



# Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

*Operation-C*

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# PasswordStore Audit Report

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## Table of Contents

- Table of Contents
- Protocol Summary
- Disclaimer
- Risk Classification
- Audit Details
  - Scope
  - Roles
- Executive Summary
  - Issues found
- Findings
  - High
    - \* [H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone and no longer private
    - \* [H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password
  - Low
  - Informational
    - \* [I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect.

## Protocol Summary

A smart contract application for storing a password. Users should be able to store a password and then retrieve it later. Others should not be able to access the password.

## Disclaimer

The Operation-C team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

## Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
		H	H/M	M
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## Audit Details

### Scope

```
1 ./src/
2 #-- Passwordstore.sol
```

## Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one else should be able to set or read the password.

## Executive Summary

### Issues found

Severity	Number of Issues Found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Gas	0

## Findings

### High

#### [H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone and no longer private

**Description:** All data stored on chain is public and visible to anyone. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be hidden and only accessible by the owner through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function.

I show one such method of reading any data off chain below.

**Impact:** Anyone is able to read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

#### Proof of Concept:

1. Create a locally running chain

```
1 make anvil
```

## 2. Deploy the contract to the chain

1 make deploy

### 3. Run the storage tool

```
1 cast storage <CONTRACT ADDRESS> 1 --rpc-url http://localhost:8545
```

You'll get an output that looks like this:

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

And then get an output of:

1 myPassword

**[H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password**

**Description:** The `PasswordStore:: setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however the purpose of the smart contract and function's natspec indicate that `This function allows only the owner to set a new password.`

```
1 function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2     // @Audit - There are no Access Controls.
3     s_password = newPassword;
4     emit SetNewPassword();
5 }
```

**Impact:** Anyone can set/change the stored password, severely breaking the contract's intended functionality

**Proof of Concept:** Add the following to the PasswordStore.t.sol test file:

```
1 function test_access_control_of_set_password(address randomAddress)
2     public {
3         vm.prank(randomAddress);
4         string memory newPassword = "newPassword";
5         passwordStore.setPassword(newPassword);
6
7         vm.prank(owner);
```

```
8     string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
9
10    assertEq(actualPassword, newPassword);
11 }
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Add an access control conditional to `PasswordStore::setPassword`

```
1 if(msg.sender != s_owner){
2     revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
3 }
```

## Low

### Informational

**[I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect.**

#### Description:

```
1 /*
2  * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3  * -> * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4  */
5 function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {}
```

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` while the natspec says it should be `getPassword(string)`.

**Impact:** The natspec is incorrect

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
1 /*
2  * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
3  * -> * @param newPassword The new password to set.
4  */
```