



THE BINARY WISDOM

LogicText

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Introduction/Prologue

My obedience shall be in a place called Good and Inverted.
—*Father of Menelaus, Sample 78*

Since so relatively little has been gained, carried on a very subject with much rose-colored inspiration, and together with the efforts of great men, philosophy has yet largely united every quality and virtue which exists in ineffectibly flowing, soul-golden, and moving. For that particular reason, no man who is ignorant of many mathematical, speech, and naturalist sciences will not harbour in his breast a great threshold of excellence.

Difficult specimens of philosophy weaken our forces, and we are feeling again, and expecting a question yet greater than what has followed. In the country where Plato dwells, as Livy afterwards declares, they are found

by private citizens robbing, slaying, and running innocent with all their history in their books, hung with stars. They may perceive then, as myself have experienced also, and am a little ashamed to observe such a feeling, that the laurel, or the laurel, will never depart from those who read them, and who know their writings worship. It is a great question which they really believe.¹.

¹ *What then is true knowledge, good mind, whether by experience or learning; by will or by accident?*

Part I

CONDITIONAL SAMPLES: GENERATED WITH A KEYWORD

Chapter 1

Free Will

Free will and desire, and the reason of our desires. For the present, let us leave it at that. All that we here have to say is clear, and it may be well to be said without comment. But if it were in our power and desire to go on more and further than is suggested by its obvious consequences, to say that all desires of ourselves are of necessity self-imposed, and that all desire of another for us, even as regards pleasure, is necessarily a self-imposed desire, it is plain that we do not say this in the sense of our present admission that every desire of another for us is a self-imposed will and desire, a voluntary will, and that every desire of another, whether in our present life or hereafter, is necessarily a self-imposed desire and desire. For it does

not really say that no one can, for his own sakes, do any of these things as a pleasure for himself or for others.

This is what it should be. All desires, whether the want of which we feel, or the desire to satisfy it, or the wish to do so, are self-imposed upon us by God Himself; and it is to this He says, "For as the law gives life, so shall it give them that believe" (Rom. xv, 4). "But," it says, "any one may be dead before the deeds are done, so long as his righteousness is alive." To the believer nothing is less impossible than to be dead before the deed is done. Death is also impossible. It may be that in him who has to live a life in vain, death seems nearer to him. Still, the will to live is the eternal good of the whole world.

I do indeed see that in some men to act rightly, to make such and such good deeds, it is not as if inanimate things, living or dead, could have anything like our desire after self or our desire for others. For a little time at least it seems not altogether certain that self or others are in their nature to act rightly. But what the case in fact is, it seems, we cannot say; for there is still a tendency to give the impression that by their very nature they could act rightly. All this may be changed by the very circumstance that we can act without being dead.

For if some beings are able to act by this tendency, what has been done so far is merely the practice of ordinary

action among men. But it is at least probable that by the virtue of faith we may not be hindered in this by such thoughts as those. We shall deal with the matter further on.

And we have also spoken of the act of making good, whether inanimate, immortal or material, by any means necessary even for the life of the soul, since in this way God created the soul and created the body. We say also about a life in the realm of the living that the power of the heart of man is to die for the sake of God, in which the soul is united to itself, and with what end it moves in its rest, of which our soul can see no form, and in which the action of other men is to be as little as possible when we meet with another. For such a matter is a matter for the imagination, of which, as in every other matter, reason would lead to no conclusion, but as we have seen, it is not to be found. When we talk of a soul, we are talking in a proper way of the body, a body so small, as though it could not be seen by sight and sound without being noticed by thought and sensation. For, not only is the soul itself invisible to ourselves, but as to sound alone it is also hidden, and when we have spoken this, we have referred to the soul.

Again, the soul is to be found in all things, because, in its nature and as to its place in the universe, it moves from

one side to the other, each doing a new work, and doing things without having anything to do with the first. Now to think that things were made of matter and of nothing without a soul is absurd because, since matter is not to be divided out nor divided into two parts, and although it might be divided into many things, in like manner the soul moves from one side to the other. For there is not a soul in any thing by virtue of its motion, and so it is necessary to believe that all things are made by God to come to their end, that is, to the end of living by the power of faith.

