

# Evaluating Statistical Methods for Nuclear Forensics Analysis

Preliminary Examination

Arrielle Opotowsky

University of Wisconsin-Madison

29 January 2018



**WISCONSIN**  
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

# Outline



## 1 Introduction

Motivation

Methodology

## 2 Literature Review

Nuclear Forensics

Statistical Models

Algorithms for Prediction

ML Model Assessment

ML Model Validation

Computational Tools

Previous Work

## 3 Demonstration

Training Data

Reactor Parameter Prediction

ML Model Validation

## 4 Research Proposal

Experiment 1

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

Method Comparison

## 5 Summary

# Research Overview



How does the ability to determine forensic-relevant spent nuclear fuel attributes using machine learning techniques degrade as less information is available?

## Determine

The inverse problem: given end measurements, calculate the model parameters that created them

## Information

Nuclide vectors, measurements of isotope ratios

## Forensic-relevant Attributes

Reactor type, enrichment, cooling time, burnup

## Machine Learning Techniques

Creating statistical models (not physical)

## Degrade

Model prediction performance

## Less Information


Error in nuclide vectors, fewer measurements, etc

**Figure 1:** Definitions of terms within the main research question



# Nuclear Security and Forensics

Incidents related to trafficking or malicious use, 1993–2016



- FY2016 DHS DNDO budget : 0.3 bill
- FY2016 DOE NNSA nonpro budget : 1.6 bill

Figure 2: 24 years of incidents: HEU (12), Pu (2), Pu-Be neutron sources (4) [Obtained from: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/itdb-factsheet-2017.pdf>]



# Needs in Nuclear Forensics




Figure 3: Typical technical nuclear forensics workflow

## Material-specific:

- Measurement needs
- Measurement techniques
- Forensic signatures

## Challenges:

- Rapid characterization
- Forensics databases
  - Multidimensional
  - Inconsistent uncertainties
  - International cooperation



# Computational Methods




Figure 4: Nuclear forensics research: physical, experimental, and computational

# Computational Methods




Figure 5: Comparison of two different computational approaches



# Statistical Methods




Figure 6: Workflow of a methodology using statistical models

- Training data: large set of SNF measurements
  - Labels (e.g., burnup)
  - Features (e.g., nuclide concs)
  - Instances (individual SNF recipe)
- Statistical learner
  - Machine learning algorithms
  - Algorithm parameters
  - Predict label of new instance
- Model evaluation
  - Diagnostic curves
    - Learning curves
    - Validation curves
  - Prediction error
    - Bias versus variance
    - Generalizability



# Statistical Methods



	TRAINING DATA	TESTING DATA
<b>Physical Motivation</b>		
Ideal World	<i>Lab-Measured Mass Spectra</i>	<i>Lab-Measured Mass Spectra</i>
Real World	<i>Lab-Measured Gamma Spectra</i>	<i>Field-Measured Gamma Spectra</i>
<b>Computational Representation</b>		
Ideal World	<i>Simulation-Created Isotopics</i>	<i>Simulation-Created Isotopics</i>
Real World	<i>DRF-Derived Gamma Spectra</i>	<i>DRF-Derived Gamma Spectra</i>

Figure 7: Illustration of data set modularity

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# Nuclear Forensics Investigations



## Post-detonation

- Collection: debris, swipe samples
- Characterization: rapid analysis of isotope ratios
- Goals
  - Inverse problem: reconstruct weapon design/yield
  - Safety: informing disaster response
- Data evaluation



# Nuclear Forensics Investigations

## Post-detonation

- Collection: debris, swipe samples
- Characterization: rapid analysis of isotope ratios
- Goals
  - Inverse problem: reconstruct weapon design/yield
  - Safety: informing disaster response
- Data evaluation

## Pre-detonation

- Collection: depends on intercepted material
- Characterization: non-destructive and destructive
- Goals:
  - Inverse problem: material chain of custody
  - Safety: material handling and security
- Data evaluation



# Nuclear Forensics as an Inverse Problem

Use Bayes' Framework:

$$P(M|D) = \frac{P(D|M)P(M)}{P(D)}$$

M : **M**odel parameters

D : Measured **D**ata

Physical System	Bayes Representation	Calculated from:	
Model Parameterization	Prior Probability : P(M)	Model Space	Simulation <i>Input</i> : Rxtr Parameters
Forward Problem	Marginal Likelihood : P(D)	Data Space	Simulation <i>Output</i> : SNF Recipes
	Likelihood : P(D M)	Both	<i>Output</i> + <i>Input</i> = (Statistical) Model
Inverse Problem	Posterior Probability : P(M D)	Both	(Statistical) Model : <i>Output</i> -> <i>Input</i>

