance track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, "Is the stability task progressing?" and in the long run, "Is the activity complete?" Examples of output indicators might be the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained. Military forces monitor output indicators during the implementation of an activity until they complete the activity.

4-55. In contrast to measures of performance, a *measure of effectiveness* is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). These measures focus on the results or consequences of task performance and provide information that guides decisions to take additional or alternate actions. Examples of measures of effectiveness include reduced insurgent activity, reduced inflation rates, and improvements in agricultural production. Other examples might be decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). Generally, forces evaluate measures of effectiveness only after completing an activity.

4-56. In the context of assessment, an *indicator* is a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness (JP 5-0). Indicators use available information to inform a specific measure of performance or measure of effectiveness. A single indicator can inform multiple measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Valid indicators are measurable, collectable, and relevant to a specific time. Examples of indicators include bushels of apples sold in a specific market in the past month, numbers of escalation of force incidents along a given route in the past 90 days, and numbers of bridges repaired in a province. Commanders may use their commander's critical information requirements to focus information collection on the relevant indicators they need to make critical decisions throughout the conduct of operations.

4-57. In many cases, indicators that directly assess a given stability task are not available. In these cases, proxy indicators that measure second-order effects related to the stability task may be necessary. An example of this may be the change in staple food prices as an indicator for long-term perceptions of stability as rises in food prices may indicate hoarding in expectation of instability. However, military forces need to take care with proxy indicators to ensure that the cause of the change is understood and related to the activity that needs to be measured. In the staple food example, poor harvests may result from the rise in production prices rather than expected instability. Knowing the cause of a change is key to understanding the meaning of an indicator.

4-58. Stability operations, especially in post-conflict situations, often take a long time with military forces gauging progress over the course of months or years. Effective forces consider responsiveness for selecting measurement tools in stability. In stability, responsiveness is the speed with which a desired change can be detected by a measurement tool. In practice, responsiveness varies greatly among potential measures of effectiveness. It is critical to select measures of effectiveness and supporting indicators as responsive as possible during the conduct of these operations. Patience is also critical as tactical impatience can lead to selecting indicators that satisfy reporting requirements but that do not provide an accurate assessment.

4-59. Effective assessment for stability operations incorporates both quantitative (observation-based) and qualitative (opinion-based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to assessment, especially in operations where the civil population plays such a prominent role. A key aspect of any assessment is the degree to which it relies upon human judgment and the degree to which it relies upon direct observation and mathematical rigor. Rigor offsets the inevitable bias, while human judgment focuses rigor and processes on intangibles that are often key to success. The appropriate balance depends on the situation—particularly the nature of the operation, its included stability operations, and available resources for assessment.

# Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ADP 3-07 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (\*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADP</b>	Army doctrine publication
<b>ADRP</b>	Army doctrine reference publication
<b>ATP</b>	Army techniques publication
<b>DA</b>	Department of the Army
<b>DDR</b>	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DODD</b>	Department of Defense directive
<b>DOS</b>	Department of State
<b>FM</b>	field manual
<b>IDAD</b>	internal defense and development
<b>JP</b>	joint publication
<b>SSR</b>	security sector reform
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USG</b>	United States Government

## SECTION II – TERMS

### Army design methodology

A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

### assessment

The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

### commander's visualization

The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 6-0)

### counterinsurgency

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-24)

### decisive point

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

**defeat mechanism**

The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.  
(ADP 3-0)

**force tailoring**

The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander. (ADP 3-0)

**foreign internal defense**

Participation by civilian and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the action programs and activities undertaken by a host-nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**indicator**

In the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness.  
(JP 5-0)

**information operations**

The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

**internal defense and development**

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**measure of effectiveness**

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

**measure of performance**

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

**message**

A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme.  
(JP 3-61)

**operational approach**

A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

**peace building**

Stability actions that strengthen and rebuild a society's institutions, infrastructure, and civic life to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07.3)

**peace enforcement**

Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.  
(JP 3-07.3)

**peacekeeping**

Military operations undertaken, with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

**peacemaking**

The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 3-07.3)

**planning**

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about. (ADP 5-0)

**planning horizon**

A point in time commanders use to focus the organization's planning efforts to shape future events. (ADP 5-0)

**\*reintegration**

The process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace.