We answer that this is a necessary hypothesis, and also that it follows from the fact that all things have powers of seeing through which we can know their order and nature, and even that every object itself is a symbol and a point of the universe, which we can see by its properties.

Pseudo Astrologus is the author of the three best books on astrology in antiquity: Plutarch. There is also another, by Dionysius Maximus, a treatise on astrology. It is very interesting, indeed the works by Astrologists are the most accurate and reliable. Astrology must not only be true for man, but that it may be true for others as well as for us, for they too must look to it for information, and because it is in accordance with our own will, if astrology works to the best of our ability. There is nothing to prevent these, and if it is true to them, it must be true for man

only. In this sense, it must be right, and true, if only the human mind will believe it. That there exists an external object that can speak to men, for example, gives us the necessary premises. Astrology gives us truth only on that account, as we have seen and as we understand astrology. The question whether the world is made of atoms, or solid stones, is an equally important one. Of both there is clear evidence, for there is no doubt about it. There is absolutely no question, on the contrary, that this is possible. Such is also apparent from astronomy, for it tells us, with exactness and certitude, that the world is indeed made of such matter as atoms or of stones.

It turns out that such atoms or stones are of two kinds, a solid and an imperfect one, and a solid that is a certain colour, and so forth. The solid form that man sees and feels is the solid form from which we are able to determine the order and place of matter, but it is a mere reflection, a physical object; for the order of matter is always the same. These atomic things, though they are not solid in substance, exist, nevertheless, as an imperfect representation of the order and place of this atomic substance, in this or another form: since only this imperfect physical existence, or representation, is possible through the solid form of matter, and not through the imperfect representation. And there can be no such thing as anything but

these imperfect forms; nor can there be anything better than everything but matter in its perfection, since, from the point of view of that which is not made of matter, the matter which is not made of matter itself cannot have much perfection besides physical perfection.

Now this, since it is clear that it is impossible for anything inferior to matter in itself by reason of its imperfect composition, can have nothing to do with the infinite.

Chapter 2

Morality

Morality is not to be confused with this conceit that the man of sense ought to know what is and what is not. It is a natural truth that our understanding has a faculty for the understanding and a faculty for the understanding has a faculty for the understanding. So the man of sense has the faculty to know what is, and consequently also the faculty to know the nature of the world as he sees it. It has the faculty to see. It knows that there are two worlds or worlds in which our senses are able to perceive the same thing. This is as certain as the one, two and two make four. If the man of sense is not able to see this, he is not a good person—he is not fit to be the king or the lord of England. We know that our understanding is able to perceive; but

how can it see the world if it cannot see its own nature? What right there is in the world is, as it were, given out to the man of sense that he may see the visible world.

The world may be known in his knowledge as long as he wishes to know it; but he must be content that he may not become wise who is not able to see. This is the doctrine of Plato and of all the Greek philosophers who followed him with great piety. Aristotle has more clearly shown how the universe, with its manifold and manifold forms, is the object of the knowledge of the understandings. This, he says, is the reason that the knowledge of nature is the object of the understanding and the understanding is that which can be grasped by the understanding.

It is clear that the two faculties of the understanding must be considered together: but we find in Aristotle too much deficism of the truth of the conception of the two faculties. To do one thing we must look at it from all sides. To say with him that I know not what is the nature of all things, and that I know no more than that a man may be fit to be a king, is like saying that I may have a taste in wine, and that I know that certain things are odourless than others: and if so, is it not evident that the man of sense must know how wine is odourless? What is the use of a man who cannot see to be able to taste? To say I know nothing or know nothing is simply to deny reality. For

if I do not know, I cannot know anything; and if I do not know, I have no certainty. For I have not no knowledge at all.

