I respond to CM's comment, quoted here :

> Let me try to unpack my own version of what's going on in these scenarios to give you an idea of how we could infer existence that requires no perceiving point of view, even though we ourselves can only come to know things from a point of view.
>
> We take in observations of a solid colored cube under some consistent lighting from multiple points of view. After having taken in some number of these, we infer the cube shape and some position and orientation on a coordinate system we project.
>
> From that mathematical description of the inferred state, we can give counterfactual situations about "what does the object look like from this perspective?" "From that perspective?" Etc. In each case we can derive and render what it would look like from that perspective. But that's what we're doing, something counterfactual.
>
> The structural state of the object is not the infinite set of possible perspectives of it. It's the something related to finite state you inferred.
>
> We can imagine a scenario where every possible perspective would show a different color, or an orientation we didn't expect, or a different item altogether. In that case, inferring an independent object that requires no point of view would be unwarranted.
>
> Oddly though, over and over we continue to have observations that agree with a picture of the world in which there are objects that are independent of any perspective

Let's say that I am in this Object Research Group. I need to believe that this object — which will come to be called a "cube" — is something that we all intend, that we are all researching the same thing to begin with. Now that object is present for me in the first place. I see it, from this or that point of view. I don't consider myself to be part of a research team unless that object is *present for others too.* This "presence of objects for others"

is what I call "consciousness." I think that maybe you skip too quickly over this part.

We are going to have to speak or write to one another about our different first-person "experiences" of this object. Spoken words are themselves available through first-person hearings. I make sounds that "radiate" significance "properly" in my own ears, and I have to trust that such sounds will "radiate" significance in a "close enough" way for others on my team. I don't believe in a "pure meaning" that hitches a ride on sound-as-vehicle. In my view, first-person experience is "articulated" or "intelligible." I find myself thrown into a world of "candles" and "beans" and "divorces" and "research" and so on.

I'd include math as part of this "mutual intelligibility assumption." Of course it is a more specialized type of communication. But I assume that everyone on the research team enacts the rules, and trades signs appropriately.

Now this object is only perceptually present to me in "flashes" or "aspects", but I discuss it as the transcendent "unity" not only of these flashes it offers to me but also to all flashes that is has and may yet offer to others. This object is a between-us possibility of further manifestation. To co-determine it as a cube is to further specify what kind of further manifestation a rational person *ought* to expect. If they share our norms and have access to reports of our individual experience, they ought to also determine the object as a cube. This would enact or "prove" or "support" the claim that they share our norms. From this they can infer its volume, which may contribute to expectations of how much water it will displace, assuming it is heavy enough not to float.

Of course we already use ray tracing to create perspectival flashes in video games. The object can be defined in terms of triangles in 3D space. Then appearances of the object for this or that first-person player can be generated on the fly. In the video game example, where a team controls the source code, it's especially tempting to think of an Objective Reality of the object, which would be its encoded specification, from which "appearances"

are generated as needed.

What is easy to forget here is that this co-constructed cube is signitively present in a first person way for all those involved. The research is conducted to maximize the sharing of the resulting belief, so much so that one forgets that each researcher still left to the devices of their "private" imagination and the "private" way that spoken and written signs "radiate" "significance" for their sense organs. The transcendence of the cube is still present for this or that "subject." The "objective presence" of the object looks to me to be no more than this shared sense of shared expectation, shared belief.

You suggest another example where I'd say that "object construction" fails. To me it's not surprising that "cubes" are reliably stable or coherent in the way to present themselves to pluralities of subjects. We have a word for "cube" "because" of this stability. *Without such coherence, we wouldn't come to believe that we were talking about the same thing in the first place.* As I see it, you are tempted to explain the transcendence of objects by that same transcendence of objects.

Explanation is only possible — only makes sense — if we already share a world of objects through language. This "presupposed" sharing-of-the-world-through-language is what I mean by the "forum" — the "space of assembly" that ontology requires to *be* a **rational** discussion of what there is. We don't only need objects in common but also a normative framework that holds participants to a coherent norm. Of course we also need a communication system, a mutually intelligible sign system.

As I see it, any ontological thesis that challenges one of these conditions for the possibility of ontology is necessarily unwarranted, because it implies that warranted claims about the world are not possible.

Perhaps you are trying to express the necessity of something like the forum in your own way. Perhaps you are emphasizing the transcendence of objects and not seeing that I also demand that same transcendence. The key difference may be that I insist that

presence is first-person, but that presence for me would include the signitive presence (the idea) of objects that also present themselves to others. For instance, I insist on the consciousness of others while saying that I can't see through their eyes. But I can't avoid this complex point, for I need to talk to others about their experience, and my spoken words are directed to their ears. I speak because I believe I will be heard and mostly understood.