LSAT

RELEASED TEST XXX EXPLAINED

A Guide to the December, 1999 LSAT

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SECTION I: LOGIC GAMES

Game 1—*Six Loaves of Bread*
(Q. 1-5)

The Action: The entities in this game are the six loaves. Each loaf is either oatmeal, rye, or wheat, and each is either sliced or unsliced. So we've got a Matching game on our hands. The **Key Issues** are:

1) Which loaves can, must, and cannot be oatmeal, rye, and wheat?

2) Which loaves can, must, and cannot be sliced?

The Initial Setup: There really isn't much to draw here. We've got six loaves, so we can write out six slots, indicating above and below each whether that loaf is oatmeal, rye, or wheat, and whether that loaf is sliced or not.

$$\text{o/r/w}$$
$$\text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—}$$
$$\text{sl/un}$$

The Rules:

1) tells us we can't have all of the same kind. There are many good ways to represent this. For example, we could simply put a "2+" next to the o/r/w list.

2) This one is straightforward enough. We can't have more than 3 ryes, so at least 3 will be either oatmeal or wheat.

3) If there is no unsliced wheat loaf, then any wheat loaves must be sliced, and any unsliced loaf must be either oatmeal or rye. "w —> sl" and "un—>o or r" will take care of this.

4) Finally, we get some concrete information. One of our loaves is an unsliced oatmeal loaf. We can fill this in directly.

5) It's natural to read this in conjunction with Rule 4. If we get a second unsliced loaf, then we need an unsliced rye loaf. In other words, the next unsliced loaf we get has to be rye.

Key Deductions: This one is pretty wide open. The rules mostly tell us what can't happen, but lots of possibilities are out there. All the loaves could be unsliced, all but one could be sliced, and many combinations of kinds are possible. A little time spent looking for deductions is never a bad idea, but here you needed to quickly proceed to the questions.

The Final Visualization:

$$\text{2+ of o/r/w} \qquad \text{o}$$
$$\text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—} \quad \text{—}$$
$$\text{sl/un} \quad \text{un}$$
$$\text{max 3 r's}$$
$$\text{w—> sl}$$
$$\text{un—> o or r}$$
$$\text{2nd unsliced is r}$$

The Big Picture:

- **Sometimes there just isn't much to draw. Here, writing out the six slots isn't a bad thing if it helps you visualize the situation, but even that may not have been necessary. As long as you understood the game's action, you were ready to consult the rules individually.**

- **As you look for deductions, get a sense of how "open" the game is. Does the entire game come down to just a few scenarios, or is it wide open? With practice, you'll be better able to tell when it's worth investing extra time looking for deductions. Here, the savvy test taker realized that there are numerous possibilities, and so it's best to hit the questions relatively quickly.**

The Questions:
1. (D)
As it turns out, Rule 5 eliminates all the wrong choices, but if you tackled the rules in order, here's what you would have found: Rule 1 kills (A), which has only oatmeal loaves. Rule 2 doesn't help, but Rule 3 kills (C), which has the forbidden unsliced wheat loaf. Rule 4 doesn't help, but Rule 5 knocks off (B) and (E), which each have two or more unsliced loaves but no unsliced rye loaf.

- **Usually, each wrong choice in an Acceptability question will violate a different rule, but not this time: If you happened to consult Rule 5 first, you would have been able to eliminate all the wrong choices. But don't count on that happening too often. In any case, the Kaplan Acceptability Method of checking the rules against the choices will yield the point every time, one way or another.**

2. (A)
The reference to unsliced loaves should point you to Rules 3, 4, and 5. Each choice has at least one unsliced oatmeal loaf, and there's no unsliced wheat loaf among the choices, but (A) is a straightforward violation of Rule 5. With more than one unsliced loaf, (A) needs to have an unsliced rye loaf as well, but it isn't there. So (A) can't be a complete and accurate list of the unsliced loaves.

- **Once you've found the correct answer, mark it and move on. There isn't time to check the other choices, too. To succeed in Logic Games, you must learn to trust your work.**

- **Use the question stem to help you to focus on the most relevant rules.**

3. (C)
This one has to be handled choice by choice:

(A) is a little complicated. If the only unsliced loaves are oatmeal loaves, then only one loaf is unsliced (Rules 4 and 5). Could the other five be sliced? Sure, they could all be sliced wheat loaves, or some combination of sliced wheat and sliced rye, as long as we don't have more than three rye loaves. So (A) is possible.

(B) If the only sliced loaves are rye, then there's no wheat loaves at all (Rule 3). Can we still make an acceptable arrangement? Sure. We could, for example, have three unsliced oatmeal, one unsliced rye, and two sliced rye loaves.

(C) is a straightforward violation of Rule 4, so it's our answer. There's no need to check the other choices, but for the record:

(D) Yes, we could (for example) have no sliced oatmeal loaves, one sliced wheat loaf, two unsliced oatmeal loaves and three unsliced rye loaves.

(E) Yes, we could (for example) have one unsliced oatmeal loaf, one unsliced rye loaf, and four sliced wheat loaves.

- **When you need to check the choices one by one, do so in the most efficient manner. Complicated choice like (D) and (E) are good ones to consult last. Here, where (C) presents such an obvious violation, it's best not to waste time on (D) and (E) at all.**

4. (D)
This is another one that must be checked choice by choice, but you can (and should!) do so strategically. The best place to start is with the correct choice for Acceptability question 1: There we saw that we could have all unsliced loaves, and no wheat loaves, which proves that neither (B) nor (C) must be true.

(A), (E) We could have one unsliced oatmeal loaf and five sliced wheat loaves, so neither (A) nor (E) must be true.

(D) is therefore our winner: If we had more than four sliced oatmeal loaves—say five—then all six loaves would be oatmeal when we added in Rule 4's unsliced oatmeal loaf. A delivery consisting only of oatmeal loaves would violate Rule 1.

- **Don't forget about your answer to the Acceptability question! It presents a definite example of a valid arrangement which you can almost always use to save time on later questions.**

5. (B)
If four wheat loaves are delivered, then those wheat loaves are sliced (Rule 3). One unsliced oatmeal loaf is always included, and that kills (A), (C), and (E). So what could the sixth loaf be? It can't be an unsliced oatmeal, since that would violate Rule 5. That kills (D). So (B) must be correct. The sixth loaf could be a sliced oatmeal loaf.

- **Before consulting the choices one by one, work with the hypothetical and see if you can make some deductions. You may be able to quickly find the answer or at least get it down to two choices.**

Game 2—*Answering Machine Messages*
(Q. 6-10)

The Action: From the opening paragraph, it might have seemed as though this was a simple six-slot Sequencing game. But the wording of that first sentence leaves open the possibility that not everyone left a message and that some people might have left more than one. In any case, the Grouping element (selecting from the list of people the ones that left messages) becomes evident from the implications of Rules 1 and 2. So we're dealing with a Sequencing/Grouping Hybrid, and the **Key Issues** are:

1) Which people left messages?

2) How many messages were left by each person?

3) Which of the six messages could, must, or cannot have been left by each person?

The Initial Setup: Despite the complication introduced by the Grouping element, you could still set this up in the standard Sequencing manner, with six slots and a list of entities. You just needed to remember that some people could have left more than one message, and some might not have left a message at all.

<div align="center">

F G H L P T
— — — — — —

</div>

The Rules:

1) This rule lets us know that there's a Grouping element involved, but also limits that action. At most one person can leave more than one message. That means that if there are two messages from Fleure, for example, there can't be two or more from any other single person. Shorthanding this rule isn't easy, so simply underlining it might be a good reminder.

2) The limit on one person's messages is three. More on this in the Key Deductions.

3) is a simple if-then rule. If H is 1, then P is 6. So if we can't put a P in 6, then we can't have an H in 1.

4) If we hear from G, then we hear from F and P, too. So if we don't hear from either F or P, then we can't hear from G.

5) If we hear from F, we hear from both P and T, with all P's before all T's. So if we don't hear from either P or T, or if we can't get all the P's before all the T's, then we can't hear from F.

6) Similarly, if we hear from P, we hear from both H and L, with all H's before all L's. So if we don't hear from either H or L, or if we can't get all the H's before all the L's, then we can't hear from P.

Key Deductions: If no more than one person can leave more than one message (Rule 1), and that person can leave no more than three (Rule 2), then we have to hear from at least three other people, and so **at least four people left messages**. This deduction may not seem like a big deal, even though it eliminates (E) from Q. 9, but it's the key to finding further deductions that unlock the game.

We have to hear from at least four people, and so let's look at Rules 4-6. Let's see what happens when we don't hear from any of H, L, P, or T. If we don't hear from H, then we can't hear from P, either (contrapositive of Rule 6). But then we can't hear from G, either (contrapositive of Rule 4). In that case, we've eliminated three people, we're down to only three, and we need to hear from at least four. Therefore, **H must leave a message**. Similarly, rejecting L means we have to reject P and then G. Again, that's impossible, so **L must leave a message**.

Now let's look at P and T. Rejecting either one means we must reject F (contrapositive of Rule 5) and G (contrapositive of Rule 4). Again, that's impossible, so **both P and T must leave a message**. Now that we know that P is selected, Rule 6 definitely kicks in, and we know that **all of H's messages precede all of L's**.

Now, these were tough deductions to find, and they're only helpful on some of the questions, so don't beat yourself up if you didn't see them. Use this exercise as practice to help you get in the habit of noticing such things in the future.

The Final Visualization: Here's what we have to work with, with the contrapositives in parentheses.

F G H L P T
—   —   —   —   —   —
H, L, P, T all in
H . . . L
3 max per person
If H 1 ——> P 6
(If P NOT 6 ——> H NOT 1)
If G ——> F and P
(If NO F or NO P ——> NO G)
If F ——> P . . . T
(If NO P . . . T ——> NO F)

The Big Picture:

- **Did you complete this game before you took a look at Game 4? If so, you would have done better following the Kaplan strategy of previewing the section. Why sink a ton of time on the five questions here when the seven questions in Game 4 are so much easier?**

- **Always nail down the action of a game as soon as possible and certainly before moving to the questions. But don't be thrown if the action isn't perfectly established in the introductory paragraph. Here, it was pretty easy to assume that this was a standard Sequencing game until you saw the first few rules.**

- **Once you've conducted an overview, you're ready to pick your master sketch. For Hybrid games, start with the element of the game with which you're familiar, and then add the other element, if necessary. Despite this game's complicated nature, the basic Sequencing sketch works fine.**

- **When looking for deductions, look for characters that are mentioned in more than one rule. Rules 4-6 here demand your attention in this regard.**

- **When you're faced with an "if-then" rule, find the contrapositive, but also think about the rule in the context of the game. Forming the contrapositives to Rules 4-6 is no big deal. Understanding the implications of those contrapositives unlocks the game.**

The Questions:

6. (D)

This game wasn't easy, but this was the easiest question. The standard Kaplan Method for Acceptability questions applies. Take the rules and use them to eliminate choices. Rule 1 kills (E). Rule 2 doesn't help, but Rule 3 eliminates (C). Rule 4 axes (B), Rule 5 kills (A), and we're down to (D), the correct answer.

- **Even tough games have easy questions that reward you for hanging in there. If you've interpreted the rules properly, you should be able to at least get through the Acceptability questions.**

7. (A)

This one must be attacked choice by choice, and wouldn't be a bad one to postpone:

(A) works and is correct. Since we hear from F, we must hear from P, T, H, and L (Rules 5 and 6), and they could appear in this order: F P T H L F. There's really no need to check out the other choices, but for the record:

(B) directly violates Rule 3: If H is first, P must be last, so we can't have H both first and last.

(C) We deduced above that H and L must both be represented, with all H messages preceding all L messages. Having L first on the machine would make this impossible. Had you not made this deduction, the process for eliminating (C) would be as follows: L first means that P cannot leave a message (Rule 6). No P means no F (Rule 5), and no F means no G (Rule 4). Now there's not enough people to leave messages without violating Rule 1 or Rule 2.

(D), (E) If P is first and last, then we can't get all the P's before all the T's, and we need a T in there somewhere (see Key Deductions, above), and so we can't have an F or a G (contrapositives of Rules 4 and 5). So we're down to four people: P, T, H, and L. Now here's where the game gets tricky. It looks as though we can form an acceptable arrangement here. In general, we can form an acceptable list from four people, as long as we heard from one person three times (e.g. P H L T P P). But that won't work here. Do you see why? The stem specifies that the correct answer is a person whose first and second messages appear first and last. So if we hear from a person three times, that person's second message cannot appear last, since that person's third message will be last. The upshot for (D) is that if we have P first and last and we can't have

any more P's, then we can't form an acceptable arrangement out of two P's, one H, one L, and one T. The story is the same for (E): If we have T first and last and can't have any more T's, we still can't have either an F or a G, and we can't form an acceptable arrangement out of two T's, one P, one H, and one L.

- **Here's an example where finding the correct answer isn't that tough, but eliminating the wrong choices could take forever. So checking the wrong choices after finding the right answer was a big mistake here. Have confidence in your work. Once you've found the answer, move on.**

8. (A)
G leaving the fifth message triggers Rule 4, so we have to hear from F and P, which in turn means that we have to hear from T, and all P's must precede all T's (Rule 5). So we can't put a T in 1, since there would be no way to get a P message before it. So (A) is correct.

- **If you attacked this game late in the section, this was a good question to handle early. There's fairly solid information in the stem (G=5). There's also a fairly direct path from the question stem to the correct answer, and you don't have to test out each choice one by one. So Q. 8 was more promising than, say, Qs. 7 or 9.**

9. (D)
If you made the Key Deductions we described above (and few did), then you could have quickly eliminated (A), (B), and (C). (E), basically a combination of Rules 1 and 2, is another statement you could have deduced up front. So (D) is the winner. We could hear once from each of the six people, in which case we'd have no repeat callers. (D) need not be true.

- **If you didn't make all the deductions at the start (and again, that was hard in this case), then you could have made them here. But you also could have avoided considering (A), (B), and (C), and focused instead on (D) and (E). Why? Because (A), (B), and (C) are very similar to each other. There's only one right answer, so none of them is likely to be the one we want. Always attack the choices in the most efficient way possible. Sometimes, there's no way to tell what will save you time. But when you see some choices that look basically interchangeable, then none of them is likely to be correct. Focus your attention elsewhere.**

10. (C)
A P in 5 means we'll need to hear from H and L, with all the H's before all the L's. Since P's only message is fifth, we can't have an H in 1, since that would force a P in 6. That kills (A), and after a little more thought, it kills (D) and (E) as well. If an L is second, then an H is first, and we have the same problem. So (D) is out. Similarly, if F is third and fourth, then we need a T after we hear from P (Rule 5). So we're looking at this scenario: __ __ F F P T.

But we still need to hear from H and L, in that order, and the only available positions are the first and second positions. We still can't have H in 1, and so (E) is impossible.

Once you have it down to (B) and (C), you only have to check one, although you could guess if you were running short of time. Let's look at (B) first. If we hear from T twice, then we can't put all the T's after all the P's, and so we can't hear from either F or G (contrapositives of Rules 4 and 5). But now we don't have enough messages! T leaves exactly 2, and P, H, and L leave exactly 1. That's only 5 messages, so (B) is impossible. So (C) is correct. If L left two messages, the sequence F H L L P T works fine.

- **If you're down to two choices, you never need to check both. Check one. If it's correct, mark it with confidence. If it's wrong, mark the other choice with the same confidence.**

Game 3 — *Five Cars Washed*

(Q. 11-16)

The Action: Up through the phrase "one at a time," it appears we have a standard Sequencing game on our hands, but the action diversifies from there: Each car gets exactly one type of wash—regular, super, or premium. So not only are we to arrange the cars in the order in which they're washed, but we also have to match each car to the kind of wash it receives. The **Key Issues** for this Hybrid game will therefore be:

1) When is each car washed?

2) Which cars can, must, or cannot be washed before and after which other cars?

3) Which cars get which kind of wash?

The Initial Setup: Nothing elaborate here: Let's get the car owners down on the page as well as the numbers 1-5 for the washing time slots. One approach is to fill in the owners under the numbers, looking to place an r, s, or p above each number to signify the type of wash each car gets. We can use lower-case letters to represent the wash types to further distinguish these from the owners.

```
                        r s p
1          2            3           4           5
                      F M O T V
```

The Rules:

1) No s for 1, but s must show up somewhere. Car 1 meanwhile must get regular or premium.

2) Exactly one p. Note it.

3) Cars 2 and 3 get the same kind of wash. Choose a notation that works for you—an equals sign or arrow between them, or just the word "same" written above and between numbers 2 and 3.

4) Turn it to the positive: Both O and T must be after V. "V . . . O/T" will suffice; make sure you recognize that we can't tell from this which of O and T comes first.

5) Another sequencing rule: "O . . . M . . . F" captures the gist of this perfectly.

6) M gets regular, and the car just before M gets regular too.

Key Deductions: The game breaks down beautifully into a "Limited Options" scenario. This realization begins with a fairly standard deduction based on a combination of Rules 4 and 5. O is the common entity in these sequencing rules, so it makes sense to put them together to form "V . . . O . . . M . . . F". Hey, that's four out of the five car owners! T will fall in there somewhere, but not before V (Rule 4), so **V must be 1st**. From here we have a few entities whose options are severely restricted. O can be washed only 2nd or 3rd, while M must go 3rd or 4th—with V in 1, that's the only way to get M after O and before F as Rule 5 mandates. Who to focus on? M turns out to be the more helpful, particularly because Rule 6 influences the entity immediately before M. Nothing as definite corresponds to O. Working out what happens with O in 2 and O in 3 yields some nice deductions, but working out M's possibilities simply blows the game wide open. If you didn't follow this approach initially, now is a good time to practice this technique. Get out a new piece of paper and plot out, as quickly and accurately as you can, what happens when M is 3rd and when M is 4th. (If you did work through the game like this, kudos!—no doubt it helped you fire through the questions.)

Okay: If M is 3rd, then O is 2nd, and both get regular washes. T and F split slots 4 and 5, at least one of which must get a super wash (Rule 1). Here's what this option looks like:

```
                     OPTION 1
       r/p         r           r        at least one s
        1          2           3           4           5
        V          O           M          T/F         T/F
```

If M is 4th, things are even more defined: M, as always, gets a regular wash, and the car in slot 3 must get regular too (Rule 6), which triggers Rule 3 and forces us to put an "r" over slot 2 as well. V in slot 1 must get a regular or premium wash (Rule 1), but giving it regular would result in 4 regulars, making it impossible to include the requisite super and premium washes (Rules 1 and 2). So V in slot 1 must get a premium wash, which means the car in slot 5, the only one left, must receive the super wash called for in Rule 1. As for the order of the cars, with M 4th, F must be 5th (Rule 5), leaving O and T to battle it out for slots 2 and 3.

<u>OPTION 2</u>

p	r	r	r	s
1	2	3	4	5
V	O/T	O/T	M	F

The Final Visualization: That's it! The two options on the page are our Final Visualization, and quite a lot of information they provide. A few points to consider before we dispose of the questions.

The Big Picture:

- **If you can break a game down into limited options, it's always beneficial to do so. You should test for the possibility of limited options if a major entity is restricted to one of two possible positions. See what happens in each case—sometimes you'll be surprised at how much you can determine before hitting the game's first question.**

- **And what if more than one entity is restricted to one of two spots? Reason strategically as to which entity is more likely to best help you solidify the arrangement, and evaluate that entity's options. (Hey, if you choose the wrong one and don't get too far, you can always backtrack a bit and work out the other one. Here, that would still have been well worth your time if it eventually resulted in the options listed above.)**

- **Do you often bog down at Step 4 of the Kaplan Method, combining the rules? Here's a tip: Begin by looking for rules containing a common entity, and see if you can put those together into something bigger.**

- **Use any clues that show up in the rules to help you cement the action of a game. It may elude you at first how restricted or open-ended a game's action is until you see the way the rules talk about the entities. Here, we're told in Rule 1 that at least one car receives a super wash. Did you take that for granted? Did you assume that each of the three wash types had to appear somewhere in the ordering? If so, then this first rule should have alerted you to the fact that this need not be the case. By the time we get to Rule 6, however, we see that all the types do show up at least once.**

- **When two types of entities are present in a game, it's often helpful to differentiate them by using upper- and lower-case letters. If, however, the nature of your sketch is such that these groups of entities are nicely separated, this may not be necessary. Do what's right for you, although bear in mind that it's very important to develop consistent habits that will become second nature to you by test day. On that count, it may make sense even here to distinguish between the entities in this way.**

The Questions:

11. (B)

A standard Acceptability question; we can use either the options listed above or the traditional Kaplan Method for Acceptability questions. Since we'll be using the options in the rest of the questions, let's use the usual Kaplan Method here for practice. We simply match the rules against the choices, eliminating those that don't conform. Rule 1 kills (D), which gives the first car a super wash, and (E), which gives *no* car a super wash. (D) violates Rule 2 as well, but no other choice conflicts with that one. All the choices conform to Rule 3, but (A) disobeys Rule 4 by placing O before V. And (C) places M before O, in defiance of Rule 5. (B) remains and is correct—and, incidentally, corresponds to Option 2 above.