The philosopher says that to say that I know something is to be able to put anything in its place. The philosopher is therefore in error, for, knowing something does not mean that I have it; I have something, it is true, but something is not. This is not to be understood, however, through the expression 'to be.' The notion of knowledge, in so far as to be means this, is not to be understood by the use of the word 'know' but is in any case to be grasped with the word 'know' only as a sign of the existence of knowledge, not a thing itself. In that case the philosopher is in error. But when he understands a thing and understands it with an idea that it exists, he understands it, for he only perceives and is conscious of something that knows itself. He knows it not as a thing in itself, but he sees that nothing else exists apart from this. He is aware not of a thing but of itself, that is, he holds it to exist and that nothing exists apart from it. The philosopher therefore holds it to exist by means of an idea that exists, he knows it as an idea. He is capable of knowing that that exists by means of ideas that exist, which alone is true of everything that exists at all. I mean by ideas nothing that exists or exists by itself and by no means by any means other than an idea. Ideas and

ideas are of the same nature as things and phenomena. The philosopher's knowledge, therefore, may be called knowledge of an idea or an idea of a thing. That is why he says that I know and cannot know. But he is aware that we know nothing by the mere expression of our existence, by the means of external qualities, by external sensations, and by external forms. And this last is the same as the first proposition of every science in which I assert or deny anything, for it is that which in itself means what for its validity I cannot deny and therefore I know. But it being true that we know something, he is also aware that it is not false that I know. That is, it is not by my denying that that thing is false that I know that what I know is not false. For it is that by which I have this possibility of knowing something which I know and of never losing it. That is, the possibility of knowledge which is not known, but which is not known by means of the faculty of thought, as definite or indefinite. But it is not thus that I find the possibility of knowing any one thing—for the possibility of knowing the truth of any things is found by means of the faculty of thought; and the faculty of thought is the faculty of cognition, which I have before mentioned. For if it were possible that truth should be found by means of the faculty of thought, which is the faculty of cognition, a thing which seems to me not to be a truth is only truth

if I can conceive of a thing which I know as true, or as precisely the same thing as what the thing is. Now the faculty of thought is the faculty of cognition, which is the faculty of knowing. (23) The reason why the faculty of thought is thought is that as it can not be cognition, or knowledge, it has for its essence the possibility of the knowledge of that which can be cognition, or knowledge of that which can be concretised.

The faculty of thought in the same sense in which it could not be the knowledge that is cognition, but is that which it can conceive of as knowledge, it is the faculty which the faculty of thought, the faculty of knowledge, is. Now as I cannot perceive the presence of a thing, but only conceives of it through the faculty of thought, and as the faculty of that which I perceive is necessarily a faculty of cognition and must be in the faculty of cognition and necessarily the faculty of knowledge, so the faculty of thought in the same sense it is that I can not form conceptions of any one thing. For if I apprehend a thing as a faint image, I think of it only in the faculty of cognition, and I do not think of it in the faculty of thought. Accordingly, I apprehend it through the faculty of thought, but am not able to conceive it as a thing.

But it has thus no reality, for it cannot be thought of as what it is not. Therefore it remains void of reality, as it is.

Therefore the possibility of the faculty of the faculty of cognition is the possibility of knowing things through the faculty of the faculty of power of thinking, and the possibility of knowing things for themselves in accordance with their relation to ideas is the possibility of reason. By these we understand that the faculty of the faculty of power of thinking is the faculty of the faculty of thought in the sense in which it is thought. It is the faculty of thought in the sense in which ideas are understood as such in the course of the activity of thought. In this sense it is known to the intellect as a faculty of the faculty of power.

The faculty of the faculty of thought comprehends, or is cognize of the essential nature of things. Herein is the principle of the understanding, and it is the power which contains those principles. But knowledge of the faculty of power of thought is possible only in so far as this power possesses the faculty of the faculty of thinking; in such a way that there can only be the faculty of power in so far as that faculty possesses the faculty of thought. For in contemplation of the faculty of thought, we are never without a knowledge of the possibility of being the thing in question. Therefore, according to what has been said, the possibility and the operation of the faculty of the faculty of thought, i.e. of the faculty of thought in the

act of thinking, have different functions; and it is in the latter that all the other conceptions and conceptions are distinguished, but they need not be known in each case, i.e. the faculty of thought is not known to me as being for itself the faculty of a faculty of the faculty of power of the intellect; but I know it as being connected with it, i.e. as being connected with the phenomenon; or it is associated with it, i.e. as the cause. The knowledge of the faculty of power of the intellect, i.e. the faculty of power of thought, to such an extent may be called knowledge, not merely of what is to come, but also of the possible; for this could not be known without all the possible things considered in some degree or other, which were not only possible but also real, and could neither be possible nor be real, inasmuch as the cause of the possible things in which it had nothing to do, was, to an extent, itself possible; for, as its power extended through the whole of time, so as to its limit, the possibility.

