"my own limitation" $\implies$ *"ontological conclusion" that I don't track with.*

Semantic integrity. What can I mean by this or that term ? If I project consciousness on you, then I project an analogue of my own existence. I project its "structure." If I find, upon close investigation, only situated perception and situated belief in my own existence, then I am reluctant to "believe in" or pretend I can *even make sense of* some other kind of presence or being.

We're not limited …to … our experience. We can…draw conclusions about other patterns of activity in the world that is not within our own experience.

I agree. But the hard part is specifying this interpersonal situation. I understand the apple to be transcendent, also for others. I can believe reports about the apple that others provide. But my total sense of the world, including my understanding of what has happened in my empirical absence, is *my* total sense of the world. If I take pride in being a scientific or rational person, then my total sense of the world, what I believe, will tend to include the consensus beliefs of the scientific community. But this sense of the world is situated. It is the world as I believe it to be. I essentially add nothing when I call my own beliefs "true."

Why do we give the perceptual streams ontological priority?

As scientists or philosophers, we pursue warranted beliefs. We perform the interpersonal virtue of rationality. We find words that we assume are intelligible to others. I direct my results at others for whom they can be significant. I make claims about patterns. I suggest explications of the most fundamental terms in use by us. I "perform" science in relation to other people, who each have their own perspective on the world. The stream of the other is precisely the world as it gives itself to the other.

I trust that others have the same entities as me, from their own perspective. I take that entity to have part of its genuine being in that manifestation for them. I can't see the entity through their eyes, so I can't have the object from their POV directly.

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But I can trade signs with them, as part of a project of enlarging what stubborn remains finally my own perspective, my own (owned) sense of the world.

I may grant consciousness to dogs or even spiders, but I'd be incoherent if I denied the presence of the world to the same people I share my beliefs with. Indeed, I offer them signs to do so, which are part of our-world-from-their-POV.

So why do we grant primary reality to the streams but only a shattered secondary existence to the other objects?

The empirical ego of others is just as shattered as the table. As flesh-and-blood person, I am a thing in the world like all the rest. But as "consciousness," I am the presence of a stream of situations, organized by "cumulative" (memory-rich) belief.

Is postulating such a strange stream of coherent experience *warranted* ? As I see it, it had better be. Because the edifice of science *presupposes* experiencers who can compare and criticize beliefs. Knowledge is an ethical, inter-personal concept. Justification is a normative concept. We have *already* assumed a community of responsible believers.

The problem with thinkers like Democritus is that they don't explain how to recover normativity from their Lego theories of reality. Without this normativity, their atomism, for instance, is one more unjustified myth. One can go farther, if one accepts an inferential approach to semantics. We don't even have myth without the normativity that grounds meaning. We inherit a tendency to inflate beliefs useful in a practical context to fundamental ontologies, but these physical "tool" theories almost always succeed in the practical context by evading the difficult ontological issues. It's often useful to operate with theories that strategically evade issues that one can afford to evade, as long as one is only moving stuff around. And not trying to make sense of our situation in its entirety.

And if the objects are only shattered among the streams, there is no reason for any coherence. The generic case would be

that when I look at the apple from the side of the room it will be green, from this side it will be yellow, and from that side it will be purple (or really more broadly that there won't be any coherent apple at all). So we're left with no explanation of the coherence of the objects of our perception from different perspectives, and we've removed the ability to even give an explanation of such regularities because all they can be is a shattered set of happenstance regularities without the ability to posit a single causal nexus that accounts for the correlations. Or maybe you see some alternative single causal nexus that accounts for all of the perceptions?

I suggest that the substance of objects is "logical." I grasp the object before me as *an* object, as a foregrounded between-us enduring *unity* against a fluid background of what it is not. I tend to do this as others do. We can study this instituting of these conventionally shared objects only *through* the institution in question. Being-in-the-world is being-with-others is being-in-language. This is the "fact" that makes the institution of facts and their explanation possible.

Does positing a substrate presence-independent "objective reality" explain our sharing the world ? It seems to me to hang phrases on the transcendence that we already take for granted as the basis of our mutual intelligibility. We share objects *because* we share a different kind of "absolute" objects. But why do we share these absolute objects ? We seem to be shuffling around the brute fact of our being here together. Even if could agree on a Theory of Everything, that theory would itself just hang in the air, a final brute fact. Explanation tends to explain (incorporate) less familiar and local patterns into larger familiar and global patterns. These global patterns, because they are familiar, lose their strangeness, are no longer cause for wonder.

Really working hard to try and see your view, but its hard to avoid that it seems to me not to have the features needed as a foundation for explanation of the world, not only in science but even to live our lives

I see my work as *facing* the lifeworld in all of its richness. For instance, I insist that rationality is an ethical concept. I grant "full reality" to responsible linguistic subjects. I suggest that the lifeworld can't be plausibly constructed from "objectively present" Legos. My phenomenalism has nothing to do with a typical misreading of this position. The world between us in its richness is emphasized. My "experience" is not "inside" me. But I think "subjectivistic" thinkers were *trying* to emphasize the from-a-point-of-view-ness of the *manifestation* of this common world. The quality or presence of the world is "first-person," and yet it is the shared world that is present. Indirect realist theories try to transform this presence (the presence *of* different kinds of stuff) **into** a mere stuff. They project the "true" being of objects elsewhere. This "true being" is cast in the role of obscure cause of the secondary being of icons in a container subject reconceived as a graphical user interface. The "true" object is unsituated. I consider this a exaggeration of the between-us-ness of objects that we take for granted in our discussion of such objects.