- **Whatever deductions you make up front, including the plotting out of limited options, can be used on an Acceptability question. Anything that can help you scan and eliminate choices should be used. But you always have the trusty traditional Kaplan Method for this type to fall back on if you're short on deductions.**

12. (A)

If V doesn't get a premium wash, that places us squarely in Option 1, with V resigned to regular. That means V has the same kind of wash as O, who always gets a regular wash in Option 1 (and in Option 2 for that matter, a fact tested later in Q. 15). Choice (A) has it right.

(B), (C) With V, O, and M receiving regular washes here, T and F, who float between 4 and 5, must receive the premium and super washes, although we don't know which gets which. Either way, (B) can't be true—M gets regular, and T gets one of the other kinds. And the fourth car could get the super rather than the premium wash, so (C) could be true, but need not be.

(D), (E) No, in Option 1, O is 2nd and M is 3rd.

- **The reason to break a game into limited options when possible is, of course, to use the options to pick up quick points. And the best way to use the options is to let the information in the question stems guide you to the option that's in play. Then you can often read the correct answer right off your sketch.**

13. (B)

The stem calls for the same kind of wash for cars 4 and 5. In Option 2, car 4 gets a regular wash and car 5 gets the super, so once again we're firmly in Option 1 territory. This time we're looking for the choice that COULD be true. A quick comparison of the choices to Option 1 yields (B): T could be 4th or 5th.

(A), (C) In Option 1, O is 2nd and T comes after M.

(D) and (E) are a little trickier because they involve one additional step. The stem put us into Option 1, and we were able to select (B) immediately without even bothering to plot out the specific wash types for each slot. We didn't have to—T could be 5th, no doubt about it. But, just for the record, if we saw to it that 4 and 5 got the same type of wash, we'd find that they must both get super washes because only one car gets premium (Rule 2), and making them both regular would leave no place for the super wash. And if 4 and 5 both get super washed, then the premium wash must fall to V in slot 1. Now it's clear why (D) and (E) cannot be true (although, given the options, we didn't even need to take it this far).

- **Notice all of the work that the limited options helped us avoid here. We didn't even have to follow through on the actual specifics of the stem to find the correct choice; all we needed to know was the option the stem required.**

- **When you find an answer in Logic Games, don't waste time checking the others. The LG section is designed specifically so that you *don't* have time to work through every choice. In order to get through the section in 35 minutes, you're going to have to become adept at selecting answers with confidence and blowing off the rest once you've found the one that works.**

14. (E)

No new information, and we're looking for something that must be true. A quick glance should be all that's necessary to evaluate each choice.

(A) In Option 1, V can get a regular wash, not to mention the fact that the stem for Q. 12 flat out tells us that (A) here need not be true.

(B), (D) No, the washes are fully determined for the five cars in Option 2, and there only car 5 gets the super job.

(C) In Option 1, the wash for car 5 is wide open.

(E)'s all that's left, so it must be true. Indeed, car 2 gets a regular wash in both options.

- **A "non-if" "must be true" question in a game in which you've discovered limited options is usually a piece of cake. Simply look at the options on the page and see what's common to both.**

15. (B)

M's a wash here (pun intended), since M's car always gets a regular job (Rule 6) and M appears in every choice. In Option 1, V gets regular or premium, and of course we've already seen V in other questions sporting a premium wash (Qs. 11 & 13), so V can't be part of the right answer. T and F's washes are also pretty wide open in Option 1—we just saw them both with super washes back in Q. 13, so T and F are out too. That narrows it down to (B), M and O, and a quick glance confirms that O receives a regular wash in the 2nd time slot in Option 1, and a regular wash in either slots 2 or 3 in Option 2.

- **Get in the habit of using your work from previous questions to help you deal with choices in later questions. While it may be just as easy here to check the choices against our two options, not every game breaks down as nicely as this one, and the strategy of utilizing your previous work is applicable in some form to nearly every LSAT logic game.**

16. (A)

A new question, and a new car to upset our little car-washing universe. The fact that Jabrohn's car can be washed in any of the now six positions means that our options don't really hold anymore, as M can now be either 3, 4, or 5, with the other cars shifted around as well. Best bet is to simply try out the choices (although this may not be the best use of your time—see first bullet point below). Luckily we don't have to look far for the impossibility:

(A) is a good candidate to consider first, and not just because it's first on the list (see second bullet point below). If J

comes after O, then O, as in our previous options, will be washed either 2nd or 3rd. These time slots get the same kind of wash, and it can't be premium since there's only one premium to go around. If, however, J is washed before O, then O must be 3rd—in which case the same thing applies, no premium thanks to Rules 2 and 3—or 4th. If O is 4th, M is 5th and F is 6th, and then O would get a regular wash as the car immediately preceding M (Rule 6). It takes a little trial and error, but even with J added to the mix, O can't get the premium wash, so (A) is correct.

There's certainly no need to plow through the other choices once we've determined that (A) is impossible. But for the record, the following arrangements prove that each of the other choices could be true:

(B) Jp - Vs - Ts - Or - Mr - Fs

(C), (E) Vp - Tr - Or - Mr - Fr - Js

(D) Vp - Or - Mr - Fs - Ts - Js

- **When a question throws a rule change at you, think seriously about how much work you may need to do to change your Final Visualization to incorporate the new information. Don't get greedy: If you've racked up a bunch of points already, it may not be worth redoing a whole setup for just one point—you may as well move on to another game with another 5-7 points hanging in the balance. If you're on a roll, and think you can handle it quickly, then go for it. If not, hold off and return to it later if time permits.**

- **If you find yourself in a situation where you have to try out the choices, that doesn't mean all strategy goes out the window. There's still an opportunity for cleverness in choosing which choices to try out first. If you're looking for an impossibility, look for an entity or element that seems more heavily restricted than the rest. Here, the fact that there's only one premium wash, and that O is fairly restricted as well, leads to the impossibility in (A). If, however, you were asked for something that could be true, then it would be wise to gravitate toward choices containing less restricted entities, especially free agents if there are any on hand.**

Game 4—*Toy Truck Models*
(Q. 17-23)

The Action: Seven toy-truck models are assembled on seven different assembly lines. We need to find the order of the assembly lines—we don't care about what stage of assemblage each truck is in. As usual, the **Key Issues** in this straight-forward Sequencing game are:

1) What is the order of the toy-truck assembly lines?

2) Which toy-truck assembly lines could, must, and cannot be consecutive with which other assembly lines?

The Initial Setup: Seven dashes representing the assembly lines is the standard way to go here. We can fill the toy-trucks into the spaces as we go along. Let's, as usual, also make a list of the seven entities.

F	G	H	J	K	M	S
—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The Rules:

1) F's assembly line is before J's line. "F . . .J" is the standard Kaplan symbol for rules of this type.

2) M's line is numbered one less than G's line—very simply, that's "MG."

3) H must go on one of two lines, 1 or 7. We can build this rule right into the sketch by writing an "H" with arrows pointing to assembly lines 1 and 7.

4) Here's a concrete rule. We can place S on line 4. We can also cross S off our list of entities.

Key Deductions: There are no big deductions to be made in Step 4 of the Kaplan Method. This game, though not tough by LSAT Logic Game standards, remains wide open.

The Final Visualization:

```
           F    G    H    J    K    M    S
                          S
         ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___
  H ———▶ 1    2    3    4    5    6    7  ◀——— H
                       F . . . J
                         MG
```

The Big Picture:

- **You won't always be able to find large deductions in the setup—they're not always there. If you can't make any deductions up front, then at least make sure you understand all of the rules before heading into the questions.**

- **We advise you to scope out and incorporate the most concrete rules first, and here that's Rule 3. Doing so gives you an opportunity to build the other rules around something that is set. Here, the "S" in the fourth slot doesn't help us that much, but the general strategy remains sound: While you'll never waste time handling the most concrete rules first (you have to deal with them sometime), in many cases you'll find that you save time by doing so.**

- **Straight Sequencing games have for many years been commonplace on the LSAT, and are often a good place to start a Logic Games section. That this game has seven questions makes it all the more attractive as a place to begin.**

- **Incorporate the rules directly into your diagram. Instead of writing "S in 4" or "H in 1 or 7," build these rules right into your sketch.**

- **Not all entities are created equal, and it behooves you to notice the role and relative importance of each in the game. Here, in order of "restrictedness," S is permanently fixed, H is limited to two spots, M and G form a bloc, F and J are related, and K's placement is totally open—our "free agent."**

The Questions:

17. (B)
You should master and make good use of the Kaplan Method for Acceptability questions. Just check each rule against the choices to see how the various choices violate those rules. Rule 1 says that F comes before J, so scan for a choice that has J before F. Choice (E) has J before F, in violation of Rule 1, so cross off (E). Scanning for a choice that violates Rule 2, we find choice (C), where M and G are separated by two other lines. Rule 3 is violated by choice (A), which has H in spot 5, not 1 or 7. And Rule 4 is violated by choice (D), which has S in 3, not 4. The only choice left standing is (B), which is the correct answer.

- **Use the same drill for all Acceptability questions: Pick a rule and check the choices against it, eliminating the ones that don't conform. The choice left standing is the correct answer.**

18. (C)
There's nothing for us to deduce from the question stem, so let's move on to the choices.

(A) is not correct. It can, in fact, be true that F is assembled on a lower-numbered line than line 2, namely line 1. F can go first, so long as H goes in 7 (Rule 3).

(B), (E) G can't be first, because M must be immediately before it, but there's nothing to stop M and G from taking lines 1 and 2, respectively.

(C) J can't go first (Rule 1), but there's nothing forbidding J from assembly line 2, so (C)'s our answer. At this point on Test Day, you should move on to Q. 19. But for the record:

(D) is wrong because there's nothing restricting K from line 1 or line 2.

- **When a question presents you with no new information, don't hesitate to dive into the choices, and work from there. Before you move on to the choices, make sure that you understand the question, as this one was worded somewhat strangely.**

19. (C)
The new piece of information, that K is in 5, does not allow us to deduce anything further. Again, we must move to the choices, this time in search of models that could be assembled next to each other.

(A) lists G and H on consecutive lines, but that's impossible. The placement of H is limited to spaces 1 or 7 (Rule 3). If H is in 1, then G can't be in 2, because M must immediately precede G (Rule 2). And if H is in 7, then G can't be in 6, because we need two spaces for MG, and K is in 5.

(B) has G and J. Again, we are restricted by Rule 2, which has M right before G. So, if G and J are to be consecutive, then G must come right before J, and not vice versa. Therefore, to test choice (B), we'll try to place the bloc of three trucks, "MGJ." M, G, and J cannot be 1, 2, and 3, respectively, because that would violate Rule 1. And there's no room for this bloc of three after S and K. Since we can't place "MGJ," (B) is out.

(C) What about H and J? H is limited to spaces 1 or 7 by Rule 3. With H in 1, we can't have J in 2 (Rule 1). But with H in 7, J can be in space 6. Here's one way:

F	M	G	S	K	J	<u>H</u>
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

At this point in an actual Logic Game, after finding the right answer, we again recommend that you move on to the next question. For our purposes, however, it is useful to explain why (D) and (E) are incorrect.

(D) For J and M to be consecutive, J must precede M (Rule 2). So for the toy trucks in (D) to be consecutive, we'll need to fit "JMG." That bloc of three cannot go in 1, 2, 3, because F must come before J (Rule 1). Since there are no other three consecutive open spaces, (D) must be wrong.

(E) With S firmly placed in space 4 (Rule 4), and K in space 5, there is no way for S and M to be next to each other, because placing M in space 3 would violate Rule 2.

- **Don't be intimidated by the prospect of testing choices. Work quickly and efficiently, and when you find a choice that works, move on.**

20. (D)
For this question, we are able to find the answer before we move on to the choices. We know that F must precede J, so let's just try out some scenarios, looking to place them as far away from each other as possible. If F is in 1, can J be in 7? No, because filling spaces 1 and 7 without H would violate Rule 3. With F in 1, can J be in 6? Sure, here's how:

F	M	G	S	K	<u>J</u>	H
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

F and J can be separated by at most four spaces, choice (D).

- **Here's another case in which using previous work can save you time. Does the ordering just above seem familiar to you? It's the same one we worked out in (C) from the previous question, a glance at which tells us immediately that (A), (B), and (C) are out. It's a small step from there to choice (D).**

21. (A)
The new piece of information in the stem, that K is in 2, allows us to deduce something about the placement of the "MG" bloc. "MG" must be fit in either 5 and 6, or 6 and 7. Either way, space 6 must be occupied by one of M or G:

__	K	__	S	__	M/G	__
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

At this point, we'll head into the choices.

(A) says that F must come before S, so to test that, we'll try to place F after S. Rule 1 doesn't allow F in space 7, so we'd have to place F in 5, but that leaves the MG bloc *and* J for 6 and 7, which is impossible. So if K is in 2, then it must be true that F comes before S, choice (A).

All four other choices can be true, but do not have to be.

- **The method described above is sometimes called "proving the exception"—we tried to show that (A) *need not* be true, but failed, which is proof positive that (A) is correct. Exceptions can be created to all of the other choices.**

- **"Blocs" of entities are key in Logic Games, and appear in a variety of Logic Game types. They're helpful because they often impose limitations on where we can place the entities. Here, for example, the placement of the "MG" bloc forces us to recognize that F must come before S in this situation if we are to satisfy Rule 1.**

22. (A)
Here's another question that highlights the importance of blocs of entities. If G is one before F, then (along with Rules 1 and 2) we can form the bloc of "MGF . . . J." The only way for us to place that in the sequence is if M, G, and F go in 1, 2, and 3, respectively, to be followed at some point by J. With space 1 occupied, H must go in 7 (Rule 3). That leaves spaces 5 and 6 to be split, either way, by K and J. As we head into the choices, we know the following:

M	G	F	S	J/K	J/K	H
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

With all of this information deduced, checking for the choice that must be true should be fairly easy. (A) says that F is in space 3, which is the case in our sketch. Mark (A) and move on.

Choices (B), (C), and (E) are not possible. Choice (D) can be true, but need not be.

- **In Logic Games questions, it is always to your advantage to deduce as much as you can from the stem. For questions that allow you to deduce the entire scenario, or nearly that much, the choices should be a breeze. In this question, we deduced nearly the entire order of the assembly lines before we saw the choices—always a great advantage.**

23. (D)
Again, we're presented with a hypothetical piece of information which we need to incorporate into our sketch. If M is in 1, then G must be in 2 (Rule 2), and H must be in 7 (Rule 3). We're left to place F, J, and K in accordance with Rule 1. Here's our sketch before we head into the choices:

M	G	F/K	S	F/J/K	J/K	H
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remember, we're looking for the choice that "could be true."

(A) can't be true. With H in 7, we can see from our diagram that F can't go into 6, as that would violate Rule 1.

(B) can't be true, either. If F and K are in 5 and 6, the only consecutive open spaces, J would be forced into 3, in violation of Rule 1.

(C) J can't go in space 3, so, with G in 2, (C) is not possible.

(D) K, however, can go in space 3, so with G in 2, (D) is possible. That's our answer, choice (D).

(E) With G in 2 and M in 1, K can't come one before G.

- **Again, the question, though by no means easy, becomes much more manageable by deducing information from the stem. For "if/then" questions, don't rush into the choices without at least trying to make some deductions.**

- **Hopefully you found this game manageable, and used it to pick up some quick points. Remember, nothing is stopping you from jumping right to an easy game like this first, no matter where in the section it may appear. Beginning your Logic Games section with a straightforward, familiar game can calm your nerves, boost your confidence, and get you off to a great start in the section.**

SECTION II: LOGICAL REASONING

1. (A)

We're told in the stem that we need a choice that weakens a recommendation, so we should search for the recommendation while at the same time keeping our eye out for possible problems with it. According to the author, practicing engineers need not be math whizzes any longer due to the abundance of computer programs that solve engineering math problems. "Consequently. . ." (note the excellent conclusion Keyword), engineering programs "should" place less emphasis on math to free up time for other subjects. That, of course, is the recommendation we're looking to weaken. A good weakener would seek to demonstrate that math is not as superfluous as the author maintains, and (A) accomplishes this by forging a link between math skills and the operation of the programs that the author believes makes math skills unnecessary. If no special skills are required to utilize the programs, then the author may have a point. But if the programs themselves require a certain level of math proficiency to use effectively, the author's recommendation to de-emphasize math in engineering training would seem ill-advised.

(B) introduces a distinction between "being produced" and "already in use," but the fact that many of the programs are already available and being used can only help the author's argument.

(C) is apparently meant to relate to the teaching of "other important subjects." The fact that more time is needed for the teaching of such subjects is consistent with the author's argument. It doesn't conclusively prove that math should be dropped entirely, but neither does it weaken the argument one bit.

(D), like (B), points to the accessibility and functionality of the programs, which again can only help the argument, not hurt it. If these programs could not run on the machines at the firms, then we'd have a possible knock against the recommendation.

(E) Well, then engineering students shouldn't have much trouble enacting the author's recommendation, should they? (E), like the others, is perfectly in line with a proposal that favors computer programs over learning old-fashioned paper-and-pencil number crunching.

- **Some *au-contraire* choices blatantly contradict the facts of the stimulus, while others simply lean in the other direction. (B), (D) and (E) here probably fall into the latter category—they're perfectly consistent with the recommendation and even might help it a bit. However, it's not necessary for you to debate just *how* opposite a choice is—if it strikes you as contrary in *any way* to what you're looking for, cross it off fast.**

- **For some questions it will be possible to prephrase the specifics of a correct answer. For others, you'll be able to form a general notion of what the right answer will *do*, which is usually just as helpful in leading you to the correct choice.**

- **The word "should" often connotes a recommendation. Here the word nicely signals the recommendation we set out to locate. But this word can also be important in Logical Reasoning Method of Argument and Parallel Reasoning questions, and in Reading Comp. questions that ask for the function of a paragraph or the structure of the passage as a whole.**

2. (E)

"Ironside" makes his LSAT debut in this one. Is it art imitating life or life imitating art?—a common theme of the late 20th century. Here we have such a realistic TV portrayal of a lawyer that a "real-life" lawyer laments the death of the actor as the loss of "one of our own." The author is quick to deride the lawyer's sense of reality, citing her comment as "appalling evidence" that the influence of television has caused even professionals to lose the ability to distinguish fiction from reality. Aware from the stem that the reasoning in the passage is flawed, perhaps you were able to prephrase the problem with this logic: The author *readily admits* that Raymond Burr was not a lawyer, but rather an actor who played a lawyer with great authenticity. So even if the lawyer's lament is a bit silly and melodramatic, the author cannot accuse her of mistaking fiction for reality. As (E) puts it, the author ignores the part of the lawyer's statement that would clearly forestall this critique.

(A) The author doesn't argue that *all* lawyers can't tell fiction from reality, so portraying the views of one member of a group as representative of the views of all members of that group isn't the problem here.

(B) smacks of an "ad hominem" attack, the case in which someone attacks a person rather than the person's views or argument. No such attack is made here—the author clearly relies on the lawyer's statement as evidence for his conclusion.

(C) The flaw here stems from the fact that the author misses the point that the lawyer is commenting on the authenticity of Burr's performance. If the author were more concerned with the lawyer's ability to evaluate acting performances, he probably wouldn't deduce from the lawyer's statement that she has a problem with reality.

(D) The lawyer specifically comments on Raymond Burr's TV character, and the author bases his conclusion on that specific statement. How lawyers are *usually* portrayed on the tube is outside the scope; the author has no obligation to take that into consideration.

- **You are especially rewarded for previewing the question stem for a Logical Flaw question. Such a stem alerts you to the fact that something is wrong with the argument, and you can focus your attention on spotting the problem from the outset.**

- **The "ad hominem" attack is rarely the correct answer for an LR question, although it does occasionally appear among the wrong choices.**

3. (B)

The author's conclusion is that we can safely proceed with the harvesting of peat. How do we know that, contrary to opponents' claims, such harvesting will not threaten our water supply? Easy, according to the author: because in Ireland they have been harvesting peat for centuries and the water supply is not contaminated. Do you see what's going on here? It's simple: The author is reasoning by analogy—harvesting peat in this country will be safe because harvesting peat in Ireland is safe. Once you identified that the author argues by analogy, you should have been able to predict that the correct answer would tell you something about how Ireland and this country are similar. And that's exactly what (B) does, telling you that the ecology of peat harvesting areas in Ireland is *identical* to the ecology of wetlands in this country.

