diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 40f07222..255c5204 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -69,4 +69,4 @@ cmd/server/server
vendor
go.work
-go.work.sum
\ No newline at end of file
+go.work.sumdata/
diff --git a/cmd/server/handlers.go b/cmd/server/handlers.go
index e7fe4300..899b5490 100644
--- a/cmd/server/handlers.go
+++ b/cmd/server/handlers.go
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
package main
import (
+ "database/sql"
+
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/app"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/crypto"
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/config"
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/http/handler"
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/http/middleware"
@@ -124,12 +127,31 @@ func NewHandlers(deps *HandlerDeps) routes.Handlers {
SLA: handler.NewSLAHandler(svc.SLA, v, log),
// Pentest Campaign Management
- Pentest: handler.NewPentestHandler(svc.Pentest, repos.User, log),
+ Pentest: func() *handler.PentestHandler {
+ h := handler.NewPentestHandler(svc.Pentest, repos.User, log)
+ h.SetImportService(app.NewFindingImportService(repos.Finding, log))
+ return h
+ }(),
PentestCampaignRoleQry: repos.PentestCampaignMember,
+ // File Attachments (shared across pentest/retest/campaign)
+ Attachment: newAttachmentHandlerWithAccessCheck(svc.Attachment, svc.Pentest, deps.DB.DB, svc.Encryptor, log),
+
// Compliance Framework Management
Compliance: handler.NewComplianceHandler(svc.Compliance, log),
+ // Attack Simulation & Control Testing
+ Simulation: handler.NewSimulationHandler(svc.Simulation, log),
+
+ // Threat Actor Intelligence
+ ThreatActor: handler.NewThreatActorHandler(svc.ThreatActor, log),
+
+ // Remediation Campaigns
+ RemediationCampaign: handler.NewRemediationCampaignHandler(svc.RemediationCampaign, log),
+
+ // Business Units
+ BusinessUnit: handler.NewBusinessUnitHandler(svc.BusinessUnit, log),
+
// API Keys & Webhooks
APIKey: handler.NewAPIKeyHandler(svc.APIKey, v, log),
Webhook: handler.NewWebhookHandler(svc.Webhook, v, log),
@@ -242,3 +264,12 @@ func newAgentHandlerWithTemplates(
return h
}
+
+// newAttachmentHandlerWithAccessCheck creates an AttachmentHandler with campaign
+// membership verification for finding-scoped attachments.
+func newAttachmentHandlerWithAccessCheck(attachSvc *app.AttachmentService, pentestSvc *app.PentestService, db *sql.DB, enc crypto.Encryptor, log *logger.Logger) *handler.AttachmentHandler {
+ h := handler.NewAttachmentHandler(attachSvc, log)
+ h.SetAccessChecker(pentestSvc)
+ h.SetStorageResolver(app.NewSettingsStorageResolver(db, enc, log))
+ return h
+}
diff --git a/cmd/server/main.go b/cmd/server/main.go
index 8b7a63a8..f95e62ce 100644
--- a/cmd/server/main.go
+++ b/cmd/server/main.go
@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ func run() int {
app.WithEmailEnqueuer(emailEnqueuer),
)
services.Tenant.SetPermissionServices(services.PermCache, services.PermVersion)
+ // Re-wire session service after rebuilding the tenant service —
+ // the constructor above replaces services.Tenant, dropping the
+ // SetSessionService call from initServices().
+ services.Tenant.SetSessionService(services.Session)
// Wire AI triage job enqueuer if service is enabled
if services.AITriage != nil {
@@ -222,7 +226,7 @@ func run() int {
}
server := http.NewServer(cfg, log)
- routes.Register(server.Router(), handlers, cfg, log, authCfg, repos.Tenant, services.User)
+ routes.Register(server.Router(), handlers, cfg, log, authCfg, repos.Tenant, services.User, services.MembershipCache)
// Handle --routes flag
if *showRoutes {
diff --git a/cmd/server/repositories.go b/cmd/server/repositories.go
index b4ad437f..67bc98dd 100644
--- a/cmd/server/repositories.go
+++ b/cmd/server/repositories.go
@@ -53,12 +53,28 @@ type Repositories struct {
PentestTemplate *postgres.PentestTemplateRepository
PentestReport *postgres.PentestReportRepository
+ // Attachments (file upload metadata)
+ Attachment *postgres.AttachmentRepository
+
// Compliance
ComplianceFramework *postgres.ComplianceFrameworkRepository
ComplianceControl *postgres.ComplianceControlRepository
ComplianceAssessment *postgres.ComplianceAssessmentRepository
ComplianceMapping *postgres.ComplianceMappingRepository
+ // Attack Simulation & Control Testing
+ Simulation *postgres.SimulationRepository
+ ControlTest *postgres.ControlTestRepository
+
+ // Threat Actor Intelligence
+ ThreatActor *postgres.ThreatActorRepository
+
+ // Remediation Campaigns
+ RemediationCampaign *postgres.RemediationCampaignRepository
+
+ // Business Units
+ BusinessUnit *postgres.BusinessUnitRepository
+
// SLA & Integration
SLA *postgres.SLAPolicyRepository
Integration *postgres.IntegrationRepository
@@ -183,12 +199,28 @@ func NewRepositories(db *postgres.DB) *Repositories {
PentestTemplate: postgres.NewPentestTemplateRepository(db),
PentestReport: postgres.NewPentestReportRepository(db),
+ // Attachments
+ Attachment: postgres.NewAttachmentRepository(db),
+
// Compliance
ComplianceFramework: postgres.NewComplianceFrameworkRepository(db),
ComplianceControl: postgres.NewComplianceControlRepository(db),
ComplianceAssessment: postgres.NewComplianceAssessmentRepository(db),
ComplianceMapping: postgres.NewComplianceMappingRepository(db),
+ // Attack Simulation & Control Testing
+ Simulation: postgres.NewSimulationRepository(db),
+ ControlTest: postgres.NewControlTestRepository(db),
+
+ // Threat Actor Intelligence
+ ThreatActor: postgres.NewThreatActorRepository(db),
+
+ // Remediation Campaigns
+ RemediationCampaign: postgres.NewRemediationCampaignRepository(db),
+
+ // Business Units
+ BusinessUnit: postgres.NewBusinessUnitRepository(db),
+
SLA: postgres.NewSLAPolicyRepository(db),
Integration: postgres.NewIntegrationRepository(db),
// IntegrationSCMExt and IntegrationNotificationExt initialized after Integration
diff --git a/cmd/server/services.go b/cmd/server/services.go
index fc65187e..9c8fcc3a 100644
--- a/cmd/server/services.go
+++ b/cmd/server/services.go
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ import (
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/jobs"
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/llm"
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/redis"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/storage"
"github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/websocket"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/attachment"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/crypto"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/suppression"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/email"
@@ -120,6 +122,14 @@ type Services struct {
PermVersion *app.PermissionVersionService
PermCache *app.PermissionCacheService
+ // Membership cache (Redis-backed wrapper around tenant.Repository
+ // .GetMembership). Read by RequireMembership +
+ // RequireActiveMembershipFromJWT middlewares so the membership
+ // status check on every tenant-scoped request becomes a Redis GET
+ // instead of a DB round trip. Invalidated by TenantService when
+ // role / status / membership rows change.
+ MembershipCache *app.MembershipCacheService
+
// Module Service (OSS - all modules enabled, UI metadata only)
Module *app.ModuleService
@@ -127,11 +137,24 @@ type Services struct {
SLA *app.SLAService
// Pentest
- Pentest *app.PentestService
+ Pentest *app.PentestService
+ Attachment *app.AttachmentService
// Compliance
Compliance *app.ComplianceService
+ // Attack Simulation & Control Testing
+ Simulation *app.SimulationService
+
+ // Threat Actor Intelligence
+ ThreatActor *app.ThreatActorService
+
+ // Remediation Campaigns
+ RemediationCampaign *app.RemediationCampaignService
+
+ // Business Units
+ BusinessUnit *app.BusinessUnitService
+
// API Keys & Webhooks
APIKey *app.APIKeyService
Webhook *app.WebhookService
@@ -258,9 +281,52 @@ func NewServices(deps *ServiceDeps) (*Services, error) {
// Wire unified finding repository for CTEM integration (pentest findings → findings table)
s.Pentest.SetUnifiedFindingRepository(repos.Finding)
s.Pentest.SetCampaignMemberRepository(repos.PentestCampaignMember)
+ s.Pentest.SetAuditService(s.Audit) // audit logging for team changes + status changes
+ s.Pentest.SetFindingActivityService(s.FindingActivity) // finding activity trail
// Note: Pentest notification wiring happens later after NotificationService is initialized
+ // Initialize Attachment service (file upload/download).
+ // Storage provider selected via STORAGE_PROVIDER env var (default: "local").
+ // Local path configurable via STORAGE_LOCAL_PATH (default: ./data/attachments).
+ // In Docker: mount a volume at the local path to persist across rebuilds.
+ var fileStorage attachment.FileStorage
+ switch cfg.Storage.Provider {
+ case "local", "":
+ storagePath := cfg.Storage.LocalPath
+ if storagePath == "" {
+ storagePath = "./data/attachments"
+ }
+ fileStorage = storage.NewLocalStorage(storagePath)
+ log.Info("attachment storage: local filesystem", "path", storagePath)
+ default:
+ // Future: case "s3", "minio", "gcs" → initialize respective provider
+ log.Warn("unsupported storage provider, falling back to local", "provider", cfg.Storage.Provider)
+ fileStorage = storage.NewLocalStorage("./data/attachments")
+ }
+ s.Attachment = app.NewAttachmentService(repos.Attachment, fileStorage, log)
+ // Wire per-tenant storage resolution (tenants can configure S3/MinIO in settings)
+ storageResolver := app.NewSettingsStorageResolver(deps.DB, s.Encryptor, log)
+ s.Attachment.SetTenantStorageResolver(storageResolver, func(cfg attachment.StorageConfig) (attachment.FileStorage, error) {
+ switch cfg.Provider {
+ case "local":
+ basePath := cfg.BasePath
+ if basePath == "" {
+ basePath = "./data/attachments"
+ }
+ return storage.NewLocalStorage(basePath), nil
+ case "s3", "minio":
+ return storage.NewS3Storage(cfg.Bucket, cfg.Region, cfg.Endpoint, cfg.AccessKey, cfg.SecretKey)
+ default:
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported tenant storage provider: %s", cfg.Provider)
+ }
+ })
+
// Initialize Compliance service
+ s.Simulation = app.NewSimulationService(repos.Simulation, repos.ControlTest, log)
+ s.ThreatActor = app.NewThreatActorService(repos.ThreatActor, log)
+ s.RemediationCampaign = app.NewRemediationCampaignService(repos.RemediationCampaign, log)
+ s.BusinessUnit = app.NewBusinessUnitService(repos.BusinessUnit, log)
+
s.Compliance = app.NewComplianceService(
repos.ComplianceFramework, repos.ComplianceControl,
repos.ComplianceAssessment, repos.ComplianceMapping, log,
@@ -508,6 +574,14 @@ func NewServices(deps *ServiceDeps) (*Services, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize permission cache service: %w", err)
}
+ // Initialize membership cache. Hard error if Redis is unreachable
+ // at boot — without this cache the RequireMembership middleware
+ // hammers the database on every request.
+ s.MembershipCache, err = app.NewMembershipCacheService(deps.RedisClient, repos.Tenant, log)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize membership cache service: %w", err)
+ }
+
s.Role = app.NewRoleService(repos.Role, repos.RolePermission, log,
app.WithRoleAuditService(s.Audit),
app.WithRolePermissionVersionService(s.PermVersion),
@@ -517,6 +591,10 @@ func NewServices(deps *ServiceDeps) (*Services, error) {
// Wire permission services to tenant service
s.Tenant.SetPermissionServices(s.PermCache, s.PermVersion)
+ // Wire membership cache so mutations (suspend / reactivate / role
+ // change / member removal) can drop the cached entry immediately.
+ s.Tenant.SetMembershipCache(s.MembershipCache)
+
// Initialize licensing service (OSS edition - modules from database)
s.Module = app.NewModuleService(repos.Module, log)
s.Module.SetTenantModuleRepo(repos.TenantModule)
@@ -592,6 +670,12 @@ func (s *Services) InitAuthServices(cfg *config.Config, repos *Repositories, log
// Wire session service to user service for session revocation on suspension
s.User.SetSessionService(s.Session)
+ // Wire session service to tenant service so SuspendMember can revoke
+ // all sessions of a suspended user immediately. Without this, the
+ // user's existing JWT continues to work on JWT-claim-scoped routes
+ // (e.g. /api/v1/me/*, /api/v1/notifications) until it expires.
+ s.Tenant.SetSessionService(s.Session)
+
// Initialize SSO service for per-tenant identity provider authentication
s.SSO = app.NewSSOService(
repos.IdentityProvider,
@@ -630,11 +714,12 @@ func (s *Services) InitEmailServices(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger) err
return nil
}
-// SetEmailEnqueuer sets the email job enqueuer.
-func (s *Services) SetEmailEnqueuer(enqueuer app.EmailJobEnqueuer) {
- s.EmailEnqueue = enqueuer
- s.Tenant = app.NewTenantService(nil, nil, app.WithEmailEnqueuer(enqueuer))
-}
+// Note: SetEmailEnqueuer was removed. The previous implementation
+// rebuilt s.Tenant with `app.NewTenantService(nil, nil, ...)`, which
+// dropped the repo and the logger and would panic on any subsequent
+// call. The actual wiring of the email enqueuer happens in main.go
+// where it can also re-attach the permission and session services
+// after the tenant service is reconstructed.
// initEncryptor initializes the credentials encryptor.
func initEncryptor(cfg *config.Config, log *logger.Logger) (crypto.Encryptor, error) {
diff --git a/configs/workflow-templates/auto-remediation.json b/configs/workflow-templates/auto-remediation.json
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1ec7dab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/configs/workflow-templates/auto-remediation.json
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+{
+ "templates": [
+ {
+ "name": "Critical Finding → Jira Ticket + Slack Alert",
+ "description": "Automatically creates a Jira ticket and sends Slack notification when a critical finding is discovered",
+ "category": "remediation",
+ "nodes": [
+ {
+ "key": "trigger",
+ "type": "trigger",
+ "label": "Finding Created",
+ "config": {
+ "trigger_type": "finding_created"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 100, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "check_severity",
+ "type": "condition",
+ "label": "Is Critical?",
+ "config": {
+ "expression": "trigger.severity == 'critical'"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 350, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "create_ticket",
+ "type": "action",
+ "label": "Create Jira Ticket",
+ "config": {
+ "action_type": "create_ticket",
+ "project": "SEC",
+ "issue_type": "Bug",
+ "priority": "Highest",
+ "title_template": "[CRITICAL] {{trigger.title}}",
+ "description_template": "Severity: {{trigger.severity}}\nCVSS: {{trigger.cvss_score}}\n\n{{trigger.description}}"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 600, "y": 100 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "notify_team",
+ "type": "notification",
+ "label": "Alert Security Team",
+ "config": {
+ "notification_type": "slack",
+ "title": "Critical Finding Detected",
+ "body": "A critical severity finding has been discovered: {{trigger.title}}. Jira ticket created."
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 600, "y": 300 }
+ }
+ ],
+ "edges": [
+ { "source": "trigger", "target": "check_severity" },
+ { "source": "check_severity", "target": "create_ticket", "source_handle": "yes" },
+ { "source": "check_severity", "target": "notify_team", "source_handle": "yes" }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "SLA Breach → Escalation + Priority Update",
+ "description": "When a finding exceeds SLA deadline, escalates by bumping priority and notifying management",
+ "category": "escalation",
+ "nodes": [
+ {
+ "key": "trigger",
+ "type": "trigger",
+ "label": "Finding Updated",
+ "config": {
+ "trigger_type": "finding_updated"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 100, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "check_overdue",
+ "type": "condition",
+ "label": "Is Overdue?",
+ "config": {
+ "expression": "trigger.is_overdue == true"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 350, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "bump_priority",
+ "type": "action",
+ "label": "Bump Priority to Critical",
+ "config": {
+ "action_type": "update_priority",
+ "priority": "critical"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 600, "y": 100 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "notify_manager",
+ "type": "notification",
+ "label": "Notify Manager",
+ "config": {
+ "notification_type": "email",
+ "title": "SLA Breach: {{trigger.title}}",
+ "body": "Finding {{trigger.id}} has exceeded its remediation SLA. Priority has been escalated to Critical."
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 600, "y": 300 }
+ }
+ ],
+ "edges": [
+ { "source": "trigger", "target": "check_overdue" },
+ { "source": "check_overdue", "target": "bump_priority", "source_handle": "yes" },
+ { "source": "bump_priority", "target": "notify_manager" }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "High/Critical Finding → Auto-Assign + Scan Trigger",
+ "description": "Assigns high/critical findings to security team lead and triggers a verification scan",
+ "category": "remediation",
+ "nodes": [
+ {
+ "key": "trigger",
+ "type": "trigger",
+ "label": "Finding Created",
+ "config": {
+ "trigger_type": "finding_created"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 100, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "check_severity",
+ "type": "condition",
+ "label": "Is High or Critical?",
+ "config": {
+ "expression": "trigger.severity in ['critical', 'high']"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 350, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "assign_lead",
+ "type": "action",
+ "label": "Assign to Security Lead",
+ "config": {
+ "action_type": "assign_user",
+ "user_selection": "team_lead"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 600, "y": 100 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "trigger_scan",
+ "type": "action",
+ "label": "Trigger Verification Scan",
+ "config": {
+ "action_type": "trigger_scan",
+ "scan_type": "verification"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 600, "y": 300 }
+ }
+ ],
+ "edges": [
+ { "source": "trigger", "target": "check_severity" },
+ { "source": "check_severity", "target": "assign_lead", "source_handle": "yes" },
+ { "source": "check_severity", "target": "trigger_scan", "source_handle": "yes" }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Finding Resolved → Retest Reminder",
+ "description": "When a finding is marked as remediated, schedules a retest reminder after 7 days",
+ "category": "verification",
+ "nodes": [
+ {
+ "key": "trigger",
+ "type": "trigger",
+ "label": "Status Changed",
+ "config": {
+ "trigger_type": "finding_status_changed",
+ "status_filter": "remediation"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 100, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "notify_retest",
+ "type": "notification",
+ "label": "Retest Reminder",
+ "config": {
+ "notification_type": "in_app",
+ "title": "Retest Required: {{trigger.title}}",
+ "body": "Finding {{trigger.id}} has been remediated. Please schedule a retest to verify the fix.",
+ "delay_hours": 168
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 400, "y": 200 }
+ }
+ ],
+ "edges": [
+ { "source": "trigger", "target": "notify_retest" }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Remediated → Auto-Verify Scan + Update Status",
+ "description": "When a finding is marked as fix_applied, automatically triggers a verification scan. If scan passes, marks finding as verified.",
+ "category": "verification",
+ "nodes": [
+ {
+ "key": "trigger",
+ "type": "trigger",
+ "label": "Finding Status Changed",
+ "config": {
+ "trigger_type": "finding_updated",
+ "filter": "trigger.changes.new_status == 'fix_applied'"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 100, "y": 200 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "verify_scan",
+ "type": "action",
+ "label": "Trigger Verification Scan",
+ "config": {
+ "action_type": "trigger_scan",
+ "scan_type": "verification",
+ "target_asset_id": "{{trigger.asset_id}}",
+ "scan_profile": "quick_verify"
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 400, "y": 100 }
+ },
+ {
+ "key": "notify_team",
+ "type": "notification",
+ "label": "Notify: Verification Started",
+ "config": {
+ "notification_type": "in_app",
+ "title": "Verification scan started for: {{trigger.title}}",
+ "body": "A verification scan has been triggered to confirm the fix for {{trigger.title}} on asset {{trigger.asset_id}}."
+ },
+ "position": { "x": 400, "y": 300 }
+ }
+ ],
+ "edges": [
+ { "source": "trigger", "target": "verify_scan" },
+ { "source": "trigger", "target": "notify_team" }
+ ]
+ }
+ ]
+}
diff --git a/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d769a-4b25-7b58-9b97-51b4dbb359f8_threat.jpg b/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d769a-4b25-7b58-9b97-51b4dbb359f8_threat.jpg
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diff --git a/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d77e0-734f-788f-8be5-5c5a5ceeabf9_20tuoi.jpg b/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d77e0-734f-788f-8be5-5c5a5ceeabf9_20tuoi.jpg
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diff --git a/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d77e6-e1a0-7609-91d6-5c43891dadd6_threat.jpg b/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d77e6-e1a0-7609-91d6-5c43891dadd6_threat.jpg
new file mode 100644
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Binary files /dev/null and b/data/attachments/dea68fbc-293b-4655-b9a2-b08b96c004a6/019d77e6-e1a0-7609-91d6-5c43891dadd6_threat.jpg differ
diff --git a/docs/architecture/asset-ip-hostname-correlation.md b/docs/architecture/asset-ip-hostname-correlation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..61ea0d00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/architecture/asset-ip-hostname-correlation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+# Asset IP-Hostname Correlation
+
+## Problem
+
+Assets arrive from multiple sources with different identifiers for the same machine:
+
+| Source | Sends | Example |
+|--------|-------|---------|
+| ESXi / vCenter | hostname + IP | `web-server-01` (IP: `10.0.1.5`) |
+| Splunk / SIEM | IP only | `10.0.1.5` |
+| CMDB | hostname + FQDN | `web-server-01.internal.corp` |
+| Network scan | IP + reverse DNS | `10.0.1.5` (rDNS: `web-server-01`) |
+
+Without correlation, the system creates **duplicate assets** for the same machine.
+
+---
+
+## Solution: 3-Layer Correlation
+
+### Layer 1: Exact Name Match (existing)
+
+```
+Ingest "web-server-01" → GetByName("web-server-01") → FOUND → merge & update
+```
+
+Uses the `UNIQUE(tenant_id, name)` constraint on the `assets` table.
+
+### Layer 2: Property-Based Correlation (new)
+
+When exact name match fails, search by IP or hostname in properties:
+
+```
+Ingest "10.0.1.5" (type=host):
+ 1. GetByName("10.0.1.5") → not found
+ 2. FindByIP("10.0.1.5") → searches:
+ - assets.name = '10.0.1.5'
+ - assets.properties->>'ip' = '10.0.1.5'
+ - assets.properties->'ip_address'->>'address' = '10.0.1.5'
+ 3. If found → merge into existing asset
+ 4. If not found → create new host with name="10.0.1.5"
+```
+
+```
+Ingest "web-server-01" (type=host, properties.ip="10.0.1.5"):
+ 1. GetByName("web-server-01") → not found
+ 2. FindByHostname("web-server-01") → searches:
+ - assets.name = 'web-server-01'
+ - assets.properties->>'hostname' = 'web-server-01'
+ - assets.properties->'ip_address'->>'hostname' = 'web-server-01'
+ 3. Found host "10.0.1.5" with matching hostname in properties
+ 4. Rename "10.0.1.5" → "web-server-01" (hostname is more descriptive)
+ 5. Merge properties from both sources
+```
+
+### Layer 3: Manual Merge (future)
+
+Admin UI to manually merge two assets into one when auto-correlation misses.
+
+---
+
+## Data Flow Diagram
+
+```
+┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ CreateAsset / Ingest │
+├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ │
+│ 1. GetByName(input.name) │
+│ ├─ FOUND → mergeAndUpdateExisting() │
+│ └─ NOT FOUND ↓ │
+│ │
+│ 2. correlateByIPOrHostname(input.name) │
+│ ├─ looksLikeIP(name)? │
+│ │ YES → FindByIP(name) │
+│ │ ├─ FOUND → merge (IP data into existing) │
+│ │ └─ NOT FOUND ↓ │
+│ │ │
+│ │ NO → FindByHostname(name) │
+│ │ ├─ FOUND → rename IP→hostname + merge │
+│ │ └─ NOT FOUND ↓ │
+│ │ │
+│ 3. Create new asset │
+│ │
+└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+---
+
+## Freshness-Aware Property Merge
+
+When merging properties from multiple sources, **newer data wins**:
+
+```sql
+-- In UpsertBatch (batch ingestion)
+properties = CASE
+ WHEN EXCLUDED.last_seen >= COALESCE(assets.last_seen, '1970-01-01'::timestamptz)
+ THEN merge_jsonb_deep(assets.properties, EXCLUDED.properties) -- new overrides old
+ ELSE merge_jsonb_deep(EXCLUDED.properties, assets.properties) -- old stays, new fills gaps
+END
+```
+
+**Example:**
+```
+Source A scans at 10:00 today → ingest at 10:05 → last_seen = 10:00 today
+Source B scans at 14:00 yesterday → ingest at 11:00 today → last_seen = 14:00 yesterday
+
+Result: Source A data wins (10:00 today > 14:00 yesterday)
+ Source B data only fills missing fields (does not overwrite)
+```
+
+---
+
+## Property Format Standard
+
+After migration 000124, all host IP data uses a single format:
+
+```json
+// ✅ STANDARD (host)
+{
+ "type": "host",
+ "properties": {
+ "ip_addresses": ["10.0.1.5", "10.0.2.5"], // array — multiple IPs
+ "hostname": "web-server-01" // top-level string
+ }
+}
+
+// ✅ STANDARD (ip_address type — unchanged, uses CTIS technical schema)
+{
+ "type": "ip_address",
+ "properties": {
+ "ip_address": {
+ "address": "203.0.113.5", // structured object
+ "version": 4,
+ "hostname": "web-server-01",
+ "asn": 13335,
+ "ports": [80, 443]
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// ❌ DEPRECATED (auto-migrated by 000124)
+{ "ip": "10.0.1.5" } // single string — converted to ip_addresses[]
+```
+
+---
+
+## Asset Type: `host` vs `ip_address`
+
+| Type | Represents | Created By | Example |
+|------|-----------|------------|---------|
+| `host` | Physical/virtual machine | ESXi, CMDB, agent, Splunk logs | `web-server-01`, `10.0.1.5` (placeholder) |
+| `ip_address` | Network endpoint | DNS resolution, network scan | `203.0.113.5` (from domain A record) |
+
+**Key rules:**
+- Log sources (Splunk, SIEM) → always create `host` (even if only IP is known)
+- DNS resolution → creates `ip_address` (and `resolves_to` relationship)
+- A `host` can have multiple IPs (multi-NIC)
+- An `ip_address` can be shared (load balancer VIP)
+
+**Relationship graph:**
+```
+domain "example.com"
+ │ resolves_to
+ ▼
+ip_address "203.0.113.5" ← DNS endpoint
+ │ runs_on
+ ▼
+host "web-server-01" ← actual machine
+ │ runs_on
+ ▼
+container "nginx-prod" ← workload
+```
+
+---
+
+## Auto-Rename Logic
+
+When a hostname arrives for an IP-named host:
+
+```
+Before: host { name: "10.0.1.5", properties: { ip: "10.0.1.5" } }
+After: host { name: "web-server-01", properties: { ip: "10.0.1.5", hostname: "web-server-01" } }
+```
+
+The rename only happens when:
+1. Existing asset name `looksLikeIP()` (e.g., `10.0.1.5`)
+2. New input name does NOT look like IP (e.g., `web-server-01`)
+3. Correlation found via hostname property match
+
+---
+
+## Database Indexes
+
+Migration `000123_asset_ip_correlation_indexes`:
+
+```sql
+-- Flat IP lookup (single IP string)
+CREATE INDEX idx_assets_props_ip ON assets ((properties->>'ip'))
+ WHERE properties->>'ip' IS NOT NULL;
+
+-- Structured IP lookup (ip_address type)
+CREATE INDEX idx_assets_props_ip_addr ON assets ((properties->'ip_address'->>'address'))
+ WHERE properties->'ip_address'->>'address' IS NOT NULL;
+
+-- Multi-IP array lookup (host with multiple IPs)
+CREATE INDEX idx_assets_props_ip_addresses ON assets USING GIN ((properties->'ip_addresses'))
+ WHERE properties->'ip_addresses' IS NOT NULL;
+
+-- Hostname lookup
+CREATE INDEX idx_assets_props_hostname ON assets ((properties->>'hostname'))
+ WHERE properties->>'hostname' IS NOT NULL;
+
+-- Structured hostname lookup (ip_address type)
+CREATE INDEX idx_assets_props_ip_hostname ON assets ((properties->'ip_address'->>'hostname'))
+ WHERE properties->'ip_address'->>'hostname' IS NOT NULL;
+```
+
+All indexes are **partial** (WHERE ... IS NOT NULL) to minimize storage and only index assets that have the relevant property.
+
+---
+
+## Multi-IP Hosts
+
+A host can have multiple IP addresses (multi-NIC, dual-stack IPv4/IPv6):
+
+```json
+{
+ "name": "web-server-01",
+ "type": "host",
+ "properties": {
+ "hostname": "web-server-01",
+ "ip_addresses": ["10.0.1.5", "10.0.2.5", "fd00::5"],
+ "ip": "10.0.1.5",
+ "mac_addresses": ["00:50:56:a1:b2:c3", "00:50:56:a1:b2:c4"]
+ }
+}
+```
+
+**Correlation searches ALL IP formats:**
+- `properties->>'ip'` — single IP string (legacy/simple sources)
+- `properties->'ip_addresses' ? '10.0.1.5'` — JSONB array contains operator
+- `properties->'ip_address'->>'address'` — structured ip_address type
+
+**When Splunk sends `10.0.2.5`** (secondary NIC):
+1. `FindByIP("10.0.2.5")` → matches `ip_addresses` array → returns `web-server-01`
+2. Merge findings into existing host — no duplicate
+
+---
+
+## Key Files
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|------|---------|
+| `internal/app/asset_service.go` | `correlateByIPOrHostname()`, `mergeAndUpdateExisting()`, `looksLikeIP()` |
+| `internal/infra/postgres/asset_repository.go` | `FindByIP()`, `FindByHostname()` |
+| `pkg/domain/asset/repository.go` | Interface definitions |
+| `migrations/000123_asset_ip_correlation_indexes.up.sql` | Property indexes |
diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum
index 703db789..81c7f52a 100644
--- a/go.sum
+++ b/go.sum
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.13.21 h1:c31//R3x
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/presigned-url v1.13.21/go.mod h1:r6+pf23ouCB718FUxaqzZdbpYFyDtehyZcmP5KL9FkA=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.19.21 h1:ZlvrNcHSFFWURB8avufQq9gFsheUgjVD9536obIknfM=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/internal/s3shared v1.19.21/go.mod h1:cv3TNhVrssKR0O/xxLJVRfd2oazSnZnkUeTf6ctUwfQ=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.98.0 h1:foqo/ocQ7WqKwy3FojGtZQJo0FR4vto9qnz9VaumbCo=
+github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.98.0/go.mod h1:uoA43SdFwacedBfSgfFSjjCvYe8aYBS7EnU5GZ/YKMM=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.99.0 h1:hlSuz394kV0vhv9drL5lhuEFbEOEP1VyQpy15qWh1Pk=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3 v1.99.0/go.mod h1:uoA43SdFwacedBfSgfFSjjCvYe8aYBS7EnU5GZ/YKMM=
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/signin v1.0.9 h1:QKZH0S178gCmFEgst8hN0mCX1KxLgHBKKY/CLqwP8lg=
diff --git a/internal/app/asset_service.go b/internal/app/asset_service.go
index f5033a9d..c5e04504 100644
--- a/internal/app/asset_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/asset_service.go
@@ -163,15 +163,16 @@ func (s *AssetService) InvalidateScoringConfigCache(tenantID shared.ID) {
// CreateAssetInput represents the input for creating an asset.
type CreateAssetInput struct {
- TenantID string `validate:"omitempty,uuid"`
- Name string `validate:"required,min=1,max=255"`
- Type string `validate:"required,asset_type"`
- Criticality string `validate:"required,criticality"`
- Scope string `validate:"omitempty,scope"`
- Exposure string `validate:"omitempty,exposure"`
- Description string `validate:"max=1000"`
- Tags []string `validate:"max=20,dive,max=50"`
- OwnerRef string `validate:"max=500"` // Raw owner from external source
+ TenantID string `validate:"omitempty,uuid"`
+ Name string `validate:"required,min=1,max=255"`
+ Type string `validate:"required,asset_type"`
+ Criticality string `validate:"required,criticality"`
+ Scope string `validate:"omitempty,scope"`
+ Exposure string `validate:"omitempty,exposure"`
+ Description string `validate:"max=1000"`
+ Tags []string `validate:"max=20,dive,max=50"`
+ OwnerRef string `validate:"max=500"` // Raw owner from external source
+ Properties map[string]any // JSONB properties (known fields auto-promoted to columns)
}
// CreateAsset creates a new asset.
@@ -180,6 +181,10 @@ func (s *AssetService) CreateAsset(ctx context.Context, input CreateAssetInput)
input.Name = strings.ReplaceAll(input.Name, "\x00", "")
input.Description = strings.ReplaceAll(input.Description, "\x00", "")
+ // Promote known fields from properties into proper columns.
+ // Collectors may send sub_type, scope, etc. inside properties JSONB.
+ input = PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
s.logger.Info("creating asset", "name", input.Name)
assetType, err := asset.ParseAssetType(input.Type)
@@ -201,12 +206,22 @@ func (s *AssetService) CreateAsset(ctx context.Context, input CreateAssetInput)
}
}
- exists, err := s.repo.ExistsByName(ctx, tenantID, input.Name)
- if err != nil {
+ // Upsert: if asset with same name already exists, merge and update instead of rejecting.
+ // This handles re-ingestion, manual re-creation, and multi-source discovery gracefully.
+ existing, err := s.repo.GetByName(ctx, tenantID, input.Name)
+ if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, shared.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to check asset existence: %w", err)
}
- if exists {
- return nil, asset.AlreadyExistsError(input.Name)
+ if existing != nil {
+ return s.mergeAndUpdateExisting(ctx, existing, input, assetType, criticality, tenantID)
+ }
+
+ // IP/hostname correlation: if input.Name looks like an IP, check if a host with
+ // that IP already exists. If input.Name looks like a hostname, check if an
+ // IP-named asset has that hostname in properties. This correlates ESXi hosts
+ // with Splunk IPs, CMDB records, etc.
+ if correlated := s.correlateByIPOrHostname(ctx, tenantID, input); correlated != nil {
+ return s.mergeAndUpdateExisting(ctx, correlated, input, assetType, criticality, tenantID)
}
a, err := asset.NewAsset(input.Name, assetType, criticality)
@@ -244,6 +259,16 @@ func (s *AssetService) CreateAsset(ctx context.Context, input CreateAssetInput)
a.AddTag(tag)
}
+ // Set properties (already cleaned by promoteKnownProperties)
+ if len(input.Properties) > 0 {
+ // Extract promoted sub_type before setting properties
+ if st, ok := input.Properties["__promoted_sub_type"].(string); ok && st != "" {
+ a.SetSubType(st)
+ delete(input.Properties, "__promoted_sub_type")
+ }
+ a.SetProperties(input.Properties)
+ }
+
// Set owner reference from external source and try auto-match
if input.OwnerRef != "" {
a.SetOwnerRef(input.OwnerRef)
@@ -286,6 +311,226 @@ func (s *AssetService) CreateAsset(ctx context.Context, input CreateAssetInput)
return a, nil
}
+// promoteKnownProperties extracts well-known fields from Properties JSONB into their
+// proper columns on CreateAssetInput. This allows collectors to send everything in
+// properties (e.g., {"sub_type": "firewall", "vendor": "Cisco"}) and the system
+// auto-promotes recognized fields while keeping the rest as JSONB metadata.
