Instead of the perceptual presence of a thing, I might speak of a qualitative presence. The orange-coloredness and the soft plump roundness of the orange is of the orange itself. I can become aware of functional relationships between my nervous system and the way the orange manifests, but I should not be mislead into using a terminology that betrays the orange, which is there.

At the same time, I realize that I can't be sure how the orange manifests itself to others. I tend to assume that other humans have it before them as I have it before me. Of course I can't even prove that they and I are referring to the same entity, for all proof presupposes the general if imperfect success of such reference, in a kind of blind trust that largely goes unnoticed.

And what about chatty aliens, who learn English, if they ever arrive? The affable gentleman from the rings of Saturn has eleven eyes, what we would call eyes. He seems to be able to see through walls and around corners, if "seeing" is the right word.

Returning to humans, perhaps certain painters have experienced color "more vividly" than the average human. Perhaps they *felt* redness in the seeing of it, in a way that most of us do not.

Then there's the idea of an inverted spectrum. As Kraft and other logical positivists saw, it's as if discussion can only check the similarity of the "structure" and not the "content" of "private experience." We both call it "red." Or we both call it "an orange."

This we trust, though I don't think we can prove it.

Do all of us even "have" the "qualitative presence" of things? It seems to me that the notion of the empirical is aimed at this qualitative presence, traditionally a presence "through" the sense organs, which might be called the *nonsense* organs, since they are associated with what "exceeds" or "overflows" conceptuality.

If we and our visitors from the rings of Saturn can seem to agree on the meaningfulness of a concept of the empirical, then we'll agree that existence includes "quality" through the "qualitative presence" of things that are "between us" (in that part of existence traditionally said to be "external" to another part where toothaches and daydreams have been said to live.)