(A) tells us that environments change, but that tells us nothing about the similarity between Ireland and this country that's necessary for this argument by analogy to work.

(C) is outside the scope because we aren't concerned with the effect of *other industries* on the water supply. We only want to know what effect *peat harvesting* will have.

(D) is irrelevant, since it doesn't compare this country to *Ireland*, which is after all the relevant "other country." If anything, (D) might be a weakener, since it points out a potentially relevant *difference* between this country and other countries. In any case, (D) is no strengthener.

(E) is irrelevant. We're not concerned with peat harvesting as a source of fuel; we want to know about its effects on the water supply.

- **In arguments by analogy, the classic way to *strengthen* the argument is by showing how the two things that are being compared are *similar* to each other; the classic way to *weaken* these arguments is by showing how the two entities are *different* from each other.**

4. (C)

A good critical reading reveals that the "facts" alluded to in the second sentence are the evidence for the conclusion they supposedly "demonstrate." The facts regard the respective salary demands of the Chefs' and Hotel Managers' unions. The chefs are looking for a 10 percent increase, while the managers are shooting for 8 percent. This, concludes our author, means that the dollar amount the chefs are requesting is higher than that of the managers. But a crucial piece of information is missing: What are these people making *to begin with*, before the raises? How can the author conclude that the average amount the Chef's Union is demanding is higher in real dollars than that of the Hotel Manager's Union if we have only info on percent increases, and no info on the salaries those increases are based on?

If this were a Logical Flaw question, we'd say the conclusion isn't supported because it's quite possible that the hotel managers make on average a higher salary than the chefs, thus allowing a smaller percent increase for the managers to still result in a higher actual raise. (For example, an 8% increase for managers averaging $100,000 a year would be an $8000 average raise, while a 10% increase for chefs averaging $50,000 would come to $5000.) Since we need to strengthen the argument, we need to look for the choice that eliminates this possibility. (C) does the trick: If the chefs make, on average, more than the managers, then it stands to reason that a 10 percent chef increase will come out to more moola than an 8 percent manager increase, and the argument has been strengthened.

(A) The respective number of members is irrelevant here, as the conclusion concerns the "average dollar amount" of the raises. Comparing the averages takes care of any possible differences between the Unions' total membership.

(B) Bully for the chefs. The *likelihood* of achieving raises, however, makes no difference to the argument concerning the relative *amounts* of those raises.

(D), (E) Past raises are outside the scope, which here is confined to next year's raises. Since the information in these choices doesn't indicate the resulting salaries of the chefs and managers, it has no bearing on the comparison in the conclusion.

- **As a Kaplan student, you're taught to recognize the difference between percentages and raw numbers, so hopefully the omission of the average base salaries as a necessary part of this argument struck you as a main consideration here. To strengthen an argument like this, find the choice that tidies up the numbers so that the results work out as the author contends.**

5. (B)
The question stem tells us to find the generalization that captures the parent's experience, so we're looking for a principle: an abstract account covering the situation at hand. In this case, imitation didn't work, reason didn't work, but making brushing part of her storytime routine did the trick. So (B) is right in line. Habit and repetition can be more effective than other means.

(A), (D) No, imitation was one of the strategies that didn't work.

(C) We don't know whether the child was *capable* of responding to reason, we just know she didn't. So (C) goes too far.

(E) We don't know *why* the child didn't brush her teeth. Maybe she was trying to get attention, but we can't tell for sure.

- **Don't read too much into the argument. Stick to what you're given. Choices like (C) and (E) lurk for those that form unsupported interpretations of the stimulus.**

6. (B)
Some students reported having trouble with this one on test day in December 1999. For some, it was because the logic struck them as correct, not "flawed" at all (even though the question stem is quite clear on that point). "Hey," they protested, "the students there take a wide range of courses and Miriam's a student—she must take a wide range too!" Nosiree! This is an example of a classic whole-to-part miscalculation. It is true of the student body *taken in the aggregate* that they take a wide range of courses. This doesn't have an impact on any one individual. It is eminently possible for a student, Miriam for instance, to take nothing but literature courses, and yet the generalization would remain true. So we're looking for a choice containing a similar error:

(A) This choice was the *other* reason for students' concern on test day, because it sure does sound close—and close to (B), as well. But since only one choice (the right answer) has been set up as correct, no matter how similar (A) and (B) first appear, they must be different. One must be right and the other wrong, and for categorical reasons. Actually, though, (A) is an example of proper logic. The students—the individuals—take math. Well, Miguel is an individual student, so yes, he does take math. That's proper logic. But:

(B) Here we get another aggregate noun paralleling "student body." The editorial board is likewise composed of individuals, but a generalization about an aggregate group doesn't necessarily apply to every member of the group. Just as Miriam, in the stimulus, might well take a very narrow range of courses even as the student body as a whole ranges widely, so might Louise have never written a word even as the board as a whole has written widely on legal issues. But both (B) and the stimulus are certain that the individual in question shares the group's overall accomplishment, and that's why (B) is correct here.

(C), (E) Essentially both of these go wrong in the same way—they reason from part-to-whole, rather than (in the stimulus) whole-to-part. And, if anything, (C) looks like valid reasoning.

(D) commits a common logic fallacy: If X (old car) then Y (need frequent oil changes). Since not X (new = not old) therefore not Y (doesn't need as frequent changes). This is a flaw, all right, but not the one committed in the stimulus.

- **One logical truism tested from time to time on the LSAT is: That which is true of the part need not be true of the whole. And vice versa.**

- **Whenever you are torn between two choices, remember that only one choice (the right answer) has been set up as correct. Therefore, no matter how similar two choices may appear, *they must be different.* That difference may be escaping you for the moment, but there's no doubt that one must be right and the other wrong, and for categorical reasons. (Unless of course they're both wrong, and that's why they look so similar!) Anyway, instead of comparing them endlessly to each other—which just compounds the mystery —compare each to the text in question, and think: *What did the testmakers have in mind here? What were they up to when they wrote this question and these choices?***

7. (D)
"Don't be ridiculous!" begins the proponent's reply to the opponent—no punches pulled here. The opponent of offshore oil drilling argues that drilling in certain areas is not worth the risk; these areas contribute only a small amount of oil overall to the country, and new wells there would contribute only a small percentage of that. Obviously, the proponent doesn't agree that the new wells shouldn't be drilled simply because they will add very little to the country's oil supply. If that reasoning held, he argues, we wouldn't allow new farms, because no one farm is capable of feeding the entire country for long. The farm example is meant to sound ridiculous, and by extension imply that the opponent's reasoning regarding the new wells is ridiculous as well. (D) describes this method: The farm example is provided as a parallel argument, the implausibility of which is meant to highlight the "ridiculous" nature of the opponent's argument.

(A) The proponent offers no hard evidence in support of drilling, let alone evidence that's "more decisive" than that offered by the opponent. The proponent talks only about farms, in an effort to imply that the opponent's reasoning is ridiculous.

(B) No, the proponent never questions the accuracy of the 4 percent and one-half of 1 percent figures. He merely implies that the opponent's conclusion derived from these figures is silly.

(C) The proponent doesn't attack the opponent's method of argument—he attacks her reasoning. Misapplying a specific way of argumentation has nothing to do with the proponent's critique.

(E) The proponent "proposes" no conclusion. Again, he merely implies by way of a supposedly parallel argument that the opponent's argument is wacky. Besides, how can the opponent's evidence support anything about farms?

- **There's a difference between a person supplying hard evidence against a position and that person implying by way of analogy or suggesting in some other way that an argument is faulty. Learn to recognize that difference.**

- **Focus on the question you're asked. Sure, there's a potential problem with the proponent's argument, but we'll have our opportunity to address that in Q. 8. Here, in this Method of Argument question, simply concentrate on what the proponent is *doing*. Then you can turn your attention to the merits of his attempt while picking up the next point.**

8. (A)
Now we get to debunk the debunker—the proponent's implication that the opponent's argument is ridiculous ain't so hot after all, and perhaps you spotted the problem your first time through: The opponent doesn't pooh-pooh the new wells simply because of their measly output, but because such a small amount is "not worth the risk of environmental disaster." What's analogous to this risk in the proponent's farm example? Nothing. The proponent ignores this aspect of the opponent's argument. If, as (A) has it, new farms pose no such analogous risk, then the supposedly parallel example that's meant to refute the opponent's argument isn't parallel after all, rendering its implication meaningless. If (A) is true, the first line of the proponent's response can be thrown back at him.

(B), (C), (D), and (E) Each of the wrong choices fails to see the intended function of the proponent's analogy; that is, to recognize that the proponent is making no contention regarding the *actual* relationship between farming and oil. *So what* if the biggest oil deposits are located under unfarmable land (B)? Or if farm products fuel people rather than things (C)? Or that new oil drilling is more regulated than new farms (D)? Or what proportion of each type of product the country imports (E)? The proponent makes no claims about any tangible connection between farms and oil, so these things have no bearing on the proponent's response.

- **When an author argues by analogy, implying, as the proponent does here, that one situation is ridiculous because a different supposedly similar situation is clearly absurd, you must make sure that the two situations are in fact analogous. The proponent here fails by conveniently ignoring the risk element cited in the opponent's argument.**

9. (C)
This question stem requires some translation. We're looking for something that, *if true*, would show that the author's explanation is only a partial one. So we're looking for a weakener of the explanation: something that points to another factor. Another way of thinking about this question is to recognize that the stem is telling you that the author is arguing that X (and only X) causes Y. You need to look for the answer choice that says Z also causes Y. The author's conclusion is that hard tracks are faster; the author says this is because the runner's foot is in contact with a hard surface for a shorter period of time. The correct answer choice will therefore give you *another* reason why hard tracks are faster. And that's what (C) does. It tells you that hard tracks also make it possible for runners to minimize the effect of wind resistance,

again making their times faster. If (C) is true, then the author's explanation of why hard tracks are fast is only a partial explanation, so (C) is correct.

None of the other answer choices offer any other explanation of how a hard track could contribute to faster times. Therefore they are all wrong.

(A) tells you about the sole type of track that can ensure dry conditions, but doesn't offer another explanation of how a hard track contributes to faster times.

(B) gives you information about what makes one runner faster than another. It doesn't even discuss track surfaces, so it is outside the scope.

(D) gives you another factor that would contribute to fast times. But it is not specific to hard tracks. Therefore, it offers no additional explanation of why hard tracks lead to fast times.

(E), which talks about maintaining soft tracks, may be good information for a grounds crew, but is just not relevant to why the author's explanation is only a partial one.

- **In causal arguments, those arguments that take the form of "X causes Y", you should always be on the lookout for *alternative* explanations: some Z factor that also causes Y.**

10. (D)
This is a Point-at-Issue question. Goswami concludes that the striking workers are underpaid. His evidence is that the *majority* of the workers make less than $20,000 per year. Nordecki counters that *if pay is the issue* then he disagrees with Goswami. Disagrees about what? In order to answer that question, look at the *evidence* Nordecki uses to disagree with Goswami. The evidence that he offers relates directly to the pay of the workers: he says that the *average* salary is $29,000. So Nordecki must be disagreeing with Goswami on the issue of whether the workers are underpaid. And that's (D).

(A) Goswami doesn't address *average* salary, and so the two are not disagreeing on this point. While it may seem as though Goswami disagrees with (A), he need not. Here's why: Goswami says that more than half of the workers earn less than $20,000. Nordecki, by contrast, talks about the *average* salary of the workers. Both of these figures can be true if those workers earning more than $20,000 earn far more than $20,000, thus bumping up the *average* salary to over $29,000. So Goswami might accept Nordecki's statistic while disagreeing with his conclusion.

(B) No other issues are even discussed. Therefore, we can't know what either speaker thinks is the *primary* issue over which the workers are striking.

(C) We don't know whether Nordecki believes that it is reasonable to support striking workers who are underpaid. He doesn't reach that issue because he does not believe these workers are, in fact, underpaid.

(E) Again, we don't know whether Nordecki ultimately supports the workers or not. All we know is that *if pay is the issue*, he does not believe they are underpaid and he would not support them *on that basis*. However, there is still the possibility that Nordecki could support their strike on *other* issues, e.g., unsafe working conditions.

- **Anytime you start seeing numbers or percentages, pay careful attention. Make sure that comparisons are valid, that is, apples to apples comparisons. Chances are, however, that there will be an apples to oranges comparison as was this case in this argument; one speaker talked about the salary of a *majority* of the workers, while the other talked about the *average* salary of the workers. These are two very different issues.**

11. (D)
On this question you needed to find the teacher's assumption. So that means you should have found the missing link between her conclusion and evidence. Her conclusion is that the student should not lie and say that Jeanne is home sick, even if the student had promised *Jeanne* that he would say that. The teacher supports this conclusion by saying that whenever we speak to each other we make an implicit promise to tell the truth, and lying is the implicit breaking of that promise. Did you see the double standard? The teacher concludes that the student should not break his promise to tell the truth *to the teacher*, even if that means breaking his promise to *Jeanne*. Therefore, the teacher must be assuming that it's OK to break *some* promises, but not others. And that's what (D) says: some *implicit* promises (promising not to lie) are worse to break than some *explicit* ones (promising Jeanne to say that she is sick).

(A) The teacher doesn't have to assume anything about whether people actually tell the truth or not. Her argument concerns when you should break promises.

(B) The argument deals only with breaking promises, and does not concern itself with what is in a person's "best interests."

(C) also contains outside the scope elements. The *consequences* of breaking promises or telling lies are not discussed.

(E) is too extreme. This teacher could not be assuming that one should *never* break a promise, because she is explicitly asking the student to break his promise to Jeanne.

- **Extreme answers are almost always wrong on assumption questions, because they require the author to assume too much.**

12. (E)
Four viable resolutions, one clunker, states the stem. This tells us that the apparent discrepancy must not be a great mystery after all, considering there are four valid solutions to it right on the page. Our job is to find the odd man out. The argument is simple enough: Antilock brakes are designed for safety, but those who drive cars with these brakes have more accidents than those who drive cars without them. Why? Each wrong choice posits a reasonable explanation of why this may be so:

(A) and (D) indict the drivers of cars with antilock brakes. If they're more careless than other drivers, or simply don't know how to use the antilock brakes, the research finding is much more understandable.

(B) Antilock brakes are *designed* for safety; no one ever said they actually worked well.

(C) Even if you empty your wallet taking care of antilock brakes, they're only as safe as *unmaintained* regular brakes. (C) thus poses another condition standing in the way of the supposed safety of the brakes. Once again, the accident stats are not nearly as surprising as they would appear at first glance.

(E)'s the winner, by virtue of its content as well as by default. The issue here is number of accidents. Severity and location of accidents are outside the scope.

- **Alternative explanations lie at the heart of many LSAT questions, including Paradox questions. Sometimes alternative explanations spring from scope shifts (e.g. being *designed* for safety vs. *being* safe, in (B)), but they also may come from unmentioned issues, such as (A) and (D)'s indictment of the *drivers* of cars with antilock brakes.**

13. (D)
If this guy is the President of the Chamber of Commerce, then the region can expect a lot more businesses to leave. The question stem tells you that his argument is flawed. The President concludes that the Planning Board is guilty of exaggerating the rate of businesses leaving the region. His evidence is that there have never been more than a thousand businesses in the region, and if they were really leaving at the rate of four per week over the past 10 years, then there wouldn't be any businesses left in the region. Did you spot the scope shift? The Planning Board, in its estimate of businesses leaving, said nothing about *how long* this had been occurring. So the President seems to assume that the Board is claiming that this rate has been accurate for a long time. Once you identified this flaw, it should have been easy to skim the choices for the correct answer. Businesses are *currently* leaving at four per week. The Planning Board *did not* say they've been leaving at four per week *for 10 years.* (D) points out the President's misrepresentation.

(A) In the first sentence the President *does* consider that no new businesses are moving in.

(B) The President is not *confusing* the rate of change of businesses in the region with the absolute number of businesses in the region. He's just misusing that rate by applying it over 10 years.

(C) Nothing in the argument suggests what would be in the interest of the Planning Board.

(E) The President never suggests that the estimate is not precise enough.

- **This is a good example of how prephrasing an answer will keep you from getting distracted by answers that may sound reasonable but don't correctly identify the flaw. The wrong choices are abstract and potentially confusing, and so understanding exactly why each is wrong would take longer than finding the correct answer.**

14. (D)
The author of the stimulus is evidently responding to someone claiming that a diet high in refined sugar can't cause diabetes. "That's inaccurate," says he. How come? Because such a diet can make one overweight, which in turn can lead to diabetes. This can be broken down algebraically: It's wrong to say that X can't cause Y, because X can lead to Z, which in turn can lead to Y.

(A)'s conclusion is that a statement of *causation* is inaccurate—that it's wrong to say that cold air can lead to colds. No good! Remember our algebraic rewrite: "It's wrong to say that X *can't* cause Y."

(B) lacks any sense of cause and effect. Also, (B)'s evidence contrasts direct flights with multiple-leg flights, but no such distinction appears in the stimulus.

(C) goes wrong in so many ways: in its conclusion (about what is *correct* to argue), in its assertion of what *is* causative rather than what isn't, and in its reference to the "primary" cause of an effect. All of that goes against the grain of the stimulus.

(D) There ya go. "X" is inferior motor oil; "Y" is poorer gas mileage; and "Z" is engine valve deterioration. All the terms plug in beautifully and the choice runs like a dream.

(E) Here again, no sense of cause and effect is present. (E) is constructed like a syllogism ("X is Y, and Y is Z") rather than a chain of causation.

- **When it seems as if the stimulus to a Parallel Reasoning question can be easily—without strain—translated into algebraic terms, do so. Then plug the terms of each choice into your algebraic statement. If you've constructed your algebraic version properly, the right one should be pretty readily identifiable.**

15. (A)
This is a pretty straightforward example of a causal argument. The conclusion is that banks will lend more money if regulatory standards are relaxed. The evidence for this is that *before* the downturn, the standards were tightened. In other words, according to this author, the tightening of the standards is what caused the banks to loan less money. And remember, one of the assumptions inherent in a causal argument is that *no other factor* caused the result in question, in this case, loaning less money. And that's the assumption that correct answer (A) identifies—it rules out an alternative explanation, namely that the downturn itself, not the regulations, caused the banks to have less money to lend.

(B) The author is arguing that the standards caused banks to loan less money. Therefore, if standards are loosened, banks will loan more money. The downturn doesn't come into play, and therefore the author doesn't have to assume anything about whether the standards caused the downturn.

(C) is irrelevant. There is no need to assume anything about whether the reason for tightening the standards was arbitrary, or rational. The wisdom of the decision is outside the scope.

(D) and (E) are too extreme. The author doesn't have to assume that much for the argument to hold true. The author is making an argument about what happened in *this particular case*. Answer choices which read "*no* economic downturn . . ." , or "*no* relaxation of standards . . ." are really saying the author is making an assumption about *every* downturn, or *every* relaxation of standards. Clearly, the author doesn't need to do that to reach a conclusion in this single instance, so these answers are incorrect. Remember, extreme answers are almost always wrong on assumption questions.

- **Once you've identified a causal argument, remember the assumptions made in such arguments. This will help you to easily identify assumptions, strengthen and weaken the arguments, and identify flaws in the arguments.**

16. (B)
This is an Inference question. Because the right answer must be supported by statements in the passage, you should avoid answer choices using extreme language. There usually won't be enough information in the passage to support choices that speak in terms of "all" or "every" or "never". Only (B) is supported by the passage, specifically the last two sentences of the paragraph. The stimulus tells us that zoos maintain breeding stocks for continued propagation of various species, and that this makes possible efforts to reestablish endangered species in the wild. Therefore, you can infer that some (though not all, or even most) specimens of endangered species are born and bred in zoos.

(A) There is nothing to support (A)'s contention that zoos have played an *essential* role in educating the public.

(C) is a perfect example of extreme language. The stimulus never suggests that there are *no* zoos that exploit wild animals. There very well may be. We only know that most new zoo animals are obtained from captive breeding programs.

(D) is a little trickier. While it does qualify its language and say that *nearly* all of the animals in zoos were born in captivity, the passage does not support even that statement. The passage states that most *new* zoo animals are born in captivity, but doesn't tell us how many *total* animals, both old and new, were born in captivity.

