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## 1

Mach and Avenarius. Empiriocriticism. The chassis or skeleton of ontocubism. In Avenarius, we have the “forum.” In both we get a plausible explication of how the nervous system is functionally related to the world’s manifestation *without* the dominant subjectivist confusion.

Norman Smith’s papers on Avenarius are good. But Smith is too rigid, perhaps trapped in another confusion. Perhaps the key prejudice of most philosophers is the projection of an “objective truth.” They assume that some beliefs are also truths. Such beliefs are “made” True by a “True” reality.

I don’t know if Avenarius was caught in this prejudice. From what I grasp of his work so far, his spirit is intensely pragmatist in a laudable sense.

## 2

Rational inquiry is not the pursuit of a supposed mystical property of assertions known as “truth.” Here I express a situated or personal *belief*, which I judge to be relatively “warranted.”

Anti-dualist ontology easily stumbles on the issue of truth. To assume truthmakers is to assume the very dualism being denied. So anti-dualist philosophy should not present itself as true. Nor should it indicate the equivalent of “the truth is there is no truth.”

Ayer’s *LTL* is a great book, on the whole, but the term “verification” is misleading. *Seeing is believing*. In other words, we can psychologically explain belief, in many cases, in terms of the believer’s perceptions.

Heidegger’s use of “truth” is admirably empirical, but it implies

relativism. Such a relativism is excellent, if carefully presented. Protagoras was understood ( approximately) to claim that every belief is true. While I agree with what I take to be the insight expressed in these uses of “truth,” I think it’s better — because less confusing — to eject the word “truth” altogether. Not from practical life, where the word “true” is useful for discussing belief. But from *primary explication*.<sup>1</sup>

The demystification of truth is not intended as a reckless irrationalism. We don’t need to aim at mirroring a Secret Objective Reality in order to be rational. As I see it, rationality is a way of being with others.

Avenarius should not be read as The Last Word. The notion of a terminus for inquiry is theological. Of course as practical beings we sometimes have to *act*. We sometimes shift our attention away from one open problem to another.

I see ontocubism itself as a continuing research problem. I take Mach and Avenarius to have offered the correct general approach. J. S. Mill and William James are likewise key influences.

As I see it, philosophers tend to fall into the trap of introjection. This is not noticed because primary explication is not *practically* constrained. Nonsense can catch on. The familiar becomes “invisible.” The experts talk nonsense together. They will criticize in one another the assumptions that they don’t share. But introjection is so dominant that very critical minds are nevertheless blind to it.

### 3

Braver’s *A Thing of This World* is an excellent book. But while reading it I was nagged by a sense of dissonance. Are these anti-realists presenting their theories as *true* ?

Anti-realism is confusion unless truth is demystified. To presuppose truth as the correspondence of an assertion and objec-

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<sup>1</sup>I use “primary explication” in the way that Whitehead used “speculative philosophy” in the beginning of *Process and Reality*. Ontocubism ( or aspect theory ) is a primary explication.

tive reality is to presuppose metaphysical realism. Truthmakers function as a “substrate” tacitly articulated by the ideal believer. This ideal believer is a philosopher’s god, an omniscient narrator.

I don’t recall Braver seeing this and emphasizing it.

I suspect that Norman Smith has trouble appreciating Avenarius because he is blind to the possibility of a post-truth philosophy.

William James demystifies truth in some lesser known passages, but more popularly he tried to give it a new pragmatic definition. A bad move.

#### 4

A radical empiricism is an un-alienated and situated empiricism. The world that has me right now is “real.” I am caught at the center of a “streaming” of the world.

This linear “timing” or “streaming” involves memory and anticipation. In its raw form, a streaming of the world is the goal-directed “experience” of a creature *in* that same world.

Humans can develop “maps” of the world that exclude ( as much as possible ) the not-relevant-to-others “character” of this world. In other words, we can work to create a scientific *image*. Mathematical models, supported by lifeworld know-how, can be developed by humans working together over many generations. This “image” allows for the creation of world-revolutionizing technology.

This map, a complex object within the world, gets taken by some as the Truth or Essence of the world. Yet the map was created from and for the “territory.” The map gets its prestige through its power in the “lifeworld.” This lifeworld is theory’s treasure, its anti-theoretical concept. Its sense of its own soil.

With introjection goes subjectivistic dualism and the projection of the scientific image as substrate truthmaker. More exactly, the scientific image is often understood as the term of a sequence

converging to this substrate as its limit.

In my view, this is the mystification of genuine fact. Theories tend to get better in terms of their practical application. The pre-theoretical pragmatist epistemology is an intensification of Francis Bacon's. Instead of knowledge as power, we tend to understand power as knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

## 5

Ontocubism is an enriched empiriocriticism. That's one of many ways to introduce it. Objects are the interpersonal syntheses of their moments or "aspects." Streams of experience as themselves "aspects" of reality. Or "torrents of naked reality."

My friend Ryan initially thought that I must be saying that there are only subjects and the streams inside these subjects. But I do not mean that. The experience of these subjects are ( to put it crudely ) linear arrangements of "logical pieces" of the things of the world. We don't have internal images of things related to the external things themselves. Not at all. The so-called "internal" "perceptions" are the "faces" and "genuine being" of the so-called "external" things.

So the world is not made of subjects. The "torrents" give both "subjects" and other objects at the same time.

Yet a coin is manifested "optically", for instance, with a latent "from-a-point-of-view-ness." Heads or tails is manifest, never both. Streams of experience as linear chains have an internal cohesion. With goal-directed memory and anticipation, we get revelations of the world "through" embodied subjects.

So world is always world-for, but it is no less the one common world that is given or manifest. So every object is temporally and spatially splintered, and the world itself is splintered. On

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<sup>2</sup>We can imagine a *radical instrumentalist* who explicitly embraces this seemingly irrationalist criterion for knowledge. This philosopher would be something like the shadow cast by Plato. I have played with a character named Horn, who is useful as apparently an internally coherent limit point at one end of the spectrum. For Horn, all theory is instrument, neither true nor false. Even "power is knowledge" is not true but the expression of an attitude.

the other hand, we humans are good at gluing it all together.

Indeed, we live “immediately” or “pre-theoretically” in the unity of objects and of the shared world as a whole. To grasp the object as a system of faces or moments or aspects requires a theoretical leap. To grasp the world as a system of coherent chains of revelation likewise requires a leap. We find this leap, more or less explicitly, in empiriocriticism and phenomenalism and radical empiricism. But most philosophers, as far as I can tell, have not made this leap.

I close by emphasizing that “ontocubism” remains tentative. It is forever a work-in-progress. It is not presented as true or finished. But my situated belief is that it is an enrichment and clarification, to some degree, of influences who deserve elaboration.