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## Object splintered ontology

A shard of the world, each stream of “experience.” Consciousness as the being or presence of this stream. Its invasive quality. Consciousness is no thing. No kind of stuff. We apply the ontological difference to this issue. Fasching is almost there. Or there enough. But consciousness as presence-of is consciousness as being itself.

Harman is right, as I see it, on the unity and priority of objects and also on their ( phenomenological ) transcendence. Though transcendence as externality is misleading. For there is no outside when there is no inside.

I can't agree with any removal of the last residue of the subject. The from-a-point-of-view-ness latent in the object's manifestation. This face of the coin and not that one. The situated radiance of an aspect of the sign.

The “stream of experience” is a stream of the naked world. But this stream is sticky with memory and anticipation. The real world, the raw world is subject-like. Or has the form of the experience of an embedded, embodied subject. Yet that subject is not prior to the stream but given through the system of streams. As A. J. Ayer already presented in *LTL*. Ayer correctly advances the breakthrough of J. S. Mill.

Avenarius addresses the priority of the brain. The style is perhaps stiff and formal, but the “spirit” of his work is first-rate. Mach's style is better, but he doesn't focus on the brain in the same way, perhaps leaving it as a corollary.

I get the “system of aspects” or “synthesis of adumbrations” approach from Husserl and Sartre. When it comes to intra-worldly between-us objects. Leibniz points to reality itself as a system of aspects in his monadology.

Most philosophers are fuzzy and confused on this primary theoretical issue. A big picture understanding of reality needs an un-

derstanding of consciousness and its relation to the world. What Ayer called the problem of perception.

Many are caught between Locke and Kant, basically presupposing dualistic representational realism and working out the details. Not realizing the whole framework is a disaster, a confusion. This confusion can prevail because it is indeed a merely theoretical confusion, with little consequence for action in the world.

It's sometimes said that people *live* naive realism. I mostly agree, tho I think people live a blend of ontoperspectivism with a dash of metaphysical realism. For instance, mathematicians are sometimes platonists. Physicists often take the scientific image for a substrate truth-maker "deep" reality. Bad metaphysics might even help them. Both get to enjoy the sense of peeping behind the veil.

In some sense, they are peeping behind the veil. But I'd say they are peeping behind —or rather around — the veil of present. I suggest that discovery is often successful invention. And also that familiar objects have a dangerous "infinity." They can surprise us, like a nuclear disaster, that we only slowly come to understand. Even this understanding is *just the settling of belief*. C. S. Peirce without the optimistic presupposition of convergence.

Yes, our tech tends to get better. If a war destroys our knowledge, we tend to think of it as recoverable. For that knowledge is belief about what we take for enduring structure. I have an intuitive sense of this. I gut-level believe in the endurance of physical "laws."

In practical terms, strong gut-level belief as such is the same as the possession of a "truth." My "anti-truth" polemic is mostly only theoretically useful. It's hard to understand post-dualist foolosophy if you assume the tacitly dualist concept of "truth" as correspondence or mirroring.

Rorty's anti-representationalism was a significant influence on me. I've read most of Rorty's work. Don't endorse all of it. Don't like his lack of eros for good speculative philosophy. Don't like

his tendency to reduce foolosophy to cultural criticism and pastel professor's progressivism. No grudge against progressivism. But a distaste for "therapeutic" anti-pseudo-philosophy. But I respect his demystifying assimilations of Heidegger and Derrida, without endorsing them. His "private irony" is worth something. This black box is where he hides the good stuff. A word to the wise will suffice. Rorty is a character with corners and shadows.

I don't long forget the rule of the professors. That academics tend to steer the field. Not anti-academic but pointing out that this is a respectable job, which presumably constrains the philosophy purveyed. "Private irony" was as much as he could say. In context, it was enough.

