KAPLAN

TEST PREP AND ADMISSIONS

LSAT*

PrepTest 42 Explained

A GUIDE TO THE DECEMBER, 2003 EXAM

SECTION I: LOGIC GAMES

Game 1: Scientists' Panel

Situation: The formation of one panel from a larger group.

Entities: A total of nine eligibles, drawn from three disciplines.

Action: To select the panel from the pool of nine.

Limitations: We have to choose a quintet of five people, which means we have to *reject* four. In a roster of nine names or letters, then, we'd be circling five and crossing out four.

According to **Rule 1**, we need to select at least one from each discipline.

Bot	Chem	Zoo
FGH	KLM	PQR

This means that the ratio of people from each discipline will have to go, in any order, 2:2:1 or 3:1:1. (Rule 1 forbids, of course, 3:2:0.)

Rule 2 is the only other rule explicitly dealing with the numbers, and we have to do some translation. "More than one botanist" literally means *exactly two or three botanists.* And that "at most one zoologist" is disingenuous, given Rule 1's requirement of one zoologist minimum. What the rule really means is:

2 or 3 Bot ⟶ 1 Zoo

2 or 3 Zoo ⟶ 1 Bot

Finally, we can assemble the other rules, two of which are negative, the last of which is in "if/then" format. **Rules 3 and 4** tell us pairs that can never be chosen together, and "NEVER SO&SO" is the best way to remember those limitations. The "if/then" rule is best understood in contrapositive form, remembering that, because choosing *M* requires both *P* and *R*, the moment **either** of the latter is out of the picture, so must *M* be. It all looks like so:

Never FK — (M) ⟶ (P) and (R)

Never KM — No P or no R ⟶ no M

It's all conditional at this point; no more deductions to be made; let's proceed to the questions.

1. (C) Acceptability

Routinely in Acceptability questions, use the rules to narrow down the possibilities quickly.

Straightforward violators up and down the line here. Rule 3 (never *FK*) is violated by **(A)**, Rule 4 (never *KM*) by **(B)** and **(D)**. **(E)**, meanwhile, errs by choosing *M* without choosing *R* (Rule 5). We're left with **(C),** without ever having to test for the biologist/zoologist numbers.

2. (E) Must be true / "If" clause

Set up a mini-sketch for "If" questions, including the new given information.

Based on the "if" clause here, the sketch should look like so:

F G H ~~K~~ ~~L~~ (M) P Q R

And having chosen *M*, Rule 5 mandates:

F G H ~~K~~ ~~L~~ (M) (P) Q (R)

There are at least two zoologists chosen at this point, so the contrapositive of Rule 2 kicks in and the number of botanists is capped at one. And 1 botanist + 1 chemist = 3 zoologists in order to form the quintet, so **(E)** is correct.

3. (E) Must be true / "If" clause

As you work on questions keep asking yourself: Which rule is in play now?

Circling *F*, *L*, *Q*, and *R* in a roster of nine reveals a lot. For one thing, we have chosen two zoologists, so *F* will be the only botanist chosen (Rule 2); *G* and *H* are out of luck. And with *F* chosen, *K* is out of luck (Rule 3) So the only choices left are *M* and *P*. If you choose *M*, you must choose *P* (Rule 5), which brings you to six scientists, one over the limit. But you can, and must, choose *P* without *M*, to bring the total to five, which is choice **(E)**.

4. (D) Must be true / "If" clause

In harder questions, you need to set up more than one possibility and assess all possibilities in light of the choices.

In this question's sketch, with *Q* and *R* eliminated, *M* must be eliminated as well (Rule 5). But now things are a little more ambiguous than they were previously. If the botanist-to-chemist ratio is 2:2, then the remaining chemists *K* and *L* will be chosen, and the two botanists will have to be *G* and *H*, because *F* is unavailable given *K*'s selection (Rule 3). So that's one possible quintet, *PGHKL*.

On the other hand, it could be 3:1, botanists to chemists, in which case we'd have to select *PFGHL*. Once again, *F* knocks out *K* and vice versa. What has to be true, given these two equally likely possibilities?

(A) Contradicted by the *PGHKL* option.

(B) Contradicted by the *PFGHL* option.

(C) No; if one chemist is chosen, it's *L*.

(D) Quite right! With *M* out, the two chemists would have to be *K* and *L*, and that spells curtains for *F*.

(E) Contradicted by the *PGHKL* option.

5. (A) Must be true / "If" clause

Creating a new sketch for a question is the most efficient way to go, provided you're careful and neat, and don't rush.

With *G* and *H* chosen, two botanists, we're down to one zoologist for sure (Rule 2), and that eliminates *M* from consideration inasmuch as *M* requires two zoologists, *P* and *R* (Rule 5):

If the quintet includes all three botanists, then of course *K* will be out (Rule 3) and we'll be choosing *FGHL* plus one zoologist. But if the botanist-to-chemist ratio is 2:2, then we *need K*, meaning *GHKL* plus one zoologist. So **(A)** is correct; it's *F* or *K* for sure.

Game 2: Loading Dock Cargoes

Situation: A row of cargo bays on a loading dock.

Entities: The six distinct types of cargo.

Action: To number the cargoes *consecutively* from 1 to 6—a classic Sequencing task.

Limitations: Six cargoes, six bays; we can number them left to right:

F *G* L M P T

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___

1 2 3 4 5 6

It almost never matters whether you sketch out a sequence horizontally or vertically—work it the way that seems logical to you—but when a game hinges on an issue like "higher number than," you need to be precise and consistent. Given the sketch above, **Rule 1** translates into:

L . . . *G*

Our sketch reminds us that livestock is somewhere to grain's left, though we cannot be sure how far. This ties into **Rule 2**, of course, giving us:

T . . . L . . . *G*

Let's skip to **Rule 4**, which (unlike Rule 3) concerns cargo already mentioned and depicted. If textiles and produce are consecutive, then both of them (in either order, *PT* or *TP*) will fit into what we've set up so far:

P/T . . . L . . . G

Now we can profit from **Rule 3**, because now produce is in the picture. Because produce's number is higher than fuel's, we'll have to have:

F . . . P/T . . . L . . . G

Five of the six events are pretty much set relative to each other. The only remaining big question is, where's *M*? And the answer is that *M* floats, able to fit in anywhere *except* to break up the produce/textile pair.

6. (A) Acceptability (Partial)

"Partial acceptability" means that you have to assess the suitability of part of a sequence or grouping.

All you need to do is mentally stick *M* into what we've already got, and *FMT* is eminently possible for the first three bays. It'd be *FMTPLG*, in fact. **(A)** is correct.

7. (A) CANNOT be true

If a choice "CANNOT be true," it follows that each of the others can.

What can't be fourth? With *M* floating, there are lots of possibilities, but grain isn't one of them. Because *G* is at least preceded by *F, P, T*, and *L*, the lowest possible number for grain is #5. **(A)** is right.

8. (C) Must be true / "If" clause / Total number

Turn abstract hints into concrete realities.

The abstract hint is "exactly one bay. "Our job is to figure out which one that is. Given what we already know, it'd have to be livestock, to wit:

F . . . P/T . . . M L G

That's six cargoes in six slots. In other words, everything is set except for the order of produce and textiles in bays 2 and 3. The other four bays are set—choice **(C)**.

9. (D) Could be true

If one choice "could be true," it follows that each of the others CANNOT.

Where can *L* fall in the sequence? No earlier than #4 (because *F, P*, and *T* precede it), and no later than #5, because *G* comes after it. That means either "#4" or "#5" must be the answer…and the testmaker has opted for the latter, choice **(D)**.

10. (C) Must be false

Some questions are only difficult if you rush or get sloppy or incomplete.

This is one of them. We have virtually every possibility worked out or available to us; our Achilles' heel in checking these choices is our own carelessness or fear.

(A) Actually already seen in correct choice **(A)** for question 6.

(B) If machinery takes bay 5, this is easily possible.

(C) No way. Livestock and fuel are separated by at least the produce/textile pair, if not machinery as well. **(C)** must be false and hence is correct.

(D),**(E)** Each is possible if *M* stays out of the way.

11. (C) Could be true EXCEPT / "If" clause

Transfer new "if" information to a sketch carefully.

With produce and textile already side by side and livestock to their right, the "if" clause here is mandating:

T P L

—which in turn means "*F. . . TPL . . .G.*" *M* falls in there someplace.

(A),**(B)** each will happen if machinery takes bay 1.

(C) No way. If machinery is placed to the left of TPL, then produce is fourth, and if it's placed to the right of *TPL*, then livestock is fourth. But textiles? Cannot be. **(C)** is what we want.

(D) Will happen if machinery is sixth.

(E) Will happen if machinery is fifth and grain is sixth.

12. (C) Must be true / "If" clause / Total number

Take concrete "if" information and build it right into a picture.

In this case, we need only draw six dashes and put *P* in the fourth, to compare this with our Master Sketch and realize that, because livestock and grain always follow the *T/P* pair:

_ _ *T P L G*

As in question 8, we have a total of four confirmed, choice **(C)**. This time the ambiguity concerns whether the row begins with fuel or machinery.

Game 3: Bakery Cookie Batches

Situations: Cookies baked in batches on a weekly schedule.

Entities: the batches of cookies—three different types, three times a week each.

Action: Hybrid—to match the batches to the days of the week, and sequence them at the same time.

Limitations: Five days (Monday through Friday), with no indication that batches *must* appear on each of the five days (i.e., a day could have no batches scheduled).

Over five days, each cookie type will appear three times, and never twice in one day (or so says **Rule 1**). So our entities ought to be 3 O's, 3 *P*'s, and 3 *S*'s; and because there's a sequence element, let's number them 1, 2, and 3 as we go along. If we build a schedule, then we can immediately build in our most concrete rule, **Rule 4**, which tells us that the second *S* will be baked on Thursday. And as batch #2 of sugar cookies is Thursday, batch #3 must be on Friday. Already our schedule looks like so:

M	T	W	Th	F
1			S2	S3

Notice that we've already inserted, in the Monday column, a little reminder of **Rule 2**'s requirement that at least one batch appear there. (No hints yet as to what type it'll be, though of course it'll be the week's first batch of whatever type it is.) There's only one remaining rule, **Rule 3,** and it tells us that one day will feature oatmeal batch #2, and peanut better batch #1, which is to say that one column will contain:

O2
P1

What day is that? It's our job to speculate. Consider! That day can't be Monday—where would oatmeal batch #1 go? And it can't be Thursday or Friday, because they wouldn't allow for peanut butter batches #2 and #3. There are only two possibilities, then, for the day of which Rule 3 speaks: Tuesday—we'll call that Option I—or Wednesday, which we'll call Option II:

Option I

M	T	W	Th	F
O1	O2		S2	S3
	P1			

Option II

M	T	W	Th	F
O or S1		O2	S2	S3
		P1	P2	P3

If you had trouble with this rule, carefully compare what you drew to this sketch. And notice that we've added the corollaries: In Option I, because oatmeal batch #2 is Tuesday, batch #1 has to be on Monday. In Option II baking peanut butter batch #1 on Wednesday definitively confirms the second and third batches. Moreover, in Option II the Monday batch required by Rule 2 is oatmeal or sugar; that we know, too.

13. (A) Acceptability

When the possibilities are laid out in an unusual visual style, you can still use your rules to eliminate the violators.

Each choice lays out the entire week's schedule by cookie rather than by day. But we can still locate the rule violators easily enough. No choice violates Rule 1, but **(C)** contradicts Rule 2 by scheduling no Monday batches. A quick scan of each sugar cookie row—seeking violators of Rule 4—yields **(B)**, whose second sugar batch is Wednesday, not Thursday. One rule remains, as do two wrong choices, so two choices must violate Rule 3, and indeed in **(D)** and **(E)** the second oatmeal is not baked on the day of the first peanut butter. All is right with **(A)**, however.

14. (A) Total number / "At most"

Work through hypothetical scenarios carefully.

We're asked for the number of days, from one to five, that are limited to "at most two batches." This means that any day that—in either option—can feature three batches (e.g., one each of the three cookie types) will excluded from the answer, while those whose maximum is two will be included.

Monday: This day has a minimum of one batch (Rule 2), and in each option could have two batches, the first O and S. But two would be the limit. Include.

Tuesday: In Option I, where Tuesday already includes *O*2 and *P*1, it could also include *S*1. Exclude.

Wednesday: In Option II, Wednesday's maximum is three: *O*2 and *P*1 for sure, and *S*1 possible. Exclude.

Thursday: In Option II, Thursday could play host to *S*2, *P*2, and *O*3. Exclude.

Friday: In either option, Friday could see all three cookies' final batches. So only Monday, or one day, **(A)**, satisfies the condition of the question.

