

overflow Check

x of mint

x in y mint

$$x_{\min} \quad y_{\min}$$

$$(x_0 + x_{in} + x_{mint}) (y_0 + y_{in} + y_{mint}) - x_{in} y_{in} \leq \text{MaxTotalSup}^2$$

$$P = \frac{y_o + y_{in} + y_{mint} + y_{in}}{x_o + x_{in} + x_{mint} + x_{in}} \leq 2 \text{ Max Total Sup}$$

$$(x_{out}, y_{out}) \leq 2 \text{ Max Total Sup}^2$$

$$m \times 10^6 \times 4$$

Handwritten diagram illustrating the relationship between different types of variables:

- A box labeled $x_0 y_{mint}$ is connected by an arrow to a box labeled $x_{mint} y_{in}$.
- A box labeled $x_{mint} y_0$ is connected by an arrow to the $x_{mint} y_{in}$ box.
- A large bracket groups the $x_{mint} y_0$ and $x_{mint} y_{in}$ boxes, with the label $x_{mint} y_{mint}$ written next to it.

$$M \leq 2^{10} \leq 2^{32}$$

$$y_{\text{mint}} (x_0 + 2x_{\text{in}} + x_{\text{mint}}) + x_{\text{mint}} (y_0 + 2y_{\text{in}} + y_{\text{mint}})$$

Article

Intro

- ↳ Necessity of Dark Pool
- ↳ Necessity of "Decentralized" DP.
- ↳ Other on-going Attempts

How to Implement

- ↳ How to Match?
 - ↳ LOB (C/P) (x: Complexity)
 - ↳ Volume Matching (x: need oracle)
 - ↳ AMM. (✓)
- ↳ How to hide order info?
 - ↳ Batch. / Uniform Clearing
 - ↳ NE & PoA of Batching AMM. (*)
 - ↳ add noise

Conclusion

Further Improvements

Appendix

- ↳ Proof of (*)

Paper 2

Liquidity Taking Game in (FM)AMM.

↳ NE.

↳ PoA.

$$\frac{y_0 + 2N y_{in}}{x_0 + 2N x_{in}} = \text{GM} \left(P_{\text{ext}}, \frac{y_0 + 2(N-1) y_{in}}{x_0 + 2(N-1) x_{in}} \right)$$

Dutch Auction for closing batch.

$$\text{user To Pool } X = \gamma_t x_0 + x_{in}$$

$$\text{user To Pool } Y = \gamma_t y_0 + y_{in}$$

$$\text{pool To User } X = x_{out}$$

$$\text{pool To User } Y = y_{out}$$

if $\text{user To Pool } X \geq \text{pool To User } X$:

transferFrom

else:

transfer

(same for y)

(Cont'd, Dutch Auction Batch Closing Fee)

$$\begin{aligned}
 ARB &= -\gamma \cdot \left(\frac{L}{\sqrt{P}} \cdot P_{ext} + L\sqrt{P} \right) \\
 &\quad + (1+\gamma) \cdot \frac{L\sqrt{P}}{2} \left(\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} - 1 \right)^2 \\
 &= -\gamma \cdot \frac{L\sqrt{P}}{2} \left(\frac{P_{ext}}{P} + 1 \right) \cdot 2 \\
 &\quad + \frac{L\sqrt{P}}{2} \left(\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} - 1 \right)^2 + \gamma \cdot \frac{L\sqrt{P}}{2} \left(\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} - 1 \right)^2 \\
 &= \frac{L\sqrt{P}}{2} \left(\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} - 1 \right)^2 - \gamma \cdot \frac{L\sqrt{P}}{2} \left(\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} + 1 \right)^2
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 ARB &> 0 \\
 \Leftrightarrow \gamma &< \left(\frac{\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} - 1}{\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} + 1} \right)^2 \approx \frac{1}{4} \left(\sqrt{\frac{P_{ext}}{P}} - 1 \right)^2
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{P_{ext}}{P} \leftarrow 1.01$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Rightarrow \gamma &< \frac{1}{4} \times (1.005 - 1)^2 = \frac{1}{4} \times \frac{1}{200} \times \frac{1}{200} \\
 &= \frac{1}{16} \times \frac{1}{10^4}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\log_2(16000) \approx 17.3$$

$$\Rightarrow \sigma_N = 1 / 2^{N+16}$$

NE, PoA w/ fee rate r .

