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Land Operations
Part 4: Intelligence

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Foreword

The 21st century has brought new dimensions to war and its conduct but the principles of warfare remain enduring. Fundamentally the core purpose of land forces is the defeat of the enemy in armed conflict. Our Army has great utility across the continuum of competition, and soldiers are regularly employed in activity short of conflict. But we must never lose sight of the fact that **credible capability to fight and win wars** underpins deterrence of adversaries and our influence with allies and partners. It is the bedrock of a world-class British Army.

Understanding how to apply force and employ forces on land ensures that they will be ready and capable of success on operations. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *Land Operations* provides the basis of that understanding: the Army's way of operating and fighting. The six parts bring together our core principles with the doctrine for command, intelligence, protection, and sustainment; applicable across competition, crisis, and conflict.

ADP *Land Operations, Part 4: Intelligence* describes the principles and approach to the intelligence function. Intelligence enables the understanding, insight and foresight that are the lifeblood of an army on operations: learning and adapting, with judicious decision-making and effective action.

Our doctrine describes the fundamental principles we use to guide our actions. It represents our collective view of the best methods we have for using our current force; and it sets the scene for the delivery of Future Soldier. This version of ADP *Land Operations* is shorter and simpler than in previous years, with less detailed direction. I hope that brings clarity; but it also places more responsibility on all of us as professionals to **read it, understand it, and apply it with judgement**.

I commend ADP *Land Operations* to you.

Mark Carleton-Smith

Chief of the General Staff

May 2022

Preface

ADP *Land Operations, Part 4: Intelligence* provides the tactical-level intelligence doctrine in the land domain. The intelligence function provides commanders with analysis and understanding of the operating environment that supports their decision-making. This includes assessing the impact of environmental, enemy, adversary, friendly and neutral actors on concepts of operations and identifying the conditions required to achieve objectives. Beyond enabling understanding and supporting decision-making, intelligence also enables target acquisition.

Based on the commander's information requirements staff produce collection plans. The information collected is processed, analysed and developed into intelligence. The fundamentals required to achieve this are addressed within this publication.

- **Chapter 1 - Intelligence fundamentals.** Sets out the fundamentals of the intelligence function, covering purpose and principles. It outlines the categories of intelligence product and introduces the intelligence cycle (direction, collection, processing and dissemination).
- **Chapter 2 - Direction.** Explains the direction part of the intelligence cycle - intelligence requirements management and collection management.
- **Chapter 3 - Collection.** Explains the collection part of the intelligence cycle - focusing on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, collection disciplines and strategies, as well as an overview of intelligence capabilities.
- **Chapter 4 - Processing.** Explains the processing part of the intelligence cycle - guidance on processing the intelligence product.
- **Chapter 5 - Dissemination.** Explains the dissemination part of the intelligence cycle - dissemination considerations and reporting formats.
- **Chapter 6 - Intelligence planning.** Guidance on integrating intelligence into the planning process.

This part of ADP *Land Operations* forms part of a broader update to land tactical doctrine to ensure coherence with joint and allied doctrine developments while rationalising and simplifying the doctrine portfolio:

- **ADPs** provide the underpinning philosophy and core tenets of our approach to land tactical operations.
- **Army field manuals** provide broad guidance on the employment of land forces across the six operational themes and different environments.
- **Handbooks** provide detailed guidance on tactics, techniques and procedures for specific capabilities, levels of command and tactical activities.

ADP *Land Operations* is our capstone land tactical doctrine and is presented in six short parts that together provide the underpinning philosophy of our approach to land tactical operations. The series brings together the core tenets of our doctrine (the manoeuvrist approach, combined arms and mission command) with the principles and approaches for command, intelligence, protection and sustainment that are applicable at all levels and across all operational themes.

- **ADP *Land Operations, Part 1: Competition and Conflict*** explains the context of the contemporary operating environment and the purpose and roles of land forces.
- **ADP *Land Operations, Part 2: The Application of Land Power*** explains the core tenets of our doctrine and their application.
- **ADP *Land Operations, Part 3: Command*** explains the approach and principles of command and control.
- **ADP *Land Operations, Part 4: Intelligence*** explains the approach and principles for intelligence and understanding.
- **ADP *Land Operations, Part 5: Protection*** explains the approach and principles for protection, including understanding and managing risk.
- **ADP *Land Operations, Part 6: Sustainment*** explains the approach and principles for the sustainment of land operations.

ADP *Land Operations* parts 1 and 2 provide the core of land tactical doctrine; they are essential reading for all commanders and staff.

ADP Land Operations


ADP Pt 1: Competition and Conflict


ADP Pt 2: The Application of Land Power


ADP Pt 3: Command


ADP Pt 4: Intelligence


ADP Pt 5: Protection


ADP Pt 6: Sustainment

Operational Themes


AFM Conventional Warfare


AFM Irregular Warfare


AFM Stability and PSO


AFM Engagement


AFM HADR


AFM Homeland Resilience

Environmental Themes


AFM Urban Operations


AFM Forest Operations


AFM Cold Weather Operations


AFM Mountain Operations


AFM Desert Operations


AFM Jungle Operations

Tactical Handbooks

- Corp/Div HB
- Brigade HB
- Battlegroup HB
- Subunit HB
- Fires HB

- Irregular Warfare HB
- Military Assistance Operations HB

- Stability HB
- Peace Support Operations HB

- HADR HB
- NEO HB

- Engagement HB

- Homeland Resilience HB

- PEHB
- SOHB
- SOCs

- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance HB

- C-ISR HB
- C-Air Threat HB
- CEMA HB
- C-CBRN HB

- Survivability HB
- C-Explosive Threat HB
- Personnel Recovery HB
- C-Insider Threat HB

- Force Mounting HB
- Force Recovery HB
- Force Rehabilitation HB
- Theatre Entry HB

- Divisional Sustainment HB
- Brigade Sustainment HB
- Battlegroup Sustainment HB

Contents

CHAPTER 1
Intelligence fundamentals

Introduction

1-01. The tactical functions of command and intelligence set and maintain the direction of an operation. Intelligence is a critical enabler of understanding,[1] the application of the manoeuvrist approach and decision-making. It requires early investment and whole staff buy-in to yield best results and enable effective decision-making in land operations.

1-02. Intelligence is defined as the product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information about the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision makers.[2] As a tactical function it encompasses the activities of commanders, staff, and collection assets to generate intelligence products.

1-03. The intelligence function provides, supports, and sustains understanding by providing context to the environment and the adversary, enabling pre-emptive decision-making and decisive action. Understanding helps commanders to make decisions, manage risks, and anticipate the consequences of tactical action. Understanding allows the effective application of fighting power and must include:

- **a.** The context, including the drivers and character of competition and conflict.
- **b.** The opponent, their perceptions, motivations, strengths, and weaknesses.
- **c.** The operating environment in physical, information and human terms, including the relevant actors and audiences.
- **d.** Own capabilities and weaknesses, and the capabilities of allies and partners.

