

1

All things are “virtual” in the sense of being logically-linguistically “between us.” As “intend-able” or “reference-able” things in our discussion. Some of these things are traditionally “physical.” A spiderweb, the sun, my left hand. Others are traditionally “mental,” like daydreams or toothaches. But all have in come the “being” discussed by Meinong, which is not a predicate but the possibility of the assignment of predicates.

You can perceive my hand, always from a point of view. Your perception of my hand is itself an entity that is *other than* my hand. What would otherwise be an aspect can be “thematized,” which is to say “broken away” from my hand, understood instead as a “private experience.” If we aren’t thematizing our perceptions, these “perceptions” are just manifestations or moments of the perceived entity.

Put another way, what is normally “the object showing itself” can become “the object for me,” as an “internal” perception or psychological event.

2

Inferentialism suggests that causal norms may be merely a facet of the inferential norms that are crucial to a “form of life.” I am perhaps rational if I say “he got lung cancer, because he smoked for 15 years.” I am perhaps irrational but intelligible if I say “he got lung cancer, because he was born with blue eyes.” Rational norms themselves, as like all entities, are “given in as-

pects.” If every member of the community speaks an idiolect, then none of these idiolects is “the” language. All can use language (appeal to the norms as they understand them) to discuss such norms. In some cases, conversation falls apart, because those involved don’t sufficiently agree on the meanings of words, etc. This often happens in philosophy. The more “interesting” a philosophical thesis, the more “difficult.” But obscurity guarantees nothing, and may just be unresolved confusion on the part of the obscure.

To bring causal norms into the larger system of inferential norms helps us get over the tendency to think of a physical nature that is independent of our knowledge of it. Nature as known or understood is perhaps nature as a facet of rational (trans-)human normativity. I mention transhuman rationality because it seems logically possible that we will change our own biological status (no longer be the same species, through genetic modification) or share such norms with non-human intelligence. Both cases are explored in science fiction. I mention this to head off concerns about anthropocentrism. “Human” rationality is already perhaps “implicitly” “transhuman.” It’s worth noting too perhaps that LLMs at least impressively parrot the structure of our rationality, even if we don’t attribute “consciousness” to such devices.

3

For me, consciousness makes sense in terms of the from-a-point-of-view *presence* of the world. Conscious-

ness is being itself. In my view, this is what most of us mean or “should” mean, even if we also tend to think in terms of a “stuff.” Our consciousness is just the being of the world, from our perspective. The consciousness of another may be understood to cease, by one whose consciousness has not ceased.

The problem with consciousness-as-stuff is that this is also the “stuff” that the world itself would then be made of. Why is this a problem ? The structure is left unexamined. Aspect theory or ontocubism is attempt to describe this structure, while avoiding conceptions of neutral, primal “stuff.” The “stuff” approach obscures the structural problem, which is how the same world is only given in a plurality of “first-person” manifestations. Since “first-person” emphasizes sentience at a level of personality, “from-a-point-of-view” or “perspectival” are perhaps better terms.