

LEE EIGENHOFF

20 JUNE 2025

Situated presence. Situated “perception.” Situated “belief.” I don’t have experience. Experience has me, and experience-so-called is therefore *WORLD*.

Presence is here-now. Here and now for *who* ? The “first-person” presencing of world. The world “has” the flesh of the ego. The world streams through the eyes and ears and nose and skin of that ego. Of that thing that is trained to say “I.”

“Faces of World.” World as precisely a potential infinity of such “faces.” Each face a “personal continuum.” Each face the-world-for-Jack, the world-for-Jill, and so on.

The world-for-Jack streams in through his sense organs. Jack finds himself the mobile center of world-for-Jack. But Jill is in Jack’s world, and Jack’s in Jill’s. Both find themselves each at their own center of their own streaming of the same one world.

I do not pretend to see around my situatedness. Here I offer the sense that *I can personally make* of “consciousness,” etc.

When I say that Jill is “conscious,” I mean that the world streams around her, with her at the center. I mean that the world is “immediately” qualitatively “present” for her.

But this “immediacy” is not so easily spoken. We call the same things “red.” I call this similarity of response the *pragmatic* concept of red, or pragmatic-red.

Is this all there is to red ?

I don't think so. That Jack and Jill call the same things red is itself a situated belief.

Bobby tentatively believes that Jack and Jill call the same things red.

According to Bobby, Jack called a Bobby-green thing red. And Jill called that same Bobby-green thing red. A Bobby-green thing is a thing that Bobby would call green.

But this belief about Bobby is also situated. I present it in this paper. The context indicates that it is to be accepted. So you, the reader, are to pretend that *you personally* believe this story about Bobby. Put yourself in Bobby's shoes.

The issue of quality is typically obscured by our tendency to leap out of our *own* situatedness. Or so *I* situatedly believe.

The "hard problem of the physical" is our failure to notice this. We hear talk of "the physical" and don't notice that it is only ever manifest through *situated* perception. This situated perception involves "immediate" and "ineffable" quality. Or so I believe. This is how I can make sense of so-called "physical" objects between us.

I see a chair, for instance, and believe pre-verbally even that you too will see it, if you happen to be around. I can't see chairs through your eyes, but I wouldn't be so sure that you could see chairs if you always tripped over them. So the pragmatic concept of

seeing the chair is entangled with the elusive-concept,
the thing that the situated-I “wants” to say but “can-
not.” Unless you, situated like me, believe I just did.