**Table 1:** Mapping the study of a physical system its Bayesian representation

# Machine Learning



machine vs. statistical (domain knowledge-¿none)  
supervised and unsupervised  
clustering, dimensionality reduction  
classification, regression – discrete and continuous variables

# Supervised Regression




Figure 8: Schematic of a representative prediction workflow




# Linear Models

Objective: minimize error over all training data wrt their labels


$$F(\mathbf{X}) = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^P x_j \beta_j$$

Smoothing model using regularization by varying  $\lambda$

$$F(\mathbf{X}) = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^P x_j \beta_j + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^P \beta_j^2$$



Input Feature ( $x$ ),  $\lambda = 0$



Input Feature ( $x$ ),  $\lambda > 0$

Figure 9: How regularization might affect the generalizability of an ML model





# Nearest Neighbor Methods

Objective: minimum distance between test sample and training instance(s)

$$Y(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{x_i \in N_k(\mathbf{x})} y_i$$




Figure 10: Illustration of the regularization effects by choosing  $k$



# Support Vector Machines and Regression




Figure 11: Classification with SVM and regression with SVR

# Support Vector Regression with Many Dimensions



Objective: minimize margin width and outliers

$$\min \frac{1}{2} \|w\|^2 + C \sum_i \xi_i$$

$$\text{subject to : } |y_i - (w\phi(x_i) + b)| \leq \varepsilon + \xi_i$$

$$\text{where : } w = \sum_i \alpha_i y_i \phi(x_i)$$

$$\text{and : } K(x_i, x_j) = \phi(x_i)\phi(x_j) = e^{\gamma \|x_i - x_j\|^2}$$




Figure 12: Diagram showing the use of the kernel trick with SVR

# Dimensionality Reduction



Manual via domain knowledge or some measure

PCA

Factor Analysis

ICA



# Types of Error




Figure 13: Diagram explaining the concept of  $k$ -fold cross-validation



# Error Metrics

$$\text{Mean Squared Error (MSE)} : \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - f(x_i))^2}{n}$$

$$\text{Mean Absolute Error (MAE)} : \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n |y_i - f(x_i)|}{n}$$

$$\text{Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE)} : \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{|y_i - f(x_i)|}{y_i}}{n}$$

$$\text{Coefficient of Determination, } R^2 : \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (f(x_i) - \bar{y})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - \bar{y})^2}$$

# Sources of Error




Figure 14: Bias and variance comprise the prediction error



# Training Set Size: Learning Curves




Figure 15: Learning curves for three training scenarios with respect to training set size





# Model Complexity: Validation Curves




Figure 16: Validation curve showing different fitness of models with respect to model complexity



# Model Comparison

$$Posterior = \frac{Likelihood * Prior}{Marginal Likelihood}$$

Probabilities	Calculation Method	Example
<b>P(D M)</b> Likelihood	MLE or ML model prediction w/ CV	Given [M] : BWR, burnup = $x$ GWd/MTU Then [D] : Pu-239 concentration = $y$ %
<b>P(M)</b> Prior	Histogram of simulation <b>inputs</b>	Given [D] : No direct information Then [M] : BWR, burnup = $x$ GWd/MTU
<b>P(D)</b> Marginal L.	Histogram of simulation <b>outputs</b>	Given [M] : No direct information Then [D] : Pu-239 concentration = $y$ %
<b>P(M D)</b> Posterior	Indirectly, from 3 probabilities above	Given [D] : Pu-239 concentration = $y$ % Then [M] : BWR, burnup = $x$ GWd/MTU

**Table 2:** Table showing how each component of the model comparison framework will be computed

# Computational Tools



- Training Data : SNF recipes from SCALE/ORIGEN-ARP [11, 13]
- Information Reduction
  - Gamma energies: ORIGEN
  - Computational gamma spectra: GADRAS [2]
- Statistics Toolkit : scikit-learn (python) [12]

# Pre-detonation Materials of Interest



UOC

UOX powder

SNF

Reprocessed SNF



# Statistical Methods Employed




Figure 17: Unsupervised clustering for visualization separating reactor types [4]





Figure 18: Factor analysis employed to determine provenance of unknown plutonium [8]

# Statistical Methods Employed



**Figure 19:** Burnup prediction error with respect to random nuclide error, using nearest neighbor & ridge regression methods [1]

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# Proposed Experiment Methodology




