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Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)

If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.

For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:

openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA


Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <>
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mattcaswell committed Mar 10, 2015
1 parent 0b142f0 commit e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b
Showing with 3 additions and 2 deletions.
  1. +3 −2 ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -719,8 +719,9 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
} else
i = 1;

if (i)
ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
goto err;

/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);

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