1-04. Understanding is a continuous process; every action will result in a reaction, altering the behaviours and perceptions of the opponent, other actors and audiences, the character of the operating environment and the aim of an operation itself. Commanders need to anticipate the likely outcomes and consequences of their actions and be ready to adapt accordingly.

1-05. Intelligence is the product of a continuous process that directly supports command. Understanding of a commander's information requirements drives intelligence collection efforts that acquire data and information to answer those requirements. The acquired data and information are processed and fused with existing intelligence to develop and maintain the common intelligence picture as a key element of the common operating picture. Intelligence must provide commanders with timely, accurate, predictive, and relevant intelligence and recommendations that contribute to effective decision-making.

1 The importance of understanding is discussed in depth in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04, *Understanding and Decision-making*.

2 NATO*Term*.

Principles

1-06. The principles of intelligence provide guidance for the planning and provision of intelligence for land operations and are set out below:

a. **Accessibility.** Intelligence staff process relevant information and intelligence so that it is readily available to intelligence consumers. Intelligence is of no value if it is not accessible to those who require it.

b. **Sharing.** Mechanisms are needed whereby intelligence can be shared, in a timely manner, within NATO and with non-NATO entities, guided by the idea of need to share in accordance with security policy. The source of the information might be protected and the information itself might be sanitised to protect the source to share information with others. NATO information exchange and classification procedures must encourage and enable concerted effort, collaboration, and cooperation wherever possible.

c. **Responsiveness.** The intelligence staff, supporting agencies and nations must be proactive to meet intelligence requirements. Intelligence staff should be able to quickly analyse, fuse, process and present products for non-military and military decision makers.

d. **Flexibility.** The intelligence staff should establish an overall picture that provides timely, relevant, integrated, and focused intelligence, suited to evolving security challenges. This requires a robust intelligence structure that can support intelligence-driven operations.

e. **Interoperability.** Common or interoperable processes, networks, and systems support intelligence direction, collection, processing and dissemination, and the management of the intelligence organisation. Central coordination of intelligence assets avoids duplication of effort, provides mutual support, and ensures the efficient, economic use of all resources.

f. **Comprehensive.** Intelligence should be comprehensive in nature and should explain the interrelated elements of a complex operating environment in an unbiased and undistorted manner. It should also consider the situation from the perspective of key actors, thus improving the predicative content of any assessment.

g. **Continuous refinement.** Intelligence is continuously reviewed and, where necessary, revised to consider new information received. Also, underlying requirements and the allocation of resources is continuously reviewed to ensure that the intelligence effort at all levels is aligned with assigned priorities and that collection and processing capabilities are adequate to service an evolving operational environment.

Levels of intelligence

1-07. Notwithstanding the ethos of intelligence with no boundaries, categorising intelligence into levels provides a helpful indicator of its function and helps to scope the resource requirements. Such a categorisation does not imply ownership or limit relevance and utility to a specific level of command. There are three levels of intelligence: strategic, operational, and tactical. Intelligence must flow between these levels:

a. **Strategic intelligence.** Strategic intelligence is intelligence required for the formation of policy, military planning and the provision of indications and warnings at the national and/or international levels.[3]

3 NATO*Term*.

b. **Operational intelligence.** Operational intelligence is intelligence required for the planning and conduct of campaigns at the operational level.[4]

c. **Tactical intelligence.** Tactical intelligence is intelligence required for the planning and execution of operations at the tactical level.[5]

Intelligence architecture

1-08. **Single intelligence environment.** The single intelligence environment is the way UK Defence describes an architecture that improves coherence between operational levels. It relies on common applications, processes, and well-trained people to enable data driven decisions. The single intelligence environment consists of Permanent Joint Headquarters, single Services, Directorate Special Forces, partners across government, academia, and allies and partners. It is defined in JDP 2-00, *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* as the overall space, conditions, and surroundings within which the military intelligence structure interfaces and operates with other national and international information and intelligence agencies to support decision makers at all levels.

1-09. **Defence Intelligence.** Defence Intelligence is the main provider of strategic intelligence to the armed forces. Defence Intelligence supports partners across government with advice and intelligence assessments. These include the Government Communications Headquarters, the Secret Intelligence Service, and the Security Service. Defence Intelligence are responsible for the single intelligence environment into which the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre act as the conduit for the land component contribution.

1-10. **Land intelligence structure.** A well-structured and coherent architecture underpins successful intelligence operations. Unlike a command and control structure this deals with relationships, linkages, and coordination rather than direction and authority. The Land Intelligence Fusion Centre leads the land component's intelligence structure and is the primary interface with Defence Intelligence and partners across government. Divisional information manoeuvre groups coordinate divisional intelligence capabilities (both organic and non-organic) and providing the link from the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre to brigade combat teams and battlegroups.

4 NATO*Term.*
5 NATO*Term.*



Figure 1-1. Land intelligence structure - organisations linked via the single intelligence environment

1-11. **Land Intelligence Fusion Centre.** The fusion centre provides all source intelligence support to the land component's understanding. The land intelligence priority list guides the focus of tactical intelligence. The fusion centre conducts horizon scanning and intelligence monitoring to maintain situational awareness and understanding against these priorities. This ensures that when Defence deploys a land component the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre can quickly work up briefings for commanders of theatre entry forces.

Vignette 1 - The Targeting Coordination Group in Northern Ireland

The intelligence structure established in Northern Ireland in 1969 had changed little since 1916. Indeed, the mistakes of 1916 were replicated in 1969 with a failure to: link military and civilian intelligence agencies; and to understand and agree the roles of the agencies, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the Army. Initially, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Army ran several intelligence-gathering units with similar, but discrete, functions, as did the national intelligence and security agencies. There was little coordination between the units, resulting in missed opportunities, duplication of effort and even an own goal. Consequently, in 1979 Sir Maurice Oldfield reviewed intelligence and designed a single coordination point for all covert units and the wider security forces that were able to react in a timely way and ensure the most appropriate intelligence capability was applied to resulting exploitation. The targeting coordination group was the result.

Categories of intelligence product

1-12. Intelligence products must reflect their intended use and fall into one of the following categories:

a. **Basic intelligence.** Intelligence derived from any source, that may be used as reference material for planning and as a basis for processing subsequent information or intelligence.[6] Basic intelligence is fused from all available data, information, joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance reports, single-source intelligence and all-source intelligence and it is the baseline for developing current intelligence.

b. **Current intelligence.** Intelligence which reflects the current situation at either strategic or tactical level.[7] It can offer greater granularity than basic intelligence but is perishable because it reflects a moment in time.

c. **Predictive intelligence.** Predictive intelligence (formerly known as applied intelligence) provides direct support to the decision-making process.[8] It draws on basic and current intelligence to meet specific and normally predictive intelligence requirements. It informs forecasting and warning, as well as including assessment of an adversary's probable courses of action and how to influence audiences.