Figure 20: Workflow of the experiments with tools used for each step





# Training Set

ORIGEN Rxtr	Rxtr Type	Enrichment
CE14x14	PWR	2.8
CE16x16	PWR	2.8
W14x14	PWR	2.8
W15x15	PWR	2.8
W17x17	PWR	2.8
S14x14	PWR	2.8
VVER440	PWR	3.60
VVER440_3.82	PWR	3.82
VVER440_4.25	PWR	4.25
VVER440_4.38	PWR	4.38
VVER1000	PWR	2.8
GE7x7-0	BWR	2.9
GE8x8-1	BWR	2.9
GE9x9-2	BWR	2.9
GE10x10-8	BWR	2.9
Abb8x8-1	BWR	2.9
Atrium9x9-9	BWR	2.9
SVEA64-1	BWR	2.9
SVEA100	BWR	2.9
CANDU28	PHWR	0.711
CANDU37	PHWR	0.711

Table 3: ORIGEN simulations [1]

	PWR	BWR	PHWR
Power Density [MW/MTU]	32	23	22
Burnup [MWd/MTU]	600–17700	600–12300	600–12300
Cooling Time	{1m, 7d, 30d, 1y}		

Table 4: Range of burnups and cooling times simulated for the training set [1]



# Independent Testing Set

Reactor	Type	Enrichment	Cooling Time	Burnup
CANDU28	PHWR	0.711	{1m, 7d, 30d, 1y}	{1400, 5000, 11000}
CANDU28	PHWR	0.711	{3m, 9d, 2y}	{5000, 6120}
CE16x16	PWR	2.8	{1m, 7d, 30d, 1y}	{1700, 8700, 17000}
CE16x16	PWR	2.8	{3m, 9d, 2y}	{8700, 9150}
CE16x16	PWR	3.1	{7d, 9d}	{8700, 9150}
GE7x7-0	BWR	2.9	{1m, 7d, 30d, 1y}	{2000, 7200, 10800}
GE7x7-0	BWR	2.9	{3m, 9d, 2y}	{7200, 8800}
GE7x7-0	BWR	3.2	{7d, 9d}	{7200, 8800}

Table 5: Separate testing set used in previous work [1]

# Initial Results



Algorithm	Error Origin	MAPE	RMSE [MWd/MTU]
Nearest Neighbor Regression	Testing Set	9.82	812.43
	5-fold Cross-Validation	2.24	421.41
Ridge Regression	Testing Set	15.68	1049.66
	5-fold Cross-Validation	0.08	13.08
Support Vector Regression	Testing Set	12.28	769.97
	5-fold Cross-Validation	2.08	188.07

Table 6: MAPE and RMSE for both CV and testing sets



# Information Reduction

## **Demonstrated : Random error**

Introduced  $0\% < E_{max} < 10\%$


Each nuclide receives  $[1 - E_{max}, 1 + E_{max}]$  error

## **Not Demonstrated : Systematic error**

Gamma energies (ORIGEN), radionuclides only

Gamma spectra (GADRAS), reduced radionuclide observation

# ML Model Prediction with Reduced Information



**Figure 21:** Negative MAPE for three algorithms given increasing random nuclide error



# Algorithm Parameters

Algorithm	Parameter	Value
Nearest Neighbor Regression	$n$ -neighbors	1
	Weights	uniform
	Distance Metric	L2: Euclidian Distance
Ridge Regression	Regularization, $\alpha$	1.0
	Normalization	False
	Stopping Tolerance	0.001
Support Vector Regression	Kernel	Radial Basis Function
	Gamma, $\gamma$	0.001
	$C$	1000
	Epsilon, $\epsilon$	0.1
	Stopping Tolerance	0.001

**Table 7:** Parameters chosen for demonstration;  $C$  and  $\gamma$  are not the default values



# Learning Curves




Figure 22: Learning curve and comparison schematic for SVR



# Learning Curves




Figure 23: Learning curve and comparison schematic for NN Regression





# Validation Curves





Figure 24: Validation curve and comparison schematic for SVR



# Validation Curves





Figure 25: Validation curve and comparison schematic for NN Regression

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# Research Proposal Preparations



Previous Work -  $\lambda$  SFCOMPO-based  
Finalizing set of algorithms  
computational resources

# Statistical Learning with Direct Isotopics



**Goals** : Understand limits of simplest scenario

- ① Usefulness of statistical methods for reactor parameter prediction
- ② Best performing methods

**Variables**

- ① the complexity of the ML algorithm used,
- ② feature reduction, and
- ③ different subsets of the decision space.



# Statistical Learning with Direct Isotopics

## Qualitative Hypotheses

- Complex algorithm will provide best behavior
- Manual preprocessing (feature reduction): speed, accuracy
- Reduction of decision space should help: PWR vs. BWR?

