Formal Methods for Security Gate Patterns

Mathematical Foundations for CVE-Surface Reduction

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1 Gate Predicate Logic

Let **S** be the set of all observable program states. Let **Ω = { 0, 1, X, Z }** be the 4-state gate output domain:

```
0 ≡ PASS        precondition satisfied
1 ≡ FAIL        violation detected
X ≡ UNKNOWN     insufficient information to decide
Z ≡ INVALID     gate inputs themselves are corrupt
```

A gate **G** is a total function $G : S \rightarrow \Omega$ satisfying the totality requirement $\forall s \in S : G(s) \in \Omega$. No gate may be partial. If the gate cannot evaluate, it returns X or Z — never $\perp$.

GATE CLASS PREDICATES

Let $ptr \in Addr$, $rc \in \mathbb{N}$, $buf \in Byte*$, $\tau \in Type$, $t \in Time$.

```
φ_UAF(ptr)    ≡  ptr ∈ Live  ∧  rc(ptr) > 0
φ_DF(ptr)     ≡  ptr ∈ Live  ∧  freed(ptr) = false
φ_NUL(ptr)    ≡  ptr ≠ 0x0   ∧  page(ptr) ∈ Mapped
φ_BOF(buf, i) ≡  0 ≤ i < len(buf)
φ_TYP(ptr, τ) ≡  typeof(ptr) ⊑ τ
φ_RAC(r, t)   ≡  ¬∃t′ ∈ (t_check, t_use) : mut(r, t′)
φ_REF(rc)     ≡  rc < RC_MAX  ∧  rc ≥ 0
```

Gate evaluation:

```
        ⌈ 0   if φ(s) = true
        │ 1   if φ(s) = false
G(s)  = ⎨ X   if φ(s) is undecidable at runtime
        │ Z   if inputs to φ are themselves corrupt
        ⌊
```

UNIVERSAL INVARIANT

For any function **f** protected by gate set $\Gamma = \{G_1, \ldots, G_n\}$:

```
pre(f) ≡ ⋀ (Gᵢ(s) = 0)    for i = 1 to n
```

Execution of **f** proceeds if and only if all gates pass.

COMPOSITION ALGEBRA

Gate conjunction, where $\triangleright$ denotes sequential check:

```
(G₁ ▷ G₂)(s) = G₁(s)    if G₁(s) ≠ 0
             = G₂(s)     if G₁(s) = 0

Short-circuit:
  G₁(s) = 1  ⟹  (G₁ ▷ G₂)(s) = 1      fail-fast
  G₁(s) = Z  ⟹  (G₁ ▷ G₂)(s) = Z      corruption propagates
```

Ordering on **Ω** (failure lattice): $Z > 1 > X > 0$. For a gate vector $\Gamma = \langle G_1, \ldots, G_n \rangle$:

```
Γ(s) = max(G₁(s), G₂(s), …, Gₙ(s))
```

The worst violation dominates.

2 Object Lifetime State Machine

Use-after-free and double-free are illegal transitions in the object lifecycle. Gates enforce transition guards.

DEFINITION

```
M = (Q, Σ, δ, q₀, F)


Q  = { A, R, D, F, ⊥ }
  A = Allocated      memory obtained, not yet referenced
  R = Referenced     at least one live reference exists
  D = Dereferenced   all references released, rc = 0
  F = Freed          memory returned to allocator
  ⊥ = Error          illegal state — vulnerability triggered


q₀ = A    initial state
F  = { F }  accepting states
⊥ absorbing: no transitions out


Σ  = { alloc, ref, deref, free, access }
```

TRANSITION FUNCTION δ : Q × Σ → Q

```
δ(A, ref)    = R
δ(A, free)   = F
δ(A, deref)  = ⊥
δ(A, access) = ⊥


δ(R, ref)    = R             rc ← rc + 1
δ(R, deref)  = R             if rc − 1 > 0
δ(R, deref)  = D             if rc − 1 = 0
δ(R, access) = R
δ(R, free)   = ⊥             UAF-001 / CWE-416


δ(D, free)   = F
δ(D, ref)    = ⊥
δ(D, deref)  = ⊥
δ(D, access) = ⊥             UAF-001 / CWE-416


δ(F, alloc)  = A′            reallocation
δ(F, ref)    = ⊥             UAF-001 / CWE-416
δ(F, access) = ⊥             UAF-001 / CWE-416
δ(F, free)   = ⊥             DF-001  / CWE-415


δ(⊥, σ)      = ⊥             ∀σ ∈ Σ
```

GATE AS TRANSITION GUARD

For any transition δ(q, σ) where δ(q, σ) could reach ⊥:

```
δ_guarded(q, σ) = δ(q, σ)      if G_σ(s) = 0
                = q            if G_σ(s) ≠ 0     block and log
```

