




RFID Hacking

Live Free or RFID Hard

03 Aug 2013 – DEF CON 21 (2013) – Las Vegas, NV



Presented by:
Francis Brown
Bishop Fox
www.bishopfox.com

Agenda

OVERVIEW

- Quick Overview
 - RFID badge basics
- Hacking Tools
 - Primary existing RFID hacking tools
 - Badge stealing, replaying, and cloning
 - Attacking badge readers and controllers directly
 - Planting Pwn Plugs and other backdoors
- Custom Solution
 - Arduino and weaponized commercial RFID readers
- Defenses
 - Protecting badges, readers, controllers, and more






Introduction/Background

GETTING UP TO SPEED



Badge Basics

FREQUENCIES



Name	Frequency	Distance
Low Frequency (LF)	120kHz – 140kHz	<3ft (Commonly under 1.5ft)
High Frequency (HF)	13.56MHz	3-10 ft
Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF)	860-960MHz (Regional)	~30ft





Legacy 125kHz

STILL KICKIN'

- "Legacy 125-kilohertz proximity technology is still in place at around 70% to 80% of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time" - Stephane Ardiley, HID Global.
- "There is no security, they've been hacked, there's no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and it's not resistant to sniffing or common attacks."

80%



Opposite of Progress

TALK MOTIVATIONS

So what then?

← 2007

- If you're using 125KHz Prox, your doors are highly insecure.
- Demo time!

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2013 →

The screenshot shows a blog post titled "Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards" posted by Zack Martin on June 13, 2013. The post discusses the prevalence of legacy 125-kilohertz proximity technology in physical access control systems. A quote from Stephane Ardiley, product manager at HID Global, states that while the technology is still in place at around 70% to 80% of deployments, it will take a long time to change due to security concerns. The post also notes that proximity cards and mag stripes are basic technologies and lack security features like data protection and privacy.

So what then?

← 2007

- If you're using 125KHz Prox, your doors are highly insecure.
- Demo time!

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COMPREHENSIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SERVICES

2013 →

HID The Trusted Source for Secure Identity Solutions

Home > Blog > Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards

Making the Leap from Prox to Contactless ID Cards


Posted: 06/13/13 by Zack Martin

Legacy 125-kilohertz proximity technology is still in place at around 70% to 80% of all physical access control deployments in the U.S. and it will be a long time before that changes, says Stephane Ardiley, product manager at HID Global.

Still there are many reasons a migration from older access technologies is inevitable. The biggest is the increase in security. "Proximity cards and mag stripes are basic technologies when it comes to physical access control," Ardiley says. "There is no security, they've been hacked, there's no protection of data, no privacy, everything is in the clear and it's not resistant to sniffing or common attacks."

How a Card Is Read

POINTS OF ATTACK





Badge Types


HID PRODUCTS



- The data on any access card is **simply a string of binary numbers** (ones and zeros) of some fixed configuration and length, used to identify the cardholder
- HID makes **different types of cards** capable of carrying this binary data including:
 - Magnetic Stripe
 - Wiegand (swipe)
 - 125 kHz Prox (HID & Indala)
 - MIFARE contactless smart cards
 - iCLASS contactless smart cards** Multi-technology cards*



Badge Types



HID® Technology Card Guide

HID technology cards enable users to seamlessly manage multiple applications and migration projects through a single credential containing diverse technologies.

High Frequency
13.56 MHz read/write iCLASS®, MIFARE® and DESFire® contactless smart card technology is available in various combinations with low frequency, magnetic stripe and contact smart chip modules.

Low Frequency
Genuine HID® cards are designed to work with the large installed base of HID Prox and Indala proximity readers.

Magstripe/Wiegand
A magnetic or Wiegand stripe can be added to maintain functionality with legacy access control, time and attendance and vending systems. Wiegand is not available on all combinations, please see the HTOG for details.

Contact Chip
Crescendo® cards include a wide variety of contactless technologies, paired with an industry standard contact chip, to integrate with physical and logical access control solutions out-of-the-box. HID can also embed a wide range of commercially available contact chips.

hidglobal.com

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mkt_20may2010_tcg_en


Badge Basics

CARD ELEMENTS

Card – “Formats” Decoded

- Card ID Number
- Facility Code
- Site Code (occasionally)


Legend




*Note: if saw printed card number on badge, could potentially brute force the 1-255 facility code (for Standard 26 bit card)



Badge Formats




DATA FORMATS




HID ProxCard II "Formats"

- 26 – 37 bit cards
- 44 bits actually on card
- 10 hex characters
 - Leading 0 usually dropped

The 35 bit HID Corporate 1000 format





Badge Formats


DATA FORMATS

4.1.5 Example Output

The following is an example of an ID card with the number of “816” decimal, which will be output by the MaxiProx reader, the number “02004CA0661” hex.


