


# SmartDec



## Orbs Smart Contracts Security Analysis

This report is public.

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Abstract . . . . .	2
Disclaimer . . . . .	2
Summary . . . . .	2
General recommendations . . . . .	2
Checklist . . . . .	3
Procedure . . . . .	4
Checked vulnerabilities . . . . .	5
Project overview . . . . .	6
Project description . . . . .	6
The latest version of the code . . . . .	6
Project architecture . . . . .	6
Automated analysis . . . . .	7
Manual analysis . . . . .	8
Critical issues . . . . .	8
Medium severity issues . . . . .	8
Low severity issues . . . . .	8
CEI pattern violation . . . . .	8
Redundant code . . . . .	9
Extra gas consumption . . . . .	10
Code logic . . . . .	11
Compiler version . . . . .	11
Notes . . . . .	12
Gas limit and loops . . . . .	12
Appendix . . . . .	13
Code coverage . . . . .	13
Compilation output . . . . .	13
Tests output . . . . .	14
Ethlint output . . . . .	18

# Abstract

In this report, we consider the security of the [Orbs](#) project. Our task is to find and describe security issues in the smart contracts of the platform.

# Disclaimer

The audit does not give any warranties on the security of the code. One audit cannot be considered enough. We always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts. Besides, security audit is not an investment advice.

# Summary

In this report, we considered the security of Orbs smart contracts. We performed our audit according to the [procedure](#) described below.

The audit showed neither critical nor medium severity issues. However, a number of low severity issues were found.

All of the issues were fixed in [the latest version of the code](#).

# General recommendations

The contracts code is of high code quality. Therefore, we do not have any additional recommendations.

# Checklist

## Security

The audit showed no vulnerabilities.

Here by vulnerabilities we mean security issues that can be exploited by an external attacker. This does not include low severity issues, documentation mismatches, overpowered contract owner, and some types of bugs.



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## Compliance with the documentation

The audit showed no discrepancies between the code and the provided documentation.



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## Tests

The audit showed that the code was covered with tests sufficiently.



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The text below is for technical use; it details the statements made in Summary and General recommendations.

# Procedure

In our audit, we consider the following crucial features of the smart contract code:

1. Whether the code is secure.
2. Whether the code corresponds to the documentation (including whitepaper).
3. Whether the code meets best practices in efficient use of gas, code readability, etc.

We perform our audit according to the following procedure:

- automated analysis
  - we scan project's smart contracts with our own Solidity static code analyzer [SmartCheck](#)
  - we scan project's smart contracts with several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools such as [Remix](#), [Ethlint](#), [Solhint](#)
  - we manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by tools
- manual audit
  - we manually analyze smart contracts for security vulnerabilities
  - we check smart contracts logic and compare it with the one described in the documentation
  - we run tests and check code coverage
- report
  - we reflect all the gathered information in the report

# Checked vulnerabilities

We have scanned Orbs smart contracts for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that we considered (the full list includes them but is not limited to them):

- [Reentrancy](#)
- [Front running](#)
- [DoS with \(unexpected\) revert](#)
- [DoS with block gas limit](#)
- [Gas limit and loops](#)
- [Locked money](#)
- [Integer overflow/underflow](#)
- [Unchecked external call](#)
- [ERC20 Standard violation](#)
- [Authentication with tx.origin](#)
- [Unsafe use of timestamp](#)
- [Using blockhash for randomness](#)
- [Balance equality](#)
- [Unsafe transfer of ether](#)
- [Fallback abuse](#)
- [Using inline assembly](#)
- [Short address attack](#)
- [Private modifier](#)
- [Compiler version not fixed](#)
- [Style guide violation](#)
- [Unsafe type deduction](#)
- [Implicit visibility level](#)
- [Use delete for arrays](#)
- [Byte array](#)
- [Incorrect use of assert/require](#)
- [Using deprecated constructions](#)

# Project overview

## Project description

In our analysis we consider Orbs [specification](#) ("CONTRACT.md" in the repo) and [smart contracts' code](#) (version on commit 803d630dc802396cd1369424b8810e00cc3f9f8c).

## The latest version of the code

After the initial audit, some fixes were applied and the code was updated to the [latest version](#) (version on commit 92abd6b1dea152f958f1fc90afd03849e9f2f674). Also, the specification was updated ("CONTRACT.md" in the repo).