**security cooperation**

All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-20)

**security force assistance**

The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

**stability mechanism**

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADP 3-0)

**stability operation**

An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)

**task-organizing**

The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)

**unified action**

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**unified land operations**

The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action. (ADP 3-0)

**unity of effort**

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

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# References

All websites accessed on 10 June 2019.

## REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

*DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. June 2019.

*ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols*. 14 August 2018.

## RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

### JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine>. Most Department of Defense instructions are available online: <https://www.esd.whs.mil/dd/>.

*DODD 3000.05. Stabilization*. 13 December 2018.

*JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. 25 March 2013.

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# Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

## A

- actions, legal, 2-16–2-17
  - nonlethal, 3-63–3-69
- activities, balance with resources and capabilities, 4-6–4-8
  - categories of, 1-36
  - civil security, 2-65
  - commander's planning, 4-12
  - engagement, 1-34
  - focus on, 2-24
  - interrelated, 2-63
  - intervention, 1-34
  - prevention, 3-6–3-8
  - prioritizing, 1-36
  - stability, 2-14
- actors, collaboration, 4-15
  - planning and, 4-8
- adversary, prevent, 2-9
- agencies, support to, 2-78
- approach, comprehensive, 1-12
  - integrated, 1-6, 2-25
  - operational, 4-34–4-36
  - whole-of-government, 1-11
- area security, consolidation of gains, 2-13
- Army stability operations, 1-7
- Army stability operations tasks, planning for, 4-7
- assessment, 4-51–4-59
  - defined, 4-51
  - indicators, 4-59
  - plans and, 2-84
  - tools, 4-52
- assistance, humanitarian, 2-39–2-41
- authority, governing, 2-46
  - intervening, 1-20

## B

- behavior, regulate, 2-73

## C

- capabilities, balance with resources and activities, 4-6–4-8
  - building host nation, 1-13–1-14
  - integrating, 4-23

- lethal, 3-64
- planning for, 4-6
- understanding, 4-16
- capacity building, governance and, 1-58
  - host nation, 1-13–1-14
- challenges, leaders, 2-23
  - planning, 4-10–4-11
  - resources, 2-19
  - rule of law, 1-51
  - safety and security, 1-47–1-49
  - solving, 2-55
  - transition, 3-24
- civil control, conditions, 2-68
  - support to, 2-68–2-73
  - tasks, 2-68, 2-73
- civil security, activities, 2-65
  - establishing, 2-64–2-67
  - resources, 2-66
- civilian protection, 3-55–3-60
  - methods, 3-56
  - risks, 3-58
- civilians, host-nation ownership, 1-18
  - leaders, 1-55
  - military efforts and, 2-23–2-51
  - needs of, 1-53
  - participation by, 2-44
  - protect, 2-16
  - tasks, 1-37
  - trust from, 1-46
- civil-military efforts, 1-43
  - host-nation capacity, 2-33
- civil-military teaming, 1-29
- collaboration, planning, 4-14, 4-24
  - stability sectors, 4-33
- commander's visualization, 4-35
- commander's visualization, defined, 4-17
- commanders, *See also* leaders.
  - considerations, 2-85, 3-68, 3-70
  - focus, 4-21
  - objectives, 3-51
  - planning role, 4-12–4-18
  - requirements, 3-71
  - responsibilities, 2-58, 2-76, 3-24, 3-69, 4-28
- role, 2-17
- commerce, 1-59
- commitment, 4-26
- compel, 4-39
- complexity, operations, 4-4
  - recognize, 4-4–4-5
- compliance, 1-22
- comprehensive approach, unity of effort, 1-12
- conduct security cooperation, stabilization framework and, 2-90–2-96
- conflict prevention, peace operations and, 3-16
- conflict transformation, 1-8
- consent, legitimacy, 1-22
- considerations, planning, 4-3
- consolidate gains, 2-11–2-21
  - achievements from, 2-11
  - stability operations tasks and, 2-14–2-15, 2-21
- consolidation of gains, achieving objectives and, 3-5
  - stability, 2-6
  - training, 1-42
  - types, 2-13
- control, stability mechanism, 4-40
- cooperation, peace operations, 3-20
  - planning and, 4-8
  - population, 3-51
  - unity of effort, 1-11
- counterinsurgency, 3-43–3-46
  - defined, 3-43
  - echelons, 3-46
- criminals, 1-52
  - accounting for, 2-35
- crisis response, limited contingency operations and, 3-3
- culture, rule of law, 2-72