(E) is wrong because the passage says only that zoos serve both functions. Nothing says that the *main* purpose is now education. Don't infer too much.

- **Extreme choices are common on Inference questions, so take care not to infer too much. Remember, the correct answer to an Inference question must be true. Accept no substitutes.**

17. (B)
As soon as you see percentages being discussed, you should pay close attention. And since the question stem tells you that there is a flaw in the argument, it's a good bet that the author is going to confuse the numbers in some way. The author concludes that people from the service professions are underrepresented in boardrooms because only a very small percentage of people from the service professions ever become board members of the largest corporations. Well, that doesn't make much sense. There are probably millions of people in any industry you can think of, including the service industry; but there are only a few people (relatively speaking) that are board members of the largest corporations. So by the author's reasoning, virtually every industry would be underrepresented. Therefore, the author's conclusion doesn't logically follow from the evidence. (B) correctly identifies this flaw; it points out that the way you tell whether a group is underrepresented is to look at the percentage of *board members* who come from a particular *group*—not by looking at what percentage of the group become board members.

Once you have identified this fundamental flaw, none of the other answer choices should have distracted you. Note that (C), (D), and (E) have outside the scope elements, namely, corporate boardrooms generally, smaller corporations, and social responsibility.

(A) is wrong because 600 of the largest corporations is a perfectly reasonable sample. After all, that includes the entire Fortune 500.

- **Identifying the flaw in an argument *before* you go to the answer choices will be a big help in eliminating wrong answer choices that don't at least resemble your prephrased answer.**

18. (A)
This Inference question clearly has a formal logic feel to it, so you can bet that you'll need to know your contrapositives to find the correct answer. Here's the chain of statements: Inspired musical performances guarantee a good show. So IMP —> GS. But there won't be a good show unless there are sophisticated listeners. "X cannot be true unless Y" is logically equivalent to "X implies Y," and so the second statement means that if there is a good show, there must be sophisticated listeners. Combining this with the first sentence gives us IMP —> GS —> SL. Now, being a sophisticated listener requires one to know one's musical roots. So if there are sophisticated listeners out there, they must understand their musical roots. Throwing this in gives us IMP —> GS —> SL —> UMR. From here, many statements are deducible, so it's best to hit the choices:

(A) is inferable and must be correct. If there aren't sophisticated listeners, there can't be a good show (contrapositive of 2nd sentence), and if there isn't a good show, there can't be inspired musical performances (contrapositive of 1st sentence). Boom.

(B) mixes up the statements. If there *isn't* a good show, we can only conclude that there won't be inspired musical performances. We don't know anything about sophisticated listeners or understanding musical roots.

(C) reverses the if-then relationship. Combining the statements, we know that if there are inspired musical performances, there must be people that understand their musical roots, but that doesn't mean that if people understand their musical roots then there must be inspired musical performances.

(D) The only thing that guarantees a good show is inspired musical performances. If there is a good show, we can deduce that there are sophisticated listeners who understand their musical roots, but (D) mixes this up.

(E) also reverses the if-then. Inspired musical performances guarantee sophisticated listeners, not the other way around.

- **If, by test day, formal logic isn't a strong area for you, don't spend much time on questions like these. You'll be able to identify them pretty easily by their use of the typical formal logic lingo (if/then, unless, etc.), so head for greener pastures.**

- **However, if you have some time before test day, there's no reason that you cannot make formal logic a strength. Once you are fluent with if/then rules and can form contrapositives, move on to the more complicated structures (cannot/unless, only if, etc.).**

- **"X cannot be true unless Y" means "X —> Y."**

19. (C)
The stem tells us we need to find the principle that's inconsistent (i.e., logically conflicts) with the columnist's conclusion. So the first step is to identify that conclusion. The Keyword "so" signals the conclusion: we shouldn't apply taxes on a bunch of things connected to dangerous activities. What choice contradicts this conclusion? Only (C). According to (C), we *should* use financial incentives (like taxes) to discourage dangerous activities (like parachuting, etc.).

(A), (E) The stimulus concerns the merits of taxing items to discourage their use. Other purposes of taxation, like funding something else, are outside the scope. So neither (A) nor (E) contradicts the conclusion.

(B) We don't know what the columnist thinks about healthy activities, so there's no conflict here.

(D) is right in line with the columnist. If you picked (D), perhaps you misread the stem?

- **This question essentially tests your command of the term "consistent." Two things are consistent when they can both be true. They are inconsistent when they cannot. But here's a key point many miss: Two statements that have nothing to do with each other (like "It is Wednesday" and "ice cream tastes good") are consistent with each other. There's no contradiction between them, so there's no inconsistency.**

20. (E)
This one's tricky, and might have been a good candidate to skip during your first pass through the section. It's an Inference question, a kind that's typically not vulnerable to prephrasing, and it has a formal logic element jumbling together the terms "some," "only," "not," and the hypothetical "if." Eeek! Surely no picnic. But there is a clever way into this, and it involves working backwards, beginning at the end. That's where the most concrete information appears, so it makes sense to note that and work from there. Here's what we know: There is public support for the project; the critics acknowledge it. "If the critics were right about this" (referring to something that comes earlier), then there would NOT be support. But there is support, so guess what? The critics must be wrong. About what? About "this." What's "this"? It's what the critics "maintain" in the first sentence: Public funding for the project is justified only if the public can see the benefit. In other words, the critics believe that the public seeing the benefit is required for public funding to be justified—the "only if" tells us that. And if the critics are wrong in thinking so, as we deduced above from the latter part of the stimulus, then the public seeing a benefit is NOT required for the justification of the public funding, choice (E).

Not fun, eh? The wrong choices ain't no pleasure cruise, either:

(A) goes too far. An indication of the public benefit associated with a project may not be necessary, but that doesn't mean that it's irrelevant.

(B), (C) The argument concerns the requirements for justification. The critics argue that something is necessary to justify continued funding, but the scientist's argument is set up to imply that this belief is wrong, that such a requirement does not exist. We cannot tell from the argument, therefore, whether the funding is actually justified (B) or what would best indicate such a justification (C). The scientist doesn't get into all that—she merely argues (albeit in a roundabout way) that the critics' criterion for justification is bogus.

(D) *Au contraire:* The scientist's argument suggests that the public supports the project despite the fact that no benefit to the public is indicated.

- **For some, the formal logic nature of this question was enough to send them packing. Others enjoy the world of if-thens. Regardless, in *your* Logical Reasoning practice, develop a sense for which questions are tough *for you*. Then, on Test Day, put off those questions until last (if you get to them at all). If timing is a problem, you're always better off running out of time on a question you might have gotten wrong *anyway*, rather than missing out on an easy point that you didn't have time for because you got bogged down in a killer earlier on.**

- **In Logic Games we advise that you seek out and work with the most concrete rules first; this helps you to build a solid foundation upon which the more abstract rules can be incorporated. This strategy applies to some Logical Reasoning Inference questions as well. When a stimulus contains lots of bits of information and you're asked to deduce what must be true, find the most definite piece and build from there.**

21. (A)
Sometimes the simplest arguments prove to be the toughest questions. The conclusion is that the new bill will almost surely fail to pass. The evidence is that the leaders of all major parties have stated that they oppose it. In order to strengthen this argument, you need to find a statement that most accurately describes the situation in which this bill finds itself. In other words, you need to stay within the scope. (A) says that most bills that have not been supported by

even one leader (that's the same as our bill, which is opposed by leaders of all major parties) have not been passed into law (which is what our conclusion predicts—that the bill will fail to pass). Therefore (A) is correct.

(B) is tricky. But it doesn't strengthen the argument because it describes the characteristics of bills that have not been passed into law; we're trying to predict what will happen to a bill that is not supported by leaders of any major party. (B) supports the notion that failing bills are unsupported, but we're looking for a choice that says that unsupported bills will fail.

(C) provides evidence about a bill that has the endorsement of the leaders of all major parties; that doesn't help us to support the predicted fate of a bill without any endorsement.

(D), if anything, weakens the argument by suggesting that a law can be passed without extensive support.

(E) The fact that most bills that have been passed into law were supported by at least one leader doesn't really tell us anything about what will happen to a bill not supported by any leader.

- **If you found yourself having a great deal of trouble determining the differences among these answer choices, don't worry—this was a tough question. However, remember not to spend an excessive amount of time on any one question. They're all worth the same. An important part of test-taking strategy is knowing when to cut your losses, guess, and move on.**

22. (E)
More debunking—this time of an old rattlesnake folktale. We cannot, in fact, tell the age of a rattlesnake by the number of its rattle sections, but only because these sometimes break off. The author concludes (note the Conclusion Keyword "so") that if these sections *didn't* break off, we *would* be able to tell the age of a rattlesnake by counting its sections. This would certainly make sense if we knew the precise amount of time it takes a rattlesnake to form a new section, and this interval never changed. But notice that we're told only that a new section appears every time a snake molts. How often is that? If it's variable, then the author's claim is bogus—we *wouldn't* be able to tell the age simply from the number of sections. In order for the claim in the last sentence to hold up, we need to know that the intervals at which rattlesnakes molt are *consistent.* Note that we don't need to know the *exact time* of the molting periods—only that there *is* an exact timing for this and that it doesn't change. So (A) is a red herring whereas correct choice (E) relates to the real issue at hand: If molting time is variable depending on food availability, then the whole theory goes out the window. The author must therefore assume that no such molting variations occur.

(A) We hinted above at why (A) need not be assumed, but let's clarify here. Suppose a rattlesnake molts once every 2 1/2 years. Then, as long as no sections broke off, we would still be able to pinpoint the snake's age—again, provided that the molting intervals were consistent. There's no need for once-a-year molting.

(B) Appearance of the overall rattles across species? We're concerned with the *number of sections* in the rattles. The rattles can vary widely in appearance across species and that wouldn't have any bearing on the argument.

(C) introduces an element of variability that works *against* the author's theory. What's necessary here is that molting stays consistent under all conditions; that's the only way the conclusion stands up.

(D) Brittleness is factored out of the equation. The conclusion is based on the hypothetical "if they were not so brittle. . . ", so nothing regarding brittleness need be assumed here.

- **Use the Denial Test if you're unsure of a choice in an Assumption question. If the argument falls apart when you deny or negate a choice, then that choice is necessary to the argument. Here, if rattlesnakes *don't* molt as often when lacking food as when food is plentiful, then the author would be wrong to state that we'd be able to tell the age of a snake from its number of sections. This confirms that (E) is required. If you deny the other choices, you'll find that the argument remains unscathed.**

23. (D)
Our next confrontation features Tony vs. Anna in a video debate. Tony asserts that video stores would make out economically if they bought and stocked movies recorded on the new kind of videocassette. The decreased lifespan of the new tapes, Tony reasons, is outweighed by their cheaper cost. Anna's reply, which is the focus of Q. 23, begins with the Contrast Keyword "But," so no doubt she takes exception to Tony's advice for the video stores. She points out that the cost of the videocassette is only a small fraction of the overall cost of buying a videotaped movie, the bulk of the expense residing in the royalty fee. Each time a tape wears out (and these new-fangled ones wear out faster than the older ones), a store incurs another royalty fee. It's not hard to see where Anna is going with this: The overall cost savings Tony touts will be very minimal, if they exist at all, because the area in which Tony's savings accrue represents only a tiny fraction of the overall cost. That's (D).

(A) Anna passes no judgment on the price of royalties. She merely points out the cost breakdown to show that Tony hasn't considered the entire picture, not to bemoan "excessive" royalty charges.

(B) goes too far. Anna speaks mostly to the issue of price to imply that Tony's suggestion is not cost effective. That's far from a paean to high-quality videocassettes or a recommendation of what the stores should do.

(C), (E) The cost to customers is outside the scope. Both speakers are concerned only with the cost to the video stores.

- **Aspects of an issue that an author neglects to discuss are outside the scope of the argument, even if they fall under the same general topic. Sure, it's reasonable to believe that the price a video store pays for its movies will in some way determine the price it charges its customers. But if the author (or speakers in this case) doesn't take up this issue, then neither should we. (C) and (E), dealing with customer fees, should have been easy kills.**

24. (C)
Our familiarity with Anna's argument should now help us to turn the tables on her as we rush to Tony's defense. Remember, the sticking point for Anna is royalties. If we can somehow get around that, or at least lessen the impact of the royalty fees, we'd be able to revive Tony's argument. And that's all the prephrase we need: Only one choice even mentions royalties, and it turns out to be the winner here. If, as (C) maintains, royalties on the new videocassettes are half that of the old, then the force of Anna's response would be severely weakened, and Tony's advocacy of the new tapes would once again seem reasonable.

(A) offers an irrelevant comparison, since the retail price of movies has nothing to do with the comparison between costs related to the old and new videocassettes.

(B), if anything, would seem to work in Anna's favor: The more replacement copies needed, the more royalties the stores will have to pay. And the new videotapes that Tony supports wear out faster than the old ones, so Anna's caveat about royalties would seem especially relevant here. If you didn't see it this way, you should have at least sensed that there's nothing in this one to help Tony.

(D) Customers again? When people might buy a movie rather than rent one is outside the scope.

(E) may seem to have some relevance, tying in with the durability issue. But multiple viewings can only contribute to tape degradation, which again can't help Tony's case—he'd still have to deal with Anna's royalties contention.

- **Focusing on the scope of an argument can help you zero in on the correct choice, especially when only one choice raises the relevant issue. Anna's rebuttal introduces one factor that Tony doesn't consider: royalties. To help Tony counter her response, we need the choice that takes on this issue, and (C)'s the only one that does.**

25. (D)
The question stem is just a wordy way of asking you to identify the logical flaw in the argument. This is a classic case of confusing *correlation* with *causation.* Just because X and Y appear together doesn't mean that X causes Y. Here the physician cites the evidence of high testosterone levels in younger men, and lower estrogen levels in post-menopausal women. The physician then couples this with the fact that men get heart disease earlier, and women get it later, and finally concludes that testosterone promotes heart disease, and estrogen tends to inhibit disease. Looking at this evidence, you can agree that hormone levels and heart disease do seem to be *correlated,* but does that necessarily mean that these hormones *promote* or *inhibit* disease? Might there be other causes? Couldn't the correlation just be coincidence? Once you have identified this flaw (and it should come naturally after having read numerous causal arguments) you should be able to go quickly to correct answer choice (D).

(A), (B), and (E) are incorrect because of their use of extreme language. The physician has only concluded that these hormones *tend* to promote or inhibit heart disease. The physician does not presume that they are the primary factors, or that they are the *only* hormones that have this effect, or that hormone levels *do not vary.*

(C) The physician never suggests whether men or women are more likely to contract heart disease.

- **When you're asked to find a flaw in a causal argument, make sure you pay attention to whether the author is confusing correlation with causation, as this author did. Also make sure that the author hasn't overlooked any potential alternative causes, or that the author hasn't reversed the order of causation, i.e., saying X caused Y when in fact, Y caused X.**

26. (B)
The question stem tells you that you're looking for a flaw in the argument. The author's argument in a nutshell says that in order to assess the value of a scientific discipline, you have to look at its origins. And as an example, he cites chemistry. According to his argument, to assess the value of chemistry, we have to take into account that its early practitioners believed in magic. This should have prompted you to say, "So what? Who cares what alchemists believed?" And that's essentially what (B) says. The author fails to consider that chemistry is no longer practiced by alchemists, who believe in magic, so it makes no sense to judge its value based on how it was practiced in the past.

(A) The author isn't arguing that in order to have value you must have an unblemished origin. The author is only saying that as part of the value assessment process, you must consider the discipline's origins. So the author need not establish what (A) says.

(C) The author uses his chemistry example to support, not contradict, the principle under consideration.

(D) is basically the reverse of (A), and is wrong for the same reasons.

(E) The author uses discipline in one sense: a field of study.

- **Don't fault the author for not doing what he or she isn't logically required to do. Sure, this author does not establish the facts in (A) or (D), but so what?**

SECTION III:
READING COMPREHENSION

Passage 1—*The Okapi*
(Q. 1-6)

Topic and Scope: The okapi; specifically, their number, feeding behavior, and geographic distribution.

Purpose and Main Idea: The very first sentence suggests that the author's purpose is to explore the "difficult questions" that began to be posed in 1900 when the okapi were discovered. And indeed, the author goes on to answer, sometimes definitively, sometimes speculatively, many of those questions. If there is a main idea—and there must be, because Question 1 says there is—it's that.

Paragraph Structure: ¶1 provides an introduction to the okapi and a report on the resolution of the debate over what family it belongs to.

¶2 blatantly announces its scope: Lines 14-15 promise to consider the size of the okapi population, and that's what the ¶ goes on to do. The gist of it is that radio technology confirmed that there are more okapi than zoologists had at first suspected, but that they're tightly concentrated in a small part of northeastern central Africa.

¶3 explores why the okapi seem scarce (a combination of their excellent camouflage, residence in the forest interior, and solo feeding habits). And ¶4 ends with some additional questions, answered with less certainty than the previous ones, all dealing with puzzling aspects of the okapi's decision as to where to live.

The Big Picture:

- **Science passages typically annoy LSAT students, because they often don't possess much background knowledge or a consuming interest in science topics. But coming to a passage with a "blank slate"—with no baggage of outside opinions or knowledge to distract you—can be a plus rather than a drawback, if you choose to see it as such and plunge in with confidence and a sense of humor.**

- **The structure of science passages on the LSAT is usually quite blatant. (That's the tradeoff for handing you a passage topic that you're almost certainly unfamiliar with.) Look at all the Keywords that the author provides: "a number of difficult questions"; "The First"; "The next question"; "One reason for…"; "Another is…"; "But other questions…arise"; "Another question is…"—to name but a few! Don't be scared of science. Confidently use the help provided by the passage author and editor to get you through it all.**

- **Making mental pictures of what the author is describing—"seeing," for instance, the okapi well-camouflaged deep in the forest, foraging solo on a wide variety of plant treats—helps you cut past scientific jargon and detail and get the gist of a ¶ swiftly.**

The Questions:
1. (C)
This passage offers a whole lot of "ideas"—explanations, theories—about the okapi rather than one all-encompassing one. For that reason, we should expect the right answer to reflect the wide range of the author's okapi interest. And it does. Whether you attack each choice in turn, or skim through the choices looking for something tempting, (C) should jump out as correct. It picks up on the fact that some okapi questions have been answered while some remain, and it gets the scope right: (C)'s last five words appropriately identify the specific areas treated in the text.

(A), (D) Each of these is fatally flawed by its overemphasis of the detail in ¶2 about the radio transmitters. Both choices imply that the radio technology was useful in answering most if not all of the relevant questions about the okapi, when in fact all the little collars did was track the critters and help to confirm their number and general habitat. The bulk of the passage, lines 27-58, has nothing to do with the radio devices; they deserve no place in the Main Idea statement.

(B) is wrong on a couple of levels. By focusing just on the "questions" about the okapi, (B) makes it sound as if the author of the passage never tries to answer those questions…when in fact, of course, answering the questions is the author's main concern. Also, the questions themselves weren't immediately "because of" how okapi look and their infrequent capture. The questions emerged because this was a new species discovery.

(E) is too negative and extreme. Many of the questions have been answered, and those answers are present in the text. Also (E), like (A) and (D), unaccountably puts major emphasis on the small detail of the radio-tracking collars.

- **Beware choices in Global questions that put too much emphasis on minor detail.**

- **Avoid getting "hypnotized" by a vivid detail early in the passage (such as the radio transmitters here). Part of good critical reading involves deciding, as you go along, which details are significant and which are less so.**

2. (D)

One should be able to answer any question about the purpose of any ¶ if s/he has done the right Roadmapping en route. Our Roadmap reveals that ¶3 is explaining why the okapi have seemed scarcer than they really are—choice (D).

(A) would be better if it read "*answer* a question about okapi behavior," for that's what the ¶ does.

(B), (C) No rebutting or countering takes place in ¶3 whatsoever. It's a ¶ of explanation.

(E) This is not an advocative passage and certainly not an advocative ¶, so the notion that anything in this passage is "support[ing] a belief" is peculiar. But in any case, the ¶ evidence suggests why okapi are less rare than they seemed, so (E) is doubly off.

- **Don't just "roadmap" in your head. Whether you choose a noun, or a phrase, or a full sentence, see to it that you jot down next to each ¶ its scope or idea or essence. Right there in the text booklet. You have the ability to jot down anything you want in the LSAT booklet to help yourself; use it!**

3. (D)

This "analogy" question works a bit like Parallel Reasoning in Logical Reasoning, doesn't it? None of the five situations described has anything to do with the okapi, but we need to find among them a parallel with okapi feeding behavior. A quick rereading of lines 37-43, where the okapi feeding is described, should yield a simple idea: It's kind of an okapi smorgasbord, in which they graze in a picky way, a little here, a little there, sampling a lot of different plants and leaving a lot uneaten. That's just what (D)'s newspaper reader is doing, moving all over the place.