Chapter 3

Obey the Law

Obey the law of the universe.

The one is always inconsistent with the other. Every one, like Socrates, is a paradox. Socrates, the one, the one thing, and the other, the other thing, as if the two were the one thing and the one thing and the other, and if one could prove either that the one and the other were two, or that they were both one and the other, or that one is like the other, or that the one exists even while the one is not, that one has two minds and another two minds, and so on; and in like manner even the laws of nature are not always contradictory. The one is true, and the other false. But the two can never be true together, neither of which can be true. This is impossible. The one is

absolutely contradictory. The other cannot be. Therefore the contradictions are either opposite, the laws of nature are contradictory or the laws of nature are true. This is the only possible answer to the question: Which is the supreme being? The answer is simple. In that sense the one is supreme. The other does not exist, and if it did exist, the one would have to be the highest creative principle. In other words, in order to make this theory believable, we must suppose the supreme being to suffer the same despair that he suffers in the other world, although in the other world he suffers at some slight inconvenience. But this is impossible. In the first place, it is absurd. Secondly, in every case one must confess that one can never be sure of anything of such a kind.

The contradiction of the law of the one is impossible. There are consequences to the one. The one is contradictory to the other. The other, too, can never be true. And if this is all, what is there to astonish us at? If it is true, what is to make one more astonished than before?

We are in an enlightened age. In one sense it is the time of old philologists. They have been reading and rereading for many years. They have made some calculations, and are still re-reading the books of Aristotle, and, yes, they have written their works again. Their minds have been enlightened. The books are now very fresh to their memory

and to their understanding. They still make the mistake of comparing the two modes of expression; and they are very wrong in believing, like so many others, that their philosophy is a philosophy of words. It is philosophy, as far as it applies to words, and as far as it applies to the whole of philosophy. But philosophy is not anything abstract. As long as a man speaks he has only used up the vocabulary. It is a science in that sense of the term. This is an obvious point before our readers, and one which they have often forgotten. They have said, like many others, that the philosopher has no concept of the nature of the world, and that he lives in the present. They say there is no concept of the past and the whole of the future. And there is not even a conception of a future, for they cannot foresee what will come after this day has come. They cannot foresee whether this day will ever take place; and they cannot foresee whether this person shall be at that time still alive or dead. In other words, they cannot predict whether the day will come by reason of the laws, or even of accident. They cannot foresee the day when their mother will die or of their fathers. They imagine that their knowledge of the future has passed beyond the stage of the abstract; and yet they have not a notion what it means to know. They are conscious that, even though they are at a stand about it, they are still conscious of what the

day's circumstances, or the hour of that day, or the hour of their mother's death, are. This is because, according to our understanding of nature and in accordance with our understanding of life, it is the past which defines the present as well as the future as well as the past, and which tells us whether I shall continue to live. That is what we have already seen. Now if our conception of things were to become less abstract, and less certain, then nothing could deter us from any thought, however uncertain or inconclusive that thought might be; and every effort would have its limits and yield to its own inevitable limits.

Chapter 4

Time Travel

Time travel, and as a mode of existence; the idea of a relational form of existence in which the phenomena of history and life are not merely phenomena, for which it is proper to believe, but realities in which there is a real substance, and where all this existence is not only historical and social but also real." But the assertion that we might have a real substance in time is an unreasonable conclusion on the ground that there is no absolute inferiority in time. "When I say that we never can say what the time is, I do not say that we never can say what the existence of the objects of time is. I do not mean that we can say that we can never give an adequate test of anything which we cannot prove of itself... On the contrary, the fact that we

have no absolute inference of our experience has made our experience true.

"The absolute inferiority, again, of things has no meaning; we cannot say that things are in one absolute and inferior relation to each other. They are two different substances, and in their relations they can be as great as we desire to make them. If things are not two antecedents, their relations to each other are two.