**Entries are by paragraph number.**

**D**

DDR, 3-28–3-36  
characteristics, 3-28  
planning for, 3-33  
program, 3-29  
SSR, 3-34  
unified land operations, 3-32  
decisive point, defined, 4-27  
operational art, 4-27–4-28  
defeat mechanism, 4-43–4-44  
combining, 4-45  
defined, 4-43  
stability mechanism and, 4-37–  
4-45  
types of, 4-44  
defense, 2-3  
defense policy, 1-25–1-29  
describing, planning, 4-18  
development, economic concerns,  
2-82  
diplomacy, support to, 3-6  
disarmament, demobilization, and  
reintegration, See DDR.

**E**

economic, recovery, 2-49  
economic and infrastructure  
development, support to, 2-82–  
2-89  
economic sector, conditions, 2-86  
host nation, 2-82  
economic stabilization, local  
challenges, 2-88  
regional challenges, 2-89  
economic stabilization and  
infrastructure sector, 2-47–2-49  
economy, building, 1-60  
challenges, 1-59, 2-48  
integrated approach and, 2-87  
objectives, 1-60  
stabilization, 2-83  
sustainable, 1-59–1-60, 2-85  
efforts, civil-military, 1-43  
linking, 2-23–2-51  
response, 2-45  
end state, achieving, 1-35  
conditions, 1-43–1-60, 4-21–  
4-26  
influences on, 4-28  
support to, 2-96  
variables, 4-22  
engagement, activities, 1-34  
environment, safe and secure,  
1-46–1-49, 2-67, 3-19  
securing, 2-64  
shaping, 3-59

essential services, conditions  
required, 2-74  
lack of, 3-37  
restore, 2-74–2-78  
essential stability task matrix, 2-26  
benefits from, 2-29  
integration and, 2-31  
using, 2-27

essential stability tasks, stability  
sectors of, 2-28

establish civil security,  
stabilization framework and,  
2-64–2-67  
evolution, security cooperation,  
2-94

expectations, legitimacy, 1-23

**F**

flexibility, task-organizing, 4-50  
transition, 3-25

force organization, 4-46–4-50

force tailoring, 4-47–4-48  
defined, 4-47

forces, employment, 1-35  
organizing, 4-46  
support to, 3-73

foreign humanitarian assistance,  
3-37–3-38

foreign internal defense, 3-39–  
3-42  
defined, 3-39

fostering sustainability,  
stabilization framework, 1-41

fragile state, categories of, 1-32  
characteristics of, 1-30  
economy and, 2-48  
justice system, 2-69  
risks, 3-61

fragile states framework, 1-30–  
1-35  
assistance model, 1-33

framework, fragile states, 1-30–  
1-35  
integrated approach, 1-6  
stabilization, 1-36–1-42

framework actions, categories,  
1-38

fundamentals, types of stability,  
1-7

**G**

governance, capacity building  
and, 1-58

characteristics, 1-55  
conditions, 2-79  
economy and, 2-49  
functions of, 2-43

support to, 2-79–2-81  
governance and participation  
sector, 2-42–2-46  
government, challenges, 1-57  
host nation, 2-81  
legitimacy of, 1-56  
responsibility of, 2-18