(A) *Au contraire!*—(A) is just the opposite of what the okapi do. They emphatically do not "consum[e] all of it before going on."

(B)'s "strictly follows the outline" immediately kills this choice. Okapi's meandering feeding is at odds with the professor's strict structure.

(C) is kind of amusing—as if the okapi were described as deliberately keeping themselves as hungry as possible until they must eat to survive.

(E) doesn't involve eating, or consumption, whatsoever. Since nothing in (E) is being consumed—like the leaves of the okapi or the newspaper text of (D)'s reader—(E) can't possibly parallel the okapi eating behavior.

- **Whenever Reading Comprehension asks you to make an analogy with something in the text, you can avoid getting bogged down in tempting wrong answers by pre-phrasing an answer first, and your pre-phrase need not be complex. The mere thought of words such as "grazing," "scattered," "wandering," and so on, as descriptions of how the okapi eat, should lead you readily to (D)'s description of how the newspaper reader reads.**

4. (E)

This unusually lengthy and off-putting "just suppose" needn't be as confusing as it might at first appear. Hitherto undiscovered or not, the question stem's okapis are in fact living exactly where lines 22-26 place all the other okapis, in a remote forest region in northeastern central Africa. Given that, it's reasonable to infer that what's true for the okapis in general is true for these new ones, and that's (E): As lines 55-58 assert, the current thinking is that the critters lived there when forest acreage was scarce and they continue to do so even as more forest has become available.

(A) reflects a theory, discussed in lines 49-50, that as far as we know has not yet gained wide acceptance, so one is hard pressed to agree that the zoologists would be "likely" to hold this view.

(B) *Au contraire*, okapis don't forage in that border area (lines 45-47), and if the run-of-the-mill okapis don't, why should these newly discovered ones forage there?

(C) Not enough evidence. It's possible that these okapis are beset by predators galore. Indeed, if they were, it would support one theory (lines 48-49) about why they stay in the forest.

(D) Nothing in the passage explores why okapis live in one forest *rather than another*; the author's concern is why they live deep in forests rather than in other, equally hospitable areas. If anything, (D) goes against the grain of the passage, specifically the notion that okapis don't base their living decisions on the location of preferred foliage, which they often leave uneaten to wander to new areas.

- **Whether the scope of a question is global or limited, you can't go wrong by keeping the author's main concerns and ideas uppermost in mind as you work through a passage's question set.**

5. (E)

If your passage roadmap is solid, attacking this "all/EXCEPT" question should be something of a snap. Read each choice—each question—in turn; determine where in the passage its topic is discussed; and check whether it's answered. As it happens, three of the four "wrong choices"—the questions that the passage does answer—are accompanied in the passage by the word "because." The omnipresence of that Evidence Keyword makes your analysis much easier, we think. (The evidence for the question posed in choice (B) relies in the passage on the phrase "is confirmed.")

(A) is explained in lines 15-17.

(B) Confirmation of the okapi's place within the giraffe family comes in lines 11-13.

(C) is addressed at length in lines 29-35.

(D) Lines 37-43 answer this one.

(E)'s the odd man out. We are told what picky eaters the okapis are at lines 37-39, but the author never tells us *why* that's so. We get the fact, but no explanation for it, so (E) contains the notion that's not backed up by information and gets the point here.

> • **Kaplan's emphasis on Keywords is neither accidental nor idle. Keep in touch with the Keyword categories, as well as the examples of each that show up in passage after passage. They do help you read more efficiently, and they surely do help you answer questions with greater accuracy and speed.**

6. (C)

Not much to be done here but attack the choices in one order or another, remembering that one *and only one* of them has been set up to agree with the author's views.

(A) All lines 23-24 tell us is that okapis "are not as rare" as was thought. (A) goes way too far.

(B) "All the questions" have been answered? Given how the passage ends? And by those little collars, whose only purpose was to give us a better sense of the okapis' scarcity?

(C) ties together lines 15-17 and lines 27-29 and is the correct answer: Everyone thought the critters were scarce, largely because of their exceptional camouflage, and the rest of ¶3 details the "habits" that inferably contribute to the hunters' difficulty in finding them.

(D) Got to check the remaining ones, just to be sure. (D) is pretty bad. It's factually wrong—okapis love many different plants, assert lines 33-37—and it also presumes to answer authoritatively one of the still-open questions with which the passage ends.

(E) There's no basis in the passage for making any kind of "what if" prediction about okapi numbers, let alone one so unqualified as (E). If either theory presented in ¶4 as to why the okapi avoid the forest-savanna border is correct, then it would seem that their numbers would *decrease* if they were to forage in this area. Since the author does present these theories as possibilities, we must conclude that (E) is far from consistent with the author's position here.

> • **Don't let one question get you bogged down! Some students reported that they flew pretty quickly and accurately through the first five of this okapi set, and then spent a lot of time struggling with Q. 6. In retrospect, they wished they had skipped the question the moment it became time-consuming, so as to invest more time in the points coming up. Learn from their error! When a question is draining time away, it's probably prudent to skip it temporarily, or guess, and move on to greener pastures.**

> • **Regarding (E): Be very suspicious of predictions when answering Inference questions. Most of the time, we cannot predict what might or will or would happen under conditions other than those of the passage. Most predictions are wrong when they appear in Inference questions.**

Passage 2—*Greek Tragedy*
(Q. 7-14)

Topic and Scope: Greek tragedy; specifically, to what extent human choice and the desires of the gods influence the plays' action.

Purpose and Main Idea: The author's purpose is to survey three scholars who take very different positions on the issue of what animates the action in 5th C. BC Greek tragedy. However, since the author ends up taking no personal stand on the issue, she provides no "main idea" of her own per se (and there's no Main Idea question present, which is no surprise). The "idea" of the passage, then, must be stated in factual terms, something like: Scholars have disagreed as to what underlies the actions of the characters in Greek tragedy, with some emphasizing human autonomy, some the will of the gods, and some a mixture of the two.

Paragraph Structure: ¶1 kicks off with the first viewpoint represented, that of Snell who, while identified as an "early scholar" (who knows how early?), expresses a point of view that may well have struck you as rather modern: He believes that the tragic protagonist makes free choices between tough alternatives. At the end of the ¶ this fellow Barbu chimes in to link this idea of human free agency to Greek civilization generally.

¶2 gives us Rivier's take. He's identified as an opponent of Snell's, and we quickly see why: Rivier puts the choices available to a human protagonist squarely in the hands of the gods. It is the deities' desires that move things along, not human autonomy at all. All the human does is recognize the rock/hard place choice the gods have assigned to him.

¶3 is given over to Lesky, who "disputes both views," the passage author helpfully informs us. Lesky's idea, that human desires and gods' desires are in a state of "constant tension," is transmitted through the example of the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus, in which Agamemnon's choice (to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia) is also the gods' choice, although the blameworthiness flows to the human Agamemnon alone. Our author leaves us without making an effort to tie it all together, and we cannot know to which model of Greek tragedy she herself would subscribe.

The Big Picture:

- **Nearly every LSAT Reading Comprehension section features at least one "Book Review" passage, in which the views of more than one writer or school of thought are compared and contrasted. When one of these comes along, be sure to remember that the big skill they're testing is your ability to keep track of the different points of view: where they converge (if at all) and how they differ.**

- **Also remember that the author of the passage need not sign on to any of the points of view described, or even provide one of her own. Certainly this author keeps out of the debate here, as far as her own view is concerned.**

The Questions:
7. (C)
We should be primed for this one, having just ended our Roadmap with a consideration of Lesky's views in ¶3 and recognized that Lesky is interested in the "constant tension" between gods and men. But that precise thought doesn't appear among the choices upon a quick scan, so we will have to examine the choices in turn.

(A) sounds tempting at first glance, because it mentions gods and men in the same breath. But in fact what unites gods and men, according to Lesky, is their desires as to man's behavior. The gods' *motives* for wanting men to behave in a certain way, however, go unmentioned. In terms of Agamemnon, for instance, we are told his sacrifice is motivated by a desire for success in battle (remember this when we get to choice (C), okay?). Artemis wants Iphigenia sacrificed as well; but why?—we are never told.

(B) The notion that a human protagonist "solely determines" his fate is of course a Snell idea, not that of Lesky.

(C) isn't a complete statement of Lesky's view of Agamemnon (it leaves out the role of the gods), but it must be said that (C) is true as far as it goes: His decision-making process *is* influenced by his desire for military success. (C) is correct, though we should check out the ones that remain:

(D) directly contradicts what we've just affirmed regarding (C). At least part of Agamemnon's motives are personal rather than relevant to Artemis.

(E) If anything defines tragedy for Lesky, on the evidence of the passage, it's that "constant tension" between gods and man mentioned in the last sentence, and that contradicts (E)'s idea that the real tragedy is political in nature. (That the passage never uses the word "political" is a pretty good clue that (E) is out of line.)

- **If your pre-phrased sentiment doesn't appear among the choices, don't despair. Hang in there, and study the choices in some order. Remember that one of them *must* work.**

8. (C)
Let's explore the *context* of the quotation from *Agamemnon* starting at line 44. The king learns of a necessary condition for wind—the sacrifice of his child. (There's ordinarily a lot of wind in Greek tragedies, but not in this one.). That's the "divine necessity" mentioned at line 47. Then it goes on to say that the king "deeply desires a victorious battle," COLON: That colon indicates that the desire for the battle leads directly to what follows the colon which, as we know, is the quotation in question.

What does all this amount to? The quotation must mean: *If the gods decree that this sacrifice is a necessary condition for me, then I'm allowed* ("it is permitted") *to want it*. Note that this is absolutely in keeping with the overall Lesky motif, that a human will feel a want that was put there by divine intervention. This matches up rather neatly with correct choice (C).

(A) goes bad early on—Agamemnon doesn't want to *evade* battle, and anyway the sacrifice would permit him to *wage* it—but it gets the latter part right.

(B)'s "if" clause is exactly the same as that of correct choice (C). But in Agamemnon's quotation the antecedent of the pronoun "it" is sacrifice, not battle. The quotation is Agamemnon's soliloquy on the impending murder of his daughter. So (B) goes fatally wrong at the end (as does Agamemnon at the end of the play, and boy, do he and his descendants pay the price, cf. the *Oresteia*).

(D) begins "As I alone…" Not only does that deviate from Agamemnon's expressed awareness of the gods' influence, but it counters Lesky's idea about the role of the gods in human choice. And why would the author insert this quotation as an illustration of Lesky's viewpoint, if as (D) suggests it reflects a Snellian view?

(E) misrepresents the necessary condition in effect, and gets things backwards, to boot: It's not that desiring victory guarantees the success of the sacrifice, but rather that the sacrifice is necessary for wind to conduct the battle.

- **Punctuation can act as a useful Keyword just as much as "however," "because," and "therefore." Use *everything* an author gives you to figure out what's what.**

- **When choices resemble each other really closely, as these five do, be sure to compare their pieces carefully. And as soon as you notice that a choice goes wrong, cross it out—completely, with your pencil—so that you'll find it easier to study the remaining choices.**

9. (D)
Whether you zero in on the place in ¶2 where the "forces that give the dramas their truly tragic dimension," lines 27-28, or just think about the gist of the entire ¶, you sort of have to come to choice (D). In contrast to Snell, Rivier's whole point is that what the gods want is intimately tied up with what humans want and do. And that's (D).

(A) ¶2 makes it clear that the tragic protagonist is eminently aware of the rock/hard place choice facing him, in contrast to (A)'s idea of delusion.

(B) "Heroism," like "political" in Q. 7 (E), is never mentioned, which is a pretty good hint that the concept is outside the scope of the passage—which it is.

(C) For that matter, neither is the issue of personal responsibility, whether right or wrongful, relevant to ¶2 or anything else in the passage.

(E) The passage stops short of ever considering any consequences of behavior—punishment or reward—in Greek tragedy.

- **Keep the gist of a ¶ in mind even when answering a question that merely concerns a *detail* in that ¶. It could help a lot.**

10. (C)
Here's a very Logical-Reasoning-like question: What's the point at issue between Lesky and Rivier? This is very much a time for pre-phrasing. In Rivier's reading of Greek tragedies, the superhuman forces of the gods set up the decision. The human character has no real choices, only "choices" (the quotes are our author's, line 32) whose final selection is determined by "necessity" (lines 35-36). Rivier, then, sees humans' own desires as irrelevant if not nonexistent. But humans are more autonomous in the Lesky view of the plays—a hero like Agamemnon possesses "desires that…are his own" (lines 52-53). It is that issue of human choice that separates Rivier and Lesky, and that makes (C) correct.

(A) hardly defines a difference between the two scholars. Certainly Rivier's protagonists have great awareness (see Q. 9, above), and Lesky's reading of *Agamemnon* includes the ruler's awareness of what Artemis wants. And in any case, (A) deals with the awareness of *consequences*, an issue not part of the passage at any point. So (A) is kind of a mess.

(B) See the discussion of (A), above. A strong case can be made that *both* Rivier and Lesky grant awareness of the role of the gods to the Greek protagonists.

(D), (E) Matters of morals and ethics have no more to do with this passage than do "political" in Q. 7 (E) or "heroism" in Q. 9 (B). There's a brief side reference to characters' actions "that must be condemned by us," lines 52-53, but you have to work to turn that into a major concern with morals or ethics, and in any case it's not opposed by a reference in ¶2, which it must be to be correct here.

- **When the question asks for an issue about which two thinkers would disagree, remember that the wrong choices must be either areas of *agreement* (like (B) above) or, like (A), (D), and (E), areas where agreement is unsure because the issues are outside the scope.**

11. (E)
You need not recognize the plots of the plays in the answer choices as coming from actual Greek plays—*Antigone, Seven Against Thebes*, the *Oresteia*—to handle the challenge of Question 11. Any of these plots, we can infer, could be retold and reinterpreted by Snell, Rivier, or Lesky, and they'd come out differently each time based on each scholar's viewpoint. What's important is that we focus on the right scholar—Rivier, in this case—and recall his overall point of view (essentially that the gods pull the strings, and that humans simply wake up to the course that has been divinely set for them). Armed with that summary, (E) shouldn't be a close call. It's all there: the course chosen by the gods, the long deliberative process, the eventual realization by the protagonist.

(A) fails to mention the gods at all, so it deviates markedly from the Rivier model. (A)'s tragic figure (Antigone) sounds more like a Snellian figure in her self-determination.

(B) Here's Antigone again, "acceding to the gods' request" but mostly motivated out of love of her dead brother. This combination reflects Lesky more than Rivier.

(C) is talking about Mrs. Agamemnon, Clytemnestra (there sure was a lot of activity around the Agamemnon household, you bet). By disobeying the gods she is manifestly not making her choice along the lines of the Rivier model.

(D), like (C), deviates from the Rivier model because its tragic figure (King Creon) is defying the gods rather than "independently" choosing the course the gods have set for him, as in correct choice (E). Also, even if this protagonist were obedient, operating under a heavenly curse isn't the same as operating under heavenly compulsion.

- **Here's a classic example of the way in which Book Review passages are used to test your command of varying viewpoints.**

12. (D)
Barbu, Snell's cheering section, is trotted out at lines 19-23 to ascribe the Snell idea of human autonomy in decisions to Greek civilization generally. He says that the plays of Aeschylus are "proof of"—in other words, evidence for—how the idea of the autonomous human had begun to take hold in Greece. Well, that can only be true (and you might well have pre-phrased this) if Aeschylus's plays had some relevance to, or reflected, the texture of Greek society. It's a connection Barbu doesn't explicitly mention in his brief little quote, but it's a connection he must assume is there, and that's why (D) is correct. Use the Kaplan Denial Test: If, contrary to (D), the plays didn't at all reflect the broader ideas underlying Greek life and society, if they were somehow anomalous or renegade, then the plays wouldn't be "proof of" any generalization about Greek civilization whatsoever. If (D) is false, Barbu's little argument falls apart. Therefore, (D) as written must be his assumption.

(A), (B), (C) Aeschylean innovation is not hinted at by the brief Barbu reference, yet all three of these choices use words like "new," "introduced," "original source" that are simply not justified. Barbu uses the Aeschylean drama as "proof" of the emergence of the autonomous human in Greek civilization; in no sense does he necessarily mean that the former led to the latter. All three choices differ widely in terms of that which they ascribe to Aeschylus as an innovator, but they're all wrong for exactly the same reason.

(E) Since Barbu's scope is that of Greek civilization only, we simply cannot ascribe to him any assumption about how the entire "Western world" works.

- **When a question focuses on a brief detail or quotation, most of the wrong choices will depart from the scope and/or infuse the detail with too much significance. A modest detail will generate a modest right answer. Stick closely to what's there on the page.**

- **Many Reading Comprehension questions hinge on the logic of the passage and hence benefit from your use of Logical Reasoning skills, notably that of determining the author's central assumption.**

13. (B)
Once the question points you to Snell, all that's necessary is to go back to reread the ¶ in question and zero in on the salient features. At that point you're primed to pick out the four statements that occur there, or pick out the "odd man out," whichever proves to be easier. (B) should catch your eye early, since there's nothing about supernatural forces in Snell's theory, which focuses on the freedom and autonomy of the individual protagonist. If anything, harmonizing with the gods seems more of a Rivier thing.

(A) is mentioned in lines 12-13.

(C) is attested to in lines 9-10.

(D) is explicitly alluded to at line 11.

(E) is a major point covered in lines 10-15.

- **When the testmaker blatantly points you to a particular ¶, it's a gift horse you don't want to look in the mouth. Don't dally! Get back to it, skim it quickly for its essentials, and then proceed confidently to the choices.**

14. (C)
Anyone pre-phrasing this answer should be looking for two things: the presence of the right scope (i.e. the controversy over who pulls the strings in Greek tragedy) and the absence of an imputation that the author is taking a stand. (C) fits the bill admirably in both respects.

(A) can and should be quickly discarded because it imputes to the author's purpose an argument for or against something, which couldn't be further from this author's mind.

(B) To reduce this passage to a mere litany of "themes" is to miss the author's principal interest in the viewpoints of various scholars on a particular issue under debate.

(D), though not quite so much as (A), misrepresents the passage as an expression of qualitative analysis. The author reports the objective gist of each scholar's ideas, not their "relative merits."

(E) gets the broad topic wrong. Greek tragedy is not incidental to a broader discussion of human philosophy. Greek tragedy is *the* subject at hand.

- **If, over time, you've gotten out of the habit of pre-phrasing answers whenever possible, get back into it. If you've never gotten into the habit, start now.**

Passage 3—*Meyerson vs. Critical Legal Studies*
(Q. 15-21)

Topic and Scope: Denise Meyerson and Critical Legal Studies (hereafter, CLS); specifically, Meyerson's critique of CLS's attack on "orthodox legal theory."

Purpose and Main Idea: The author writes to describe Meyerson's response to the CLS challenge to legal theory. What does the author think of the merits of that response? We can't tell for sure. Although the author seems pretty sympathetic to Meyerson's views, the author never really takes a definitive stand.

Paragraph Structure: ¶1 demonstrates the importance of the Kaplan strategy of reading the first 1/3 carefully. In two sentences, the author identifies the cast of characters and sets the stage for the conflict described in the remaining ¶'s. We learn that CLS scholars have mounted an attack on traditional legal theory: They say that it's inherently contradictory. But Meyerson has a critique of the critique. She says that there may be no contradictions after all, and that in any case CLS scholars overstate the importance of their claims.

The last three paragraphs describe this conflict. In ¶2, we learn that CLS scholars think that conflicting values lead to arbitrary results. But Meyerson, with the helpful example of the lawyer preserving confidences, argues that in some cases one value (in this case, professional obligation) can outweigh another (in this case, moral principle). In these cases, conflicting values can still produce rational judgments.

In ¶3, Meyerson discusses cases in which one value does *not* clearly outweigh another. Comparing the difference between a pair of reasonable and equally compelling solutions with a third totally absurd solution, according to Meyerson, demonstrates that a reasonable choice *can* be made even in the face of equally compelling alternatives. This line of reasoning is apparently intended to counter the CLS position that the lack of a clear-cut winner necessarily must lead to an irrational decision.

¶4 covers some new ground: the connection between formalism and objectivism. No need to get bogged down in the details here, but here's the gist: formalism is the belief that finding solutions to a legal problem is a deductive process, like solving a math problem. CLS scholars say that if you believe in formalism, you have to believe in objectivism, too. Objectivism is the view that the law has ethical legitimacy. Meyerson says that you can have formalism without objectivism, and uses the "shoplifting game" example to demonstrate her point. The author brings up a possible CLS counter to this argument, but Meyerson gets the last word.