15. (C) Could be true EXCEPT / "If" clause

When you've set up Limited Options, use a question's "if" clause to decide which option is in play.

Only in Option I is the first peanut butter batch on Tuesday, so let's compare the choices to it.

(A) Possible; *O*1 and *S*1 could be on Monday.

(B) Possible; *P*1 and *S*1.

(C) Uh-oh. *S*2 is Thursday for sure in this option, and *O*2 is Tuesday for sure. So what **(C)** proposes is impossible, and the correct answer.

(D) Possible: *S*2 and *P*2.

(E) Possible: *S*3 and either *O*3 or *P*3.

16. (D) Must be true / "If" clause

You can always redraw your sketch if doing so helps you. It's better than redrawing it in your head.

Wednesday can only be batchless in Option I, so we'd have:



Clearly *P2* and *P*3 are Thursday and Friday, respectively; the first *S* is Monday or Tuesday; and the third *O* comes in one of the last two days.

(A) Possible: *O*2, *P*1, and *S*1.

(B) Possible, but not necessarily true: Friday must include *S*3 and *P*3, but *O*3 could be baked on Thursday or Friday.

(C) Not necessarily. If **(A)** is true, then **(C)** is false.

(D) Yes. For sure, the second *P* and *S* must be placed on Thursday. **(E)**, for the record, is false if Monday and Tuesday each get two batches.

17. (A) Could be true / "If" clause

If the right answer "could be true," then the other four are impossible.

Once again we're in Option I only—the only option permitting a single Friday batch—and there we quickly see that **(A)** could be true, *S*1 could be on Monday. The other four choices are all contradicted by Option I.

18. (E) Could be false / "If" clause

If the right answer "could be false," then the other four must be true.

The "if" clause seems ambiguous at first reading, but work it out, using the options. We want a day that includes one batch 3 and another batch 1, but Option II is far too "backloaded" for that; too many 2s and 3s coming toward the end of the week. However, in Option I, there's one possibility, and that is Wednesday's availability for both *O*3 and *S*1:

M	T	W	Th	F
O1	O2	O3	S2	S3
	P1	S1		

(A) True: No day is batchless.

(B) True: It's right there in the sketch.

(C) Ditto.

(D) Ditto.

(E), the right answer, is possible, because *P*3 could go on Friday along with *S*3.

Game 4: Students' Play Reviews

Every Logic Games section has one high-difficulty game, and this one is higher difficulty than most. Those who didn't sit for the December 2003 LSAT can be grateful that the game wasn't on their test. Those who *did* sit for it can be grateful that it only amounted to five questions in total. And *everyone* can be grateful that it's now "off the table," and available to us so we can learn from it.

Situation: A series of plays wanting reviews.

Entities: The plays and reviewers.

Action: To match them up.

Limitations: Built into the opening paragraph is the fact that each reviewer sees at least one play and possibly more, which means that our entities will be at least *J, K, L, M,* and *O,* plus the strong possibility of one or more repeated letters. The game doesn't spell out that all three plays need to be seen, though it ends up working out that way in practice. Here's a simple setup that includes concrete **Rule 3**, which makes two definite assignments:

SUN	TAN	UND
	K O	

The numbers, as so often, are critical. **Rule 1** tells us that *M*'s total number of plays is larger than *K*'s or *L*'s. You can jot down "*M* > *K* and *L*," but the real work is realizing that *M has to see two or three plays, and K and L, 1 or 2 each. M*'s minimum is two, otherwise *K* and *L* would have to see zero plays, and that's forbidden.

Rule 2 tells us that we'll never see "*JL*" or "*JM*" in any play's column, and a note can be made of those facts. And **Rule 4** is the most open-ended of the bunch. You have to realize its implications. If exactly two students see the same exact roster of plays, it follows that *the other three students must each have totally unique assignments*—unique in number or play title or both.

Let's get back to the numbers. Let's make them concrete. We know that *M*, relative to *K* and *L* at least, has a large number of plays to see. Can that number be three?

No, it cannot. Because if *M* saw all three plays, that would leave *J* with nothing at all to see (remember Rule 2: *J* has to be placed in at least one column, but *M* mustn't be there too). Therefore, *M has to see exactly two plays, and K and L* (Rule 1) *one each.* Jot that down, and note that *K* already has her one assignment, *Tamerlane.* So that's it for *K*.

Let's follow up on *J* and *M*. Since *M* has to see exactly two plays, the third—the one *M* doesn't see—will be *J*'s. *So J's total is one as well.*

O's total? Can't be sure; no rules speak about *O*. All we know is that *O* occupies at least one slot. And speaking of slots, let's expand our work to include those as well. Besides *K* and *O* at *Tamerlane*, we need three more slots: two for *M*, and a third for *J*. Therefore:

SUN	TAN	UND
—	K O —	—

J = 1
~~K = 1~~
L = 1
M = 2
O = 1 or more

So how about that final rule, the one about the two identical rosters? Well, if *O* sees a pair of plays, then *M* and *O* could be the two of whom Rule 4 speaks. Otherwise, it'll be exactly two of the singles. Either way, remember that only two students receive the exact same assignments. The other three must all be different.

19. (A) Complete and accurate list

Read question stems very, very carefully.

"Only *Sunset*" means *Sunset* and no other play. Well, that clearly can't refer to *M*, whose total is two; *K*, who sees only the one play *Tamerlane*; and *O*, who sees at least *Tamerlane.* Eliminating all choices that mention *M*, *K*, or *O* leaves us with **(A)** and **(C)**, and the latter includes a pair that Rule 2 forbids. So **(A)** is left and must be correct.

20. (B) Must be true

When you're given no "if" clause, scan the choices to see their similarities, and to get a sense of what they focus on.

All five choices make numerical comparisons between students. We've figured out most of the numbers; this should be a breeze:

(A) False. *J* and *L* each see one.

(B) Boom! We've found it. Indeed, *M* sees two and *J,* one. The remaining choices all mention *O*, about whom we know very little; they're all possible only.

21. (E) Could be true / "If" clause

Turn abstract question stem hints into concrete realities.

Here, the abstract hint is that "exactly three…review *Undulation.*" It's up to you to ask: Oh yeah? Which three? Well, the trio cannot include *K*, whose one and only assignment is *Tamerlane* (that "one and only" is turning out to be the biggest prequestion deduction in the game). So the trio here must include three of the following: *J, L, M, O*. But wait! It can't be *J*, because *J* never sees a play with either *L* or *M*. So the three *Undulation* reviewers must be *L, M*, and *O*—and note that **(A)**, **(B)**, and **(C)** can all be discarded as false statements.

So, of the remaining two choices, which one is possible? It works out to be **(E)**, because **(D)** causes a violation: if *L* sees *Tamerlane* in addition to *Undulation*, then *L* is seeing two plays, exactly *M*'s total in violation of Rule 1. On the other hand, *O* causes no problems by seeing *Sunset*.

22. (D) Could be true / Complete and accurate list

Use your Master Sketch and rule notation to narrow down your choices.

Any complete and accurate *Tamerlane* list must include *K* and *O* (Rule 3), so **(A)** and **(E)** can be discarded. Meanwhile, as we noted earlier, we need at least a third *Tamerlane* reviewer in order to accommodate the two *M*'s and a third *J*. So **(B)** bites the dust. Speaking of *M* and *J*, their rule is what gets us to correct choice **(D)**. If **(C)** were true—if no one but *K, L*, and *O* saw the play—then it'd be impossible to avoid pairing up *M* and *J* elsewhere. So **(D)**, *KMO* is left as the one and only possibility.

23. (D) Must be true

Questions don't always get progressively tougher in a game. Sometimes a late one can be a slam dunk.

If *J* doesn't review *Tamerlane*, then *M* does. That we know. The combination of Rules 1 and 2 means that two of the plays go to *M*, and the third one to *J*. And since **(D)** reads "*M* sees *Tamerlane,*" it's correct!

By the way, notice how rarely we were called upon to use that complex fourth rule.

SECTION II: LOGICAL REASONING

1. (A) Weaken the Argument

Always be alert to alternatives that the author may have ignored.

Carl's alleged incompetence is based on the fact that he has the lowest solution rate on the force. But what if there are other factors going on, other factors to speak to his *superior* detection skills? If **(A)** is true, then clearly Carl is far from incompetent, and his low solution rate is simply a function of the difficulty of the few cases he's assigned.

(B) Carl's past reputation has nothing necessarily to do with his present competence; besides, he was a beat cop then. He's a detective now.

(C) Both competent and incompetent detectives alike can share in this technical resource. Perhaps **(C)** is meant to make you think that Carl's low solution rate is ridiculous given the database available to him, though if anything that *strengthens* the conclusion.

(D) At best, Carl's past experience is less than relevant to his career now. At worst, **(D)** *bolsters* the idea that as a detective, Carl is less than first rate.

(E) Even if Carl were among those officers (which he may not be), the statistics are irrelevant to an assessment of Carl's competence.

2. (D) Role of a Statement

"Premise" means "evidence."

The statement in question is followed by the phrase "That shows that," a blatant signal of the conclusion. Right then and there you know that the statement is evidence for the conclusion that follows. **(D)** has it right.

(A) The author never goes so far as to argue that "any word" produces a positive or negative connotation.

(B) 180. This choice flips the premise and the conclusion, flying in the face of "This shows that."

(C) The first two sentences tell us that meaningful words and nonsense words, respectively, provoke positive or negative responses. Neither of those statements "supports" the other. And the statement in question isn't a generalization.

(E) This experimental vs. ordinary distinction appears nowhere in the stimulus. And once again, "This shows that" proves that the statement in question is a premise, not the conclusion.

3. (D) Logical Flaw

Keep an eye out for common logical flaws—that is, those that appear often in LSAT questions.

When two things tend to occur together, like anxiety and high blood pressure, it's called a correlation. The common logical flaw is to assume that there must be some kind of cause and effect between the two things, and that's what **(D)** points out.

(A) Actually, "hypertensive personality" is in fact specifically defined, as that "particular combination of traits."

(B) The issue of permanence (or mutability) of traits is never raised.

(C) No claim is "restated," and since the hypertensive personality isn't the conclusion, there's no need to provide any evidence for it.

(E) Other traits are irrelevant to whether these particular ones have any causal relation to high blood pressure.

4. (A) Weaken the Argument

To weaken an argument, look at and question the central assumption(s) that the author has made.

The conclusion, that Grey probably read Jordan's book, is based on the evidence that Jordan's use of a metaphor predated Grey's by seven years. The author assumes that the only way Grey could have picked up the metaphor is by reading Jordan, but the existence of a third source using the same metaphor, and fully a quarter century before Jordan did, offers an alternative explanation. If **(A)** is true, it's every bit as likely that Grey (and Jordan) both read the 1860 text, as that Grey read Jordan's.

(B) That Grey's book may have one, or many, differences from Jordan's is beside the point. If everything were as it seems, the appearance of the identical metaphor alone would be enough to prove the author's point.

(C) Who cares who the intended audience is? Did Grey, or did Grey *not*, have to read Jordan's book to pick up that metaphor? That's the key question at hand.

(D) Jordan's reuse of her own metaphor in a book that postdates Grey's is irrelevant to whether Grey read her earlier, 1885 work.

(E) This choice just cites scholars' opinions, irrelevant to the facts of the alleged metaphor theft.

5. (B) Paradox

Restating the essential paradox requires a close reading of the stimulus.

How, the author wonders (you can sense his amazement), can drugs be a necessary part of back pain treatment, if sufferers do just as well with physical therapy alone as with a combination of the two? The key is the repeated phrase "who receive." There are two different groups of patients compared here: Those who get physical therapy only, and those who get physical therapy and drugs. If the specialists' judgments were correct in the first place, then every patient who received drugs (whether or not physical therapy went with them) did need them, while every patient who received only physical therapy *didn't* need drugs. And the accuracy of the judgments explains why all of the patients received equal relief. Again, there's no contradiction *if* the prescriptions were accurately made, and that's why **(B)** resolves the paradox.

(A) Restates the essential idea of separate treatments, but fails to explain how drugs are necessary for those who get them.

(C) The degree of completeness of cure, in however many cases, is irrelevant; for all we know, it was the p.t. that caused the "complete" recovery, not the drugs at all.

(D) That some, aggravated cases respond well to drugs doesn't explain why drugs are "necessary" to "all…who receive them."

(E) "Other muscles" are outside the scope here; this is backs only.

6. (B) Weaken the Argument

Pay attention when a term in the conclusion goes unmentioned in the evidence.

The profusion of fringe movements poses a threat to the world's national identities only if the latter cannot coexist with the former. And there's no reason why they can't, since "national identities" are never mentioned in the evidence. If **(B)** is right, and stable national identities aren't just compatible with but actually *depend upon* a profusion of subcultures, then by the author's own logic, national identities are safe and secure.