**H**

host nation, capacity and  
capability, 1-13–1-14  
economic sector, 2-82  
goals, 2-80  
leaders, 2-47, 3-21  
legitimacy, 1-15  
ownership, 1-15, 1-19  
reform, 3-26  
responsibilities, 2-45  
security, 2-90  
support to, 2-55, 2-80, 3-39  
tasks, 2-61

hostilities, ending, 3-29

host-nation capacity, building,  
2-71, 2-87  
civil-military efforts, 2-33

humanitarian assistance and  
social well-being sector, 2-39–  
2-41

**I**

indicator, assessment, 4-59  
challenges, 4-57  
defined, 4-56

influence, by military forces, 3-65  
stability mechanism, 4-41

information, gathering, 3-71  
indicator, 4-56–4-57

information environment,  
considerations, 3-48–3-49

information operations, defined,  
3-47

nonlethal actions and, 3-68  
stability, 3-47–3-54

information-related capability,  
considerations, 3-50–3-54

infrastructure, development, 2-83  
establish, 2-42

initial response, stabilization  
framework, 1-39

instability, causes, 1-3, 2-39, 3-37  
challenges of, 1-53  
intervention, 2-40

institution, establish, 2-42

integrated approach, creating,  
2-25

DDR, 3-33

defense policy and, 1-25

## Entries are by paragraph number.

integrated approach (*continued*)  
 economy and, 2-87  
 justice and reconciliation sector, 2-36  
 tasks, 1-6

integration, essential stability task matrix, 2-31

intelligence, 3-70–3-72

internal defense and development, defined, 3-40

international, cooperation, 3-20

intervention, activities, 1-34

justice and reconciliation sector, 2-37

**J–K**

joint, stability functions, 2-50–2-51

joint operations, Army in, 2-7–2-22

justice, and reconciliation sector, 2-35–2-38

justice and reconciliation sector, 2-35–2-38

activities, 2-38

categories, 2-37

elements, 2-36

justice system, *See also* legal.

challenges, 2-69

fragile state, 2-69

**L**

land forces, efforts, 2-34

large-scale ground combat, conduct, 2-10

leaders, *See also* commanders.

challenges of, 2-23

civilian, 1-55

considerations, 3-57

host nation, 2-47

legal, *See also* justice system.