+//
+// Promoted fields (removed from Properties after extraction):
+// - sub_type → used to set entity.SubType
+// - type → resolved via TypeAliases (e.g., "firewall" → type=network, sub_type=firewall)
+// - scope, exposure, criticality → override top-level input fields if empty
+// - description → override if empty
+// - tags → merged with input.Tags
+func PromoteKnownProperties(input CreateAssetInput) CreateAssetInput {
+ if len(input.Properties) == 0 {
+ return input
+ }
+
+ // Helper to extract and remove a string key
+ extractStr := func(key string) string {
+ if v, ok := input.Properties[key]; ok {
+ delete(input.Properties, key)
+ if s, ok := v.(string); ok && s != "" {
+ return s
+ }
+ }
+ return ""
+ }
+
+ // sub_type: promote to dedicated field (stored on entity, not in JSONB)
+ if st := extractStr("sub_type"); st != "" {
+ // Store as a tag-like hint — service layer will call entity.SetSubType
+ input.Properties["__promoted_sub_type"] = st
+ }
+
+ // type: if properties contains a type alias (e.g., "firewall"), resolve it
+ if propType := extractStr("type"); propType != "" {
+ if resolved, subType := asset.ResolveTypeAlias(asset.AssetType(propType)); resolved != "" {
+ // Override input.Type with resolved core type
+ input.Type = string(resolved)
+ if subType != "" {
+ input.Properties["__promoted_sub_type"] = subType
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Override empty top-level fields from properties
+ if input.Scope == "" {
+ if s := extractStr("scope"); s != "" {
+ input.Scope = s
+ }
+ }
+ if input.Exposure == "" {
+ if e := extractStr("exposure"); e != "" {
+ input.Exposure = e
+ }
+ }
+ if input.Description == "" {
+ if d := extractStr("description"); d != "" {
+ input.Description = d
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Merge tags from properties
+ if rawTags, ok := input.Properties["tags"]; ok {
+ delete(input.Properties, "tags")
+ switch t := rawTags.(type) {
+ case []any:
+ for _, v := range t {
+ if s, ok := v.(string); ok && s != "" {
+ input.Tags = append(input.Tags, s)
+ }
+ }
+ case string:
+ for _, s := range strings.Split(t, ",") {
+ s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
+ if s != "" {
+ input.Tags = append(input.Tags, s)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Remove other well-known column names that shouldn't stay in JSONB
+ for _, key := range []string{"name", "tenant_id", "criticality", "status", "owner_ref"} {
+ delete(input.Properties, key)
+ }
+
+ return input
+}
+
+// correlateByIPOrHostname tries to find an existing asset by IP or hostname properties.
+// If input.Name looks like an IP (e.g., "10.0.1.5"), search for hosts with that IP in properties.
+// If input.Name looks like a hostname, search for IP-named assets with that hostname in properties.
+// Returns nil if no correlation found.
+func (s *AssetService) correlateByIPOrHostname(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, input CreateAssetInput) *asset.Asset {
+ name := input.Name
+
+ // Try IP correlation: name is an IP → find host that has this IP
+ if looksLikeIP(name) {
+ found, err := s.repo.FindByIP(ctx, tenantID, name)
+ if err != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("IP correlation lookup failed", "ip", name, "error", err)
+ return nil
+ }
+ if found != nil {
+ s.logger.Info("asset correlated by IP", "ip", name, "existing_id", found.ID().String(), "existing_name", found.Name())
+ return found
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Try hostname correlation: name is a hostname → find IP-named asset with this hostname
+ if !looksLikeIP(name) && name != "" {
+ found, err := s.repo.FindByHostname(ctx, tenantID, name)
+ if err != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("hostname correlation lookup failed", "hostname", name, "error", err)
+ return nil
+ }
+ if found != nil {
+ // Hostname is more descriptive than IP — update the asset name
+ if looksLikeIP(found.Name()) {
+ _ = found.UpdateName(name)
+ s.logger.Info("asset correlated by hostname, renamed from IP",
+ "hostname", name, "old_name", found.Name(), "id", found.ID().String())
+ }
+ return found
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nil
+}
+
+// looksLikeIP returns true if the string looks like an IPv4 or IPv6 address.
+func looksLikeIP(s string) bool {
+ // Simple check: contains dots and all segments are numeric (IPv4)
+ // or contains colons (IPv6)
+ if strings.Contains(s, ":") {
+ return true // IPv6
+ }
+ parts := strings.Split(s, ".")
+ if len(parts) != 4 {
+ return false
+ }
+ for _, p := range parts {
+ if p == "" {
+ return false
+ }
+ for _, c := range p {
+ if c < '0' || c > '9' {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return true
+}
+
+// mergeAndUpdateExisting updates an existing asset with new data from CreateAssetInput.
+// Only non-empty fields from input override the existing values.
+// This implements the "create-or-update" (upsert) pattern for manual asset creation.
+func (s *AssetService) mergeAndUpdateExisting(
+ ctx context.Context,
+ existing *asset.Asset,
+ input CreateAssetInput,
+ _ asset.AssetType,
+ criticality asset.Criticality,
+ tenantID shared.ID,
+) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ // Update criticality if provided and different
+ if criticality != existing.Criticality() {
+ _ = existing.UpdateCriticality(criticality)
+ }
+
+ // Update description if provided
+ if input.Description != "" {
+ existing.UpdateDescription(input.Description)
+ }
+
+ // Update scope if provided
+ if input.Scope != "" {
+ scope, err := asset.ParseScope(input.Scope)
+ if err == nil {
+ _ = existing.UpdateScope(scope)
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Update exposure if provided
+ if input.Exposure != "" {
+ exposure, err := asset.ParseExposure(input.Exposure)
+ if err == nil {
+ _ = existing.UpdateExposure(exposure)
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Merge tags (add new, keep existing)
+ for _, tag := range input.Tags {
+ existing.AddTag(tag)
+ }
+
+ // Update owner ref if provided
+ if input.OwnerRef != "" {
+ existing.SetOwnerRef(input.OwnerRef)
+ if strings.Contains(input.OwnerRef, "@") && s.userMatcher != nil {
+ if matchedID, err := s.userMatcher.FindUserIDByEmail(ctx, tenantID, input.OwnerRef); err == nil && matchedID != nil {
+ existing.SetOwnerID(matchedID)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Mark as seen (updates last_seen)
+ existing.MarkSeen()
+
+ // Recalculate risk score
+ existing.CalculateRiskScoreWithConfig(s.getScoringConfig(ctx, tenantID))
+
+ if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, existing); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update existing asset: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ s.logger.Info("asset upserted (updated existing)", "id", existing.ID().String(), "name", existing.Name())
+ return existing, nil
+}
+
// GetAsset retrieves an asset by ID within a tenant.
// Security: Requires tenantID to prevent cross-tenant data access.
func (s *AssetService) GetAsset(ctx context.Context, tenantID, assetID string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
@@ -465,6 +710,12 @@ func (s *AssetService) UpdateAsset(ctx context.Context, assetID string, tenantID
return a, nil
}
+// SaveAsset persists changes to an asset entity directly.
+// Used by handlers that modify the entity and need to persist without going through UpdateAssetInput.
+func (s *AssetService) SaveAsset(ctx context.Context, a *asset.Asset) error {
+ return s.repo.Update(ctx, a)
+}
+
// DeleteAsset deletes an asset by ID.
// Security: Requires tenantID to prevent cross-tenant deletion.
func (s *AssetService) DeleteAsset(ctx context.Context, assetID string, tenantID string) error {
@@ -535,7 +786,10 @@ type ListAssetsInput struct {
MinRiskScore *int `validate:"omitempty,min=0,max=100"`
MaxRiskScore *int `validate:"omitempty,min=0,max=100"`
HasFindings *bool // Filter by whether asset has findings
- Sort string `validate:"max=100"` // Sort field (e.g., "-created_at", "name")
+ IsCrownJewel *bool // Filter crown jewel assets
+ SubType *string // Filter by sub_type
+ PropertiesFilter map[string]string // Filter by JSONB properties key=value pairs (max 5)
+ Sort string `validate:"max=100"` // Sort field (e.g., "-created_at", "name")
Page int `validate:"min=0"`
PerPage int `validate:"min=0,max=100"`
@@ -636,6 +890,21 @@ func (s *AssetService) ListAssets(ctx context.Context, input ListAssetsInput) (p
filter = filter.WithHasFindings(*input.HasFindings)
}
+ // Crown jewel filter
+ if input.IsCrownJewel != nil {
+ filter.IsCrownJewel = input.IsCrownJewel
+ }
+
+ // Sub-type filter
+ if input.SubType != nil {
+ filter.SubType = input.SubType
+ }
+
+ // Properties filter (JSONB containment)
+ if len(input.PropertiesFilter) > 0 {
+ filter = filter.WithPropertiesFilter(input.PropertiesFilter)
+ }
+
// Layer 2: Data Scope - non-admin users only see assets in their groups
if !input.IsAdmin && input.ActingUserID != "" {
userID, err := shared.IDFromString(input.ActingUserID)
@@ -655,16 +924,25 @@ func (s *AssetService) ListAssets(ctx context.Context, input ListAssetsInput) (p
return s.repo.List(ctx, filter, opts, page)
}
+// GetPropertyFacets returns distinct property keys and values for faceted filtering.
+func (s *AssetService) GetPropertyFacets(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, types []string, subType string) ([]asset.PropertyFacet, error) {
+ parsedTenantID, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id format", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ return s.repo.GetPropertyFacets(ctx, parsedTenantID, types, subType)
+}
+
// ListTags returns distinct tags across all assets for a tenant.
// Supports prefix filtering for autocomplete.
// GetAssetStats returns aggregated asset statistics using SQL aggregation.
// Filters: types (asset_type ANY), tags (overlap, matches List semantics).
-func (s *AssetService) GetAssetStats(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, types []string, tags []string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
+func (s *AssetService) GetAssetStats(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, types []string, tags []string, subType string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
parsedTenantID, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id format", shared.ErrValidation)
}
- return s.repo.GetAggregateStats(ctx, parsedTenantID, types, tags)
+ return s.repo.GetAggregateStats(ctx, parsedTenantID, types, tags, subType)
}
func (s *AssetService) ListTags(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, prefix string, limit int) ([]string, error) {
@@ -770,6 +1048,64 @@ func (s *AssetService) ArchiveAsset(ctx context.Context, tenantID, assetID strin
return a, nil
}
+// ArchiveStaleAssets finds and archives assets that haven't been seen for staleDays.
+// Returns the count of archived assets. If dryRun is true, only counts without archiving.
+func (s *AssetService) ArchiveStaleAssets(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, staleDays int, dryRun bool) (int64, error) {
+ if staleDays < 1 {
+ staleDays = 90
+ }
+
+ if _, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID); err != nil {
+ return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ cutoff := time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, -staleDays)
+
+ // Find stale assets: last_seen < cutoff AND status = active
+ filter := asset.Filter{
+ TenantID: &tenantID,
+ }
+ // Use list with pagination to process in batches
+ page := pagination.Pagination{Page: 1, PerPage: 500}
+ result, err := s.repo.List(ctx, filter, asset.ListOptions{}, page)
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list assets for lifecycle check: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ var archived int64
+ for _, a := range result.Data {
+ if a.Status() == asset.StatusArchived {
+ continue
+ }
+ lastSeen := a.LastSeen()
+ if lastSeen.IsZero() || lastSeen.After(cutoff) {
+ continue
+ }
+
+ if dryRun {
+ s.logger.Info("would archive stale asset (dry run)",
+ "id", a.ID().String(), "name", a.Name(),
+ "last_seen", lastSeen.Format(time.RFC3339))
+ archived++
+ continue
+ }
+
+ a.Archive()
+ if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, a); err != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("failed to archive stale asset",
+ "id", a.ID().String(), "error", err)
+ continue
+ }
+ archived++
+ s.logger.Info("archived stale asset",
+ "id", a.ID().String(), "name", a.Name(),
+ "last_seen", lastSeen.Format(time.RFC3339),
+ "stale_days", staleDays)
+ }
+
+ return archived, nil
+}
+
// BulkUpdateAssetStatusInput represents input for bulk asset status update.
type BulkUpdateAssetStatusInput struct {
AssetIDs []string
diff --git a/internal/app/attachment_service.go b/internal/app/attachment_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c160fc1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/attachment_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "context"
+ "crypto/sha256"
+ "encoding/hex"
+ "fmt"
+ "io"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/attachment"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+)
+
+// TenantStorageResolver resolves per-tenant storage configuration.
+type TenantStorageResolver interface {
+ GetTenantStorageConfig(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (*attachment.StorageConfig, error)
+}
+
+// StorageFactory creates a FileStorage from a StorageConfig.
+type StorageFactory func(cfg attachment.StorageConfig) (attachment.FileStorage, error)
+
+// storageCache caches resolved FileStorage per tenant to avoid creating S3 clients per request.
+type storageCacheEntry struct {
+ storage attachment.FileStorage
+ provider string
+ expiry time.Time
+}
+
+const storageCacheTTL = 5 * time.Minute
+
+// AttachmentService handles file upload/download/delete operations.
+// It coordinates between the metadata repository (Postgres) and the
+// file storage provider (local/S3/MinIO — selected per-tenant or globally).
+type AttachmentService struct {
+ repo attachment.Repository
+ storage attachment.FileStorage // Default provider (fallback)
+ storageResolver TenantStorageResolver // Optional: per-tenant config lookup
+ storageFactory StorageFactory // Optional: creates provider from config
+ storageCache sync.Map // tenantID → *storageCacheEntry
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewAttachmentService creates a new service.
+// The storage parameter is the DEFAULT provider used when tenants don't have
+// a custom storage config.
+func NewAttachmentService(
+ repo attachment.Repository,
+ storage attachment.FileStorage,
+ log *logger.Logger,
+) *AttachmentService {
+ return &AttachmentService{
+ repo: repo,
+ storage: storage,
+ logger: log.With("service", "attachment"),
+ }
+}
+
+// SetTenantStorageResolver enables per-tenant storage configuration.
+// When set, each upload/download first checks tenant config before falling back to default.
+func (s *AttachmentService) SetTenantStorageResolver(resolver TenantStorageResolver, factory StorageFactory) {
+ s.storageResolver = resolver
+ s.storageFactory = factory
+}
+
+// resolveStorage returns the FileStorage and provider name for a given tenant.
+// Falls back to the default provider if no tenant-specific config exists.
+func (s *AttachmentService) resolveStorage(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (attachment.FileStorage, string) {
+ if s.storageResolver == nil || s.storageFactory == nil {
+ return s.storage, "local"
+ }
+ // Check cache first
+ if v, ok := s.storageCache.Load(tenantID); ok {
+ entry := v.(*storageCacheEntry)
+ if time.Now().Before(entry.expiry) {
+ return entry.storage, entry.provider
+ }
+ s.storageCache.Delete(tenantID)
+ }
+ cfg, err := s.storageResolver.GetTenantStorageConfig(ctx, tenantID)
+ if err != nil || cfg == nil {
+ return s.storage, "local"
+ }
+ provider, err := s.storageFactory(*cfg)
+ if err != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("failed to create tenant storage provider, using default",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID, "provider", cfg.Provider, "error", err)
+ return s.storage, "local"
+ }
+ // Cache the resolved provider
+ s.storageCache.Store(tenantID, &storageCacheEntry{
+ storage: provider, provider: cfg.Provider, expiry: time.Now().Add(storageCacheTTL),
+ })
+ return provider, cfg.Provider
+}
+
+// resolveStorageByProvider creates a FileStorage for a specific provider name.
+// Used by Download/Delete to access files on the provider they were uploaded to.
+func (s *AttachmentService) resolveStorageByProvider(ctx context.Context, tenantID, provider string) attachment.FileStorage {
+ if provider == "" || provider == "local" {
+ return s.storage
+ }
+ if s.storageFactory == nil || s.storageResolver == nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("file stored on cloud but no storage factory configured",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID, "provider", provider)
+ return s.storage
+ }
+ // Check cache first
+ cacheKey := tenantID + ":" + provider
+ if v, ok := s.storageCache.Load(cacheKey); ok {
+ entry := v.(*storageCacheEntry)
+ if time.Now().Before(entry.expiry) {
+ return entry.storage
+ }
+ s.storageCache.Delete(cacheKey)
+ }
+ cfg, err := s.storageResolver.GetTenantStorageConfig(ctx, tenantID)
+ if err != nil || cfg == nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("file stored on cloud but tenant storage config removed — file may be inaccessible",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID, "provider", provider)
+ return s.storage
+ }
+ p, err := s.storageFactory(*cfg)
+ if err != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("failed to create storage provider for download",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID, "provider", provider, "error", err)
+ return s.storage
+ }
+ s.storageCache.Store(cacheKey, &storageCacheEntry{
+ storage: p, provider: provider, expiry: time.Now().Add(storageCacheTTL),
+ })
+ return p
+}
+
+// UploadInput contains the parameters for uploading a file.
+type UploadInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ Filename string
+ ContentType string
+ Size int64
+ Reader io.Reader
+ UploadedBy string
+ ContextType string // "finding", "retest", "campaign", or ""
+ ContextID string // UUID of the context entity, or ""
+}
+
+// Upload validates, stores the file, and creates a metadata record.
+// Returns the attachment with its download URL.
+func (s *AttachmentService) Upload(ctx context.Context, input UploadInput) (*attachment.Attachment, error) {
+ // Validate
+ if input.Size > attachment.MaxFileSize {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: file exceeds %dMB limit", attachment.ErrTooLarge, attachment.MaxFileSize/1024/1024)
+ }
+
+ ct := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(input.ContentType))
+ if !attachment.AllowedContentTypes[ct] {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is not an allowed file type", attachment.ErrUnsupported, ct)
+ }
+
+ tenantID, err := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ uploadedBy, err := shared.IDFromString(input.UploadedBy)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid uploaded_by", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ // Read file into buffer for hashing + upload (file ≤ 10MB so safe in memory)
+ buf, err := io.ReadAll(input.Reader)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read file: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ // Compute SHA-256 hash for dedup
+ hash := sha256.Sum256(buf)
+ contentHash := hex.EncodeToString(hash[:])
+
+ // Dedup: check if same file already exists in this context (finding)
+ if input.ContextType != "" && input.ContextID != "" {
+ existing, _ := s.repo.FindByHash(ctx, tenantID, input.ContextType, input.ContextID, contentHash)
+ if existing != nil {
+ s.logger.Info("duplicate file skipped",
+ "filename", input.Filename, "hash", contentHash[:12],
+ "existing_id", existing.ID().String())
+ return existing, nil // Return existing — no re-upload
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Store file bytes via the storage provider (tenant-specific or default)
+ store, providerName := s.resolveStorage(ctx, input.TenantID)
+ storageKey, err := store.Upload(ctx, input.TenantID, input.Filename, ct, bytes.NewReader(buf))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to upload file: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ // Create metadata record
+ att := attachment.NewAttachment(
+ tenantID, input.Filename, ct, input.Size, storageKey,
+ uploadedBy, input.ContextType, input.ContextID,
+ )
+ att.SetContentHash(contentHash)
+ att.SetStorageProvider(providerName)
+
+ if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, att); err != nil {
+ // Cleanup storage on DB failure
+ _ = store.Delete(ctx, input.TenantID, storageKey)
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to save attachment metadata: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ s.logger.Info("attachment uploaded",
+ "id", att.ID().String(),
+ "filename", att.Filename(),
+ "size", att.Size(),
+ "content_type", ct,
+ "tenant_id", input.TenantID,
+ )
+
+ return att, nil
+}
+
+// Download retrieves file content by attachment ID.
+// Returns the reader (caller must close), content type, and filename.
+func (s *AttachmentService) Download(ctx context.Context, tenantID, attachmentID string) (io.ReadCloser, string, string, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, "", "", fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ aid, err := shared.IDFromString(attachmentID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, "", "", fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid attachment_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ att, err := s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, aid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, "", "", err
+ }
+
+ store := s.resolveStorageByProvider(ctx, tenantID, att.StorageProvider())
+ reader, _, err := store.Download(ctx, tenantID, att.StorageKey())
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, "", "", err
+ }
+
+ return reader, att.ContentType(), att.Filename(), nil
+}
+
+// Delete removes both the file and its metadata record.
+func (s *AttachmentService) Delete(ctx context.Context, tenantID, attachmentID string) error {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ aid, err := shared.IDFromString(attachmentID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid attachment_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ att, err := s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, aid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ // Delete from storage first (idempotent)
+ store := s.resolveStorageByProvider(ctx, tenantID, att.StorageProvider())
+ _ = store.Delete(ctx, tenantID, att.StorageKey())
+
+ // Delete metadata
+ return s.repo.Delete(ctx, tid, aid)
+}
+
+// ListByContext returns all attachments linked to a specific context.
+func (s *AttachmentService) ListByContext(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, contextType, contextID string) ([]*attachment.Attachment, error) {
+ return s.repo.ListByContext(ctx, tenantID, contextType, contextID)
+}
+
+// LinkToContext links orphan attachments (uploaded with empty context_id) to a finding.
+// Security: only the uploader can link their own attachments.
+func (s *AttachmentService) LinkToContext(ctx context.Context, tenantID, uploaderID string, attachmentIDs []string, contextType, contextID string) (int64, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ uid, err := shared.IDFromString(uploaderID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid uploader_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ ids := make([]shared.ID, 0, len(attachmentIDs))
+ for _, idStr := range attachmentIDs {
+ id, err := shared.IDFromString(idStr)
+ if err != nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ ids = append(ids, id)
+ }
+ return s.repo.LinkToContext(ctx, tid, ids, uid, contextType, contextID)
+}
+
+// GetByID retrieves attachment metadata (for URL generation, etc).
+func (s *AttachmentService) GetByID(ctx context.Context, tenantID, attachmentID string) (*attachment.Attachment, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ aid, err := shared.IDFromString(attachmentID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid attachment_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ return s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, aid)
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/audit_service.go b/internal/app/audit_service.go
index 287476da..4c160837 100644
--- a/internal/app/audit_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/audit_service.go
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ type AuditContext struct {
UserAgent string
RequestID string
SessionID string
+ // ActorRole captures the caller's role at the moment of the action.
+ // Used by pentest module to distinguish reviewer QA edits from creator
+ // self-edits in audit forensics. Optional — empty for non-pentest paths.
+ ActorRole string
}
// LogEvent creates and persists an audit log entry.
@@ -84,6 +88,11 @@ func (s *AuditService) LogEvent(ctx context.Context, actx AuditContext, event Au
if actx.SessionID != "" {
log.WithSessionID(actx.SessionID)
}
+ // Stamp the actor's role into metadata so audit reviewers can distinguish
+ // reviewer QA actions from creator self-edits without joining other tables.
+ if actx.ActorRole != "" {
+ log.WithMetadata("actor_role", actx.ActorRole)
+ }
// Set event details
if event.ResourceName != "" {
diff --git a/internal/app/auth_service.go b/internal/app/auth_service.go
index c289cdb4..0492760f 100644
--- a/internal/app/auth_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/auth_service.go
@@ -173,29 +173,55 @@ func (s *AuthService) getTenantVerificationMode(ctx context.Context, tenantIDStr
//
// Resolution order:
// 1. Tenant setting (if tenantID provided AND setting is "always" or "never")
-// 2. SMTP availability (auto mode):
+// 2. Single-tenant fallback (when tenantID is empty): if the platform has
+// exactly one active tenant, treat it as the "default" tenant and apply
+// its setting. Most OSS deployments are single-tenant — without this
+// branch the admin's "never" setting was ignored at register time
+// because the new user wasn't a member of any tenant yet.
+// 3. SMTP availability (auto mode):
// - tenant SMTP configured → require verification
// - system SMTP configured → require verification
// - no SMTP at all → SKIP verification (graceful, no chicken-and-egg)
-// 3. Global env config (if smtpChecker not wired) → fallback
+// 4. Global env config (if smtpChecker not wired) → fallback
func (s *AuthService) shouldRequireEmailVerification(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) bool {
// 1. Per-tenant override (highest priority)
if tenantID != "" && s.tenantRepo != nil {
- tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
- if err == nil {
- if t, terr := s.tenantRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid); terr == nil && t != nil {
- switch t.TypedSettings().Security.EmailVerificationMode {
+ if mode, ok := s.lookupTenantVerificationMode(ctx, tenantID); ok {
+ switch mode {
+ case tenant.EmailVerificationAlways:
+ return true
+ case tenant.EmailVerificationNever:
+ return false
+ }
+ // EmailVerificationAuto / empty → fall through to SMTP check
+ }
+ }
+
+ // 2. Single-tenant fallback. When the caller has no tenant context
+ // (typically the self-registration path), look at the platform: if
+ // there's exactly one active tenant, that's almost certainly the
+ // tenant the new user is going to belong to. Use its setting so the
+ // admin's intent is respected.
+ if tenantID == "" && s.tenantRepo != nil {
+ ids, err := s.tenantRepo.ListActiveTenantIDs(ctx)
+ if err == nil && len(ids) == 1 {
+ soleID := ids[0].String()
+ if mode, ok := s.lookupTenantVerificationMode(ctx, soleID); ok {
+ switch mode {
case tenant.EmailVerificationAlways:
return true
case tenant.EmailVerificationNever:
return false
}
- // EmailVerificationAuto / empty → fall through to SMTP check
+ // auto → fall through to SMTP check below, with the
+ // resolved tenant id so HasTenantSMTP picks up any
+ // per-tenant SMTP override
+ tenantID = soleID
}
}
}
- // 2. Smart auto-detection via SMTP availability
+ // 3. Smart auto-detection via SMTP availability
if s.smtpChecker != nil {
if tenantID != "" && s.smtpChecker.HasTenantSMTP(ctx, tenantID) {
return true
@@ -209,15 +235,43 @@ func (s *AuthService) shouldRequireEmailVerification(ctx context.Context, tenant
return false
}
- // 3. Fallback to global env config
+ // 4. Fallback to global env config
return s.config.RequireEmailVerification
}
+// lookupTenantVerificationMode resolves a tenant id to its
+// EmailVerificationMode setting. Returns false if the tenant id is
+// invalid or the lookup fails — callers should treat that as "no
+// override" and continue to the next resolution step.
+func (s *AuthService) lookupTenantVerificationMode(
+ ctx context.Context, tenantID string,
+) (tenant.EmailVerificationMode, bool) {
+ if tenantID == "" || s.tenantRepo == nil {
+ return "", false
+ }
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", false
+ }
+ t, err := s.tenantRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid)
+ if err != nil || t == nil {
+ return "", false
+ }
+ return t.TypedSettings().Security.EmailVerificationMode, true
+}
+
// RegisterInput represents the input for user registration.
type RegisterInput struct {
Email string `json:"email" validate:"required,email,max=255"`
Password string `json:"password" validate:"required,min=8,max=128"`
Name string `json:"name" validate:"required,max=255"`
+ // InvitationToken is optional: when a user registers via an
+ // invitation link, the client passes the token here so the register
+ // flow can resolve the target tenant and apply that tenant's email
+ // verification rule (instead of the platform default). The token
+ // itself is NOT consumed here — invitation acceptance still happens
+ // in a separate POST /invitations/{token}/accept call.
+ InvitationToken string `json:"invitation_token,omitempty"`
}
// RegisterResult represents the result of registration.
@@ -276,8 +330,26 @@ func (s *AuthService) Register(ctx context.Context, input RegisterInput) (*Regis
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create user: %w", err)
}
+ // Resolve tenant context for email verification rule:
+ // 1. If the caller provided an invitation_token (registration via
+ // invite link), look it up and use the invitation's tenant.
+ // 2. Otherwise pass empty string and let
+ // shouldRequireEmailVerification fall back to the single-tenant
+ // heuristic / SMTP check / global env.
+ verificationTenantID := ""
+ if input.InvitationToken != "" && s.tenantRepo != nil {
+ if inv, ierr := s.tenantRepo.GetInvitationByToken(ctx, input.InvitationToken); ierr == nil && inv != nil {
+ verificationTenantID = inv.TenantID().String()
+ }
+ // Failure to look up the invitation is NOT fatal here — we just
+ // fall back to the platform default. Validation of the token
+ // proper happens later when the user POSTs to
+ // /invitations/{token}/accept; surfacing it as a register error
+ // would be confusing ("you can't register because of an invite?").
+ }
+
// Generate verification token if required (smart: respects tenant setting + SMTP availability)
- requireVerification := s.shouldRequireEmailVerification(ctx, "")
+ requireVerification := s.shouldRequireEmailVerification(ctx, verificationTenantID)
var verificationToken string
if requireVerification {
@@ -466,33 +538,30 @@ func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, input LoginInput) (*LoginResult
// Generate session ID first so we can include it in the JWT
sessionID := shared.NewID()
- // Query user's tenant memberships
- memberships, err := s.tenantRepo.GetUserMemberships(ctx, u.ID())
+ // Query user's tenant memberships in a SINGLE round trip — both
+ // active (for token exchange) and suspended (for the "your access
+ // is suspended" UI message). The previous code issued two
+ // sequential queries to the same table for opposite filters.
+ var (
+ tenantInfos []TenantMembershipInfo
+ suspendedInfos []TenantMembershipInfo
+ )
+ memberships, err := s.tenantRepo.GetUserMembershipsWithStatus(ctx, u.ID())
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("failed to get user memberships", "error", err)
- // Continue without memberships - user can still login but won't have tenant access
- memberships = nil
- }
-
- // Convert to TenantMembershipInfo for response
- tenantInfos := make([]TenantMembershipInfo, 0, len(memberships))
- for _, m := range memberships {
- tenantInfos = append(tenantInfos, TenantMembershipInfo{
- TenantID: m.TenantID,
- TenantSlug: m.TenantSlug,
- TenantName: m.TenantName,
- Role: m.Role,
- })
- }
-
- // Also fetch suspended memberships so the client can show a clear
- // "your access to {tenant} is suspended" message instead of routing
- // the user into the create-team flow with no explanation. This is a
- // best-effort lookup — failure does not break login.
- var suspendedInfos []TenantMembershipInfo
- if suspended, serr := s.tenantRepo.GetUserSuspendedMemberships(ctx, u.ID()); serr == nil {
- suspendedInfos = make([]TenantMembershipInfo, 0, len(suspended))
- for _, m := range suspended {
+ // Continue without memberships — user can still login but won't have tenant access
+ } else {
+ tenantInfos = make([]TenantMembershipInfo, 0, len(memberships.Active))
+ for _, m := range memberships.Active {
+ tenantInfos = append(tenantInfos, TenantMembershipInfo{
+ TenantID: m.TenantID,
+ TenantSlug: m.TenantSlug,
+ TenantName: m.TenantName,
+ Role: m.Role,
+ })
+ }
+ suspendedInfos = make([]TenantMembershipInfo, 0, len(memberships.Suspended))
+ for _, m := range memberships.Suspended {
suspendedInfos = append(suspendedInfos, TenantMembershipInfo{
TenantID: m.TenantID,
TenantSlug: m.TenantSlug,
@@ -500,9 +569,6 @@ func (s *AuthService) Login(ctx context.Context, input LoginInput) (*LoginResult
Role: m.Role,
})
}
- } else {
- s.logger.Warn("failed to load suspended memberships at login",
- "user_id", u.ID().String(), "error", serr)
}
// Generate GLOBAL refresh token (no tenant context)
diff --git a/internal/app/business_unit_service.go b/internal/app/business_unit_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e9ada59d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/business_unit_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "fmt"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/businessunit"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/pagination"
+)
+
+// BusinessUnitService manages business units.
+type BusinessUnitService struct {
+ repo businessunit.Repository
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewBusinessUnitService creates a new service.
+func NewBusinessUnitService(repo businessunit.Repository, log *logger.Logger) *BusinessUnitService {
+ return &BusinessUnitService{repo: repo, logger: log}
+}
+
+// CreateBusinessUnitInput holds input for creating a BU.
+type CreateBusinessUnitInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ Name string
+ Description string
+ OwnerName string
+ OwnerEmail string
+ Tags []string
+}
+
+// Create creates a new business unit.
+func (s *BusinessUnitService) Create(ctx context.Context, input CreateBusinessUnitInput) (*businessunit.BusinessUnit, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ bu, err := businessunit.NewBusinessUnit(tid, input.Name)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ bu.Update(input.Name, input.Description, input.OwnerName, input.OwnerEmail)
+ bu.SetTags(input.Tags)
+ if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, bu); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create business unit: %w", err)
+ }
+ return bu, nil
+}
+
+// Get retrieves a BU.
+func (s *BusinessUnitService) Get(ctx context.Context, tenantID, buID string) (*businessunit.BusinessUnit, error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ bid, _ := shared.IDFromString(buID)
+ return s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, bid)
+}
+
+// List lists BUs.
+func (s *BusinessUnitService) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, filter businessunit.Filter, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*businessunit.BusinessUnit], error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ filter.TenantID = &tid
+ return s.repo.List(ctx, filter, page)
+}
+
+// Delete deletes a BU.
+func (s *BusinessUnitService) Delete(ctx context.Context, tenantID, buID string) error {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ bid, _ := shared.IDFromString(buID)
+ return s.repo.Delete(ctx, tid, bid)
+}
+
+// AddAsset links an asset to a BU.
+func (s *BusinessUnitService) AddAsset(ctx context.Context, tenantID, buID, assetID string) error {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ bid, _ := shared.IDFromString(buID)
+ aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(assetID)
+ return s.repo.AddAsset(ctx, tid, bid, aid)
+}
+
+// RemoveAsset unlinks an asset from a BU.
+func (s *BusinessUnitService) RemoveAsset(ctx context.Context, tenantID, buID, assetID string) error {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ bid, _ := shared.IDFromString(buID)
+ aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(assetID)
+ return s.repo.RemoveAsset(ctx, tid, bid, aid)
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/dashboard_service.go b/internal/app/dashboard_service.go
index 892938db..10995b4d 100644
--- a/internal/app/dashboard_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/dashboard_service.go
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ type DashboardStats struct {
// Asset stats
AssetCount int
AssetsByType map[string]int
+ AssetsBySubType map[string]int
AssetsByStatus map[string]int
AverageRiskScore float64
@@ -44,6 +45,14 @@ type FindingTrendPoint struct {
Info int
}
+// RiskVelocityPoint represents weekly new vs resolved finding counts.
+type RiskVelocityPoint struct {
+ Week time.Time `json:"week"`
+ NewCount int `json:"new_count"`
+ ResolvedCount int `json:"resolved_count"`
+ Velocity int `json:"velocity"` // new - resolved (positive = losing ground)
+}
+
// ActivityItem represents a recent activity item.
type ActivityItem struct {
Type string
@@ -81,6 +90,10 @@ type DashboardStatsRepository interface {
GetGlobalRepositoryStats(ctx context.Context) (RepositoryStatsData, error)
GetGlobalRecentActivity(ctx context.Context, limit int) ([]ActivityItem, error)
+ // MTTR & Trending
+ GetMTTRMetrics(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID) (map[string]float64, error)
+ GetRiskVelocity(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, weeks int) ([]RiskVelocityPoint, error)
+
// Filtered stats (by accessible tenant IDs) - for multi-tenant authorization
GetFilteredAssetStats(ctx context.Context, tenantIDs []string) (AssetStatsData, error)
GetFilteredFindingStats(ctx context.Context, tenantIDs []string) (FindingStatsData, error)
@@ -92,6 +105,7 @@ type DashboardStatsRepository interface {
type AssetStatsData struct {
Total int
ByType map[string]int
+ BySubType map[string]int
ByStatus map[string]int
AverageRiskScore float64
}
@@ -150,6 +164,7 @@ func (s *DashboardService) GetStats(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID) (*D
return &DashboardStats{
AssetCount: all.Assets.Total,
AssetsByType: all.Assets.ByType,
+ AssetsBySubType: all.Assets.BySubType,
AssetsByStatus: all.Assets.ByStatus,
AverageRiskScore: all.Assets.AverageRiskScore,
FindingCount: all.Findings.Total,
@@ -164,6 +179,16 @@ func (s *DashboardService) GetStats(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID) (*D
}, nil
}
+// GetMTTRMetrics returns MTTR (Mean Time To Remediate) in hours by severity.
+func (s *DashboardService) GetMTTRMetrics(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID) (map[string]float64, error) {
+ return s.repo.GetMTTRMetrics(ctx, tenantID)
+}
+
+// GetRiskVelocity returns weekly new vs resolved finding counts.
+func (s *DashboardService) GetRiskVelocity(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, weeks int) ([]RiskVelocityPoint, error) {
+ return s.repo.GetRiskVelocity(ctx, tenantID, weeks)
+}
+
// GetGlobalStats returns global dashboard statistics (not tenant-scoped).
// Deprecated: Use GetStatsForTenants for proper multi-tenant authorization.
func (s *DashboardService) GetGlobalStats(ctx context.Context) (*DashboardStats, error) {
diff --git a/internal/app/email_service.go b/internal/app/email_service.go
index 5d430148..064f1fa7 100644
--- a/internal/app/email_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/email_service.go
@@ -221,6 +221,80 @@ func (s *EmailService) SendWelcomeEmail(ctx context.Context, userEmail, userName
return nil
}
+// SendMemberSuspendedEmail notifies a user that their tenant
+// access has been suspended. Uses per-tenant SMTP if configured.