Note: The customer code is never transmitted or displayed.

Represented as 10 HEX characters typically (with leading zero dropped)



RFID Other Usage

WHERE ELSE?





RFID Hacking Tools

PENTEST TOOLKIT


Methodology

3 STEP APPROACH

1. Silently steal badge info



2. Create card clone



3. Enter and plant backdoor



Distance Limitations

A \$\$ GRABBING METHOD



Swiping Proximity Cards...



Existing RFID hacking tools only work when
a few centimeters away from badge

Standard proxmark3 cloning

FAILED

hid fskdemod
98139d7c32 (5432)
98139d7c32 (5432)
98139d7c32 (5432)

proxmark3> lf hid sim 98139d7c32
Emulating tag with ID 98139d7c32
#db# Stopped

Jonathan Westhues

Detailed description: This block contains several images and text related to RFID cloning. It features a large photograph of a man in a brown jacket and blue jeans performing a proximity card grab on another man in a blue hoodie and jeans. A large red 'FAILED' stamp is overlaid on the image. To the right is a smaller photo of a smiling man holding a proxmark3 device. Below the images are two blocks of text: one showing raw hid fskdemod data and another showing a terminal session for proxmark3 cloning. The name 'Jonathan Westhues' is also present.



proxmark³


Proxmark3

RFID HACKING TOOLS

- RFID Hacking swiss army knife
- Read/simulate/clone RFID cards



```
proxmark3> lf hid fskdemod
#db# TAG ID: 98139d7c32 (5432)
#db# TAG ID: 98139d7c32 (5432)
#db# TAG ID: 98139d7c32 (5432)
#db# Stopped
```





Single button, crazy flow diagram on lone button below

```
proxmark3> lf hid sim 98139d7c32
Emulating tag with ID 98139d7c32
#db# Stopped
```




ProxBrute

RFID HACKING TOOLS



- Custom firmware for the Proxmark3
- Brute-force higher privileged badges, like data center door




RFIDiot Scripts

RFID HACKING TOOLS



The screenshot shows the BackTrack 5 desktop environment. The application menu is open, showing various tool categories like Information Gathering, Exploitation Tools, and RFID Tools. The RFID Tools category is expanded, showing sub-options such as RFID ACG, RFID Frosch, and RFID PCSC. The terminal window at the bottom shows the user is root on a BackTrack system, running the command `./cardsel`. The output lists several PCSC devices, including an OmniKey CardMan and an ACG LAHF USB device. The ACG LAHF USB device is highlighted, showing its details: 125/134.2 kHz and 13.56 MHz. To the right of the terminal, there is a small image of the ACG LAHF USB reader.



RFIDeas Tools

RFID HACKING TOOLS

**pcProx® 125 kHz & \$269.00
AIR ID® 13.56 MHz Card Analyzer**

Intelligent portable Card Analyzers for determination
of proximity & contactless smart cards



Readers compatible with this card:

RDR-6081AKU Black Reader
RDR-6081APU Pearl Reader
KT-6081AKU Black Reader
KT-6081APU Black Reader w/mounting kit

No software required,
open up notepad and go

Card Size/Data: 26 Bits/0x3F9CDEE

Analysis Complete

Press Scroll Lock or Caps Lock to start analysis.

- No software required
- Identifies card type and data
- Great for badges w/o visual indicators of card type

pcProx 125 kHz Supported Cards—Partial List


AWID *¹Cardax
Casi-Rusco® *¹Deister
EM410X/Rosslare *¹G-Prox™ II
HID® *Hitag 1, S
*¹Hitag 2 Honeywell Nexwatch
*¹IDTECK/RF Logics Indala® 26 bit
Indala® Custom Kantech ioProx™
*Keri Systems *ReadyKey Pro
¹SecuraKey RadioKey®

AIR ID 13.56 MHz Supported Cards—Partial List

14443A/15693 CSN *Felica
iCLASS® CSN MIFARE® CSN
MIFARE® DesFire CSN *¹Sielox
¹XceedID®



Tastic Solution






Tastic RFID Thief



LONG RANGE RFID STEALER






- Easily hide in briefcase or messenger bag, read badges from up to 3 feet away
- Silent powering and stealing of RFID badge creds to be cloned later using T55x7 cards



Tastic RFID Thief

LONG RANGE RFID STEALER

- Designed using Fritzing
- Exports to Extended-Gerber
- Order PCB at www.4pcb.com
 - \$33 for 1 PCB
 - Much cheaper in bulk