ARB

$$= -(1+r)(px+y) + (1-r)\left(p \cdot \frac{y}{p_c} + p_c x\right)$$

$$= -r\left(px+y + \frac{p}{p_c}y + p_c x\right)$$

$$+ \left(\frac{p}{p_c}y + p_c x - px - y\right)$$

$$= (y - p_c x) \left(\frac{p}{p_c} - 1\right) - r(y + p_c x) \left(1 + \frac{p}{p_c}\right)$$

$$\frac{y+2y}{x+2x} = \frac{y+2y'}{x+2x'}$$

$$= p_c$$

WLOG

$$y' > y$$

(i.e., $x' > x$).

$$\Rightarrow y' - y = p_c (x' - x)$$

$$(y' - p_c x') \left(\frac{p}{p_c} - 1\right) - r(y' + p_c x') \left(1 + \frac{p}{p_c}\right)$$

$$P_n L' - P_n L = -r((y' - y) + p_c(x' - x)) \cdot \left(1 + \frac{p}{p_c}\right) < 0$$

\Rightarrow optimal response is either $(x, 0)$ or $(0, y)$.

$$i) \quad p_{-i} \in \left(\frac{1-r}{1+r} p, \frac{1+r}{1-r} p \right)$$

Player i does not participate.

$$ii) \quad p_{-i} < \frac{1-r}{1+r} p.$$

$$p_f = \sqrt{\frac{1-r}{1+r} \cdot p \cdot p_{-i}} \quad \forall i \in [N].$$

$$\Rightarrow p_{-i} = p_{-j} \quad \forall i, j$$

$$\Leftrightarrow y_i = y_j$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{f + 2N y_{eq}}{X} = \sqrt{p \cdot \frac{f + 2(N-1) y_{eq}}{X}}$$

$$iii) \quad p_{-i} > \frac{1+r}{1-r} p.$$

vice versa.

$$\frac{f}{X + 2N x_{eq}} = \sqrt{p \cdot \frac{f}{X + 2(N-1) x_{eq}}}$$

LVR Estimation

$$i) P > \frac{1+r}{1-r} \cdot \frac{Y}{X}$$

We have

$$P_c = \frac{Y + 2Ny}{X} = \sqrt{P \cdot \frac{Y + 2(N-1)Y}{X}}$$

Thus

$$LVR|_{Y=0} = N \cdot (Y - P_c X) \left(\frac{P}{P_c} - 1 \right)$$

$$= \left(P_c \cdot \frac{X}{Y + 2(N-1)Y} - 1 \right) N Y$$

$$= \left(\frac{Y + 2Ny}{Y + 2(N-1)Y} - 1 \right) \times N Y$$

$$= \frac{2Ny^2}{Y + 2(N-1)Y}$$

$$= PX \cdot \frac{2Ny^2}{(Y + 2Ny)^2}$$

$$= \frac{1}{2N} PX \cdot \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{Y}{2Ny}\right)^2} \leq \frac{1}{2N} PX$$

$$ii) \quad P < \frac{1-\gamma}{1+\gamma} \cdot \frac{y}{x}$$

We have

$$P_c = \frac{\gamma}{X+2Nx} = \sqrt{P \cdot \frac{\gamma}{X+2(N-1)x}}$$

Again,

$$LVR|_{\gamma=0} = N \cdot ARB$$

$$= N \cdot (y - P_c x) \left(\frac{P}{P_c} - 1 \right)$$

$$= P N x \left(\frac{P_c}{P} - 1 \right)$$

$$= P N x \cdot \frac{2x}{X+2(N-1)x}$$

$$= \frac{P}{2N} \cdot 4N^2 x^2 \cdot \left(\frac{\gamma}{X+2Nx} \right)^2 \cdot \frac{1}{P\gamma}$$

$$= \frac{\gamma}{2N} \cdot \frac{4N^2 x^2}{(X+2Nx)^2}$$

$$= \frac{\gamma}{2N} \cdot \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{X}{2Nx}\right)^2} \leq \frac{\gamma}{2N}$$

$$\Rightarrow LVR = O\left(\frac{1}{N}\right).$$

Similar result
for $\gamma > 0$.

