Bootstrapping a Libre, Self-Hosting RISC-V Computer

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### The Plan

- Build an FPGA based computer from Free / Libre software and gateware sources:
  - Linux, BusyBox
  - LiteX, RocketChip
- Using Free / Libre software and HDL toolchains:
  - gcc
  - yosys, trellis, nextpnr

### You Can Follow Along

- On a pre-configured Fedora VM
  - http://mirror.ini.cmu.edu/litex/litexdemo.f32.ova
    - Built for VMWare (Fusion / Workstation), for convenience
    - Link availability not guaranteed beyond April 2021!
  - Login: *user*
  - Password: tartans
  - Pre-installed with toolchains, sources

### Building the Development VM

- Kickstart a Fedora VM: litexdemo.f32.ks
- Log in as user (password: tartans), and run:

```
# git clone -recursive https://github.com/riscv/riscv-gnu-toolchain
# pushd riscv-gnu-toolchain; configure -prefix=$HOME/RISCV -enable-multilib
# make newlib linux; popd; rm -rf riscv-gnu-toolchain
# echo 'export PATH=$PATH:$HOME/RISCV/bin' >> ~/.bashrc

# mkdir ~/LITEX; cd ~/LITEX
# git clone https://github.com/litex-hub/linux -b litex-rebase
# git clone https://github.com/litex-hub/linux-on-litex-rocket
# git clone https://github.com/riscv/riscv-pk
# wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enjoy-digital/litex/master/litex_setup.py
# python3 ./litex_setup.py init install -user
# wget https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-1.31.0.tar.bz2 -0 - | tar xfj -
```

### Let's start building!

- We'll talk theory while waiting for build to finish!
- Start with the bitstream (it takes the longest):

```
# cd ~/LITEX
# litex_boards/litex_boards/targets/lambdaconcept_ecpix5.py --build \
     --cpu-type rocket --cpu-variant linuxd --sys-clk-freq 50e6 \
     --with-ethernet --with-sdcard
```

Next, start building BusyBox:

```
# cp linux-on-litex-rocket/conf/busybox-*.config busybox*/.config
# (cd busybox*; make CROSS_COMPILE=riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-)
```

## Create the *initramfs.cpio* image

```
# mkdir initramfs; pushd initramfs; mkdir -p \
      bin sbin lib etc dev home proc sys tmp mnt nfs root usr/bin usr/sbin usr/lib
# cat > etc/inittab <<- "FOT"
::sysinit:/bin/busybox mount -t proc proc /proc
::sysinit:/bin/busybox mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /tmp
::sysinit:/bin/busybox mount -t sysfs sysfs /sys
::sysinit:/bin/busybox --install -s
/dev/console::sysinit:-/bin/ash
FOT
# cp ../busybox*/busybox bin/; ln -s bin/busybox ./init
# fakeroot <<- "EOT"
mknod dev/null c 1 3; mknod dev/zero c 1 5; mknod dev/tty c 5 0
mknod dev/console c 5 1; mknod dev/mmcblk0 b 179 0
mknod dev/mmcblk0p1 b 179 1; mknod dev/mmcblk0p2 b 179 2
find . | cpio -H newc -o > ../initramfs.cpio
EOT
# popd
```

### Start building Linux

• Embed *initramfs.cpio* into the kernel image:


• Let's discuss the *bigger picture* while we wait...

# Self-Hosting (Compiler)



- Written in its own language
- Compiles its own sources
  - Subject to Trusting Trust attack (Ken Thompson)
    - Mitigated by Diverse Double Compilation (D. A. Wheeler)
- Bootstrapping


### Self-Hosting Software Stack



 Self-hosting compiler can build all software needed for its own execution

 Free / Libre sources for all components!