The Big Picture:

- For many test takers, this was the toughest passage of the four. The abstract subject matter, plus the complicated cast of characters (Meyerson is criticizing a criticism . . .) left many gasping for air, and so the last passage would have been a better place to continue one's work in the section.

- We've often said that the skills measured in Reading Comp. are important for success in law school, and passages like this one reinforce this fact. A passage like this could easily appear in a textbook on legal theory. If you were assigned such a passage in law school, you can bet that you would have to be able to answer questions similar to the ones you see here (although they probably wouldn't be in multiple-choice format).

- Two things that are contradictory cannot both be true. That is, they make conflicting claims; they necessarily oppose each other. The term "contradiction" lies at the heart of this particular passage, but it's also an important term in LR.

- Reading the first 1/3 or so carefully is an important part of your Reading Comp. preparation. LSAT authors typically define the scope of the passage early on, so paying extra attention early can help you to predict as you read.

The Questions:
15. (E)
The passage relates Meyerson's critique of the CLS critique. Only (E) captures this without dragging in distorted ideas.

(A) The passage doesn't mention "legal theorists" that criticize CLS, although lines 28-9 mention that at least one other critic shares Meyerson's views. In any case, (A) fails to give Meyerson the credit she deserves. It's her critique that's the subject here.

(B) "Complexity of actual legal dilemmas?" Meyerson never criticizes CLS on those grounds. If anything, it's the CLS scholars that claim that legal theory is complicated with conflicting principles, but even that is a stretch.

(C) No, it's the CLS scholars that think that traditional legal theory is contradictory. Meyerson doesn't level that claim at CLS.

(D) starts OK, but there's no basis in the passage for concluding that Meyerson's "hierarchy of values" claim in ¶2 is the most important one.

- **When there are multiple sides in a passage, make sure you keep them straight. The questions will require you to know who says what.**

- **Always read all five choices in Reading Comp. Here, if you were tempted by any of the wrong choices, you should have reconsidered your view upon considering (E).**

16. (B)
Lines 46-50 ask us to "consider a game." That game has pretty clear rules but obviously has no moral authority. So it illustrates Meyerson's belief that formalism does not necessarily require objectivism. In other words, legal rules can be unambiguous (as the game is) without having ethical legitimacy (as the game doesn't). (B) points out that the game is intended to be analogous to the legal process, so it's correct here.

(A) The shoplifting game is just a hypothetical example; the passage doesn't suggest that this was a real event in which a principle has been applied.

(C) The game doesn't show that something doesn't matter much. Even though it's a game, it's used to show a serious point.

(D) *Au contraire*, the game is designed to show that two things are comparable.

(E) Stealing is reprehensible, sure, but that's not the point. Meyerson is merely trying to show that CLS scholars are wrong. She doesn't argue that their ideas are morally bankrupt.

- **Use punctuation to help you understand the author's purpose. Lines 44-5 describe Meyerson's claim, and line 45 ends with a colon (":"). What does that mean? In formal writing, a colon is used only as a means of signaling that what follows is a list, definition, explanation, or recapitulation of what has gone before. So once you see the colon at the end of line 45, you know that the next few lines will explain the previous point.**

17. (D)
The author's primary purpose is closely connected to the main idea. As we've discussed, the author describes Meyerson's challenge to CLS, but the author's own opinion doesn't really come through. (D) captures this notion.

(A), (C), and (E) are too opinionated to be correct here. In fact, you could eliminate all of them on the basis of their verb alone. Does the author "evaluate," "advocate," or "refute?" No way, so (A), (C), and (E) must be wrong.

(B) starts off OK, but this essay concerns the controversy itself, and not how it arose.

- **When all the choices start with verbs, conduct a "verb scan" to zero in on the correct answer. Since the correct answer must be completely correct, any choice that uses the wrong verb must be wrong.**

- **Before hitting the questions, you should have a sense of the author's general point of view. Is it positive, negative, or neutral? Knowing this will help you eliminate many wrong choices.**

18. (E)
The line reference takes us to the "external considerations" of line 53, which in turn takes us back to the "game" that was the subject of Q. 16. Lines 50-53 say that CLS scholars might try to break the analogy between the shoplifting game and legal rules by claiming that it's impossible to form legal rules without making some moral judgments. That is, one has to bring in external considerations. But Meyerson counters in lines 54-6 that such considerations may be viewed as inherent in the rules of the game; in other words, those considerations may not be "external" after all. Applied back to the world of legal rules, we can therefore infer that Meyerson would find it debatable whether the moral judgments are external to the legal world, as the CLS proponents suggest in their objection.

(A) The extent of one's belief in the legal process isn't relevant to anything. It isn't even mentioned.

(B) If anything, the necessity of endorsing policies and values harks back to CLS's point, not Meyerson's.

(C) might remind you of ¶2, where Meyerson discusses a situation in which one value might outweigh another. But that was part of another discussion.

(D) is a plausible point of view, but there's no indication that Meyerson believes it. If anything, it sounds as though Meyerson believes that the moral world could be completely distinct from the legal world.

- **When you see a line reference, always start a few lines before the reference to make sure that you understand the context.**

- **Often, two or more questions will be very closely related. For example, this question builds on Q. 16. When you're in such a situation, use your work on the easier question to help you with the harder one.**

19. (A)
¶3 presents Meyerson's counter to the CLS claim involving conflicting values. Meyerson says that even when values conflict, we can reason it out. For that reason, Meyerson thinks that the CLS critique doesn't have such "far-reaching implications." Lines 37-8 clarify this point: deciding between answers can be a reasoned process even if there isn't one undeniable answer. This was enough to point you to (A). The CLS scholars believe that conflicting values reduce legal theory to arbitrariness. Indeed, that would be a far-reaching implication. But Meyerson thinks that one can find a reasoned answer even given conflicting values.

(B) isn't a point of contention here, so it can't be the "far-reaching conclusion" that Meyerson disputes. Meyerson acknowledges that values are at play here.

(C) The notion of alternative solutions that are morally similar isn't present in the passage.

(D) is a CLS view from ¶2, but isn't the one that Meyerson contests in ¶3. Meyerson doesn't try to show that legal questions have unique answers. She just tries to show that choosing between answers isn't an arbitrary process. So (D) goes too far.

(E) distorts the passage. Rationality is the tool we can use for choosing between alternative solutions. The solutions themselves aren't ranked in terms of their rationality.

- **Many LSAT wrong answers use the passage's language, but distort its ideas. That's why you should go back to the passage to find specific textual support for your answer.**

20. (A)
¶4 discusses Meyerson's take on the relationship between formalism and objectivism. The author first identifies Meyerson's critique of the CLS claim that formalism requires objectivism, which matches the first part of choice (A). The rest of the paragraph investigates Meyerson's position, using the shoplifting game as an example. The author raises a possible CLS objection, but counters with Meyerson's likely reply to it. In doing so, the author is investigating the plausibility of Meyerson's critique, and so the rest of (A) matches up as well.

(B) There aren't two different opponents of a single view here, but rather two conflicting viewpoints presented.

(C) What new position?

(D) If anything, practical consequences are discussed in ¶3, but not ¶4.

(E) What two different solutions?

- **Getting the gist pays off in LSAT points. This paragraph isn't easy to completely understand, but understanding the gist of the paragraph is enough to find the correct answer to a question like this one.**

21. (C)
CLS views are discussed at many different points of the passage, so it would have been tough to prephrase an answer here. So choice-by-choice is the way to go:

(A) *Au contraire*, CLS scholars think that conflicting values render it impossible to come up with a definitive answer to a legal question.

(B) *Au contraire*, ¶4 says that CLS scholars believe that the law is intertwined with value decisions.

(C) is inferable for the same reason that (A) wasn't. CLS scholars think that legal theory cannot provide definitive answers to legal questions (lines 8-15). So (C) is correct.

(D) *Au contraire*, it's Meyerson that makes the game comparison. CLS scholars would reject it.

(E) No, it's *Meyerson* that says that there can be better choices given competing values.

- **When a passage has many viewpoints, keep clear on who says what. You don't have to know every detail, but you do have to know each character's general viewpoint.**

Passage 4—*African American Rice Cultivation*

(Q. 22-27)

Topic and Scope: African American rice cultivation; specifically, the reasons why early African Americans cultivated rice.

Purpose and Main Idea: The author presents two theories of an historian that attempt to explain why slave and post-slavery African Americans cultivated rice despite limited economic uses for this commodity. The main gist of these theories—theories the author neither explicitly supports or rejects but simply considers "compelling" and "intriguing"—is that there was a strong cultural and political element inherent in the early African Americans' act of cultivating rice.

Paragraph Structure: ¶1 introduces Amelia Wallace Vernon and her discovery that early African American slaves brought with them from Africa the knowledge of how to grow rice, contrary to the belief that rice cultivation was introduced in America by the French. Her evidence is the document described in the middle of the ¶. Essential to note is the author's description of this discovery as "especially compelling."

¶2: After one sentence that continues to deal with the "how" of Vernon's research (she interviewed elderly African Americans with info on the topic), we're suddenly thrust into Vernon's key preoccupation, and the main concern of the remainder of the passage, namely: Why did African Americans grow rice when cotton was clearly the prime crop? We're told of Vernon's two "intriguing" answers, the first of which is outlined briefly in the remainder of this ¶. During slavery, plantation owners, who also ate rice, allowed after-hours rice cultivation on land that wasn't suited for cotton. This allowed also for an outlet of sorts for the slaves who were able to partake in this activity somewhat independently, inferably affording them a break from the tedium of their usual work.

¶s 3 and 4 describe the second theory, taking up the more difficult question of why rice cultivation continued even after slavery was abolished. The disadvantages of growing rice are documented—essentially, it doesn't seem to make economic sense. We have to wait until the second half of ¶3's last sentence, beginning with the word "except," to find the answer: The value of growing rice to post-slavery African Americans resided in the act of transforming the land. This is essentially a preview to the final ¶, which spells out this answer in greater depth, and the first sentence summarizes Vernon's position clearly. Transforming the land was not meant to bring them financial rewards; the act itself was the reward. The rice wasn't the goal—making the land their own (the "cultural explanation"), and the symbolic claiming of land that was promised by the government (the "political" explanation) drove them to grow the rice.

The Big Picture:

- **Watch for a narrowing of the scope that occurs over the course of the passage. The main concern does not always appear in the first ¶—sometimes a little background information is required before the primary purpose of the passage emerges. By the end of this passage, we realize that we've come a far piece from the discovery that African Americans introduced rice into the United States. The passage could have gone on to focus only on this new discovery (why, for example, people once thought the French introduced rice; how we can be so sure it was the African Americans; how this alters other beliefs regarding the agriculture of early colonial America, etc.). But that would be a different passage. *This* author has something else in mind, and we need to be receptive to the ways in which he narrows his scope along the way.**

- **And how does the good critical reader pinpoint the true crux of the passage? By paying special attention to Emphasis Keywords and Keyword phrases. "At the heart of Vernon's research . . ." (lines 18-19) is as clear a sign as you're likely to get that screams "here's the important stuff!" What follows is clearly important to Vernon. The remaining 35 lines of the passage focus on this "question of why" they grew rice, so it's also clearly important to the author. And whatever is important to the author is important to us.**

- **In LSAT Reading Comp., promises made are promises kept. When an author mentions that someone has proposed two intriguing theories regarding a matter, he almost has to tell us what those theories are, and likely will describe both as well. But what happens after that is still up for grabs, and you should be on the alert for the common follow-ups to such a structure: 1) The author compares and contrasts the two theories, and/or sides with one or the other. 2) The author introduces other ideas and/or theorists who debate the two theories, either supporting or rejecting them. 3) The author simply spells out the theories, only hinting at his opinion of them or the theorist in question. The latter is what we get here.**

- **Paraphrase the text, condense it as much as possible, and don't get bogged down in details. Lines 31-39—a big chunk of ¶3—boils down to the simple idea that growing rice was not economically practical. That's all you needed to take out of those lines *unless and until* a question demands a stricter re-reading.**

- **Keep the characters of the passage straight in your mind. Here there are only two main ones—Vernon and the author. (The myth-propagating historians of ¶1 barely rate a mention.) Phrases like "according to Vernon," "Vernon suggests," and "Vernon speculates," sprinkled throughout the text, remind us that these are Vernon's ideas being relayed by the author, and not necessarily the author's beliefs. Does the author sign on to these theories? Not explicitly, no—but that doesn't stop him from "admiring" the theories and being "receptive" to them, as we'll see below in Q. 23.**

The Questions:
22. (A)
We begin with a Global question of the "title" variety, and it's not likely that any book with a title as long as these is ever going to make it to the best-sellers list. Nonetheless, the length of these titles works in our favor, giving us more elements to match up to confirm our selection. Keeping the main gist of the author's concern in mind (which, remember, is Vernon's answer to the question of why these African Americans grew rice), we can confidently evaluate the choices looking for the one that best sums up the passage. And it helps that the first choice is the winner:

(A) <u>What</u>? "The Introduction of Rice Cultivation." <u>Where</u>? "What is now the U.S." <u>By whom</u>? "Africans" (which based on the setting makes them African Americans). <u>When</u>? "During and After Slavery." And "Its Continued Practice" relates to the main question of *why* this occurred during this time. All major elements present and accounted for. If you picked up an essay with this title, you wouldn't be the least bit surprised to find these 55 lines—which is, after all, the best confirmation that (A) is correct.

(B) sounds like a pretty good title for the hypothetical passage described in the first Big Picture bullet point above. The origin of rice cultivation in the U.S. pertains well enough to the first ¶, but is too narrow for the rest of the passage. Its impact on the economy? That's a distortion and a FUD (faulty use of detail) trying to get some mileage out of the dates 1760 and 1920. More importantly, what about the reasons *why* African Americans engaged in this practice? That's the main concern of the passage and nothing in (B) reflects that.

(C), (E) The tenant system (line 34) is too small a part of the passage to be part of the title, and the time frame of (C)—post slavery—doesn't encompass Vernon's first theory.

(D) We have cultural and political explanations of a phenomenon here, not a description of cultural and political *contributions* of African Americans.

- **A title summarizes the passage's main concern in a few catchy words (well, usually a few—these are fairly long as far as titles go). Make sure each of the main words in the title you select matches the major elements of the passage.**

23. (B)
To say one is "intrigued" (line 22) means that one is interested, willing to listen. "Receptive" is therefore a perfect description here of the author's attitude toward Vernon's theories. Calling Vernon's discovery "compelling" (line 12) also matches up well with (B)'s "admiring of its accomplishments." (B) best describes the author's attitude here.

(A) Half right, half wrong: "Respectful" is fine, but "skeptical" is unwarranted. Nowhere in the passage does the author state or imply that he questions the validity of Vernon's theories.

(C) The author does seem to applaud Vernon's effort, but again, the words "compelling" and "intriguing" have to rule out "neutral" as the attitude toward her findings.

(D) Same as (A)—"skeptical" is uncalled for here.

(E) Motives are never discussed, but "overtly dismissive" is really the main culprit in this one. There's not one negative word about Vernon's theories in the whole piece.

- **In "Attitude" (also known as "Tone") questions, decide first whether the author is positive, negative, or neutral, and eliminate choices on that basis alone. From the words "compelling" and "intriguing," we know that the author here is at least somewhat positive (or, at the very least, NOT negative or neutral). That by itself allows us to kill all of the wrong choices.**

- **Learn to recognize the subtle boundaries of authorial opinion. Here, we see that one need not actively and explicitly support a theory in order to appreciate or respect that theory or the theorist who proposed it.**

24. (D)

This Application question narrows our focus to the final ¶ and the post-slavery explanation. Refresh your memory if you need to: Although not economically practical, these African Americans engaged in growing rice for cultural and political reasons. We're therefore looking for another situation in which people engage in an activity as an "end in itself" with more than just economic considerations in mind. The situation in (D) relates perfectly to the African Americans' motivation cited in lines 47-50; they viewed the land as "an extension of self and home" and desired to "make it their own." The neighborhood folks tend to the vacant lot out of a similar sense of ownership, and their protest of the city's neglect of the lot corresponds nicely to the political explanation given in lines 50-55.

(A) The activity here does not fall into the category of "an end in itself": Beautifying is a goal that extends beyond the mere act of planting, and creating borders qualifies as a practical consideration.

(B) The activity here certainly involves a practical economic motivation unlike any underlying the rice cultivation of the African Americans in question.

(C) "A sense of civic duty" runs counter to the symbolic political protest of the post-slavery African American rice growers. Also, this activity is intended to "forestall" a city action, whereas the African Americans' activity was in protest of the lack of a promised government action. Not analogous.

(E) More practical considerations abound in (E). The African Americans and the neighbors in correct choice (D) transformed space for no practical economic reason but rather out of a sense of ownership and protest. This group in (E) is transforming space with a specific practical goal in mind.

> • **An Application question asks you to apply the ideas of the passage in some way to an outside situation. Looking for a situation that's "most analogous" should also remind you of Parallel Reasoning in the Logical Reasoning section, and there's no reason why you can't use the strategies you employ in that question type here. Try to paraphrase the situation's key aspects. Here, phrases like "not economically practical," "ownership," and "protest" should come to mind, which are precisely the elements found in correct choice (D).**

25. (C)

It's not impossible, but probably difficult to precisely prephrase the correct answer for this Global "organization of the passage" question, but we should at least review in our minds the major elements of the passage before hitting the choices. There's a discovery, a major question posed, and two possible theories to answer the question. Let's take that with us into the choices.

(A) Historical phenomenon? Not great, but let's give it the benefit of the doubt. Competing theories? Let's kill it there. (What theories compete? The two theories pertain to two different time periods.) If you went further, there's simply more ammo to axe (A)—one theory is "settled upon"? No.

(B) Discovery sounds fine—that's how Vernon's finding is described in ¶1. Method? Yeah, we can buy that. It's not a major part of the author's concern, but he does state a couple of examples of Vernon's method in the first 18 lines. "Two questions left unanswered"? That's a clear distortion: One question is posed (why did African Americans cultivate rice during and after slavery?), and two theories are provided to answer it—which brings us to correct choice (C).

(C) "Fact," "discovery," "finding," any of that's fine to describe the beginning of this passage. The "fact" is that Africans introduced rice cultivation to what was to become the United States. A question raised, two answers given? Yup, right on target. As we've stated throughout, that's just what we get. Lines 19-21 ask why African Americans grew rice in a cotton-dominated industry, and the two "intriguing" theories—one to account for the practice during slavery, one after—follow.

(D) and (E) both skip over the first 18 lines and jump right to the question at hand, which really can't suffice for a description of the entire passage's organization. Still, the more obvious problem with (D) is the notion that there are reasons given for the "difficulty in answering the question." This never happens. All we get are the two possible theories. And (E) fails at the end as well: What issues surrounding the study are discussed? The passage ends with a discussion of Vernon's theories, not issues *surrounding* her study as a whole.

> • **In questions asking for a passage's organization, summarize in your own words the major elements of the passage before looking at the choices. You're not likely to guess every word of the correct choice, but a clear understanding of the basic building blocks should help you to eliminate the wrong choices and to latch onto the right one when you see it.**

26. (B)
"Cites which one of the following" tells us we've got an Explicit Text question on our hands, and the major clue as to where to find the answer is the phrase "tenant system." This shows up only once, in the middle of ¶3. Why does rice cultivation not make much sense in the context of the tenant system? Well, the tenant system is described as a system by which farmers paid the owners of their land with the crops they raised. Problem is, owners back then wouldn't take rice as a payment, which clearly highlights the puzzling nature of the African Americans' practice of using these lands to grow rice. (B) squarely hits upon the right issue.

(A) We know that landowners ate rice during slavery. We don't know whether they did so after—perhaps they still did. In any case, the problem with growing rice under the tenant system is clearly stated as a matter of economics, not taste.

(C)'s a FUD (faulty use of detail): "After-hours" cultivation is mentioned one ¶ earlier in conjunction with the slavery period. The tenant system comes later, both historically as well as structurally in the passage.

(D) No distinction is made between the energy required to grow cotton and rice. The only difference between them suggested in relation to tenant farming is that cotton was accepted as payment while rice was not. (Maybe if you chose this one you picked up on the notion that the labor to grow rice on tenant land was out of proportion to the reward; but this, again, is inferably only because rice was not accepted as payment, and not because of any excessive labor requirement of rice cultivation.)