actions, 2-16–2-17

imposing, 2-35

legitimacy and laws, 1-17

legitimacy, aspects of, 1-16

growth from, 1-18

host nation, 1-15, 3-44

mandate, 1-20

perceptions, 1-56

sources of, 1-17

stabilization and, 1-16–1-23

liaisons, DDR, 3-31

limited contingency operations, crises response and, 3-3

line of effort, commanders use of, 4-30–4-31

developing, 2-25

operational art, 4-29–4-33

**M**

mandate, legitimacy and, 1-20

manner, legitimacy, 1-21

mass atrocity response operation, 3-60

measure of effectiveness, defined, 4-55

measure of performance, assessment, 4-53–4-54  
 defined, 4-53

media, perceptions, 3-48–3-49

message, defined, 3-47  
 information environment, 3-48

military forces, characteristics, 2-56

civilian efforts and, 2-23–2-51

influences by, 3-65

peace operations and, 3-17

powers of, 2-46

responsibilities, 2-62

role, 1-13

security cooperation and, 2-93

stabilizing, 2-57

support from, 2-61, 2-79, 2-81, 2-88, 3-2, 3-38

tasks, 1-37, 2-52

military information support operations, 3-53

Soldier and leader engagement, 3-54

minimum-essential stability operations tasks, 2-16–2-20

identifying, 2-59

planning for, 4-7

types, 2-16

minimum-essential tasks, stability operations, 2-16–2-20

mission, legitimacy, 1-19

model, assistance, -133

**N**

national strategy, 1-24

nonlethal actions, 3-63–3-69

**O**

objectives, achieving, 2-93

commander, 3-51

economy, 1-60

peace operations, 3-10

political, 3-35

risks, 3-62

rule of law, 1-50

safety and security, 1-48–1-49

social well-being, 1-54

offense, 2-3

minimum-essential stability operations tasks, 2-20

requirements fro, 2-20

operational approach, considerations, 4-37

defined, 4-19

determining, 4-36

operational art, 4-34–4-36

operational art, elements of, 4-20  
 stability, 4-19–4-36

operational concept, Army, 2-1

operational environment, stabilizing, 2-55

operations, balancing, 3-4

nature of, 4-5

shaping, 2-8

organizations, support from, 2-15

**P–Q**

partners, unity of effort, 1-10

peace, planning for, 3-31

requirements for, 1-43

women and security, 3-61–3-62

peace building, defined, 3-15

peace enforcement, defined, 3-13

peace operations, 3-9–3-21

characteristics, 3-18

considerations, 3-17–3-21

cooperation, 3-20

objectives, 3-10

types, 3-10–3-16

peacekeeping, defined, 3-12

peacemaking, defined, 3-14

peacetime, preventative actions, 3-8

security cooperation and, 3-8

support during, 3-2

people, stability operations, 3-51

perceptions, 1-1

considerations, 3-66

influenced, 3-52

legitimacy, 1-17, 1-21, 1-23, 1-56

media and, 3-48

mission, 1-19

populations, 2-76

pitfalls, planning, 4-11

planners, responsibilities, 2-26

planning, avoid pitfalls, 4-11

balancing operations, 3-4

challenges, 4-10–4-11

commander's role, 4-12–4-18

considerations, 4-3–4-11

DDR, 3-31

defined, 4-1

focus, 4-45

**Entries are by paragraph number.**

planning (*continued*)  
stability operations and, 4-1–4-2  
transitions, 3-23  
planning horizon, defined, 4-9  
recognize, 4-9–4-10  
plans, formulating, 2-84  
policy, defense, 1-25–1-29  
developing strategy of, 1-44  
economic, 2-86  
population, *See also* civilian assistance to, 2-75  
considerations about, 3-68  
interactions, 2-47  
perceptions, 3-49, 3-66  
safety for, 2-70  
security, 3-69  
support from, 3-21  
support to, 2-39  
prevent, stability and, 2-9  
prevent role, focus, 3-7  
prevention, activities, 3-6–3-8  
conflict, 3-16  
priorities, understanding, 4-16  
tasks, 2-30  
transitions and, 3-22  
protection of civilians, 3-55–3-60

**R**

rebuilding, efforts to, 2-68  
reconciliation, and justice sector, 2-35–2-38  
reconstruction, essential task matrix, 2-26–2-49  
recovery, civil control, 2-72  
economic, 2-49  
reintegration, *See also* DDR.  
defined, 3-28  
relief agencies, support to, 2-78  
requirements, identifying, 2-26  
resources, balance with  
capabilities and activities, 4-6–4-8  
civil security, 2-66  
distributing, 2-19  
planning for, 4-6  
responsibility, government, 2-18  
restore essential services,  
stabilization framework and, 2-74–2-78  
restraint, principle, 3-66, 3-69  
risks, objectives, 3-62  
reducing, 3-55  
understanding civilian, 3-57  
role, commander, 2-17

strategic, 2-7–2-22  
rule of law, 1-50–1-52  
challenges, 1-51  
civil control and, 2-71–2-72  
culture, 1-52  
establishing, 1-50  
objectives, 1-50  
use of force, 3-35

**S**

safety and security, establishing, 2-67  
sector, economic stabilization and infrastructure, 2-47–2-49  
governance and participation, 2-42–2-46  
humanitarian assistance and social well-being, 2-39–2-41  
justice and reconciliation, 2-35–2-38  
security, 2-33–2-34  
security, challenges, 1-47–1-48  
host nation, 1-14  
managing, 3-69  
unstable conditions, 2-57  
women and peace, 3-61–3-62  
security assistance, activities, 2-91  
security cooperation, activities, 2-92  
conduct, 2-90–2-96  
defined, 2-91  
military forces and, 2-93  
prevention activities and, 3-8  
support to, 2-95  
security forces, host nation, 2-90  
security sector, focus, 2-33–2-34  
security sector assistance, 3-27  
security sector reform, 3-26–3-27  
DDR, 3-34  
defined, 3-26  
services, providing, 2-15  
shape, stability and, 2-8  
social capital development, activities, 2-44  
social well-being, 1-53–1-54  
humanitarian assistance, 2-39–2-41  
objectives, 1-54  
society, changing, 2-44  
Soldier and leader engagement, information-related capability, 3-52  
military information support operations, 3-54  
understanding, 4-14  
stability, considerations, 3-41