1-13. In summary basic intelligence informs our baseline understanding, while current intelligence offers a view of the actual situation at present. Predictive intelligence forecasts what the situation might be at a given time in the future.

The intelligence cycle

1-14. Intelligence is the product of a continuous process that encompasses the activities of commanders, staff, and collection assets to generate intelligence products to support the command function. The intelligence cycle describes the process used and is a continuous cycle of direction, collection, processing, and dissemination. These are NATO-defined terms. Figure 1-2 explains in more detail:

a. **Direction.** Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.[9]

b. **Collection.** The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.[10]

c. **Processing.** The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.[11]

d. **Dissemination.** The timely conveyance of intelligence, in a suitable form and by any suitable means, to those who need it.[12]

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6 NATO*Term.*
7 NATOTerm.
8 JDP 0-01.1, *UK Terminology Supplement to NATOTerm.*
9 NATO*Term.*
10 NATO*Term.*
11 NATO*Term.*
12 NATO*Term.*



CCIR	commander's critical information requirements	**ISTAR**	intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
CCIRM	commander's critical information requirements matrix		
IPE	intelligence preparation of the environment	**PIR**	priority intelligence requirement
IR	information requirement	**RFI**	request for information

Figure 1-2. The intelligence cycle

1-15. The commander's information requirements drive the intelligence cycle. This informs the direction to acquire data and information from various sources to fulfil the commander's priority intelligence requirements. The acquired data and information are processed and fused with existing intelligence to maintain the common intelligence picture as a key element of the common operating picture. Intelligence must provide decision makers and commanders with timely, accurate, predictive, and relevant intelligence and recommendations that contribute to effective decision-making.

Intelligence responsibilities

1-16. Intelligence is fundamental to the planning and conduct of land operations. To enable the commander and their intelligence staff to focus intelligence effort, areas of intelligence responsibility, areas of intelligence interest and areas of interest are established. These areas are not only geospatial in nature but may also include other area such as culture, politics, demography, economics, and importantly information given the universal presence of the internet and communications media as a global lever of influence. Figure 1-3 outlines the relationship between these areas.



Figure 1-3. The intelligence relationship to planning and conduct of land operations

1-17. **Area of intelligence responsibility.** The area of intelligence responsibility is the area for which a commander has the responsibility to provide intelligence with the means available. The capabilities of the collection assets at the commander's immediate disposal, of which range and availability are the principal factors, limit the size of the area of intelligence responsibility. Both these factors influence where the commander directs the main effort of the intelligence staff. An intelligence preparation of the environment will be conducted within the area of intelligence, identifying named areas of interest, target areas of interest, and decision points. The decision support overlay and decision support overlay matrix use these to prompt the tasking of assets through the intelligence collection plan. An area of intelligence responsibility will be assigned to commanders to define their area of operations for intelligence.

1-18. **Area of intelligence interest.** The area of intelligence interest is a geographical area for which a commander requires intelligence on the factors and developments that may affect the outcome of operations. The commander may require intelligence from outside the area of intelligence responsibility if it is likely to influence the plan for the current operation or if it could affect future operations. As the commander is unlikely to be able to acquire this intelligence through their own collection systems, the intelligence staff must request it from higher or flanking formations. Information and intelligence acquired outside the area of intelligence responsibility should be disseminated to those other formations or units to whom it may be of interest.

1-19. **Area of interest.** The area of interest is defined as the area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, and which includes the commander's areas of influence, operations or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.[13] This area also includes areas occupied by adversary forces that could jeopardise the accomplishment of the mission.

13 NATO*Term.*

Key points

- The intelligence function provides, supports, and sustains understanding by providing context to the environment and the adversary, enabling pre-emptive decision-making and decisive action.
- Intelligence is the product of a continuous process that directly supports command and answer a commander's information requirements.
- The principles of intelligence are accessibility, sharing, responsiveness, flexibility, interoperability, comprehensive, and continuous refinement.
- The single intelligence environment describes an architecture, relying on common applications and processes, which improves coherence between operational levels. It consists of Permanent Joint Headquarters, single Services, Directorate Special Forces, partners across government, academia, and allies and partners.
- The intelligence cycle describes the process used and is a continuous cycle of direction; collection; processing; and dissemination.
- Defined areas of intelligence responsibility, within areas of intelligence interest, focus intelligence efforts. These areas are geospatial, but can also cover broader aspects such as culture, politics, demography, economics, and importantly information.

CHAPTER 2
Direction

Overview

2-01. Direction is the determination of intelligence requirements, planning of the collection effort, issue of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies. The intelligence estimate provides the products necessary to support planning and operations, including:

- **a.** Adversary situation overlays with associated course of action statements and high-value target lists and often including high pay-off target lists.
- **b.** Event templates and event matrices.
- **c.** Modified combined arms obstacle overlay products, terrain effects appreciations and terrain assessments.
- **d.** Weather forecasts, light tables, mobility effects charts, light/illumination tables, space weather forecasts, weather estimates.
- **e.** Political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information and areas, structures, capabilities, organisations, people, and events (civil considerations) overlays and change tracking informed by civil consideration assessments and relevant overlays.

2-02. In the context of the intelligence cycle in land operations, direction occurs at four levels:

- **a.** The commander's direction to the intelligence staff to provide intelligence on matters of concern formally expressed as priority intelligence requirements.
- **b.** Formation intelligence staff (as the functional authority for intelligence) issuing staff direction to the formation's units establishing priorities for collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence.
- **c.** Direction to collectors via the intelligence annex to an operation order, a collection plan, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance matrix or a request for information.
- **d.** Release of collection assets and retasking following fulfilment of a request for information or collection task, a change in collection priority, or a dynamic retasking.

Information requirements

2-03. A gap in knowledge will lead to a question which will take the form of information requirements and intelligence requirements. The commander should be as specific as possible and place these in order of priority. The commander should also make clear their intent so that the staff understand the priorities within the context of the overall mission. Information and intelligence requirements comprise:

a. **Information requirements.** Information about an adversary or potentially hostile actors and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that needs to be collected and processed to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.[14] They consist of:

(1) **Specific information requirements.** Specific information requirements describe the information required, the location where the required information can be collected and the time during which they can be collected.

(2) **Essential elements of information.** Commander's critical information requirements can be broken down into more manageable essential information requirements, which clarify points for collection and analysis. They are bounded by time and location and provide focused specific questions or tasks for collectors.

(3) **Request for information.** A unit can issue an information requirement to another organisation as a request for information when it does not have sufficient allocated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources.

b. **Itelligence requirements.** Statements that provides the rationale and priority for intelligence activity, and the detail to allow the intelligence staff to satisfy the requirements in the most effective manner.[15] They articulate gaps in knowledge that must be filled so that a commander can conduct planning. Intelligence requirements may be further categorised as:

(1) **Priority intelligence requirements.** Some intelligence requirements will be critical to the planning and conduct of operations. These are designated priority intelligence requirements. They are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has a stated priority for planning and decision-making.