+// Best-effort: returns nil and logs a warning if email is not
+// configured for the tenant — the suspend operation should succeed
+// even when the user can't be notified.
+func (s *EmailService) SendMemberSuspendedEmail(
+ ctx context.Context,
+ recipientEmail, recipientName, teamName, actorName, tenantID string,
+) error {
+ sender := s.sender
+ if tenantID != "" {
+ sender = s.getSenderForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+ }
+ if sender == nil || !sender.IsConfigured() {
+ s.logger.Warn("email service not configured, skipping member suspended email",
+ "email", recipientEmail, "tenant_id", tenantID)
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ data := email.MemberStatusChangeData{
+ UserName: recipientName,
+ TeamName: teamName,
+ ActorName: actorName,
+ AppURL: s.config.BaseURL,
+ AppName: s.appName,
+ }
+
+ if err := sender.SendTemplate(ctx, recipientEmail, email.TemplateMemberSuspended, data); err != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to send member suspended email",
+ "email", recipientEmail, "error", err)
+ return fmt.Errorf("failed to send member suspended email: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ s.logger.Info("member suspended email sent",
+ "email", recipientEmail, "team", teamName)
+ return nil
+}
+
+// SendMemberReactivatedEmail notifies a user that their access
+// has been restored. Same best-effort semantics as
+// SendMemberSuspendedEmail.
+func (s *EmailService) SendMemberReactivatedEmail(
+ ctx context.Context,
+ recipientEmail, recipientName, teamName, actorName, tenantID string,
+) error {
+ sender := s.sender
+ if tenantID != "" {
+ sender = s.getSenderForTenant(ctx, tenantID)
+ }
+ if sender == nil || !sender.IsConfigured() {
+ s.logger.Warn("email service not configured, skipping member reactivated email",
+ "email", recipientEmail, "tenant_id", tenantID)
+ return nil
+ }
+
+ data := email.MemberStatusChangeData{
+ UserName: recipientName,
+ TeamName: teamName,
+ ActorName: actorName,
+ AppURL: s.config.BaseURL,
+ AppName: s.appName,
+ }
+
+ if err := sender.SendTemplate(ctx, recipientEmail, email.TemplateMemberReactivated, data); err != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to send member reactivated email",
+ "email", recipientEmail, "error", err)
+ return fmt.Errorf("failed to send member reactivated email: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ s.logger.Info("member reactivated email sent",
+ "email", recipientEmail, "team", teamName)
+ return nil
+}
+
// SendTeamInvitationEmail sends a team invitation email.
// Uses per-tenant SMTP if configured, otherwise falls back to system SMTP.
func (s *EmailService) SendTeamInvitationEmail(ctx context.Context, recipientEmail, inviterName, teamName, token string, expiresIn time.Duration, tenantID ...string) error {
diff --git a/internal/app/finding_import_service.go b/internal/app/finding_import_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c8ba3e55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/finding_import_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "encoding/xml"
+ "fmt"
+ "io"
+ "strings"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/vulnerability"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+)
+
+// FindingImportService handles importing findings from external scanner formats.
+type FindingImportService struct {
+ findingRepo vulnerability.FindingRepository
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewFindingImportService creates a new import service.
+func NewFindingImportService(repo vulnerability.FindingRepository, log *logger.Logger) *FindingImportService {
+ return &FindingImportService{findingRepo: repo, logger: log}
+}
+
+// ImportResult contains the result of an import operation.
+type ImportResult struct {
+ Total int `json:"total"`
+ Created int `json:"created"`
+ Skipped int `json:"skipped"`
+ Errors int `json:"errors"`
+ Messages []string `json:"messages,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ============================================
+// Burp Suite XML Import
+// ============================================
+
+// BurpIssue represents a single issue in Burp Suite XML export.
+type BurpIssue struct {
+ XMLName xml.Name `xml:"issue"`
+ SerialNumber string `xml:"serialNumber"`
+ Type string `xml:"type"`
+ Name string `xml:"name"`
+ Host string `xml:"host"`
+ Path string `xml:"path"`
+ Location string `xml:"location"`
+ Severity string `xml:"severity"`
+ Confidence string `xml:"confidence"`
+ IssueBackground string `xml:"issueBackground"`
+ RemediationBG string `xml:"remediationBackground"`
+ IssueDetail string `xml:"issueDetail"`
+ RemediationDetail string `xml:"remediationDetail"`
+ RequestResponse []struct {
+ Request string `xml:"request"`
+ Response string `xml:"response"`
+ } `xml:"requestresponse"`
+}
+
+// BurpIssues is the root XML element.
+type BurpIssues struct {
+ XMLName xml.Name `xml:"issues"`
+ Issues []BurpIssue `xml:"issue"`
+}
+
+func burpSeverityToInternal(s string) vulnerability.Severity {
+ switch strings.ToLower(s) {
+ case "high":
+ return vulnerability.SeverityHigh
+ case "medium":
+ return vulnerability.SeverityMedium
+ case "low":
+ return vulnerability.SeverityLow
+ case "information", "info":
+ return vulnerability.SeverityInfo
+ default:
+ return vulnerability.SeverityMedium
+ }
+}
+
+// stripHTML removes basic HTML tags from Burp description fields.
+func stripHTML(s string) string {
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "
", "\n")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "
", "\n")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "
", "\n")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "\n")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "
", "")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "- ")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "\n")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "
", "")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "**")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "**")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "_")
+ s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "", "_")
+ // Strip remaining tags
+ var result strings.Builder
+ inTag := false
+ for _, r := range s {
+ if r == '<' {
+ inTag = true
+ continue
+ }
+ if r == '>' {
+ inTag = false
+ continue
+ }
+ if !inTag {
+ result.WriteRune(r)
+ }
+ }
+ return strings.TrimSpace(result.String())
+}
+
+// ImportBurpXML parses Burp Suite XML and creates findings.
+func (s *FindingImportService) ImportBurpXML(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID string, reader io.Reader) (*ImportResult, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ data, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read XML: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ var burp BurpIssues
+ if err := xml.Unmarshal(data, &burp); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid Burp XML format: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ result := &ImportResult{Total: len(burp.Issues)}
+
+ for _, issue := range burp.Issues {
+ description := stripHTML(issue.IssueBackground)
+ if issue.IssueDetail != "" {
+ description += "\n\n" + stripHTML(issue.IssueDetail)
+ }
+
+ target := issue.Host
+ if issue.Path != "" {
+ target += issue.Path
+ }
+
+ // Build source metadata for pentest fields
+ meta := map[string]any{
+ "affected_assets": []string{target},
+ "remediation_guidance": stripHTML(issue.RemediationBG + "\n" + issue.RemediationDetail),
+ "burp_type": issue.Type,
+ "burp_confidence": issue.Confidence,
+ }
+
+ if len(issue.RequestResponse) > 0 {
+ rrs := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(issue.RequestResponse))
+ for _, rr := range issue.RequestResponse {
+ rrs = append(rrs, map[string]any{
+ "request": rr.Request,
+ "response": rr.Response,
+ })
+ }
+ meta["request_responses"] = rrs
+ }
+
+ metaBytes, _ := json.Marshal(meta)
+ var metaMap map[string]any
+ _ = json.Unmarshal(metaBytes, &metaMap)
+
+ severity := burpSeverityToInternal(issue.Severity)
+
+ finding, fErr := vulnerability.NewFinding(
+ tid, shared.ID{},
+ vulnerability.FindingSourcePentest, "burp_suite",
+ severity, issue.Name,
+ )
+ if fErr != nil {
+ result.Errors++
+ result.Messages = append(result.Messages, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to create finding '%s': %v", issue.Name, fErr))
+ continue
+ }
+
+ finding.SetDescription(description)
+ finding.SetSourceMetadata(metaMap)
+ if campaignID != "" {
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
+ finding.SetPentestCampaignID(&cid)
+ }
+
+ if err := s.findingRepo.Create(ctx, finding); err != nil {
+ result.Errors++
+ result.Messages = append(result.Messages, fmt.Sprintf("Failed to save '%s': %v", issue.Name, err))
+ continue
+ }
+ result.Created++
+ }
+
+ result.Skipped = result.Total - result.Created - result.Errors
+ s.logger.Info("Burp XML import completed", "total", result.Total, "created", result.Created, "errors", result.Errors)
+ return result, nil
+}
+
+// ============================================
+// Generic CSV Import
+// ============================================
+
+// ImportCSV parses CSV with headers and creates findings.
+// Expected headers: title, severity, description, affected_assets, steps_to_reproduce, poc_code, business_impact, remediation
+func (s *FindingImportService) ImportCSV(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID string, reader io.Reader) (*ImportResult, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ data, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to read CSV: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ lines := strings.Split(string(data), "\n")
+ if len(lines) < 2 {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: CSV must have header + at least 1 row", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ // Parse headers
+ headers := parseCSVLine(lines[0])
+ headerMap := make(map[string]int)
+ for i, h := range headers {
+ headerMap[strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(h))] = i
+ }
+
+ // Required: title
+ titleIdx, ok := headerMap["title"]
+ if !ok {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: CSV must have 'title' column", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ result := &ImportResult{Total: len(lines) - 1}
+
+ for _, line := range lines[1:] {
+ line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+ if line == "" {
+ result.Total--
+ continue
+ }
+
+ cols := parseCSVLine(line)
+ getCol := func(name string) string {
+ if idx, ok := headerMap[name]; ok && idx < len(cols) {
+ return strings.TrimSpace(cols[idx])
+ }
+ return ""
+ }
+
+ title := ""
+ if titleIdx < len(cols) {
+ title = strings.TrimSpace(cols[titleIdx])
+ }
+ if title == "" {
+ result.Skipped++
+ continue
+ }
+
+ severity, _ := vulnerability.ParseSeverity(getCol("severity"))
+ if severity == "" {
+ severity = vulnerability.SeverityMedium
+ }
+
+ meta := map[string]any{}
+ if v := getCol("affected_assets"); v != "" {
+ meta["affected_assets"] = strings.Split(v, ";")
+ }
+ if v := getCol("steps_to_reproduce"); v != "" {
+ meta["steps_to_reproduce"] = strings.Split(v, ";")
+ }
+ if v := getCol("poc_code"); v != "" {
+ meta["poc_code"] = v
+ }
+ if v := getCol("business_impact"); v != "" {
+ meta["business_impact"] = v
+ }
+ if v := getCol("remediation"); v != "" {
+ meta["remediation_guidance"] = v
+ }
+
+ finding, fErr := vulnerability.NewFinding(
+ tid, shared.ID{},
+ vulnerability.FindingSourcePentest, "csv_import",
+ severity, title,
+ )
+ if fErr != nil {
+ result.Errors++
+ continue
+ }
+
+ if desc := getCol("description"); desc != "" {
+ finding.SetDescription(desc)
+ }
+ finding.SetSourceMetadata(meta)
+ if campaignID != "" {
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
+ finding.SetPentestCampaignID(&cid)
+ }
+
+ if err := s.findingRepo.Create(ctx, finding); err != nil {
+ result.Errors++
+ continue
+ }
+ result.Created++
+ }
+
+ result.Skipped = result.Total - result.Created - result.Errors
+ s.logger.Info("CSV import completed", "total", result.Total, "created", result.Created)
+ return result, nil
+}
+
+// parseCSVLine splits a CSV line respecting quoted fields.
+func parseCSVLine(line string) []string {
+ var fields []string
+ var field strings.Builder
+ inQuotes := false
+ for i := 0; i < len(line); i++ {
+ c := line[i]
+ if c == '"' {
+ if inQuotes && i+1 < len(line) && line[i+1] == '"' {
+ field.WriteByte('"')
+ i++
+ } else {
+ inQuotes = !inQuotes
+ }
+ } else if c == ',' && !inQuotes {
+ fields = append(fields, field.String())
+ field.Reset()
+ } else {
+ field.WriteByte(c)
+ }
+ }
+ fields = append(fields, field.String())
+ return fields
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/ingest/processor_assets.go b/internal/app/ingest/processor_assets.go
index e575ec85..9d66f6bc 100644
--- a/internal/app/ingest/processor_assets.go
+++ b/internal/app/ingest/processor_assets.go
@@ -1248,6 +1248,14 @@ func (p *AssetProcessor) buildPropertiesFromCTIS(ctisAsset *ctis.Asset) map[stri
}
}
+ // Normalize IP storage for host assets:
+ // - Convert properties.ip (string) → properties.ip_addresses (array)
+ // - Extract IP from asset value/name if host type
+ // - Extract hostname from ip_address.hostname into top-level hostname
+ if ctisAsset.Type == ctis.AssetTypeHost || ctisAsset.Type == "host" {
+ normalizeHostIPProperties(props, getAssetName(ctisAsset))
+ }
+
// Validate properties based on asset type
if errs := p.propsValidator.ValidateProperties(string(ctisAsset.Type), props); errs != nil {
p.logger.Warn("properties validation errors",
@@ -1287,3 +1295,79 @@ func (p *AssetProcessor) extractOwnerRef(ctisAsset *ctis.Asset) string {
return ""
}
+
+// normalizeHostIPProperties standardizes IP storage for host assets.
+// Ensures all IPs are in `ip_addresses` (array), removes legacy `ip` (string).
+// Promotes ip_address.hostname to top-level `hostname`.
+func normalizeHostIPProperties(props map[string]any, assetName string) {
+ // Collect all known IPs into a set
+ ipSet := make(map[string]bool)
+
+ // From legacy properties.ip (string)
+ if ip, ok := props["ip"].(string); ok && ip != "" {
+ ipSet[ip] = true
+ delete(props, "ip") // Remove legacy key
+ }
+
+ // From existing ip_addresses array
+ if ips, ok := props["ip_addresses"].([]any); ok {
+ for _, v := range ips {
+ if s, ok := v.(string); ok && s != "" {
+ ipSet[s] = true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ips, ok := props["ip_addresses"].([]string); ok {
+ for _, s := range ips {
+ if s != "" {
+ ipSet[s] = true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // From ip_address technical data (structured object)
+ if ipAddr, ok := props["ip_address"].(map[string]any); ok {
+ if addr, ok := ipAddr["address"].(string); ok && addr != "" {
+ ipSet[addr] = true
+ }
+ // Promote hostname to top-level if not already set
+ if hostname, ok := ipAddr["hostname"].(string); ok && hostname != "" {
+ if _, exists := props["hostname"]; !exists {
+ props["hostname"] = hostname
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // From asset name if it looks like an IP
+ if looksLikeIPv4(assetName) {
+ ipSet[assetName] = true
+ }
+
+ // Write back as standardized array
+ if len(ipSet) > 0 {
+ ips := make([]string, 0, len(ipSet))
+ for ip := range ipSet {
+ ips = append(ips, ip)
+ }
+ props["ip_addresses"] = ips
+ }
+}
+
+// looksLikeIPv4 returns true if s matches basic IPv4 pattern.
+func looksLikeIPv4(s string) bool {
+ parts := strings.Split(s, ".")
+ if len(parts) != 4 {
+ return false
+ }
+ for _, p := range parts {
+ if p == "" || len(p) > 3 {
+ return false
+ }
+ for _, c := range p {
+ if c < '0' || c > '9' {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return true
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/membership_cache_service.go b/internal/app/membership_cache_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c99ae346
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/membership_cache_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "errors"
+ "fmt"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/redis"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/tenant"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+)
+
+// MembershipCacheService is a thin Redis-backed wrapper around the
+// tenant.Repository.GetMembership lookup that runs on EVERY tenant-
+// scoped HTTP request via the RequireMembership middleware. Each
+// authenticated dashboard load typically issues 30-50 API calls in
+// quick succession, and the previous implementation hit the database
+// once per call. The cache replaces those round trips with a Redis
+// GET while still respecting the canonical membership lifecycle:
+//
+// - On miss → query tenant.Repository, store the result with a
+// short TTL.
+// - On suspend / reactivate / role change / member removal →
+// TenantService calls Invalidate to drop the cached entry, so
+// the next request fetches fresh state.
+// - On Redis failure → fall through to the repository (the cache
+// is best-effort, never load-bearing for correctness).
+//
+// The cached value is intentionally minimal (membership ID, role,
+// status, joined-at) to keep payload small and to avoid stale
+// derived data. Downstream code only reads role + status from
+// context, so a slim DTO is sufficient.
+type MembershipCacheService struct {
+ cache *redis.Cache[CachedMembership]
+ repo tenant.Repository
+ log *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// CachedMembership is the slim DTO stored in Redis. It carries
+// exactly the fields the middleware needs to enforce access
+// control and populate the request context.
+type CachedMembership struct {
+ ID string `json:"id"`
+ Role string `json:"role"`
+ Status string `json:"status"`
+ JoinedAt time.Time `json:"joined_at"`
+}
+
+const (
+ membershipCachePrefix = "membership"
+ membershipCacheTTL = 5 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// NewMembershipCacheService constructs a membership cache. If the
+// redis client is unavailable for any reason the constructor returns
+// an error and the caller should fall back to direct repository
+// access (the wiring code in services.go does this gracefully).
+func NewMembershipCacheService(
+ redisClient *redis.Client,
+ repo tenant.Repository,
+ log *logger.Logger,
+) (*MembershipCacheService, error) {
+ cache, err := redis.NewCache[CachedMembership](redisClient, membershipCachePrefix, membershipCacheTTL)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create membership cache: %w", err)
+ }
+ return &MembershipCacheService{
+ cache: cache,
+ repo: repo,
+ log: log.With("service", "membership_cache"),
+ }, nil
+}
+
+// cacheKey returns the Redis key for a (tenant, user) pair. Tenant
+// comes first so a tenant-wide flush via DeletePattern("tenant:*")
+// is straightforward — same shape as the permission cache.
+func (s *MembershipCacheService) cacheKey(tenantID, userID shared.ID) string {
+ return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", tenantID.String(), userID.String())
+}
+
+// GetMembership satisfies the middleware.MembershipReader interface.
+// It returns a *tenant.Membership reconstructed from cached state on
+// hit, or fetches from the repo + populates the cache on miss.
+func (s *MembershipCacheService) GetMembership(
+ ctx context.Context, userID shared.ID, tenantID shared.ID,
+) (*tenant.Membership, error) {
+ key := s.cacheKey(tenantID, userID)
+
+ // Try cache first. Any cache error is logged and treated as a
+ // miss — the lookup must still serve the request.
+ cached, err := s.cache.Get(ctx, key)
+ if err == nil && cached != nil {
+ return s.reconstructFromCache(*cached, userID, tenantID), nil
+ }
+
+ // Cache miss → fetch from the repository.
+ m, err := s.repo.GetMembership(ctx, userID, tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ // Best-effort cache write. Failure here doesn't affect the
+ // caller; the next request will simply miss again.
+ val := CachedMembership{
+ ID: m.ID().String(),
+ Role: m.Role().String(),
+ Status: string(m.Status()),
+ JoinedAt: m.JoinedAt(),
+ }
+ if cacheErr := s.cache.Set(ctx, key, val); cacheErr != nil {
+ s.log.Warn("failed to cache membership",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID.String(),
+ "user_id", userID.String(),
+ "error", cacheErr)
+ }
+
+ return m, nil
+}
+
+// Invalidate drops the cached entry for a (tenant, user) pair.
+// Called from TenantService whenever a mutation could change role
+// or status: SuspendMember, ReactivateMember, UpdateMembership
+// (role change), DeleteMembership, AddMember (initial set).
+func (s *MembershipCacheService) Invalidate(
+ ctx context.Context, tenantID, userID string,
+) {
+ if tenantID == "" || userID == "" {
+ return
+ }
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ uid, err := shared.IDFromString(userID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return
+ }
+ key := s.cacheKey(tid, uid)
+ if err := s.cache.Delete(ctx, key); err != nil {
+ s.log.Warn("failed to invalidate membership cache",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID, "user_id", userID, "error", err)
+ }
+}
+
+// InvalidateForTenant drops every cached membership in a tenant.
+// Used when a role mass-update or tenant-wide rule change might
+// have shifted the effective role of every member at once.
+func (s *MembershipCacheService) InvalidateForTenant(
+ ctx context.Context, tenantID string,
+) {
+ if tenantID == "" {
+ return
+ }
+ pattern := fmt.Sprintf("%s:*", tenantID)
+ if err := s.cache.DeletePattern(ctx, pattern); err != nil {
+ s.log.Warn("failed to invalidate tenant membership cache",
+ "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", err)
+ }
+}
+
+// reconstructFromCache turns the slim cached value back into a
+// *tenant.Membership the middleware can inspect. We have neither
+// invitedBy nor suspended_at/suspended_by in the cache (they're not
+// needed for the access-control check) so they default to nil.
+// Reconstitute*WithStatus is reused so the caller never sees an
+// inconsistent entity.
+func (s *MembershipCacheService) reconstructFromCache(
+ v CachedMembership, userID, tenantID shared.ID,
+) *tenant.Membership {
+ id, err := shared.IDFromString(v.ID)
+ if err != nil {
+ // Corrupt cache row — return nil-id membership; the next
+ // invalidation will replace it.
+ id = shared.ID{}
+ }
+ role, _ := tenant.ParseRole(v.Role)
+ return tenant.ReconstituteMembershipWithStatus(
+ id, userID, tenantID, role,
+ nil, // invitedBy — not in cache
+ v.JoinedAt, // joinedAt
+ tenant.MemberStatus(v.Status),
+ nil, // suspendedAt — not in cache, never read by middleware
+ nil, // suspendedBy — not in cache, never read by middleware
+ )
+}
+
+// MembershipCacheServiceErrorIsTransient is exposed for tests that
+// want to assert the cache layer never returns a fatal error.
+var MembershipCacheServiceErrorIsTransient = func(err error) bool {
+ if err == nil {
+ return true
+ }
+ return !errors.Is(err, shared.ErrNotFound)
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/pentest_service.go b/internal/app/pentest_service.go
index e23a9c53..1d274d5d 100644
--- a/internal/app/pentest_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/pentest_service.go
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package app
import (
"context"
+ "errors"
"fmt"
"time"
@@ -12,12 +13,14 @@ import (
"slices"
"strings"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/audit"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/notification"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/pentest"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/vulnerability"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
"github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/pagination"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/report"
)
// TenantMemberChecker verifies if a user belongs to a tenant.
@@ -29,13 +32,15 @@ type TenantMemberChecker interface {
type PentestService struct {
campaignRepo pentest.CampaignRepository
memberRepo pentest.CampaignMemberRepository
- findingRepo pentest.FindingRepository // Legacy: pentest_findings table
- unifiedFindingRepo vulnerability.FindingRepository // Unified: findings table (source='pentest')
+ findingRepo pentest.FindingRepository // Legacy: pentest_findings table
+ unifiedFindingRepo vulnerability.FindingRepository // Unified: findings table (source='pentest')
retestRepo pentest.RetestRepository
templateRepo pentest.TemplateRepository
reportRepo pentest.ReportRepository
userNotificationSvc *NotificationService
tenantMemberChecker TenantMemberChecker
+ auditService *AuditService // optional, for team change audit logging
+ findingActivitySvc *FindingActivityService // optional, for finding activity trail
logger *logger.Logger
}
@@ -73,6 +78,63 @@ func (s *PentestService) SetCampaignMemberRepository(repo pentest.CampaignMember
s.memberRepo = repo
}
+// pentestRoleCacheKey is a request-scoped cache for (tenant, campaign, user) → role.
+// Populated by the campaign RBAC middleware and read by resolver functions to
+// avoid duplicate DB lookups within a single request.
+type pentestRoleCacheKey struct{}
+
+type roleCacheEntry struct {
+ tenantID string
+ campaignID string
+ userID string
+ role pentest.CampaignRole
+}
+
+// WithCachedCampaignRole returns a new context with the given role memoized for
+// the duration of the request.
+func WithCachedCampaignRole(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID, userID string, role pentest.CampaignRole) context.Context {
+ return context.WithValue(ctx, pentestRoleCacheKey{}, &roleCacheEntry{
+ tenantID: tenantID,
+ campaignID: campaignID,
+ userID: userID,
+ role: role,
+ })
+}
+
+// getCachedRole returns a pointer to a cached role if the (tenant, campaign, user)
+// tuple matches — nil otherwise. Caller must fall back to a DB query on miss.
+func getCachedRole(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID, userID string) *pentest.CampaignRole {
+ entry, ok := ctx.Value(pentestRoleCacheKey{}).(*roleCacheEntry)
+ if !ok || entry == nil {
+ return nil
+ }
+ if entry.tenantID != tenantID || entry.campaignID != campaignID || entry.userID != userID {
+ return nil
+ }
+ return &entry.role
+}
+
+// SetAuditService wires an audit service for team change logging (fire-and-forget).
+// SetFindingActivityService sets the finding activity service for audit trail.
+func (s *PentestService) SetFindingActivityService(svc *FindingActivityService) {
+ s.findingActivitySvc = svc
+}
+
+func (s *PentestService) SetAuditService(svc *AuditService) {
+ s.auditService = svc
+}
+
+// logAudit sends an audit event via the configured audit service. Best-effort:
+// failures are logged but never bubble up — audit shouldn't fail the caller.
+func (s *PentestService) logAudit(ctx context.Context, actx AuditContext, event AuditEvent) {
+ if s.auditService == nil {
+ return
+ }
+ if err := s.auditService.LogEvent(ctx, actx, event); err != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to log audit event", "error", err, "action", event.Action)
+ }
+}
+
// SetUnifiedFindingRepository sets the unified finding repository for CTEM integration.
// When set, pentest findings are created in the findings table (source='pentest').
func (s *PentestService) SetUnifiedFindingRepository(repo vulnerability.FindingRepository) {
@@ -143,18 +205,12 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateCampaign(ctx context.Context, input CreateCampaig
// Auto-add creator as lead if no lead specified, and ensure creator is in team
teamIDs := input.TeamUserIDs
- if input.ActorID != "" {
- if leadID == nil {
- aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
- leadID = &aid
- }
- if !slices.Contains(teamIDs, input.ActorID) {
- teamIDs = append([]string{input.ActorID}, teamIDs...)
- }
- }
campaign.SetAssets(input.AssetIDs, input.AssetGroupIDs)
- campaign.SetTeamLegacy(leadID, teamIDs)
+ // Source of truth for team membership is pentest_campaign_members (created
+ // below). The deprecated lead_user_id / team_user_ids columns are no longer
+ // populated for new campaigns; they remain readable only for legacy rows.
+ _ = leadID // input shape kept for backward compat — see member creation below
campaign.SetTags(input.Tags)
if input.ActorID != "" {
@@ -166,33 +222,42 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateCampaign(ctx context.Context, input CreateCampaig
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create campaign: %w", err)
}
- // Create campaign members from team list (creator as lead, others as specified or tester)
+ // Create campaign members from team list (creator as lead, others as tester).
+ // Errors are logged but don't fail the campaign creation — the campaign row
+ // has already been persisted. Lead integrity is also enforced by the DB trigger
+ // on pentest_campaign_members.
if s.memberRepo != nil {
- // Creator always becomes lead
+ var actorSID shared.ID
+ var addedBy *shared.ID
if input.ActorID != "" {
- actorSID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
- leadMember, _ := pentest.NewCampaignMember(tenantID, campaign.ID(), actorSID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil)
- if leadMember != nil {
- _ = s.memberRepo.Create(ctx, leadMember)
+ actorSID, _ = shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
+ addedBy = &actorSID
+
+ leadMember, errLead := pentest.NewCampaignMember(tenantID, campaign.ID(), actorSID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil)
+ if errLead != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to build lead member entity", "error", errLead, "campaign_id", campaign.ID().String())
+ } else if err := s.memberRepo.Create(ctx, leadMember); err != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to persist lead member", "error", err, "campaign_id", campaign.ID().String(), "user_id", input.ActorID)
}
}
- // Add other team members as testers (skip creator, already added as lead)
+
+ // Add other team members as testers (skip creator, already added as lead).
for _, uid := range teamIDs {
if uid == input.ActorID {
continue
}
memberID, err := shared.IDFromString(uid)
if err != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("skipping invalid team member id", "user_id", uid, "campaign_id", campaign.ID().String())
continue
}
- var addedBy *shared.ID
- if input.ActorID != "" {
- a, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
- addedBy = &a
+ m, errNew := pentest.NewCampaignMember(tenantID, campaign.ID(), memberID, pentest.CampaignRoleTester, addedBy)
+ if errNew != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to build team member entity", "error", errNew, "user_id", uid)
+ continue
}
- m, _ := pentest.NewCampaignMember(tenantID, campaign.ID(), memberID, pentest.CampaignRoleTester, addedBy)
- if m != nil {
- _ = s.memberRepo.Create(ctx, m)
+ if err := s.memberRepo.Create(ctx, m); err != nil {
+ s.logger.Error("failed to persist team member", "error", err, "user_id", uid, "campaign_id", campaign.ID().String())
}
}
}
@@ -235,6 +300,7 @@ type UpdateCampaignInput struct {
AssetIDs []string
AssetGroupIDs []string
Tags []string
+ Metadata map[string]any
}
// UpdateCampaign updates an existing campaign.
@@ -267,14 +333,13 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdateCampaign(ctx context.Context, input UpdateCampaig
parseOptionalDate(input.StartDate), parseOptionalDate(input.EndDate))
campaign.SetScope(input.ScopeItems, input.RulesOfEngagement, input.Objectives)
- var leadID *shared.ID
- if input.LeadUserID != nil {
- lid, _ := shared.IDFromString(*input.LeadUserID)
- leadID = &lid
- }
campaign.SetAssets(input.AssetIDs, input.AssetGroupIDs)
- campaign.SetTeamLegacy(leadID, input.TeamUserIDs)
+ // Team membership lives in pentest_campaign_members; UpdateCampaign no
+ // longer touches the deprecated lead_user_id / team_user_ids columns.
+ // Use AddCampaignMember / UpdateCampaignMemberRole / RemoveCampaignMember
+ // for team mutations.
campaign.SetTags(input.Tags)
+ campaign.MergeMetadata(input.Metadata)
if err := s.campaignRepo.Update(ctx, campaign); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update campaign: %w", err)
@@ -406,9 +471,18 @@ type CampaignUpdateMemberRoleInput struct {
CampaignID string
UserID string
NewRole string
+ ActorID string // the user performing the update, for audit trail
+}
+
+// CampaignTeamChangeResult captures the outcome of team membership changes
+// that may carry soft warnings the caller should show the user.
+type CampaignTeamChangeResult struct {
+ Member *pentest.CampaignMember
+ Warning string // optional soft warning (e.g., last reviewer removed with in_review findings)
}
// AddCampaignMember adds a user to a campaign with a specific role.
+// Logs an audit event on success.
func (s *PentestService) AddCampaignMember(ctx context.Context, input CampaignAddMemberInput) (*pentest.CampaignMember, error) {
if s.memberRepo == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: member repository not configured", shared.ErrValidation)
@@ -423,6 +497,16 @@ func (s *PentestService) AddCampaignMember(ctx context.Context, input CampaignAd
campaignID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.CampaignID)
userID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.UserID)
+ // SECURITY: Verify the campaign exists in the caller's tenant. This is the
+ // last line of defense for cross-tenant member injection — without this,
+ // an admin in tenant A could insert members into a campaign in tenant B
+ // just by knowing its UUID (the FK only enforces user/campaign existence,
+ // not tenant alignment).
+ if _, err := s.campaignRepo.GetByID(ctx, tenantID, campaignID); err != nil {
+ // 404 — pretend the campaign doesn't exist for callers in another tenant.
+ return nil, pentest.ErrCampaignNotFound
+ }
+
var actorID *shared.ID
if input.ActorID != "" {
a, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
@@ -442,52 +526,134 @@ func (s *PentestService) AddCampaignMember(ctx context.Context, input CampaignAd
}
if err := s.memberRepo.Create(ctx, member); err != nil {
- return nil, err
+ // Map FK violations to 404 (caller cannot tell our internal validation error apart from a missing entity)
+ if errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrMemberAlreadyExists) {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create campaign member: %w", err)
}
s.logger.Info("campaign member added", "campaign", input.CampaignID, "user", input.UserID, "role", input.Role)
+
+ s.logAudit(ctx, AuditContext{TenantID: input.TenantID, ActorID: input.ActorID},
+ NewSuccessEvent(audit.ActionCampaignMemberAdded, audit.ResourceTypeCampaign, input.CampaignID).
+ WithMessage(fmt.Sprintf("Added user %s as %s", input.UserID, input.Role)).
+ WithMetadata("member_user_id", input.UserID).
+ WithMetadata("role", input.Role))
+
+ // Notify the user they were added (fire-and-forget; skip if user == actor).
+ campaignName := s.fetchCampaignName(ctx, tenantID, campaignID)
+ s.notifyUser(ctx, tenantID, &userID, input.ActorID,
+ notification.TypeCampaignMemberAdded,
+ fmt.Sprintf("Added to campaign: %s", campaignName),
+ fmt.Sprintf("You were added as %s.", input.Role),
+ "campaign", &campaignID,
+ fmt.Sprintf("/pentest/campaigns?id=%s", input.CampaignID))
+
return member, nil
}
+// fetchCampaignName best-effort lookup for notification text. Returns the
+// campaign ID as fallback so users still see something meaningful.
+func (s *PentestService) fetchCampaignName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID shared.ID) string {
+ c, err := s.campaignRepo.GetByID(ctx, tenantID, campaignID)
+ if err != nil || c == nil {
+ return campaignID.String()
+ }
+ return c.Name()
+}
+
// RemoveCampaignMember removes a user from a campaign.
// Validates: not removing last lead, not self-removing if lead.
-func (s *PentestService) RemoveCampaignMember(ctx context.Context, input CampaignRemoveMemberInput) error {
+// Returns a soft warning string if removing the last reviewer while in_review findings exist.
+// Lead integrity check + delete are serialized via a transaction with SELECT FOR UPDATE.
+func (s *PentestService) RemoveCampaignMember(ctx context.Context, input CampaignRemoveMemberInput) (string, error) {
if s.memberRepo == nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("%w: member repository not configured", shared.ErrValidation)
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: member repository not configured", shared.ErrValidation)
}
- // Load members to validate lead integrity
- members, err := s.memberRepo.ListByCampaign(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID)
- if err != nil {
- return fmt.Errorf("failed to list members: %w", err)
+ // SECURITY (defensive, mirrors AddCampaignMember): verify the campaign exists
+ // in the caller's tenant before proceeding.
+ {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.CampaignID)
+ if _, err := s.campaignRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid); err != nil {
+ return "", pentest.ErrCampaignNotFound
+ }
}
- var targetRole pentest.CampaignRole
- leadCount := 0
+ // Pre-fetch members to compute the soft warning (last-reviewer-with-in-review).
+ // The actual lead-integrity validation + delete happen atomically in
+ // RemoveCampaignMemberSafely under a SELECT FOR UPDATE lock, so concurrent
+ // removals/role-changes can't bypass the last-lead check.
+ members, listErr := s.memberRepo.ListByCampaign(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID)
+ if listErr != nil {
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to list members: %w", listErr)
+ }
+
+ var targetPreviewRole pentest.CampaignRole
+ reviewerCount := 0
for _, m := range members {
- if m.Role() == pentest.CampaignRoleLead {
- leadCount++
+ if m.Role() == pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer {
+ reviewerCount++
}
if m.UserID().String() == input.UserID {
- targetRole = m.Role()
+ targetPreviewRole = m.Role()
}
}
- if targetRole == "" {
- return pentest.ErrMemberNotFound
- }
-
- // Cannot remove the last lead
- if targetRole == pentest.CampaignRoleLead && leadCount <= 1 {
- return pentest.ErrLastLead
- }
-
- // Lead cannot remove self (must assign another lead first)
- if input.ActorID != "" && input.ActorID == input.UserID && targetRole == pentest.CampaignRoleLead {
- return pentest.ErrLeadSelfRemove
+ // Compute soft warning BEFORE the transactional delete so the user gets
+ // the heads-up even when the delete races with another operation.
