NOTES I TOOK WHILE WATCHING

Ontological ego is, for me, exactly the face of world. It is an "ego" only in the sense of being structured by the belief of the associated empirical ego.

Langauge itself is qualitative. No pure meaning. Just equivalence classes of empirical signs, which have their being splintered over the faces of the world.

Language is in a certain sense "structural."

Is my red your red? We call the same things red.

Is my fire hydrant also yours? We mostly have to trust that we do intend the same entity.

Potential infinity of faces.

What does it mean to "be" a thing? To be a "conscious" human is to "stream the world" it seems to me.

Do simple objects have a simple phenomenal stream?

What people have called "consciousness" is (for me) the presence or thereness of being of things.

Yes! New "observers" do indeed "add aspects" to the fire hydrant. Yes, I suggest there is no never-present never-qualitative "core" hidden away.

Yes, we don't (I don't) associate "faces of world" with every entity in the world.

No talk of the forum yet. No talk of my rejection of "pure meaning."

You are largely rejecting "classic phenomenalism." Which is fine, because I am only offering an updated variant.

If inanimate objects have their own faces, then they just do. My main point is that entities have all of their being "through" such faces.

I'd say don't take "perspective" in too visual a sense. It's a visual metaphor, like aspect. But I mean smell, thirst, the emotional response to a melody, the smell of cut grass.

I don't know if your smell of cut grass is MY smell of cut grass. But I believe (without being able to prove) that "the smell of cut grass" is THERE "for" you, present with "quality." This is what I mean, you might say, when I call you "conscious." Your "consciousness" is not a

stuff but the (situated) presence of THE CUT GRASS ITSELF. In this case especially as scent.

I can't "live the world as you do" in a "direct" way. What we know (or so I believe) is always situated belief, situated "perception." The forum is plural because we meet in this space of assembly to hash out how things are.

So reality is "transcendent" and "between us."

Epistemology and ontology are entangled.

Physicalism is an ontology, in my view.

Physicalism is, in slogan form, the thesis that everything is physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. SEP

That's ontological, seems to me.

Fire hydrant is NOT "within the minds." The subject is empty. The fire hydrant is splintered over the faces of world.

"Maybe the object is independent." The problem: what does that MEAN? How does that add to J. S. Mill? I already insist that the object transcends the individual subject, but I don't project the object beyond all POSSIBLE manifestation. The thing is an interpersonal possibility of manifestation. Mill is cautious, says as much as "should" be said.

The phenomenal stream is rich. I agree with your comments on the chair. Categorial intuition. The stream is suffused with "memory" and "anticipation." I don't think the stream has a bright simple bland texture. I sort of take Husserl and Heidegger for granted.

Absolute transcendence is projection the object beyond all POSSIBLE "manifestation." This manifestation is presence-quality. Or present quality.

I don't go full solipsist because that's a performative contradiction. Language is between us. "Meaning" is between us. The world is fundamentally a forum. I don't evade our situated inquiry, you might say. My objection to indirect realism is that *it* invents a container subject, a jar of representational images and pure meanings, which it suspends with other such jars over a projected substrate, articulated implicitly by an omniscient 3rd person narrator. To see what I mean, you might ask yourself who has the entire "truth"? Is there an entire "truth" about

the world? As far as I know (and can make sense of) the world is always "for" a situated believer/perceiver.

Toward the end, I think you are seriously misreading me. I insist that the world is "more real" in a certain sense than the subject. I suggest that indirect realism is actually subjective idealism with a glued on "substrate."

What is causal efficacy? How do you evaluate it? Via manifestations. Yes "real" is honorific in ordinary life (J. L. Austin's work), but retreat into pragmatism is a retreat from ontology. My work includes a careful attempt to say JUST HOW objects exist between us.

That objects are transcendent I take for granted. Of course. But what is the exact-as-possible character of this transcendence?

GENERAL COMMENTS

Overall, an amazing video. I think the idea of presenting your understanding of my work first is ideal. Toward the end, you couldn't resist critique. Which is understandable. But this is where I also felt the most misunderstood. The comments on solipsism suggest that maybe you don't believe me when I emphasize the empty subject. This might be connected to a neglect of the forum idea which is central to my ontology.

Throughout the first half, I was impressed by how well you presented my views. Even though you critiqued what I'd call a misreading of me toward the end, you put my own words up. And that is commendable.

I'm grateful that you took the time and trouble to discuss my thoughts, and of course I noticed and appreciated the kind words about me as a person. Great vid! And I hope you keeping making vids. I'd love to see one on your approach, which I confess is still fuzzy to me on some crucial points.