(A) 180. The author fears for the current national identities. If new ones are in the offing, then his fear is even more justified.

(C) If the "rate of cultural change" changes, will it slow down or speed up? If it speeds up, this is a 180; if it slows down, it might weaken. It could be either, so this choice is wrong.

(D) This choice fails to mention "national identities," and the pluralistic/monolithic distinction has nothing to do with the stability of whatever national identities we are currently enjoying.

(E) The issue here is not the choice between a solidified identity and none at all, but between stable and unstable ones.

7. (D) Inference

A correct inference has to stick closely to the topic and scope of the stimulus.

A product with which customers were perfectly happy in a blind test, flopped in the new packaging; the similarity of the old and new cans was at odds with the dissimilarity of the contents. The object lesson here is not to allow a package to raise doomed expectations. **(D)** asserts the necessity of proper packaging for success.

(A) There's no packaging vs. quality conflict here; it's a conflict between what's promised and what's delivered.

(B) A classic wrong answer, mistaking necessity for sufficiency. That misleading packaging can doom a product doesn't mean that *appropriate* packaging must lead to *success*.

(C) The packaging *wasn't* different enough, that's the point. And the product *was* changed. **(C)** misstates both of the key terms.

(E) It misstates the issue to focus on which will sell better, the old vs. the new. The issue is mispackaging causing a promising product to fail.

8. (A) Point at Issue

The correct point at issue must be the choice to which one speaker would agree while the other would disagree.

Larew believes that the prosperity of the bottom fifth of income earners increased relative to that of the top fifth, because the average income of those at the bottom rose more than did the average income of those at the top. In disagreeing with Larew's conclusion, Mendoza doesn't dispute the percentage increase, but points out the huge discrepancy between the two groups' absolute dollar amounts. Mendoza

relies on dollar amounts, so he would say "no" to the question raised by **(A)**, while Larew would say "yes."

(B),**(C)** Both choices take issue with the top fifth vs. bottom fifth comparison altogether. But both speakers accept that comparison, although each computes it differently.

(D) 180. Contrary to **(D)**, both speakers agree that things have gotten better for those at the bottom.

(E) This is the point of Larew's that Mendoza accepts in the first clause of his second sentence.

9. (A) Principle

Each piece of a principle must match up to the key elements of the right answer.

A matching real-life situation has to provide an instance of a person reacting to a challenge in a way that brings about self-knowledge. In **(A)**, the person is the pianist, the challenge is the memory lapse, the reaction is the understanding, and the self-knowledge is the preparation for the future.

(B) The salesman, as described, suffers no challenge and comes to no self-knowledge "into [his] own weaknesses."

(C) This sentiment involves even less challenge and awareness than **(B)** does, if that's possible.

(D) No reaction mentioned; no self-awareness of weaknesses either.

(E) This choice would match up better if it spoke of someone whose bobbling of a public speech led, upon reflection, to insight that could be used in later speeches. But **(E)** just speaks of someone *taking on* a challenge, stopping short of the reaction to same.

10. (C) Strengthen the Argument

An argument is strengthened if one of its central assumptions is bolstered.

The stimulus compares two solutions to the problem of urbanization, and we want to support the second—the one that suggests trading urban goods for agricultural goods. That solution hinges on agricultural shortages being part of the great urbanization problem, an assumption that **(C)** reinforces.

(A) Government subsidy would be a third solution to the problem, and hence weakens rather than strengthens the economists' view.

(B) This broad statement is off point. We cannot be sure that "the problems resulting from increasing urbanization" are in fact problems "with economic causes."

(D) The economists are offering a solution based on the trading of goods between rural and urban areas, but that doesn't mean that a "trade imbalance between countries" is causing the urbanization problem.

(E) "Free trade" is never explicitly advocated, but if the economists' view does qualify as free trade then **(E)** would weaken, rather than strengthen, their recommendation.

11. (E) Inference

An inference must be true based on the given text.

Inez's rationale for calling *The Nature of Matter* "mislabeled" is that nearly 50% of the content deals not with matter but with energy. If the title were to "summarize the content of the whole book," then surely, as **(E)** says, it should mention both concepts.

(A) This title would be illogical, since Inez acknowledges that more than 50% of the book does deal with matter.

(B) That "matter and energy are two facets of the same phenomenon" is a far cry from asserting that they are identical.

(C) Both speakers agree that matter and energy are related.

(D) Neither person speaks to the value of the book. Inez takes issue with the *title*, and Antonio takes issue with Inez.

12. (D) Logical Flaw

A logical flaw is a disjunction between evidence and conclusion.

The politician cites the double-digit price increases of a small and extremely narrow selection of products—two auto-related items, newspapers, propane, and bread—to rebut economists' claim that the average is less than 3 percent. Logically, the average would have to cover many more products as well as the widest possible selection, the two things to which correct choice **(D)** points.

(A) To say a group is mistaken is not to accuse them personally.

(B) To rebut a claimed average, a speaker doesn't have to prove or disprove the expertise of his opponents; he just has to come up with a better figure (something that the politician, of course, fails to do).

(C) He doesn't "infer" that the < 3% figure is not true, he *states* it, and uses evidence to that effect.

(E) Making "an emotional appeal" means stirring up the emotions of the listener with powerful and provocative language; the politician does none of those things.

13. (C) Point at Issue

Any statement upon which two speakers do, or could, agree on cannot be the point at issue.

Sherrie explicitly states her argument: Government should restrict tobacco because it's addictive and, hence, dangerous. Fran's point is subtler, and begins with her assessment of the word "addictive"—by that definition, coffee and soda qualify. She implies that it would be absurd for government to restrict coffee and soda on the grounds of addictiveness, and so the same must hold for tobacco: Sheer "addictiveness" is not enough. Thus Fran would disagree with **(C)** as vigorously as Sherrie would affirm it.

(A) Sherrie speaks of "dangerous" drugs only, and Fran mentions only non-drug products, so either or both could agree or disagree with **(A)**'s broad proclamation.

(B) Fran states this explicitly, but there's no reason why Sherrie couldn't agree with her: "I agree we shouldn't regulate those beverages," she could say to Sherrie, "but I'm talking tobacco, not coffee and soda!" When the second speaker brings up a new issue in a Point at Issue question, the right answer will never address that new issue.

(D) Fran questions Sherrie's view on the consequences of determining that a substance is illegal, not the scientific minds that made the determination.

(E) Sherrie certainly believes this, and Fran might well agree. We can't tell, because Fran only tells us what she thinks about the restriction of everyday beverages.

14. (B) Assumption

Use the Kaplan "Denial Test" to determine whether you've chosen the correct assumption.

The 27-year metamorphosis of the spring from macaque no-man's-land to favorite macaque hot-spot is presented as evidence that the macaques aren't prisoners of their genetic imprinting—they can adopt and pass on new behavior. This conclusion of course depends on the assumption that the hot springs story *has no genetic component:* that, as **(B)** says, such changes in behavior pattern aren't predetermined. If **(B)** is false (here's the Denial Test at work), if what transpired from 1963 to 1990 *was* genetically hard-wired, then the story illustrates the exact *opposite* of what the author seeks to prove. Hence **(B)** is the author's central assumption.

(A) The issue is mutation of behavior, not of genetic heritage. And if anything, **(A)** is an assumption one would make if using the hot spring story to prove that macaques are "captives of their genetic heritage."

(C) This necessary condition for a "genetic alteration" is, like **(A)**, beside the point given that the author wants to *debunk* a genetic explanation.

(D) Goes too far. The author wants to prove that in the specific terms of adopting and changing behaviors, macaques aren't prisoners of their genes, not that they are totally independent of them.

(E) The permanence of the changed behavior is a totally separate issue from—i.e. outside the scope of—the *cause* of the changed behavior.

15. (D) Logical Flaw

When arguments are flawed—a fact the question stem alerts you to—look for scope shifts between evidence and conclusion.

That technological innovators are motivated by personal gain is presented as evidence that innovation can rarely serve society's general interest. But those two things are totally separate issues! **(D)** properly points out that the motivation for an action need have nothing whatsoever to do with its ultimate outcome.

(A) There is nothing impossible about the premise that technological innovators "are almost without exception" motivated by personal gain. Indeed, the qualifier "almost" makes the premise even more acceptable.

(B) Misstates the disjunction that the author perceives. He may well concede that technology beneficial to society can be commercially viable as well; what he's concerned with is the initial motivation of the innovators.

(C) That the innovators may not achieve their initial goal (of personal gain) is irrelevant to whether their initial motivation negates their benefits to society.

(E) The author expresses no "theoretical views." His premise is a real-life assessment of the real-life motivation of innovators. It's an opinion, of course, but an opinion isn't in and of itself a "theoretical view."

16. (E) Inference

Note the distinctions among "all," "some," and "none" when assessing formal logic statements.

After dividing horror stories into two types (mad scientist stories and beast stories), and describing characteristics of each, the author tells us two traits (two necessary conditions, if you like) that both types have in common. We proceed into the choices, knowing that one and only one has to be true.

(A) Way off, though tempting if read too quickly. All beast *horror* stories describe the violation of nature's laws, but other types of beast stories need not do so.

(B) Links together the two traits common to all horror stories in an improper "if/then." Any number of nonhorror stories that describe a violation of nature's laws—even a scholarly nonfiction work—might have a very different intent from provoking reader dread.

(C) Only *some* beast horror stories are specifically identified as having a psychologically disturbed character whom the beast symbolizes. Other horror stories—and indeed, some of the beast ones—need not "usually" feature such a character.

(D) We are not logically permitted to assume that the author's feeling that scientific knowledge is inadequate to guide our lives qualifies as "antiscientific views."

(E) The only one left must be inferable, and it is. Because all horror stories describe violations of nature's laws, and some beast horror stories use symbolism, then at least those symbolic stories must describe violations of nature's laws. A straightforward syllogism, buried deep within the stimulus.

17. (A) Logical Flaw

As with question 15, be on guard for scope shifts.

Certainly the politician disagrees with his opponents that social spending should be reduced. But to rebut an opponent, one must argue on the grounds that he sets up: In this case, on those "theoretical grounds." Instead of doing so, the politician starts talking about deficits and bloated bureaucracy. In other words, he totally begs the question, as **(A)** points out.

(B) The speaker implicitly attacks the character of bureaucrats and other politicians, but they are not necessarily the opponents of whom he's speaking at the outset.

(C) The very fact that he refers to a phenomenon's "main cause" is proof that he does not take a single cause for granted.

(D) He dismisses his opponents' views as "theoretical," never bothering to address them as extreme or otherwise.

(E) We get a strong sense that the politician defines "excessive spending" as bureaucratic bloat, while his opponents' definition is "wasteful social programs." Either way, the term is defined well enough for the sake of argument.

18. (A) Strengthen the Argument

To strengthen an argument is to make it more likely, not necessarily to prove it.

The author's position on this chicken/egg dilemma is that flowers' colors probably developed in response to bees' vision, rather than vice versa. No evidence is provided, so we're asked to identify it, and **(A)** does the job by driving a wedge between vision and color. True, **(A)** provides evidence about other insects rather than bees themselves, so **(A)** doesn't prove the point. But if **(A)** is true, if bee-like insect vision often doesn't depend on color, then it becomes more likely that bee vision didn't adapt to colors and thus that the adaptation was vice versa.

(B) Without our knowing more about those insects and their vision and response to color, **(B)** can have no effect on the logic either way.

(C) No comparison of numbers of species can affect whether vision adapted to color or the reverse.

(D) The issue is bees' reliance on plants, not vice versa as **(D)** would have it.

(E) That nothing but flowers is part of bees' diet couldn't have less to do with the direction of the adaptation that made the feeding possible.

19. (C) Assumption

"Precondition," "must," and "need to" all mean "necessary conditions."

The argument for freedom of thought that allegedly "fails" is the first sentence—the idea that it's a necessary condition for intellectual progress. The author rejects it because intellectual progress requires mining interrelated ideas, and such mining, in turn, requires intellectual discipline. What's missing from this chain of necessity is the disjunction between intellectual discipline and freedom of thought, and **(C)** establishes that. If as **(C)** says, freedom of thought and intellectual discipline don't coexist, then the author's logic is affirmed, and freedom of thought *cannot* be necessary for intellectual progress.

(A) This sentiment is essentially the contrapositive of sentence 2's first clause. As such, since it's already present in the argument, it can't bring the argument to closure.

(B) The "valuing" of intellectual progress is a new term introduced by **(B)**, and hence is not essential to tying up the argument at hand.