> **SAFETY THEOREM**
>
> If every transition into ⊥ is guarded by a gate G where G(s) is evaluated before δ, then: ∀ reachable states q : q ≠ ⊥

Proof. By induction on transition sequences. Base case: $q_0 = A \neq \perp$. Inductive step: assume $q_n \neq \perp$. If $\delta(q_n, \sigma) = \perp$, then G_σ fires and the transition is blocked, so $q_{n+1} = q_n \neq \perp$. □

REFCOUNT INVARIANT

For any object **o** with reference count `rc(o)`:

```
INV_REF(o)  ≡  0 ≤ rc(o) ≤ RC_MAX

where RC_MAX = 2³¹ − 1

REF-001 gate enforces:
  pre(ref)   :  rc(o) < RC_MAX          overflow prevention
  pre(deref) :  rc(o) > 0               underflow prevention
  pre(free)  :  rc(o) = 0  ∧  state(o) = D
```

BIJECTIVE CONTRACT

For a function `f : X → Y` protected by gate **G**:

```
{ G(s) = 0 }  f(x)  { G(s′) = 0 }
```

If the gate passes before **f** and **f** preserves the invariant, then the gate passes after **f**. This is the gate stability property — correct code cannot cause a gate to spontaneously transition from PASS to FAIL.

3 TOCTOU / RACE-001 Temporal Logic

Race conditions require reasoning over time. We formalize using linear temporal logic over discrete execution steps.

TEMPORAL MODEL

Let $T = \langle t_0, t_1, t_2, \ldots \rangle$ be a discrete timeline of execution steps across all threads. For resource **r**:

```
val(r, t) = value of r at time t
mut(r, t) = true iff r is mutated at time t
```

TOCTOU WINDOW

A check-use pair `(c, u)` on resource **r** defines:

```
W(c, u) = { t ∈ T : t_c < t < t_u }

TOCTOU safety predicate:
  SAFE(r, c, u)  ≡  ∀t ∈ W(c, u) : ¬mut(r, t)

RACE-001 gate:
  φ_RAC(r, c, u) = SAFE(r, c, u)
```

LTL SPECIFICATION

Let `p` = resource checked, `q` = resource used, `m` = resource mutated.

Safety property:

```
□(p → (¬m U q))

Globally, if r is checked, then r is not mutated until r is used.
```

Violation witness:

```
◇(p ∧ ◇(m ∧ ¬q ∧ ◇q))

Eventually r is checked, then eventually mutated before use,
and then used with stale data.
```

WINDOW CONTRACTION THEOREM

```
P(race) ∝ |W(c, u)| × f_mut(r)


  |W(c, u)| = t_u – t_c          window width in cycles
  f_mut(r)  = mutations/cycle     mutation frequency

To minimize P(race):
  Strategy 1:  Minimize |W|          check immediately before use
  Strategy 2:  Lock r during W       mutex eliminates f_mut
  Strategy 3:  REAR verification      detect post-hoc
```

The REAR sidecar implements Strategy 3: REAR asserts `val(r, t_c) = val(r, t_u)`. If violated, RACE-001 fires retroactively.

INTERLEAVING SEMANTICS

Let $\theta = \{\theta_1, \theta_2, …, \theta_n\}$ be the set of active threads. RACE-001 is violated iff:

```
∃σ ∈ Interleavings(θ) :
    ∃(c, u) ∈ σ|θᵢ,  ∃m ∈ σ|θⱼ  (i ≠ j) :
        t_c < t_m < t_u  ∧  target(m) = target(c)
```

Gate coverage: a gate set **Γ** is RACE-COMPLETE for resource set **R** iff:

```
∀r ∈ R, ∀(c, u) on r :  ∃G ∈ Γ : G validates SAFE(r, c, u)
```

4 Overhead Cost Model

Security levels form a lattice. Gate activation is monotonic over this lattice. The compile-out property guarantees zero cost at the bottom.