goals, 1-1–1-4  
joint functions, 2-50–2-51  
long-term, 1-54, 2-67  
operational art in, 4-19–4-36  
planning, 4-3–4-11  
prevention efforts and, 3-6  
solutions, 2-41  
success, 2-58

stability mechanism, combining, 4-45  
defeat mechanism and, 4-37–4-45  
defined, 4-38

stability operation, defined, 1-2  
conducted with, 2-5  
consideration for, 3-1–3-5  
consolidation of gains, 2-13  
focus of, 2-2  
nonlethal means, 3-67  
participants, 1-27  
requirements, 2-60  
support from, 2-4

stability operations tasks, Army, 2-21, 2-52–2-96  
consolidate gains and, 2-14–2-15  
identifying, 2-55–2-60  
minimum-essential, 2-16–2-20  
nesting, 2-51

stability sectors, activities, 2-63  
collaboration, 4-33  
DDR and, 3-30  
essential stability task matrix, 2-28  
framework, 2-32  
information operations and, 3-50  
stability operations tasks, 2-52  
using, 2-29

stability tasks, categories, 2-61

stabilization, essential task matrix, 2-26–2-49  
fundamentals, 1-5–1-15  
legitimacy and, 1-16–1-23  
results from, 1-4  
support to, 1-28, 3-72

stabilization activities, guidance, 1-26–1-29

stabilization framework, 1-36–1-42  
Army stability task and, 2-54  
conditions of, 1-45  
fostering sustainability, 1-41  
initial response, 1-39  
transformation, 1-40  
using, 2-61–2-96

stable governance, 1-55–1-58

staffs, role, 2-59

**Entries are by paragraph number.**

stakeholders, collaboration, 4-15  
planning for, 4-8  
states, fragile categories, 1-31  
strategic roles, 2-7–2-22  
support, stability mechanism, 4-42  
sustainment, 3-73  
support to civil control,  
stabilization framework and,  
2-68–2-73  
support to economic and  
infrastructure development,  
stabilization framework and,  
2-82–2-89  
support to governance,  
stabilization framework and,  
2-79–2-81  
sustain, economy, 2-85  
sustainment, 3-73–3-74  
activities, 3-74

**T**

task-organizing, 4-49–4-50  
defined, 4-49  
tasks, civil control, 2-68, 2-73

integrate and synchronize,  
4-24  
prioritization, 2-30, 2-50  
stability activities and, 2-14  
team, civil-military, 1-29  
tools, assessment, 4-52, 4-58  
training, consolidation of gains,  
1-42  
transformation, stabilization  
framework, 1-40  
tasks, 2-77  
transition, 3-22–3-25  
challenges, 3-24  
DDR, 3-34  
planning, 3-23  
trust, building, 3-47  
civilians, 1-46  
legitimacy and, 1-16  
unity of effort, 1-10

**U**

uncertainty, planning horizon and,  
4-9  
understanding, commander, 4-13–  
4-17, 4-35  
fostering, 4-16

unified action, contribution of, 2-1  
defined, 1-9  
unified land operations, 2-1–2-6  
DDR, 3-32  
defined, 2-1  
stability operations tasks, 2-53  
unity of effort, 1-9–1-12  
achieving, 1-25, 2-24  
defined, 1-9  
leaders and, 2-23  
requirements, 1-10  
use of force, rule of law, 3-35

**V**

visualization, line of effort and,  
4-31  
stability mechanism and, 4-38  
visualizing, planning, 4-17

**W–X–Y–Z**

whole-of-government approach,  
unity of effort, 1-11  
win, 2-22  
women, peace, and security,  
3-61–3-62

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**31 July 2018**

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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