Hacker
inside


Custom PCB

TASTIC RFID THIEF

Custom PCB – easy to plug into any type of RFID badge reader




LCD Screen





Wiegand Input




TASTIC RFID THIEF

Custom PCB – reads from Wiegand output of reader

The Wiegand interface is still widely used

- ▶ The Wiegand interface has 3 wires:
 - ▶ GND
 - ▶ DATA0
 - ▶ DATA1
- ▶ To send a '0'-bit, a pulse is sent on DATA0
- ▶ To send a '1'-bit, a pulse is sent on DATA1
- ▶ Very widely used, especially in the U.S.
- ▶ Even to this day every HID reader has a Wiegand output





Commercial Readers

TASTIC RFID THIEF



Low Frequency
Genuine HID™ cards are designed to work with the large installed base of HID Prox and Indala proximity readers.

HID Prox Indala®



- HID MaxiProx 5375AGN00

**Read Range	ProxCard® II card - up to 24" (60.9 cm) ISOPROX® II card - up to 20" (50.8 cm) DuoProx® II Card - up to 20" (50.8 cm) Smart ISOPROX® II - up to 20" (50.8 cm) Smart DuoProx® II Card - up to 20" (50.8 cm) HID Proximity & MIFARE® Card - up to 20" (50.8 cm) ProxCard® Plus card - up to 13" (33 cm) ProxKey® II key fob - up to 17" (43.2 cm) MicroProx® Tag - up to 15" (38 cm) ProxPass® Active Vehicle Tag - up to 6' (1.8 m)
--------------	---



- Indala Long-Range Reader 620






Indala Cloning

EXAMPLE IN PRACTICE



```
proxmark3> lf indalademod
Expecting a bit less than 312 raw bits
Recovered 311 raw bits
worst metric (0=best..7=worst): 6 at pos 20
UID=0000000000000000000000000000000010011110010101100000100010100010101 (4f2b04515)
Occurrences: 4 (expected 4)
proxmark3>
```

```
proxmark3> lf indalaclone 4f2b04515
Cloning 64bit tag with UID 4f2b04515
#db# DONE
proxmark3
```






Tastic Solution: Add-ons

MODULES TO POTENTIALLY ADD



- Arduino NFC Shield
- Arduino BlueTooth Modules
- Arduino WiFly Shield (802.11b/g)
- Arduino GSM/GPRS shields (SMS messaging)
- WIZnet Embedded Web Server Module
- Xbee 2.4GHz Module (802.15.4 Zigbee)
- Parallax GPS Module PMB-648 SiRF
- Arduino Ethernet Shield
- Redpark - Serial-to-iPad/iPhone Cable





Forward Channel Attacks

EAVESDROPPING RFID



Droppin' Eaves

BADGE BROADCASTS



- Card is powered by 125 kilohertz sine wave.
- Card responds with AM broadcast of bits.
- Broadcast can be received with modified AM radio or oscilloscope.




125 kilohertz (in)

"1011100010101101..."
"1011100010101101..."
"1011100010101101..."
"1011100010101101..."

AM broadcast (out)

Asymmetric Channels



Cloner 2.0 by Paget

EAVESDROPPING ATTACK

- Chris Paget talked of his tool **reaching 10 feet** for this type of attack
- Tool never actually released, unfortunately
- **Unaware of any public tools** that exist for this attack currently

Cloner 2.0


- In development
- Massively improved capabilities
 - Passive mode
 - Let someone else power the card, sniff at a distance
 - Aiming for 10 feet
 - Drop it in a bush, come back the next day
- Blackhat 2008?

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Page's tool unfortunately was never released

Eavesdropping attack proposed

IOActive, Inc. © 2007



RFID Card Cloning


CARD PROGRAMMING

Programmable Cards



Simulate data *and behavior* of any badge type

- T55x7 Cards
- Q5 cards (T5555)





Programmable Cards



Cloning to T55x7 Card using Proxmark3

- HID Prox Cloning – example:

```
lf hid clone <HEX>
lf hid clone 20068d83d5
```

- Indala Prox Cloning – example:

```
lf indal(clone <HEX>
lf indal(clone 4f2b04795
```



proxmark3



Reader and Controller Attacks

DIRECT APPROACH



Reader Attacks

JACKED IN



Finding Wiegand

- Dump private keys, valid badge info, and more in few seconds





Fig. 3. Programming interface adapter for PICkit2 to switch Pin 1 with Pin 3.