(D) Offers two new, and hence irrelevant, terms, "creativity" and "truth."

(E) 180. This choice actually *connects* the two terms between which the author needs to drive a wedge.

20. (B) Weaken the Argument

Consider unexamined alternatives when weakening arguments.

To the author, a jury trial is unfair when the issue in question is particularly technical, because experts in such issues are routinely kept off the jury. But what if fairness is *enhanced* by knocking experts off? That's what **(B)** proposes. Under **(B)**'s circumstances, the jury trial is fairer because the exclusion policy reduces bias.

(A) 180. This is an argument for having expertise on the jury so as to make the deliberations clearer, and hence *more* fair.

(C) This one wants you to think that if arbitration is unfair, that makes jury trial fairer. But arbitration is totally outside the scope.

(D),**(E)** The quality or expertise of witnesses is also far outside the scope of whether expertise should be allowed in the jury room.

21. (C) Principle

Keep thinking in terms of necessity and sufficiency, throughout the Logical Reasoning section.

The statement describes two conditions that together are sufficient to "generally benefit" people: evidence of the potential benefit, and the desire to benefit. The only choice that fully demonstrates the principle is **(C)**: the evidence is the statement Betsy overhears; her motive in changing the filter is to benefit her daughter; and the efficiency of the furnace is the accrued benefit

(A) The action here, engaging in diplomacy, is done not to benefit others but to protect one's own reelection chances.

(B) Works fine until the very end, where the promised benefit is *not* delivered. Since the two sufficient conditions are met, **(B)** contradicts the principle.

(D) Leaves the benefit to Bob—his success in kicking his dependency—as an open question.

(E) To illustrate the principle, Zachary's act must be based on evidence, not a "hope" that his action will benefit his parents.

22. (B) Parallel Reasoning

Use a comparison of the conclusions to narrow down the choices in Parallel Reasoning.

The conclusion is the assertion of the fact that the guide covers a particular type of restrictions. The right answer must have the same kind of conclusion, so we can quickly reject **(A)**, whose conclusion reports a recommendation, and **(E)**, whose conclusion *is* a recommendation.

Next, we examine the evidence. The guide covers all restrictions except for two categories, and radio airplay restrictions fall into neither category, so radio airplay restrictions must be in the guide. In the same way, in **(B)** the club awards a prize to all perennials except for two categories, and coreopsis falls into neither category, so coreopsis must get a prize.

(C) Brings up one category of exception ("poses a threat…") rather than two, and we don't know whether the Windsor Coalition falls under that exception.

(D) Offers *no* categories of exception.

23. (E) Assumption

Arguments are vulnerable when they engage in categorical statements.

This argument is vulnerable because the professor states that superheated plasma is "never" a factor in ball lightning. Thus the assumption will have to be pretty strong, to shore up the logic. His conclusion is based on the ball lightning he has observed, which (if plasma were involved) should have burned intensely and risen. If the conclusion is to apply to *all* ball lightning, then it has to be true that the ball lightning he observed is 100% characteristic of the phenomenon, and that makes **(E)** correct.

(A) Other types of lightning are outside the scope of an argument about whether plasma causes one particular type.

(B) The presence of others to affirm that which the professor observed is unnecessary. What *is* necessary is that those observations be characteristic of all ball lightning.

(C) Since the argument is designed to *rebut* a possible cause of ball lightning, the existence of one or more contributing causes is beside the point.

(D) Too broad (in bringing up "gaslike substances" generally) and too vague (in not spelling out whether the bright light is "intense").

24. (B) Logical Flaw

Recognize circular reasoning when it comes along—which isn't often.

The claim that the cereal is healthy is based on the fact that those who care about health buy it, and they wouldn't buy it if it weren't healthy. Say what? There's no independent evidence for the healthfulness of the cereal; it's assumed to be true in order to prove that it's true, a classic flaw called "circular reasoning" and one that is repeated in **(B)**. There's no evidence of the intellectual challenge of the card game except that intellectuals play it, and they play it because it's intellectual. Ordinarily, circular reasoning plays a role in the LSAT only when it's mentioned in wrong answer choices, but occasionally—albeit very rarely—it actually appears.

(A) This argument provides independent evidence for the politeness of "these people"—their consistent politeness outside and inside of work.

(C) The taste test is legitimate evidence that discriminating people choose Brand Z.

(D) The evidence for the people's shortness is the prior observation of those people. Again, first hand evidence.

(E) The vase/peacock mistake is certainly evidence of the people's poor eyesight.

25. (C) Weaken the Argument

An argument that can be weakened is an argument that has at least one major flaw.

The conclusion that support groups have a negligible effect on disease *T* sufferers is based on the survey results. 43 sufferers attended groups, 43 didn't, and after 10 years only two people from each group were still alive. Well, that's understandable; everyone dies eventually; what's unaddressed is how long each group livedon the average, in the course of that decade. If, as **(C)** says, the support-group members averaged two additional years each as compared to others, then the negligibility of support groups on longevity is certainly open to question.

(A) The longer life of two people, versus two other people, does no real damage given that (on its face, at least) the survey sees equality between 41 in one group and 41 on the other.

(B) Whether group attendance is standard or unusual, mandatory or voluntary, is irrelevant to whether group attendance lengthens lifespans.

(D) If anything, patients' lack of faith in support groups should strengthen the argument that the groups had a negligible effect on longevity, rather than weaken it.

(E) Merely coping with disease *T* isn't the issue here; it's how long one lives once one is diagnosed and treated.

26. (B) Logical Flaw

Keep a list of perennial, "classic flaws" that you run into in your LSAT practice.

This section has seen several classic flaws, and this one is a true perennial. It is logically improper to conclude that something is true because it hasn't been proven false, and **(B)** spells that out. Independent evidence of the astronomer's thesis is required, and she doesn't provide any.

(A) To point out that one's opponents haven't proven their point does not qualify as an attack on the opponents themselves.

(C) 180. Since the astronomer is claiming to have rebutted a proposed cause of the cratering, by definition she must *believe* that there are alternative explanations.

(D) She doesn't deny that her thesis is subject to criticism. Indeed, she seems to believe (wrongly) that it's been criticized and that the criticism has been found wanting.

(E) She implies that meteoroids are one type of "cosmic debris," and frankly, for the argument to work she doesn't even have to provide even that much definition. The logic doesn't hinge on what a meteoroid is.

SECTION III: READING COMPREHENSION

Passage 1: Thurgood Marshall

The **Topic** is, of course, Thurgood Marshall. By line 10 we can see that the **Scope** is his career (particularly his innovations in public interest litigation strategy and methods). The **Purpose** is to focus the reader's attention away from his already well known civil rights ideology and judicial career, toward his less well known but perhaps even more significant "legacy to the field of public interest law," a field that we're told was "forever changed" as a result of his civil rights work with the NAACP.

Paragraph 1 lays out the broad idea that cases were carefully chosen and crafted, rather than picked out hit or miss, so that paragraph 2 can narrow the scope to "one aspect" of the approach: "The test case strategy," with special emphasis on Marshall's insistence on choosing likeable and credible plaintiffs. Another aspect, and the topic of paragraph 3, was the controversial (lines 40–45) use, in expert testimony, of statistics from sociology and psychology to persuade the courts that some discrimination was unconstitutional.

Finally, if you were wondering when the author would justify the reference in lines 9–10 to the "strategic and methodological legacy," paragraph 4 is it. Marshall's approaches have been used in a variety of public interest contexts and, surprisingly enough (lines 57–59), by attorneys on both ends of the political spectrum. The last four lines should leave us with the distinct impression that irrespective of ideology, that which was radical is now the norm. Your **Roadmap** could reflect much of what we've just laid out, like so:

¶1: Marshall's major influence on public interest law

¶2: Careful choice of cases, esp. plaintiffs

¶3: Use of statistics to bolster unconstitutionality arguments

¶4: Broader legacy

1. (B) Global

Look for the Main Point to encompass Topic, Scope, and Purpose, and avoid choices that venture into marginal areas.

The right answer has to take in both Marshall's legal work and its enduring legacy, and only **(B)** meets both criteria.

(A) To reduce Marshall's career to work on "certain discriminatory laws," without reference to civil rights or public interest law generally, is misguided. Also, **(A)** ascribes Marshall's principal success to the cases he worked on themselves, rather than to his legacy years later.

(C) Focuses too narrowly on politics ("ideology," "political objectives") to the exclusion of everything else. Political considerations come up only in passing in sentence one, and again in passing in paragraph 4. Also, the passage does not "reinvestigate…his record as a judge."

(D) It would be more accurate to say that Marshall *devised* the set of tactics, not "adopted" them, and **(D)** ventures too broadly to "the law" in general rather than to the one specific branch of the law.

(E) Marshall is identified in passing (to the few people who didn't already know) as a Supreme Court justice in lines 1–3, and that's it for that phase of his career. It's barely a footnote here, not part of the Main Point as **(E)** would have it.

2. (D) Logic (Purpose of a Sentence)

Beware of "half-right/half-wrong" choices.

The first sentence, as we noted in question 1 **(E)** above, identifies Marshall's Supreme Court tenure; it also asserts that most of the writing about him has emphasized only his time on the bench and his early politics. Since the author wants to transcend the norm and illuminate another, less celebrated facet of Marshall's career, **(D)** is correct.

(A) The second half may be right in its reference to Marshall's achievements, but the first half is way off in its reference to a disputed claim. Many LSAT Reading Comprehension passages begin with disputed claims, but this isn't one of them; no one is cited as disputing Marshall's judicial record.

(B) Half-right, in that it establishes the topic, but way off in its focus on controversy, which is never alluded to in lines 1–6.

(C) Half-right, in that it introduces Marshall as both judge and lawyer, but way off in implying that the author is interested in both equally.

(E) Half-right, in that the author's unusual take on Marshall's career might well qualify as a "new perspective," given the earlier writing on him, but way off in its reference to correcting an inaccuracy.

3. (A) Logic (Parallel Reasoning)

This question challenges us to put Marshall's public interest law legacy into action, by finding an analogous use of his NAACP strategies. Reviewing paragraphs 2 and 3 should lead you to look for an answer choice that includes selecting a case for its precedential effect and impact and to use expert testimony and statistics to buttress the case, both of which are found in **(A)**. The pollution case described would certainly qualify as having enormous potential impact (lines 23–25) and makes use of expert data (lines 34–35).

(B) The impact here is less on precedent than on the environment itself, and there's nothing in Marshall's record as reported here that suggests an affinity for celebrity counsel.

(C) "Pursuing a series of cases" doesn't sound like the kind of careful and nuanced choice that Marshall tended to make (lines 21–25), and according to paragraph 3 Marshall often wanted judges to go beyond strict constitutional construction, so at least the latter half of **(C)** qualifies as a 180.

(D) The potential impact on precedent, not the needs of the plaintiff, motivated Marshall, and the word "appeal" as used in line 32, meaning likability, isn't the kind of appeal to the public that **(D)** describes.

(E) Neither precedential research nor pretrial settlement consultation, while plausibly part of any attorney's arsenal, is cited as a particularly Marshallian strategy.

4. (C) Author's Attitude

Subject one-word answer choices to the same rigorous scrutiny you would any other choices.

The test case strategy, like the use of statistical data and other strategies, is presented as an "innovation" in line 14 and "originally considered to be a radical departure" in line 60. Surely that justifies "unprecedented," choice **(C)**.

(A) No evidence that Marshall was at all arbitrary; indeed, his search for test cases was deliberate and nuanced.

(B) Lines 25–26 attest to the strategy's flexibility.

(D) "Essential," line 27, refers to a necessary condition for the strategy's success, not to the necessity of the strategy itself.

(E) How is the test case strategy somehow someone's opinion, as **(E)** would suggest? It's a way of changing the law, neither subjective nor objective in nature.

5. (B) Inference

Take seriously the idea that "the passage provides support" for a correct inference, and seek out that support in the text before making your selection.

(A) Line 4 refers to Marshall's "ideological content" but there's no evidence of that ever having changed.

(B) If Marshall and the NAACP didn't just take up any old case (lines 17–18), they must have rejected some as well as accepted others. And if they sought "sympathetic litigants" (line 31) they must have rejected some unlikable ones. **(B)** must be on the money. And as a result, the other choices must be poor:

(C) The nature of the controversy surrounding Marshall's tactics goes undescribed. Maybe it was an internal struggle within the NAACP as **(C)** asserts, but maybe objections came from the outside instead.

(D) Any comparison between Marshall's strategies in lower court vs. higher court is utterly irrelevant—never mentioned, never alluded to.

(E) Distorts the nature of the legacy as described here. Yes, other public interest lawyers picked up Marshall's methods, but there's no reason to believe that the NAACP colleagues themselves did so, let alone "revised" them.