## Project architecture

For the audit, we were provided with the truffle project. The project is an npm package and includes tests.

- The project successfully compiles with `truffle compile` command (see [Compilation output](#) in [Appendix](#))
- The project successfully passes all the tests with 100% coverage

The total LOC of audited Solidity sources is 282.

# Automated analysis

We used several publicly available automated Solidity analysis tools. Here are the combined results of SmartCheck, Solhint, and Ethlint scanning. All the issues found by tools were manually checked (rejected or confirmed).

**True positives** are constructions that were discovered by the tools as vulnerabilities and can actually be exploited by attackers or lead to incorrect contracts operation.

**False positives** are constructions that were discovered by the tools as vulnerabilities but do not consist a security threat.

Cases when these issues lead to actual bugs or vulnerabilities are described in the next section.

Tool	Rule	True positives	False positives
SmartCheck	Costly loop	2	3
	Use of SafeMath		1
	Extra gas consumption	2	
	Unsafe array's length manipulation	1	
Total SmartCheck		5	4
Solhint	Compiler version 0.4.26 does not satisfy the 0.5.10 semver requirement		3
	Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic		3
Total Solhint		0	6
Ethlint	Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.timestamp').		3
Total Ethlint		0	3
Total Overall		5	13



# Manual analysis

The contracts were completely manually analyzed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the documentation. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified. All the confirmed issues are described below.

## Critical issues

Critical issues seriously endanger smart contracts security. We highly recommend fixing them.

**The audit showed no critical issues.**

## Medium severity issues

Medium issues can influence smart contracts operation in current implementation. We highly recommend addressing them.

**The audit showed no medium severity issues.**

## Low severity issues

Low severity issues can influence smart contracts operation in future versions of code. We recommend taking them into account.

## CEI pattern violation

**StakingContract.sol**, line 309:

```
require(token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this),
_totalAmount), "StakingContract::distributeRewards -
insufficient allowance");
```

There are a few state variables written after the external call (tokens' transfer). So this statement violates CEI pattern. We recommend moving tokens' transfer to the end of function where all the calculations are done.

*Comment from the developers: "We maintained the original code related to the CEI pattern item in StakingContract.sol, distributeRewards() as is as it makes the code more readable (first transferring the funds to the staking contract then distribute them), there's no reentrancy risk as the ORBS ERC20 is a standard ERC20."*

## Redundant code

There are a few duplicate getters:

- **StakingContract.sol**, lines 336–338:

```
function getStakeBalanceOf(address _stakeOwner) external  
view returns (uint256) {  
    return stakes[_stakeOwner].amount;  
}
```

At the same time `stakes` variable has `public` visibility level and a default getter as result.

- **StakingContract.sol**, lines 342–344:

```
function getTotalStakedTokens() external view returns  
(uint256) {  
    return totalStakedTokens;  
}
```

At the same time `totalStakedTokens` variable has `public` visibility level and a default getter as result.

- **StakingContract.sol**, lines 359–361:

```
function getToken() external view returns (IERC20) {  
    return token;  
}
```

At the same time `token` variable has `public` visibility level and a default getter as result.

We highly recommend changing variables' visibility levels to `internal` in order to remove redundant getters, improve code readability and transparency and decrease cost of deployment.

*The issues have been fixed and are not present in the latest version of the code.*

## Extra gas consumption

The following variables are read from the storage while there are equal memory variables:

- **StakingContract.sol**, line 124

```
emit MigrationManagerUpdated(migrationManager);
```

There is equal memory variable `_newMigrationManager`.

- **StakingContract.sol**, line 136

```
emit EmergencyManagerUpdated(emergencyManager);
```

There is equal memory variable `_newEmergencyManager`.

Reading from local memory requires significantly less gas compared to reading from the storage. Thus, we recommend using memory variables in order to reduce gas consumption.

The issues have been fixed and are not present in the latest version of the code.

The following variables are read from the storage on every iteration of the corresponding loops:

- **StakingContract.sol** line 148

```
for (uint i = 0; i < approvedStakingContracts.length; ++i)
```

- **StakingContract.sol**, line 168

```
while (i < approvedStakingContracts.length - 1)
```

Reading from local memory requires significantly less gas compared to reading from the storage. Thus, we recommend placing these variables into local memory in order to reduce gas consumption.

