

## A RESPONSE TO A YOUTUBE COMMENT

The comment is:

Hi, I stumbled on your channel a few weeks ago and saw some of your videos, I've been thinking from time to time about ontocubism since then, sorry if this doesn't relate to anything in this video as I haven't watched it yet, I just wanted to ask some questions to better understand, So as I understand it, Ontocubism claims that the nature of a thing is the sum of various perceptions that a conscious being experiences when interacting with the aforementioned thing, through various senses, however the thing still has an objective nature consisting of the total number of perceptions that it invokes, if that is the case (please correct me if I'm wrong), is the nature of that thing decided by the total number of perceptions that it has caused up to this point? Or maybe the total number of perceptions it ever will cause? Or the number of perception it can possibly cause? If it is the last one, then is it defined by the perceptions it can reasonably cause? For example if I have a fruit that is halfway between an apple and a pear, is its objective nature the entire spectrum that exists between a true apple and a true pear? (By true I mean a theoretical object that has the property that anyone will recognize it as a certain thing, in this case, a true apple being an apple that cannot possibly be interpreted as anything other than an apple), or if

the perceptions that make up a things objective nature do not need to be "reasonable" as that is vague to begin with, wouldn't all of the natures of all possible things overlap? By that I mean, let's say that hypothetically, there can exist someone who perceives all pears as apples, and also hypothetically, there can exist someone which perceives all pears as oranges, and as dogs, and cats, and all other concepts, including abstract ones, like thought, mind, soul, if that is the case, then really nothing can be inferred about the nature of anything, as you have stated to be against the idea that information is either unknowable or untransmittable, the very last option is surely excluded, but of the other 3 options, the first 2 would imply that a things objective nature changes every time it is perceived, and the third option, being that an objects nature is everything that it can reasonably be interpreted as, is arguably too vague to mean anything, as "reasonable" highly differs from person to person, thank you for reading this, if you did, I just wanted to voice my concerns, and I would highly appreciate you correcting any misconception I have about Ontocubism

Excellent questions ! Ontocubism (AKA aspect theory) is fairly slippery, because it is so intensely anti-representational.

The "logical core" or "essence" of any object ( in-

cluding entities like justice or  $\sqrt{2}$  ) is just our “co-intending” of it. We “refer” to the “same” object. I call this “co-intending” or “intelligibility” by many names, all of them just trying to point out the “unity” of the object as a “synthesis” of its manifestations.

Or rather we trust and hope that we have this mutual understanding. We can’t *prove* anything with *assuming* at least rough mutual intelligibility. I can’t make a case for this or that thesis that matters if you don’t basically understand what I’m saying. So rational conversation (philosophy, science) “presupposes” the “forum.” In practical life, we almost never really doubt ordinary references to mundane objects. Philosophers have mostly taken this forum for granted without even *noticing* it. This foundation or ground, which mostly functions “transparently,” is therefore also an “abyss.” This is something Lee Braver discussed in *Groundless Grounds*, largely influenced by Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Hume.

Now let’s focus on empirical object, because these involve perception pretty much by definition. The lady from Neptune has “sonar” (or something like it, as far as we can make out.) She does not have what we’d call eyes. This lady visits our planet, and a linguistics professor, Sally, is tasked with communicating with this Neptunian. Sally comes to believe, after hours of hard work, that she (Sally) and the Neptunian are now both talking about the same apple, which Sally brought along, for just this purpose. *How* Sally comes to believe this is something for a scriptwriter to imag-

ine. But Sally now has the sense of being able to “co-intend” *that particular apple*. The Neptunian and Sally both perceive the *same* apple in presumably very different ways.

Note that the “consciousness” of Sally is not a “stuff” but the “from-a-point-of-view” presence of the world itself. Why is this “experience” of Sally’s to be understood as world-from-perspective ? Because logic is intrinsically transcendent. I can’t prove this, because this is part of the forum that makes anything like proof possible in the first place. I sometimes use “tribal software” as a metaphor for language. We humans, anyway, seem to “share the world through language.” So Sally (just as I would) projects this kind of thing on the Neptunian. And projects also “consciousness” associated with that Neptunian.

So Sally believes that both she and the Neptunian “have the world” from different points of view. The apple manifests in both “streamings” of the world. For Sally, it is a red crunchy snack. What is it for the lady from Neptune ? We might also ask a related question. *How does a person born blind understand talk about color ?* A person born blind can come to believe that objects manifests as “shaped color” for those lucky people with “vision.” The “sonar” of the Neptunian is to typical human beings as the sighted human is to the human born blind. Note, however, that *all of this* exposition is “built” on the foundation of a the forum, which is also an “abyss.” I, personally, have to trust that “ontocubism” will ( ideally ) mean

for others what it means for me. Finally ontocubism is not representational but explicative, but I'll ignore that here as leading into another difficult issue.

Let me address some of your particular points. The person who perceived all pears as apples does not quite make sense *in this context*. There is no “apple-in-itself.” All entities are always from a point of view, situated in a particular set of beliefs.

An empirical entity is the system of its faces. It is an “open” system, including a potential infinity of faces. An object is basically “constituted” “between us” simply by our “referring” to the “same” thing. (Again, we can't prove that co-reference is successful in general — since proof presupposes the general success of reference. But the alternative is mute despair.) We can talk about entities that may become perceptually present. We can remember entities that once were perceptually present. In 23,000 years, two aliens may discuss George Washington's wooden teeth as empirical objects that “were” once perceptually present. They reason this way : if we had a time machine, we could scan those teeth and figure out what kind of tree they were made from. Note that inferential aspect of meaning here. If I dug a deep tunnel in a particular desolate piece of land on this planet, I *might* find a new species of huge centipede. That's a possible entity, understood already an empirical or *possibly* perceptually present. The world exists mostly in the vast darkness of merely possible presence. I type this in my room, seeing only the things in my room, but log-

ically aware of a vast world outside that I could “make present” by moving in this or that direction.

So the “core” of the object is the “unity” or “synthesis” of an unlimited and unpredictable number of “aspects” or “faces.” The genuine *empirical* “being” of that object is in those faces. The taste of the cookie for me is a genuine *part* of that cookie’s empirical reality. The taste is not an “image” or “representative.” It is just one of many ways that the cookie can manifest perceptually. Ontocubism is a form of direct realism, in that sense. But it is also anti-realism, in the sense that the objects aren’t projected into a “pre-articulated” “aperspectival realm”. In short, the object is its many manifestations (perceptions) *understood to be* perceptions *of*. The perceptions are “logically” organized into the object. We “learn” to see the red couch as *the* red couch, which is “between us,” as something we can discuss. As something that endures beyond this or that perception of it.

I guess I should stress that there is no “objective” apple in ontocubism. No “real apple” that transmits information to different brains that then create varying “images” of that real apple. Indirect realism basically understands things that way, and I oppose that framework.

As far as I can tell, people either do or do not end up with a sense of mostly understanding one another. This is part of the sense we have of sharing a world. A person who saw the same things “too” differently would presumably not even be able to convince us (or

be convinced) that we were talking about the same things in the first place. I see no way to rule out this possibility. But in those cases, conversation doesn't get very far. People in that case just seem "crazy" to one another, and that's that.