## Self-Hosting Software Stack



 Self-hosting compiler can build all software needed for its own execution

 Relies on (deployed on top of) Hardware


### More Details re. *Hardware*

"Software" CPU ISA & I/O registers Microarchitecture Register Transfer Level (RTL) **ASICs FPGAs** 

Gateware (written in HDL)


Physical (i.e., silicon)

### Self-Hosting Extended to Gateware




- C compiler → *Software*
- HDL compiler → Gateware
- Free / Libre sources for all components!
- *Physical* (silicon, ASICs or FPGAs) out of scope!

### Gateware Compilation Stages



### ASICs vs. FPGAs



- Application Specific Integrated Circuit
- dedicated, optimized etched silicon
  - photolithographic masks
- hard IP cores



- Field Programmable Gate Array
- grid: programmable blocks, interconnect
  - bitstream
- soft IP cores

### Hardware Attack Surface

- Fabrication (Malicious ASIC Foundry)
  - masks reverse engineered, modified to insert malicious behavior into ASIC
    - privilege escalation CPU backdoor (A2 Trojan)
    - tamper with silicon doping polarity (e.g., to weaken hardware-based crypto)
  - problematic to test / verify after the fact!
  - mitigated by using FPGAs: hard to predict where to add useful Trojan silicon!
- Compilation (Malicious HDL Toolchain)
  - generate *malicious* design from *clean* HDL sources
- Design Defects (accidental or intentional HDL bugs)
  - Spectre, Meltdown, etc.

# Why Self-Hosting?

- Freedom! Liberty! Independence! :)
  - From *black-box*, and/or *non-Libre* dependencies
- Trust a running software + gateware stack to the same extent as its cumulative sources
  - Gateware HDL sources
  - Software sources (including C and HDL compilers)

### Bootstrap Software+Gateware Stack

- Host (x86\_64/Linux):
  - Build clean C (cross-)compiler
  - Build clean HDL compiler (for both x86\_64 and rv64gc)
  - Cross-compile target (rv64gc) software stack
  - Build gateware (FPGA bitstream) for target system
- Target (rv64gc/Linux):
  - Program FPGA board with gateware/bitstream
  - Boot into target software stack
    - Self-hosting from this point forward!
  - Natively rebuild gateware bitstream, software stack, from sources, as needed

## LiteX + Rocket SoC Block Diagram




Image credit: Florent Kermarrec

## Finish building boot.bin image

Embed kernel into boot.bin (BBL):

 Make boot.bin available via TFTP, or copy to 1st MSDOS / FAT16 primary partition of SDCard

### Boot Linux on LiteX+Rocket SoC

Connect board via USB, and start a console:


```
# screen dev/ttyUSB1 115200
```

Program the board with the compiled bitstream:

```
# openocd -f litex-boards/litex_boards/prog/openocd_ecpix5.cfg \
   -c 'transport select jtag; init;
   svf build/lambdaconcept_ecpix5/gateware/lambdaconcept_ecpix5.svf; exit'
```

LiteX loads boot.bin, Linux boots into BusyBox

## Try it on your own FPGA board!







**ECPIX-5** 

trellisboard

ecp5-5g-versa

### Demo, then Q&A

 For up-to-date build steps, see: https://github.com/litex-hub/linux-on-litex-rocket

Thank You!

# **Backup Material**

### Compilers, Trusting Trust, and DDC

- Ken Thompson's self-propagating C compiler hack
  - malicious compiler inserts Trojan during compilation of *victim program* 
    - clean sources malicious binary (incl. *compiler's own sources*!)
    - compiler source hack no longer needed beyond 1st iteration!
- David A. Wheeler's mitigation: Diverse Double Compilation (DDC)
  - suspect compiler A: sources S<sub>A</sub>, binary B<sub>A</sub>
  - trusted compiler T: binary  $B_T$

$$S_A \rightarrow B_A \rightarrow X$$

$$S_A \to B_T \to Y$$

- X and Y are functionally identical, but different binaries

$$S_{A} \to X \to X_{1}$$

$$S_A \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Y_1$$

- X<sub>1</sub> and Y<sub>1</sub> must be *identical binaries* (output of two *functionally identical* compilers)!