


## Functional Resonance Accident Model Method and examples


Erik Hollnagel University of Linköping, Sweden E-mail: eriho@ida.liu.se




CSE LAB	Premises for FRAM analysis			
	Model type	Sequential model	Epidemiological model	Systemic model
	Model structure	Structurally decomposable	Structurally decomposable	Functionally decomposable
	Model dynamics	Linear independence	Linear dependence	Non-linear dependencies
	Typical representation	Event tree, fault tree	Barriers (Swiss cheese)	Functional modules (resonance)
	Risk assessment method	THERP, HAZOP, FMEA	Swiss cheese, TRIPOD	FRAM
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## Identify essential system functions; characterise each function by six basic parameters.\* Characterise the (context dependent) potential variability using a checklist. Define functional resonance based on possible dependencies (couplings) among functions. Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required performance monitoring. \*Based on the principles of SADT ("Structured Analysis and Design Technique")








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CSE LAB		Functional unit parameters
Inputs (I)		What is needed to perform function. Constitute the links to previous functions; can be either transformed or used in order to produce outputs.
	Outputs (O)	What is produced by function. Constitute links to subsequent functions.
	Resources (R)	What is needed by function to process input (e.g., hardware, procedures, software, energy, manpower).
	Controls / constraints (C)	Serve to supervise or restrict function (monitor, adjust it when it goes astray). Can be active functions or just plans, procedures and guidelines.
	Preconditions (P)	System conditions that must be fulfilled before a function can be carried out, e.g., that another step or process has been completed or that a specific system condition has been established.
	Time (T)	Everything takes place in time and is governed by time. Can also be a constraint in the sense of a time window for an activity (a duration), Can be considered as a special kind of resource.
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



# FRAM analysis steps I dentify essential system functions; characterise each function by six basic parameters. Characterise the (context dependent) potential variability using a checklist. Define functional resonance based on possible dependencies (couplings) among functions. Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required performance monitoring.


























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## FRAM analysis steps

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
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## How can functions affect each other?

If a function is likely to have increased variability, then establish the dependencies by the following questions:



Which other functions uses this as input?


Which other functions depends on this as a pre-condition?


Which other functions depend on this for timing? (synchronisation, start, finish)

Which other functions uses this as a resource?

Which other functions depend on this to control what they do?








inoperable was broken due to the violation of how to handle such a situation.


The operators anticipated that the closing of the disconnecting switches for the LPCS pumps were included in the startup procedure, but never checked this


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
assumption.


ROOT CAUSE






















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
## RNAV steps


- 1. Code procedure from paper into a digital navigation database
- 2. Load navigation database in A/C
- 3. Insert RNAV procedure in FMC flight plan
- 4. Check correct procedure inserted
- 5. Engage Autopilot (AP) and/or Flight Director (FD) in LNAV and VNAV modes
- 6. Monitor navigation performance
- 7. Control Flight Technical Error (FTE)
- 8. Manage speed to be appropriate for landing latest at Decision Height
- 9. Land the aircraft with the use of visual cues from DH














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## Performance monitoring

- Generic performance measurements
  - TRIPOD-DELTA
  - WANO
  - **•** . . .
- Specific performance measurements
  - ETTO-conditions
  - Typical / frequent adjustment types
  - **\*** . . .
- Barriers
  - Insisting on procedure compliance is an inefficient solution
  - Instead focus on the reasons why short-cuts are made
- Damping (variability) instead of eliminating (failures)
  - Improve the conditions that require trade-offs to be made
  - E.g., additional resources, reduced pressures, better information



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## Performance indicators

WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators): Collective doses, fuel index, unavailability of safety systems, unplanned scrams, availability, unplanned losses of production

Generic (from survey of about 80 models of organisational effectiveness):
top-level commitment awareness (of safety problems)
Preparedness
Flexibility
just culture organisational learning visibility (of safety margins)



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## Conclusions

Risk assessment based on principle of functional resonance

→ Not constrained by pre-defined links and relations (event trees)

Accidents seen as a result of concurrencies

→ Analysis: find concurrencies present in the situation

No assumptions about individual failures

Prediction: find potential concurrencies for the task/activity

Determine when performance variability is likely

Determine how variability may express itself

Determine how other functions may be affected by variability (resonance).