"The idea of a relative existence is in other ways at least an illusion. In other words, the notion of our being able to judge of any thing by the relations it has to every other thing is nothing more than the idea of its being an existence, which in the general sense does not exist, and is an accident. This makes the notion itself a mere fable, one which could be used as far as the practical understandings of our thinking organs would permit; yet the idea was not the object of that reasoning which found satisfaction in it. On the contrary, the idea itself is a mere fable; it could be used for only very particular ends: it can only be used for so many practical applications.

"It is a mistake to think of the idea as something which in itself is no more than the idea of its relation to an object and to that object. From this point of view it is nothing but "a notion, a representation of an object."

But we must not be deceived. This representation is

not that thing which stands alone in the whole universe, but it is also the whole world, and therefore is absolutely necessary to it. The thing which stands apart in the world is "the idea" and to this concept is consequently required a corresponding word, a word which means not only that which stands separately within the world, but which is in it as well. This word, again, is the conception of this conception, and in it and through it all other ideas are conceived to proceed, and are also possible to them, in accordance with this idea. Thus the world-image of the Word expresses a conception by means of which it is possible for the things of this conception to exist, and this conception may be called the conception of the world-image. Thus the world-image is the formal idea of which the Word is the concrete symbol. The Word was then an ideality, and the formal idea had a necessary necessity of this form through which it has proceeded in time. In this world-image there are not only ideas, but the ideas themselves—the forms of thought—and also the reason, the principle which holds things to their very foundations, which is the conception of the world-image. Thus reason could only exist in the Idea, which is the world-image."—*Ibid.* p. 100.

Here Diderot concludes this great work with all the profound and penetrating insights which the spirit of the period deserves to possess as a proof of its own unity. A

brief notice of this will be found elsewhere.

The philosophy of the Diderot must be distinguished from that of the Kant, whom I had already called the original of Hegel's philosophy. He is not merely superior to him, and far more so than either; he has a far more extensive understanding, as the spirit of the period in general had, and he gives it a higher order. This, however, does not suffice. In order to realise the truth of this statement Diderot must study far more than his predecessors did. It will be necessary for him to pass over to the stage now in question, which is not yet reached.

Part II

UNCONDITIONAL SAMPLES

Chapter 5

Selected Samples

Sample 3

Thou hast an object of the same kind: wherfrom will it rise by itself, and will not even kill; but thou savourest it?

Do men think thus? Accomplished the only thing which therefore suffers is the understanding, the normalizing looks of pity for these about whom, as animals, we have not even the crude and contemptible sensitiveness and feeling of a murder, as the savant has of the dead. The immanence of the good is, as we have seen, witnessed by us in absolutely relatively simple forms: the presence of a true object which, subject to detachment but not abode in itself, exists apart from the body, life, the related being,

and such like, and which has no means of arising from these bodily phenomena. Now, connection with them cannot remain absent-mind, but the object must be capable of being by the universal. Therefore, as the satrap to whom the satrapy can appeal has "this object, this universal," thus he could never exist ... giving up one's primary bodily nature in order to avoid the multitude of problems and trips, against questioning the "consciousness" (not "pleasure"), or fear associated with such deeds, then the emphatic replies to such cries, "What? has this awareness discontinuous with itself?" are symptoms of essencelessness and absolutely useless speech; and only the strained consequents of such like arguments, diverted from the theme of their purpose, remain worth the trouble. The good is conceived in such a way as to be of such a character as to be capable of constant adjustment to the object. Formally unconscious only as a "passage from the mind to the body," it must be obeyed on the basis of a cognizance of the course and motion of the object in the body, to show that it did ever exist, yet which has no ground in life itself for being denoted by this term, and not having it has no effects. This is what is done by the topontology of the mind: while the "conscious" thinks in the mind: and the sole and forsaken being whos too blessed to be aware of his own dwelling in the mind--however he may have the

imagination made into him, and be blinded by it in many places, before he is sure of being able to get a close look at the whole man in himself: in and by virtue they are wise monks.

Nature of desire, and really know—that what moves them does impress in their heart the mind which is the primary and spontaneous object of which we are content, and is our own being.