(E) distorts the passage. We're not told anything about tenant lands used primarily for cotton, let alone their suitability for rice. The only thing that vaguely sounds like this is the fact that the "after-hours" rice cultivation during slavery, discussed in ¶3, was carried out on lands not suitable for cotton.

- **Remember earlier when we glossed over the details in the middle of ¶3 during our reading of the passage? Only now does it make sense to go back and read that stuff a little more carefully—because a specific point demands it. Even so, you may still have had a good enough notion of what the right answer might sound like here, because it still relates to the passage's main concern, namely, why did they cultivate the rice if it was economically not practical to do so? The tenant system is merely provided as one illustration of this economic impracticality.**

- **FUD wrong answer choices, those that misapply a detail, are often built around wording from the wrong part of the passage. (C) and (E) are examples here.**

27. (C)
We end by seeking the author's primary purpose, which should be fairly clear by now. Presenting theories about a puzzling phenomenon (C) is about as close as we're going to get here. Why did they grow rice when it seems so illogical to do so? This is the puzzle that's explored throughout the latter 2/3 of the passage, and the beginning stuff is there to set this question up. All of the wrong answers go astray in the usual manner:

(A) Vernon's not primarily concerned with demonstrating that there is a puzzle, but rather with proposing solutions to it.

(B) There's a little background material in the beginning that sets up the puzzle in question, but (B) ignores the majority of the passage that deals with Vernon's explanations. Presenting those is the real reason this thing was written.

(D) The only previous historians alluded to are those who once thought that Africans added nothing to the New World but their labor. But these people are long forgotten as soon as Vernon and her theories are taken up, as early as the middle of ¶1. The word "criticize" also fully distorts the author's intention here.

(E) The author doesn't describe—let alone "analyze"—the economic effects of the fact that these African Americans grew rice. He's merely interested in presenting Vernon's theories on *why* they did this, not what the ramifications were.

- **Many wrong choices have more than one problem, but you only need one flaw to discard any choice. In (D), did you focus on "criticize," or "previous historians"? Neither of these jibes with the author's primary purpose, and either one could serve as the basis of elimination. Perhaps it was fastest to axe this one based on its first word alone. And speaking of which:**

- **Verbs are extremely important in Primary Purpose questions. If you're running low on time, you can scan the verbs used in each choice and usually eliminate at least one. Here, the first three are passable, the fourth (criticize) is totally off, and the fifth (analyze) ain't so great either, since there's a discussion or presentation of someone else's theory here, not really an analysis by the author. But "criticize" for sure should have triggered a red flag.**

- **The questions in a Reading Comp. set are generally not presented in order of difficulty. Consequently, you're likely to find easy ones near or at the very end if you persevere and get to them. It would be a shame to bog down in, say, an Application question with lengthy choices like Q. 24, only to miss this straightforward Global question that tests your most basic understanding of the passage.**

SECTION IV: LOGICAL REASONING

1. (A)

This question stem may seem a bit unfamiliar, but hopefully you recognized it as a variation of a standard Assumption question. We're looking for the assumption that would complete the argument, so again, we need to identify the argument's evidence and conclusion. The author's conclusion is stated up front: A government ought to protect and encourage free speech. The Keyword "because" signals the author's evidence, that "free speech . . . is conducive to a healthy nation and thus is in the best interest of its people." This sounds like a pretty good argument so far, but it's missing a subtle step: We know that free speech is in the best interests of the people, but who's to say that the government ought to act in that interest? It seems obvious, but this notion isn't stated in the argument, and it's necessary for the argument to work. So choice (A) completes the argument.

(B), (C), (D), and (E) The wrong choices all introduce new concepts instead of completing the argument in the stimulus. Inalienable rights, (B)? "An activity that helps a government to govern," (C)? The interests of the government itself, (D)? Universal human rights, (E)? None of these choices connects the interests of the people with the actions of government. Instead, they complicate matters, and so cannot fit the bill here.

- **"Outside the scope" is a common type of wrong answer choice in Assumption questions. Notice how direct the argument is—the language is clean, terse, and precise. Nothing about inalienable (B), or universal human rights (E) is required for the argument to work. That's not to suggest that (B) and (E) are not or cannot be *true*; they could be. They're just not *necessary* for the argument to be valid.**

2. (B)

An earthquake theory is plausible save one mystery: There should be lots of heat given off during earthquakes, but such increases in heat have not been detected. What's the main point? Simply that—the current theory doesn't fully explain earthquake data; specifically, the absence of enormous amounts of heat. That's (B).

(A) distorts the text: There may be weather-related increases in heat following earthquakes. More importantly, however, even if we overlook this distinction, the lack of large heat increases following earthquakes isn't the overall point of the argument but rather the mystery suggesting that the current theory isn't fully plausible.

(C) A little fatalistic, eh? (C) is way too extreme. Nothing in the passage suggests that this theory won't be amended to plausibly explain the causes of earthquakes one day, or that some other theory won't do the same. The author's not this negative; just a little puzzled, perhaps.

(D) Because the author finds the theory "plausible," we might infer that he believes the theory is right and the heat evidence is simply lacking. But we can't rule out the possibility that he feels that the lack of heat evidence points to a flaw in the theory. Even if we go with the former, we would only be able to say that the author would *agree* with (D), but not that the argument is structured to lead to this conclusion. The main point must include something about the theory.

(E) No, the author doesn't rule out the possibility that the theory may be correct. He simply points to one aspect of it that to this point remains mysterious.

- **The main point of a stimulus must encompass the entire scope of the author's concerns, but must not expand that scope into uncharted territories.**

- **Beware of extreme answer choices that blow the author's ideas way out of proportion. (C) is a perfect example.**

3. (C)

The question stem tells us we need to identify the purpose of the first sentence, so we need to put it in context. Standing alone, the first sentence could be a conclusion or evidence, but the rest of the stimulus makes its purpose clear. Sentence 1 essentially says that the only reason to lock someone up is to prevent them from harming others/others' property. Sentence 2 rules out lawbreaking alone as a justification, and sentence 3 elaborates on this point. So the last two sentences support the first by excluding another justification for locking people up. Therefore, the first sentence must be the conclusion, and that's what (C) says.

(A) Sentence 1 offers no support to the "no free will" claim in (A).

(B) No, the rest of the argument supports the first sentence.

(D) There is no stated claim regarding retribution for past illegal acts, so (D) is off.

(E) reverses the relationship. The lawbreaking claim supports the first sentence, not the other way around.

- **Remember, an argument's conclusion can appear anywhere in the stimulus. So always interpret a statement in the context in which it appears.**

4. (A)
The question stem identifies this as an Inference question, so you'll probably have to bypass pre-phrasing and, instead, evaluate each choice. The argument introduces a gene that can be turned on by cigarette smoke, leading to cancerous cells. However, smokers with genes that are not turned-on have the same risk of lung cancer as do other smokers. Therefore, there must be something else at play here beside stimulation of the gene, or as (A) says, stimulation "is not the only factor."

(B) discusses nonsmokers, which is beyond the scope of the argument.

(C) and (E) run contrary to the last sentence in the argument, which told us that smokers, with or without this turned-on gene, have the same risk of cancer. (E) is also not inferable because it introduces the possibility that there are people without the gene. The gene could be a universal one.

(D) is outside the scope, since we don't know what else might trigger the gene. For all we know, potato chips could be a more potent stimulant of the gene than cigarette smoke. Sounds ridiculous? Yes, but it's not ruled out by the argument.

- **When evaluating choices for an Inference question, don't be satisfied with a choice that sounds possible or plausible. Go after the only choice that is definitely, logically true based on the limited scope of the stimulus.**

5. (A)
In the question stem, "discrepancy" signals paradox, and our first step in a Paradox question is to identify a (seeming) contradiction in the stimulus. This is a familiar one: Despite the fact that polled *eligible* voters favored one candidate, another candidate won the election by a wide margin. The paradox is a relatively simple one, and so, it is cleared up by four of the five choices. Our job is to pick the one choice that does NOT resolve the discrepancy. Obviously, we can't predict a choice that will not resolve the discrepancy, so let's move into the choices to search for the right answer. (A) discusses *ineligible* supporters, an issue not mentioned in the scenario, and one that does nothing to resolve the facts. *Ineligible* supporters of either candidate were not polled, nor did they vote. They are truly outside the scope of the stimulus.

(B) informs us of something that occurred in the narrow window of time between the poll and the election. Those favoring Mulhern in the poll could have voted instead for Yeung. This certainly would, in the language of the question, "contribute to a resolution of the discrepancy."

(C) suggests that the poll itself was flawed, with a bias for Panitch. The contradiction between the results of the poll and the election are resolved, then, by the inaccuracy of the poll.

(D) resolves the discrepancy by suggesting that not all *eligible* voters actually voted. If it is true that too many of Panitch's supporters decided to stay home and not vote, and all of Yeung's supporters came out to vote, the discrepancy would plainly be resolved.

(E) refers to a possible sampling error, which, like (C), reveals a flaw in the poll. To drive the point of (E) to an extreme, imagine if they had conducted the poll at the Panitch Mayoral Campaign Headquarters. Any flaw in the poll that might possibly hint at a bias in favor of Panitch would contribute to a resolution of the discrepancy.

- **Very often a "discrepancy" or "paradox" on the LSAT is easily explainable, which makes it easy for the test-makers to present an EXCEPT question like this one. The right answer will likely involve an issue that's outside the scope.**

6. (B)
We're looking for a flaw, and it's quite possible you sensed that the commissioner goes a little too far in her conclusion. Some organization or institution (we're not told who the poor saps are) is short a whopping billion dollars (so that's where all the petty cash went...). Funds cannot be increased, so the only way is to decrease outlays. Fair enough so far. Then a plan is introduced that will save, lo and behold, a billion dollars over the next year (no more free coffee in the company cafeteria?). So the problem can be solved ONLY if this plan is adopted. And there's where the commish over-reaches. Just because this plan will save the billion, what evidence is provided that it is the *only* way to do so? Perhaps it is, but the commissioner gives no evidence to that effect, which *she must do* if she is going to claim that this is the ONLY way to solve the problem. (B) fancies this up a little, but says the same thing: The plan may be *adequate*, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it's *required*—that is, that nothing else could do the trick.

(A) We have no reason to doubt the certainty of the assertions in the stimulus—that the billion is missing, funds are unavailable, the outlined plan would save a billion, etc. These are basic factual statements that the commissioner has every right to rely on.

(C) Experts? The only people who possibly merit this lofty title here are the budget forecasters who provide a hard and fast projection, not an "opinion." But even if you considered it such, it's still not inappropriate for the commissioner to rely on it.

(D) There's nothing vague in the language used here.

(E) harks back to (A): Why should we question the assertion that there's no way to increase available funds? It's not unreasonable to expect the commissioner to know whether there are funds available or not. It is well within the commissioner's right to "take this for granted." The error lies elsewhere.

- **Usually, when an argument is flawed, what's questionable are not the facts of the argument, but rather *how* the facts are *used* to form the conclusion. Questioning the facts, or the right of the author to rely on them, will not often yield the flaw (see (A) and (E) above). Only when there's contextual evidence that suggests that a particular assertion may be questionable can we attack the argument on those grounds.**

- **One word can make all the difference in the validity of an author's reasoning, especially when that word is a powerful formal logic term like "only." The testmakers are looking to see who glosses over that word, and who not only sees it but also recognizes its importance in this particular context. Leave that word out, and we have a valid argument. As it stands, the "only" in the last sentence throws the commissioner's reasoning into question.**

7. (B)
Q. 7 has a Logic Games feel to it. We're given statements we're to assume are true (rules), and are asked to find the one statement that cannot be true. There are two statements we must take as givens, which we should paraphrase in our own words: 1) That a poem's meaning is derived from the interaction between the poem and the reader's beliefs, not just from the poem itself, is shown by Dickinson's poetry. 2) No two readers from different eras have the same set of beliefs. There's only one thing we can deduce from these statements: Since beliefs in part determine meaning, and beliefs necessarily *differ* from one era to another, then people from different eras CANNOT derive the same meaning from a particular poem. (B) is thus impossible: Based on the "rules" of the passage, two readers from different centuries cannot have the same take on a Shakespeare sonnet.

The four wrong choices all could be true, so anything that's at least consistent with the stimulus can be ruled out:

(A) Sure: As long as a reader's own belief system is also in play, nothing stops her interpretation of a Dickinson poem from being influenced by another's take on it.

(C) Beliefs can evolve over time, so there's no reason why an interpretation of a poem couldn't do so as well.

(D) Two readers from different eras *must* arrive at different interpretations, because they must have different beliefs. But that doesn't mean that two readers from the *same* era must form the *same* interpretation—they too could have different beliefs, and thus differ in their poetic analyses.

(E) is eminently possible. Nothing is mentioned about readers' enjoyment of poetry, so there's no reason why enjoyment could not be enhanced by access to the views of the poet.

- **In Inference questions, don't argue with the facts of the passages. If a question stem tells you to accept all of an author's statements as true, then keep your own opinions out of it. Here, the assertion that any two readers of different eras must have radically different beliefs may have struck you as implausible and extreme, but for the sake of this question you must accept it and look only to see how it combines with the other statements in the passage.**

- **The skills we teach you at Kaplan for characterizing the answer choices in Logic Games can help you on other sections of the LSAT as well. A "could be true EXCEPT" stem means the same thing in LG, LR, and RC—the right answer must be false.**

8. (E)
Another flaw question, so keep your eyes peeled for where the logic goes astray. You can't get a clearer signal of an author's conclusion than the phrase "This shows conclusively that . . ." So the author thinks there's definitely no link between Old- and New-World civilizations simply because some evidence that's used to demonstrate a possible link is not perfect. Sure, says the archaeologist, the Mayans and Egyptians both built pyramids, but there are certain differences between them in design and function. Therefore, no link between Old and New. Well, this could, we suppose, support the notion that the Egyptians and Mayans weren't linked, but not too well—perhaps the Mayans somehow learned pyramid building from the Egyptians but incorporated their own look and functionality to suit their culture. More info is needed even to prove conclusively that there was no link between these two civilizations. Yet the author even goes one step further, concluding based on this specific Egyptian-Mayan example that no Old-World/New-World link exists *at all*. The evidence provided is simply too paltry for this definitive pronouncement in the final sentence. (E) is a fancy way of saying this. The author mistakenly assumes no other evidence is needed.

(A), (B), (C) Wow! The testmakers are hitting all the old classics here in one question. "Evidence" is mentioned only once in the argument, and the archaeologist does not deviate from the way the word is used in sentence 1. No equivocation (A). There's also no emotional appeal here (B)—just a straightforward presentation of facts and a conclusion derived from those facts. Finally, the argument's not circular either (C), which is what "assumes the conclusion it is trying to prove" means. The conclusion is different from the evidence, even though there isn't a great link between them.

(D) The archaeologist can commiserate with the commissioner from Q. 6 in this section regarding this "vagueness" charge (also choice (D) in that one). To add insult to injury the archaeologist is accused of imprecision as well. But just because the logic stinks doesn't mean any words or phrases are vague, ambiguous, or imprecise. Tombs are tombs, pyramids are pyramids, design and function are self-explanatory, and so on.

- **Use Keywords and Keyword phrases to help you locate the author's or speaker's conclusion. Also take note of the tone of the conclusion. Is it a categorical, thundering, definitive statement like the one here? Those need a good deal of supporting evidence. It takes less rigorous argumentation to support a more qualified toned-down conclusion.**

- **Keep on top of the usual flaws that appear on the LSAT. Equivocation, emotional appeals and circular reasoning are rarely the right answer to an LR question, but they do appear with some regularity as wrong choices. And if you choose one of these "vague and imprecise" choices like (D) here and the one in Q. 6, you had better make sure that more than just the logic is muddled.**

9. (B)
The conclusion of the argument to which we must find a parallel reads like so: "My MS. is unlikely to be taken seriously by publishers." How come? Because of the generalization that first-time authors like the speaker don't get taken seriously, except under one possible exception—celebrity status—which the speaker doesn't possess. So the right answer will conclude the unlikelihood of something occurring—in other words, it'll be a prediction of that which probably won't happen—and one based on the fact that a possible exception has not been met.

(A)'s conclusion, "X may win," runs counter to the original "My MS. is *unlikely* to…" Also, the possible exception to a generalization is *met*—the candidate *has* become unpopular.

(B) "It will probably be boring" parallels "My MS. is unlikely to be taken seriously," and we have a generalization (fruit salad with bananas is dull) with a possible exception (2+ exotic fruits) that isn't met (guava only). We have our winner. For the sake of instruction we should examine the other three choices. But not with respect. Because, we repeat, we have our winner.

(C)'s conclusion, "The meeting is unlikely to be well attended," is parallel enough. But in (C) a generalization is supported by a *sufficient* condition—there's usually poor attendance *if* zoning is the only issue—and that condition is *met*. All of those elements deviate from the form of the stimulus.

(D) is a little more complex than (C) but it's flawed for pretty much the same reason: The conclusion is pretty parallel, but the generalization is supported by a sufficient condition ("if surviving") rather than being undercut by a possible exception.

(E)'s conclusion, far from being a prediction about what is likely to happen, is a deduction about what *did* happen. No way does that parallel the original.

- **When you're quite sure you have located a right answer, be sure to look over the remaining choices—*but not with respect*; just to make sure that they are in fact flawed and that your choice was on the money.**

10. (E)
Here's an Inference question based on a scientific study. The only thing that the study points to is that there is a difference in having the "IV-1" gene, as opposed to the "IV-2" gene. In the study, where other possible complicating factors were controlled, the results pointed to a positive effect of gene IV-2. (E), in appropriately qualified language, expresses information "most strongly supported" that "may" be true. On the basis of the results, it is reasonable to conclude (E), that IV-2 may inhibit cholesterol.

(A) is far beyond the scope of the study. There is nothing in the stimulus concerning gene frequency in the general population.

(B) may be true in real life, but is certainly not inferable based on the study above. Always stick to the facts in the stimulus.

(C) What's to account for the fact that the IV-2 subjects did not experience an increase in blood cholesterol levels? It could be excretion, but there is no reason to believe that it is. Maybe, instead, IV-2 subjects were not excreting, but rather, were metabolizing the excess cholesterol. (C), while possible, is not strongly supported by the passage.

(D) *Au contraire*. If anything, the passage seems to suggest that those with the IV-1 face a *higher* risk of heart disease.

- **LSAT Logical Reasoning passages commonly deal with science topics. Rest assured, you don't need to be a Bio major for the LSAT. Some will be intimidated by these topics. Don't let them get to you—stay confident and stick to the scope of the stimulus.**

11. (A)
After reading the question stem, we know to look for something that "if true about the *last year*," weakens the author's argument. The author's conclusion, stated in the last sentence, is that the program instituted two years ago has reduced the dropout rate. That's certainly possible, since there's a reasonable connection between morale and dropout rates, but is this argument really airtight? No. The author has assumed a causal relationship between the program and the dropout rate—but it's our job to weaken that connection. As is often the case with Weaken questions, an alternative explanation could be responsible for the change observed. (A) suggests that last year there was a recession with high unemployment. With a high level of unemployment, high school students couldn't expect to drop out and simply "go to work." So it's possible that the recession, and not the program, kept kids in school. (A) thus weakens the argument.

(B) The length of time that dropouts suffered from low morale is outside the scope of the argument.

(C) It's reassuring to know that the annual dropout rate is below fifty percent, but it has no effect on the argument.

(D), if true, might have made it easier for high school *graduates* to get jobs, but that's one step removed from this argument, which deals with high school dropouts getting jobs.

(E), if anything, would strengthen the conclusion that the morale program was effective by strengthening the connection between morale and dropout rates.

- **Don't hypothesize too much with an answer choice. If you have to twist a choice to show that it weakens/strengthens an argument, then that choice is probably wrong. Look instead for the one choice that *unambiguously* has the desired effect on the argument.**

12. (C)
Henry was a bomb until piggybacked with the popular *That's Life*. Then *Henry* became popular. Then it was moved to another night and began to tank again. The author's conclusion is the obvious one that *Henry's* sudden Tuesday night success can be attributed to its following *That's Life* and not to any merits of its own. Anything that reinforces this general pattern would help strengthen the argument. If (C) is true, and the new show following *That's Life* has suddenly doubled its ratings, then it seems even more reasonable to believe that the factor governing *Henry's* popularity was its proximity to *That's Life*, as the author maintains.

(A), (E) The amount of time these shows have been on the air (A) and the initial reaction to *That's Life* (E) are irrelevant to an argument concerning the shows' present popularity.

(B), if true, would most likely weaken the argument. If the situation is as the author describes, we'd expect at least a little life in the new show's ratings. Now, one could argue that it's possible that the new Tuesday show is so bad that even following the megahit *That's Life* can't help it. Fair enough, but that would only get (B) to somewhere around neutral. There's no way this is a strengthener.