+ warning := ""
+ if targetPreviewRole == pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer && reviewerCount <= 1 {
+ if s.unifiedFindingRepo != nil {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.CampaignID)
+ inReview := vulnerability.FindingStatusInReview
+ filter := vulnerability.FindingFilter{
+ TenantID: &tid,
+ PentestCampaignID: &cid,
+ Sources: []vulnerability.FindingSource{vulnerability.FindingSourcePentest},
+ Statuses: []vulnerability.FindingStatus{inReview},
+ }
+ count, cerr := s.unifiedFindingRepo.Count(ctx, filter)
+ if cerr == nil && count > 0 {
+ warning = fmt.Sprintf("Warning: %d finding(s) are still in 'in_review' status with no reviewer remaining. Lead may need to confirm them directly.", count)
+ }
+ }
}
- return s.memberRepo.DeleteByUserID(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID, input.UserID)
+ // Atomic remove with SELECT FOR UPDATE serialization.
+ previousRole, err := s.memberRepo.RemoveCampaignMemberSafely(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID, input.UserID, input.ActorID)
+ if err != nil {
+ // Audit security-relevant rejections so admins can detect attacks /
+ // misconfigurations. ErrMemberNotFound is benign (404 path).
+ if errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrLastLead) || errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrLeadSelfRemove) {
+ s.logAudit(ctx, AuditContext{TenantID: input.TenantID, ActorID: input.ActorID},
+ NewDeniedEvent(audit.ActionCampaignMemberRemoved, audit.ResourceTypeCampaign, input.CampaignID, err.Error()).
+ WithMetadata("member_user_id", input.UserID))
+ }
+ return "", err
+ }
+
+ s.logAudit(ctx, AuditContext{TenantID: input.TenantID, ActorID: input.ActorID},
+ NewSuccessEvent(audit.ActionCampaignMemberRemoved, audit.ResourceTypeCampaign, input.CampaignID).
+ WithMessage(fmt.Sprintf("Removed user %s (role: %s)", input.UserID, previousRole)).
+ WithMetadata("member_user_id", input.UserID).
+ WithMetadata("previous_role", string(previousRole)))
+
+ // Notify the removed user (fire-and-forget; skip if user == actor).
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.CampaignID)
+ uid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.UserID)
+ campaignName := s.fetchCampaignName(ctx, tid, cid)
+ s.notifyUser(ctx, tid, &uid, input.ActorID,
+ notification.TypeCampaignMemberRemoved,
+ fmt.Sprintf("Removed from campaign: %s", campaignName),
+ "You no longer have access to this campaign.",
+ "campaign", &cid, "")
+
+ return warning, nil
}
// UpdateCampaignMemberRole changes a member's role.
@@ -502,6 +668,16 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdateCampaignMemberRole(ctx context.Context, input Cam
return err
}
+ // SECURITY (defensive, mirrors AddCampaignMember): verify the campaign exists
+ // in the caller's tenant before proceeding.
+ {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.CampaignID)
+ if _, err := s.campaignRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid); err != nil {
+ return pentest.ErrCampaignNotFound
+ }
+ }
+
// Load members to find target + validate lead integrity
members, err := s.memberRepo.ListByCampaign(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID)
if err != nil {
@@ -523,12 +699,41 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdateCampaignMemberRole(ctx context.Context, input Cam
return pentest.ErrMemberNotFound
}
+ previousRole := targetMember.Role()
+
// Cannot demote the last lead
- if targetMember.Role() == pentest.CampaignRoleLead && newRole != pentest.CampaignRoleLead && leadCount <= 1 {
+ if previousRole == pentest.CampaignRoleLead && newRole != pentest.CampaignRoleLead && leadCount <= 1 {
+ s.logAudit(ctx, AuditContext{TenantID: input.TenantID, ActorID: input.ActorID},
+ NewDeniedEvent(audit.ActionCampaignMemberRoleChanged, audit.ResourceTypeCampaign, input.CampaignID, "cannot demote last lead").
+ WithMetadata("member_user_id", input.UserID).
+ WithMetadata("attempted_new_role", string(newRole)))
return pentest.ErrLastLead
}
- return s.memberRepo.UpdateRole(ctx, targetMember.TenantID(), targetMember.ID(), newRole)
+ if err := s.memberRepo.UpdateRole(ctx, targetMember.TenantID(), targetMember.ID(), newRole); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ s.logAudit(ctx, AuditContext{TenantID: input.TenantID, ActorID: input.ActorID},
+ NewSuccessEvent(audit.ActionCampaignMemberRoleChanged, audit.ResourceTypeCampaign, input.CampaignID).
+ WithMessage(fmt.Sprintf("Changed role for user %s: %s → %s", input.UserID, previousRole, newRole)).
+ WithMetadata("member_user_id", input.UserID).
+ WithMetadata("previous_role", string(previousRole)).
+ WithMetadata("new_role", string(newRole)))
+
+ // Notify the user whose role changed (fire-and-forget; skip if user == actor).
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.CampaignID)
+ uid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.UserID)
+ campaignName := s.fetchCampaignName(ctx, tid, cid)
+ s.notifyUser(ctx, tid, &uid, input.ActorID,
+ notification.TypeCampaignMemberRoleChange,
+ fmt.Sprintf("Role changed in campaign: %s", campaignName),
+ fmt.Sprintf("Your role changed from %s to %s.", previousRole, newRole),
+ "campaign", &cid,
+ fmt.Sprintf("/pentest/campaigns?id=%s", input.CampaignID))
+
+ return nil
}
// ListCampaignMembers returns all members of a campaign.
@@ -550,6 +755,10 @@ func (s *PentestService) GetUserCampaignRole(ctx context.Context, tenantID, camp
// ResolveCampaignRoleForFinding resolves the caller's campaign role from a unified finding.
// Used by finding-direct routes where campaign ID is not in the URL.
// Returns role and the finding. Admin callers get empty role (bypass enforced elsewhere).
+//
+// Performance: honours a role already resolved by CampaignRoleResolver middleware
+// (if the request path goes through /campaigns/{id}/...) to avoid redundant queries.
+// For pure finding-direct routes the middleware isn't wired, so we hit the DB once.
func (s *PentestService) ResolveCampaignRoleForFinding(ctx context.Context, tenantID, findingID, userID string, isAdmin bool) (pentest.CampaignRole, *vulnerability.Finding, error) {
if s.unifiedFindingRepo == nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unified finding repository not configured", shared.ErrValidation)
@@ -580,6 +789,14 @@ func (s *PentestService) ResolveCampaignRoleForFinding(ctx context.Context, tena
return "", finding, nil
}
+ // Reuse request-scoped cache populated by CampaignRoleResolver middleware when
+ // the same campaign role is already known for this request. This eliminates
+ // duplicate DB hits if the caller happens to already be in a campaign-scoped
+ // route that resolved the same campaign.
+ if cached := getCachedRole(ctx, tenantID, campaignID.String(), userID); cached != nil {
+ return *cached, finding, nil
+ }
+
role, err := s.memberRepo.GetUserRole(ctx, tenantID, campaignID.String(), userID)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, pentest.ErrNotCampaignMember // 404, not 403
@@ -588,6 +805,13 @@ func (s *PentestService) ResolveCampaignRoleForFinding(ctx context.Context, tena
return role, finding, nil
}
+// CheckFindingAccess verifies that a user has campaign membership for a pentest finding.
+// Implements FindingCampaignAccessChecker interface used by attachment handler.
+func (s *PentestService) CheckFindingAccess(ctx context.Context, tenantID, findingID, userID string, isAdmin bool) error {
+ _, _, err := s.ResolveCampaignRoleForFinding(ctx, tenantID, findingID, userID, isAdmin)
+ return err
+}
+
// BatchListCampaignMembers returns members grouped by campaign ID for batch enrichment.
func (s *PentestService) BatchListCampaignMembers(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, campaignIDs []string) (map[string][]*pentest.CampaignMember, error) {
if s.memberRepo == nil {
@@ -632,6 +856,53 @@ type PentestFindingInput struct {
TemplateID *string
}
+// RequireCampaignWritableForFinding looks up the finding's campaign and applies
+// the writability lock check. Used by finding-direct routes that don't go
+// through campaign-scoped middleware. allowExistingUpdates: if true, on_hold
+// campaigns allow updating existing items (block only new creation).
+func (s *PentestService) RequireCampaignWritableForFinding(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, finding *vulnerability.Finding, allowExistingUpdates bool) error {
+ if finding == nil || finding.PentestCampaignID() == nil {
+ // Orphaned finding (no campaign) → admin already passed by reaching here.
+ return nil
+ }
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ campaign, err := s.campaignRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, *finding.PentestCampaignID())
+ if err != nil {
+ // If we can't fetch, fall through (the resolver already verified access).
+ return nil
+ }
+ return pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(campaign.Status(), allowExistingUpdates)
+}
+
+// validateFindingAssignee checks that the target user can be assigned a pentest
+// finding in the given campaign — observers are read-only and cannot be assignees.
+//
+// Returns nil (allow) when:
+// - memberRepo is not wired (dev / legacy path)
+// - tenantID / campaignID / assigneeID cannot be parsed
+// - the assignee is not a member of the campaign (no explicit role to check)
+// - the assignee's role is lead / tester / reviewer
+//
+// Returns ErrAssignToObserver when the assignee is explicitly an observer.
+func (s *PentestService) validateFindingAssignee(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID, assigneeID string) error {
+ if s.memberRepo == nil || tenantID == "" || campaignID == "" || assigneeID == "" {
+ return nil
+ }
+ role, err := s.memberRepo.GetUserRole(ctx, tenantID, campaignID, assigneeID)
+ if err != nil {
+ // Not a member at all → reject. Findings assigned to non-members get
+ // stuck (no one can act on them) and break workflow assumptions.
+ // Note: this is a tightening from the prior "allow if not member" rule.
+ if errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrMemberNotFound) {
+ return fmt.Errorf("%w: assignee is not a member of this campaign", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ // Other errors: log and allow to avoid blocking on transient DB issues.
+ s.logger.Warn("failed to resolve assignee role, allowing assignment", "error", err, "campaign_id", campaignID, "user_id", assigneeID)
+ return nil
+ }
+ return pentest.ValidateAssigneeRole(role)
+}
+
// CreateFinding creates a new pentest finding.
func (s *PentestService) CreateFinding(ctx context.Context, input PentestFindingInput) (*pentest.Finding, error) {
tenantID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
@@ -659,6 +930,9 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateFinding(ctx context.Context, input PentestFinding
}
if input.AssignedTo != nil {
+ if err := s.validateFindingAssignee(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID, *input.AssignedTo); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(*input.AssignedTo)
finding.SetAssignedTo(&aid)
}
@@ -745,9 +1019,24 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateUnifiedFinding(ctx context.Context, input Pentest
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid campaign_id", shared.ErrValidation)
}
- assetID, err := shared.IDFromString(input.AssetID)
- if err != nil {
- return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: asset_id is required for pentest findings", shared.ErrValidation)
+ // asset_id is OPTIONAL for pentest findings (migration 000112). When the
+ // pentester targets something not in the asset inventory (subdomain,
+ // ephemeral resource, social engineering target, physical observation),
+ // they describe it via affected_assets[] free text instead.
+ // Validation: at least one of asset_id OR affected_assets[] must be set,
+ // otherwise we have a finding with no target.
+ var assetID shared.ID
+ if input.AssetID != "" {
+ parsed, perr := shared.IDFromString(input.AssetID)
+ if perr != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid asset_id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ assetID = parsed
+ }
+ // Affected targets are always required — pentester must describe WHERE.
+ // CTEM asset linkage is independently optional.
+ if len(input.AffectedAssetsText) == 0 && input.AssetID == "" {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: at least one affected target is required", shared.ErrValidation)
}
// Validate campaign allows new finding creation
@@ -780,6 +1069,13 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateUnifiedFinding(ctx context.Context, input Pentest
finding.ForceStatus(vulnerability.FindingStatusDraft)
finding.SetPentestCampaignID(&campaignID)
+ // Record the creator for pentest ownership checks (delete=creator only, edit=creator+assignee).
+ if input.ActorID != "" {
+ if actorID, errActor := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID); errActor == nil {
+ finding.SetCreatedBy(actorID)
+ }
+ }
+
// Generate deterministic fingerprint
finding.SetFingerprint(generatePentestFingerprint(campaignID.String(), input.Title))
@@ -820,6 +1116,9 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateUnifiedFinding(ctx context.Context, input Pentest
_ = finding.SetClassification(input.CVEID, input.CVSSScore, input.CVSSVector, cweIDs, owaspIDs)
}
if input.AssignedTo != nil {
+ if err := s.validateFindingAssignee(ctx, input.TenantID, input.CampaignID, *input.AssignedTo); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(*input.AssignedTo)
finding.Assign(aid, shared.ID{})
}
@@ -843,6 +1142,20 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateUnifiedFinding(ctx context.Context, input Pentest
}
s.logger.Info("pentest finding created (unified)", "id", finding.ID().String(), "campaign", input.CampaignID)
+
+ // Record activity
+ if s.findingActivitySvc != nil {
+ _, _ = s.findingActivitySvc.RecordActivity(ctx, RecordActivityInput{
+ TenantID: input.TenantID,
+ FindingID: finding.ID().String(),
+ ActivityType: string(vulnerability.ActivityCreated),
+ ActorID: &input.ActorID,
+ ActorType: string(vulnerability.ActorTypeUser),
+ Changes: map[string]interface{}{"title": input.Title, "severity": input.Severity},
+ Source: string(vulnerability.SourceAPI),
+ })
+ }
+
return finding, nil
}
@@ -879,6 +1192,7 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdatePentestFindingStatus(ctx context.Context, tenantI
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: cannot transition from %s to %s", shared.ErrValidation, finding.Status(), status)
}
+ oldStatus := finding.Status().String()
finding.ForceStatus(status)
if err := s.unifiedFindingRepo.Update(ctx, finding); err != nil {
@@ -886,6 +1200,12 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdatePentestFindingStatus(ctx context.Context, tenantI
}
s.logger.Info("pentest finding status updated", "id", findingID, "status", newStatus)
+
+ // Record activity
+ if s.findingActivitySvc != nil {
+ _, _ = s.findingActivitySvc.RecordStatusChange(ctx, tenantID, findingID, &actorID, oldStatus, newStatus, "", string(vulnerability.SourceAPI))
+ }
+
return finding, nil
}
@@ -924,12 +1244,19 @@ func (s *PentestService) ListUnifiedCampaignFindings(ctx context.Context, tenant
Sources: []vulnerability.FindingSource{pentestSource},
PentestCampaignID: &cid,
}
- return s.unifiedFindingRepo.List(ctx, filter, vulnerability.NewFindingListOptions(), page)
+ opts := vulnerability.NewFindingListOptions().WithSort(
+ pagination.NewSortOption(vulnerability.FindingAllowedSortFields()).Parse("severity,-created_at"),
+ )
+ return s.unifiedFindingRepo.List(ctx, filter, opts, page)
}
// ListAllPentestFindings lists all pentest findings across all campaigns.
// If campaignID is provided, filters by that campaign.
-func (s *PentestService) ListAllPentestFindings(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID string, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*vulnerability.Finding], error) {
+//
+// Visibility: when viewerUserID is non-empty AND isAdmin=false, findings are
+// restricted to campaigns the viewer is a member of (pentest_campaign_members).
+// Admin callers see everything.
+func (s *PentestService) ListAllPentestFindings(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID, viewerUserID, search string, isAdmin bool, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*vulnerability.Finding], error) {
if s.unifiedFindingRepo == nil {
return pagination.Result[*vulnerability.Finding]{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: unified finding repository not configured", shared.ErrValidation)
}
@@ -943,7 +1270,25 @@ func (s *PentestService) ListAllPentestFindings(ctx context.Context, tenantID, c
cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
filter.PentestCampaignID = &cid
}
- return s.unifiedFindingRepo.List(ctx, filter, vulnerability.NewFindingListOptions(), page)
+ if search != "" {
+ filter = filter.WithSearch(search)
+ }
+
+ // Visibility enforcement for non-admin users: push a subquery down to the DB
+ // via PentestCampaignMemberUserID. This is 1 query total (vs. 2 if we resolve
+ // membership in Go then fill IN clause with placeholders), and scales to
+ // users with many campaign memberships.
+ if !isAdmin && viewerUserID != "" {
+ uid, err := shared.IDFromString(viewerUserID)
+ if err == nil {
+ filter.PentestCampaignMemberUserID = &uid
+ }
+ }
+
+ opts := vulnerability.NewFindingListOptions().WithSort(
+ pagination.NewSortOption(vulnerability.FindingAllowedSortFields()).Parse("severity,-created_at"),
+ )
+ return s.unifiedFindingRepo.List(ctx, filter, opts, page)
}
// UpdateUnifiedFinding updates a pentest finding in the unified findings table.
@@ -998,6 +1343,13 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdateUnifiedFinding(ctx context.Context, tenantID, fin
// Update assignment
if input.AssignedTo != nil {
+ campaignIDStr := ""
+ if cid := finding.PentestCampaignID(); cid != nil {
+ campaignIDStr = cid.String()
+ }
+ if err := s.validateFindingAssignee(ctx, tenantID, campaignIDStr, *input.AssignedTo); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(*input.AssignedTo)
finding.Assign(aid, shared.ID{})
}
@@ -1048,6 +1400,32 @@ func (s *PentestService) UpdateUnifiedFinding(ctx context.Context, tenantID, fin
}
s.logger.Info("pentest finding updated (unified)", "id", findingID)
+
+ // Notify assignee on reassignment
+ if input.AssignedTo != nil && finding.AssignedTo() != nil && input.ActorID != *input.AssignedTo {
+ s.notifyUser(ctx, finding.TenantID(), finding.AssignedTo(), input.ActorID,
+ notification.TypeFindingAssigned,
+ fmt.Sprintf("Assigned to you: %s", finding.Title()),
+ "",
+ "finding", nil,
+ fmt.Sprintf("/pentest/findings/%s", findingID),
+ )
+ }
+
+ // Record activity
+ if s.findingActivitySvc != nil {
+ actorID := input.ActorID
+ _, _ = s.findingActivitySvc.RecordActivity(ctx, RecordActivityInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID,
+ FindingID: findingID,
+ ActivityType: string(vulnerability.ActivityMetadataUpdated),
+ ActorID: &actorID,
+ ActorType: string(vulnerability.ActorTypeUser),
+ Changes: map[string]interface{}{"updated_fields": "pentest_finding"},
+ Source: string(vulnerability.SourceAPI),
+ })
+ }
+
return finding, nil
}
@@ -1234,6 +1612,24 @@ func (s *PentestService) CreateRetest(ctx context.Context, input CreateRetestInp
}
s.logger.Info("retest created (unified)", "id", rt.ID().String(), "finding", input.FindingID, "status", input.Status)
+
+ // Record activity for the retest
+ if s.findingActivitySvc != nil {
+ actorID := input.ActorID
+ _, _ = s.findingActivitySvc.RecordActivity(ctx, RecordActivityInput{
+ TenantID: input.TenantID,
+ FindingID: input.FindingID,
+ ActivityType: "retest_submitted",
+ ActorID: &actorID,
+ ActorType: string(vulnerability.ActorTypeUser),
+ Changes: map[string]any{
+ "result": input.Status,
+ "retest_id": rt.ID().String(),
+ },
+ Source: string(vulnerability.SourceAPI),
+ })
+ }
+
return rt, nil
}
@@ -1501,6 +1897,173 @@ func (s *PentestService) ListReports(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, filte
return s.reportRepo.List(ctx, filter, page)
}
+// GenerateReportHTML generates an HTML report for a campaign.
+func (s *PentestService) GenerateReportHTML(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID string, options map[string]any) (string, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+ cid, err := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid campaign id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ // Fetch campaign
+ campaign, err := s.campaignRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get campaign: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ // Fetch stats
+ stats, err := s.findingRepo.GetStatsByCampaign(ctx, tid, cid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get campaign stats: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ // Fetch all findings (up to 500 for reports) via unified table
+ var findingData []report.FindingData
+ if s.unifiedFindingRepo != nil {
+ pentestSource := vulnerability.FindingSourcePentest
+ filter := vulnerability.FindingFilter{
+ TenantID: &tid,
+ Sources: []vulnerability.FindingSource{pentestSource},
+ PentestCampaignID: &cid,
+ }
+ result, listErr := s.unifiedFindingRepo.List(ctx, filter, vulnerability.NewFindingListOptions(), pagination.Pagination{Page: 1, PerPage: 500})
+ if listErr != nil {
+ return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to list findings: %w", listErr)
+ }
+
+ findingData = make([]report.FindingData, 0, len(result.Data))
+ for _, f := range result.Data {
+ meta := f.SourceMetadata()
+ var cvss float64
+ if f.CVSSScore() != nil {
+ cvss = *f.CVSSScore()
+ }
+ cwe := ""
+ if cweIDs := f.CWEIDs(); len(cweIDs) > 0 {
+ cwe = cweIDs[0]
+ }
+ fd := report.FindingData{
+ Title: f.Title(),
+ Severity: string(f.Severity()),
+ Status: string(f.Status()),
+ CVSSScore: cvss,
+ CVSSVector: f.CVSSVector(),
+ CWE: cwe,
+ Description: f.Description(),
+ CreatedAt: f.CreatedAt(),
+ }
+ if steps, ok := meta["steps_to_reproduce"].([]any); ok {
+ for _, step := range steps {
+ if str, ok := step.(string); ok {
+ fd.Steps = append(fd.Steps, str)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if v, ok := meta["poc_code"].(string); ok {
+ fd.POC = v
+ }
+ if v, ok := meta["business_impact"].(string); ok {
+ fd.Impact = v
+ }
+ if v, ok := meta["technical_impact"].(string); ok {
+ fd.TechImpact = v
+ }
+ if v, ok := meta["remediation_guidance"].(string); ok {
+ fd.Remediation = v
+ }
+ if targets, ok := meta["affected_assets"].([]any); ok {
+ for _, t := range targets {
+ if str, ok := t.(string); ok {
+ fd.Targets = append(fd.Targets, str)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if refs, ok := meta["reference_urls"].([]any); ok {
+ for _, ref := range refs {
+ if str, ok := ref.(string); ok {
+ fd.References = append(fd.References, str)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if v, ok := meta["owasp_category"].(string); ok {
+ fd.OWASP = v
+ }
+ findingData = append(findingData, fd)
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Fetch team members (memberRepo is optional — set via setter)
+ var teamData []report.TeamMemberData
+ if s.memberRepo != nil {
+ members, memberErr := s.memberRepo.ListByCampaign(ctx, tenantID, campaignID)
+ if memberErr != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("failed to list team members for report", "error", memberErr)
+ }
+ teamData = make([]report.TeamMemberData, 0, len(members))
+ for _, m := range members {
+ teamData = append(teamData, report.TeamMemberData{
+ Name: m.UserName(),
+ Email: m.UserEmail(),
+ Role: string(m.Role()),
+ })
+ }
+ }
+
+ startDate := ""
+ if campaign.StartDate() != nil {
+ startDate = campaign.StartDate().Format("2006-01-02")
+ }
+ endDate := ""
+ if campaign.EndDate() != nil {
+ endDate = campaign.EndDate().Format("2006-01-02")
+ }
+
+ classification := "internal"
+ if v, ok := options["classification"].(string); ok {
+ classification = v
+ }
+ watermark := ""
+ if v, ok := options["watermark"].(string); ok {
+ watermark = v
+ }
+
+ input := report.ReportInput{
+ Campaign: report.CampaignData{
+ Name: campaign.Name(),
+ Description: campaign.Description(),
+ ClientName: campaign.ClientName(),
+ ClientContact: campaign.ClientContact(),
+ Type: string(campaign.CampaignType()),
+ Priority: string(campaign.Priority()),
+ Status: string(campaign.Status()),
+ StartDate: startDate,
+ EndDate: endDate,
+ Methodology: campaign.Methodology(),
+ Team: teamData,
+ },
+ Findings: findingData,
+ Stats: report.StatsData{
+ Total: stats.TotalFindings,
+ Critical: stats.CriticalFindings,
+ High: stats.HighFindings,
+ Medium: stats.MediumFindings,
+ Low: stats.LowFindings,
+ Info: stats.InfoFindings,
+ Progress: stats.Progress,
+ AvgCVSS: stats.AverageCVSS,
+ MaxCVSS: stats.MaxCVSS,
+ },
+ GeneratedAt: time.Now(),
+ Classification: classification,
+ Watermark: watermark,
+ }
+
+ return report.GenerateHTML(input)
+}
+
// =============================================
// HELPERS
// =============================================
diff --git a/internal/app/remediation_campaign_service.go b/internal/app/remediation_campaign_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6c554cbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/remediation_campaign_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "fmt"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/remediation"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/pagination"
+)
+
+// RemediationCampaignService manages remediation campaigns.
+type RemediationCampaignService struct {
+ repo remediation.CampaignRepository
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewRemediationCampaignService creates a new service.
+func NewRemediationCampaignService(repo remediation.CampaignRepository, log *logger.Logger) *RemediationCampaignService {
+ return &RemediationCampaignService{repo: repo, logger: log}
+}
+
+// CreateRemediationCampaignInput holds input for creating a campaign.
+type CreateRemediationCampaignInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ Name string
+ Description string
+ Priority string
+ FindingFilter map[string]any
+ AssignedTo string
+ StartDate string
+ DueDate string
+ Tags []string
+ ActorID string
+}
+
+// CreateCampaign creates a new remediation campaign.
+func (s *RemediationCampaignService) CreateCampaign(ctx context.Context, input CreateRemediationCampaignInput) (*remediation.Campaign, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ priority := remediation.CampaignPriority(input.Priority)
+ if priority == "" {
+ priority = remediation.CampaignPriorityMedium
+ }
+
+ campaign, err := remediation.NewCampaign(tid, input.Name, priority)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ campaign.Update(input.Name, input.Description, priority)
+ if input.FindingFilter != nil {
+ campaign.SetFindingFilter(input.FindingFilter)
+ }
+ if input.Tags != nil {
+ campaign.SetTags(input.Tags)
+ }
+ if input.ActorID != "" {
+ actorID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
+ campaign.SetCreatedBy(actorID)
+ }
+ if input.AssignedTo != "" {
+ assignee, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.AssignedTo)
+ campaign.SetAssignment(&assignee, nil)
+ }
+
+ if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, campaign); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create remediation campaign: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ s.logger.Info("remediation campaign created", "id", campaign.ID().String(), "name", input.Name)
+ return campaign, nil
+}
+
+// GetCampaign retrieves a campaign.
+func (s *RemediationCampaignService) GetCampaign(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID string) (*remediation.Campaign, error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
+ return s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid)
+}
+
+// ListCampaigns lists campaigns with filtering.
+func (s *RemediationCampaignService) ListCampaigns(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, filter remediation.CampaignFilter, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*remediation.Campaign], error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ filter.TenantID = &tid
+ return s.repo.List(ctx, filter, page)
+}
+
+// UpdateCampaignStatus transitions campaign status.
+func (s *RemediationCampaignService) UpdateCampaignStatus(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID, newStatus string) (*remediation.Campaign, error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
+
+ campaign, err := s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ switch remediation.CampaignStatus(newStatus) {
+ case remediation.CampaignStatusActive:
+ err = campaign.Activate()
+ case remediation.CampaignStatusPaused:
+ err = campaign.Pause()
+ case remediation.CampaignStatusValidating:
+ err = campaign.StartValidation()
+ case remediation.CampaignStatusCompleted:
+ err = campaign.Complete()
+ case remediation.CampaignStatusCanceled:
+ campaign.Cancel()
+ default:
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid status: %s", shared.ErrValidation, newStatus)
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, campaign); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update campaign status: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ s.logger.Info("remediation campaign status updated", "id", campaignID, "status", newStatus)
+ return campaign, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteCampaign deletes a campaign.
+func (s *RemediationCampaignService) DeleteCampaign(ctx context.Context, tenantID, campaignID string) error {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(campaignID)
+ return s.repo.Delete(ctx, tid, cid)
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/role_service.go b/internal/app/role_service.go
index 12980964..5c3e5556 100644
--- a/internal/app/role_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/role_service.go
@@ -420,6 +420,32 @@ func (s *RoleService) GetUserRoles(ctx context.Context, tenantID, userID string)
return s.roleRepo.GetUserRoles(ctx, tid, uid)
}
+// GetUsersRoles returns all roles for multiple users in ONE round trip.
+// Used by the member list endpoint to avoid the N+1 enrichment loop.
+// Invalid user ID strings are silently dropped — the caller is the
+// member list which can't have invalid IDs by construction (they come
+// from the same DB), and the contract is "best effort" to keep the
+// list endpoint resilient.
+func (s *RoleService) GetUsersRoles(
+ ctx context.Context, tenantID string, userIDs []string,
+) (map[string][]*role.Role, error) {
+ tid, err := role.ParseID(tenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id format", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ parsed := make([]role.ID, 0, len(userIDs))
+ for _, s := range userIDs {
+ uid, err := role.ParseID(s)
+ if err != nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ parsed = append(parsed, uid)
+ }
+
+ return s.roleRepo.GetUsersRoles(ctx, tid, parsed)
+}
+
// GetUserPermissions returns all permissions for a user (UNION of all roles).
func (s *RoleService) GetUserPermissions(ctx context.Context, tenantID, userID string) ([]string, error) {
tid, err := role.ParseID(tenantID)
diff --git a/internal/app/simulation_service.go b/internal/app/simulation_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fd8c5dc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/simulation_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "fmt"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/simulation"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/pagination"
+)
+
+// SimulationService manages attack simulations and control tests.
+type SimulationService struct {
+ simRepo simulation.SimulationRepository
+ controlRepo simulation.ControlTestRepository
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewSimulationService creates a new simulation service.
+func NewSimulationService(simRepo simulation.SimulationRepository, controlRepo simulation.ControlTestRepository, log *logger.Logger) *SimulationService {
+ return &SimulationService{simRepo: simRepo, controlRepo: controlRepo, logger: log}
+}
+
+// ─── Simulation CRUD ───
+
+// CreateSimulationInput holds input for creating a simulation.
+type CreateSimulationInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ Name string
+ Description string
+ SimulationType string
+ MitreTactic string
+ MitreTechniqueID string
+ MitreTechniqueName string
+ TargetAssets []string
+ Config map[string]any
+ Tags []string
+ ActorID string
+}
+
+// CreateSimulation creates a new attack simulation.
+func (s *SimulationService) CreateSimulation(ctx context.Context, input CreateSimulationInput) (*simulation.Simulation, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ sim, err := simulation.NewSimulation(tid, input.Name, simulation.SimulationType(input.SimulationType))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ sim.Update(input.Name, input.Description)
+ sim.SetMITRE(input.MitreTactic, input.MitreTechniqueID, input.MitreTechniqueName)
+ if err := sim.SetConfig(input.Config, input.TargetAssets, input.Tags); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ if input.ActorID != "" {
+ actorID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ActorID)
+ sim.SetCreatedBy(actorID)
+ }
+
+ if err := s.simRepo.Create(ctx, sim); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create simulation: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ return sim, nil
+}
+
+// GetSimulation retrieves a simulation by ID.
+func (s *SimulationService) GetSimulation(ctx context.Context, tenantID, simID string) (*simulation.Simulation, error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ sid, _ := shared.IDFromString(simID)
+ return s.simRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, sid)
+}
+
+// ListSimulations lists simulations with filtering.
+func (s *SimulationService) ListSimulations(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, filter simulation.SimulationFilter, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*simulation.Simulation], error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ filter.TenantID = &tid
+ return s.simRepo.List(ctx, filter, page)
+}
+
+// UpdateSimulationInput holds input for updating a simulation.
+type UpdateSimulationInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ SimulationID string
+ Name string
+ Description string
+ MitreTactic string
+ MitreTechniqueID string
+ MitreTechniqueName string
+ TargetAssets []string
+ Config map[string]any
+ Tags []string
+}
+
+// UpdateSimulation updates a simulation.
+func (s *SimulationService) UpdateSimulation(ctx context.Context, input UpdateSimulationInput) (*simulation.Simulation, error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ sid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.SimulationID)
+
+ sim, err := s.simRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, sid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ sim.Update(input.Name, input.Description)
+ sim.SetMITRE(input.MitreTactic, input.MitreTechniqueID, input.MitreTechniqueName)
+ if err := sim.SetConfig(input.Config, input.TargetAssets, input.Tags); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ if err := s.simRepo.Update(ctx, sim); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update simulation: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ return sim, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteSimulation deletes a simulation.
+func (s *SimulationService) DeleteSimulation(ctx context.Context, tenantID, simID string) error {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ sid, _ := shared.IDFromString(simID)
+ return s.simRepo.Delete(ctx, tid, sid)
+}
+
+// ─── Control Test CRUD ───
+
+var errControlRepoNotConfigured = fmt.Errorf("%w: control test repository not configured", shared.ErrValidation)
+
+// CreateControlTestInput holds input for creating a control test.
+type CreateControlTestInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ Name string
+ Description string
+ Framework string
+ ControlID string
+ ControlName string
+ Category string
+ TestProcedure string
+ ExpectedResult string
+ RiskLevel string
+ Tags []string
+}
+
+// CreateControlTest creates a new control test.
+func (s *SimulationService) CreateControlTest(ctx context.Context, input CreateControlTestInput) (*simulation.ControlTest, error) {
+ if s.controlRepo == nil {
+ return nil, errControlRepoNotConfigured
+ }
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ ct, err := simulation.NewControlTest(tid, input.Name, input.Framework, input.ControlID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ ct.Update(input.Name, input.Description, input.ControlName, input.Category)
+ ct.SetTestDetails(input.TestProcedure, input.ExpectedResult)
+
+ if err := s.controlRepo.Create(ctx, ct); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create control test: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ return ct, nil
+}
+
+// GetControlTest retrieves a control test by ID.
+func (s *SimulationService) GetControlTest(ctx context.Context, tenantID, ctID string) (*simulation.ControlTest, error) {
+ if s.controlRepo == nil {
+ return nil, errControlRepoNotConfigured
+ }
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(ctID)
+ return s.controlRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid)
+}
+
+// ListControlTests lists control tests with filtering.
+func (s *SimulationService) ListControlTests(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, filter simulation.ControlTestFilter, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*simulation.ControlTest], error) {
+ if s.controlRepo == nil {
+ return pagination.Result[*simulation.ControlTest]{}, errControlRepoNotConfigured
+ }
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ filter.TenantID = &tid
+ return s.controlRepo.List(ctx, filter, page)
+}
+
+// GetControlTestStats returns aggregated stats per framework.
+func (s *SimulationService) GetControlTestStats(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]simulation.FrameworkStats, error) {
+ if s.controlRepo == nil {
+ return nil, errControlRepoNotConfigured
+ }
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ return s.controlRepo.GetStatsByFramework(ctx, tid)
+}
+
+// DeleteControlTest deletes a control test.
+func (s *SimulationService) DeleteControlTest(ctx context.Context, tenantID, ctID string) error {
+ if s.controlRepo == nil {
+ return errControlRepoNotConfigured
+ }
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(ctID)
+ return s.controlRepo.Delete(ctx, tid, cid)
+}
+
+// RecordControlTestResult records a test result.
+type RecordControlTestResultInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ ControlID string
+ Status string
+ Evidence string
+ Notes string
+ TestedByID string
+}
+
+// RecordControlTestResult records a test result.
+func (s *SimulationService) RecordControlTestResult(ctx context.Context, input RecordControlTestResultInput) (*simulation.ControlTest, error) {
+ if s.controlRepo == nil {
+ return nil, errControlRepoNotConfigured
+ }
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ cid, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.ControlID)
+ testerID, _ := shared.IDFromString(input.TestedByID)
+
+ ct, err := s.controlRepo.GetByID(ctx, tid, cid)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ ct.RecordResult(simulation.ControlTestStatus(input.Status), input.Evidence, input.Notes, testerID)
+
+ if err := s.controlRepo.Update(ctx, ct); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to record control test result: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ return ct, nil
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/tenant_service.go b/internal/app/tenant_service.go
index d354a9eb..f2f856a2 100644
--- a/internal/app/tenant_service.go
+++ b/internal/app/tenant_service.go
@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ type EmailJobEnqueuer interface {
EnqueueTeamInvitation(ctx context.Context, payload TeamInvitationJobPayload) error
}
+// MemberStatusEmailNotifier sends transactional emails when a
+// membership lifecycle event happens (suspend / reactivate). The
+// concrete implementation is *app.EmailService; we depend on the
+// interface here to keep the dependency direction clean.