Pre-existence and affirmation of nature, as opposed to it, has, let us explain , no other meaning for the reference to the Maker, if secondary—if Plato himself in different times has said otherwise—for the He by whom the substance is to be recognised—did seem to think knowledge of nature came very near, but to human nature that brought the first impress upon it that which pushed it so far as to suspend its credulity. Our purpose is to look at a side of the development of Plato this remains, that of the development of philosophy in this field. We will not learn either from itself, or from Plato, how far philosophical thought goes beyond nature, can be classified, and can slide into question and contradiction, and free of these difficulties, and of all the haphazard means in its necessary effort to escape and dispute with the established system, to prove it to be conventionally true, and to allow it to prevail as a rule. we are told that the place of Plato's intellectual

independently scientific writing, viz. his Commentaries in the Aristotelian sense, still differs from that of Aristotle. Aristotle is quaintly called by us Criticism according as all discovered thought (accessible through the intermediary of Culture) does, or does not, appear honest and honest, in the culture it first comes into. But on this point, the difficulty which concerns us, Aristotle leaves to special attention.

Sample 7

And now, I say, thou makest me unhappy! I have thought the best of crying, but I am suffering my pain. Thou speakest well of me, but thou desert doest not know, nor can I do lest death should meet with us deemed by God: thou sittest stooping in thy grave, and in thy beliefs shall we both fall.

You are often mistaken in what seems pleasant, and regret thy obstinate blindness. There is a sight more pleasant, one sublime, and incline beyond the pains of sight. Teach me.

British Whig: it is impossible for the subjects to become less capable of discernment than of sight. And if they are stupid, are they philosophers ever nor concips of grace?

You have a mind going astray. But you have no head,—you have none, and for longer than the last hour you boasted up to it that you were a stellar much captured

within your his-tatters of fortune. When they say, 'Let us unthink this passage.' and hang on the concluding letter, they measure the wind from the sea by its point of contact, but they cannot measure the sea from the point of contact of the wind, nor can they know what they mean by the word 'updated,' for in the fairest light the sailor are always wild and squandering, and the philosopher always worn out by almost every want.

What then is true knowledge, good mind, whether by experience or learning; by will or by accident?

By will, therefore, we find many actions of much greater virtue, unless by tempestuous understanding we are once over this fault of levelling trust; gravity and courage put upon it are rare, patiently they are treated; but when the we have caught a lemon by the scoop, they sing a fast rise. If there is a failing of will, there must be something metahis for blessed account, good if not an urgent consolation from the wide comfiture of joy that surpasses our valour, but very bad or dead just as you intuitively may consciousness, but of no use in us.

And, as before said, not Pelagian will,—either it be a mere falsity of intuition, or a feeble attempt to make a higher paradise than the highest we may have at last come at, a chance, old and well-tried. It may be a ancient Greek or a sudden after-thought; it may produce the

most emeralding felicity in youth, and maybe even even an elevated life by initiating ourselves to the great reasons of life, even to the highest judgment of human justice. I am still a child, yet I know them with the simplicity of an old gentleman, Edition: current; Page: [297] for feeling the wretchedness and lack of power of nature. Hence, it would seem that in certain crafty or Occidental varieties of generation there is a connexion between thought and reason, upon sojourn beyond the sight of the common crowd into which twenty or thirty years of human life converge.

his truth is more than obvious, for why should one person's judgment, painfully as it is labouring, the most ardent life take the place of another's, else how could the former have some superiority but by disfranchising itself of the preceding faculties? If, then, one man is too Zelligish in his judgment, the person plainly too weak in the brains, the aloofness of a spectator, should result, with him, that doggerel, obtuse, often base, pride, and astringent and suspicious blindness, and humours are the cord thus fixed between mind and Observateness be boiled. My placebo, the dummy) is a gadget of some one in whose power it is for example the air, through which I hold on to me, the bubble and handle round the device, and the sensor the fixed disc before, the side, the bottom of such and such a

rotating part, upon which I may hold this and that round.

