# Understanding Web Application Threats and Mitigations



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### Agenda



Top OWASP threats

**Exploring the injection attack** 

Secret and general data management

External devices for extra security



### What Is OWASP?

Open Web
Application
Security Project

Provides free resources

Popular "Top 10" vulnerability list



### OWASP Top Ten Reference

OWASP Top 10 - 2013	<b>→</b>	OWASP Top 10 - 2017
A1 – Injection	<b>→</b>	A1:2017-Injection
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	<b>→</b>	A2:2017-Broken Authentication
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	7	A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References [Merged+A7]	U	A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE) [NEW]
A5 – Security Misconfiguration	7	A5:2017-Broken Access Control [Merged]
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure	7	A6:2017-Security Misconfiguration
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Contr [Merged+A4]	U	A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	x	A8:2017-Insecure Deserialization [NEW, Community]
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	<b>→</b>	A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	×	A10:2017-Insufficient Logging&Monitoring [NEW,Comm.]


# Injection Attacks



#### **HTTP POST**


<subject>Don't mind me!</subject>
<body>(code to insert "hacker" user)</body>


USER	PASSWORD	
Alice	abc123	
Bob	def456	
hacker	just_added	






### Broken Authentication








# Sensitive Data Exposure



USER	ACCT NUMBER
Alice	ewija^r%kW4r
Bob	8jEbH4(d!Xv\$p





### XML External Entity (XXE)




#### **HTTP POST**







### Broken Access Control




# Security Misconfigurations



### **Vulnerability scan**

SERVICE	USER	PASSWORD
Web server	admin	tomcat
SQL server	sa	Password123





### Cross-site Scripting (XSS)



#### HTTP PUT


```
<script type="text/javascript">
  alert(document.cookie);
</script>
```



**HTTP GET** 




"Why is my session data popping up in front of me?"





### Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)






### Insecure Deserialization




"\$0 balance, I'm debt free!"






Bob's balance: \$0.00

Bob's balance: \$100,000.00






### Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities




"We updated the system in 1998, right now the business is focused on growing sales, not IT."








## Insufficient Logging and Monitoring



### Continuous monitoring (SIEM)







## Demo



**Exploring the injection attack** 



```
import getpass
secret = getpass.getpass()
print(
         type(secret),
         secret
)
```

```
$ python getpasstest.py
Password:
<class 'str'> d3v0p$
```

- Comes standard with Python
- ◆ Prompt for password using OS mechanism; text not revealed
- A bad idea just for illustration

- Run the program
- Reflect type and value



```
import os
secret = os.environ["SECRET"]
print(
     type(secret),
     secret
)
```

```
■ Comes standard with Python
```

- Read the env variable "SECRET"
- A bad idea just for illustration


\$ export SECRET="d3v0p\$"
\$ python3 envtest.py
<class 'str'> d3v0p\$

- Define "SECRET" env variable
- Run the program
- Reflect type and value



# Python "keyring" Library

```
$ pip install keyring
import keyring
keyring.set_password(
    "devopstest",
    "krtest",
    "d3v0p$"
)
```





```
$ cat krtest.py
import keyring
secret = keyring.get_password(
    "devopstest",
    "krtest"
print(type(secret), secret)
$ python3 krtest.py
<class 'str'> d3v0p$
```

■ Read the keyring password "devopstest" into "secret"

■ A bad idea just for illustration

- Run the program
- Reflect type and value



# Other Approaches

Restricted plain text files

Encrypted vault files

Many commercial products



### Firewall and Reverse Proxy Tag Team

#### **HTTP** request










**HTTP** response



## Load Balancers and DNS; Achieving Scale



### Summary



So many products

So many design considerations

Continue your education

Thank you!