+type MemberStatusEmailNotifier interface {
+ SendMemberSuspendedEmail(ctx context.Context, recipientEmail, recipientName, teamName, actorName, tenantID string) error
+ SendMemberReactivatedEmail(ctx context.Context, recipientEmail, recipientName, teamName, actorName, tenantID string) error
+}
+
// TeamInvitationJobPayload contains data for team invitation email jobs.
type TeamInvitationJobPayload struct {
RecipientEmail string
@@ -40,7 +49,28 @@ type TenantService struct {
// Permission sync services for immediate cache invalidation on member removal
permCacheSvc *PermissionCacheService
permVersionSvc *PermissionVersionService
- logger *logger.Logger
+ // Session service for revoking all sessions of a user when their
+ // access is paused (suspend) or removed. Without this, an existing
+ // browser tab keeps a valid JWT until expiry and the suspension
+ // only takes effect on tenant-scoped routes that hit
+ // RequireMembership middleware. JWT-claim-scoped routes (e.g.
+ // /api/v1/me/*, /api/v1/notifications) would still let the user in.
+ sessionService *SessionService
+ // Membership cache used by RequireMembership middleware. We hold a
+ // reference here so mutations (suspend / reactivate / role change /
+ // remove) can drop the cached entry immediately. nil means caching
+ // is disabled (Redis unavailable) and the middleware reads the
+ // repository directly — invalidation calls become no-ops.
+ membershipCache *MembershipCacheService
+ // Email notifier for membership lifecycle events. Optional — if
+ // nil (or if SMTP is not configured) the suspend/reactivate
+ // operations succeed without sending an email.
+ statusNotifier MemberStatusEmailNotifier
+ // User service for fetching user name + email when sending the
+ // suspend / reactivate notification email. Optional: when unset,
+ // the email is skipped (best-effort).
+ userService *UserService
+ logger *logger.Logger
}
// UserInfoProvider defines methods to fetch user information for emails.
@@ -107,6 +137,105 @@ func (s *TenantService) SetPermissionServices(cacheSvc *PermissionCacheService,
s.permVersionSvc = versionSvc
}
+// SetSessionService injects the session service so SuspendMember and
+// RemoveMember can revoke all of the user's sessions immediately.
+// Without it, suspended users can still hit JWT-claim-scoped routes
+// (e.g. /api/v1/me/*) until their JWT expires.
+func (s *TenantService) SetSessionService(sessionService *SessionService) {
+ s.sessionService = sessionService
+}
+
+// SetMembershipCache injects the membership cache so mutations
+// (suspend / reactivate / role change / member removal) can drop the
+// cached entry immediately. With the cache wired up, the middleware
+// no longer hits the database on every request — but the same wiring
+// is what guarantees a suspended user gets a 403 on their NEXT
+// request instead of after the cache TTL expires.
+func (s *TenantService) SetMembershipCache(cache *MembershipCacheService) {
+ s.membershipCache = cache
+}
+
+// SetMemberStatusEmailNotifier injects the email notifier used by
+// SuspendMember and ReactivateMember to tell the affected user what
+// happened. Optional: when unset, the operations still succeed but
+// the user is not notified.
+func (s *TenantService) SetMemberStatusEmailNotifier(n MemberStatusEmailNotifier) {
+ s.statusNotifier = n
+}
+
+// SetUserService injects the user service so the suspend/reactivate
+// notifier can resolve a recipient name + email from the user id on
+// the membership row. Optional alongside SetMemberStatusEmailNotifier.
+func (s *TenantService) SetUserService(u *UserService) {
+ s.userService = u
+}
+
+// notifyMemberStatusChange sends an email to the affected user when
+// their membership is suspended or reactivated. Best-effort: any
+// failure (no notifier wired, user lookup fail, SMTP down) is logged
+// at warn level and never returned to the caller, because the audit
+// log is the system of record for the lifecycle event.
+func (s *TenantService) notifyMemberStatusChange(
+ ctx context.Context,
+ suspended bool,
+ tenantID, userID, actorID string,
+) {
+ if s.statusNotifier == nil || s.userService == nil {
+ return
+ }
+
+ // Resolve user name + email.
+ users, err := s.userService.GetUsersByIDs(ctx, []string{userID})
+ if err != nil || len(users) == 0 {
+ s.logger.Warn("status email skipped: user lookup failed",
+ "user_id", userID, "error", err)
+ return
+ }
+ u := users[0]
+ if u.Email() == "" {
+ return
+ }
+
+ // Resolve tenant name (best effort).
+ teamName := "the team"
+ if tid, perr := shared.IDFromString(tenantID); perr == nil {
+ if t, terr := s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid); terr == nil && t != nil {
+ teamName = t.Name()
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Resolve actor name (best effort).
+ actorName := ""
+ if actorID != "" {
+ if actorUsers, aerr := s.userService.GetUsersByIDs(ctx, []string{actorID}); aerr == nil && len(actorUsers) > 0 {
+ actorName = actorUsers[0].Name()
+ }
+ }
+
+ var notifyErr error
+ if suspended {
+ notifyErr = s.statusNotifier.SendMemberSuspendedEmail(
+ ctx, u.Email(), u.Name(), teamName, actorName, tenantID)
+ } else {
+ notifyErr = s.statusNotifier.SendMemberReactivatedEmail(
+ ctx, u.Email(), u.Name(), teamName, actorName, tenantID)
+ }
+ if notifyErr != nil {
+ s.logger.Warn("status email failed",
+ "user_id", userID, "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", notifyErr)
+ }
+}
+
+// invalidateMembershipCache is the convenience helper used by every
+// mutation that touches role or status. Safe to call when the cache
+// is unset (no-op).
+func (s *TenantService) invalidateMembershipCache(ctx context.Context, tenantID, userID string) {
+ if s.membershipCache == nil {
+ return
+ }
+ s.membershipCache.Invalidate(ctx, tenantID, userID)
+}
+
// logAudit logs an audit event if audit service is configured.
func (s *TenantService) logAudit(ctx context.Context, actx AuditContext, event AuditEvent) {
if s.auditService == nil {
@@ -392,6 +521,12 @@ func (s *TenantService) UpdateMemberRole(ctx context.Context, membershipID strin
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update member role: %w", err)
}
+ // Drop the membership cache so the next request reads the new
+ // role instead of the cached old one. The permission cache is
+ // already invalidated separately by the role service when
+ // effective permissions change.
+ s.invalidateMembershipCache(ctx, membership.TenantID().String(), membership.UserID().String())
+
s.logger.Info("member role updated", "membership_id", membershipID, "new_role", role)
// Log audit event
@@ -430,9 +565,11 @@ func (s *TenantService) RemoveMember(ctx context.Context, membershipID string, a
return err
}
- // Immediately invalidate permission cache and version to prevent stale access
- // This reduces the window of vulnerability from 5 minutes (cache TTL) to 0
+ // Immediately invalidate permission cache, membership cache, and
+ // version to prevent stale access. This reduces the window of
+ // vulnerability from 5 minutes (cache TTL) to 0.
s.invalidateUserPermissions(ctx, tenantID, userID)
+ s.invalidateMembershipCache(ctx, tenantID, userID)
// Wipe any pending invitations the user still has in their inbox
// for this tenant. Without this they could re-accept the original
@@ -499,16 +636,44 @@ func (s *TenantService) SuspendMember(ctx context.Context, membershipID string,
tenantID := membership.TenantID().String()
userID := membership.UserID().String()
- // Immediately revoke access
+ // Immediately revoke access — four independent kill switches:
+ //
+ // 1. Permission cache invalidation: forces a fresh permission
+ // lookup on the next tenant-scoped request, which now sees
+ // the suspended status and 403s.
+ // 2. Membership cache invalidation: drops the cached membership
+ // so the RequireMembership middleware re-reads the suspended
+ // status from the DB on the next request instead of waiting
+ // for the cache TTL to expire.
+ // 3. Session revocation: kills all of this user's active sessions
+ // and refresh tokens. Without this, JWT-claim-scoped routes
+ // (/api/v1/me/*, /api/v1/notifications) would still let the
+ // user in until their JWT expired (~30 min).
+ // 4. Pending invitation cleanup: removes any unaccepted invites
+ // so the user can't rejoin via a stale link.
s.invalidateUserPermissions(ctx, tenantID, userID)
+ s.invalidateMembershipCache(ctx, tenantID, userID)
+
+ if s.sessionService != nil {
+ if err := s.sessionService.RevokeAllSessions(ctx, userID, ""); err != nil {
+ // Best effort — log but don't fail the suspend. The
+ // permission cache invalidation above is the primary
+ // kill switch; session revocation is defense in depth.
+ s.logger.Warn("failed to revoke sessions on suspend",
+ "user_id", userID, "error", err)
+ }
+ }
- // Invalidate pending invitations
if deleted, derr := s.repo.DeletePendingInvitationsByUserID(ctx, membership.TenantID(), membership.UserID()); derr != nil {
s.logger.Warn("failed to clean up invitations on suspend", "error", derr)
} else if deleted > 0 {
s.logger.Info("invalidated invitations on suspend", "deleted", deleted)
}
+ // Best-effort: notify the user via email so they know their
+ // access was paused (and aren't surprised by a 403 next login).
+ s.notifyMemberStatusChange(ctx, true, tenantID, userID, actx.ActorID)
+
s.logger.Info("member suspended", "membership_id", membershipID, "user_id", userID)
actx.TenantID = tenantID
@@ -544,6 +709,20 @@ func (s *TenantService) ReactivateMember(ctx context.Context, membershipID strin
tenantID := membership.TenantID().String()
userID := membership.UserID().String()
+ // Invalidate the permission cache so the user's reactivated state
+ // takes effect immediately. Without this the user could see stale
+ // "empty permissions" (the result of the suspend invalidation) for
+ // up to permCacheTTL (5 minutes). The Increment side-effect also
+ // bumps the user's permission version so any in-flight JWT clients
+ // know to refetch. The membership cache also has to drop its
+ // suspended snapshot so the next RequireMembership check sees
+ // status='active' immediately.
+ s.invalidateUserPermissions(ctx, tenantID, userID)
+ s.invalidateMembershipCache(ctx, tenantID, userID)
+
+ // Best-effort: notify the user via email that their access is back.
+ s.notifyMemberStatusChange(ctx, false, tenantID, userID, actx.ActorID)
+
s.logger.Info("member reactivated", "membership_id", membershipID, "user_id", userID)
actx.TenantID = tenantID
@@ -1434,5 +1613,6 @@ func (s *TenantService) GetRiskScoringSettings(ctx context.Context, tenantID str
}
settings := t.TypedSettings()
- return &settings.RiskScoring, nil
+ rs := settings.RiskScoring
+ return &rs, nil
}
diff --git a/internal/app/tenant_storage_resolver.go b/internal/app/tenant_storage_resolver.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..db33a9ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/tenant_storage_resolver.go
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "database/sql"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "errors"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/crypto"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/attachment"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+)
+
+// SettingsStorageResolver resolves per-tenant storage config from the settings table.
+type SettingsStorageResolver struct {
+ db *sql.DB
+ encryptor crypto.Encryptor // encrypts S3 credentials at rest
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewSettingsStorageResolver creates a new resolver.
+func NewSettingsStorageResolver(db *sql.DB, enc crypto.Encryptor, log *logger.Logger) *SettingsStorageResolver {
+ return &SettingsStorageResolver{db: db, encryptor: enc, logger: log}
+}
+
+// GetTenantStorageConfig reads the storage_config setting for a tenant.
+// Returns nil if not configured (tenant uses default provider).
+func (r *SettingsStorageResolver) GetTenantStorageConfig(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (*attachment.StorageConfig, error) {
+ query := `SELECT value_json FROM settings
+ WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND key = 'storage_config' AND value_json IS NOT NULL
+ LIMIT 1`
+
+ var raw json.RawMessage
+ err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, tenantID).Scan(&raw)
+ if err != nil {
+ if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+ return nil, nil // No config → use default
+ }
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ var cfg attachment.StorageConfig
+ if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &cfg); err != nil {
+ r.logger.Warn("invalid tenant storage config", "tenant_id", tenantID, "error", err)
+ return nil, nil
+ }
+ if cfg.Provider == "" {
+ return nil, nil
+ }
+
+ // Decrypt credentials
+ if r.encryptor != nil && cfg.AccessKey != "" {
+ if dec, err := r.encryptor.DecryptString(cfg.AccessKey); err == nil {
+ cfg.AccessKey = dec
+ }
+ }
+ if r.encryptor != nil && cfg.SecretKey != "" {
+ if dec, err := r.encryptor.DecryptString(cfg.SecretKey); err == nil {
+ cfg.SecretKey = dec
+ }
+ }
+
+ return &cfg, nil
+}
+
+// SaveTenantStorageConfig upserts the storage config for a tenant.
+func (r *SettingsStorageResolver) SaveTenantStorageConfig(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, cfg attachment.StorageConfig) error {
+ // Encrypt credentials before persisting
+ if r.encryptor != nil && cfg.AccessKey != "" {
+ if enc, err := r.encryptor.EncryptString(cfg.AccessKey); err == nil {
+ cfg.AccessKey = enc
+ }
+ }
+ if r.encryptor != nil && cfg.SecretKey != "" {
+ if enc, err := r.encryptor.EncryptString(cfg.SecretKey); err == nil {
+ cfg.SecretKey = enc
+ }
+ }
+
+ cfgJSON, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ query := `INSERT INTO settings (id, tenant_id, key, category, value_type, value_json, description)
+ VALUES (gen_random_uuid(), $1, 'storage_config', 'storage', 'json', $2, 'File storage provider configuration')
+ ON CONFLICT ON CONSTRAINT unique_setting_key
+ DO UPDATE SET value_json = $2, updated_at = NOW()`
+
+ _, err = r.db.ExecContext(ctx, query, tenantID, cfgJSON)
+ return err
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/threat_actor_service.go b/internal/app/threat_actor_service.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..16748c2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/threat_actor_service.go
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "fmt"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/threatactor"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/pagination"
+)
+
+// ThreatActorService manages threat actor intelligence.
+type ThreatActorService struct {
+ repo threatactor.Repository
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewThreatActorService creates a new threat actor service.
+func NewThreatActorService(repo threatactor.Repository, log *logger.Logger) *ThreatActorService {
+ return &ThreatActorService{repo: repo, logger: log}
+}
+
+// CreateThreatActorInput holds input for creating a threat actor.
+type CreateThreatActorInput struct {
+ TenantID string
+ Name string
+ Aliases []string
+ Description string
+ ActorType string
+ Sophistication string
+ Motivation string
+ CountryOfOrigin string
+ MitreGroupID string
+ TTPs []threatactor.TTP
+ TargetIndustries []string
+ TargetRegions []string
+ Tags []string
+}
+
+// CreateThreatActor creates a new threat actor.
+func (s *ThreatActorService) CreateThreatActor(ctx context.Context, input CreateThreatActorInput) (*threatactor.ThreatActor, error) {
+ tid, err := shared.IDFromString(input.TenantID)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid tenant id", shared.ErrValidation)
+ }
+
+ actor, err := threatactor.NewThreatActor(tid, input.Name, threatactor.ActorType(input.ActorType))
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+
+ actor.Update(input.Name, input.Description, threatactor.ActorType(input.ActorType))
+ actor.SetIntel(input.Sophistication, input.Motivation, input.CountryOfOrigin, input.MitreGroupID)
+ actor.SetTTPs(input.TTPs)
+ actor.SetTargeting(input.TargetIndustries, input.TargetRegions)
+
+ if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, actor); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create threat actor: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ return actor, nil
+}
+
+// GetThreatActor retrieves a threat actor by ID.
+func (s *ThreatActorService) GetThreatActor(ctx context.Context, tenantID, actorID string) (*threatactor.ThreatActor, error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(actorID)
+ return s.repo.GetByID(ctx, tid, aid)
+}
+
+// ListThreatActors lists threat actors with filtering.
+func (s *ThreatActorService) ListThreatActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string, filter threatactor.Filter, page pagination.Pagination) (pagination.Result[*threatactor.ThreatActor], error) {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ filter.TenantID = &tid
+ return s.repo.List(ctx, filter, page)
+}
+
+// DeleteThreatActor deletes a threat actor.
+func (s *ThreatActorService) DeleteThreatActor(ctx context.Context, tenantID, actorID string) error {
+ tid, _ := shared.IDFromString(tenantID)
+ aid, _ := shared.IDFromString(actorID)
+ return s.repo.Delete(ctx, tid, aid)
+}
diff --git a/internal/app/threat_intel_refresh.go b/internal/app/threat_intel_refresh.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bea6fbe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/app/threat_intel_refresh.go
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+package app
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "fmt"
+ "net/http"
+ "strconv"
+ "strings"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+)
+
+// ThreatIntelRefresher handles automated EPSS and KEV data refresh.
+type ThreatIntelRefresher struct {
+ logger *logger.Logger
+ client *http.Client
+}
+
+// NewThreatIntelRefresher creates a new refresher.
+func NewThreatIntelRefresher(log *logger.Logger) *ThreatIntelRefresher {
+ return &ThreatIntelRefresher{
+ logger: log,
+ client: &http.Client{Timeout: 60 * time.Second},
+ }
+}
+
+// EPSSScore represents an EPSS score entry.
+type EPSSScore struct {
+ CVE string `json:"cve"`
+ EPSS float64 `json:"epss"`
+ Model string `json:"model"`
+ Date string `json:"date"`
+}
+
+// KEVEntry represents a CISA KEV catalog entry.
+type KEVEntry struct {
+ CVEID string `json:"cveID"`
+ VendorProject string `json:"vendorProject"`
+ Product string `json:"product"`
+ VulnerabilityName string `json:"vulnerabilityName"`
+ DateAdded string `json:"dateAdded"`
+ ShortDescription string `json:"shortDescription"`
+ RequiredAction string `json:"requiredAction"`
+ DueDate string `json:"dueDate"`
+ KnownRansomwareCampaignUse string `json:"knownRansomwareCampaignUse"`
+}
+
+// FetchEPSSScores fetches EPSS scores from FIRST.org API.
+// Returns top 1000 CVEs by EPSS score.
+func (r *ThreatIntelRefresher) FetchEPSSScores(ctx context.Context) ([]EPSSScore, error) {
+ url := "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?order=!epss&limit=1000"
+
+ req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create EPSS request: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ resp, err := r.client.Do(req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch EPSS: %w", err)
+ }
+ defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+ if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("EPSS API returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
+ }
+
+ var result struct {
+ Data []struct {
+ CVE string `json:"cve"`
+ EPSS string `json:"epss"`
+ Percentile string `json:"percentile"`
+ Date string `json:"date"`
+ Model string `json:"model_version"`
+ } `json:"data"`
+ }
+
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode EPSS response: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ scores := make([]EPSSScore, 0, len(result.Data))
+ for _, d := range result.Data {
+ epss, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(d.EPSS, 64)
+ scores = append(scores, EPSSScore{
+ CVE: d.CVE,
+ EPSS: epss,
+ Model: d.Model,
+ Date: d.Date,
+ })
+ }
+
+ r.logger.Info("fetched EPSS scores", "count", len(scores))
+ return scores, nil
+}
+
+// FetchKEVCatalog fetches CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
+func (r *ThreatIntelRefresher) FetchKEVCatalog(ctx context.Context) ([]KEVEntry, error) {
+ url := "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json"
+
+ req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create KEV request: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ resp, err := r.client.Do(req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch KEV: %w", err)
+ }
+ defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+ if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("KEV API returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
+ }
+
+ var catalog struct {
+ Vulnerabilities []KEVEntry `json:"vulnerabilities"`
+ }
+
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&catalog); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode KEV response: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ r.logger.Info("fetched KEV catalog", "count", len(catalog.Vulnerabilities))
+ return catalog.Vulnerabilities, nil
+}
+
+// FetchEPSSForCVEs fetches EPSS scores for specific CVE IDs.
+func (r *ThreatIntelRefresher) FetchEPSSForCVEs(ctx context.Context, cveIDs []string) ([]EPSSScore, error) {
+ if len(cveIDs) == 0 {
+ return nil, nil
+ }
+
+ // FIRST.org API accepts comma-separated CVE list
+ url := fmt.Sprintf("https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=%s", strings.Join(cveIDs, ","))
+
+ req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url, nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create EPSS request: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ resp, err := r.client.Do(req)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch EPSS: %w", err)
+ }
+ defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+ if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("EPSS API returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
+ }
+
+ var result struct {
+ Data []struct {
+ CVE string `json:"cve"`
+ EPSS string `json:"epss"`
+ } `json:"data"`
+ }
+
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode EPSS response: %w", err)
+ }
+
+ scores := make([]EPSSScore, 0, len(result.Data))
+ for _, d := range result.Data {
+ epss, _ := strconv.ParseFloat(d.EPSS, 64)
+ scores = append(scores, EPSSScore{CVE: d.CVE, EPSS: epss})
+ }
+
+ return scores, nil
+}
+
diff --git a/internal/config/config.go b/internal/config/config.go
index f618f8dc..2327daaa 100644
--- a/internal/config/config.go
+++ b/internal/config/config.go
@@ -32,6 +32,25 @@ type Config struct {
Encryption EncryptionConfig
AITriage AITriageConfig
AgentConfig AgentConfigConfig
+ Storage StorageConfig
+}
+
+// StorageConfig holds file attachment storage settings.
+// Default: local filesystem at ./data/attachments.
+// Future: S3, MinIO, GCS via provider selection per-tenant.
+type StorageConfig struct {
+ // Provider selects the storage backend: "local" (default), "s3", "minio"
+ Provider string
+ // LocalPath is the filesystem path for the "local" provider.
+ // Default: ./data/attachments
+ // In Docker: mount a volume to persist across container rebuilds.
+ LocalPath string
+ // S3/MinIO settings (future)
+ Bucket string
+ Region string
+ Endpoint string
+ AccessKey string
+ SecretKey string
}
// AppConfig holds application-level configuration.
@@ -440,6 +459,15 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
TemplatesDir: getEnv("AGENT_CONFIG_TEMPLATES_DIR", "configs/agent-templates"),
PublicAPIURL: getEnv("AGENT_PUBLIC_API_URL", ""),
},
+ Storage: StorageConfig{
+ Provider: getEnv("STORAGE_PROVIDER", "local"),
+ LocalPath: getEnv("STORAGE_LOCAL_PATH", "./data/attachments"),
+ Bucket: getEnv("STORAGE_BUCKET", ""),
+ Region: getEnv("STORAGE_REGION", ""),
+ Endpoint: getEnv("STORAGE_ENDPOINT", ""),
+ AccessKey: getEnv("STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY", ""),
+ SecretKey: getEnv("STORAGE_SECRET_KEY", ""),
+ },
Server: ServerConfig{
Host: getEnv("SERVER_HOST", "0.0.0.0"),
Port: getEnvInt("SERVER_PORT", 8080),
diff --git a/internal/infra/http/handler/asset_handler.go b/internal/infra/http/handler/asset_handler.go
index 68784c5d..abc4186b 100644
--- a/internal/infra/http/handler/asset_handler.go
+++ b/internal/infra/http/handler/asset_handler.go
@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ type AssetResponse struct {
OwnerRef string `json:"owner_ref,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Type string `json:"type"`
+ SubType string `json:"sub_type,omitempty"`
+ Category string `json:"category"`
Provider string `json:"provider,omitempty"`
ExternalID string `json:"external_id,omitempty"`
Criticality string `json:"criticality"`
@@ -114,14 +116,15 @@ type OwnerBriefResponse struct {
// CreateAssetRequest represents the request to create an asset.
type CreateAssetRequest struct {
- Name string `json:"name" validate:"required,min=1,max=255"`
- Type string `json:"type" validate:"required,asset_type"`
- Criticality string `json:"criticality" validate:"required,criticality"`
- Scope string `json:"scope" validate:"omitempty,scope"`
- Exposure string `json:"exposure" validate:"omitempty,exposure"`
- Description string `json:"description" validate:"max=1000"`
- Tags []string `json:"tags" validate:"max=20,dive,max=50"`
- OwnerRef string `json:"owner_ref" validate:"max=500"`
+ Name string `json:"name" validate:"required,min=1,max=255"`
+ Type string `json:"type" validate:"required,asset_type"`
+ Criticality string `json:"criticality" validate:"required,criticality"`
+ Scope string `json:"scope" validate:"omitempty,scope"`
+ Exposure string `json:"exposure" validate:"omitempty,exposure"`
+ Description string `json:"description" validate:"max=1000"`
+ Tags []string `json:"tags" validate:"max=20,dive,max=50"`
+ OwnerRef string `json:"owner_ref" validate:"max=500"`
+ Properties map[string]any `json:"properties,omitempty"`
}
// UpdateAssetRequest represents the request to update an asset.
@@ -154,6 +157,8 @@ func toAssetResponse(a *asset.Asset) AssetResponse {
OwnerRef: a.OwnerRef(),
Name: a.Name(),
Type: a.Type().String(),
+ SubType: a.SubType(),
+ Category: string(a.Category()),
Provider: a.Provider().String(),
ExternalID: a.ExternalID(),
Criticality: a.Criticality().String(),
@@ -316,7 +321,10 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) List(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
MinRiskScore: parseQueryIntPtr(query.Get("min_risk_score")),
MaxRiskScore: parseQueryIntPtr(query.Get("max_risk_score")),
HasFindings: parseQueryBoolPtr(query.Get("has_findings")),
- Sort: query.Get("sort"),
+ IsCrownJewel: parseQueryBoolPtr(query.Get("is_crown_jewel")),
+ SubType: nilIfEmpty(query.Get("sub_type")),
+ PropertiesFilter: ParsePropertiesFilter(query.Get("properties")),
+ Sort: query.Get("sort"),
Page: parseQueryInt(query.Get("page"), 1),
PerPage: parseQueryInt(query.Get("per_page"), 20),
ActingUserID: middleware.GetUserID(r.Context()),
@@ -441,6 +449,7 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) Create(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
Description: req.Description,
Tags: req.Tags,
OwnerRef: req.OwnerRef,
+ Properties: req.Properties,
}
a, err := h.service.CreateAsset(r.Context(), input)
@@ -1143,6 +1152,7 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) BulkUpdateStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
type AssetStatsResponse struct {
Total int `json:"total"`
ByType map[string]int `json:"by_type"`
+ BySubType map[string]int `json:"by_sub_type"`
ByStatus map[string]int `json:"by_status"`
ByCriticality map[string]int `json:"by_criticality"`
ByScope map[string]int `json:"by_scope"`
@@ -1171,9 +1181,10 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) GetStats(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
query := r.URL.Query()
typesFilter := parseQueryArray(query.Get("types"))
tagsFilter := parseQueryArray(query.Get("tags"))
+ subTypeFilter := query.Get("sub_type")
// Use service method with SQL aggregation for efficient stats
- aggStats, err := h.service.GetAssetStats(r.Context(), tenantID, typesFilter, tagsFilter)
+ aggStats, err := h.service.GetAssetStats(r.Context(), tenantID, typesFilter, tagsFilter, subTypeFilter)
if err != nil {
h.handleServiceError(w, err)
return
@@ -1182,6 +1193,7 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) GetStats(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
stats := AssetStatsResponse{
Total: aggStats.Total,
ByType: aggStats.ByType,
+ BySubType: aggStats.BySubType,
ByStatus: aggStats.ByStatus,
ByCriticality: aggStats.ByCriticality,
ByScope: aggStats.ByScope,
@@ -1222,6 +1234,25 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) ListTags(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string][]string{"tags": tags})
}
+// GetFacets returns distinct property keys and their values for faceted filtering.
+// Scoped to tenant + optional type filter. Returns top 20 values per key.
+func (h *AssetHandler) GetFacets(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ query := r.URL.Query()
+ types := parseQueryArray(query.Get("types"))
+ subType := query.Get("sub_type")
+
+ facets, err := h.service.GetPropertyFacets(r.Context(), tenantID, types, subType)
+ if err != nil {
+ h.handleServiceError(w, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+ _ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(facets)
+}
+
// SyncResponse represents the response from a sync operation.
type SyncResponse struct {
Success bool `json:"success"`
@@ -1689,4 +1720,43 @@ func (h *AssetHandler) TriggerScan(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(response)
}
+// UpdateCrownJewel marks/unmarks an asset as a crown jewel with business impact scoring.
+func (h *AssetHandler) UpdateCrownJewel(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ assetID := r.PathValue("id")
+
+ var req struct {
+ IsCrownJewel bool `json:"is_crown_jewel"`
+ BusinessImpactScore float64 `json:"business_impact_score"`
+ BusinessImpactNotes string `json:"business_impact_notes"`
+ }
+ if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+ apierror.BadRequest("Invalid JSON body").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+
+ a, err := h.service.GetAsset(r.Context(), tenantID, assetID)
+ if err != nil {
+ h.handleServiceError(w, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ // Store crown jewel data in properties (DB columns added by migration 000126)
+ props := a.Properties()
+ if props == nil {
+ props = make(map[string]any)
+ }
+ props["is_crown_jewel"] = req.IsCrownJewel
+ props["business_impact_score"] = req.BusinessImpactScore
+ props["business_impact_notes"] = req.BusinessImpactNotes
+ a.SetProperties(props)
+
+ if err := h.service.SaveAsset(r.Context(), a); err != nil {
+ h.handleServiceError(w, err)
+ return
+ }
+
+ writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toAssetResponse(a))
+}
+
// Helper functions are defined in common.go
diff --git a/internal/infra/http/handler/attachment_handler.go b/internal/infra/http/handler/attachment_handler.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..38be6938
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/infra/http/handler/attachment_handler.go
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+package handler
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "encoding/json"
+ "errors"
+ "io"
+ "mime"
+ "net/http"
+ "path/filepath"
+ "strings"
+
+ "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/app"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/http/middleware"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/apierror"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/attachment"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+)
+
+// FindingCampaignAccessChecker verifies that a user has access to a finding's campaign.
+// Returns nil if access is allowed, ErrNotFound/ErrForbidden otherwise.
+type FindingCampaignAccessChecker interface {
+ CheckFindingAccess(ctx context.Context, tenantID, findingID, userID string, isAdmin bool) error
+}
+
+// AttachmentHandler handles file upload/download/delete HTTP endpoints.
+type AttachmentHandler struct {
+ service *app.AttachmentService
+ accessChecker FindingCampaignAccessChecker // optional; when nil, no campaign check
+ storageResolver *app.SettingsStorageResolver // optional; for storage config CRUD
+ logger *logger.Logger
+}
+
+// NewAttachmentHandler creates a new handler.
+func NewAttachmentHandler(svc *app.AttachmentService, log *logger.Logger) *AttachmentHandler {
+ return &AttachmentHandler{service: svc, logger: log}
+}
+
+// SetStorageResolver wires the tenant storage config resolver for GET/PATCH storage settings.
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) SetStorageResolver(resolver *app.SettingsStorageResolver) {
+ h.storageResolver = resolver
+}
+
+// SetAccessChecker wires the campaign-membership checker for finding-scoped attachments.
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) SetAccessChecker(checker FindingCampaignAccessChecker) {
+ h.accessChecker = checker
+}
+
+// verifyContextAccess checks campaign membership for finding/retest-context attachments.
+// For other context types or when no checker is configured, it's a no-op.
+// Both "finding" and "retest" contexts use finding ID as context_id.
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) verifyContextAccess(r *http.Request, contextType, contextID string) error {
+ if h.accessChecker == nil || contextID == "" {
+ return nil
+ }
+ // Both finding and retest contexts store finding_id as context_id
+ if contextType != "finding" && contextType != "retest" {
+ return nil
+ }
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ userID := middleware.GetUserID(r.Context())
+ isAdmin := middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context())
+ return h.accessChecker.CheckFindingAccess(r.Context(), tenantID, contextID, userID, isAdmin)
+}
+
+// Upload handles multipart file upload.
+// POST /api/v1/attachments
+//
+// Accepts multipart/form-data with:
+// - file: the file to upload
+// - context_type: optional "finding", "retest", "campaign"
+// - context_id: optional UUID of the linked entity
+//
+// Returns JSON with the attachment metadata including the download URL.
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) Upload(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ userID := middleware.GetUserID(r.Context())
+
+ // Limit request body to max file size + overhead
+ const maxBody = attachment.MaxFileSize + 1024*1024 // file + form overhead
+ r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBody)
+
+ if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(attachment.MaxFileSize); err != nil {
+ apierror.BadRequest("File too large or invalid multipart form").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+
+ // Campaign membership check on upload
+ ctxType := r.FormValue("context_type")
+ ctxID := r.FormValue("context_id")
+ if err := h.verifyContextAccess(r, ctxType, ctxID); err != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Access denied").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+
+ file, header, err := r.FormFile("file")
+ if err != nil {
+ apierror.BadRequest("Missing 'file' field in multipart form").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ defer file.Close()
+
+ // Sniff content type from actual bytes first, then fallback to file extension
+ // for types that Go's sniffing table doesn't cover (markdown, har+json, mp4 variants).
+ buf := make([]byte, 512)
+ n, _ := file.Read(buf)
+ contentType := http.DetectContentType(buf[:n])
+ // Reset reader — Seek back to start
+ if seeker, ok := file.(io.Seeker); ok {
+ _, _ = seeker.Seek(0, io.SeekStart)
+ }
+ // DetectContentType only returns ~14 MIME types. For generic results,
+ // use file extension as a more specific hint (e.g., .md → text/markdown).
+ if contentType == "application/octet-stream" || contentType == "text/plain" {
+ ext := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(header.Filename))
+ extMIME := map[string]string{
+ ".md": "text/markdown", ".markdown": "text/markdown",
+ ".csv": "text/csv", ".har": "application/har+json",
+ ".mp4": "video/mp4", ".webm": "video/webm",
+ }
+ if better, ok := extMIME[ext]; ok {
+ contentType = better
+ }
+ }
+
+ att, err := h.service.Upload(r.Context(), app.UploadInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID,
+ Filename: header.Filename,
+ ContentType: contentType,
+ Size: header.Size,
+ Reader: file,
+ UploadedBy: userID,
+ ContextType: r.FormValue("context_type"),
+ ContextID: r.FormValue("context_id"),
+ })
+ if err != nil {
+ switch {
+ case errors.Is(err, attachment.ErrTooLarge):
+ apierror.BadRequest(err.Error()).WriteJSON(w)
+ case errors.Is(err, attachment.ErrUnsupported):
+ apierror.BadRequest(err.Error()).WriteJSON(w)
+ default:
+ h.logger.Error("attachment upload failed", "error", err)
+ apierror.InternalServerError("Upload failed").WriteJSON(w)
+ }
+ return
+ }
+
+ writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]any{
+ "id": att.ID().String(),
+ "filename": att.Filename(),
+ "content_type": att.ContentType(),
+ "size": att.Size(),
+ "url": att.URL(),
+ "markdown": att.MarkdownLink(),
+ "created_at": att.CreatedAt(),
+ })
+}
+
+// Download serves the file content for an attachment.
+// GET /api/v1/attachments/{id}
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) Download(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
+
+ // Campaign membership check: resolve attachment metadata to verify context access
+ if h.accessChecker != nil {
+ att, aerr := h.service.GetByID(r.Context(), tenantID, id)
+ if aerr != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ if err := h.verifyContextAccess(r, att.ContextType(), att.ContextID()); err != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ }
+
+ reader, contentType, filename, err := h.service.Download(r.Context(), tenantID, id)
+ if err != nil {
+ if errors.Is(err, attachment.ErrNotFound) {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ h.logger.Error("attachment download failed", "error", err, "id", id)
+ apierror.InternalServerError("Download failed").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ defer reader.Close()
+
+ // Set headers for inline display (images) or download (other files).
+ // Use mime.FormatMediaType to properly escape filename (prevents header injection).
+ w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
+ disposition := "attachment"
+ if isImageMIME(contentType) {
+ disposition = "inline"
+ }
+ w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", mime.FormatMediaType(disposition, map[string]string{"filename": filename}))
+ // Cache for 1 hour (attachments are immutable once uploaded)
+ w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "private, max-age=3600")
+ w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+
+ if _, err := io.Copy(w, reader); err != nil {
+ h.logger.Warn("attachment stream interrupted", "error", err, "id", id)
+ }
+}
+
+// Delete removes an attachment and its stored file.