(D) as well could only weaken the argument by providing an excuse for *Henry's* Wednesday night failure. If *Henry* had been up against some blockbuster show on Wednesdays, then perhaps *Henry's* low Wednesday ratings aren't a good indicator of how much people like the show.

- **Some choices, like (A) and (E) here, are outside the scope because they extend beyond the passage's time frame. If a choice goes back or forward in time, immediately ask yourself whether the time period mentioned is relevant to the specifics of the argument.**

13. (B)
We get a chance at two questions for this dialogue stimulus; let's scan them before we read the stimulus. Q. 13, a Method of Argument question, asks us for the role played by a statement of Joseph, and Q. 14, a Flaw question, asks us to identify a flaw in Laura's argument. Joseph introduces us to Fermat, and tells us that Fermat was lying or wrong in claiming to have proved the theorem. Laura responds that the theorem has been recently proved and, so, Fermat was not lying or wrong about having proved the theorem. Joseph's statement that "this alleged theorem . . ." is a conclusion of his argument, but not his overall main point. This statement is supported by the evidence that immediately follows it—that no one else has proved it. The use of that evidence to support the statement in question makes it a conclusion, but not *the main* conclusion. Joseph's main conclusion is that Fermat was either lying or wrong, which is supported by his statement that the theorem cannot be proved. Choice (B) states just that.

(A) By definition the statement cannot be an assumption, for an assumption is an *unstated* yet necessary premise of an argument. If it's stated, then it can't be an assumption.

(C) Anticipating potential objections is common in LSAT arguments, but it is not the case here. When authors anticipate objections, they say things like "while you may say that. . ." or "although it may be true that. . ."

(D) No, Joseph does not refute the statement—he asserts it.

(E) The statement is used to support his argument's main conclusion.

- **Questions that ask you about the role played by parts of the stimulus often rely on your ability to identify evidence and conclusion.**

14. (C)
Laura's evidence is that someone has proved the theorem, and her conclusion is that Fermat was not lying nor mistaken. She assumes that because the theorem has now been proven, Fermat must have also proved it. For her conclusion to be correct that Fermat was not lying or mistaken, it is *necessary* that the theorem be proved, but the fact that *someone* has proved the theorem isn't *sufficient* to make her case. With all due respect to Fermat, the fact that someone else has proved the theorem does not necessarily mean that Fermat has. Choice (C) identifies the necessary/sufficient flaw in Laura's argument.

(A) No claim of Laura's contradicts her conclusion that Joseph was wrong in stating that Fermat was lying or mistaken.

(B) Laura makes no reference to anybody's character.

(D) Although it is true that Laura does not define "provable," it is not necessary that she define it. Therefore, it's not a flaw.

(E) This choice is irrelevant to both speakers' arguments. There is a difference between the two claims discussed in (E), but that difference doesn't matter here.

- **For both Qs. 13 and 14, it is necessary that you push past the difficult language and focus on the real issues. The LSAT will throw difficult, wordy language at you, knowing that some will stumble on it. This "LSAT language" may seem unfamiliar, but it is not impossible to cut through. Keep paraphrasing to make the stimulus your own.**

15. (C)
This Strengthen question stem takes a strange form. As with any Strengthen/Weaken question, we must first identify the evidence and conclusion. The conclusion is the entire first sentence and can be considered as four separate conclusions:

1) Very large classes are bad for a university.

2) Very small classes are bad for a university.

3) Very light teaching loads are bad for a university.

4) Very heavy teaching loads are bad for a university.

The evidence, however, only relates to points (1) and (4). We should therefore expect the correct answer to address points (2) and/or (3). Choice (C), in shoring up the argument, explains the problem with small classes and light teaching loads, points (2) and (3).

(A) addresses point (3), but doesn't identify a weakness in light teaching loads. What's wrong with professors focusing their remaining time on research?

(B) Lots of classroom discussion seemingly would be good for a university, thereby *weakening* the argument.

(D) That small classes and light teaching loads are common in the best universities weakens the argument.

(E), like (A), does not convincingly state a problem with light teaching loads.

- **Questions will not always announce themselves as a certain type. Just because this one doesn't say "strengthen" or "support" does not make it any less of a Strengthen question. Identifying a question's type is an important first step in tackling any question.**

16. (D)
The stem is packed with clues. It tells us 1) what the shipping manager does (criticize the sales manager) and what we're to do (recognize the basis for the criticism). Let's start with the person being criticized: The evidence Keyword "because" bisects the sales manager's argument, the conclusion preceding it and the evidence naturally following it. Sales should get the highest priority, because without a successful sales department, the company is sunk. And it's not too hard to anticipate a criticism of this line of reasoning: There are other necessary departments whose success are crucial to the company, the shipping manager points out. They can't all get highest priority. (D) gets at this issue: The sales manager bases her argument on the necessity of the sales department, without considering the possible necessity of other departments. If necessity alone is the criterion, then the "absurd consequence" is having to award the highest priority to a bunch of different departments, which is by definition impossible.

(A) The shipping manager doesn't argue that the sales department is not critical to the company's success. He simply implies that such necessity cannot very well serve as the basis for awarding highest-priority status.

(B) There's nothing ambiguous about the term "highest priority," nor does the shipping manager say or imply that there is. In making his criticism, the shipping manager clearly understands what the sales manager means by this term.

(C) distorts the shipping manager's criticism. He never ranks the departments in terms of which ones are more important to the company. He merely states that there are others that, like the sales department, are also necessary for the company's success. And from this assertion stems his real criticism.

(E) The shipping manager criticizes the sales manager's recommendation, not any "generalization" she's made. Even if we consider the latter's assumption that necessity warrants highest priority a "generalization" of sorts, there's no "atypical case" present here. If anything, the shipping manager argues that the sales department is *typical* in its function as a necessary component of the company.

- **Beware of choices that distort an author's or speaker's point. Saying that there are other departments that are necessary to the company is not the same as saying that there are others that are *more* necessary, as (C) maintains. Distortion is a common form of LSAT wrong answer, both in LR and RC.**

17. (C)
Although the question stem doesn't make it obvious, this is a weaken question. We're asked to find the choice which, if true, suggests that cutting down on coffee might *not* lower the risk of heart disease. Given that coffee drinkers tend to get heart disease more often than the average, it might seem prudent to cut down on coffee. It certainly appears as if the researchers have interpreted the evidence to mean that coffee drinking causes increased risk of heart disease. But for all we know, the connection between coffee drinking and heart disease could be a coincidence. Maybe there's something about coffee drinkers *other than* their coffee drinking that makes them more likely to get heart disease. (C) provides such a factor: stress. It tells us that we don't know what the relationship between coffee consumption and stress is, and that stress definitely causes heart disease. If (C) is true, it's just as likely that coffee is not causally related to heart disease at all, but is simply correlated with the real cause, stress. If that's the case, cutting down on the java may very well not decrease the risk of heart disease as the researchers seem to expect.

(A) and (E) provide evidence for a direct causal relationship between drinking more coffee and increasing one's risk of heart disease, so these choices do the opposite of what we're looking for. If these choices are true, the researchers' response seems even more reasonable.

(B) is outside the scope: It has nothing to do with the relationship between coffee and the risk of heart disease.

(D) is not relevant because the stimulus states that the study explicitly made corrections for smoking habits.

(E), like (A), also shows a direct relationship between more coffee and increased risk of heart disease, making it more likely that the researchers' precaution would decrease their risk.

- **The LSAT nearly always tests your understanding of causation in some way or another, and that makes perfect sense, when you think about it. After all, the law is greatly concerned with determining what effects could have been caused by what factors, and distinguishing causal relationships from mere correlation. The outcomes of many legal cases hinge on just such distinctions.**

18. (B)
The relationship of power to ethics and new technologies is the subject here, and we're charged with finding the statement that would bolster the author's contention. The politically powerful see new technologies as a means to help them keep and expand their rule. Those who create new technological marvels, therefore, benefit from their ingenuity. Not so for ethical trailblazers, who suffer for their contributions because new ethical arguments and ideas threaten those in power. Did you recognize the chunk missing from this argument? The author makes no explicit link between the use to which the powerful can put new techno marvels and the benefits to those who create them; or, for that matter, between the harm new ideas can have on the powerful and the pain such new ideas can cause their creators. Evidently, the author assumes such links, but the argument is fairly weak unless these connections are made explicit. (B) fills in the gaps: If powerful politicians reward those who can help them, and punish those who threaten their rule, then it seems more reasonable to believe that the techno geeks will benefit while the beacons of morality will suffer.

(A) goes against the author's claim by suggesting that ethical innovators could become friends of the state if their innovations tend to support the current regime.

(C) There's no reason why these qualities must be mutually exclusive. Forbidding any individual to possess both has no bearing on the argument.

(D) On one hand, we could say that the issue is confined to how powerful politicians use new technology, not how their enemies may use it, in which case (D) would be outside the scope. On the other hand, we could see (D) as weakening the powerful politicians' belief that new technology is to their advantage; here's a case in which it can hurt them. In either case, (D) does nothing to strengthen the argument.

(E) would seem to be a prudent course of action for ethical creators *if the argument were true*, but it doesn't by itself help to solidify the validity of the author's claim.

- **Some assumptions represent thinking that's so commonplace that it appears that such evidence is part of the argument when in fact it's not. In our cynical times, the notion that powerful politicians reward those who help them and punish those who hurt them seems axiomatic. But how it *seems* to us is not relevant; what matters is the evidence that the author *actually provides*. And this author doesn't spell this out, yet his conclusion depends on it being so. (B) provides this connection, and in doing so strengthens the argument.**

- **Don't confuse a reasonable consequence of an argument (like (E) here) for something that strengthens or weakens that argument.**

19. (C)
The argument compares seed-eating birds with nectar-eating birds, both of which have the same overall energy requirement. Based on the evidence that a given amount of nectar provides more energy than does the same amount of seeds, the author concludes that seed-eating birds must spend more time eating. What's missing here? The relationship between how much time it takes to eat a given amount of nectar with the time it takes to eat a given amount of seeds. For the author's conclusion to be valid, it must be assumed that those times are equal. That's answer choice (C). If you don't see that, use the Denial Test. If it *does* take longer for birds to eat a given amount of nectar, let's say 10 times longer, then it's very possible that nectar-eating birds will spend more of their free time eating.

(A) The author explicitly compares birds with the *same* overall energy requirements, so (A) is not a problem here.

(B) The author doesn't make this assumption. If the nectar-eating bird did sometimes eat seeds, he would still take less time to eat than a bird that ate exclusively seeds, according to this author's reasoning.

(D) is outside the scope. Body temperature plays no role in this equation.

(E) is wrong for the same reason as (A). The experiment compared birds whose energy requirements were the same.

- **This question is an excellent example of how assumptions provide a crucial link between the evidence and the conclusion. The conclusion here was about how long birds spent eating to get a certain amount of energy. The evidence was about the amount of food that was required for a given amount of energy. The missing link then was the time it took to eat that given amount of food. The pieces won't always fit together this neatly, but understanding the structure of this argument, and the relationship between its evidence, conclusion, and assumption is essential to doing well on Assumption, Strengthen, and Weaken questions.**

20. (A)
The consumer advocate says that we need to understand a product's social impact before it's marketed, but the new antihistamine is being marketed now even though its impact isn't well understood. The consumer advocate thinks that it's therefore obvious that we need to slow down the process of bringing products to the marketplace. But hold on: Is the new antihistamine representative of products in general, or is it an exception? If it's an exception, then we can't learn much from considering it. However, if (A) is true, and most new drugs under consideration are even worse understood, then we'd be able to conclude that most drugs under consideration aren't well understood. In that case, the danger of releasing drugs that aren't well understood seems greater, which strengthens the advocate's claim. So (A) is our strengthener.

(B) is limited in scope to "some drugs," which is too vague to strengthen this argument. Remember, "some" means "at least one," so for all we know, the number of drugs whose social impact are little understood that are referred to in (B) may be very small, even just one. That's not enough to help an argument calling for a "general reduction" in the pace of bringing new drugs to market.

(C)'s "some drugs" has the same vagueness problem discussed in (B) above, but this choice was perhaps easiest to eliminate from the phrase "economic success," a concept that's clearly outside the scope of an argument dealing with drug safety.

(D) Chemically similar? What does that mean? What necessary relationship does it have to social impact? We don't know, so (D) is too vague, too.

(E) says that if this drug should be on the market, then other drugs should be on the market, too. But the stimulus indicates that this drug shouldn't be on the market, as its effects aren't well understood. So the addition of (E) takes us no further.

- **If an LSAT author makes an argument by citing only a particular case or a small set of cases, ask whether that case is representative of the larger picture.**

21. (E)
What's the point at issue between Tina and Sergio? Tina senses a literary and artistic link between oceans and eccentricity, and proposes that the Renaissance-era "Ship of Fools" practice is probably the cause. Nope, says Sergio: From time immemorial, the oceans have been perceived as mysterious and unpredictable, and that explains their association with eccentricity. So both accept the connection between oceans and eccentricity, but Tina sees the cause of the link in how a particular culture at a particular time *used* the ocean, while to Sergio it's the nature of the ocean itself that's responsible. Note the extreme words that Sergio employs: "always" and "invariably." These words leave little doubt that his time frame for the phenomenon stretches far beyond Tina's explanation, and (E) captures the dispute perfectly: Tina believes the linkage dates from the European Renaissance (that's the point in time at which she places its cause), while Sergio believes it goes back much further than that.

(A) Social desirability (or, in this case, lack thereof) appears only in Tina's argument, so this can't be the point at issue here.

(B) Word for word from Sergio's argument—but nothing in Tina's argument denies or affirms this.

(C) deals only with Tina's argument, and reverses its cause and effect to boot.

(D) *Au contraire*, here's something about which both speakers would agree—they would both agree to disagree with (D). Both believe that people in the past have linked oceans and eccentricity—Tina specifies artists and writers, and Sergio cites "people invariably."

- **In a Point-at-Issue question, nothing that pertains to only one speaker's argument can be the basis of the dispute.**

22. (D)

This is an Inference question. Remember to stick close to the passage. In this passage the crucial thing to note is that one group *increased* its caloric intake by 25%, all of it alcohol. The other group *replaced* 25% of its caloric intake with alcohol. And yet both groups gained equivalent amounts of body fat. Based on this information, you can infer that body fat gain is not dependent *solely* on the number of calories one consumes. If that were the *only* factor affecting body fat gain, then we would expect the two groups to have gained different amounts of body fat, since they had different caloric intakes. But they were equivalent, so we can infer that (D) is correct.

(A) The stimulus gives no information on rates of metabolism.

(B) We can't infer anything from the general population from looking at these two groups.

(C) We can't infer from this passage a single thing about weight gain—it's simply not discussed. The stimulus restricts itself to a discussion of body fat. Be careful not to infer too much.

(E) is directly contradicted by the information in the passage.

- **Above all, the LSAT tests your ability to read carefully and to note even subtle differences in language. In this stimulus it was crucial that you saw the difference between *increasing* a group's caloric intake by 25% and *replacing* 25% of a group's caloric intake. In the answer choices, you had to notice that there is a difference between weight gain and body fat increase.**

23. (C)

The director of the charity repeatedly lied about the number of people helped by the charity, but when confronted by the investigators, accepted responsibility for the deception. But the investigators oddly blame the journalists *as much as* the director for misrepresenting the charity's beneficence, because they unquestioningly printed the numbers they were told. The journalists didn't fabricate the story—they merely printed the numbers they were given. It seems that the investigators believe that printing erroneous information without checking it is on a par with making up that info in the first place. The principle in (C) embodies that notion, and thus supports the investigators' claim. The description in the first part of the choice clearly applies to the journalists; the phrase "no less responsible" in the middle matches up perfectly with "as much to blame as..."; and "than anyone else" clearly includes the director. (C) hits on all cylinders, while the other choices stray from or distort the scope of the situation:

(A) A principle demanding honesty of charitable workers is irrelevant here. (A) would justify a claim that the director was wrong in exaggerating the numbers, but that's not the claim the investigators make. Their claim regards who is to blame for the consequences of this deception.

(B) "...*knowingly* aids a liar..."? That doesn't fit—the journalists are charged with naively accepting the numbers and reporting them as fact, not with consciously aiding and abetting the deception.

(D) Perhaps the director fits the description in the beginning of this principle, although we really can't say for sure—we're not told what his motivation was for lying, only that he did. But who lies here to "promote a good cause"? And who's to say which is better? These are all issues not addressed in the argument, so this principle does the investigators no good.

(E) While the beginning of this principle does fit the description of the director, the comparison to one who conceals wrongdoing leads nowhere. Not applicable.

- **A choice that includes elements that are outside the scope of the argument cannot support a claim in the argument.**

24. (D)

Certainly the companies promoting voice mail have a vested interest in making it sound as good as possible. Their pitch includes greater convenience, more flexibility, and lower cost than the garden-variety answering machine. One need not jump through hoops to weaken an argument like this—pointing out a factor that the voice mail folks overlook (conveniently, no doubt) that favors the answering machine over voice mail would be enough. The factor in (D) serves perfectly well. A huge benefit of answering machines (as we suspect most of us have discovered by now) is the ability they afford us to "screen" our calls. They weren't invented for that purpose, but people certainly figured out pretty quickly how to use them that way. (D) therefore cites a function of answering machines that voice mail can't match, and to the extent that that function is desirable (which isn't so hard to imagine), we'd be less likely to believe the prediction that voice mail will render the answering machine obsolete.

(A), (E) (A) supports the companies' argument by citing another advantage of voice mail over answering machines, while limitations of the traditional answering machine (E) can also only help bolster the voice mail people's prediction.

(B) The history of the answering machine's initial success is irrelevant to whether this new phone service will do away with it for the reasons cited.

(C) is one possible illustration of the flexibility touted by the companies. It may not strengthen their argument immensely, but such examples of flexibility certainly can't hurt their case.

- **The job of a weakener is not to categorically disprove an argument, but rather to render its conclusion less likely. Might not the answering machine still go the way of the dodo? Sure. But in this context (this specific evidence leading to this specific conclusion), the fact presented in (D) simply makes the route the author takes to this conclusion seem a bit shakier. And in order to do that, it has to be *relevant to the reasoning,* something many of the wrong choices are not.**

- **The ability to imagine alternatives within an argument is a key skill in LSAT Logical Reasoning. Here an argument is weakened by an <u>alternative possibility</u> that the arguers don't consider. Sometimes, we can take a set of facts (an argument's evidence) and imagine an <u>alternative conclusion</u> to the one that the author derives from those facts. And still other times we can formulate an <u>alternative explanation</u>, which is a different mechanism from the one proposed by the author by which a phenomenon in the passage could have come about. Facility with formulating alternatives helps us on a number of LR question types, including Strengthen, Weaken, and Logical Flaw.**

25. (A)
The length of the stimulus and choices may be daunting, and so may their format, but if you seek to reduce everything to essentials, the right answer is right around the corner. The stimulus asserts, in two sentences that work as one, that a necessary condition of an artist's greatness is the knowledge of a series of great works. From that assertion, the stimulus draws a two-part conclusion, to wit, that: (1) "greatness" is merely an assessment based on an artist's works that are known, and hence that (2) one cannot *predict* the quality of unknown or future work based on the artist's "greatness." Whether or not this seems reasonable to you (and it shouldn't, since the stem does identify the logic as "questionable"), we need to seek a two-part conclusion, part of which is a prediction.

(A) On that basis alone, (A) stands out. "Having a cold" parallels "is great," "observing symptoms" parallels "assessing known works," and the choice ends with the two-part conclusion that a cold is really just an observation of symptoms, and that one cannot predict future symptoms as a result. (A) is the one. For the record:

(B)'s conclusion is a single, not a double, and it's a value judgment ("These people must be different") rather than a prediction.

(C)'s conclusion, signaled by "Therefore," is about the impossibility of prediction, yes. But (C)'s evidence veers off into many areas not present in the stimulus, and lacks a necessary condition to kick off the logic.

(D), too, lacks any reference to a necessary condition, and the stimulus has no parallel with the viruses differing in nature and effect.

(E) The conclusion "one can never be certain that a person has a cold" might parallel a conclusion that went "One can never truly call an artist great." But that's a far cry from the conclusion in the stimulus.

- **The key to Parallel Reasoning is to distill the stimulus into its essence—its form—whether you use algebra (as in Q. 14 in this test's first LR section) or the language of rhetoric (as in Q. 9 and 25 in this section). Don't rush into the choices until you've got a handle on the *form* of the logic in the stimulus.**