(2) **Enduring intelligence requirements.** Intelligence requirements that require regular and repeated satisfaction over time.[16]

2-04. Direction and guidance enable the conduct of the intelligence estimate to support planning and operations; the *Operational Intelligence Handbook* provides further detail.

Intelligence requirements management and collection management

2-05. Within the direction stage of the intelligence cycle, intelligence requirements management is the main internal activity for the G2 staff and provides the gearing into collection management. Collection management directly supports both intelligence and the operations process.

2-06. **Intelligence requirements management.** The management of intelligence requirements is a G2-led function. Intelligence requirements management is a function that validates, refines, and prioritises intelligence requirements. It determines if these requirements can be answered by existing products. Intelligence requirements management ensures the quality control of the processed outputs and oversees dissemination of the products or results. This management occurs at all levels and is an integral function within the direction stage of the intelligence cycle.

14 NATO*Term.*
15 NATO*Term.*
16 New UK definition in JDP 2-00, *Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations* and awaiting approved status by NATO.

2-07. **Collection management.** Collection management is a G3-led process. Collection management is a staff function converting intelligence requirements and requests for information into collection requirements. The process prioritises these collection requirements, tasking appropriate collection capabilities, or commands monitoring the results, and retasking where necessary. This process must consider the availability of assets, sensor coverage, environmental conditions, and communications capabilities to make the best use of the collection capabilities. Its purpose is to coordinate the collection of all necessary data while ensuring the efficient use of limited and valuable collection assets.

2-08. **Responsibilities.** G2 plans in a formation command post is normally tasked with preparing the initial collection plan for each operation or phase. The G2 intelligence requirements and collection management staff officer oversees the collection plan by submitting information collection requests to the G3 and external intelligence staff. This requires coordinating with other collection plan staff to determine information collection resource availability and information available from other sources.

2-09. **Information management.** Although information management appears under the direction phase of the intelligence cycle, it is a continuous process throughout the intelligence cycle. Information management is enabled by technology but requires qualified human oversight to ensure timely analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of relevant information in support of operations.

Vignette 2 - Operation HERRICK (from COS 19 Bde 2009)

Question: How good was the intelligence you received?

Answer: 'Intelligence was not good and did not support planning. This goes back to the structural point that I made earlier; we are set up to exploit our higher formation's understanding, rather than exploiting the realities on the ground. The OISG concentrated on areas like TOP SECRET and HUMINT rather than the practical information on how the population makes decisions. In Panchai Palang we needed to know things like who ran the markets in Babaji and what their links were to the authorities and the Taliban, but the official J2 structure and ISTAR platforms were unable to do that. In my view, the OISG analysts would have been better employed analysing unit and subunit information instead. The two times we got the best intelligence for Panchai Palang were when one of the SO1s walked into a refugee camp and asked, "who comes from Babaji?" and when the Light Dragoons were in contact. Because the intelligence analysts were looking upwards, we were slow to learn from what the troops on the ground were facing. Nearly everything we have discovered since 2006 has been reactive, yet we remain structured to believe that clarity of vision comes from the top down not from the bottom up. HERRICK has been one very long recce-by-fire, without a command and planning structure designed to learn from what it has seen. Crucially, the blame for this must not be laid solely on the J2 organisations. It is for commanders to be clear on what they need to know.'

Key points

- Direction is the determination of intelligence requirements, planning of the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.
- A gap in knowledge will lead to a question which will take the form of information requirements and intelligence requirements.
- Intelligence requirements management is the main internal activity for the G2 staff and provides the gearing into collection management.

CHAPTER 3
Collection

Overview

3-01. Collection is the gathering of information to allow processing into intelligence. It is defined as the exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.[17] In some cases, collection activities will not be required because data can be retrieved from archives or databases. Collection assets are referred to as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

3-02. Intelligence is a product derived from processed information. This is achieved by collecting information through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity. This activity is continuous and helps in developing the understanding of commanders. At the tactical level, this activity can be summarised as **find to understand**.

3-03. The term intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance is only used at the tactical level. It uses the output from the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance process to support tactical activity. It focuses on gathering intelligence on targets against which the commander wishes to have an effect. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance activity can be summarised as **find to strike**. The terms intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance are inextricably linked, but it is important to understand the differences in the terminology, summarised below:

a. **Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.** Defined as a set of capabilities used to synchronise and integrate the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the resulting information in direct support of the planning, preparation and execution of operations.[18]

b. **Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.** Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance focuses on gathering intelligence on targets against which the commander wishes to have an effect. It is defined as the coordinated acquisition, processing and dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information and intelligence which supports the targeting and the integration of effects, enabling commanders to achieve their goals throughout the spectrum of conflict.

17 NATO*Term.*
18 Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 2.7, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.*

Collection techniques

3-04. **Surveillance.** Surveillance is systematic observation over extended periods. It is defined by NATO as the systematic observation across all domains, places, persons, or objects by visual, electronic, photographic, or other means. When sustained over extended periods surveillance identifies trends, patterns of life and habits which leads to deeper understanding of other potentially threatening activities or behaviour. The key requirements for successful surveillance are the ability to respond to the intelligence gained in a timely manner and to offer a degree of continuity through persistence. The role of surveillance is to provide early warning of an enemy's activity or intent. It can be coarse-grained over a wide area, or fine-grained to cover a particular location or facility.

3-05. **Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance complements surveillance by obtaining specific information within a specific area.[19] It is defined by NATO as a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an adversary or to obtain data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area.[20] Reconnaissance operations are generally more short term in nature than surveillance operations because collection capabilities are limited by time or endurance. Reconnaissance forces conduct patrolling, scouting, screening, and static observation posts as part of their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance role. They also conduct route marking, guiding, flank protection and rear area security.

3-06. **Target acquisition.** Target acquisition is the detection, identification and location of a target or target set in enough detail to allow the effective application of lethal or non-lethal effects.

3-07. **Monitoring.** Monitoring supports the development or maintenance of situational awareness, pattern of life or atmospherics of a geographical area, activity, or situation. Monitoring, information gathering, and reporting involves all military personnel as well as specialists.

Land intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities

3-08. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities support the collection phase of the intelligence cycle and contribute to fulfilling the collection requirements. These produce results derived from single-source collection disciplines that fulfil a collection requirement. The results of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activity are processed within the intelligence cycle to satisfying the collection requirement. The cycle produces all-source intelligence products that have been fused and analysed by intelligence analysts with information from all intelligence collection disciplines and from additional sources.

3-09. **Land collection capabilities.** The land component employs a range of capabilities with a primary role to support collection of information. These capabilities focus on collection, employing one or more of the techniques listed above.