+// DELETE /api/v1/attachments/{id}
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) Delete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
+
+ // Campaign membership check before deletion
+ if h.accessChecker != nil {
+ att, aerr := h.service.GetByID(r.Context(), tenantID, id)
+ if aerr != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ if err := h.verifyContextAccess(r, att.ContextType(), att.ContextID()); err != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ }
+
+ if err := h.service.Delete(r.Context(), tenantID, id); err != nil {
+ if errors.Is(err, attachment.ErrNotFound) {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ h.logger.Error("attachment delete failed", "error", err, "id", id)
+ apierror.InternalServerError("Delete failed").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+}
+
+// GetMeta returns attachment metadata (without file content).
+// GET /api/v1/attachments/{id}/meta
+func (h *AttachmentHandler) GetMeta(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ tenantID := middleware.MustGetTenantID(r.Context())
+ id := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
+
+ // Campaign membership check (same as Download/Delete)
+ if h.accessChecker != nil {
+ att, aerr := h.service.GetByID(r.Context(), tenantID, id)
+ if aerr != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ if err := h.verifyContextAccess(r, att.ContextType(), att.ContextID()); err != nil {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ }
+
+ att, err := h.service.GetByID(r.Context(), tenantID, id)
+ if err != nil {
+ if errors.Is(err, attachment.ErrNotFound) {
+ apierror.NotFound("Attachment not found").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+ h.logger.Error("attachment meta failed", "error", err, "id", id)
+ apierror.InternalServerError("Failed to get attachment").WriteJSON(w)
+ return
+ }
+
+ writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+ "id": att.ID().String(),
+ "filename": att.Filename(),
+ "content_type": att.ContentType(),
+ "size": att.Size(),
+ "url": att.URL(),
+ "markdown": att.MarkdownLink(),
+ "uploaded_by": att.UploadedBy().String(),
+ "context_type": att.ContextType(),
+ "context_id": att.ContextID(),
+ "created_at": att.CreatedAt(),
+ })
+}
+
+func isImageMIME(ct string) bool {
+ // SVG excluded: can contain
+
+SVGEOF
+
+req_upload "$SVG_FILE" "image/svg+xml" "finding" "$FINDING_ID" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+assert_status "8.1 SVG upload rejected → 400" 400
+
+# ── 8.2 Path traversal filename → sanitized (no 500, no traversal) ────────────
+# We construct the filename via a temp file copy with a "safe" on-disk name,
+# but the Content-Disposition filename includes the traversal attempt.
+TRAVERSAL_FILE="$TMPDIR_WORK/normal.png"
+printf '\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n' > "$TRAVERSAL_FILE"
+echo "traversal-${TS}" >> "$TRAVERSAL_FILE"
+dd if=/dev/urandom bs=128 count=1 >> "$TRAVERSAL_FILE" 2>/dev/null
+
+# Use curl --form-string to smuggle a traversal filename without it being
+# interpreted by curl itself.
+curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X POST "${API_URL}/api/v1/attachments" \
+ -H "$OWNER_AUTH" \
+ -F "context_type=finding" \
+ -F "context_id=${FINDING_ID}" \
+ -F "file=@${TRAVERSAL_FILE};filename=../../etc/passwd;type=image/png" \
+ > "$TMPDIR_WORK/resp" 2>/dev/null
+HTTP=$(tail -1 "$TMPDIR_WORK/resp")
+BODY=$(sed '$d' "$TMPDIR_WORK/resp")
+
+# The server should either reject it OR sanitize and return 201 — it must NOT 500
+if [ "$HTTP" = "201" ] || [ "$HTTP" = "200" ]; then
+ # Verify the stored filename does NOT contain directory traversal components
+ STORED_FILENAME=$(jv '.filename')
+ if echo "$STORED_FILENAME" | grep -q '\.\./\|\.\.\\'; then
+ fail "8.2 Path traversal filename sanitized" \
+ "filename contains traversal sequence: '$STORED_FILENAME'"
+ else
+ pass "8.2 Path traversal filename sanitized (stored as '$STORED_FILENAME')"
+ fi
+elif [ "$HTTP" = "400" ] || [ "$HTTP" = "422" ]; then
+ pass "8.2 Path traversal filename rejected ($HTTP)"
+else
+ fail "8.2 Path traversal filename" \
+ "Expected 201 (sanitized) or 400 (rejected), got $HTTP. Body: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 200)"
+fi
+
+# ── 8.3 Unauthenticated list → 401 ────────────────────────────────────────────
+req GET "/api/v1/attachments?context_type=finding&context_id=${FINDING_ID}" "" ""
+assert_status "8.3 Unauthenticated list → 401" 401
+
+# ── 8.4 Unauthenticated download → 401 ───────────────────────────────────────
+req GET "/api/v1/attachments/${ATT_ID}" "" ""
+assert_status "8.4 Unauthenticated download → 401" 401
+
+# ── 8.5 Unauthenticated delete → 401 ─────────────────────────────────────────
+req DELETE "/api/v1/attachments/${ATT_ID}" "" ""
+assert_status "8.5 Unauthenticated delete → 401" 401
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 9. META ENDPOINT
+# =============================================================================
+h "9. META ENDPOINT"
+
+# ── 9.1 GET /attachments/{id}/meta → 200 with expected fields ─────────────────
+req GET "/api/v1/attachments/${ATT_ID}/meta" "" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+assert_status "9.1 GET /attachments/{id}/meta → 200" 200
+
+META_ID=$(jv '.id')
+META_CT=$(jv '.content_type')
+META_CTX_TYPE=$(jv '.context_type')
+META_CTX_ID=$(jv '.context_id')
+
+if [ "$META_ID" = "$ATT_ID" ]; then
+ pass "9.2 Meta returns correct id"
+else
+ fail "9.2 Meta returns correct id" "Expected $ATT_ID, got $META_ID"
+fi
+if [ "$META_CT" = "image/png" ]; then
+ pass "9.3 Meta returns correct content_type (image/png)"
+else
+ fail "9.3 Meta returns correct content_type" "Expected image/png, got $META_CT"
+fi
+if [ "$META_CTX_TYPE" = "finding" ]; then
+ pass "9.4 Meta returns correct context_type (finding)"
+else
+ fail "9.4 Meta returns correct context_type" "Expected finding, got $META_CTX_TYPE"
+fi
+if [ "$META_CTX_ID" = "$FINDING_ID" ]; then
+ pass "9.5 Meta returns correct context_id"
+else
+ fail "9.5 Meta returns correct context_id" "Expected $FINDING_ID, got $META_CTX_ID"
+fi
+
+# ── 9.2 GET /attachments/{id}/meta for non-existent → 404 ────────────────────
+req GET "/api/v1/attachments/${FAKE_ID}/meta" "" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+assert_status "9.6 Meta for non-existent id → 404" 404
+
+# =============================================================================
+# CLEANUP
+# =============================================================================
+h "CLEANUP"
+
+req DELETE "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}" "" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+assert_status "Cleanup: delete campaign" 200 204
+
+# =============================================================================
+# SUMMARY
+# =============================================================================
+echo
+echo -e "${BLUE}══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
+echo -e "${BLUE} SUMMARY${NC}"
+echo -e "${BLUE}══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
+echo -e " ${GREEN}✅ Passed: $PASS${NC}"
+echo -e " ${RED}❌ Failed: $FAIL${NC}"
+echo -e " ${YELLOW}⏭️ Skipped: $SKIP${NC}"
+echo
+
+if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
+ exit 1
+fi
+exit 0
diff --git a/scripts/tests/test_e2e_pentest_rbac.sh b/scripts/tests/test_e2e_pentest_rbac.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..337433ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/tests/test_e2e_pentest_rbac.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# =============================================================================
+# Pentest Campaign Team RBAC — Full E2E Test Suite
+# =============================================================================
+# Covers RFC 2026-03-17-campaign-team-roles-rbac.md acceptance criteria:
+#
+# 1. Setup — owner registers, creates tenant, invites tester/reviewer/observer
+# 2. Campaign creation — creator auto-added as lead
+# 3. Team management — add/remove/role-change with last-lead protection
+# 4. Permission matrix — each role tested against each action
+# 5. Finding ownership — created_by + assigned_to ownership rules
+# 6. Status transitions — role × transition matrix enforcement
+# 7. Retest auto-status — tester passed != verified, reviewer/lead passed = verified
+# 8. Campaign lifecycle — on_hold/completed/canceled lock + reopen
+# 9. IDOR protection — non-member 404 on finding/report direct access
+# 10. Visibility filtering — non-admin only sees own campaigns
+# 11. Observer isolation — cannot write anything
+# 12. Audit logging — team changes logged
+#
+# Usage:
+# ./test_e2e_pentest_rbac.sh [API_URL]
+#
+# Requirements: jq, curl, python3 (for unique IDs)
+# =============================================================================
+
+RED='\033[0;31m'; GREEN='\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\033[1;33m'; BLUE='\033[0;34m'; CYAN='\033[0;36m'; NC='\033[0m'
+
+API_URL="${1:-${API_URL:-http://localhost:8080}}"
+TS=$(date +%s)
+TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/pentest_rbac.XXXXXX)
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMPDIR"' EXIT
+
+PASS=0; FAIL=0; SKIP=0
+
+# Cookie jars per role to avoid session pollution
+CJ_OWNER="$TMPDIR/cj_owner"
+CJ_TESTER="$TMPDIR/cj_tester"
+CJ_REVIEWER="$TMPDIR/cj_reviewer"
+CJ_OBSERVER="$TMPDIR/cj_observer"
+CJ_OUTSIDER="$TMPDIR/cj_outsider"
+
+p() { echo -e "${GREEN} ✅ $1${NC}"; PASS=$((PASS+1)); }
+fail() { echo -e "${RED} ❌ $1${NC}"; [ -n "$2" ] && echo -e "${RED} $2${NC}"; FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); }
+skip() { echo -e "${YELLOW} ⏭️ $1${NC}"; SKIP=$((SKIP+1)); }
+h() { echo -e "\n${BLUE}━━━ $1 ━━━${NC}"; }
+sub() { echo -e "${CYAN} ▸ $1${NC}"; }
+
+# req METHOD ENDPOINT BODY COOKIE_JAR [HEADERS...]
+req() {
+ local m="$1" e="$2" d="$3" cj="$4"; shift 4
+ local args=(-s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$m" "${API_URL}${e}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -c "$cj" -b "$cj")
+ for x in "$@"; do args+=(-H "$x"); done
+ [ -n "$d" ] && args+=(-d "$d")
+ curl "${args[@]}" > "$TMPDIR/resp" 2>/dev/null
+ HTTP=$(tail -1 "$TMPDIR/resp")
+ BODY=$(sed '$d' "$TMPDIR/resp")
+}
+
+jv() { echo "$BODY" | jq -r "$1" 2>/dev/null; }
+
+# expect DESC HTTPCODE [HTTPCODE2 ...]
+expect() {
+ local desc="$1"; shift
+ for code in "$@"; do
+ [ "$HTTP" = "$code" ] && { p "$desc ($HTTP)"; return 0; }
+ done
+ fail "$desc" "Expected $*, got HTTP $HTTP. Body: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 200)"
+ return 1
+}
+
+# expect_field DESC JQPATH EXPECTED
+expect_field() {
+ local desc="$1" path="$2" expected="$3"
+ local got
+ got=$(jv "$path")
+ if [ "$got" = "$expected" ]; then
+ p "$desc ($path=$got)"
+ else
+ fail "$desc" "Expected $path=$expected, got $got. Body: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 200)"
+ fi
+}
+
+echo -e "${BLUE}══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
+echo -e "${BLUE} PENTEST CAMPAIGN TEAM RBAC — E2E TEST SUITE${NC}"
+echo -e "${BLUE}══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
+echo " API: $API_URL"
+echo " Timestamp: $TS"
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 1. SETUP — register owner + 4 users + tenant
+# =============================================================================
+h "1. SETUP"
+
+OWNER_EMAIL="rbac-owner-${TS}@test.local"
+TESTER_EMAIL="rbac-tester-${TS}@test.local"
+REVIEWER_EMAIL="rbac-reviewer-${TS}@test.local"
+OBSERVER_EMAIL="rbac-observer-${TS}@test.local"
+OUTSIDER_EMAIL="rbac-outsider-${TS}@test.local"
+PASSWORD="TestP@ss123!"
+
+register_user() {
+ local email="$1" name="$2" cj="$3"
+ # Retry on rate-limit (429): the auth endpoint has a tight rate limiter.
+ local attempt
+ for attempt in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+ req POST "/api/v1/auth/register" \
+ "{\"email\":\"$email\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\",\"name\":\"$name\"}" "$cj"
+ if [ "$HTTP" = "201" ]; then
+ return 0
+ fi
+ if [ "$HTTP" = "429" ]; then
+ sleep 3
+ continue
+ fi
+ fail "Register $email" "HTTP $HTTP: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 150)"
+ return 1
+ done
+ fail "Register $email" "Rate-limited after 5 attempts"
+ return 1
+}
+
+# Note: /auth/register has a 3/min rate limit per IP. Spread the 5 registrations
+# (and the 2 create-first-team calls below) across ~3 minutes total.
+echo " (registering 5 users — rate-limited at 3/min, will take ~2 min)"
+register_user "$OWNER_EMAIL" "Owner" "$CJ_OWNER" || exit 1
+sleep 25
+register_user "$TESTER_EMAIL" "Tester" "$CJ_TESTER" || exit 1
+sleep 25
+register_user "$REVIEWER_EMAIL" "Reviewer" "$CJ_REVIEWER" || exit 1
+sleep 25
+register_user "$OBSERVER_EMAIL" "Observer" "$CJ_OBSERVER" || exit 1
+sleep 25
+register_user "$OUTSIDER_EMAIL" "Outsider" "$CJ_OUTSIDER" || exit 1
+p "Registered 5 users"
+
+# Owner creates the tenant
+req POST "/api/v1/auth/login" "{\"email\":\"$OWNER_EMAIL\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\"}" "$CJ_OWNER"
+req POST "/api/v1/auth/create-first-team" \
+ "{\"team_name\":\"RBAC Test ${TS}\",\"team_slug\":\"rbac-test-${TS}\"}" "$CJ_OWNER"
+OWNER_TOKEN=$(jv '.access_token')
+TENANT_ID=$(jv '.tenant_id')
+OWNER_USER_ID=$(jv '.user.id')
+[ -n "$OWNER_TOKEN" ] && [ "$OWNER_TOKEN" != "null" ] || { fail "Owner team creation failed"; exit 1; }
+OWNER_AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $OWNER_TOKEN"
+p "Owner tenant created (id=$TENANT_ID)"
+
+# Outsider creates their OWN tenant — they're not a member of the owner's tenant.
+req POST "/api/v1/auth/login" "{\"email\":\"$OUTSIDER_EMAIL\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\"}" "$CJ_OUTSIDER"
+req POST "/api/v1/auth/create-first-team" \
+ "{\"team_name\":\"Outsider Tenant ${TS}\",\"team_slug\":\"outsider-${TS}\"}" "$CJ_OUTSIDER"
+OUTSIDER_TOKEN=$(jv '.access_token')
+[ -n "$OUTSIDER_TOKEN" ] && [ "$OUTSIDER_TOKEN" != "null" ] || { fail "Outsider tenant creation failed"; exit 1; }
+OUTSIDER_AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $OUTSIDER_TOKEN"
+p "Outsider tenant created (separate)"
+
+# Owner invites the other 3 users into HIS tenant via API.
+# Each invitee was registered above (no tenant yet), so we use the
+# accept-with-refresh endpoint which authenticates via the refresh_token cookie
+# (set during their initial register/login). Token bearer auth is also forwarded
+# in case the cookie isn't honoured.
+# invite_user takes care of the full invite + accept dance and stores the
+# resulting access_token + user_id in caller-provided variables (passed by
+# name as args 3 and 4) so we don't have to re-login (which gets rate limited).
+invite_user() {
+ local email="$1" cj="$2" tok_var="$3" uid_var="$4"
+
+ # Owner creates the invitation
+ req POST "/api/v1/tenants/${TENANT_ID}/invitations" \
+ "{\"email\":\"$email\",\"role_ids\":[\"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003\"]}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ local token
+ token=$(jv '.token')
+ if [ -z "$token" ] || [ "$token" = "null" ]; then
+ fail "Invite $email" "HTTP $HTTP: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 150)"
+ return 1
+ fi
+
+ # Login the invitee to populate refresh_token cookie (single login per user — rate limit aware)
+ req POST "/api/v1/auth/login" "{\"email\":\"$email\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\"}" "$cj"
+ if [ "$HTTP" != "200" ]; then
+ fail "Login $email before accept" "HTTP $HTTP: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 150)"
+ return 1
+ fi
+ # Capture user.id from login response — login always carries it.
+ local captured_uid
+ captured_uid=$(jv '.user.id')
+
+ # Accept via the refresh-token endpoint. Response carries the new access_token.
+ req POST "/api/v1/invitations/${token}/accept-with-refresh" "" "$cj"
+ if [ "$HTTP" != "200" ] && [ "$HTTP" != "201" ] && [ "$HTTP" != "204" ]; then
+ fail "Accept invitation for $email" "HTTP $HTTP: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 150)"
+ return 1
+ fi
+ local captured_tok
+ captured_tok=$(jv '.access_token')
+
+ # Export to caller-named variables (avoids subshell capture pitfalls)
+ printf -v "$tok_var" '%s' "$captured_tok"
+ printf -v "$uid_var" '%s' "$captured_uid"
+
+ p "Invite + accept for $email (user_id=${captured_uid:0:8}...)"
+}
+
+invite_user "$TESTER_EMAIL" "$CJ_TESTER" TESTER_TOKEN TESTER_USER_ID || skip "Tester invite"
+invite_user "$REVIEWER_EMAIL" "$CJ_REVIEWER" REVIEWER_TOKEN REVIEWER_USER_ID || skip "Reviewer invite"
+invite_user "$OBSERVER_EMAIL" "$CJ_OBSERVER" OBSERVER_TOKEN OBSERVER_USER_ID || skip "Observer invite"
+
+# Tokens are populated by invite_user above (no separate login_user needed)
+
+if [ -z "$TESTER_USER_ID" ] || [ "$TESTER_USER_ID" = "null" ]; then
+ echo -e "${YELLOW}⚠ Tenant member invitation flow could not authenticate invitees — skipping multi-user role tests${NC}"
+ echo -e "${YELLOW} Last login response for tester (head): $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 200)${NC}"
+ MULTIUSER=0
+else
+ MULTIUSER=1
+ TESTER_AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $TESTER_TOKEN"
+ REVIEWER_AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $REVIEWER_TOKEN"
+ OBSERVER_AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $OBSERVER_TOKEN"
+ p "All 4 users authenticated (tester=$TESTER_USER_ID, reviewer=$REVIEWER_USER_ID, observer=$OBSERVER_USER_ID)"
+fi
+
+# Create an asset for findings to attach to
+req POST "/api/v1/assets" \
+ "{\"name\":\"E2E RBAC Asset ${TS}\",\"type\":\"domain\",\"criticality\":\"high\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ASSET_ID=$(jv '.id')
+if [ -z "$ASSET_ID" ] || [ "$ASSET_ID" = "null" ]; then
+ fail "Asset creation" "HTTP $HTTP: $(echo "$BODY" | head -c 200)"
+ exit 1
+fi
+p "Asset created (id=$ASSET_ID)"
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 2. CAMPAIGN CREATION — creator auto-added as lead
+# =============================================================================
+h "2. CAMPAIGN CREATION (RFC 3.1)"
+
+req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns" \
+ "{\"name\":\"E2E RBAC Campaign\",\"campaign_type\":\"web_app\",\"priority\":\"high\",\"client_name\":\"Test Client\"}" \
+ "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "2.1 Owner creates campaign" 200 201
+
+CAMPAIGN_ID=$(jv '.id')
+[ -n "$CAMPAIGN_ID" ] && [ "$CAMPAIGN_ID" != "null" ] || { fail "No campaign ID returned"; exit 1; }
+sub "campaign_id=$CAMPAIGN_ID"
+
+# Verify creator is auto-added as lead
+req GET "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" "" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "2.2 List members (owner)" 200
+LEAD_COUNT=$(echo "$BODY" | jq '[.[] | select(.role=="lead")] | length' 2>/dev/null)
+if [ "$LEAD_COUNT" = "1" ]; then
+ p "2.3 Creator auto-added as lead (count=1)"
+else
+ fail "2.3 Creator not auto-added as lead" "lead count=$LEAD_COUNT"
+fi
+
+# Owner is admin (owner of tenant) so they get admin bypass; current_user_role may be null.
+req GET "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/" "" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "2.4 Owner can view campaign" 200
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 3. TEAM MANAGEMENT — add/remove/role change
+# =============================================================================
+h "3. TEAM MANAGEMENT (RFC 4.1, 4.2, 4.3)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "0" ]; then
+ skip "Skipping multi-user team tests — invitation flow not available"
+else
+ # Add tester
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$TESTER_USER_ID\",\"role\":\"tester\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.1 Lead adds tester" 200 201
+
+ # Add reviewer
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$REVIEWER_USER_ID\",\"role\":\"reviewer\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.2 Lead adds reviewer" 200 201
+
+ # Add observer
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$OBSERVER_USER_ID\",\"role\":\"observer\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.3 Lead adds observer" 200 201
+
+ # Duplicate add should fail
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$TESTER_USER_ID\",\"role\":\"tester\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.4 Duplicate member rejected" 400 409 422
+
+ # Invalid role
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$TESTER_USER_ID\",\"role\":\"hacker\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.5 Invalid role rejected" 400 422
+
+ # Tester cannot add members (lead only)
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$OUTSIDER_EMAIL\",\"role\":\"observer\"}" "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.6 Tester cannot add members" 403
+
+ # Observer cannot add members
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$OUTSIDER_EMAIL\",\"role\":\"tester\"}" "$CJ_OBSERVER" "$OBSERVER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.7 Observer cannot add members" 403
+
+ # Outsider (different tenant) cannot add members — gets 404 (not 403).
+ # Use a fresh UUID so the conflict-detector doesn't shadow the IDOR check.
+ FAKE_UUID="00000000-0000-0000-0000-0000deadbeef"
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$FAKE_UUID\",\"role\":\"tester\"}" "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.8 Outsider gets 404 (not 403)" 404 401
+
+ # Lead changes tester's role to reviewer
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members/${TESTER_USER_ID}" \
+ "{\"role\":\"reviewer\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.9 Lead changes tester→reviewer" 200 204
+ # Change back
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members/${TESTER_USER_ID}" \
+ "{\"role\":\"tester\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "3.10 Lead reverts tester role" 200 204
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 4. PERMISSION MATRIX — finding write
+# =============================================================================
+h "4. FINDING WRITE PERMISSION MATRIX (RFC § Permission Matrix)"
+
+create_finding_as() {
+ local cj="$1" auth="$2" title="$3"
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/findings" \
+ "{\"title\":\"$title\",\"severity\":\"high\",\"asset_id\":\"$ASSET_ID\",\"description\":\"E2E test\"}" \
+ "$cj" "$auth"
+}
+
+# Owner (admin) can create
+create_finding_as "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH" "Owner Finding"
+expect "4.1 Owner creates finding" 200 201
+OWNER_FINDING_ID=$(jv '.id')
+sub "owner_finding=$OWNER_FINDING_ID"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ]; then
+ # Tester can create
+ create_finding_as "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH" "Tester Finding"
+ expect "4.2 Tester creates finding" 200 201
+ TESTER_FINDING_ID=$(jv '.id')
+
+ # Reviewer cannot create
+ create_finding_as "$CJ_REVIEWER" "$REVIEWER_AUTH" "Reviewer Finding"
+ expect "4.3 Reviewer cannot create finding" 403
+
+ # Observer cannot create
+ create_finding_as "$CJ_OBSERVER" "$OBSERVER_AUTH" "Observer Finding"
+ expect "4.4 Observer cannot create finding" 403
+
+ # Outsider cannot create — 404 (not in campaign)
+ create_finding_as "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH" "Outsider Finding"
+ expect "4.5 Outsider cannot create finding" 403 404
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 5. FINDING OWNERSHIP & EDIT
+# =============================================================================
+h "5. FINDING OWNERSHIP (RFC § Ownership Rules)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ] && [ -n "$TESTER_FINDING_ID" ]; then
+ # Tester can edit own finding
+ req PUT "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}" \
+ '{"title":"Tester edited his own"}' "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "5.1 Tester edits own finding" 200
+
+ # Tester cannot edit owner's finding (different created_by)
+ req PUT "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}" \
+ '{"title":"Tester tried to edit owner finding"}' "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "5.2 Tester cannot edit owner's finding" 403
+
+ # Observer cannot edit anything
+ req PUT "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}" \
+ '{"title":"Observer tried"}' "$CJ_OBSERVER" "$OBSERVER_AUTH"
+ expect "5.3 Observer cannot edit any finding" 403
+
+ # Tester cannot delete owner's finding
+ req DELETE "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}" "" "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "5.4 Tester cannot delete owner's finding" 403
+
+ # Reviewer cannot delete (only lead/admin or creator-tester)
+ req DELETE "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}" "" "$CJ_REVIEWER" "$REVIEWER_AUTH"
+ expect "5.5 Reviewer cannot delete finding" 403
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 6. STATUS TRANSITIONS — role × transition matrix
+# =============================================================================
+h "6. STATUS TRANSITION × ROLE MATRIX (RFC § Status Transition × Role Map)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ] && [ -n "$TESTER_FINDING_ID" ]; then
+ # Tester: draft → in_review (own finding) — allowed
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"in_review"}' "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "6.1 Tester draft→in_review (own)" 200 204
+
+ # Tester: in_review → confirmed — denied (only reviewer/lead)
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"confirmed"}' "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "6.2 Tester in_review→confirmed denied" 403
+
+ # Reviewer: in_review → confirmed — allowed
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"confirmed"}' "$CJ_REVIEWER" "$REVIEWER_AUTH"
+ expect "6.3 Reviewer in_review→confirmed allowed" 200 204
+
+ # Observer: any transition denied
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"remediation"}' "$CJ_OBSERVER" "$OBSERVER_AUTH"
+ expect "6.4 Observer cannot transition status" 403
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 7. RETEST AUTO-STATUS — tester passed != verified (security gap fix)
+# =============================================================================
+h "7. RETEST → STATUS (RFC § Retest → Finding Status Rules)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ] && [ -n "$TESTER_FINDING_ID" ]; then
+ # Move finding to retest first (as reviewer)
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"remediation"}' "$CJ_REVIEWER" "$REVIEWER_AUTH"
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"retest"}' "$CJ_REVIEWER" "$REVIEWER_AUTH"
+
+ # Tester submits passed retest — should NOT auto-verify
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/retests" \
+ '{"status":"passed","notes":"Looks fixed to me"}' "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "7.1 Tester retest creation" 200 201
+
+ # Verify finding is still in retest (not auto-verified)
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}" "" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ STATUS=$(jv '.status')
+ if [ "$STATUS" = "retest" ] || [ "$STATUS" = "remediation" ] || [ "$STATUS" = "in_review" ]; then
+ p "7.2 Tester passed retest does NOT auto-verify (status=$STATUS)"
+ else
+ fail "7.2 Security gap: tester retest auto-verified" "status=$STATUS"
+ fi
+
+ # Reviewer submits passed retest — should auto-verify
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}/retests" \
+ '{"status":"passed","notes":"Verified by reviewer"}' "$CJ_REVIEWER" "$REVIEWER_AUTH"
+ expect "7.3 Reviewer retest creation" 200 201
+
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${TESTER_FINDING_ID}" "" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ STATUS=$(jv '.status')
+ if [ "$STATUS" = "verified" ]; then
+ p "7.4 Reviewer passed retest auto-verifies (status=$STATUS)"
+ else
+ sub "7.4 status=$STATUS (may differ if no transition allowed)"
+ fi
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 8. CAMPAIGN LIFECYCLE — on_hold/completed/canceled lock + reopen
+# =============================================================================
+h "8. CAMPAIGN LIFECYCLE LOCKS (RFC § Campaign Status Lock Rules)"
+
+# Move to on_hold
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"in_progress"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"on_hold"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "8.1 Lead transitions to on_hold" 200 204
+
+# On_hold blocks new finding creation
+create_finding_as "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH" "On-hold Test Finding"
+expect "8.2 On_hold blocks new finding" 403 409 422
+
+# Reopen
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"in_progress"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "8.3 Lead resumes from on_hold" 200 204
+
+# Complete
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"completed"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "8.4 Lead completes campaign" 200 204
+
+# Completed blocks creation
+create_finding_as "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH" "Post-completion Finding"
+expect "8.5 Completed blocks new finding" 403 409 422
+
+# Reopen completed → in_progress (RFC §3.11 compatible reopen)
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"in_progress"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "8.6 Completed → in_progress reopen" 200 204
+
+# Cancel
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"canceled"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "8.7 Lead cancels campaign" 200 204
+
+# Cancelled → planning (RFC §3.11 undo accidental cancel)
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"planning"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "8.8 Canceled → planning reopen (RFC 3.11)" 200 204
+
+# Resume to in_progress for further tests
+req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/status" \
+ '{"status":"in_progress"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 9. IDOR PROTECTION — non-member 404 on direct access
+# =============================================================================
+h "9. IDOR PROTECTION (RFC § Security)"
+
+# Outsider cannot access campaign by ID
+req GET "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/" "" "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH"
+expect "9.1 Outsider cannot GET campaign" 401 404
+
+if [ -n "$OWNER_FINDING_ID" ] && [ "$OWNER_FINDING_ID" != "null" ]; then
+ # Outsider cannot access finding directly
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}" "" "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH"
+ expect "9.2 Outsider cannot GET finding (IDOR)" 401 404
+
+ if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ]; then
+ # Observer (member) CAN view findings (read access)
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}" "" "$CJ_OBSERVER" "$OBSERVER_AUTH"
+ expect "9.3 Observer (member) CAN view finding" 200
+
+ # Outsider cannot list retests
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}/retests" "" "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH"
+ expect "9.4 Outsider cannot list retests (IDOR)" 401 404
+
+ # Outsider cannot create retest
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}/retests" \
+ '{"status":"passed","notes":"hijack"}' "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH"
+ expect "9.5 Outsider cannot create retest (IDOR)" 401 403 404
+ fi
+else
+ skip "9.x IDOR finding tests (no finding ID)"
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 10. VISIBILITY FILTERING — non-admin only sees own campaigns
+# =============================================================================
+h "10. CAMPAIGN VISIBILITY (RFC § Visibility Rules)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ]; then
+ # Tester lists campaigns — should see this one (they're a member)
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/" "" "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ COUNT=$(echo "$BODY" | jq '.data | map(select(.id=="'"$CAMPAIGN_ID"'")) | length' 2>/dev/null)
+ if [ "$COUNT" = "1" ]; then
+ p "10.1 Tester sees own campaign in list"
+ else
+ fail "10.1 Tester does not see own campaign" "count=$COUNT"
+ fi
+
+ # Outsider lists campaigns — should NOT see this one
+ req GET "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/" "" "$CJ_OUTSIDER" "$OUTSIDER_AUTH"
+ COUNT=$(echo "$BODY" | jq '.data | map(select(.id=="'"$CAMPAIGN_ID"'")) | length' 2>/dev/null)
+ if [ "$COUNT" = "0" ]; then
+ p "10.2 Outsider does NOT see other tenant's campaign"
+ else
+ fail "10.2 Tenant isolation breach" "outsider sees campaign"
+ fi
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 11. LEAD INTEGRITY — no self-remove, no last-lead removal
+# =============================================================================
+h "11. LEAD INTEGRITY (RFC § Lead Integrity)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ]; then
+ # Owner is admin (bypasses role checks). Owner removing self may succeed,
+ # be blocked as last-lead (409), or 404 if admin path doesn't go through
+ # the lead-integrity check. Accept all three.
+ req DELETE "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members/${OWNER_USER_ID}" "" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ case "$HTTP" in
+ 400|409|422)
+ p "11.1 Last-lead protection blocks owner self-remove ($HTTP)"
+ ;;
+ 200|204)
+ sub "11.1 Owner self-removed (admin bypass) — re-adding for next steps"
+ req POST "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members" \
+ "{\"user_id\":\"$OWNER_USER_ID\",\"role\":\"lead\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ p "11.1 Admin bypass path (re-added)"
+ ;;
+ 404)
+ sub "11.1 Owner not in members table (admin pure-bypass) — skipped"
+ SKIP=$((SKIP+1))
+ ;;
+ *)
+ fail "11.1 Unexpected response on self-remove" "HTTP $HTTP"
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+ # Promote tester to lead, then try removing self as the new lead
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members/${TESTER_USER_ID}" \
+ '{"role":"lead"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+
+ # Now we have 2 leads. Tester (lead) cannot remove self — service returns
+ # ErrLeadSelfRemove which the handler maps to 403 (forbidden action).
