- 1. I use William James' phrase **personal continuum** for what others might call a particular stream of phenomenal consciousness.
- 2. The world (reality) is the logically fused "system" of all such personal continua, actual and possible, human and non-human.
- 3. Each personal continuum can also be described as an **aspect** or **face** of reality.
- 4. Reality is nothing more than these faces. Reality is not hidden "behind" these faces.
- 5. Reality is, in other words, only "first-personal" or from a particular point of view.
- 6. "Objective reality" is sentimental, meaningless phrase.
- 7. Objectivity is senseless if understood as the absence of perspective. It remains useful, however, for indicating the absence of *relevant* or *disqualifying* bias. It's OK if the juror and the defendant both speak English and grew up in the same town, but the juror should not be the defendant's mother.
- 8. Consciousness is best understood as the (perspectival) being or presence of the world. The world is not "made of" consciousness or mind or of some equally mystified and elusive hyper-physical stuff.
- 9. Aspect theory is a pluralism. No category, such as the mental or the physical (mind or matter), is fundamental.
- 10. Metaphysical declarations of the form $All\ is\ X$ are cognitively empty, though they can serve as flags

- in the boring war between spiritualism and antispiritualism.
- 11. The "there-ness" or being or presence of entities is not a kind of stuff. The noun "being" is used to point at the "fact" that there is a world in the first place.
- 12. The character or form of the presence of the world is "subjective" in the sense of "from a point of view." I see the chair. You see the chair.
- 13. Sharing in the world through language, we each understand the chair as seeable-by-others. We discuss and intend the *same* chair, which nevertheless appears only in various personal continua or phenomenal streams, always from a point of view, and *for* this or that sentient organism.
- 14. This organism, in the human case an "empirical ego," is one more entity that exists as a system of aspects or moments. There is no organism-from-no-perspective. My empirical ego and yours, like other entities, are logically between us. They have their being, all of it, in various personal continua.
- 15. Objects are not representations, and objects are not "inside" subjects.
- 16. Subjects, as aspects of reality, are the form of the presence of objects.
- 17. Empirical subjects are empirical entities "at the center" of their associated personal continuum. As a body with a name, trained to say "I," I live in a "torrent" of reality-from-my-point-of-view. This "my" refers to my empirical-linguistic ego.

- 18. These personal continua are not containers.
- 19. What gets misunderstood as a "physical" chair-initself is the logical-conventional "between-us-ness" of the chair.
- 20. Empirical entities are interpersonal possibilities of perspectival perceptual presence.
- 21. Just as reality is a "system of faces" or "ideal manifold" of personal continua, so are objects system of their own "faces."
- 22. A "face" or "moment" of an object is also known as a perception or appearence of that object.
- 23. An object is the "ideal manifold" of its manifestations in various personal continua.
- 24. An existence (a personal continuum) is a stream of situations-from-a-perspective. The continuum is therefore a stream of aspects of situations, and these aspects of situations include aspects of entities.
- 25. Finally, a particular "stream of situations" (a particular personal continuum) is itself an aspect of reality.
- 26. The world is fundamentally a forum.
- 27. Ontology, as a *rational* explication of what fundamentally is, tacitly presupposes this "forum" as the set of the conditions for its possibility.
- 28. Language (logic) is a component of the "communal subjectivity" that is presupposed in all conversation that takes a shared world and the general success for granted.

- 29. We might say that the chair is the logical-conventional synthesis of perceptions of the chair, possible and actual. This **of-ness** is "logical."
- 30. We can't "prove" the "external world" or successful reference. Proof only makes sense in a "forum" that is radically "presupposed." This is why Kant was confused when he regretted the lack of such a proof. He did not "see" his assumption of and reliance upon the "forum."
- 31. "Truth", like "objective reality", is cognitively empty. Belief is the horse. Truth is the unicorn. The confused notion of truth as correspondence evaporates with the confused notion of a reality-from-no-perspective where truthmakers were supposed to live.
- 32. In words less blunt, I embrace a radicalized redundancy theory of truth.
- 33. What remains is more or less warranted, more or less *desirable*, *belief*. This explication is therefore not presented as "truth." I offer a set of beliefs for consideration.
- 34. Note that inferential and semantic norms are also always "from a point of view." Successful conversation depends on something like a sufficiently congruent grasp of such norms.