Sample 12

The white cloth- robe, fluttering, toss elsewhere, for other! Some earthly corpse with its lowest thoughts, the dead sea-whale over the river, the sunset where the dawn burns on the high clouded table, the sand that rolls in the gravel the tumble on the behind. For cometh the soul from the water; for it seeth afar its way; thy mind, as it bittereth it, yoketh itself therewith. In innumerable things, allfaced and adaptable, shut Cite amoeba, plant, moth, moth, and serpents of fear, as vices of death and decay. Of all these, though angry they blasphemed like a tongue against the fire, like serpents they rebelled against the waters, still their manner had not changed; for they sometimes saw the Lacedaemonian waters approach them when the sun reached Sicyon, look belly with the elf. Sidon the Chaldee, the Arabian easted with excellence, having left his Galilean fields in order to gone with his wisdom and pantomime to the western earth as Norway-elf involved with natives in and round the mountain; his heart not enough in country-life for the red blossom tree, his modesty seeking in a good rank only to go about love's territory. The object of his fancy was that there in the universal spiritual preserve dwelling there, a bird might be found; close it with its wings, and with its

wings many birds of harvest land in the sweet spring-time.
Soul up on spring longing for sanctuary, sometimes the
coals of whose deep slow fire are seen lit midheaven,
sometimes the lentils in its loins. Forty states of glorious
bloom, gathering behind, at same time drying again. Soul
scattering all, in the hollow of unrest, in unrest, in this
new bound, dim place: the arch of death is hidden in this
well of joy.

Just–Hakora's song is sung,
'Graua muarde de fire,
Graua muarde de love,
-aurora c' ultra duala vernata
-a portal de wax-damos
Allentir' th' honest languor of love,
(Dream of love common to all,
the everlasting shimmer of light,
Enlighten us all)

—what a sign th' individual gifts set free,
Homel's unique dance in love of Elouir noon,

(From the spells we hear during the half-moon's downy
day,
Is a blossom blooming, from the sodden of love's fair face,

Tear-drops beginning to fly in the air,
and-whir-whirl, about this toan-wail!)

Do not I suppose it is only the mirth, and –
So I say: you have the love, and I love you also.
And thus if love may him joy of joy blossom thee more
finely,
And to thee full bloom well it draws up th' way.

So shall tender happiness pass over the plain broad
highway, each tree heights above thee,
All while the tortuous waves of love break in of the weeds
And the refreshing streams tend their afternoon girl with
delicacy
And distinction more than love.

Tho' weary woe in love, hither do I joy by the air,
ferry your feet upon the air,
warm thy heart with an unaccustomed draught, bring
thee,
Now this is death in the desert, I sweep from the desert
my heels on stone!

Sample 14

Thus perpetually the diminishing fluctuations of one's

abilities and satisfactions increase the indefinable depths of one's being. The demonstration lies in that in every person, at every moment of life, over and over again, there is a concentrated feeling of end on the other side of this solid barrier, and he is not himself. And we must apply the same doctrine to literature. The events of the piece can be at the end of three or four lines which will not become unnecessary as we learn more and more. When the essential thing, Eventually, comes first and brings everything exactly to nothing, the importance of the whole is impotent in our misery of life. ...

I had to pursue this on a peculiarly slender spirit of wit when I was avoiding causes of anxiety, and warned that it was necessary to yield to expected oneness, if possible. Any day shall tell us whether it is achieved or not. But so far as I am concerned, the triumph of cognition fawns some, and attempts to read my life through the prism of abstract reason, and perhaps fail—and that's enough in itself.

name a quality which is most of all our own, it ceases to be mere power. Such vulgar confusion, in the condition in which it seems to flow, consists in an reflected surveillance of our own nature—our wholes—as if we could apply it to everything in which we find ourselves. The multiformity of our character, not our happiness, our attacks and depar-

tures have for us an enigmatical figure, because, if we can put them together in a certain sense, they would appear to be. Meanwhile, each one of us desires the rigidity and fixity of the image or the clearness of the explanation, but if we measure the success of our causes in indifference to these merits or defects, we bring off a feeling that, although there are none of our virtues which we are not proud of and no ones of our faults which we are proud of, the results are nonetheless still ours. These virtues, though they may be imbued in us even for themselves, if we will so call them, still seem second-best, for it is effect, as well as all other effects, to be semi-possessed of them and tried for them. And this second-best, slightly to the extent of suffering, will come of itself. And that second-best, then, which is our being in this world, inasmuch as it is.