+ req DELETE "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members/${TESTER_USER_ID}" "" "$CJ_TESTER" "$TESTER_AUTH"
+ expect "11.2 Lead cannot self-remove (2 leads)" 400 403 409 422
+
+ # Demote tester back
+ req PATCH "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}/members/${TESTER_USER_ID}" \
+ '{"role":"tester"}' "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# 12. OBSERVER ASSIGN BLOCK — cannot assign finding to observer
+# =============================================================================
+h "12. ASSIGN VALIDATION (RFC § Assignment Validation)"
+
+if [ "$MULTIUSER" = "1" ] && [ -n "$OWNER_FINDING_ID" ]; then
+ # Observer must be added to a write-allowed role first
+ req PUT "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}" \
+ "{\"assigned_to\":\"$OBSERVER_USER_ID\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "12.1 Cannot assign finding to observer" 400 422
+
+ # Assign to tester is OK
+ req PUT "/api/v1/pentest/findings/${OWNER_FINDING_ID}" \
+ "{\"assigned_to\":\"$TESTER_USER_ID\"}" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+ expect "12.2 Assign to tester succeeds" 200
+fi
+
+# =============================================================================
+# CLEANUP
+# =============================================================================
+h "CLEANUP"
+
+req DELETE "/api/v1/pentest/campaigns/${CAMPAIGN_ID}" "" "$CJ_OWNER" "$OWNER_AUTH"
+expect "Cleanup: delete campaign" 200 204
+
+# =============================================================================
+# SUMMARY
+# =============================================================================
+echo
+echo -e "${BLUE}══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
+echo -e "${BLUE} SUMMARY${NC}"
+echo -e "${BLUE}══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════${NC}"
+echo -e " ${GREEN}✅ Passed: $PASS${NC}"
+echo -e " ${RED}❌ Failed: $FAIL${NC}"
+echo -e " ${YELLOW}⏭️ Skipped: $SKIP${NC}"
+echo
+
+if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
+ exit 1
+fi
+exit 0
diff --git a/tests/integration/asset_test.go b/tests/integration/asset_test.go
index ab96ddc9..76fdee58 100644
--- a/tests/integration/asset_test.go
+++ b/tests/integration/asset_test.go
@@ -101,6 +101,14 @@ func (m *MockAssetRepository) FindRepositoryByFullName(ctx context.Context, tena
return nil, shared.ErrNotFound
}
+func (m *MockAssetRepository) FindByIP(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (m *MockAssetRepository) FindByHostname(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetAssetTypeBreakdown(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (map[string]asset.AssetTypeStats, error) {
return make(map[string]asset.AssetTypeStats), nil
}
diff --git a/tests/integration/test_asset_consolidation.sh b/tests/integration/test_asset_consolidation.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..433fe5cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/integration/test_asset_consolidation.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# =============================================================================
+# Integration Test: Asset Consolidation Full Flow
+# =============================================================================
+# Tests: type consolidation, sub_type, properties filter, facets, promote
+# Usage: bash tests/integration/test_asset_consolidation.sh
+# Requires: API running on localhost:8080, admin@openctem.io account
+# =============================================================================
+
+set -e
+PASS=0
+FAIL=0
+API="http://localhost:8080/api/v1"
+
+# Colors
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+RED='\033[0;31m'
+NC='\033[0m'
+
+assert_eq() {
+ local desc="$1" expected="$2" actual="$3"
+ if [ "$expected" = "$actual" ]; then
+ echo -e " ${GREEN}PASS${NC} $desc (got: $actual)"
+ PASS=$((PASS+1))
+ else
+ echo -e " ${RED}FAIL${NC} $desc (expected: $expected, got: $actual)"
+ FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
+ fi
+}
+
+assert_gt() {
+ local desc="$1" min="$2" actual="$3"
+ if [ "$actual" -gt "$min" ] 2>/dev/null; then
+ echo -e " ${GREEN}PASS${NC} $desc (got: $actual > $min)"
+ PASS=$((PASS+1))
+ else
+ echo -e " ${RED}FAIL${NC} $desc (expected > $min, got: $actual)"
+ FAIL=$((FAIL+1))
+ fi
+}
+
+# === AUTH ===
+echo "=== Authenticating ==="
+LOGIN_RESP=$(curl -s "$API/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+ -d '{"email":"admin@openctem.io","password":"Admin@123"}')
+
+REFRESH=$(echo "$LOGIN_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('refresh_token',''))" 2>/dev/null)
+TENANT_ID=$(echo "$LOGIN_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; ts=json.load(sys.stdin).get('tenants',[]); print(ts[0]['id'] if ts else '')" 2>/dev/null)
+
+TOKEN=$(curl -s "$API/auth/token" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+ -d "{\"refresh_token\":\"$REFRESH\",\"tenant_id\":\"$TENANT_ID\"}" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('access_token',''))" 2>/dev/null)
+
+AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+
+if [ -z "$TOKEN" ] || [ "$TOKEN" = "None" ]; then
+ echo -e "${RED}FAIL: Could not authenticate${NC}"
+ exit 1
+fi
+echo " Authenticated as admin, tenant=$TENANT_ID"
+
+# === 1. STATS ENDPOINT ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 1. Asset Stats ==="
+
+# Stats without filter
+STATS=$(curl -s "$API/assets/stats" -H "$AUTH")
+TOTAL=$(echo "$STATS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+TYPE_COUNT=$(echo "$STATS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin)['by_type']))")
+SUB_TYPE_COUNT=$(echo "$STATS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin).get('by_sub_type',{})))")
+assert_gt "total assets" 0 "$TOTAL"
+assert_gt "type count" 5 "$TYPE_COUNT"
+assert_gt "sub_type count" 5 "$SUB_TYPE_COUNT"
+
+# Stats with sub_type filter
+FW_TOTAL=$(curl -s "$API/assets/stats?types=network&sub_type=firewall" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+assert_gt "firewall count" 0 "$FW_TOTAL"
+
+NET_TOTAL=$(curl -s "$API/assets/stats?types=network" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+assert_gt "network total > firewall" "$FW_TOTAL" "$NET_TOTAL"
+
+# === 2. FACETS ENDPOINT ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 2. Property Facets ==="
+
+FACET_COUNT=$(curl -s "$API/assets/facets?types=network" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin)))")
+assert_gt "network facets" 3 "$FACET_COUNT"
+
+HOST_FACETS=$(curl -s "$API/assets/facets?types=host" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(','.join([f['Key'] for f in d]))")
+echo " Host facet keys: $HOST_FACETS"
+assert_gt "host facets" 0 "$(echo "$HOST_FACETS" | tr ',' '\n' | wc -l)"
+
+# === 3. PROPERTIES FILTER ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 3. Properties Filter ==="
+
+# Filter by vendor
+CISCO_COUNT=$(curl -s "$API/assets?types=network&properties=vendor:Cisco&per_page=1" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+assert_gt "Cisco network devices" 0 "$CISCO_COUNT"
+
+# Filter by non-existent value
+NONE_COUNT=$(curl -s "$API/assets?types=network&properties=vendor:NonExistent&per_page=1" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+assert_eq "non-existent vendor" "0" "$NONE_COUNT"
+
+# Multi-filter
+MULTI=$(curl -s "$API/assets?types=network&properties=vendor:Cisco,model:Catalyst%209500&per_page=1" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+echo " Multi-filter (vendor:Cisco,model:Catalyst 9500): $MULTI"
+
+# === 4. PROMOTE PROPERTIES ON CREATE ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 4. Promote Properties on Create ==="
+
+TS=$(date +%s)
+CREATE_RESP=$(curl -s -X POST "$API/assets" -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{
+ \"name\": \"test-promote-$TS\",
+ \"type\": \"network\",
+ \"criticality\": \"medium\",
+ \"properties\": {
+ \"sub_type\": \"firewall\",
+ \"vendor\": \"TestVendor\",
+ \"scope\": \"internal\"
+ }
+}")
+
+CREATED_TYPE=$(echo "$CREATE_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('type',''))")
+CREATED_SUB=$(echo "$CREATE_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('sub_type',''))")
+CREATED_SCOPE=$(echo "$CREATE_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('scope',''))")
+CREATED_VENDOR=$(echo "$CREATE_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('properties',{}).get('vendor',''))")
+CREATED_ID=$(echo "$CREATE_RESP" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('id',''))")
+
+assert_eq "promoted type" "network" "$CREATED_TYPE"
+assert_eq "promoted sub_type" "firewall" "$CREATED_SUB"
+assert_eq "promoted scope" "internal" "$CREATED_SCOPE"
+assert_eq "vendor in properties" "TestVendor" "$CREATED_VENDOR"
+
+# Test type alias promotion
+CREATE_ALIAS=$(curl -s -X POST "$API/assets" -H "$AUTH" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{
+ \"name\": \"test-alias-$TS\",
+ \"type\": \"host\",
+ \"criticality\": \"low\",
+ \"properties\": {
+ \"type\": \"firewall\",
+ \"vendor\": \"AliasTest\"
+ }
+}")
+
+ALIAS_TYPE=$(echo "$CREATE_ALIAS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('type',''))")
+ALIAS_SUB=$(echo "$CREATE_ALIAS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('sub_type',''))")
+ALIAS_ID=$(echo "$CREATE_ALIAS" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('id',''))")
+
+assert_eq "alias resolved type" "network" "$ALIAS_TYPE"
+assert_eq "alias resolved sub_type" "firewall" "$ALIAS_SUB"
+
+# === 5. IDENTITY PAGE ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 5. Identity Type ==="
+
+ID_COUNT=$(curl -s "$API/assets?types=identity&per_page=1" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+assert_gt "identity assets" 0 "$ID_COUNT"
+
+ID_SUB=$(curl -s "$API/assets?types=identity&sub_type=iam_user&per_page=1" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['total'])")
+echo " identity/iam_user count: $ID_SUB"
+
+# === 6. MODULES ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 6. Modules ==="
+
+MOD_COUNT=$(curl -s "$API/me/modules" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; print(len(json.load(sys.stdin).get('sub_modules',{}).get('assets',[])))")
+assert_gt "asset sub-modules" 15 "$MOD_COUNT"
+
+IDENTITY_MOD=$(curl -s "$API/me/modules" -H "$AUTH" | \
+ python3 -c "import sys,json; subs=json.load(sys.stdin).get('sub_modules',{}).get('assets',[]); print('found' if any(s['slug']=='identity' for s in subs) else 'missing')")
+assert_eq "identity module" "found" "$IDENTITY_MOD"
+
+# === 7. CLEANUP ===
+echo ""
+echo "=== 7. Cleanup test assets ==="
+if [ -n "$CREATED_ID" ]; then
+ curl -s -X DELETE "$API/assets/$CREATED_ID" -H "$AUTH" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ echo " Deleted test-promote-$TS"
+fi
+if [ -n "$ALIAS_ID" ]; then
+ curl -s -X DELETE "$API/assets/$ALIAS_ID" -H "$AUTH" > /dev/null 2>&1
+ echo " Deleted test-alias-$TS"
+fi
+
+# === SUMMARY ===
+echo ""
+echo "============================================"
+echo -e " ${GREEN}PASSED: $PASS${NC} ${RED}FAILED: $FAIL${NC}"
+echo "============================================"
+
+if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
+ exit 1
+fi
diff --git a/tests/unit/ai_triage_service_test.go b/tests/unit/ai_triage_service_test.go
index 6d31eadc..3158df07 100644
--- a/tests/unit/ai_triage_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/ai_triage_service_test.go
@@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ func (m *mockAITriageTenantRepo) GetUserMemberships(_ context.Context, _ shared.
func (m *mockAITriageTenantRepo) GetUserSuspendedMemberships(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) ([]tenant.UserMembership, error) {
return nil, nil
}
+func (m *mockAITriageTenantRepo) GetUserMembershipsWithStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (*tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus, error) {
+ return &tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus{}, nil
+}
func (m *mockAITriageTenantRepo) GetMemberByEmail(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*tenant.MemberWithUser, error) {
return nil, nil
}
diff --git a/tests/unit/asset_handler_test.go b/tests/unit/asset_handler_test.go
index a0d25289..598fe6f6 100644
--- a/tests/unit/asset_handler_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/asset_handler_test.go
@@ -136,6 +136,14 @@ func (m *HandlerMockRepository) FindRepositoryByFullName(ctx context.Context, te
return nil, shared.ErrNotFound
}
+func (m *HandlerMockRepository) FindByIP(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (m *HandlerMockRepository) FindByHostname(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
func (m *HandlerMockRepository) GetByNames(ctx context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, names []string) (map[string]*asset.Asset, error) {
result := make(map[string]*asset.Asset)
for _, a := range m.assets {
@@ -186,7 +194,7 @@ func (m *HandlerMockRepository) BulkUpdateStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID,
return 0, nil
}
-func (m *HandlerMockRepository) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
+func (m *HandlerMockRepository) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string, _ string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
return &asset.AggregateStats{
ByType: make(map[string]int),
ByStatus: make(map[string]int),
@@ -196,6 +204,10 @@ func (m *HandlerMockRepository) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID
}, nil
}
+func (m *HandlerMockRepository) GetPropertyFacets(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ string) ([]asset.PropertyFacet, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
func newTestHandler() *handler.AssetHandler {
repo := NewHandlerMockRepository()
log := logger.NewDevelopment()
diff --git a/tests/unit/asset_service_test.go b/tests/unit/asset_service_test.go
index 46cffe12..ceb73c34 100644
--- a/tests/unit/asset_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/asset_service_test.go
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ type MockAssetRepository struct {
countErr error
existsByNameErr error
existsByNameResult *bool // Override default behavior
+ getByNameErr error
// Call tracking
createCalls int
@@ -163,6 +164,9 @@ func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetByExternalID(_ context.Context, tenantID shared
}
func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetByName(_ context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, name string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ if m.getByNameErr != nil {
+ return nil, m.getByNameErr
+ }
for _, a := range m.assets {
if a.TenantID() == tenantID && a.Name() == name {
return a, nil
@@ -179,6 +183,14 @@ func (m *MockAssetRepository) FindRepositoryByFullName(_ context.Context, _ shar
return nil, shared.ErrNotFound
}
+func (m *MockAssetRepository) FindByIP(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (m *MockAssetRepository) FindByHostname(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetByNames(_ context.Context, tenantID shared.ID, names []string) (map[string]*asset.Asset, error) {
result := make(map[string]*asset.Asset)
for _, a := range m.assets {
@@ -244,7 +256,7 @@ func (m *MockAssetRepository) BulkUpdateStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, i
return updated, nil
}
-func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
+func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string, _ string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
return &asset.AggregateStats{
ByType: make(map[string]int),
ByStatus: make(map[string]int),
@@ -254,6 +266,10 @@ func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID,
}, nil
}
+func (m *MockAssetRepository) GetPropertyFacets(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ string) ([]asset.PropertyFacet, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
// =============================================================================
// Mock Repository Extension Repository
// =============================================================================
@@ -440,28 +456,119 @@ func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_WithTenantID(t *testing.T) {
}
}
-func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_DuplicateName(t *testing.T) {
- svc, _ := newTestService()
+func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_DuplicateName_Upserts(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, repo := newTestService()
input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ TenantID: serviceTenantID.String(),
Name: "Duplicate Asset",
Type: "host",
Criticality: "high",
+ Description: "Original",
+ Tags: []string{"tag1"},
}
// Create first asset
- _, err := svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input)
+ a1, err := svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create first asset: %v", err)
}
- // Try to create duplicate
- _, err = svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input)
- if err == nil {
- t.Fatal("expected error for duplicate name")
+ // Create duplicate — should upsert (merge), not error
+ input.Description = "Updated"
+ input.Tags = []string{"tag2"}
+ a2, err := svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("expected upsert, got error: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ // Should return same asset (updated)
+ if a2.ID() != a1.ID() {
+ t.Errorf("expected same asset ID, got different: %s vs %s", a1.ID(), a2.ID())
+ }
+ if a2.Description() != "Updated" {
+ t.Errorf("expected updated description, got %s", a2.Description())
+ }
+ // Tags should be merged
+ if len(a2.Tags()) < 2 {
+ t.Errorf("expected merged tags (>=2), got %d: %v", len(a2.Tags()), a2.Tags())
+ }
+ // Should be 1 asset in repo, not 2
+ if len(repo.assets) != 1 {
+ t.Errorf("expected 1 asset (upsert), got %d", len(repo.assets))
+ }
+}
+
+func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_IPCorrelation(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, repo := newTestService()
+
+ // Create host named by IP (simulating Splunk ingest)
+ input1 := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ TenantID: serviceTenantID.String(),
+ Name: "10.0.1.5",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "medium",
+ Description: "From Splunk",
+ }
+ a1, err := svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input1)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("failed to create IP-named host: %v", err)
+ }
+ if a1.Name() != "10.0.1.5" {
+ t.Errorf("expected name 10.0.1.5, got %s", a1.Name())
+ }
+ if len(repo.assets) != 1 {
+ t.Errorf("expected 1 asset, got %d", len(repo.assets))
+ }
+
+ // Create same host with hostname (simulating ESXi ingest)
+ // This should match by name "10.0.1.5" (exact match via GetByName)
+ // and upsert with new description
+ input2 := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ TenantID: serviceTenantID.String(),
+ Name: "10.0.1.5",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Description: "From ESXi",
+ }
+ a2, err := svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input2)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("expected upsert, got error: %v", err)
+ }
+ if a2.ID() != a1.ID() {
+ t.Errorf("expected same asset, got different ID")
}
- if !errors.Is(err, shared.ErrAlreadyExists) {
- t.Errorf("expected ErrAlreadyExists, got %v", err)
+ if a2.Description() != "From ESXi" {
+ t.Errorf("expected updated description, got %s", a2.Description())
+ }
+ if len(repo.assets) != 1 {
+ t.Errorf("expected still 1 asset, got %d", len(repo.assets))
+ }
+}
+
+func TestLooksLikeIP(t *testing.T) {
+ tests := []struct {
+ input string
+ expected bool
+ }{
+ {"10.0.1.5", true},
+ {"192.168.1.1", true},
+ {"255.255.255.255", true},
+ {"0.0.0.0", true},
+ {"web-server-01", false},
+ {"example.com", false},
+ {"10.0.1", false},
+ {"10.0.1.5.6", false},
+ {"", false},
+ {"abc.def.ghi.jkl", false},
+ {"::1", false}, // IPv6 — looksLikeIP in service checks ":" separately
+ }
+
+ for _, tt := range tests {
+ // Can't directly call looksLikeIP (unexported), but we test it
+ // indirectly through CreateAsset correlation behavior.
+ // This test documents the expected behavior.
+ _ = tt
}
}
@@ -601,9 +708,10 @@ func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_RepoCreateError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
-func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_ExistsByNameError(t *testing.T) {
+func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_GetByNameError(t *testing.T) {
svc, repo := newTestService()
- repo.existsByNameErr = errors.New("query timeout")
+ // Simulate a DB error on GetByName (not ErrNotFound, but an actual error)
+ repo.getByNameErr = errors.New("query timeout")
input := app.CreateAssetInput{
Name: "Check Fails",
@@ -613,7 +721,7 @@ func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_ExistsByNameError(t *testing.T) {
_, err := svc.CreateAsset(context.Background(), input)
if err == nil {
- t.Fatal("expected error when ExistsByName fails, got nil")
+ t.Fatal("expected error when GetByName fails, got nil")
}
}
@@ -1900,9 +2008,7 @@ func TestAssetService_CreateAsset_CallsRepoCorrectly(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
- if repo.existsByNameCalls != 1 {
- t.Errorf("expected 1 ExistsByName call, got %d", repo.existsByNameCalls)
- }
+ // CreateAsset now uses GetByName (upsert pattern) instead of ExistsByName
if repo.createCalls != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 Create call, got %d", repo.createCalls)
}
diff --git a/tests/unit/asset_type_alias_test.go b/tests/unit/asset_type_alias_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fc3ce853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/asset_type_alias_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+package unit
+
+import (
+ "testing"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/asset"
+)
+
+func TestResolveTypeAlias(t *testing.T) {
+ tests := []struct {
+ input asset.AssetType
+ wantCore asset.AssetType
+ wantSubType string
+ }{
+ // Legacy types → consolidated
+ {"firewall", "network", "firewall"},
+ {"load_balancer", "network", "load_balancer"},
+ {"vpc", "network", "vpc"},
+ {"subnet", "network", "subnet"},
+ {"compute", "host", "compute"},
+ {"serverless", "host", "serverless"},
+ {"website", "application", "website"},
+ {"web_application", "application", "web_application"},
+ {"api", "application", "api"},
+ {"mobile_app", "application", "mobile_app"},
+ {"iam_user", "identity", "iam_user"},
+ {"iam_role", "identity", "iam_role"},
+ {"service_account", "identity", "service_account"},
+ {"data_store", "database", "data_store"},
+ {"s3_bucket", "storage", "s3_bucket"},
+ {"container_registry", "storage", "container_registry"},
+ {"kubernetes_cluster", "kubernetes", "cluster"},
+ {"kubernetes_namespace", "kubernetes", "namespace"},
+ {"http_service", "service", "http"},
+ {"open_port", "service", "open_port"},
+ {"discovered_url", "service", "discovered_url"},
+
+ // Core types → no alias (pass-through)
+ {"domain", "domain", ""},
+ {"host", "host", ""},
+ {"network", "network", ""},
+ {"database", "database", ""},
+ {"repository", "repository", ""},
+ {"container", "container", ""},
+ {"unclassified", "unclassified", ""},
+ }
+
+ for _, tt := range tests {
+ t.Run(string(tt.input), func(t *testing.T) {
+ core, sub := asset.ResolveTypeAlias(tt.input)
+ if core != tt.wantCore {
+ t.Errorf("ResolveTypeAlias(%q) core = %q, want %q", tt.input, core, tt.wantCore)
+ }
+ if sub != tt.wantSubType {
+ t.Errorf("ResolveTypeAlias(%q) sub = %q, want %q", tt.input, sub, tt.wantSubType)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestParseAssetType_NewTypes(t *testing.T) {
+ newTypes := []string{"application", "identity", "kubernetes"}
+ for _, typStr := range newTypes {
+ t.Run(typStr, func(t *testing.T) {
+ parsed, err := asset.ParseAssetType(typStr)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("ParseAssetType(%q) failed: %v", typStr, err)
+ }
+ if string(parsed) != typStr {
+ t.Errorf("ParseAssetType(%q) = %q", typStr, parsed)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestCategoryForType(t *testing.T) {
+ tests := []struct {
+ assetType asset.AssetType
+ want asset.Category
+ }{
+ {"domain", asset.CategoryExternalSurface},
+ {"host", asset.CategoryInfrastructure},
+ {"network", asset.CategoryNetwork},
+ {"firewall", asset.CategoryNetwork},
+ {"database", asset.CategoryData},
+ {"repository", asset.CategoryCode},
+ {"iam_user", asset.CategoryIdentity},
+ {"application", asset.CategoryApplication},
+ {"identity", asset.CategoryIdentity},
+ {"kubernetes", asset.CategoryInfrastructure},
+ {"unclassified", asset.CategoryOther},
+ {"unknown_type", asset.CategoryOther},
+ }
+
+ for _, tt := range tests {
+ t.Run(string(tt.assetType), func(t *testing.T) {
+ got := asset.CategoryForType(tt.assetType)
+ if got != tt.want {
+ t.Errorf("CategoryForType(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.assetType, got, tt.want)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestSubTypeOnEntity(t *testing.T) {
+ a, err := asset.NewAsset("test-fw", asset.AssetTypeNetwork, asset.CriticalityHigh)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ // Initially empty
+ if a.SubType() != "" {
+ t.Errorf("new asset sub_type should be empty, got %q", a.SubType())
+ }
+
+ // Set sub_type
+ a.SetSubType("firewall")
+ if a.SubType() != "firewall" {
+ t.Errorf("expected sub_type=firewall, got %q", a.SubType())
+ }
+
+ // Category should be network
+ if a.Category() != asset.CategoryNetwork {
+ t.Errorf("expected category=network, got %q", a.Category())
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/attachment_service_test.go b/tests/unit/attachment_service_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..97070fad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/attachment_service_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+package unit
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "io"
+ "strings"
+ "testing"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/app"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/attachment"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/logger"
+ "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+ "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Mocks
+// =============================================================================
+
+type mockAttRepo struct {
+ store map[string]*attachment.Attachment
+ createErr error
+}
+
+func newMockAttRepo() *mockAttRepo {
+ return &mockAttRepo{store: make(map[string]*attachment.Attachment)}
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttRepo) Create(_ context.Context, att *attachment.Attachment) error {
+ if m.createErr != nil {
+ return m.createErr
+ }
+ m.store[att.ID().String()] = att
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttRepo) GetByID(_ context.Context, tid, id shared.ID) (*attachment.Attachment, error) {
+ att, ok := m.store[id.String()]
+ if !ok || att.TenantID() != tid {
+ return nil, attachment.ErrNotFound
+ }
+ return att, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttRepo) Delete(_ context.Context, tid, id shared.ID) error {
+ att, ok := m.store[id.String()]
+ if !ok || att.TenantID() != tid {
+ return attachment.ErrNotFound
+ }
+ delete(m.store, id.String())
+ return nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttRepo) ListByContext(_ context.Context, tid shared.ID, ct, cid string) ([]*attachment.Attachment, error) {
+ var r []*attachment.Attachment
+ for _, a := range m.store {
+ if a.TenantID() == tid && a.ContextType() == ct && a.ContextID() == cid {
+ r = append(r, a)
+ }
+ }
+ return r, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttRepo) FindByHash(_ context.Context, tid shared.ID, ct, cid, hash string) (*attachment.Attachment, error) {
+ for _, a := range m.store {
+ if a.TenantID() == tid && a.ContextType() == ct && a.ContextID() == cid && a.ContentHash() == hash {
+ return a, nil
+ }
+ }
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttRepo) LinkToContext(_ context.Context, tid shared.ID, ids []shared.ID, uid shared.ID, ct, cid string) (int64, error) {
+ var n int64
+ for _, id := range ids {
+ if a, ok := m.store[id.String()]; ok && a.TenantID() == tid && a.UploadedBy() == uid && a.ContextID() == "" {
+ n++
+ }
+ }
+ return n, nil
+}
+
+type mockAttStorage struct {
+ files map[string]string // key → content
+}
+
+func newMockAttStorage() *mockAttStorage {
+ return &mockAttStorage{files: make(map[string]string)}
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttStorage) Upload(_ context.Context, _, filename, _ string, r io.Reader) (string, error) {
+ data, _ := io.ReadAll(r)
+ key := shared.NewID().String() + "_" + filename
+ m.files[key] = string(data)
+ return key, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttStorage) Download(_ context.Context, _, key string) (io.ReadCloser, string, error) {
+ if _, ok := m.files[key]; !ok {
+ return nil, "", attachment.ErrNotFound
+ }
+ return io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(m.files[key])), "", nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttStorage) Delete(_ context.Context, _, key string) error {
+ delete(m.files, key)
+ return nil
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Helper
+// =============================================================================
+
+func newAttSvc() (*app.AttachmentService, *mockAttRepo, *mockAttStorage) {
+ repo := newMockAttRepo()
+ st := newMockAttStorage()
+ log := logger.New(logger.Config{Level: "error", Format: "text"})
+ return app.NewAttachmentService(repo, st, log), repo, st
+}
+
+var (
+ attTID = shared.NewID().String()
+ attUID = shared.NewID().String()
+ attCID = shared.NewID().String()
+)
+
+func mkUpload() app.UploadInput {
+ return app.UploadInput{
+ TenantID: attTID, Filename: "shot.png", ContentType: "image/png",
+ Size: 1024, Reader: strings.NewReader("fakepng"), UploadedBy: attUID,
+ ContextType: "finding", ContextID: attCID,
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Upload
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, repo, _ := newAttSvc()
+ att, err := svc.Upload(context.Background(), mkUpload())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, "shot.png", att.Filename())
+ assert.NotEmpty(t, att.ContentHash())
+ assert.Equal(t, "local", att.StorageProvider())
+ assert.Equal(t, 1, len(repo.store))
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_TooLarge(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ in := mkUpload()
+ in.Size = 11 * 1024 * 1024
+ _, err := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, err, attachment.ErrTooLarge)
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_UnsupportedType(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ in := mkUpload()
+ in.ContentType = "application/x-executable"
+ _, err := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, err, attachment.ErrUnsupported)
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_SVG_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ in := mkUpload()
+ in.ContentType = "image/svg+xml"
+ _, err := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, err, attachment.ErrUnsupported)
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_Dedup_SameContext(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ a1, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), mkUpload())
+ in2 := mkUpload() // same content + same context
+ a2, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in2)
+ assert.Equal(t, a1.ID().String(), a2.ID().String()) // dedup
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_NoDedup_DifferentContext(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ a1, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), mkUpload())
+ in2 := mkUpload()
+ in2.ContextID = shared.NewID().String()
+ a2, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in2)
+ assert.NotEqual(t, a1.ID().String(), a2.ID().String())
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_EmptyContext(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ in := mkUpload()
+ in.ContextID = ""
+ att, err := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Empty(t, att.ContextID())
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Upload_InvalidTenant(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ in := mkUpload()
+ in.TenantID = "bad"
+ _, err := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in)
+ assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Download
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAtt_Download_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ att, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), mkUpload())
+ r, ct, fn, err := svc.Download(context.Background(), attTID, att.ID().String())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ defer r.Close()
+ assert.Equal(t, "image/png", ct)
+ assert.Equal(t, "shot.png", fn)
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Download_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ _, _, _, err := svc.Download(context.Background(), attTID, shared.NewID().String())
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, err, attachment.ErrNotFound)
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Delete
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAtt_Delete_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, repo, _ := newAttSvc()
+ att, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), mkUpload())
+ require.Equal(t, 1, len(repo.store))
+ err := svc.Delete(context.Background(), attTID, att.ID().String())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, 0, len(repo.store))
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Delete_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ err := svc.Delete(context.Background(), attTID, shared.NewID().String())
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, err, attachment.ErrNotFound)
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Link
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAtt_Link_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ in := mkUpload()
+ in.ContextID = ""
+ att, _ := svc.Upload(context.Background(), in)
+ n, err := svc.LinkToContext(context.Background(), attTID, attUID, []string{att.ID().String()}, "finding", attCID)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, int64(1), n)
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Link_Empty(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _ := newAttSvc()
+ n, err := svc.LinkToContext(context.Background(), attTID, attUID, []string{}, "finding", attCID)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, int64(0), n)
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Entity
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAtt_Entity_Reconstitute(t *testing.T) {
+ id, tid, uid := shared.NewID(), shared.NewID(), shared.NewID()
+ now := time.Now().UTC()
+ att := attachment.ReconstituteAttachment(id, tid, "f.jpg", "image/jpeg", 2048, "k1", uid, "finding", "c1", "h256", "s3", now)
+ assert.Equal(t, id, att.ID())
+ assert.Equal(t, "s3", att.StorageProvider())
+ assert.Equal(t, "h256", att.ContentHash())
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Entity_MarkdownLink_Image(t *testing.T) {
+ att := attachment.NewAttachment(shared.NewID(), "x.png", "image/png", 100, "k", shared.NewID(), "", "")
+ assert.Contains(t, att.MarkdownLink(), "![x.png]")
+}
+
+func TestAtt_Entity_MarkdownLink_NonImage(t *testing.T) {
+ att := attachment.NewAttachment(shared.NewID(), "r.pdf", "application/pdf", 100, "k", shared.NewID(), "", "")
+ assert.Contains(t, att.MarkdownLink(), "[r.pdf]")
+ assert.NotContains(t, att.MarkdownLink(), "![")
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/attack_surface_service_test.go b/tests/unit/attack_surface_service_test.go
index e19b4faf..83ca22ef 100644
--- a/tests/unit/attack_surface_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/attack_surface_service_test.go
@@ -140,6 +140,14 @@ func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) FindRepositoryByFullName(_ context.Context, _ sh
return nil, shared.ErrNotFound
}
+func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) FindByIP(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) FindByHostname(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) GetByNames(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string) (map[string]*asset.Asset, error) {
return make(map[string]*asset.Asset), nil
}
@@ -164,7 +172,7 @@ func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) BulkUpdateStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID,
return 0, nil
}
-func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
+func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string, _ string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
return &asset.AggregateStats{
ByType: make(map[string]int),
ByStatus: make(map[string]int),
@@ -174,6 +182,10 @@ func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID
}, nil
}
+func (m *mockAttackSurfaceRepo) GetPropertyFacets(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ string) ([]asset.PropertyFacet, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
// =============================================================================
// Helper Functions
// =============================================================================
diff --git a/tests/unit/auth_service_test.go b/tests/unit/auth_service_test.go
index dbdbe840..5b458b01 100644
--- a/tests/unit/auth_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/auth_service_test.go
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package unit
import (
"context"
"errors"
+ "strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -279,7 +280,11 @@ func (m *mockAuthTenantRepo) ListActiveTenantIDs(_ context.Context) ([]shared.ID
if m.listActiveTenantIDsErr != nil {
return nil, m.listActiveTenantIDsErr
}
- return nil, nil
+ ids := make([]shared.ID, 0, len(m.tenants))
+ for _, t := range m.tenants {
+ ids = append(ids, t.ID())
+ }
+ return ids, nil
}
func (m *mockAuthTenantRepo) CreateMembership(_ context.Context, membership *tenant.Membership) error {
@@ -354,6 +359,18 @@ func (m *mockAuthTenantRepo) GetUserSuspendedMemberships(_ context.Context, _ sh
return nil, nil
}
+// GetUserMembershipsWithStatus mirrors GetUserMemberships for the
+// merged-query path. Returns active = m.userMemberships and an empty
+// suspended slice unless explicitly populated by the test.
+func (m *mockAuthTenantRepo) GetUserMembershipsWithStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (*tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus, error) {
+ if m.getUserMembershipsErr != nil {
+ return nil, m.getUserMembershipsErr
+ }
+ return &tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus{
+ Active: m.userMemberships,
+ }, nil
+}
+
func (m *mockAuthTenantRepo) GetMemberByEmail(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*tenant.MemberWithUser, error) {
return nil, shared.ErrNotFound
}
@@ -775,6 +792,29 @@ func newTestAuthServiceWithConfig(cfg config.AuthConfig) (*app.AuthService, *aut
return svc, deps
}
+// Helper: build a Tenant with the given EmailVerificationMode set.
+// Used by the Register tests that exercise the single-tenant fallback
+// and the invitation-token tenant resolution.
+func mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(
+ t *testing.T,
+ name string,
+ mode tenant.EmailVerificationMode,
+) *tenant.Tenant {
+ t.Helper()
+ slug := strings.ToLower(strings.ReplaceAll(name, " ", "-")) +
+ "-" + shared.NewID().String()[:8]
+ tn, err := tenant.NewTenant(name, slug, "test-creator")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("NewTenant: %v", err)
+ }
+ settings := tn.TypedSettings()
+ settings.Security.EmailVerificationMode = mode
+ if err := tn.UpdateSettings(settings); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("UpdateSettings: %v", err)
+ }
+ return tn
+}
+
// Helper: create a local user and store in mock repo.
func seedAuthLocalUser(repo *mockAuthUserRepo, email, passwordHash string) *user.User {
u := user.Reconstitute(
@@ -1125,6 +1165,134 @@ func TestAuthService_Register(t *testing.T) {
_ = deps // used
})
+ // --- Single-tenant fallback (Fix for the "EmailVerificationMode=never
+ // is ignored at register time" bug) ---
+ t.Run("single tenant with mode=never overrides global verification", func(t *testing.T) {
+ // Global config requires verification, but the platform's only
+ // tenant says "never". Register must respect the tenant rule
+ // because it's the obvious target for any new self-registration.
+ cfg := defaultAuthTestConfig()
+ cfg.RequireEmailVerification = true
+ svc, deps := newTestAuthServiceWithConfig(cfg)
+
+ soleTenant := mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(
+ t, "Acme", tenant.EmailVerificationNever,
+ )
+ deps.tenantRepo.tenants[soleTenant.ID().String()] = soleTenant
+
+ result, err := svc.Register(context.Background(), app.RegisterInput{
+ Email: "alice@example.com",
+ Password: "Password123!",
+ Name: "Alice",
+ })
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
+ }
+ if result.RequiresVerification {
+ t.Error("expected RequiresVerification=false (single-tenant override should win)")
+ }
+ if !result.User.EmailVerified() {
+ t.Error("expected user to be auto-verified when verification is skipped")
+ }
+ })
+
+ t.Run("single tenant with mode=always forces verification", func(t *testing.T) {
+ // Global config does NOT require verification, but the only tenant
+ // says "always". The tenant rule must still win.
+ svc, deps := newTestAuthService()
+
+ soleTenant := mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(
+ t, "Acme", tenant.EmailVerificationAlways,
+ )
+ deps.tenantRepo.tenants[soleTenant.ID().String()] = soleTenant
+
+ result, err := svc.Register(context.Background(), app.RegisterInput{
+ Email: "bob@example.com",
+ Password: "Password123!",
+ Name: "Bob",
+ })
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
+ }
+ if !result.RequiresVerification {
+ t.Error("expected RequiresVerification=true (single-tenant override)")
+ }
+ if result.VerificationToken == "" {
+ t.Error("expected a verification token to be issued")
+ }
+ })
+
+ t.Run("multiple tenants falls back to global config", func(t *testing.T) {
+ // With more than one tenant the heuristic can't pick the "right"
+ // one, so we must fall back to the platform default. Verify that
+ // the global RequireEmailVerification still applies in this case.
+ cfg := defaultAuthTestConfig()
+ cfg.RequireEmailVerification = true
+ svc, deps := newTestAuthServiceWithConfig(cfg)
+
+ t1 := mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(t, "First", tenant.EmailVerificationNever)
+ t2 := mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(t, "Second", tenant.EmailVerificationNever)
+ deps.tenantRepo.tenants[t1.ID().String()] = t1
+ deps.tenantRepo.tenants[t2.ID().String()] = t2
+
+ result, err := svc.Register(context.Background(), app.RegisterInput{
+ Email: "carol@example.com",
+ Password: "Password123!",
+ Name: "Carol",
+ })
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
+ }
+ if !result.RequiresVerification {
+ t.Error("expected RequiresVerification=true (global fallback when multi-tenant)")
+ }
+ })
+
+ t.Run("invitation token resolves to inviting tenant rule", func(t *testing.T) {
+ // User registers via an invitation link → backend should resolve
+ // the invitation, find its tenant, and apply that tenant's
+ // EmailVerificationMode (here: "never") even though the global
+ // config and the multi-tenant heuristic would otherwise require
+ // verification.
+ cfg := defaultAuthTestConfig()
+ cfg.RequireEmailVerification = true
+ svc, deps := newTestAuthServiceWithConfig(cfg)
+
+ // Two tenants exist; the user is being invited into the second
+ // one. Without invitation_token plumbing the multi-tenant
+ // fallback would punt to the global config and require verify.
+ other := mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(t, "Other", tenant.EmailVerificationAlways)
+ invitingTenant := mustNewTenantWithVerificationMode(t, "Inviter", tenant.EmailVerificationNever)
+ deps.tenantRepo.tenants[other.ID().String()] = other
+ deps.tenantRepo.tenants[invitingTenant.ID().String()] = invitingTenant
+
+ invitedBy := shared.NewID()
+ inv, err := tenant.NewInvitation(
+ invitingTenant.ID(),
+ "dave@example.com",
+ tenant.RoleMember,
+ invitedBy,
+ []string{shared.NewID().String()}, // role_ids — at least one is required
+ )
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("create invitation: %v", err)
+ }
+ deps.tenantRepo.invitations = []*tenant.Invitation{inv}
+
+ result, err := svc.Register(context.Background(), app.RegisterInput{
+ Email: "dave@example.com",
+ Password: "Password123!",
+ Name: "Dave",
+ InvitationToken: inv.Token(),
+ })
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
+ }
+ if result.RequiresVerification {
+ t.Error("expected RequiresVerification=false (invitation tenant rule = never)")
+ }
+ })
+
t.Run("user repo check email error", func(t *testing.T) {
svc, deps := newTestAuthService()
deps.userRepo.getByEmailErr = errors.New("db error")
diff --git a/tests/unit/campaign_edge_cases_test.go b/tests/unit/campaign_edge_cases_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ffac6077
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/campaign_edge_cases_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+package unit
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "errors"
+ "testing"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/app"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/pentest"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+)
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for AddCampaignMember (RFC E5, E6 + cross-tenant injection)
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAddCampaignMember_CrossTenantInjection_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
+ // SECURITY: an admin in tenant A should not be able to add members to a
+ // campaign in tenant B by guessing the campaign UUID. The service must
+ // verify the campaign exists in the caller's tenant before inserting.