19 Detailed information can be found in the *Ground Reconnaissance Tactics Handbook*.
20 NATO*Term*.

a. **Armoured cavalry regiment.** Predominantly conducting reconnaissance by stealth and often performing enabling tasks such as flank protection, route selection and providing screens or guards.

b. **Light cavalry regiment.** As above, with reduced protection but greater operational mobility, and the ability to interact with the local population due to the open architecture of their vehicles.

c. **Reconnaissance platoons.** The organic reconnaissance capability for battlegroups. They can be task-organised to include Javelin (command launch unit sight), portable surveillance and target acquisition devices, and snipers to form an intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance group.

d. **Surveillance and target acquisition patrols.** The surveillance and target acquisition regiment provide patrols to support divisional operations and staff in the divisional command post. The patrols' primary role is to conduct **find**, **understand**, and **strike** in the divisional deep battlespace.

e. **Military intelligence.** The role of the Intelligence Corps is to provide specialist intelligence and security capability to the Army and Defence. They have expertise across the intelligence disciplines.

f. **Fire support teams.** The teams can observe and track targets using Firestorm and portable surveillance and target acquisition devices. They can call for fire from air, aviation, artillery, mortars, multiple-launch rocket system, naval gunfire support and Exactor.

g. **Engineer reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance of natural and artificial features provides the commander with mobility and counter-mobility information and contributes to determining routes and going for wheeled and tracked vehicles. They also contribute to combined arms obstacle planning.

h. **Human terrain reconnaissance.** Conducting reconnaissance of the human environment including its political, social, and cultural aspects.

i. **Defence Human Intelligence Unit.** Although not under direct command of the land component, the unit provides specialist human intelligence operators and field human intelligence teams to support a joint task force, both ahead of and during an operation.

j. **Human environment reconnaissance analysis.** The coordination of multiple collection and analysis capabilities such as human terrain reconnaissance, outreach, and information activities, to provide targeted insight into the human terrain to support a commander's information requirements and decision-making cycle.

k. **Defence Cultural Specialist Unit.** The unit holds teams of cultural specialist operators at readiness to deploy alongside the land component and provides support across Defence as required. A Defence Cultural Specialist Unit team deploys to a divisional command post to provide an enhanced understanding of the human terrain of an operational theatre to support campaign continuity, operational planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of effort. A team consists of those with a deep cultural knowledge at the tactical level, human terrain analysts and cultural specialists with language skills.

l. **Air and aviation reconnaissance.** Conducted by rotary and fixed-wing tactical aircraft. Non-dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms can also be used if the platform is able to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance alongside its main role.

m. **Uncrewed aircraft systems.** Also referred to as remotely piloted aircraft systems, they have utility at all levels of command. The Royal Artillery provides one tactical uncrewed aircraft systems regiment in support of divisional operations. The regiment operates electro-optical and infrared sensors and a synthetic aperture radar/ground-moving target indicator capability. These provide the land component with real-time surveillance and imagery intelligence at range, enabling collection efforts beyond the range of optical sights mounted of crewed platforms. The Royal Artillery also provides one mini uncrewed air system regiment in support of brigade operations. Nano and micro uncrewed air systems are used at the lower-tactical level.

n. **Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance engineer** regiment provides specialist counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance support to UK Defence, including point and area reconnaissance. This is a joint force activity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability will be allocated to the land component at division level.

o. **Military police.** Conduct reconnaissance alongside Royal Engineers to determine route suitability.

p. **Geographic support.** The divisional geographic cell provides geographic support to the divisional command post. The cell provides geospatial information in the form of mapping, satellite imagery and geospatial overlay data and geospatial intelligence, including terrain analysis when required. The cell also provides web-mapping services. It is likely that the division's core geographic cell will receive augmentation by personnel and equipment from other Defence geospatial agencies to suit the operation. This could include meteorological staff, a forward map depot or technical support from Royal Engineers.

3-10. **Joint and coalition collection.** Other agencies collect information from a variety of sources, available on request to intelligence staff and units deployed on operations.

3-11. **Sensors.** Land forces collection capabilities employ a range of sensors, including:

a. **Ground-moving target indicator.** These sensors allow detection, location and tracking of moving targets. Ground-moving target indicator radars are predominantly mounted on air platforms. Tactical uncrewed aircraft systems such as Watchkeeper (ground-moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar) and portable surveillance target acquisition radar used by snipers and fire support teams can track moving vehicles and fall of shot.

b. **Synthetic aperture radar.** All-weather sensors provide detailed imagery of large areas, generating imagery of static or relocatable targets. Often mounted on airborne platforms.

c. **Electro-optical.** Sensors which operate in the visual range of the electromagnetic spectrum and capture still images and full motion video.

d. **Infrared.** Sensors which rely on temperature difference between object and its surroundings.

e. **Weapon-locating radar.** Locate the signatures of indirect fire either passively (acoustic) or actively (radar). The sensor will find the point of origin and the point of impact of the projectile. Sensors can also detect and track some uncrewed aircraft systems.

f. **Air defence radar.** The air defence group use the land environment air picture provided by radar to detect, identify, and track aircraft. This creates a local air picture to provide information for the air defence control network.

g. **Acoustic weapon location.** The Royal Artillery surveillance and target acquisition regiment provide counter-fires capability through their radar and sound-ranging platforms.

h. **Electromagnetic warfare and signals intelligence.** 3 (UK) Division is supported by one electromagnetic warfare and signals intelligence regiment. It delivers persistent ground-based collection through a mixture of systems to deliver tactical electromagnetic warfare and signals intelligence. This includes electronic surveillance and electronic attack. The regiment can also provide a deployed command post enabling access to joint and strategic level signals intelligence, offensive and defensive electromagnetic warfare, and national cyber and electromagnetic activity capabilities.

3-12. **Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and collection management.** The collection management process balances requirements from all requestors against available assets to ensure the most efficient use of the capability. The staff maintain and feed the collection management process with an understanding of what capabilities, assets, and sensors are available for tasking.

Collection disciplines

3-13. Intelligence collection disciplines are the means or systems used to observe and record or convey information. There may be occasions when intelligence is based on product from one discipline, but it is important to employ more than one discipline, leading to effective all-source analysis. The six intelligence collection disciplines are:

a. **Geospatial intelligence.** Imagery and geo-referenced data.

b. **Human intelligence.** Collected by human sources, e.g. field unit, Defence engagement, and routine patrolling. Human intelligence is a spectrum with clear delineation between human intelligence activities and framework activities.

(1) **Human intelligence activities.** Collection requiring specialist human intelligence skills employing trained and qualified personnel as their primary task, e.g. Defence Human Intelligence Unit.

(2) **Framework activities.** Collection requiring only basic human intelligence skills by personnel as part of their normal duties, e.g. routine patrolling.

c. **Imagery intelligence.** Electro-optical/infrared and radar (synthetic aperture radar and ground-moving target indication). Also ground-penetrating radar, ultrasound, and magnetic resonance.

d. **Measurement and signature intelligence.** From scientific and technical analysis using sensors, e.g. acoustic sound-ranging. Acoustic intelligence is a subdiscipline of measurement and signature intelligence.

e. **Open-source intelligence.** Open-source, publicly available and other unclassified sources.

f. **Signals intelligence.** Exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum - both signals and emissions. Comprises communications intelligence and electronic intelligence.