## Risk Mitigation

- New algorithms: tree-based, neural nets, Bayesian MLE
- Statistical preprocessing: PCA, ICA
- New materials: Pu, UOC, Post-detonation (urban canyon [3])

# Statistical Learning with Gamma Spectra



**Goals** : Understand limits of real-world scenario

- ① Level of reduction in reactor parameter prediction
- ② Best performing methods

**Variables**

- ① the complexity of the ML algorithm used,
- ② feature reduction (implicit), and
- ③ quality of training and/or testing data set.

# Statistical Learning with Gamma Spectra



## Qualitative Hypotheses

- Complex algorithm will provide best behavior
- Indirect isotopics = implicit feature reduction: less accurate
- Higher quality gamma spectra will yield better results

## Risk Mitigation

- New algorithms: tree-based, neural nets, Bayesian MLE
- Further manual or statistical preprocessing
- Add isotope identification step



# Statistical Learning with Reprocessed Fuel



**Goals :** Probe prediction performance in reprocessing scenario

- ① Experiment with both direct and indirect isotopics
- ② Fresh evaluation of preprocessing
- ③ Best performing methods for materials with multiple sources

## **Variables**

- ① the complexity of the ML algorithm used,
- ② quality of training data set, and
- ③ type of preprocessing for feature reduction.

# Statistical Learning with Reprocessed Fuel



## Qualitative Hypotheses

- Complex algorithm will provide best behavior
- Reduced information will provide less accurate results
- ICA may outperform PCA, but factor analysis may outperform components analysis [7, 9, 10, 15, 14, 4, 5]

## Risk Mitigation

- New algorithms: tree-based, neural nets, Bayesian MLE
- Manual preprocessing
- Results may be interesting even if prediction fails
- Ensemble methods or other creative solutions [15, 14]



# Probability Distributions

Include uncertainty for measures of confidence, posterior probs become prob distrib

$C$  : constant given by marginal likelihood

$\mathbf{d}$  : training data set

$\mathbf{m}$  : model parameters

$P(\mathbf{d}|\mathbf{m})$  : likelihood distribution function

$P(\mathbf{m})$  : prior probability distribution

$P(\mathbf{m}|\mathbf{d})$  : posterior probability distribution

$$P(\mathbf{m}|\mathbf{d}) = C * P(\mathbf{d}|\mathbf{m}) * P(\mathbf{m})$$

Integrate over prob densities to get prob distrib

$\mathbf{m}$  : range of predicted model parameters

$\mathbf{d}$  is a set of nuclide vectors

$$\rho(\mathbf{x}) = \prod_i \rho(x_i)$$

$$P(\mathbf{m}) = \int_{\mathbf{m}} \rho(\mathbf{d}) d\mathbf{d}$$

Likelihood distribution function:

$$P(\mathbf{d}|\mathbf{m}) = \int_{\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{m}} \rho(\mathbf{d}|\mathbf{m}) d\mathbf{m}$$

But, we infer them...



# Estimating Density Functions

estimate  $\rho$ , have a 'sense' or try different prior probability distributions are given by the model space, e.g., reactor parameters as predicted from the ML models. [17] Note: This implies the posterior is now only dependent on the likelihood.

likelihood function: the training phase provides the maximum likelihood distribution through the use of CV, since the results are reported as a mean error with a standard deviation (which can be converted to accuracy for likelihood) [12]

MLE is not this simple for other methods that do not employ CV [16, 17]



# Posterior Odds

citations plz

calc a non-normalized posterior probability distribution,  $P(m_i|d)$  then do it for a model obtained from a different algorithm,  $P(m_j|d)$

relative posterior probability distribution : *posterior odds*  $B_{ij} = \frac{\rho(d|m_i)}{\rho(d|m_j)}$  : *Bayes factor*.

$$\frac{P(m_i|d)}{P(m_j|d)} = B_{ij} \frac{P(m_i)}{P(m_j)}$$

$ \ln B_{ij} $	Probability	Likelihood Strength
< 1.0	< 0.750	Inconclusive
1.0	0.750	Weak
2.5	0.923	Moderate
5.0	0.993	Strong

**Table 8:** Model comparison using likelihood strength

posterior probabilities calculated from  $|\ln B_{ij}|$

Summarize:

Given a mean-squared error and its standard deviation from using CV with any alg, get MLE

compare two models : MLE to MLE:



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Summarize



# References I

- [1] Kenneth Dayman and Steven Biegalski.  
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*Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry*, 296:195–201, 2013.
  
- [2] Steven M. Horne, Gregory G Thoreson, Lisa A. Theisen, Dean J. Mitchell, Lee Harding, and Wendy A. Amai.  
Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software - Detector Response Function (GADRAS-DRF).  
User's Manual, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, Dec 2014.  
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