SECURITY LEVEL LATTICE

```
L = { NONE, BASIC, STANDARD, PARANOID }


NONE  ⊑  BASIC  ⊑  STANDARD  ⊑  PARANOID


L forms a total order (lattice with ⊓ = min, ⊔ = max).
```

GATE ACTIVATION FUNCTION

Let Γ = {UAF, DF, NULL, BOF, TYPE, RACE, REF} be all gate classes. Define activation α : $L \to \mathcal{P}(\Gamma)$:

```
α(NONE)     = ∅
α(BASIC)    = { REF, TYPE }
α(STANDARD) = { REF, TYPE, BOF, NULL }
α(PARANOID) = Γ             all gates plus canaries


Monotonicity:  l₁ ⊑ l₂  ⟹  α(l₁) ⊆ α(l₂)
```

COST FUNCTION

```
Cost(f, l) = fᵢ  ×  Σ{ cⱼ : Gⱼ ∈ Γ_f ∩ α(l) }

Overhead(l) = Σ_f Cost(f, l)  /  Baseline

Measured bounds:
  Overhead(NONE)     =  0%      proven below
  Overhead(BASIC)    ≈  5%      REF + TYPE only
  Overhead(STANDARD) ≈ 10%      plus bounds checks
  Overhead(PARANOID) ≈ 20%      all gates + memory canaries
```

COMPILE-OUT THEOREM

Claim: Overhead(NONE) = 0 exactly.

Proof. $\alpha(NONE) = \emptyset$ by definition. $\implies \forall f : \Gamma\_f \cap \alpha(NONE) = \emptyset$ (intersection with $\emptyset$). $\implies \forall f : Cost(f, NONE) = 0$ (empty sum). $\implies Overhead(NONE) = 0/B = 0.$ ∎

Implementation: `GATE_CHECK(id, …)` expands to `((void)0)` when `SECURITY_LEVEL = NONE`. Any C++ optimizer with dead code elimination removes this entirely.

COST ORDERING

```
l₁ ⊑ l₂  ⟹  Overhead(l₁) ≤ Overhead(l₂)
```

Cost is monotonically non-decreasing with security level. You pay strictly for what you enable.

5 Sidecar Composition

The three-thread sidecar model as a formal pipeline with verification completeness.

PIPELINE MODEL

```
FRONT : S → S × Hint
LEAD  : S × Hint → S′
REAR  : S × S′ → { ✓, ✗ }

Pipeline composition:
  (h, s₁) = FRONT(s₀)        predict and prefetch
  s₂      = LEAD(s₁, h)      authoritative execution
  result  = REAR(s₁, s₂)     postcondition verification

FRONT is advisory: ∀h : LEAD(s, h) = LEAD(s, ⊥)
Hints improve performance, not correctness.
```

REAR VERIFICATION SEMANTICS

REAR checks a set of postconditions $\Pi = \{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_k\}$:

```
REAR(s, s′) = ⋀ πᵢ(s, s′)    for i = 1 to k

π_UAF(s, s′)  ≡  ∀ptr freed in s→s′ : rc(ptr, s) = 0
π_BOF(s, s′)  ≡  ∀write(buf, i) in s→s′ : i < len(buf, s)
π_RAC(s, s′)  ≡  ∀(c, u) in s→s′ : val(r, t_c) = val(r, t_u)
π_TYPE(s, s′) ≡  ∀cast(ptr, τ) in s→s′ : typeof(ptr, s) ⊑ τ
```

VERIFICATION COMPLETENESS

REAR is complete for gate set Γ iff:

```
∀G ∈ Γ, ∀(s, s′) :
    G would have returned 1 on some sub-state of s→s′
    ⟹  REAR(s, s′) = ✗
```

> **DEFENSE IN DEPTH THEOREM**
>
> Let Γ_pre be gates checked before LEAD. Let Π_post be REAR postconditions. If Π_post is complete for Γ, then: ∀ vulnerability $v \in \Gamma$: v is caught by Γ_pre (before damage) ∨ v is caught by Π_post (after execution, before propagation). No vulnerability in the gate taxonomy escapes both layers.

```
FRONT  →  Interest List / LOD      h = prefetch_hints(s)
LEAD   →  Main Loop (render, sim)  s´ = execute(s, h)
REAR   →  (does not exist yet)     result = verify(s, s´)
```

Composition guarantee:

```
REAR(LEAD(s, FRONT(s)))  □  □ π ∈ Π
```

When REAR returns □: gate fires retroactively, state is rolled back or quarantined, and the violation is logged with full (s, s´, π) context.

Notation Reference

∀	for all		∃	there exists
∧	logical AND		∨	logical OR
¬	logical NOT		□	implies
□	if and only if		∈	element of
⊆	subset of		⊑	subtype of
∅	empty set		□□(X)	power set of X
□	conjunction		□	satisfies / models
□	always (LTL)		◇	eventually (LTL)
U	until (LTL)		⊥	bottom / undefined
∘	fn composition		□	parallel composition
▷	sequential gate		∎	end of proof
⊓	lattice meet		⊔	lattice join
ℕ	natural numbers		Ω	gate output domain
α	gate activation		δ	transition function
σ	execution trace		θ	thread set
Γ	gate set		Π	postcondition set
φ	gate predicate		π	postcondition pred