

LETTER FROM EISENDORFF

I think it works as an explication, but I also like “cloud of aspects” as “poetry.” It shows how the issue of The One And The Many is right there in every point-out-able entity. To speak the entity puts it between us, or confesses its prior between-us-ness. And us between an us in the first place, a plurality of from-a-point-of-view presencings of the world, gives us an understanding of the thing as necessarily multi-faceted. Many faces, the way it manifests for you now and for me later and so on. But the face is recognized as face of THE thing. “Perceptions” are logically synthesized into the enduring interpersonal object as possibility of further manifestation. And inference and calculation and so on. So manifestation is general here. Participation, one might say. The entity endures for further participation. An *open* system, more possible than actual. Not to be identified with any finite set of its moments. Which can of course be thematized, so that they become their *own* manifolds of their *own* moments.

Basic **structure** of an ontology. For indirect realism, one steel-solid external reality, and plurality of representational soap-bubbles. For ontocubism, a world that is fragmented full of things that are splintered. A personal existence is a fragment of the world, and this fragment is constituted by the splinters of things, by their participation in from-a-point-of-view situations.

Existence is a perspectival presencing of the world, which means a stream of aspects of situations, and each aspect of a situation includes aspects of entities

entangled in that situation. The world is all of these “existences.” A potential infinity. Rodent and alien, kitten and turtle. But especially those in “the forum,” who can (relatively) explicitly share the world with us.

No pure meaning. No purely meaningless stuff. A lifeworld. Signs (spoken sentences, for instance) are things in the world, clouds of aspects, that are more “meaningfully” radiant than other entities. Especially if their radiance is caught up in conventions. But even the tree in my front yard is an “incarnate word” as a recognized tree. The hiss of a cat. The rumble of a train. The drizzle when I step out to take a walk. Without the user-interface theory that would suck all the meaning from the world, we have the original lifeworld in its unbroken qualitative radiance. The restoration of empirical objects *as* empirical. Not their spectral projections onto “things in themselves.”

Existence is not fundamentally bubble but a naked torrent of reality. Yet such an existence is “incarnate” and “from a point of view.” So “ontocubism” takes “something” from subjective idealism, while being more world-centered than indirect “realism.”

As I see it, it puts the world forward as much as possible without incoherence. The “from-a-point-of-view-ness” is THERE in the manifestation of the empirical object. “Scientistic” ontologies tend to ignore this, and pretend they can scrape it off. But they end up in an incoherence that is ignored in its practical harmlessness. Though perhaps some harm is done through a “lying” disenchantment of the world.

Yet, as you'll point out, I'm an atheist in the ordinary lingo, with no religion to sell. Despite the rescue of the lifeworld and the empirical object. You continue to tease me for this, but I feel like I'm "fixing" logical positivism. An honest explication of "the given." Not "true" but "honest" in the "face" of logical norms as they manifest for me. Hell, my "system" acknowledges the meaningfulness of talk about God. As intentional object, God is. But is God empirically real or significant ? For me, no. But that's not part of my explication. I'm not fanatically against a most vivid monad. I can imagine situations that would transform my belief, but I don't expect them.