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1

Some would like to excise Heidegger's existentialism.  
*What is all this preachy authenticity crap ? Can't we just stick with the cool hammer stuff ?*

But others might prefer the existential stuff: *This babble about Being is obscure and secondary.*

2

In the case of my own related work, the connection between the *being babble* and the *authenticity crap* has become "visible" to me.

What glues these issues together, so that they illuminate one another, is the concept of

*S I T U A T E D N E S S.*

3

Perception is first-personal or situated. Belief is first-personal or situated. Presence — the being of things — is first-personal or situated.

Existence or "dasein" is always M I N E.

What is this mine-ness ?

I quote the SEP:

*Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ ... to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. ... Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.*

This is the DUALIST approach to what I’d call *qualitative presence*. Or just quality or just presence.

For quality is presence is quality, and being is the “first-personal” presence or quality of the world.

In other words, **existence is situated**.

This insight is at the core of modern philosophy. It is even at the core of the dualistic indirect realism that phenomenism opposes.

But philosophers have usually tried to contain this uncanny situatedness. This involves the **invention** of “consciousness” as Inside Stuff, which is then opposed to Outside Stuff.

Only the Inside Stuff is situated. The Inside Stuff contains and quarantines situatedness. This is how the “sacred” being of the Outside Stuff is protected.

## 6

People who insist on the reality of qualia are trapped in the language of their enemy.

What they *want* to say is that the world — colorful stinking and noisy — is T H E R E.

There *how* ? Through their eyes and ears and noses and so on — through their F L E S H which cannot escape from the center of all this *presence*.

## 7

Logical positivists, inspired by empiricism, often embraced phenomenalism in terms of what I call situated perception.

Some of them embraced the redundancy theory of truth, which I take to express the situatedness of belief.

But they did not see or did not emphasize the uncanny implications of this dual situatedness.

For instance, they tended to call the metaphysics they didn't like *meaningless*.

They didn't say : “*I* can't make sense of X.”

They tended to say : “*You* can't make sense of X.”

They pretended to have non-situated access to the TRUE meaning of words.

## 8

The last internal entity to be rooted out by a stubbornly situated phenomenism is “PURE” meaning.

The etymology of the word *translate* shows us how strong this metaphor is. “Meaning” is “immaterial.” Meaning, the story goes, is without quality. It is present without quality, at least for the solitary “mind.” But this pure meaning can only leap from one interior to another by means of detour *through* quality.<sup>1</sup>

## 9

To let go of this story of pure meaning is to see the incoherence — for the phenomenist — in declaring a speech act “meaningless from God’s perspective.” The “God” involved is something like personified, ideal Rationality.

Situated ontology becomes coherent and “authentic” when it confesses that *its own access to semantic and inferential norms is situated*.

Authentic ontology is situated. One<sup>2</sup> is not a situated ontologist. *I* might be, and *you* might be, but One is not.

## 10

To understand me so far is to understand that *all that I’ve said so far is presented as my own situated*

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<sup>1</sup>Thinkers like Derrida help free us from this story. Since I have already addressed this topic, I’ll say no more here.

<sup>2</sup>This “One” is the Anyone or They in Heidegger.

*belief.*

I can try to explain what I see as the advantages of this belief, and that's it. I can live with that.