6. (E) Inference

If the author would agree with the right answer, it must be the case that the wrong choices are either areas of disagreement, or issues somehow outside the passage scope.

(A) The author seems to think that Marshall's Supreme Court tenure has gotten plenty of attention if not acclaim, so at least that half of **(A)** is a distortion.

(B) All of Marshall's strategies are lumped together as "controversial" (without much explanation), so **(B)** is wrong to highlight any one of them as most controversial; and the only paradox in the passage is that both liberal and conservative lawyers have been able to make successful use of the same techniques (lines 57–59).

(C) It's possible that other lawyers used statistics before, but the author's description of Marshall's strategies as "innovative" argues against that.

(D) This choice refers to the birth of public interest law firms where the passage only talks about their growth (lines 46–48), and their nature, radically different or otherwise, is never mentioned.

(E) The last remaining choice must be the winner, and it is. Marshall inferably stood on the left of the political spectrum, but even if that weren't apparent, his strategies have been employed by both the left and the right (lines 50–55), so surely there's a lot of room for Marshall to have been surprised at his own legacy.

7. (D) Detail

Use question stem Hot Words to pinpoint the location of the right answer.

The only controversy explicitly spelled out, lines 40–45—indeed, the only passage reference to the Hot Words "legal scholars"—comes in the use of "nonlegal" statistical evidence in court, choice **(D)**. And since legal scholars appear nowhere else, criticism or no criticism, none of the other choices is at all tenable.

Passage 2: Roy Lichtenstein

The **Topic** of painter Roy Lichtenstein is announced right away, and the **Scope** is his style or, as the author puts it, "his merger of" comics and fine art. This is one of those passages that also announces the **Main Idea** up front: the author feels that that merger is "complex" and interesting, a mixture of fun and seriousness. This theme is explored in the paragraphs that follow. Paragraph 2 is devoted to the relationship between pop art (Lichtenstein and his '60s colleagues) and the late abstract expressionists against which pop art was rebelling. Paragraph 3 is all Lichtenstein—he goes beyond "cartoonish methods" to "realism" and "inner sweetness"; he's sincere, not cynical, unlike (lines 43–45) pop artists. We ought to recognize that the coda (lines 52–55) returns to the merger of comics and deep feeling alluded to in paragraph 1. Your **Roadmap** could look like so:

¶ 1: Roy L.—*comics + seriousness*

¶ 2: *Pop art rebels against abstract impressionism*

¶ 3: Roy L. *sincere, not cynical*

8. (B) Global

With lengthy answer choices, there's lots of room for the four wrong choices to go wrong, so you should be able to toss them out rapidly.

Only **(B)** picks up on the author's thesis, in both paragraph1 and in lines 52–55, that though Lichtenstein echoed comic books and engaged in some parody, his art is serious and heartfelt. The other choices contradict this idea or move far away from it:

(A) Far from trying to "re-create" abstract expressionism, Lichtenstein had "an impulse toward realism."

(C) Lichtenstein is a departure from expressionist tradition not, as **(C)** alleges, a part of it, and the author feels that Lichtenstein's use of comics complements, rather than "obscures," his emotional content.

(D) Focuses on paragraph 2 only—the relationship of pop art to abstract expressionism—ignoring the substance of the author's view of Lichtenstein that paragraph s 1 and 3 emphasize.

(E) In the passage the notion of "excessive sophistication" is attached (lines 46–48) to specific artists not to the entire "art world"; and the "reconciliation" it discusses is between "cartoons and fine art" as well as between "parody and true feeling," all of which **(E)** reduces to simplistic terms.

9. (E) Author's Attitude

Keep the Scope in mind during every question.

Scope is a key factor in this Attitude question because all five choices are basically supportive of Lichtenstein. But on what grounds? **(E)** gets it right by echoing the successful merger of fun and seriousness with which the passage both begins and ends.

(A) Paragraph 3 begins by implying that if Lichtenstein were only about rebelliousness, as **(A)** would have it, he would be a fairly marginal figure.

(B) Likewise, the author's interest in Lichtenstein transcends mere parody.

(C) Any "blatant rejection" or rebellion was against late abstract expressionism only, not the entire movement; and again, the author is interested in much more than sheer rebellion.

(D) Lichtenstein's art was "cartoonish" and filled with "surface bravado," terms that hardly convey the idea of a "subtle critique."

10. (A) Logic (Purpose of a Detail)

When a question stem points you to a line reference, consider its context.

The sentence in question, in lines 38–43, is preceded by a reference to "realism" and a "depiction of contemporary life," and it ends with "…were reflections of [Lichtenstein's] culture." That's **(A)**, pure and simple.

(A) By the time the author gets to line 38 he has taken the discussion beyond the sheerly parodistic.

(C) The contrast with abstract expressionism comes in the previous paragraph.

(D) The emotionality of Lichtenstein doesn't come up until later, in lines 50–55.

(E) There's no "endorsement" in the list of cultural artifacts, just an objective reporting of that which was represented in Lichtenstein's paintings.

11. (E) Logic (Parallel Reasoning)

If you can't predict an answer readily, stop trying, and simply attack the choices in order. Don't overdo the prediction process.

"The spirit of Lichtenstein's work" is a pretty broad area of interest so it's tough, if not impossible, to

predict where the right answer will be going. After reviewing the gist of each paragraph, we should attack each choice in turn.

(A) Careful! While Lichtenstein had "an impulse toward realism," we're explicitly told that his art contained "word balloons and highly stylized figures" (lines 12–13).

(B) Lichtenstein was parodying the high-mindedness of a genre, late abstract expressionism, not human beings per se. And "stick figures" (not withstanding the "simple black lines") don't seem to go along with the comic book genre and the "large areas of primary color."

(D) The "simple black lines," however, certainly don't suggest **(D)**'s "vague shapes and images." Lichtenstein dealt with consumer culture (paragraph 3) using recognizable images, not vague ones.

(E) The only one left has to be the winner, and it is. The "comment on society's values" echoes the "reflections of the culture" reference in line 42, while the realistic depiction of objects is very much in line with the list in lines 38–43 we examined in question 10.

12. (D) Logic (Weaken the Argument)

Weakening a Reading Comprehension argument is trickier than doing so in Logical Reasoning, because the latter consists of only one conclusion and support, while a reading passage can contain several arguments. Be sure to tie your choice specifically to something in the text.

(A) That Lichtenstein may have gone to abstract expressionism exhibitions neither marks him as a hypocrite nor is inconsistent with the author's assertions. Surely Lichtenstein needed to see the genre in order to rebel against it.

(B),**(C)** Praise for an abstract expressionist of any period, early or late, who manages to get some emotion into his art is very much in character for Lichtenstein; remember, he was rebelling against "fading emotional power" (lines 27–29).

(D) The very reason that **(B)** and **(C)** are in character for Lichtenstein, makes **(D)** the right answer. For Lichtenstein to criticize emotionality in a painting—especially in a fellow pop artist—would contradict his quarrel with "airy, high-minded,…lyrical" abstract art.

(E) The other side of **(B)**'s and **(C)**'s coin. It's quite in keeping for Lichtenstein, a man who merged "parody and true feeling," to bash an artist for pushing emotion out.

13. (B) Global

Though choices may be brief, four of them must be categorically poor. Be bold in your analysis.

The moment we realized, in lines 1–4, that the author was interested in exploring Lichtenstein's style, we were on track for choosing **(B)**. The "motivation" it describes turns out to be rebellion against an earlier genre (paragraph 2) and a response to contemporary life (paragraph 3).

(A) Implies that Lichtenstein is somehow a mystery to the author, rather than the subject of the author's in-depth analysis.

(C) That paragraph 2 contains (lines 15–19) a brief reference to a common misinterpretation of pop art doesn't turn the passage into a broad contrasting of "two opposing theories." The passage is structured around one theory, that of the author.

(D) "Evolution" implies changes over time, but a chronological series of shifts is not employed here to describe Lichtenstein's art.

(E) Lichtenstein was not at first recognized as a fine artist, implying that he was underestimated, not the contrary.

14. (A) Inference

Use Hot Words to focus your investigation.

"Rebellious" is paragraph 2, so search there. Lines 27–29 tie in with lines 21–25 to lead to **(A)**: Lichtenstein and his fellow pop artists appreciated "the powerful early" abstract expressionists, but disdained the intellectual and airy later offshoots.

(B) The bashing of "commercial art" comes out of nowhere. Moreover, **(B)** reduces late abstract expressionism as a Lichtenstein target, when in fact that was precisely what Lichtenstein was rebelling against.

(C) 180; gets it exactly backward.

(D) Lichtenstein's treatment of consumerism—which was more nuanced than a mere "objection"—is in any case not part of the rebellion paragraph, paragraph 2.

(E) A huge distortion. Why would Lichtenstein object to techniques that he himself used (lines 26–27)?

15. (B) Inference

When all five choices look remarkably similar, don't let that distract you. Seek out their explicit differences.

Abstract expressionism is—again—paragraph 2 only, and while the early stage is described as "powerful" (line 22) the later stage is "airy, high-minded, and overly lyrical" (line 25). That's **(B)**, pretty straightforwardly.

(A) Lichtenstein employed realism; the abstract expressionists (as the name implies) evidently never did.

(C) Has it exactly backward. 180.

(D) Abstract expressionism is described as always having been "nonrepresentational," so on the evidence it never reached a point of "clarity."

(E) However "dense" early abstract expressionism may have been, "airy" and "lyrical," the adjectives that the author ascribes to the late stage of the movement, hardly sound like "sparseness."

Passage 3: Technological Development and the Market System

Were you struck by lines 3–5? "It may seem that *X*....But *Y*...." is classic LSAT language, not unlike "Most of what has been written about Thurgood Marshall has focused on *X*,...but *Y*...." Each offers a hint that what we're about to read is "popular misconception" followed by "author's [correct] thesis." And in both cases, that's exactly what we get.

Here the **Topic** is the development of new technology by the moneyed interests, and the **Scope** is "the result[s] of this activity." One would expect the primary result to be that the rich got richer, and they do; but the real "primary result" is that everyone else becomes better off as well. Or to put it in terms of the author's **Main Idea**, there's been a narrowing of the benefits gap resulting from all this development, and that's "remarkably democratic."

Before we can find out why that's so, we need to know more about the situation, and the lengthy paragraph 2 provides the "what" in terms of four specific examples of new technology that have all benefited the masses beyond merely the investors and big shots: print (lines 14–26), computers (lines 26–35), broadcast media (lines 35–44), and communications (lines 44–48). (Your Roadmap might well have bracketed each of these examples in the margin, so that you could locate them quickly later on.)

The "why" comes in paragraph 3. These widely dispersed benefits aren't accidental, but a function of the market system. And finally, "In other words," signals that lines 58–60 will state clearly that which lines 52–57 get at more wordily—the idea that when competition drives down prices, the general public gets more access to the goods.

Besides the labeling of the paragraph 2 benefits, a **Roadmap** might include:

¶1: All benefit from new tech, not just the $ people

¶2: Examples of benefits: print, computer, broadcast, communications

¶3: Why all benefit: lower prices → broader access

16. (E) Detail

The answer to Detail questions is always to be found right there in the text, so use the text.

Paragraph 2 is the technological development paragraph , and when a quick review of lines 13–48 is followed by a scan of the choices, **(E)** is likely to jump out—it's found in lines 28–34, and specifically in line 32. Conversely, a scan of the choices that isn't preceded by a review of the text can get you in trouble, because all of the choices are plausible technological developments, but only **(E)** appears. (The really tricky one is probably **(B)**: it's the entertainment value of broadcasting, not its educational value, to which the author refers.)

17. (A) Inference

When the question asks for a synonym for selected text, predict the answer first.

We want a synonym for "democratizing," a word that appears in the phrase "a remarkable democratizing force," a phrase that in turn refers to the impact of technological development on the masses. **(A)** is the only choice that picks up on the mass distribution of benefits, and paragraph 2 certainly does go on to list examples that are both "tangible and intangible."

(B) The author makes clear that it's a small group of entrepreneurs and investors who create the technology. We reap the benefits subsequently.

(C) Again, the mass of us are explicitly distinguished, in paragraph 1, from the moneyed interests.

(D) To refer to the mass dispersal of benefits that accrues when new technology comes into being as a broad "regulation of society" is a vast distortion.

(E) Social status is, as a rule, an antidemocratic notion; and the author never gets into status issues anyway.

18. (D) Logic (Purpose of a Detail)

Start with the Purpose of the paragraph in which the detail appears.

The detail in question is part of the "why": Why does the author say that we all benefit big time from new technology? Only **(D)** refers to the causal nature of paragraph 3 in the passage as a whole, and only **(D)** properly ascribes "maximization of financial success" as a principal motivator in the entrepreneurs' behavior that leads to all those benefits in the end.

