



**Zephyr**® Project  
Developer Summit

# Insights from Zephyr Security Audit and Vulnerabilities Experiences

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


#EmbeddedOSSummit

@ceolin  
@d3zd3z




# Who we are



# Agenda


- Introduction
- Overview of past vulnerabilities on Zephyr
- External code audit
- Lessons learned
- Strategies implemented to enhance Zephyr's security
- Conclusion



# Embedded System Security


“The Zephyr OS is based on a small-footprint kernel designed for use on resource-constrained and embedded systems“

- Security in Embedded Systems is critical !
  - Embedded systems are increasingly connected to networks, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks.
  - Security breaches in embedded systems can have serious consequences, including data breaches, system malfunctions, and safety hazards.



# Zephyr: A framework for Secure Embedded Development


- Zephyr offers features such as memory protection, secure boot, and trusted firmware.
  - Modules provide additional features
- Groups dedicated to continuously improving the security of the framework.
  - Security Committee
  - Security Working Group
- Regular security updates and patches are released to address vulnerabilities and enhance security features.




# CNA

- **Registered with MITRE**  
in 2017
  - We issue our own CVEs
- **Zephyr Project Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)**

## Zephyr Project


The majority of the links on this page redirect to external websites ; these links will open a new window or tab depending on the web browser used.

Scope	Zephyr project components, and vulnerabilities that are not in another CNA's scope
Root	<a href="#">MITRE Corporation</a>
Security Advisories	<a href="#">View Advisories</a>
Program Role	CNA
Organization Type	Vendors and Projects
Country*	USA



# Vulnerability Alert Registry

- For an embargo to be effective, product makers need to be notified early so they can remediate
- Goal: Zephyr to fix issues within 30 days to give vendors 60 days before publication of vulnerability
- Product makers can register to receive these alerts for free by signing up at Vulnerability Alert Registry



The screenshot shows the Zephyr Vulnerability Alert Registry page. It features a blue header with the Zephyr logo and a hamburger menu icon. The main content area is white and contains a section titled "Criteria for Participation" in purple. Below this title is a list of four criteria, each preceded by a blue checkmark icon. The criteria are: 1. Have a contact who will respond to emails within a week and understands how Zephyr is being used in the product. 2. Have a publicly listed product based on some release of Zephyr. 3. Have an actively monitored security email alias. 4. Accept the Zephyr Embargo Policy that is outlined below. Below the list, there is a paragraph about removal: "Removal: If a member stops adhering to these criteria after joining the list then the member will be unsubscribed." At the bottom, there is a link to "More information on Zephyr's Security and Disclosure practices can be found at [Security](#)."


Zephyr

### Criteria for Participation

- ✓ Have a contact who will respond to emails within a week and understands how Zephyr is being used in the product.
- ✓ Have a publicly listed product based on some release of Zephyr.
- ✓ Have an actively monitored security email alias.
- ✓ Accept the Zephyr Embargo Policy that is outlined below.

Removal: If a member stops adhering to these criteria after joining the list then the member will be unsubscribed.

More information on Zephyr's Security and Disclosure practices can be found at [Security](#).



# Overview of past vulnerabilities






# Public Vulnerabilities



**Data is from CVEs published in the last three years !**

**\*CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures**




# Published Vulnerabilities

Total of CVEs published : 68





# Published Vulnerabilities


CVSS Score




Areas



# Published Vulnerabilities




EMBEDDED  
OPEN SOURCE  
SUMMIT




# CWEs

- CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
- CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
- CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
- CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write



# Some conclusions and questions

- Unsafe programming language
  - C is prone to buffer overflow issues
- Lack of awareness and training
- Excessive optimization and performance concerns ?
  - Insufficient validation and sanitization
- Network / Bluetooth -> Easier to fuzzy




# External code audit



# Why an external audit ?


- Identifying Vulnerabilities
- Independent Assessment
- Best Practices
- Community Trust
- Reputation






# How we choose the auditor

- Expertise in Embedded Systems
- Reputation
- Communication
- Cost
- Experience with Zephyr RTOS



# How we have defined the scope


- Security Objectives
- Components
  - Narrow to something doable and that benefits most users
- Depth of Analysis
- Threat Model



# Scope


The primary focus is centered around Zephyr's core kernel features

- User mode support
  - memory management and protections, user and supervisor threads
  - System calls
- Inter-process communication and process scheduling
- Exploit mitigations
  - Stack canaries
  - Stack guard
  - Stack pointer randomization



# Findings

- NCCGroup
- Target Zephyr 3.6 / 3.7
  - 02/2024 ~ 03/2024
- Three issues found
  - Two low severity caused by integer overflow and TOCTOU
  - One informational caused by integer overflow




# Lessons learned




# Lessons

- Defining the scope is hard
  - Resource Constraints
  - Depth and Breadth
  - Future-Proofing
  - Stakeholder Agreement



# Lessons

- Threat model is worth
  - Guiding the Audit Process
  - Validating Security Controls
  - Facilitating Communication
- Comprehensive Testing
  - The audit make it clear the importance of comprehensive testing




# Strategies implemented to enhance Zephyr's security





# Strategies

- Security Training
- Improve automated Security Checks
- Monitoring vulnerabilities in third-party components and dependencies used in Zephyr RTOS
- Community Engagement




# Conclusion



# Outcome


- **Enhanced Security**
  - The identification and subsequent remediation of even low-severity issues contribute to a more secure system
- **Increased Confidence**
  - Third-party auditor validated the security and quality of the code base increasing confidence among developers, stakeholders, and users
- **Recommendations aligned with Zephyr plans**
  - Guided Fuzzing of Libraries and Subsystems




# Positive findings

*"The overall design and documentation of Zephyr's kernel demonstrated a well understood attack surface and threat model, especially in regards to maintaining user thread privilege separation and isolation."*

*"Strong defensive programming practices were employed holistically across the kernel's codebase"*



Questions ?



# Thank you !





# Zephyr<sup>®</sup> Project

## Developer Summit



# Published Vulnerabilities