The best lines in *Beyond Good and Evil* say more than enough. If you can pick them out. Nietzsche is sometimes embarrassing. But too cutting to be neglected. So "the good guys" appropriate this or that. Which is not for me to speak as a bad guy. Private irony. "Transcendent" gallows-humor "pessimism." Nietzsche as cosmic irony assimilating Schopenhauer, surviving the vision of Schopenhauer. Laughter of the gods. To say all that one knows about Nietzsche is less than prudent. Which is not to project and worship a "true" Nietzsche but to hint at an autonomous appropriation. We might also talk about Emerson or Whitman. All hero worship is consumed in the flames of this vision of autonomy. But the victory is theoretical. In sleep a king, but waking no such matter. That's the pessimism, the reality principle. A foot still on the ground. The flower and its fertilizing shit are one. Hegel says this ( in his way ) in the lectures on art. Stirner, in his clumsy way, rips this from its historically-optimistically mystified context. In that sense he purifies it, though an inferior thinker otherwise. But it's not only how you paint but also what you paint. But it can be Nietzsche or Emerson or Whitman or Stirner. If the interpretation is weak, it doesn't matter. If the interpretation is strong, it also doesn't matter. This "content" ( wildfire autonomous cosmic irony ) is detachable. Also *connected to* if not equivalent to the sociopathic. Hard to imagine a professor presenting the undiluted version. Hence, again,

“private irony.”

The “pure theory” of Mach and Avenarius is perhaps enabled by an eerie detachment from the topical. From today’s great Cause. From every tribe but the most refined and virtual tribe of theoretical rationality. A cosmic humanism. But also an elitism compatible with and maybe dependent upon pluralism and individual freedom.

But the theorist is not the podium man. Sometimes Rorty is a podium man. As professors are paid to be. Authorities and experts, institutionally guaranteed. Kneejerk resentment and suspicion toward institutions is perhaps as questionable as gape-mouthed affirmation of the latest gospel. The People’s Conspiracy Theory often involves the replacement of one insider expert with an outside expert. Credulousness merely shifted to what is often a less valuable source. Inversion is not transcendence, etc.

I often use the word “sober.” The theorist is ( as I understand the figure ) surprisingly sober. Speculative perhaps. Dangerously open-minded. But finally sober.

Eigenhoff, for instance, thinks about his death, expects it to be N O T H I N G.

As Epicurus puts it, *where death is I am not.*

More good books, more walks in perfect weather, more snuggles, more orgasms. The usual annoyances. Perhaps a great disaster or two. But eventually nothing. A wicked world that will roll on. A few memes created, maybe, that will leap on the wheel. Till the wheel itself dissolves. A life structured not only concretely but by archetypal fantasies and longings. Granting a sense of adventure. But not cancelling a sense of nullity. That all is “empty” in an ambiguous sense. This ambiguity is itself “empty” or center-less in that same sense. H E V E L. Life is beautiful, when it is. Death is OK, more or less. But for now to be avoided. But not at all costs.

Eigenhoff’s ( partial ) detachment from historical grand narratives enables “theory” or “speculative philosophy” ( Whitehead

). The ice-cold explication of Mach or Avenarius. His logical positivism ( updated) lacks the horny scientism. In an age where superstition is often sci-fi, after all. Where the angels and demons of the mob are computers owned by oligarchs. That talk prettier than their users.

Discussions of consciousness tend toward the mystical or the patently evasive and dense. These days we have scientists waxing mystical-metaphysical, though usually in their retirement more or less from science.

Yet there is a core of “Being mysticism” that is more or less correct. Caputo on Heidegger’s mystical tendencies. Wittgenstein’s amazement that there *is* a world. The brute fact of the world, finally *beneath* all explanation. I think the case for this is strong. Strangely an atheistic and skeptical phenomenism “purifies” or “clarifies” the situation.

There is a gulf between every kind of “onto-theology” and a grasping of the ontological difference. I understand that a philosopher could indeed make a career of this. But it’s such a delicate issue that posing as an expert on it looks questionable to me. It’s *too* simple. It’s so naked to the wrong kind of mystification ( which tends always toward onto-theology ) that I’m reluctant to bring it up.

Yet the suggestion that “consciousness” means “being” can’t be understood without a sense of the ontological difference. Which is why the hard problem of the hard problem is hard. This problem of the problem is of course the dominance of the belief that there is a problem. Which involves the assumption of consciousness as an internal stuff, an emergent ghost, etc. Which involves also an eerie naivety about the physical.

I see no obvious practical advantage to be gained from understanding this stuff. Which helps explain how what I take to be confusion can endlessly prevail. Nor is there some formal proof to be sought. Fetishization of the formal is part of the general naivety about the physical as “obvious.”