3-14. **Materiel and personnel exploitation.** Materiel and personnel exploitation are the exploitation of materiel and personnel by scientific, technical and specialist intelligence activities of information gathered by a range of means. Materiel and personnel exploitation contribute to understanding by embracing technological or human techniques and forensics to provide a picture of individuals and their patterns of behaviour.



Figure 3-1. Materiel and personnel exploitation components

3-15. **Specialist Group Military Intelligence.** The specialist group is a nationally recruited pool of professionally trained reservists whose expertise augment the materiel and personnel exploitation capabilities. It provides specialist information and intelligence around regional, technical, or thematic intelligence requirements through a network of specialists. Specialist Group Military Intelligence reservists are force-generated as required.

3-16. **Counter-intelligence.** Defined as activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organisations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

Collection strategies

3-17. A single collection sensor is normally insufficient to collect and corroborate the information required; a mix of capabilities is usually more appropriate. Outlined below are the main collection strategies available to collection managers:

a. **Massing.** The application of several similar collection assets to cover the same area.

b. **Layering.** Coverage achieved by different capabilities and sensors.

c. **Soaking.** Persistent surveillance through continuous and unbroken observation.

d. **Nesting.** Ensuring that a request for information has not been duplicated at a higher or lower-level command post. Hence a subordinate command post's intelligence collection plan must nest within the higher command post's intelligence collection plan.

e. **Cross-cueing.** The deliberate handover of a task to a nominated unit, system, or person.

f. **Detect remotely.** Use of stand-off and uncrewed collection sensors to detect information at reach.

g. **Reconnaissance by stealth.** Covert action to ensure the protection of scarce, high-value assets such as ground-manned reconnaissance.

Key points

- Collection is the gathering of information for processing into intelligence.
- Information is collected through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity for processing into intelligence. At the tactical level, this activity can be summarised as **find to understand**.
- The term intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance is only used at the tactical level and can be summarised as **find to strike**.
- Land intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities employ a range of sensors across the full spectrum of collection disciplines.
- A collection strategy will normally be employed to collect information.

CHAPTER 4
Processing

Processing intelligence product

4-01. Processing turns the data and information collected into an intelligence product that decision makers can draw on to inform their choices and actions. This entails two distinct tasks. Processing is concerned with understanding what the data and information mean and their credibility. It is the conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation:

a. **Collation.** Collation is the first step in the processing phase in which the grouping together of related items of information or intelligence provides a record of events, which supports further processing.

b. **Evaluation.** Evaluation is the second step in the processing phase and consists of the appraisal of an item of information in respect to the reliability of the source and the credibility of the information. There are many reasons, including deception and subjectivity, why information may not be reliable or accurate. Information receives a reliability and a credibility score which when combined produces an alphanumeric rating for an individual piece of information that indicates the degree of confidence placed on it. The accepted grading for allocating ratings for reliability and credibility is the NATO intelligence grading system. The system captures the separate judgements of reliability and credibility in a single table with reliability graded from A to F and credibility from 1 to 6.

Reliability of the source	Credibility of the information
A Completely reliable	**1 Confirmed by other sources**
B Usually reliable	**2 Probably true**
C Fairly reliable	**3 Possibly true**
D Not usually reliable	**4 Doubtful**
E Unreliable	**5 Improbable**
F Reliability cannot be judged	**6 Truth cannot be judged**

Figure 4-1. The NATO intelligence grading system

c. **Analysis.** Analysis is the third step in the processing phase. Information is reviewed to identify the significance of data and information for decision makers, their wider understanding, and specific decisions. It is the value-adding step in the intelligence process. Analysis is an exercise of judgement in conditions of uncertainty to consider degrees of probability. Uncertainty usually arises from three problems: incomplete information, unmanageable levels of complexity and matters which inherently cannot be known such as future events. In addition, analysts must deal with the risk of adversary deception and disinformation. An assessment that is 'current history' is useful for developing the basic intelligence database but is no substitute for predictive analysis in the support of operational planning.

d. **Integration.** Integration is the fourth stage of processing where analysed information and/or intelligence is selected and combined into a pattern during the production of further intelligence. Single-source intelligence may not give the whole picture and therefore intelligence cells must analyse and fuse intelligence from a range of sources and agencies to provide corroboration and reduce the chance of being deceived. After this fusion has occurred, the origin of individual items of information is normally no longer clear. Caution is necessary during the fusion process not to improperly add information protected by a high security classification into an intelligence product that will be assigned a low security classification.

e. **Interpretation.** Interpretation is the last step in the processing phase and allows the judgement of new intelligence in relation to the current body of knowledge. This is an objective step based on common sense, experience, and military judgement. Comparison of new information or intelligence with that which is already known, gives rise to new or updated intelligence.

4-02. **Accountability.** Those personnel conducting analysis and processing information into intelligence need to be open about what is fact, deduction, assumption, or interpretation. Unqualified statements can lead to ambiguity in an assessment and misinterpretation. When making an assessment the analyst should include a measure of uncertainty or probability that an assessment is true or otherwise. For clarity Defence Intelligence has mandated the use of the probability yardstick, which shows to customers a probability range against a standardised qualitative term for each intelligence product.

Probability Yardstick

Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

Probability range	Judgement terms	Fraction range
≤ ≈5%	*Remote chance*	≤ ≈1/20
≈10% - ≈20%	*Highly unlikely*	≈1/10 - ≈1/5
≈25% - ≈35%	*Unlikely*	≈1/4 - ≈1/3
≈40% - < 50%	*Realistic possibility*	≈4/10 - < 1/2
≈55% - ≈75%	*Likely* or *Probably*	≈4/7 - ≈3/4
≈80% - ≈90%	*Highly likely*	≈4/5 - ≈9/10
≥ ≈95%	*Almost certain*	≥ ≈19/20

≈ approximately equal to ≥ is greater than or equal to ≤ is less than or equal to < is less than

Figure 4-2. Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment probability yardstick

4-03. **Perishable information.** Time critical information must be processed as rapidly as possible. This information is normally for dynamic targeting purposes where the need for speed is paramount. However, this does not mean that the value of such information to the overall intelligence picture is lost. Time-sensitive information can undergo normal processing, where it can be analysed along with all other relevant information.

Vignette 3 - Yom Kippur

The Israeli troops manning the Bar Lev Line…were unaware that war was about to descend heavily upon them…On the west bank the usual off-duty activities went on - Egyptian soldiers fishing, swimming and lounging near the water's edge…No suspicion was roused until 13.45 hours, when suddenly, on the Egyptian side, all went quiet. Off-duty soldiers disappeared, and the more observant Israeli sentries in their watch-towers noted that muzzle covers were being removed from guns and mortars on the west bank…At S hour, 14.05 hours, about two thousand weapons opened up with a tremendous barrage.

