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Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA) If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA CVE-2015-0285 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <email@example.com>
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