(A) Fails to see that the benefits summary comes in the previous paragraph.

(B) It's stretching things to call paragraph 2 a presentation of "data," and in any case the author's conclusion is about the widespread benefits of technology that in part stem from entrepreneurs' desire to maximize their financial success.

(C) "Speculative hypothesis" is jargon, the kind often seen in wrong answers. In any case, the moneyed interests' desire to maximize their profits is concrete, not speculative. And as we've just said, the phrase in question is indeed "part of an argument"—it's part of the author's evidence.

(E) What "concession"? And for that matter, what "argument…in the first two paragraphs"? The argument is largely composed of conclusion in paragraph 1, and evidence in paragraph 3.

19. (B) Inference

Don't strain to find a sentiment with which the author would agree. The right answer must be supported by solid textual evidence; find it.

(A) A classic example of "irrelevant comparison." There's nothing in paragraph 2 that warrants setting apart computers from the other technological developments on any grounds, let alone as a more meager source of profits.

(B) There was no Global question on this passage, but **(B)** would qualify as a statement of the Main Idea. It explicitly sums up both the first and last paragraph 's.

(C) The hint of open borders sounds democratic, but there's nothing in the passage that refers to economic phenomena affecting more than one country.

(D) On the evidence, technology investment doesn't sound very risky at all! The investors mentioned in the passage are all making out like crazy.

(E) Profits, at least as described here, are due to the lowering of prices and resulting mass access of goods, which has nothing to do with "geographical mobility."

20. (C) Inference

Same question as #19, same hint: find textual support for any inference answer choice that you select.

(A) The passage is wholly sunny when it comes to the phenomenon of technological innovations leading to democratization. No hint of the downside to which **(A)** points.

(B) Another irrelevant comparison (between laissez-faire economies and others), and outside the scope to boot. Regulation—to whatever degree—is not part of the discussion.

(C) The correct answer is based on a detail that you should locate (lines 18–22) and confirm. **(C)** is simply rehashing the author's point that "since printed materials have become widely available…, literacy [can be taken] for granted."

(D) Yet another irrelevant comparison, very much akin to **(A)** in question 19. We have no warrant for comparing the telephone and the printing press on *any* grounds, let alone their relative democratizing effect.

(E) The claim that the "benefits gap" has been narrowed cannot be taken to imply that it will ever go away altogether. Moreover, **(E)** goes way beyond the scope (of that gap and technology's benefits) to take in "financial assets" in general.

Passage 4: Electrical Impulses Between Neurons

As tough passages go, this is a real bear. But its difficulty stems largely from all of the scientific terminology and descriptions, and the way to get around that is to accept that if you—like most other LSAT examinees—aren't very well versed in science, you don't need to be.! **Don't try to read with the interest and depth of a scientist.** Instead, get the broad outlines of the argument down, make mental pictures of the processes, and trust that out of six questions, at least some are likely to be more doable than others.

The opening is amazingly like those of Passages One and Three: "Neurobiologists once believed that…But…." In this passage we get even more help one paragraph later: "This theory has gradually won acceptance…but for a long time little was known about…." These Keyword clues by themselves suggest that the structure of the ideas will be:

Paragraph 1: Old theory, and:

The theory that now rules.

Paragraph 2: An area of mystery, and:

New knowledge (if "little was known" for a long time, things must be different now).

And that's how it plays out. The wisdom now is that the process by which the brain works is significantly chemical, rather than sheerly electrical as was once supposed. There *is* electricity involved (lines 9–11), but it's the neurotransmitter chemistry that is believed to bind two neurons together—the excited one and the receiving one—a binding that allows the ions to move in and send the electrical impulse.

The mystery lies in the way in which the receiving neuron, or rather its receptor molecule, is able to take on those ions. (Notice how knowledgeable we sound, even if we don't know what we're talking about, or even what molecules or ions are. It's all about being fearless in taking on the text on its face.) The turning point is lines 28–30: the "structure of receptors" (translation: *the way the receptor is set up*) is what permits the change from chemical signals into electrical ones.

Do you figure that paragraph 3 will explain this new belief? You bet. The receptor has both a binding site and a kind of "ion channel," whose mouth opens to accept the ions once binding occurs. (A crude mental picture of this, however remote from scientific reality, is immensely helpful.) A "family" of receptors that meet that description have been identified. Paragraph 4 shifts the scope to speculate that effective treatment of brain disorders may involve using what we know about these two sites to influence what enters various neurons' "ion channels." A neurologist might understand this all in depth, but we surely understand enough to take a stab at the six questions. A suggested marginal **Roadmap:**

¶ 1: Theory: chem. + elec. work together in brain

¶ 2: Q: How neurons made permeable to ions? A: (ll. 30–32)

¶ 3: Explanation: two sites in receptor neurons

¶ 4: Brain disorders: new hope for treatment in neuron structure

21. (D) Global

When choices are very similar to each other, you may actually be able to knock off the wrong ones rapidly if you're fearless.

(A) and **(B)** both allege that chemistry *rather than* electricity rules brain activity, but we know that to be false: the discovery was that brain activity isn't "exclusively" electrical because chemistry plays a role. It's a shared process. That's reason enough to toss **(A)** and **(B)** right away. And **(E)** can go even faster because it ignores the Big Picture of the role of chemistry altogether, focusing on paragraph 4 only. It has to be incorrect.

The first clause of both **(C)** and **(D)** essentially, and properly, sums up the Topic, Scope, and purpose of paragraphs 1–3. Where they differ is in the second clause. **(C)** fixates on the (minor, given the context) paragraph 3 detail, lines 42–44, about receptors constituting a family, whereas **(D)** connects the bulk of the passage to the gist of paragraph 4 and its hint that brain disorders may now be more treatable. In sum, then, only **(D)** parallels the author's overall interest in terms of ideas as well as structure, so it is correct.

22. (B) Author's Attitude

Use specific textual language to support your choice of author's attitude.

The discovery in paragraph 4 is "medically significant because it raises the possibility" that "drugs targeted to specific receptors…could potentially help" treat some brain disorders. No hint of "fear of misuse," **(C)**, "fear of exaggerated potential," **(D)**, or "skepticism," **(E),** is to be found, but the language isn't 100% certain," either, **(A)**. Correct choice **(B)**'s qualified optimism is on the money.

23. (E) Detail

Don't be surprised when a string of doable questions is followed by a tough one, and always be ready to skip past the tough one in search of more points.

Once again we have five similar answer choices, and each ends with "…plays a role in neuron communication." Clearly we are to separate four factors that do play a role, from the one that does not. By circling the important noun or noun phrases in each choice—"secretion of chemicals"; "flow of ions"; "binding to receptors"; "structure of receptors"; and "size of binding sites," respectively from **(A)** through **(E)**—it may be easier for the odd man out to emerge, and it's the final choice. While the size of the opening of the "ion channel" seems to change, impeding or facilitating ion flow (lines 36–38), the size of the binding site per se is never mentioned.

(A) The very basis of the theory that the community now accepts (lines 11–14).

(B) The third step of that theoretical process (lines 16–18).

(C) The second step of that theoretical process (lines 14–16).

(D) The "new evidence" that has helped to remove skepticism about the theory (lines 30–32).

24. (D) Inference

Context is crucial for questions about specific line references.

Lines 55–56, remember, are part of the author's discussion of how the two-site structure of receptors holds promise for medical treatment. To be specific—and the question wants us to be specific—it's "the *highly selective* treatment of *certain* brain disorders" that is promising. That promise, of course, is raised by the "discovery" in lines 45–49 that *different* parts of the brain feature different kinds of receptors. Scientists, we're told, should be able to note how each type of ion channel relates to "*precise*" kinds of behavior, and lastly we see that the phrase "defined categories of neurons" is followed by "…that will *selectively* impede or enhance these effects." All of those emphases are Kaplan's, designed to highlight why **(D)** is correct: the author wants to convey the idea that defining the neurons' categories may allow science to target *different yet specific* conditions, examples of which end the passage.

(A) As far as we can tell, all or virtually all neurotransmitter receptors contain an ion channel (lines 33–36), so separating out the categories would have no effect.

(B) The issue is not whether or not a receptor responds to drugs per se, but *which* receptor does so in order to have an effect on one brain disorder or another.

(C) The only explicit reference to the word "molecule" comes in line 14. On the evidence, the author is using "receptor" and "receptor molecule" interchangeably, and neurons that (if any) lack receptors are thus outside of the passage's scope.

(E) Again, on the evidence, all of the neurons referred to in the passage are reactive to binding; that's inherent in the theory that dates back to 1904. The passage offers no distinction between those that react and those that don't.

25. (C) Global

Similar-looking choices can be profitably compared, and their number whittled down. Cross out the parts that are identical.

This situation is similar to question 21 and can be attacked in a similar way. All five choices begin with "explanation of a theory," so crossing out that phrase all five times makes the choices easier to compare. The theory is, of course, the one in paragraph 1 that, from 1904 to now, has "won acceptance"—the partly chemical theory of brain activity.

(A) and **(B)** go on to suggest that the author's next step is evidence in the theory's support. But none is offered! All that paragraph 1 provides are the steps of a theory that was "speculated" upon since 1904, the theory that is now widely accepted. So we can toss these two choices right now. In the same way, **(E)** can be rejected because the author never describes "how the theory came to win scientific acceptance"; he merely opens paragraph 2 by asserting that it did so. Regardless of these three choices' other weaknesses and possible strengths, none of them is supportable.

(C) and **(D)** agree on the author's next step, presenting the theory's obstacle (lines 21–28). So we can simply compare the two choices' final two clauses. **(D)** bafflingly suggests that the obstacle being "insurmountable" the theory must be rejected, when in fact the passage ends with the theory stronger than ever, its mechanism promising great new medical benefits. So that leaves **(C)** and indeed, as **(C)** says, the obstacle is overcome in lines 28–45, and the "implications" occupy all of paragraph 4.

26. (D) Global

Always try to predict the answer to a Primary Purpose question before you shop among the choices.

Any prediction of the passage's reason for being must take in both the partly chemical theory and its big mystery that the "new evidence" (lines 28–30 and 33) tends to clear up. Only **(D)** does both of those things. The new evidence serves to wipe away a century's worth of skepticism, and that certainly qualifies as "new support."

(A) The passage's theory about the brain's workings celebrated its 100th birthday the year this LSAT was administered. "New"?

(B) A classic 180. The new evidence *strengthens* the theory because it serves to overcome a possible objection.

(C) When a passage describes theories, the questions' wrong answers often suggest that the passage is concerned with *methodology*, and **(C)** is one of those. "The approach scientists use" is not only too broad, but skewed in that the "how" of the passage is how the brain works, not how the scientists do.

(E) Is the purpose of paragraph 4 alone.

SECTION IV: LOGICAL REASONING

1. (D) Strengthen the Argument

A recommendation for taking action *X* requires positive evidence; it's not enough simply to argue against taking action *Y*.

We get two points of view on bilirubin—reduce it in infants, or leave the level high—and we are to support the latter one. In response to Group 1's fear that high bilirubin levels can cause tetanus in the brain, Group 2 asserts the brain will usually keep the bilirubin out. That is a reason not to reduce the bilirubin level, but is not an argument for keeping it high. That is what **(D)** provides. The health benefits accruing from high bilirubin levels would argue for Group 2's recommendation.

(A) 180. The safety of reducing bilirubin levels actually argues for Group 1's recommendation, not Group 2's.

(B) Merely restates the risk of bilirubin to the infant brain, which is not in and of itself a reason to maintain or reduce the bilirubin level.

(C) The origin of bilirubin is irrelevant to whether the level should be adjusted.

(E) General agreement as to what constitutes a too-high bilirubin level would argue for Group 1 rather than Group 2.

2. (D) Assumption

The role of a missing assumption is to link key elements of evidence and conclusion. Find the missing link and you may quickly find the right answer.

Why does modern capitalism promote communal ties? Because it requires large corporations. What's needed is a link between the two, and **(D)** provides it.

(A) The author is not depending upon a comparison to other economic systems to make her point.

(B) The argument doesn't hinge on the inadvertence of capitalism's creating communal ties. To put it another way, that which is intended and that which results are generally two different things.

(C) "Some ties"? For the argument to work, there must be many strong ties at work in modern capitalism, and ties of a communal nature, not just those between corporations. **(C)** is too limited in scope and distorts the issue.

(E) As with **(A)**, no comparison of economic systems is at the heart of this consideration of the effect of capitalism on communal ties.

3. (A) Role of a Statement

When asked about the role of a statement, bracket or underline that statement in your test booklet.