In tandem with their Syrian allies to the north, the Egyptian surprise attack, on the 6th October 1973, ranks alongside that of Pearl Harbour. After their overwhelming success in the 1967 war, Israel sought to deter further wars through their qualitative superiority. If war became inevitable, the military were confident that it would have enough warning to initiate a pre-emptive knock-out blow. The possibility of surprise was not taken seriously.

Successful deception plays to the preconceptions of the opponent. In this case the firm belief within the Israeli intelligence and political hierarchy that the Arabs were not militarily capable of planning and mounting a surprise attack, and given Israel's clear and demonstrable superiority, they simply would not dare.

Egypt's war planners were aware that they needed to deceive Israeli Intelligence if they were to achieve surprise. They adopted the Soviet notion that a primary way to conceal real preparation is to disguise them as an exercise. Since 1968, both Egypt and Syria had conducted exercises along their borders, mobilising reserves, manning jump-off points, raising tensions to the point of war only to demobilise. Their attack was masked by just such an exercise, Tahrir 41. The deception was enforced by false orders to units to return to routine activity on 7 October, for officers to return to military courses on 9 October and the distribution of arrangements for soldiers to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca at the end of the month. All were to create an illusion of 'business as usual' along the front in the days before the outbreak of war. A double agent had convinced Israeli Intelligence that Egypt could not go to war without Soviet long-range bombers and Scud missiles which had not arrived and besides, an attack during the Holy month of Ramadan would be unthinkable.

It is impossible to prepare for such a large military undertaking in total secrecy, but security was maintained to a far higher level than the Israeli intelligence services believed possible. The commanders of Egypt's two armies that were to storm the Bar Lev Line learned about the plan on 1 October, their divisional commanders on 3 October and the brigade commanders a day later. Platoon commanders only learned they were going to war some 6 hours before the attack. Syria maintained equally effective security. Nonetheless the evidence was there and the Israelis had much of it, but even King Hussein of Jordan's personal warning went unheeded until it was too late. The Yom Kippur war demonstrates not a failure to gather information, but a failure to interpret that information and turn it into credible, timely and usable intelligence.

Key points

- Processing turns the data and information collected into an intelligence product that decision makers can draw on to inform their choices and actions. It is conducted through a process of collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of information.
- Processing is concerned with understanding what the data and information mean and whether they are credible.
- Time-critical information must be processed as rapidly as possible.

CHAPTER 5
Dissemination

Dissemination considerations

5-01. The final phase of the intelligence cycle is dissemination. Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence in a suitable form and by suitable means, to those who need it. It is important for intelligence staff to continuously manage the dissemination process and confirmation of dissemination is critical to the intelligence requirement management process. Without effective management, communication channels can become saturated by information and single-source reporting may be retransmitted by many intermediate collection agencies, resulting in circular reporting. If intelligence reaches its intended audience too late its value will be reduced. An 80% solution on time will always be preferable to one 100% too late. The following factors affect dissemination:

a. **Clarity.** A clear distinction should be made between what is fact and what is interpretation, assessment, or opinion. A logical sequence or a standard format assist comprehension and understanding.

b. **Information management.** Intelligence must be stored, archived, located, and retrieved efficiently. This can be achieved using a secure knowledge base on a common, open digital architecture.

c. **Communication systems.** Staff must pass information by the most appropriate means with consideration given to bandwidth, electronic gateways and encryption which will impact the passage of information. Dissemination is reliant on the availability of suitable accredited systems to process the information and have sufficient bandwidth to transport data between disparate locations.

d. **Network resilience and security.** The network and associated systems must deny enemy access to information of intelligence value, protecting friendly capabilities, intent, and dispositions. The intelligence architecture, its associated collection capabilities and the communication and information systems on which both depend, must have the resilience to continue servicing information requirements despite enemy operations intended to degrade or destroy them.

e. **Protective marking.** Intelligence reports must be as accessible as possible without compromising security standards. Marking intelligence too highly can hinder its dissemination and as a result it may lose its value as actionable intelligence. Individual paragraphs are to be marked with their classification and consideration should be given to release to partner nations.

f. **Formatting.** Intelligence delivery, in whatever format must adhere to the principles of clarity, relevance and brevity. Formats include verbal, written, graphic and electronic.

g. **Timeliness.** It is important that reports reach the requestor in a time frame when the intelligence still has value. It is acceptable to do the minimum of processing to disseminate time-sensitive information to the requestor.

Reporting formats

5-02. **NATO reporting formats.** The UK uses NATO standards for report formats and message sets to guarantee multinational interoperability. Wherever possible, written and web-based intelligence reports should follow NATO formats, which include:

a. **Intelligence report.** Sent whenever information or intelligence is urgent and holds deductions that can be made in the time available.

b. **Intelligence summary.** A concise, periodic summary of intelligence. It updates the current intelligence picture to highlight important developments during the reporting period and includes any information or intelligence relevant to extant intelligence requirements.

c. **Other reporting formats.** The UK is a member of political and military alliances on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. Comprehensive intelligence exchange arrangements exist between our allies and partners.

Key points

- Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence in an appropriate form and by suitable means, to those who need it.
- The value of intelligence reduces if it reaches its intended audience too late.

CHAPTER 6
Intelligence planning

6-01. **Intelligence planning.** Intelligence planning is an integral part of the planning process. The *Planning and Execution Handbook* provides detailed guidance on the conduct of planning, including intelligence planning. This chapter provides an overview of the key intelligence planning processes to support understanding. Following commander's direction, intelligence staff conduct an intelligence preparation of the environment and the intelligence estimate. These iterative tools are the primary means of determining intelligence requirements and how intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets can be used to gather the necessary information.

Intelligence preparation of the environment

6-02. **Intelligence preparation of the environment.** Intelligence preparation of the environment is a planning tool designed to analyse the physical, human and information dimensions of the environment within the allocated area of intelligence interest. It also includes analysis of the enemy to predict what they are most likely to do and when. It consists of operational area evaluation, threat evaluation and situation integration. In the tactical estimate, operational area evaluation typically includes centre of gravity analysis, which is one of the key analytical processes that link the higher commander's intent to the examination of potential commander's critical information requirements. Threat evaluation and threat integration follow with the latter producing the analysis of the enemy's most likely and most dangerous course of actions. The intelligence preparation of the environment also leads to the production of the intelligence collection plan and draft decision support overlay and draft decision support overlay matrix.

6-03. **Operational area evaluation.** The operational area evaluation provides an assessment of the effects of operational area or battlespace on both friendly and adversary operations. It should consider the physical, human and information dimensions of the environment. Identification of knowledge/understanding gaps within the operational area evaluation will inform the development of the intelligence collection plan.