$$P_c = \frac{f + 2Ny}{X} = \sqrt{\frac{1-r}{1+r}} P \cdot \frac{f + 2(N-1)y}{X}$$

ARB

$$= -(1+r)(Px + y) + (1-r)\left(P \cdot \frac{y}{P_c} + P_c x\right)$$

$$= -(1+r)y + (1-r) \cdot \frac{P}{P_c} y$$

$$= y(1+r) \left(\frac{1-r}{1+r} \cdot \frac{P}{P_c} - 1 \right)$$

$$= y(1+r) \left(\frac{X}{f + 2(N-1)y} \cdot P_c - 1 \right)$$

$$= y(1+r) \cdot \frac{2y}{f + 2(N-1)y} \cdot X$$

$$= 2y^2 \cdot (1-r)P \cdot \frac{1}{(f + 2Ny)^2}$$

$$= \frac{(1-r)PX}{2N^2} \cdot \frac{4N^2 y^2}{(f + 2Ny)^2}$$

$$= \frac{(1-r)PX}{2N^2} \cdot \frac{1}{\left(1 + \frac{f}{2Ny}\right)^2} \geq c \text{ (gas fee)}$$

$$\frac{(1-r)PX}{c} \geq 2N^2 \cdot \left(1 + \frac{r}{2Ny}\right)^2$$

$$= 2 \left(N + \frac{r}{2y}\right)^2$$

$$= \frac{1}{2y^2} (r + 2Ny)^2$$

$$\frac{1-r}{c} \cdot P \cdot 2y^2 \geq \frac{(r + 2Ny)^2}{X}$$

$$= \frac{1-r}{1+r} P \cdot (r + 2(N-1)y)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (1+r) \cdot 2y^2 \geq c (r + 2(N-1)y) \end{array} \right. \quad (1)$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{r + 2Ny}{X} = \sqrt{\frac{1-r}{1+r} P \cdot \frac{r + 2(N-1)y}{X}} \end{array} \right. \quad (2)$$

$$f_1(N) = y = f_2(N)$$

$$\Rightarrow N = g(c) \quad \& \quad LVR = g(c)$$


$$\frac{Y + 2Nz}{X} = \sqrt{P \cdot \frac{Y + 2(N-1)z}{X}}$$

i) $z \leftarrow 0$

$$\frac{Y}{X} < \sqrt{P \cdot \frac{Y}{X}}$$

ii) $z \leftarrow \frac{1}{2N} (PX - Y) = \frac{X}{2N} \left(P - \frac{Y}{X} \right)$

$$P > \sqrt{P \cdot \frac{Y + 2(N-1)z}{X}}$$



Structure of Article.

I. Introduction to FM-AMM.

II. Introduction to the Game:

Lemma.

Lemma.

Theorem (N is Exogenous)

Theorem (N is endogenous w.r.t.
cost c)

III. Stochastic Variant
simulation.

IV. References

i) FM-AMM Paper

ii) Cost of P/L LPing

iii) FBA

iv) Market fix itself?

v) LVR 2022

vi) LVR 2023

Account

address → address → euint
(owner) (token)

Pool

byte32 → PoolStruct

(PoolId)

↳

tokenX
tokenY

reserveX
reserveY

protocolX
protocolY

lp Total Supply
lp Balance Of

epoch

uint32 → batchStruct

Batch

orders

↳

totalSwap X

totalSwap Y

totalMint X

totalMint Y

address (trader) → Order Struct (order)

↳

swap X

swap Y

mint X

mint Y

Claimed

initial Reserve X



initial Reserve Y

Final Reserve X

Final Reserve Y


minted LP Token Amount

result
Summary




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