Following the statement in question—an assertion of a definite benefit of organized athletics—the teacher cites the objection of critics and just as quickly rebuts it, coming down squarely in favor of organized athletics. So **(A)** has it right: the opening sentence is one reason—and another one comes along shortly—for the concluding recommendation.

(B) Nothing in the paragraph (by teacher or critics) attacks the idea that organized athletics makes children stronger and more coordinated.

(C) Implies that the teacher comes back to that claim, which she does not; instead, she comes up with another reason altogether for supporting organized athletics.

(D) Rather, it's a *sufficient* reason for *retaining* funding.

(E) The objection comes one sentence later.

4. (C) Logical Flaw

Try to predict a flaw before searching among the choices.

Arguing that generosity is rarely a permanent trait because one tends to donate only occasionally, the columnist is assuming that only if one donates constantly can one be considered generous. In broader terms, the assumption is that one possesses a trait only if one constantly demonstrates it. **(C)** points out the fallacy of that assumption.

(A) "Virtuousness" is not a term of the argument; in this statement "virtue" is synonymous with trait or characteristic.

(B) Have you noticed how often wrong choices focus on a bogus charge of "attacking the opponent's character"? This is one of them.

(D) "Most donors" is an assessment of well over 50% of the population, hardly a small sample.

(E) Actually, the columnist's use of "may be a sign of…," and her explicit reference to the impermanence of generosity, suggests that far from taking for granted that generosity is at the heart of most donation, she *disagrees* with it.

5. (A) Paradox

To explain a paradox or phenomenon, stay as close to the terms of the situation as possible.

It's not exactly "paradoxical," in the traditional LSAT sense of the word, that newborns stare longer at, are more taken by, drawings of actual faces than of vaguely face-like shapes. But it's still somewhat of a puzzle that newborns can tell the difference, and we still need a choice that "most helps to explain" the tendency.

The key to the behavior is that it has been detected merely "hours after birth." Given that the babies have had little or no time to relate to any other elements of life, and that nevertheless they are assuredly drawn to a real image of a face rather than to a facsimile, the simplest and most logical explanation is that the tendencies are innate, and that's **(A)**.

(B) Fails to explain the reason why the infant stares at the object in the first place…let alone why the infant stares longer at one type of image than at another.

(C) Sounds plausible as part of the maturing process. But even setting aside the unlikelihood that **(C)**'s kind of learning could possibly occur mere "hours after birth," **(C)** might explain why infants are drawn to the human face, but why to the human face *rather than* to face-like shapes? In other words, why wouldn't they associate the ovals or scrambled faces with life's necessities as well? **(C)** fails to address the central puzzle.

(D) This is really the flipside of **(B)**. The correlation between length of staring and preference makes perfect sense, but what causes the long or short staring in the first place? Both choices beg the question.

(E) Like **(C)**, **(E)** sounds plausible based on everyday knowledge, but is far fetched in terms of the timeline, and stops short of dealing with the central question of why one type of image, rather than another, is grabbing so much attention.

6. (C) Weaken the Argument

Look for scope shifts between evidence and conclusion, especially when the argument is to be weakened.

The evidence concerns the number of crime reports, which can be up or down or stay the same based on a wide variety of factors over and above the number of *crimes committed*—which is what the conclusion concerns. **(C)** mentions a plausible explanation for the evidence that has nothing at all to do with whether crime is on the rise, and so casts serious doubt on the validity of the author's assessment.

(A) 180; the opposite of what we want. If the crime rate is actually up, even just a little, then that lends fuel to the author's flame that citizens are more at risk now.

(B) An irrelevant comparison: the age distinction is irrelevant to the author's broad value judgment on the citizens' vulnerability to crime across all age ranges.

(D) Only weakens the argument if you assume that the center has had the definite and immediate effect of reducing crime, and that's far too much to take for granted.

(E) The victim, or potential victim, cares little whether the criminal is a first-timer or a veteran. That there are only a few violent criminals doesn't make everyone safer.

7. (E) Inference

Don't attempt to predict the answer to an Inference question. Just distill the paragraph to its essence, and make a mental picture of the situation when you can.

When did the North American Ice Age end? There's a difference of opinion based on two separate experiments. By one date, warmth-adapted beetles replaced cold-adapted ones, presumably indicating that the ice was gone. By another date—fully 500 years later—masses of ice yielded to spruce forests. Both dates sound plausible as the end of an ice age.

(A) There's no indication that because the warmth-adapted beetles arose first, they were somehow replaced 500 years later in, or by, the spruce forests. Not inferable.

(B) Conversely, there's no reason to expect that the beetle situation and the forest situation were *connected*, either. Both **(A)** and **(B)** improperly blend elements of the two separate experiments. Not inferable.

(C) If we take the phrase "end point of the last ice age" literally, one would be hard pressed to infer that great ice masses stayed on the move afterward. Not inferable.

(D) Warmth-adapted beetles "replaced" cold-adapted ones, but that verb is somewhat indefinite. It's quite possible that the hardiest cold-adapted ones hung on even after the rest died off; or, indeed, that the cold-adapted ones moved north to a cold climate and exist to this day. Not inferable.

(E) The last one left, this had better be inferable, and

it is. It simply reflects the bare fact that the warmth-adapted beetles came into their own five centuries or so prior to the establishment of the spruce forests.

8. (D) Principle

When distilling a general principle out of a specific real-life situation, stay as close to the terms as you can.

The essence of the principle is that notwithstanding his confession, Ellison can't be punished because the evidence against him was illegally obtained. The trespassing of the officer in **(D)** is equivalent to the illegal recordings, and the confessed trapper Kuttner gets a similar pass.

(A) This situation deals with the justification for Long's retaliation, not with the punishment of the confessed thief Price.

(B) Justification of "reporting" is different from justification of punishment. Also, Shakila did not break any law in discovering her secretary's cable TV ripoff.

(C) Takashi's violation wasn't performed in the discovery of Sarah's illegal action, so she wouldn't merit the same pass that Ellison and Kuttner get.

(E) "We can't single one person out" is the justification here, but there's nothing like that in the Ellison story.

9. (B) Strengthen the Argument

If one choice is LEAST helpful, then the other four are quite helpful, meaning that the right answer hurts the argument or is outside the scope.

The question on the table is whether memory fades with age, and there must be some dubiousness as to whether this conclusion is conclusively proved, as there are four relevant issues that can be usefully addressed. Both the Group A seniors and the Group B students got the same task—to call a number at a specified time—and on the face of it, the seniors did much better, with only one lapse as opposed to 14 among the students. But there are a lot of issues left open, among them: How old were the students? How large was each group? And what caused the lapses—did they *have* to be the result of faulty memory? Four wrong answers will strengthen the argument; the one right answer will weaken or be out of scope.

(A) Relevant. If the groups are the same size, the 1:14 ratio is more meaningful than if Group A contained two seniors while Group B contained 1,000 college students.

(B) Irrelevant. The experiment hinged on the circumstances leading up to dialing, not on what occurred once the phones rang. **(B)** is correct. For the record:

(C) Relevant. The experiment assumes a significant age gap between the groups, and if the gap existed then the argument is stronger. But college students come in all ages, and for all we know Group B was no younger than Group A, in which case the argument is weaker.

(D) Relevant. If both groups had equal access, that's one thing. But If for some reason Group B had less access to phones at the time, then that difference in access, utterly unrelated to memory, could explain their higher number of lapses.

(E) Relevant. If Group A had five minutes' notice while Group B had five days' notice, small wonder that more of the Group B people forgot to call. But that forgetting would have nothing to do with age differences. Conversely, equal notice would strengthen the logic.

10. (D) Conclusion

Author point of view isn't just signaled by "therefore" and "thus." Opinionated language can send the same message.

"This would be a mistake" tells you that if you figure out what "this" is, you'll have the conclusion. "This" is the use of math by social scientists to make predictions. It's one thing when natural scientists do it, but social science isn't as mathematical or exact and so—says the author—distortion would result. The conclusion is neatly summed up by **(D)**.

(A) The author has no problem with social scientists' making predictions, so long as they don't overuse or misuse mathematics in doing so.

(B) The argument leaves room for math to have a huge—indeed, an equal—role in social science. Just not in terms of making predictions.

(C) May or may not be so, but clearly the author feels that that "need" should not be met by mathematical calculation…which brings us back to **(D)**.

(E) That prediction is natural science's "hallmark" doesn't mean that predicting is the "secret of its success." Even if natural science has been a smash—something the author never weighs in on, incidentally—its success could have many other possible causes.

11. (B) Paradox

Often, the resolution of a paradox not only removes contradiction, but also renders the two phenomena downright logical.

Bridge fractures develop not at high-stress points, but elsewhere. **(B)** straightforwardly explains why this should be, making the formerly paradoxical paragraph utterly logical.

(A) Non-bridges are outside the scope, as are reasons why high-stress might not lead to fracture.

(C) Reverses the cause and effect without addressing why the fractures occur in unexpected places.

(D) Structures that lack high-stress points are irrelevant to the discussion of structures that *have* them.

(E) Providing a plausible cause for both effects that are mentioned, this choice nevertheless fails to address the unexpectedness of where fractures appear.

12. (B) Logical Flaw

Be vigilant in looking out for scope shifts.

You're looking for the flaw, and the wording of the stem tells you that the flaw is the Assumption. Note "The press has a right...." and "The press has an obligation...." Out of the author's own mouth is the scope shift nakedly revealed. The *right* to do something (the evidence) doesn't convey an *obligation* to do that something (the conclusion), as **(B)** trenchantly notes.

(A) The author doesn't care whether people's personal lives are pried into or not, so she is not assuming that **(A)** is true.

(C) In both the evidence and the conclusion the author considers that libelousness might negate the principle at hand, contrary to **(C)**.

(D) 180; exactly reverses the author's logic. The press's obligation is the point of the conclusion, not the evidence.

(E) Like **(C)**, **(E)** contradicts the author by suggesting that libel is irrelevant to the issue at hand. A contradiction cannot be a necessary assumption.

13. (A) Assumption

A necessary assumption shores up a weak link between evidence and conclusion, much the same way that a "strengthener" does.

The leap the advocate makes lies in the difference between "convenient" and "superior." True, some wheelchair users find top-loaders inconvenient. But while that says nothing about their feelings as to which washer is superior (maybe they, like the average consumer, would choose the top-loader), the advocate figures that in their minds, convenience will trump any other factor. To put it another way, the advocate puts words in the wheelchair users' mouths, airily assuming that that which they find more convenient they will deem superior as well. **(A)**, which spells out that assumption, has to be true for the conclusion to be valid rather than presumptuous.

(B) This is clearly contradicted by the author's blatant comparison of two different washer types.

(C) No factors are named as to why the average consumer finds top-loaders superior. If **(C)** added the words "to some wheelchair users" it would be correct.

(D), **(E)** Both choices deal with non-wheelchair users, and we can't assume anything about *why* non-wheelchair users have deemed washers to be superior or convenient or anything else.

14. (E) Logical Flaw

Predicting an answer can save you a great deal of time in Assumption, Strengthen/Weaken, and Logical Flaw questions.

You may read about that 90% of empty brain space, and the author's claim that once we fill it, we'll be able to come up with such wonderful things, and find yourself saying "Hang on a minute—who's to say that that 90% of space will ever be useful for anything? Maybe that 90% will always stay as empty as a vacant lot." Such musing should readily lead you to **(E)**, which points out the author's unwarranted optimism about what that 90% can yield.

(A) The author does assume that *some* people's *significant* brain damage is *somewhat* detectable, but that's very different from **(A)**'s blanket statement.

(B) On the contrary, the argument seems to presume that the only reason a problem goes unsolved is a lack of brain space.

(C) This flatly contradicts the argument, which infers that 90% of the brain is empty because some severely brain damaged people show no ill effects.

(D) The author never goes so far as to say that the problems will be solved, just that they'll be "*within our ability* to solve"; a real distinction.

15. (B) Principle

Governing principles always deal with the "why" of things.

Why is the acceptance of quantum theory warranted? Because scientists tried to shoot it down and failed. Often. That's **(B)** in a nutshell.

(A) Nothing in the stimulus suggests that the number of different theories' "counterintuitive consequences" has been, or should be, compared. It's the *results* of different theories that are compared. This choice attempts to trap you by misusing a detail from the stimulus.

(C) The author seems to concede that quantum theory may have "counterintuitive consequences" but says that it's right anyway.

(D) Works fine up to a point, but doesn't lead to the conclusion in favor of quantum theory. **(D)** stops short of the theory's victory over the doubters.