Reader Attacks

GECKO-MITM ATTACK



- Insert in door reader of target building – **record badge #s**
- Tastic RFID Thief's PCB could be used similarly for MITM attack

Controller Attacks

JACKED IN




PUBLIC brad-anton / VertX

<http://nosedookie.blogspot.com>

8 commits 1 branch
branch: master VertX /

Updates from shmoocan
brad-anton authored a year ago

- [Arduino_VertX_Wiegand_BruteForce.ino](#)
- [Arduino_VertX_Wiegand_Fuzzer.ino](#)
- [Arduino_Vertx_ProxPoint_Skimmer.ino](#)
- [Attacking Proximity Card Access Systems-v0.1.pdf](#)
- [README](#)
- [VertX_CacheTool.c](#)
- [VertX_Query.py](#)
- [VertX_WebOpen.py](#)
- [VertX_discovery.xml](#)
- [WebBrix_FromVertX.xml](#)







Backdoors and Other Fun

LITTLE DIFFERENCES



Pwn Plug

MAINTAINING ACCESS



```
Linux f0ad4e00f501 2.6.32 #2 PREEMPT Sun Dec 6 17:38:26 MST 2009 armv5tel
[REDACTED]
Pwn Plug Release 0.3 : July 2011
Copyright 2010-2011 Rapid Focus Security LLC, DBA Pwnie Express

By using this product you agree to the terms of the Rapid Focus
Security EULA: http://pwnieexpress.com/pdfs/RFSEULA.pdf

This product contains both open source and proprietary software.
Proprietary software is distributed under the terms of the EULA.
Open source software is distributed under the GNU GPL.
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html

root@f0ad4e00f501:~# ls
```




Pwn Plug

MAINTAINING ACCESS



- Pwn Plug Elite: \$995.00
- Power Pwn: \$1,495.00





Raspberry Pi

MAINTAINING ACCESS

- Raspberry Pi - credit card sized, single-board computer – cheap \$35

Security Affairs Read, think, share ... Security is everyone's business


Raspberry Pi as physical backdoor to office networks

by paganinip on June 22nd, 2013



Network security engineer “Richee” explained how to use a Raspberry Pi to realize a physical backdoor to gain remote access to an office network.

Network security engineer “Richee” published an interesting post on how to use a tiny Raspberry Pi computer to obtain physical access into a corporate network. I decided to publish this post because it gives us a lesson on security perspective, Richee has in fact used the tiny Raspberry Pi hiding it in an ordinary laptop power brick, an object very common in any office and realizing in this way a physical backdoor into the network.






Raspberry Pi

MAINTAINING ACCESS



- Raspberry Pi – cheap alternative (~\$35) to Pwn Plug/Power Pwn
 - Pwnie Express – Raspberry Pwn
 - Rogue Pi – RPi Pentesting Dropbox
 - Pwn Pi v3.0






Little Extra Touches

GO A LONG WAY



- Fake polo shirts for target company
 - Get logo from target website
- Fargo DTC515 Full Color ID Card ID Badge Printer
 - ~\$500 on Amazon
- Badge accessories
- HD PenCam - Mini 720p Video Camera
- Lock pick gun/set



Defenses



A V O I D B E I N G P R O B E D



RFID Security Resources

SLIM PICKINS...

- RFID Security by Syngress
 - Not updated *since July 2005*
- NIST SP 800-98 – Securing RFID
 - Not updated *since April 2007*
- Hackin9 Magazine – Aug 2011
 - RFID Hacking, *pretty decent*



NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
Technology Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce

Special Publication 800-98

**Guidelines for Securing Radio
Frequency Identification
(RFID) Systems**



Defenses

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Consider implementing a more secure, active RFID system (e.g. "*contactless smart cards*") that incorporates **encryption, mutual authentication**, and message replay protection.
- Consider systems that also support **2-factor** authentication, using elements such as a **PIN pad** or **biometric** inputs.
- Consider implementing physical security intrusion and **anomaly detection** software.





Defenses

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Instruct employees **not to wear their badges in prominent view** when outside the company premises.
- Utilize **RFID card shields** when the badge is not in use to prevent drive-by card sniffing attacks.
- Physically protect the RFID badge readers by using **security screws** that require special tools to remove the cover and access security components.
- Employ the **tamper detect mechanisms** to prevent badge reader physical tampering. All readers and doors should be **monitored by CCTV**.





Defenses (Broken)

SOME DON'T... EXAMPLE...




USA - Green Card Sleeve

- Since May 11, 2010, new Green Cards contain an RFID chip
- Tested Carl's "*protective sleeve*", doesn't block anything.
- False sense of security



Thank You



Bishop Fox – see for more info:

<http://www.bishopfox.com/resources/tools/rfid-hacking/>