The issues have been fixed and are not present in the latest version of the code.

## Code logic

**StakingContract.sol**, lines 168-174:

```
while (i < approvedStakingContracts.length - 1) {
    approvedStakingContracts[i] = approvedStakingContracts[i
+ 1];
    i++;
}
delete approvedStakingContracts[i];
approvedStakingContracts.length--;
```

This algorithm is not gas efficient. Also, `pop()` array method is more safe way of removing arrays' elements. We recommend using the following algorithm: swap the required element with the last one, delete the last element using `.pop()` method.

*The issue has been fixed and is not present in the latest version of the code.*

## Compiler version

All Solidity files in the project start with

```
pragma solidity 0.4.26;
```

The most recent version as of the time of this writing is 0.5.13. We recommend using the latest compiler version, as newer versions include patches for recently discovered security vulnerabilities.

*The issue has been fixed and is not present in the latest version of the code.*

# Notes

## Gas limit and loops

The following loops traverse through arrays of variable length:

1. **StakingContract.sol**, line 313

```
for (uint i = 0; i < stakeOwnersLength; ++i)
```

2. **StakingContract.sol**, line 381

```
for (uint i = 0; i < stakeOwnersLength; ++i)
```

The traversed arrays are passed as functions parameters. Therefore, if there are too many items in these arrays, the execution of the corresponding functions will fail due to an out-of-gas exception.

In these cases, we recommend separating the calls into several transactions.

This analysis was performed by [SmartDec](#).

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# Appendix

## Code coverage

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
contracts/	100	100	100	100	
IMigratableStakingContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
IStakingContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
StakingContract.sol	100	100	100	100	
All files	100	100	100	100	

## Compilation output

```
Compiling your contracts...
=====
> Compiling ./contracts/IMigratableStakingContract.sol
> Compiling ./contracts/IStakingContract.sol
> Compiling ./contracts/StakingContract.sol
> Compiling ./contracts/tests/StakingContractWrapper.sol
> Compiling ./contracts/tests/TestERC20.sol
> Compiling openzeppelin-solidity/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol
> Compiling openzeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol
> Compiling openzeppelin-solidity/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
> Artifacts written to ./build/contracts
> Compiled successfully using:
- solc: 0.4.26+commit.4563c3fc.Emscripten.clang
```

## Tests output

```
Contract: StakingContract
  construction
    should not allow to create with a 0 cooldown
    should not allow to create with a 0 migration manager
    should not allow to create with a 0 emergency manager
    should not allow to create with a 0 token address
    should report version
    should correctly initialize fields
  setting of the migration manager
  as a regular account
    should not allow to set
  as a migration manager
    should set to a new address
    should not allow changing to 0
    should not allow changing to the same address
  setting of the emergency manager
  as a regular account
    should not allow to set
  as an emergency manager
    should set to a new address
    should not allow changing to 0
    should not allow changing to the same address
  adding/removal of migration destinations
  as a regular account
    should not allow adding a new contract
    should not allow removing of any contract
  as a migration manager
    should add new staking contracts
    should not allow adding a 0 address
    should not allow adding a duplicate contract
    should not allow adding more than 10 contracts
    should not allow adding again a previously removed contract
  ract
    should remove contracts
    should not allow adding a 0 address
    should revert when trying to remove a non-existing contract
  ract
  staking
  without a stake
    should allow staking
  accepting migration
    should allow staking on behalf of a different staker
    should not allow staking more tokens than the staker has
```

```

s
    should not allow staking 0 tokens
    should not allow staking more tokens than the staker has
on behalf of a different staker
    should not allow staking on behalf of a 0 address
distributing rewards
    should allow staking on behalf of different stakers in
batch
    should fail batch staking if token balance is insufficient
    should fail batch staking if total batch amount is incorrect
    should fail batch staking if stake owners and amounts lists
are in different sizes
    should fail batch staking if total token amount is 0
    should fail batch staking if one of the stake owners is a 0
address
    should fail batch staking if one of the stake amounts is a 0
s a 0
    should fail batch staking if called with empty lists
    should fail batch staking if unable to transfer with a stake
    should allow staking more tokens
with unstaked tokens
    should allow staking
with pending withdrawal
    should allow staking
after full withdrawal
    should allow staking
when stopped accepting new stake
    should not allow staking tokens
    should not allow staking tokens on behalf of a different
t staker
    should not allow staking on behalf of different stakers
in batch
    when released all stake
        should not allow staking tokens
        should not allow staking tokens on behalf of a different
t staker
    should not allow staking on behalf of different stakers
in batch
    unstaking
    without a stake
        should not allow unstaking
    with a stake

