

Textual and Statistical Analysis of Russian IRA Facebook Posts

*The paper is written in the scope of a student-faculty collaborative
summer research with professor Richard K. Merritt.

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Month Day, Year

Abstract

The 2016 United States Presidential Election was targeted by an unprecedented intelligence and influence campaign. Arising out of Russian so-called Internet Research Agency (IRA), it sought to sow discord and attack the fissures of the United States with the ultimate goal of swaying the election results. [1] [2] Recently, some of the IRA-backed Facebook advertisements were released by The United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the advertisements are in the PDF format. We have scraped the PDF files and present the results obtained by textual and statistical analysis of the above-mentioned data. Authorship attribution and sentiment analysis tests were also performed. ¹ [3] We have also made the data publicly available for other researchers and/or interested people in a much nicer and easier-to-manipulate CSV format.

¹Please note that this paper does not discuss neither social, nor political implications of these events, but attempts to explore the methods of persuasion that were employed in this influence campaign.

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
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Data and Preparation

The dataset was scraped from [2] more than 3500 Russian IRA Facebook posts made publicly available in the PDF format by the House Intelligence Committee. We used the free and open-source Python library [4] `pdftotext` to scrape the data. Many CSV files were formatted in a way that it was virtually impossible for `pdftotext` to scrape it correctly. Because of this, we have manually reviewed most of the CSV files for validity. [3] All the CSV files have been made publicly available. It is important to note that the dataset is just a sample of a bigger dataset, and albeit less likely, might not be a good representation for the overall campaign.

General Statistics


The distribution of posts over all three years shows a bimodal distribution with two peaks in quarters 2 and 4 of year 2016. Given the fact that the US Presidential Election was held in the fourth quarter of 2016, it is surprising that the number of posts in the second quarter exceeded that of the fourth quarter.



Distribution of Posts Over Years 2015, 2016, and 2017.

As for ad spendings, the fourth quarter of 2016 exceeds that of any quarter, with second quarter coming next. Interestingly, most of ads were paid in the Russian currency (ruble)

with two exceptions in 2016 quarter 3 and 2017 quarter 1 when IRA spent \$74.000 and \$35.330 respectively.



Distribution of Ad Spendings Over Years 2015, 2016, and 2017 (in rubles).

Furthermore, 99.8% of all paid ads across all years were paid in rubles. Below is the chart showing the number of posts based on a currency.

Currency	Total (All Years)
RUB	2549
USD	5
None	787
0	176

The Russian ruble is used in Russia, Belarus, and two regions of Georgia, which are considered by Russia as partially recognised states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Textual Analysis

Common Words

Among the targeted approaches utilized by this campaign, one of the rather noticeable ones was attacking the fissures of the United States by realizing both social and political historical backgrounds.

Some of the most common words used in the campaign were black, police, and people. Below is the barchart showing top 25 most commonly used words after eliminating linking verbs, prepositions, pronouns, and some other (non-relevant) words.




Figure.

Sentiment Analysis

For the sentiment analysis purposes, we used `python`'s `TextBlob` library. Suprisingly, out of all Facebook posts with `Ad Text`, 1643 were positive, 900 negative, and 933 neutral leaving the overall tone of the posts positive. Yet, the statistical significance of this claim is rather

questionable as the polarity levels were always near zero. Such low polarity level, however, demonstrates a highly intelligent design of posts maximizing efficiency of persuading targeted audience.

As the **Ad Texts** did not give us any strong proofs, we looked at the negativity levels across all three years and found a consistent trend.

Analyzing Negativity				
Subjectivity	Year 2015	Year 2016	Year 2017	2016 (%)
1.0	154	562	176	63.004
0.75	150	547	169	63.164
0.5	123	405	120	62.500
0.25	15	81	22	68.644
0.15	5	33	10	68.750
0.1	2	11	6	57.895
0.05	1	5	2	62.500

Notice that at any subjectivity level, year 2016 is consistently comprising around 60% of all posts. The year of the Presidential Election was rather negative.

Authorship Attribution

Since all of these posts were issued by the same political organization/entity, it was interesting to see if there are some common patterns between the Facebook ads of 2015, 2016, 2017. For this exact reason, we have performed authorship attribution tests and have effectively implemented two state-of-the art paper by Koppel et. al.

References

- [1] The United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *Exposing Russia's Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements*. 2018. URL: <https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/> (visited on 08/27/2019).
- [2] The United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *Social Media Advertisements*. 2018. URL: <https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/social-media-advertisements.htm> (visited on 08/27/2019).
- [3] David Oniani and Richard Merritt. *CSV data scraped from the PDF files of IRA Facebook posts*. 2019. URL: <https://github.com/oniani/ira-analysis/tree/master/data/csv> (visited on 08/27/2019).
- [4] Jason Alan Palmer. *pdftotext*. 2018. URL: <https://pypi.org/project/pdftotext/> (visited on 08/27/2019).