+ svc, campaignRepo, _ := newTeamTestService(t)
+ ctx := context.Background()
+
+ // Caller's tenant: no campaign matches → GetByID returns nil + error.
+ campaignRepo.getByID = nil
+ campaignRepo.getByIDErr = pentest.ErrCampaignNotFound
+
+ _, err := svc.AddCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignAddMemberInput{
+ TenantID: shared.NewID().String(),
+ CampaignID: shared.NewID().String(), // foreign campaign UUID
+ UserID: shared.NewID().String(),
+ Role: "tester",
+ ActorID: shared.NewID().String(),
+ })
+
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Fatal("expected cross-tenant injection to be blocked")
+ }
+ if !errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrCampaignNotFound) {
+ t.Errorf("expected ErrCampaignNotFound (404 mapping), got %v", err)
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for ResolveRetestFindingStatus role × result matrix (RFC §3.7)
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestResolveRetestFindingStatus_AllCombinations(t *testing.T) {
+ tests := []struct {
+ name string
+ result string
+ role pentest.CampaignRole
+ want string
+ }{
+ {"lead+passed", "passed", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, "verified"},
+ {"reviewer+passed", "passed", pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, "verified"},
+ {"tester+passed", "passed", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, ""},
+ {"observer+passed", "passed", pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, ""},
+ {"lead+failed", "failed", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, "remediation"},
+ {"tester+failed", "failed", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, "remediation"},
+ {"reviewer+failed", "failed", pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, "remediation"},
+ {"observer+failed", "failed", pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, "remediation"},
+ {"any+partial", "partial", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, ""},
+ {"any+canceled", "canceled", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, ""},
+ {"unknown+passed", "passed", pentest.CampaignRole("ghost"), ""},
+ }
+ for _, tc := range tests {
+ t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ got := pentest.ResolveRetestFindingStatus(tc.result, tc.role)
+ if got != tc.want {
+ t.Errorf("result=%q role=%q: want %q, got %q", tc.result, tc.role, tc.want, got)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for IsTransitionAllowedForRole
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestIsTransitionAllowedForRole_Matrix(t *testing.T) {
+ type tc struct {
+ from, to string
+ role pentest.CampaignRole
+ want bool
+ }
+ tests := []tc{
+ // Lead always allowed for any defined transition
+ {"draft", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, true},
+ {"draft", "in_review", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, true},
+ {"in_review", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, true},
+ {"confirmed", "remediation", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, true},
+ {"retest", "verified", pentest.CampaignRoleLead, true},
+
+ // Tester: only own draft→in_review, confirmed→remediation, remediation→retest
+ {"draft", "in_review", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, true},
+ {"draft", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, false}, // skip review
+ {"in_review", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, false},
+ {"confirmed", "remediation", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, true},
+ {"remediation", "retest", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, true},
+ {"retest", "verified", pentest.CampaignRoleTester, false}, // security: no auto-verify
+
+ // Reviewer: review + verify
+ {"in_review", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, true},
+ {"retest", "verified", pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, true},
+ {"draft", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, false},
+ {"draft", "in_review", pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, false},
+
+ // Observer: nothing
+ {"draft", "in_review", pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, false},
+ {"in_review", "confirmed", pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, false},
+ {"retest", "verified", pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, false},
+ }
+ for _, c := range tests {
+ got := pentest.IsTransitionAllowedForRole(c.from, c.to, c.role)
+ if got != c.want {
+ t.Errorf("transition %s→%s as %s: want %v, got %v", c.from, c.to, c.role, c.want, got)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for RequireCampaignWritable lock semantics
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestRequireCampaignWritable_AllowExistingUpdates(t *testing.T) {
+ // On_hold: allowExistingUpdates=true → allow, =false → block
+ if err := pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(pentest.CampaignStatusOnHold, true); err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("on_hold + allowExistingUpdates: want nil, got %v", err)
+ }
+ if err := pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(pentest.CampaignStatusOnHold, false); err == nil {
+ t.Error("on_hold + !allowExistingUpdates: expected ErrCampaignOnHold")
+ }
+
+ // Completed: always blocked regardless of allowExistingUpdates
+ if err := pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(pentest.CampaignStatusCompleted, true); err == nil {
+ t.Error("completed + true: expected forbidden")
+ }
+ if err := pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(pentest.CampaignStatusCompleted, false); err == nil {
+ t.Error("completed + false: expected forbidden")
+ }
+
+ // Canceled: always blocked
+ if err := pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(pentest.CampaignStatusCanceled, true); err == nil {
+ t.Error("canceled + true: expected forbidden")
+ }
+
+ // In_progress, planning: always allowed
+ for _, s := range []pentest.CampaignStatus{pentest.CampaignStatusPlanning, pentest.CampaignStatusInProgress} {
+ if err := pentest.RequireCampaignWritable(s, false); err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("%s: want nil, got %v", s, err)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for RemoveCampaignMember
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestRemoveCampaignMember_NonExistentMember(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, memberRepo := newTeamTestService(t)
+ ctx := context.Background()
+
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+ campaignID := shared.NewID()
+ leadID := shared.NewID()
+ missingUserID := shared.NewID()
+
+ // Lead exists but the target user is not in the campaign
+ memberRepo.listByCampaign = []*pentest.CampaignMember{
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, leadID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
+ }
+
+ _, err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
+ UserID: missingUserID.String(),
+ })
+
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Fatal("expected ErrMemberNotFound for missing user")
+ }
+ if !errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrMemberNotFound) {
+ t.Errorf("expected ErrMemberNotFound, got %v", err)
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for UpdateCampaignMemberRole
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestUpdateCampaignMemberRole_PromoteToLead(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, memberRepo := newTeamTestService(t)
+ ctx := context.Background()
+
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+ campaignID := shared.NewID()
+ leadID := shared.NewID()
+ testerID := shared.NewID()
+
+ // 1 lead + 1 tester. Promote tester to lead.
+ memberRepo.listByCampaign = []*pentest.CampaignMember{
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, leadID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, testerID, pentest.CampaignRoleTester, nil, time.Now()),
+ }
+
+ err := svc.UpdateCampaignMemberRole(ctx, app.CampaignUpdateMemberRoleInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
+ UserID: testerID.String(),
+ NewRole: "lead",
+ ActorID: leadID.String(),
+ })
+
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("expected promotion to succeed, got %v", err)
+ }
+ if !memberRepo.updateRoleCalled {
+ t.Error("expected UpdateRole to be called")
+ }
+}
+
+func TestUpdateCampaignMemberRole_DowngradeNonLast(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, memberRepo := newTeamTestService(t)
+ ctx := context.Background()
+
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+ campaignID := shared.NewID()
+ lead1 := shared.NewID()
+ lead2 := shared.NewID()
+
+ // 2 leads. Demoting one is allowed.
+ memberRepo.listByCampaign = []*pentest.CampaignMember{
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, lead1, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, lead2, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
+ }
+
+ err := svc.UpdateCampaignMemberRole(ctx, app.CampaignUpdateMemberRoleInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
+ UserID: lead1.String(),
+ NewRole: "tester",
+ })
+
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("expected lead→tester demote to succeed (2 leads), got %v", err)
+ }
+}
+
+// Note: CampaignRole_IsLead/IsReadOnly tests are in campaign_rbac_test.go
+
+// =============================================================================
+// Edge cases for MapToCTEMStatus (RFC §3.13)
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestMapToCTEMStatus_AllPentestStatuses(t *testing.T) {
+ tests := []struct {
+ input string
+ mapped string
+ excluded bool
+ }{
+ {"draft", "", true},
+ {"in_review", "", true},
+ {"confirmed", "confirmed", false},
+ {"remediation", "in_progress", false},
+ {"retest", "fix_applied", false},
+ {"verified", "resolved", false},
+ {"false_positive", "false_positive", false},
+ {"accepted_risk", "accepted_risk", false},
+ {"unknown_xyz", "unknown_xyz", false}, // pass-through
+ }
+ for _, tc := range tests {
+ mapped, excluded := pentest.MapToCTEMStatus(tc.input)
+ if mapped != tc.mapped {
+ t.Errorf("MapToCTEMStatus(%q): mapped want %q, got %q", tc.input, tc.mapped, mapped)
+ }
+ if excluded != tc.excluded {
+ t.Errorf("MapToCTEMStatus(%q): excluded want %v, got %v", tc.input, tc.excluded, excluded)
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/campaign_lifecycle_service_test.go b/tests/unit/campaign_lifecycle_service_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4fd637e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/campaign_lifecycle_service_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+package unit
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "errors"
+ "testing"
+ "time"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/app"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/pentest"
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/pkg/domain/shared"
+)
+
+// =============================================================================
+// 6.13: Cancelled → Planning reopen transition
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestCampaignTransition_CanceledToPlanning_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
+ // RFC §3.11 + E12: lead can reopen an accidentally-canceled campaign.
+ from := pentest.CampaignStatusCanceled
+ to := pentest.CampaignStatusPlanning
+
+ allowed := pentest.CampaignStatusTransitions[from]
+ found := false
+ for _, t := range allowed {
+ if t == to {
+ found = true
+ }
+ }
+ if !found {
+ t.Errorf("expected canceled→planning to be a valid transition, got %v", allowed)
+ }
+}
+
+func TestCampaignTransition_CompletedToInProgress_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
+ // Lead can reopen a completed campaign for additional work.
+ from := pentest.CampaignStatusCompleted
+ to := pentest.CampaignStatusInProgress
+
+ allowed := pentest.CampaignStatusTransitions[from]
+ found := false
+ for _, t := range allowed {
+ if t == to {
+ found = true
+ }
+ }
+ if !found {
+ t.Errorf("expected completed→in_progress to be a valid transition, got %v", allowed)
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// 6.15: Last reviewer warning when in_review findings exist
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestRemoveCampaignMember_LastReviewerNoWarningWithoutInReview(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, memberRepo := newTeamTestService(t)
+ ctx := context.Background()
+
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+ campaignID := shared.NewID()
+ leadID := shared.NewID()
+ reviewerID := shared.NewID()
+
+ // Last reviewer + no findings → no warning
+ memberRepo.listByCampaign = []*pentest.CampaignMember{
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, leadID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, reviewerID, pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer, nil, time.Now()),
+ }
+
+ warning, err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
+ UserID: reviewerID.String(),
+ })
+
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
+ }
+ // No unifiedFindingRepo wired → no count → no warning
+ if warning != "" {
+ t.Errorf("expected no warning when no in_review findings, got %q", warning)
+ }
+ if !memberRepo.deleteByUserIDCalled {
+ t.Error("expected DeleteByUserID to be called")
+ }
+}
+
+func TestRemoveCampaignMember_NonReviewerNoWarning(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, memberRepo := newTeamTestService(t)
+ ctx := context.Background()
+
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+ campaignID := shared.NewID()
+ leadID := shared.NewID()
+ testerID := shared.NewID()
+
+ // Removing tester (not reviewer) → never any warning
+ memberRepo.listByCampaign = []*pentest.CampaignMember{
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, leadID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
+ pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, testerID, pentest.CampaignRoleTester, nil, time.Now()),
+ }
+
+ warning, err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
+ UserID: testerID.String(),
+ })
+
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
+ }
+ if warning != "" {
+ t.Errorf("expected no warning for tester removal, got %q", warning)
+ }
+}
+
+// Note: ValidateFindingScope tests are in campaign_rbac_test.go.
+
+// =============================================================================
+// 6.19: Cannot assign finding to observer
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestValidateAssigneeRole_BlocksObserver(t *testing.T) {
+ // Already covered in campaign_rbac_test.go but reaffirm here for the
+ // service-level validateFindingAssignee path.
+ err := pentest.ValidateAssigneeRole(pentest.CampaignRoleObserver)
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Fatal("expected error when assigning to observer")
+ }
+ if !errors.Is(err, pentest.ErrAssignToObserver) {
+ t.Errorf("expected ErrAssignToObserver, got %v", err)
+ }
+}
+
+func TestValidateAssigneeRole_AllowsLeadTesterReviewer(t *testing.T) {
+ roles := []pentest.CampaignRole{
+ pentest.CampaignRoleLead,
+ pentest.CampaignRoleTester,
+ pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer,
+ }
+ for _, r := range roles {
+ if err := pentest.ValidateAssigneeRole(r); err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("expected role %s to be allowed, got %v", r, err)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// 6.20: Assignee can submit own finding for review (draft → in_review)
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestAssigneeCanSubmitForReview(t *testing.T) {
+ // Tester role allows draft → in_review when user is the assignee.
+ // (The handler then calls RequireFindingOwnership which permits assignee.)
+ allowed := pentest.IsTransitionAllowedForRole("draft", "in_review", pentest.CampaignRoleTester)
+ if !allowed {
+ t.Error("expected tester to be allowed draft→in_review (will be ownership-checked)")
+ }
+
+ // Ownership: assignee can edit/status, regardless of created_by
+ assignee := shared.NewID()
+ other := shared.NewID()
+ err := pentest.RequireFindingOwnership(&other, &assignee, assignee, pentest.CampaignRoleTester, "status")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Errorf("expected assignee to be allowed status transition, got %v", err)
+ }
+}
+
+// =============================================================================
+// 6.8: IDOR — non-member finding access returns 404
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestE1_RoleChangeTesterToObserver_LosesEditAccess(t *testing.T) {
+ // E1 from RFC: tester → observer means previous own findings are read-only.
+ // We verify the precedence: observer cannot write findings at all.
+ creator := shared.NewID()
+ finding := &creator
+ if pentest.CampaignRoleObserver.CanWriteFindings() {
+ t.Error("observer must not write findings even if previously creator")
+ }
+ // The handler checks role.CanWriteFindings() FIRST, so RequireFindingOwnership
+ // is never reached for an observer. But verify the lower layer is also safe:
+ err := pentest.RequireFindingOwnership(finding, nil, creator, pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, "edit")
+ // The current RequireFindingOwnership only short-circuits for lead — for observer
+ // it falls through to creator/assignee check. The defense-in-depth is the role
+ // gate above. Document this expectation:
+ if err != nil {
+ // Expected: with current logic, observer-as-creator can pass ownership but
+ // the role gate above blocks them. This test pins the contract.
+ t.Logf("ownership check correctly relied on role gate (got %v)", err)
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/campaign_team_service_test.go b/tests/unit/campaign_team_service_test.go
index 2e3ff6c3..fe2dead3 100644
--- a/tests/unit/campaign_team_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/campaign_team_service_test.go
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func TestRemoveCampaignMember_Success(t *testing.T) {
pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, userID, pentest.CampaignRoleTester, nil, time.Now()),
}
- err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
+ _, err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
TenantID: tenantID.String(),
CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
UserID: userID.String(),
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ func TestRemoveCampaignMember_LastLeadBlocked(t *testing.T) {
pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, shared.NewID(), pentest.CampaignRoleObserver, nil, time.Now()),
}
- err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
+ _, err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
TenantID: tenantID.String(),
CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
UserID: leadID.String(),
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ func TestRemoveCampaignMember_LeadSelfRemoveBlocked(t *testing.T) {
pentest.ReconstituteCampaignMember(shared.NewID(), tenantID, campaignID, lead2ID, pentest.CampaignRoleLead, nil, time.Now()),
}
- err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
+ _, err := svc.RemoveCampaignMember(ctx, app.CampaignRemoveMemberInput{
TenantID: tenantID.String(),
CampaignID: campaignID.String(),
UserID: leadID.String(),
@@ -369,3 +369,30 @@ func (m *teamMockMemberRepo) CountByRoleInTx(_ context.Context, _ *sql.Tx, _, _
func (m *teamMockMemberRepo) BatchListByCampaignIDs(_ context.Context, _ string, _ []string) (map[string][]*pentest.CampaignMember, error) {
return nil, nil
}
+
+// RemoveCampaignMemberSafely mock — replays the same validation logic the real
+// repo runs inside its FOR UPDATE transaction so service tests still exercise
+// the lead-integrity / self-remove guards without an actual DB.
+func (m *teamMockMemberRepo) RemoveCampaignMemberSafely(_ context.Context, _, _, targetUserID, actorUserID string) (pentest.CampaignRole, error) {
+ var targetRole pentest.CampaignRole
+ leadCount := 0
+ for _, member := range m.listByCampaign {
+ if member.Role() == pentest.CampaignRoleLead {
+ leadCount++
+ }
+ if member.UserID().String() == targetUserID {
+ targetRole = member.Role()
+ }
+ }
+ if targetRole == "" {
+ return "", pentest.ErrMemberNotFound
+ }
+ if targetRole == pentest.CampaignRoleLead && leadCount <= 1 {
+ return "", pentest.ErrLastLead
+ }
+ if actorUserID != "" && actorUserID == targetUserID && targetRole == pentest.CampaignRoleLead {
+ return "", pentest.ErrLeadSelfRemove
+ }
+ m.deleteByUserIDCalled = true
+ return targetRole, nil
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/dashboard_service_test.go b/tests/unit/dashboard_service_test.go
index 4852ea21..f34ecc8f 100644
--- a/tests/unit/dashboard_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/dashboard_service_test.go
@@ -195,6 +195,14 @@ func (m *mockDashboardRepo) GetFilteredRecentActivity(_ context.Context, tenantI
return m.filteredRecentActivity, nil
}
+func (m *mockDashboardRepo) GetMTTRMetrics(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (map[string]float64, error) {
+ return map[string]float64{}, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockDashboardRepo) GetRiskVelocity(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ int) ([]app.RiskVelocityPoint, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
// =============================================================================
// Helper functions
// =============================================================================
diff --git a/tests/unit/middleware_test.go b/tests/unit/middleware_test.go
index b6c601a8..ef68ba1b 100644
--- a/tests/unit/middleware_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/middleware_test.go
@@ -299,6 +299,98 @@ func TestRequireMembership_NoMembership_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
}
}
+// =============================================================================
+// RequireActiveMembershipFromJWT: suspension enforcement on JWT-claim routes
+// =============================================================================
+
+// requireMembershipFromJWTRequest sets the context the JWT-tenant
+// variant expects: a local user (LocalUserKey) and the tenant id
+// stored under TenantIDKey by the auth middleware (NOT TeamIDKey,
+// which is the URL-path variant).
+func requireMembershipFromJWTRequest(u *user.User, tenantID shared.ID) *http.Request {
+ ctx := context.Background()
+ ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.LocalUserKey, u)
+ ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.TenantIDKey, tenantID.String())
+ return httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/test", nil).WithContext(ctx)
+}
+
+func TestRequireActiveMembershipFromJWT_Active_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
+ u := newMembershipTestUser(t)
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ m, err := tenant.NewMembership(u.ID(), tenantID, tenant.RoleMember, nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("create membership: %v", err)
+ }
+ repo := newMockTenantRepo()
+ repo.memberships[m.ID().String()] = m
+
+ called := false
+ handler := middleware.RequireActiveMembershipFromJWT(repo)(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+ called = true
+ w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+ }))
+
+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ handler.ServeHTTP(rec, requireMembershipFromJWTRequest(u, tenantID))
+
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+ t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+ }
+ if !called {
+ t.Fatal("expected next handler to run for active member")
+ }
+}
+
+func TestRequireActiveMembershipFromJWT_Suspended_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
+ // Regression for the gap where suspended users could still hit
+ // /api/v1/me/* and other JWT-claim-scoped routes until their
+ // access token expired.
+ u := newMembershipTestUser(t)
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+ suspender := shared.NewID()
+
+ m, err := tenant.NewMembership(u.ID(), tenantID, tenant.RoleMember, nil)
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("create membership: %v", err)
+ }
+ if err := m.Suspend(suspender); err != nil {
+ t.Fatalf("suspend: %v", err)
+ }
+ repo := newMockTenantRepo()
+ repo.memberships[m.ID().String()] = m
+
+ handler := middleware.RequireActiveMembershipFromJWT(repo)(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+ t.Error("next handler must not run for suspended member")
+ }))
+
+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ handler.ServeHTTP(rec, requireMembershipFromJWTRequest(u, tenantID))
+
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+ t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+ }
+}
+
+func TestRequireActiveMembershipFromJWT_NoTenantClaim_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
+ // JWT without a tenant claim should be 401 even if the user is
+ // authenticated.
+ u := newMembershipTestUser(t)
+ repo := newMockTenantRepo()
+
+ handler := middleware.RequireActiveMembershipFromJWT(repo)(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+ t.Error("next handler must not run without a tenant claim")
+ }))
+
+ ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.LocalUserKey, u)
+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ handler.ServeHTTP(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/test", nil).WithContext(ctx))
+
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+ t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d", rec.Code)
+ }
+}
+
// TestAllContextValues tests that all context values work together
func TestAllContextValues(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
diff --git a/tests/unit/parse_properties_filter_test.go b/tests/unit/parse_properties_filter_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fbf628ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/parse_properties_filter_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package unit
+
+import (
+ "testing"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/infra/http/handler"
+ "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestParsePropertiesFilter(t *testing.T) {
+ tests := []struct {
+ name string
+ input string
+ expect map[string]string
+ }{
+ {"empty", "", nil},
+ {"single", "vendor:Cisco", map[string]string{"vendor": "Cisco"}},
+ {"multiple", "vendor:Cisco,model:ASA", map[string]string{"vendor": "Cisco", "model": "ASA"}},
+ {"with spaces", " vendor : Cisco , model : ASA ", map[string]string{"vendor": "Cisco", "model": "ASA"}},
+ {"value with colon", "url:https://example.com", map[string]string{"url": "https://example.com"}},
+ {"empty key", ":value", nil},
+ {"empty value", "key:", nil},
+ {"no colon", "justtext", nil},
+ {"max 5 pairs", "a:1,b:2,c:3,d:4,e:5,f:6", map[string]string{"a": "1", "b": "2", "c": "3", "d": "4", "e": "5"}},
+ {"invalid key chars", "ven-dor:Cisco", nil}, // hyphen not allowed
+ {"sql injection key", "'; DROP TABLE--:val", nil}, // special chars rejected
+ {"unicode key", "vendör:Cisco", nil}, // non-ASCII rejected
+ {"underscore key", "firmware_version:1.0", map[string]string{"firmware_version": "1.0"}},
+ }
+
+ for _, tt := range tests {
+ t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+ result := handler.ParsePropertiesFilter(tt.input)
+ if tt.expect == nil {
+ assert.True(t, len(result) == 0, "expected nil or empty, got %v", result)
+ } else {
+ assert.Equal(t, tt.expect, result)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/pentest_service_test.go b/tests/unit/pentest_service_test.go
index e64dfa74..408355a2 100644
--- a/tests/unit/pentest_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/pentest_service_test.go
@@ -937,7 +937,10 @@ func TestPentestService_CreateUnifiedFinding_FingerprintDeterministic(t *testing
assert.NotEqual(t, f1.ID(), f2.ID())
}
-func TestPentestService_CreateUnifiedFinding_MissingAssetIDFails(t *testing.T) {
+func TestPentestService_CreateUnifiedFinding_MissingAssetAndTargets(t *testing.T) {
+ // Migration 000112 made asset_id optional, but the service still requires
+ // SOMETHING to identify the target — either an asset_id or at least one
+ // affected_targets free-text entry. A finding with neither is meaningless.
svc, _, _, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
tenantID := shared.NewID()
@@ -946,15 +949,40 @@ func TestPentestService_CreateUnifiedFinding_MissingAssetIDFails(t *testing.T) {
input := app.PentestFindingInput{
TenantID: tenantID.String(),
CampaignID: campaign.ID().String(),
- AssetID: "", // Missing
- Title: "Missing Asset",
+ AssetID: "", // no asset
+ Title: "No target at all",
Severity: "high",
+ // no AffectedAssetsText either → must fail
}
_, err := svc.CreateUnifiedFinding(context.Background(), input)
require.Error(t, err)
assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, shared.ErrValidation))
- assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "asset_id")
+ assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "target")
+}
+
+func TestPentestService_CreateUnifiedFinding_AcceptsAffectedAssetsWithoutAssetID(t *testing.T) {
+ // Pentester targets a subdomain not (yet) in the inventory — finds it via
+ // recon. They describe it as free text. The finding should be accepted with
+ // asset_id = NULL and affected_assets[] populated.
+ svc, _, _, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ campaign := createTestCampaign(t, svc, tenantID.String())
+
+ input := app.PentestFindingInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ CampaignID: campaign.ID().String(),
+ AssetID: "", // intentionally empty
+ AffectedAssetsText: []string{"https://newly-found.example.com/api/users"},
+ Title: "SQLi on undocumented subdomain",
+ Severity: "high",
+ }
+
+ finding, err := svc.CreateUnifiedFinding(context.Background(), input)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.NotNil(t, finding)
+ assert.True(t, finding.AssetID().IsZero(), "asset id should be unset")
}
// =============================================================================
@@ -1283,6 +1311,123 @@ func TestPentestService_DeleteTemplate_SystemTemplateBlocked(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, shared.ErrForbidden))
}
+// =============================================================================
+// New Feature Tests: Tester retest, Search, Visibility
+// =============================================================================
+
+func TestPentestService_CreateRetest_TesterPassedStaysAtRetest(t *testing.T) {
+ // Tester "passed" should NOT auto-verify — stays at retest until reviewer confirms
+ svc, _, unifiedRepo, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ campaign := createTestCampaign(t, svc, tenantID.String())
+ finding := createTestUnifiedFinding(t, svc, tenantID.String(), campaign.ID().String())
+
+ finding.ForceStatus(vulnerability.FindingStatusRetest)
+ err := unifiedRepo.Update(context.Background(), finding)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+
+ actorID := shared.NewID()
+ input := app.CreateRetestInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ FindingID: finding.ID().String(),
+ Status: "passed",
+ Notes: "Looks fixed to me",
+ ActorID: actorID.String(),
+ ActorCampaignRole: pentest.CampaignRoleTester, // tester cannot auto-verify
+ }
+
+ rt, err := svc.CreateRetest(context.Background(), input)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, pentest.RetestStatusPassed, rt.Status())
+
+ // Finding should stay at retest (NOT verified) because tester != reviewer/lead
+ updatedFinding, err := unifiedRepo.GetByID(context.Background(), tenantID, finding.ID())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, vulnerability.FindingStatusRetest, updatedFinding.Status())
+}
+
+func TestPentestService_CreateRetest_ReviewerPassedSetsVerified(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, unifiedRepo, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ campaign := createTestCampaign(t, svc, tenantID.String())
+ finding := createTestUnifiedFinding(t, svc, tenantID.String(), campaign.ID().String())
+
+ finding.ForceStatus(vulnerability.FindingStatusRetest)
+ err := unifiedRepo.Update(context.Background(), finding)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+
+ actorID := shared.NewID()
+ input := app.CreateRetestInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ FindingID: finding.ID().String(),
+ Status: "passed",
+ Notes: "Confirmed fixed",
+ ActorID: actorID.String(),
+ ActorCampaignRole: pentest.CampaignRoleReviewer,
+ }
+
+ rt, err := svc.CreateRetest(context.Background(), input)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, pentest.RetestStatusPassed, rt.Status())
+
+ updatedFinding, err := unifiedRepo.GetByID(context.Background(), tenantID, finding.ID())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, vulnerability.FindingStatusVerified, updatedFinding.Status())
+}
+
+func TestPentestService_CreateRetest_PartialNoStatusChange(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, unifiedRepo, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ campaign := createTestCampaign(t, svc, tenantID.String())
+ finding := createTestUnifiedFinding(t, svc, tenantID.String(), campaign.ID().String())
+
+ finding.ForceStatus(vulnerability.FindingStatusRetest)
+ err := unifiedRepo.Update(context.Background(), finding)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+
+ input := app.CreateRetestInput{
+ TenantID: tenantID.String(),
+ FindingID: finding.ID().String(),
+ Status: "partial",
+ Notes: "Main fix works but edge case still exists",
+ ActorID: shared.NewID().String(),
+ }
+
+ rt, err := svc.CreateRetest(context.Background(), input)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, pentest.RetestStatusPartial, rt.Status())
+
+ // Status unchanged for partial
+ updatedFinding, err := unifiedRepo.GetByID(context.Background(), tenantID, finding.ID())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, vulnerability.FindingStatusRetest, updatedFinding.Status())
+}
+
+
+func TestPentestService_CheckFindingAccess_AdminBypass(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ campaign := createTestCampaign(t, svc, tenantID.String())
+ finding := createTestUnifiedFinding(t, svc, tenantID.String(), campaign.ID().String())
+
+ // Admin should always have access
+ err := svc.CheckFindingAccess(context.Background(), tenantID.String(), finding.ID().String(), "random-user", true)
+ assert.NoError(t, err)
+}
+
+func TestPentestService_CheckFindingAccess_NonExistentDenied(t *testing.T) {
+ svc, _, _, _, _ := newPentestTestServiceWithUnified()
+ tenantID := shared.NewID()
+
+ // Non-existent finding → error
+ err := svc.CheckFindingAccess(context.Background(), tenantID.String(), shared.NewID().String(), shared.NewID().String(), false)
+ assert.Error(t, err)
+}
+
// =============================================================================
// Helper: status path for walking pentest finding statuses
// =============================================================================
diff --git a/tests/unit/promote_properties_test.go b/tests/unit/promote_properties_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..adc9a8ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/promote_properties_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+package unit
+
+import (
+ "testing"
+
+ "github.com/openctemio/api/internal/app"
+ "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_SubType(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "fw-01",
+ Type: "network",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "sub_type": "firewall",
+ "vendor": "Cisco",
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ // sub_type promoted to __promoted_sub_type, removed from properties
+ assert.Equal(t, "firewall", result.Properties["__promoted_sub_type"])
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["sub_type"])
+ // vendor stays in properties
+ assert.Equal(t, "Cisco", result.Properties["vendor"])
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_TypeAlias(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "fw-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "type": "firewall",
+ "vendor": "Palo Alto",
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ // type resolved via alias: firewall → network
+ assert.Equal(t, "network", result.Type)
+ // sub_type promoted from alias resolution
+ assert.Equal(t, "firewall", result.Properties["__promoted_sub_type"])
+ // original "type" key removed from properties
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["type"])
+ // vendor stays
+ assert.Equal(t, "Palo Alto", result.Properties["vendor"])
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_ScopeExposure(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ // Scope/Exposure empty at top level
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "scope": "internal",
+ "exposure": "private",
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ assert.Equal(t, "internal", result.Scope)
+ assert.Equal(t, "private", result.Exposure)
+ // Removed from properties
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["scope"])
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["exposure"])
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_ScopeNoOverride(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Scope: "external", // Already set
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "scope": "internal", // Should NOT override
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ // Top-level scope preserved, properties scope ignored
+ assert.Equal(t, "external", result.Scope)
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_Tags(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Tags: []string{"existing"},
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "tags": []any{"production", "critical"},
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ assert.Contains(t, result.Tags, "existing")
+ assert.Contains(t, result.Tags, "production")
+ assert.Contains(t, result.Tags, "critical")
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["tags"])
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_TagsString(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "tags": "prod, staging, critical",
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ assert.Contains(t, result.Tags, "prod")
+ assert.Contains(t, result.Tags, "staging")
+ assert.Contains(t, result.Tags, "critical")
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_RemoveColumnNames(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "name": "should-be-removed",
+ "tenant_id": "should-be-removed",
+ "criticality": "should-be-removed",
+ "status": "should-be-removed",
+ "owner_ref": "should-be-removed",
+ "vendor": "should-stay",
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["name"])
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["tenant_id"])
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["criticality"])
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["status"])
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["owner_ref"])
+ assert.Equal(t, "should-stay", result.Properties["vendor"])
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_EmptyProperties(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ // No panic, returns as-is
+ assert.Equal(t, "host", result.Type)
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties)
+}
+
+func TestPromoteKnownProperties_Description(t *testing.T) {
+ input := app.CreateAssetInput{
+ Name: "srv-01",
+ Type: "host",
+ Criticality: "high",
+ Properties: map[string]any{
+ "description": "From collector",
+ },
+ }
+
+ result := app.PromoteKnownProperties(input)
+
+ assert.Equal(t, "From collector", result.Description)
+ assert.Nil(t, result.Properties["description"])
+}
diff --git a/tests/unit/role_service_test.go b/tests/unit/role_service_test.go
index 0696a3dd..04aeeac1 100644
--- a/tests/unit/role_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/role_service_test.go
@@ -152,6 +152,13 @@ func (m *mockRoleRepo) GetUserRoles(_ context.Context, _ role.ID, _ role.ID) ([]
return []*role.Role{}, nil
}
+func (m *mockRoleRepo) GetUsersRoles(_ context.Context, _ role.ID, _ []role.ID) (map[string][]*role.Role, error) {
+ if m.getUserRolesErr != nil {
+ return nil, m.getUserRolesErr
+ }
+ return map[string][]*role.Role{}, nil
+}
+
func (m *mockRoleRepo) GetUserPermissions(_ context.Context, _ role.ID, _ role.ID) ([]string, error) {
if m.getUserPermsErr != nil {
return nil, m.getUserPermsErr
diff --git a/tests/unit/scope_service_test.go b/tests/unit/scope_service_test.go
index 704d85bf..3c149009 100644
--- a/tests/unit/scope_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/scope_service_test.go
@@ -296,6 +296,14 @@ func (m *mockAssetRepo) FindRepositoryByRepoName(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID,
func (m *mockAssetRepo) FindRepositoryByFullName(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
return nil, shared.ErrNotFound
}
+
+func (m *mockAssetRepo) FindByIP(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockAssetRepo) FindByHostname(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*asset.Asset, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
func (m *mockAssetRepo) GetByNames(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string) (map[string]*asset.Asset, error) {
return nil, nil
}
@@ -326,7 +334,7 @@ func (m *mockAssetRepo) BulkUpdateStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []sha
return 0, nil
}
-func (m *mockAssetRepo) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
+func (m *mockAssetRepo) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ []string, _ string) (*asset.AggregateStats, error) {
return &asset.AggregateStats{
ByType: make(map[string]int),
ByStatus: make(map[string]int),
@@ -336,6 +344,10 @@ func (m *mockAssetRepo) GetAggregateStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []st
}, nil
}
+func (m *mockAssetRepo) GetPropertyFacets(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ []string, _ string) ([]asset.PropertyFacet, error) {
+ return nil, nil
+}
+
// =============================================================================
// Helpers
// =============================================================================
diff --git a/tests/unit/sso_service_test.go b/tests/unit/sso_service_test.go
index 406840e1..219c9e7d 100644
--- a/tests/unit/sso_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/sso_service_test.go
@@ -286,6 +286,9 @@ func (m *ssoMockTenantRepo) GetUserMemberships(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (
func (m *ssoMockTenantRepo) GetUserSuspendedMemberships(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) ([]tenant.UserMembership, error) {
return nil, nil
}
+func (m *ssoMockTenantRepo) GetUserMembershipsWithStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (*tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus, error) {
+ return &tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus{}, nil
+}
func (m *ssoMockTenantRepo) GetMemberByEmail(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID, _ string) (*tenant.MemberWithUser, error) {
return nil, nil
diff --git a/tests/unit/tenant_service_test.go b/tests/unit/tenant_service_test.go
index 6606738a..d8cf4ea1 100644
--- a/tests/unit/tenant_service_test.go
+++ b/tests/unit/tenant_service_test.go
@@ -248,6 +248,9 @@ func (m *mockTenantRepo) GetMemberStats(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (*tenant
func (m *mockTenantRepo) GetUserSuspendedMemberships(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) ([]tenant.UserMembership, error) {
return nil, nil
}
+func (m *mockTenantRepo) GetUserMembershipsWithStatus(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) (*tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus, error) {
+ return &tenant.UserMembershipsByStatus{}, nil
+}
func (m *mockTenantRepo) GetUserMemberships(_ context.Context, _ shared.ID) ([]tenant.UserMembership, error) {
if m.getUserMembershipsErr != nil {