```



should allow partially unstaking of tokens  
should allow unstaking of all tokens  
should not allow unstaking of 0 tokens  
should not allow unstaking more tokens than the staker  
has staked  
with a pending withdrawal  
should not allow unstaking of more tokens  
after a full withdrawal  
should allow unstaking of more tokens  
when stopped accepting new stake  
should allow unstaking  
when released all stake  
should allow unstaking  
withdrawal  
without a stake  
should not allow withdrawal  
when released all stake  
should not allow withdrawal  
with a stake  
should not allow withdrawal  
with an unstaked stake  
should not allow withdrawal  
with a pending withdrawal  
should allow withdrawal of all unstaked tokens  
should not allow withdrawal if unable to transfer  
after full withdrawal  
should not allow withdrawal  
when stopped accepting new stake  
should allow withdrawal  
when released all stake  
should allow withdrawal of all unstaked tokens  
restaking  
without a stake  
should not allow restaking  
with a stake  
should not allow restaking  
with an unstaked stake  
should allow restaking  
pending withdrawal  
should allow restaking  
fully withdrawn  
should not allow restaking  
stopped accepting new stake  
should not allow restaking  
released all stake

- should not allow restaking
- migration to new staking contracts
- without a stake
- should not allow migration
- with a stake
- should allow migration
- should allow partial migration
- should only allow migration to an approved migration destination
- should not allow migration to a staking contract with a different token
- should not allow migration if unable to approve
- should not allow migration of 0 tokens
- should not allow migration of more than staked tokens
- with an unstaked stake
- should only migrate tokens not in cooldown
- with a pending withdrawal
- should only migrate tokens not in cooldown
- after a full withdrawal
- should only migrate tokens not in cooldown
- when stopped accepting new stake
- should allow migration
- when released all stake
- should not allow migration
- emergency operations
- as a regular account
- should not allow requesting to stop accepting new stake
- should not allow requesting to release all stakes
- should not allow batch withdrawal of all stakes
- as an emergency manager
- when stopped accepting new stake
- should stop accepting new stakes
- should not allow requesting to stop accepting new stakes again
- should allow requesting to release all stakes
- with an unstaked tokens
- when released all stake
- should allow withdrawal of all staked and unstaked tokens
- should not allow requesting to stop accepting new stake
- should not allow requesting again to release all stakes
- batch withdraw
- with an unstaked stakes
- should not allow batch withdrawal of all stakes
- when released all stake

```
    should allow batch withdrawal of all stakes
    should revert when trying to withdraw for a 0 address
    should revert when trying to withdraw for an address without any stake
```

```
100 passing (1m)
```

## Ethlint output

```
contracts/StakingContract.sol
   8:0      warning      Contract 'StakingContract' must be
preceded by 2 blank lines.
  103:4     warning      In case of more than 3 parameters,
drop each into its own line.
  119:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  131:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  142:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  144:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  149:20    error        Only use indent of 16 spaces.
  161:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  206:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  206:57    warning      Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.
timestamp').
  213:36    warning      Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.
timestamp').
  263:34    error        Opening brace must be on the line a
fter last modifier.
  264:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  279:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  281:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  297:35    error        Opening brace must be on the line a
fter last modifier.
  303:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  305:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  309:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  351:33    error        Opening brace must be on the line a
fter returns declaration.
  414:16    error        Only use indent of 12 spaces.
  433:49    warning      Avoid using 'now' (alias to 'block.
timestamp').
  458:34    error        Opening brace must be on the line a
```

```
fter returns declaration.
```

```
contracts/tests/StakingContractWrapper.sol
```

```
6:0      warning    Contract 'StakingContractWrapper' must be preceded by 2 blank lines.
```

```
8:114    warning    Code contains empty block
```

```
contracts/tests/TestERC20.sol
```

```
5:0      warning    Contract 'TestERC20' must be preceded by 2 blank lines.
```

```
18 errors, 8 warnings found.
```