

Introduction:

Secret sharing schemes are ideal for storing information that is highly sensitive and highly important. Secret sharing refers to methods for distributing a secret amongst a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient set T of shares are combined together when certain set show up, while other sets learn nothing about the secret. A secret sharing scheme realizes an access structure $f : 2^{[n]} \rightarrow \{0, m-1\}$ by guaranteeing that for each sufficient set of shares the secret is uniformly distributed over a set of 1 secret, and for each insufficient set of shares the secret distributed over set of $m-1$ potential secrets.

[IKS13] : **Fractional secret sharing** generalizes traditional secret sharing by allowing a fine-grained control over the amount of uncertainty about the secret. Fractional secret sharing scheme realizes a fractional access structure $f : 2^{[n]} \rightarrow \{0, \dots, m-1\}$ by guaranteeing that for each set $T \subseteq [n]$ of parties, the secret is uniformly distributed over a set of $f(T) + 1$ potential secrets.

Related work:

[I+13] : In the **STACS 13' paper** that introduced the concept, **Ishai et al** put forward a construction for symmetric access structures f , where $f(T)$ depends only on the size of T , with the quite efficient share size of $n \lceil \log(\max\{n, m\}) \rceil$. However, for other f , their secret complexity is $\Omega(s)$, such that s is the number of A sets, such that $f(A) < m-1$. For many families of access structure s is $2^{\Omega(n)}$.

Motivation:

In the proposed research we want a better understanding about the share complexity of fractional secret sharing for non-symmetric functions. For standard secret sharing scheme, more efficient constructions than $\Omega(s)$ are often known. We improve [I+13] construction, to get better share complexity for certain f 's.

Main ideas:

- Following [I+13], reduce fractional secret sharing to standard secret sharing scheme for $f^{-1}(k)$ for each k .
- [I+13] use a concrete secret sharing scheme for each $f^{-1}(k)$, which is very inefficient.
- Replace the scheme used for each k with the best known one. Better schemes than currently used are known for many cases. [I+13] already do it for symmetric access structures.
- We need efficient schemes for all k simultaneously.

Main result:

- We put forward a natural fractional access structure f , related to
- s-t-connectivity, which has an efficient fractional secret sharing.
- We construct a efficient scheme for $\bigcup_{j \leq k} f^{-1}(j)$ for each k .

Result details:

- Fractional access structure : fractional s-t-connectivity - $f : 2^{[n]} \rightarrow \{0, 1, m-1\}$, such that if there are no s-t path the secret distributed over set of $m-1$ potential secrets, if there is one s-t path the secret distributed over set of 2 potential secrets, and if there are two s-t paths the secret distributed over set of 1 secret.
- Construct a formula with $n^{O(\log(n))}$ leaves for each $f^{-1}(j < k)$.
- [BL88] : monotone formulas F for $f : 2^{[n]} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ (such that 0 is matching to $m-1$ and 1 is matching to 0 we mentioned before) \rightarrow secret sharing scheme of size $\#l(F)$, such that $\#l$ is the number of leaves in F .

How to construct a formula F ?

* Formula for two distinct paths $k=0$ is :

$$F = P^2(s, t)$$

$$P^2(s, t) = \bigvee_{i=1}^n P^2(u, v, m) \bigvee_{1 \leq m_1 < m_2 \leq n} (P^1(u, v, m_1) \wedge P^1(u, v, m_2))$$

$$P^1(u, v, m) = \bigvee_{w \in V} (P^1(u, w, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) \wedge P^1(w, v, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil))$$

$$P^2(u, v, m) = \bigvee_{w_1 \neq w_2, w_1, w_2 \in V} (P^1(u, w_1, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) \wedge P^1(w_1, v, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) \wedge P^1(u, w_2, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) \wedge P^1(w_2, v, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil))$$

$$\bigvee_{w \in V} (P^2(u, w, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) \wedge P^1(w, v, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil)) \bigvee_{w \in V} (P^1(u, w, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil) \wedge P^2(w, v, \lceil \frac{m}{2} \rceil))$$

* Formula for one path $k=1$ is already known : follows from the proof of Savitch's theorem.

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