(E) "Disproved by experiment" is not a phrase that echoes the efforts of the nay-sayers as described in the stimulus. The experiments did not only fail to disprove the predictions, they proved the predictions were accurate

16. (E) Role of a Statement

Watch for Keywords, but interpret them properly. If the statement is *what* the author is trying to convince the reader of, it is the conclusion. If it is *why* the conclusion is true, it is evidence.

The sentence whose purpose we are trying to determine is followed by "however," which sounds like a contrast is coming. Did you get faked out? What the author says is "However *much*," a phrase whose purpose is to take an issue off the table (e.g., "However much you may beg, I am not taking you to the movies"). And "thus" (line 5) usually signals the conclusion, but here it introduces the conclusion that follows from sentence 2—that is, it's a conclusion that itself becomes evidence for the ultimate point. The logic goes, "We're mostly driven by personal interaction. Thus, we have to have full awareness of the identity of the giver and that of the receiver. Therefore…": sentence 1. **(E)** has it right.

(A) The statement *is* the conclusion, not a premise in support of it.

(B) There is no "consideration that might be taken to undermine the conclusion," in the stimulus, and therefore nothing to counter it.

(C) This choice is saying that the statement is a premise in support of a conclusion which is then the premise of the ultimate conclusion. That describes the second sentence, not the first sentence.

(D) The social benefit is far more clearly spelled out in sentence 3 than sentence 1.

17. (C) Inference (Formal Logic)

Formal logic inferences are generally the result of combining two distinct pieces of the stimulus.

The curator begins by limiting the museum display's scope to twentieth-century art only, and then sets up a mutually exclusive "either/or" (everything is either on loan, or permanently owned; there's no possible overlap there). Then we get information about the store: prints of all of the permanently owned art are sold there, as are "some other works," giving one example. The vagueness of the last 15 words of the stimulus ("some works…*Nighthawks"*) leads to many possibly tempting wrong choices.

(A) We don't know anything about the provenance of *Nighthawks,* which though sold in the store, is *not* part of the permanent collection and may not even be exhibited there. So *Nighthawks* itself is one of many possible exceptions to **(A)**'s blanket assertion.

(B) The twentieth century is the exclusive scope of the museum's displays but not necessarily of the store's wares. It's quite possible that prints of art from many different centuries are sold there.

(C) The museum's displays are either all on loan or all permanently owned, and the store sells "prints of all of the latter," so **(C)** covers the latter and is exactly right.

(D) *Nighthawks*' century is by no means inferable from the stimulus, and as we said regarding **(A)**, need not even be visiting the museum.

(E) Maybe so, maybe not. There's not enough information to indicate where *Nighthawks* is hanging.

18. (D) Role of the Argument

A complex argument can provide evidence for a conclusion that in turn becomes evidence for another conclusion. Watch the parts carefully.

"Because…, it is clear that…." Note that structure: "Evidence…conclusion." On the evidence of our lack of evolution, the author concludes the statement in question (that our biological adaptation is to wild foods). But is that the *main* conclusion? No, because she goes on from it to draw her final point: because

straying from that biologically adapted diet causes health woes, "thus," she concludes, the wilder our food the healthier we are. **(D)** deftly describes not just the role of the claim in question, but implicitly that of every other element.

(A) The physical problems aren't evidence for our biological adaptation; they're the result of our not heeding our biological adaptation.

(B) The "Because…" clause acts as justification for the statement in question.

(C) The main conclusion—sentence 3—doesn't explain our biological adaptation; rather, it evaluates how we can all become healthier.

(E) Reverses the evidence/conclusion relationship explicitly suggested by "Because…, it is clear that…."

19. (D) Assumption

Assumption and Flaw questions are closely related—look for assumptions as general as the lack of another reason.

"There's no obligation not to cut down trees." Despite the double negative, the sense should be clear: "It's okay to cut them down." The author's reason? Having an obligation requires a corresponding right; and that would mean that an obligation toward trees means that trees have rights, and "trees are not the sort of things that can have rights." Where the argument is vulnerable is in the glib moving from trees' obligation to trees' rights. The cited "obligation to an entity" can, and most likely does, refer to each other—to the general public, to our obligation to protect our environment; and if so, the entire argument falls apart. The only way the argument is valid is if the "obligation" refers to trees only, and that's exactly what **(D)** asserts.

(A) This reverses the sufficiency and necessity of the author's, "If there's an obligation to trees, then trees must have a right." He need not assume the converse.

(B) This choice includes the two elements, but places the attributes on the same party (rather than people and trees), and again, as in **(A)** reverses the sufficiency and necessity.

(C) The author never explicitly cites the lack of consciousness as the factor that makes trees "the sort of things" that do not have rights.

(E) As correct choice **(D)** implies, the author is not concerned with the rights of people, just of trees.

20. (A) Logical Flaw

Cut past complex or verbose detail, and reduce an argument to its basics.

The critics, whose logical flaw we are to determine, are in favor of one glass of wine a day and distrust the recommendation of three a day. Why? Because even if three a day will reduce stroke risk, that benefit will be outweighed by all the binge drinkers who will overdo and have heart attacks. By skirting over all the extraneous detail in this way, you may be able to see where the author goes wrong: he blithely lumps all of the three-a-day drinkers—many and even most of whom may not be "bingers" and thus not big heart attack risks—together with the bingers. **(A)** rightly points out that it's unfair to ascribe to three-a-day-and-no-more drinkers, the behavior and hence the health risks of the bingers.

(B) The critics don't confuse the different risks; they *compare* them, which isn't unfair to do on its face.

(C) The drinking of other beverages is completely and utterly the scope of this argument.

(D) In a way, the critics *do* "address specifically" the reduced risk of stroke, at least insofar as they say it would be outweighed by the increased risk of heart attack.

(E) Points to an irrelevant comparison between deadly and less-severe strokes. No such comparison would have any effect on the argument.

21. (D) Role of a Statement

Arguments by analogy are common on the LSAT; recognize them when they come along.

The scientist's optimism that currently-baffling scientific prose may some day be widely understood is prompted, by analogy, with the way in which Newton's ideas in *Principia* were once esoteric but later became well-known. The reference to the esoteric language of today's prose, therefore, strengthens the analogy between the past and the hoped-for future. **(D)** says pretty much that, in more abstract (esoteric?) language.

(A) The truth of the esoteric nature of scientific language is self-evident to the scientist; it certainly isn't "called into doubt."

(B) This choice's focus on the amount of similarity between Newton's ideas and today's amounts to a profound misunderstanding about why the scientist discusses both. Their cases are similar, not their ideas, per se.

(C) Today's baffling scientific language in and of itself hardly hints that the communication barrier with the public is "impermeable." Quite the opposite, in fact. It's the Newton example that gives the scientist hope.

(E) As we've seen, the phrase in question serves to connect the Newton example and the current situation, not to cast doubt on that connection.

22. (A) Parallel Reasoning (Flaw)

Be ruthless in tossing out choices when their logical form is at odds with that of the stimulus.

The conclusion makes an assertion about "some people": "Therefore, some people…" On those grounds alone, **(B)**'s "Thus, most voters…"; **(C)**'s "Thus, no corporation…"; and **(E)**'s "Thus, even companies…" can all be discarded without a look back.

Now let's look at the evidence. **(D)** proceeds from "Some parents show…" to its "some" conclusion. But there's no "some" evidence in the stimulus! As quickly as that, **(A)** is revealed as the answer because it's the last choice standing. For the record,**(A)**'s "Most scholars aren't motivated by a desire to win prizes" is logically equivalent to the stimulus' "Most political activists aren't motivated by a sense of justice" (a slight but accurate rewriting of the stimulus' first sentence). **(A)** and the stimulus match up neatly.

23. (E) Strengthen the Argument

Strengthening an argument is sometimes just a matter of shoring up a central assumption, which is why the right answers to Strengthen and Assumption questions often seem so similar.

The columnist's conclusion is that university students hoping to build a career should study general liberal arts rather than take up particular technical training, on the grounds that the former would make one more employable because of the reasoning skills that are taught. The preference for liberal arts, of course, hinges on the assumption that technical training *doesn't* teach reasoning skills. Well, that's what **(E)** affirms, hence strengthening the logic. (As with an assumption, if **(E)** were false then the argument would fail, because liberal arts and technical training would be put on an equal footing in terms of future employability.)

(A) If **(A)** were true, then technical training—inferably every bit as "good" an education as liberal arts, if not more so—might make a claim for superiority. So at best **(A)** leaves the argument alone, and at worst weakens it.

(B) The columnist never says that technical training leaves one unemployable, so **(B)**'s reassurance makes the argument no stronger.

(C) "Interesting" is nowhere brought up as relevant to the argument at hand.

(D) Would strengthen the argument only if we can take "a general understanding of life" to necessarily mean "reasoning skills and adaptiveness," which we cannot.

24. (C) Paradox

Even when the two elements of a paradox seem wholly contradictory, remember that they must coexist: that's what "reconcile" or "resolve" implies.

On first glance, it certainly seems antithetical that states with stringent car safety requirements—requirements that, experts agree, do lower accident rates—have higher accident rates than the looser states! But we need to look closer, specifically at the *cause* of those accidents. If the states with strict requirements enacted them because driving with loose standards would be even *more* dangerous, then there'd be no contradiction. And that's what makes **(C)** the right answer. The higher accident rates are understandable because road congestion in and of itself makes for riskier driving, and yet we can easily accept that the stringent—and demonstrably effective—safety standards keep the accident rate from climbing even more astronomically. Conflict resolved.

(A) Pointing out one benefit of safety inspections—and one that isn't even raised within the paragraph—does nothing to resolve the discrepancy between accident rates that are apparently higher and lower at the same time.

(B) Drivers' overconfidence might well make them less safe on the road. If so, that would deepen the paradox: suddenly safety inspections are bringing about the *opposite* of the intended effect.

(D) In contrast to **(B)**, **(D)** offers a way in which strict regulations contribute to better driving. But one must still ask, why do the strict states have the highest accident rates? The paradox remains in place.

(E) The mere presence of more kilometers of driving surface doesn't necessarily make driving more or less dangerous. And even if it did, that would only deepen the paradox, meaning more accidents in the stringent states.

25. (A) Inference

Where formal logic is concerned, even one word can make a big difference.

The operative word in the stimulus is "most." If in most parts—that is, in "well beyond 50%"—of this country, it's either easy to grow cacti (meaning that those parts are not humid) or easy to raise orange trees (meaning that those parts are not cold), then most of the country has to be either not humid, or not cold, or both. For that reason **(A)** has to be false. If **(A)** were true—if half of the country were indeed both humid and cold—then at maximum, only the other 50% of the country could grow cacti or raise oranges with the ease that the stimulus describes. And 50% doesn't qualify as "most." Meanwhile, three of the wrong choices could be true, and one of them must be:

(B) The terms of the argument are "humid" and "cold." "Hot" is never mentioned, so it's eminently possible for the entire country (let alone most of it) to be hot.

(C) Has to be true. In fact, the "some parts" of which **(C)** speaks have to comprise the majority—the parts where it's easy to grow cacti or raise oranges or both.

(D) This statement could be true. The stimulus only requires that it is easy to grow cacti *or* orange trees in most parts of the country. It could be impossible to grow cacti in the country as long as it is easy to grow orange trees in most parts of the country.

(E) Could be true. If true, then most of the country must not be cold so as to make it easy to raise orange trees there. That's consistent with the stimulus.

26. (E) Inference

Inference means "must be true," so hold your answer to a high standard and test it carefully.

This naggingly abstract analysis of common sense describes the concept as nothing more than a bunch of time-tested and useful—at least, useful at one time—theories. The author describes what it means to say that common sense "always progresses" (i.e., it's always absorbing new and even more useful theories to replace the outworn ones), while cautioning that the slow rate of absorption means that some of the obsolete theories are always around—until the new ones take over, presumably. Evaluate the choice and identify the four choices that can't be inferred:

(A) The pessimism here is unjustified; nothing in the paragraph suggests that some theories whose usefulness is as yet undemonstrated won't make their way into common sense eventually.

(B) It's a distortion to reduce common sense to "old, bad; newer, good." Any number of older theories—never replaced by newer ones because nothing more useful has ever come along—may be among the most useful of all.

(C) A theory's rapid absorption into common sense is prevented not by the rush of new theories, but because it has to be "tested over time" first.

(D) An old theory is replaced when a more useful one comes along. So the only old theories replaced are those that are less useful than a new theory, contrary to **(D)**'s assertion that every theory eventually gets replaced.

(E) As the only one left it must be inferable, and it is. **(E)** is referring to those "obsolete theories" already embodied in common sense, the ones that are less useful than those on their way in but not yet fully absorbed. Once the latter pass the test of time, they'll push out the old ones, yet there'll always be some other obsolete ones hanging around; the author so promises.

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