6-04. **Threat evaluation.** Threat evaluation provides understanding of enemy capability unconstrained by the effects of the operational environment and to determine how they might operate. It should identify their key strengths and how to mitigate them, their key weaknesses and how to exploit them, what they view as opportunities and threats and how to use them to manipulate the enemy through deception. It provides an assessment of enemy capability and intent to determine the threat to own force and mission. The threat evaluation has three sub-elements: enemy capability analysis, enemy doctrine and tactics analysis and enemy vulnerability analysis. This informs our priority intelligence requirements, decision support overlay/decision support overlay matrix, emissions control and countersurveillance control measures planning.

6-05. **Threat integration.** Threat integration identifies how the operating environment will affect enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is the result of fusing the threat evaluation with the operational area evaluation. Threat integration provides an understanding of what the enemy is most likely to do, where they are most likely to do it and when they are most likely to do it. It identifies the constraints and opportunities imposed by the environment on the range of tactics likely to be used by the enemy. This leads to the development of the enemy's most likely and most dangerous courses of action and develops the strength, weaknesses, opportunity, and threat analysis conducted during threat evaluation. Analysis of the threat integration should populate the draft decision support overlay and supporting decision support matrix, and also enable the development of the intelligence collection plan.

6-06. **Centre of gravity analysis.** The purpose of a centre of gravity analysis is to identify critical vulnerabilities for targeting. The centre of gravity is identified from the critical capabilities an actor needs to achieve their objective. It describes the primary element of their power in relation to a particular situation. While a centre of gravity can be enduring, it is not fixed; understanding must be continuously refreshed to test whether the original assessment remains valid. For detail of the conduct of centre of gravity analysis see the *Planning and Execution Handbook*.

Intelligence overlays

6-07. The overlays produced during intelligence preparation of the environment must be shared across and between levels of command. The coordination of overlay production is important as the overlap between areas of intelligence interest and areas of intelligence responsibility across levels of command could cause unnecessary staff effort and undesired duplication of asset tasking. The primary overlays are:

a. **Situation overlay.** This overlay is part of the threat evaluation step of intelligence preparation of the environment. In it the adversary's doctrinal model is moulded to fit the restrictions imposed by the factors shaping the battlefield environment such as terrain, population, infrastructure, protected areas, weather, and other relevant factors. A situation overlay is produced for each course of action based on an assessment of the adversary's aim, strengths and weaknesses and likely deployment and tactics, showing tactical deployment adapted to the terrain along identified avenues of approach and mobility corridors.

b. **Event overlay.** The event overlay is derived from the situation overlay in the threat integration step of intelligence preparation of the environment and identifies graphically when and where key tactical events may take place. Locations where events of importance to the conduct of the operation may occur are designated as named areas of interest and may be point, linear or area. Detection and recognition of events or activities confirms or denies the threat's intention to pursue a specific course of action. The identification of named areas of interest prompts the tasking of collection capabilities through the intelligence collection plan and decision support overlay matrix to establish surveillance over these areas.

c. **Decision support overlay.** The draft overlay is the product of the situation integration process. It is a combined intelligence and operational estimate in graphical form. Over the course of the estimate process the intelligence and operations staff further develop and refine the decision support overlay.

Intelligence collection plan

6-08. The intelligence collection plan drives the collection effort. The primary output of intelligence preparation of the environment once the overlays have been completed is the creation of the intelligence collection plan by the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance staff.

Intelligence estimate

6-09. **The intelligence estimate.** Provides a framework for analysis in question one of the combat estimate alongside the intelligence preparation of the environment. The intelligence preparation of the environment is an excellent means of supporting planning process but does not provide the same analytical rigour that an intelligence estimate does. The primary outputs of the intelligence estimate directly feed into the operational planning process and aid the development of the intelligence collection plan. The outputs are to:

a. Identify basic and current intelligence to inform the operational planning process.

b. Identify intelligence gaps and draft appropriate information requirements.

c. From the information requirements raised, identify the risks, issues and opportunities that affect answering the information requirements.

6-10. The key to an effective intelligence estimate is to ensure that it focuses on decision support. Intelligence estimates should use the three-column format, which provides a clear means of moving from factor to deduction to output. This is the most reliable means of ensuring that an intelligence estimate adds value rather than simply stating facts or making observations. Deductions and outputs inform the intelligence collection plan.

6-11. **Planning tools.** Staff must be thoroughly familiar with analytical planning tools such as area, structure, capabilities, organisations, people and events and political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information - physical and time, which are detailed in the human terrain analysis section in the *Planning and Execution Handbook*.

Operational staff work

6-12. **Operational staff work.** Intelligence staff at each level of command will be responsible for production of the intelligence collection plan. Development of the decision support overlay, decision support overlay matrix and surveillance and target acquisition plan should be conducted in conjunction with plans and operations staff to ensure coherence with the operational plan.

6-13. **Decision support overlay.** The decision support overlay is refined during question four of the combat estimate. It is an overlay that shows where to target the activities of a specific actor. It will show how the actor's course of action can be confirmed. It identifies, in time and space, where to gather the intelligence required (named areas of interest), when or where the commander might need to take a decision based on friendly and adversaries' timelines (decision points), and where the effect will take place (target area of interests).

6-14. **Decision support overlay matrix.** An overlay matrix should support the decision support overlay. This is a table or matrix that lists all elements of the decision support overlay, the action that is to take place in each area and who is responsible for the action. Resourcing the overlay and matrix leads to key outputs from question five of the combat estimate: a draft task organisation, further refinements to the intelligence collection plan and a list of requests for information to the higher command post that cannot be resourced from within a command post's own resources.

6-15. **Surveillance and target acquisition plan.** The allocation of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to the draft overlay and matrix is a collaborative effort between the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and operations staff. This leads to the surveillance and target acquisition plan, which aims to match requirements with specific collection assets in direct support of the intelligence collection plan. The plan should consider how surveillance changes between night and day and in response to meteorological changes. The plan tells friendly forces where they can and cannot see and have an effect. This allows the commander to understand the level of risk in a plan; the commander must decide if gaps in the plan are acceptable or commit further forces to finding activity.

6-16. **Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance annex.** The annex to an operations order gives the detailed orders to the deployed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support the main operation. It is a collaborative effort between intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance staff and the operational plans cell. Missions and tasks are allocated according to the intelligence collection plan, decision support overlay and decision support overlay matrix. Additionally, arm and Service or specialist subject matter experts within the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cell provide the coordinating instructions to their force elements regarding movement, battlespace management and resupply to enable any regrouping of assets from one unit to another.

Vignette 4 - Russian Operations in Chechnya 1994/95

Grachev's plan and timetable reflect expectations of limited resistance. Poor intelligence and faulty planning were to blame. Preparation was sloppy, with reconnaissance limited to passive reports of what could be easily observed. Maps were inadequate and of the wrong scale. Intelligence gathering did not begin in earnest until after military operations were under way. Furthermore, ground force commanders were loath to use their own resources for this mission, relying instead on air power. But even in perfect weather, air assets are a suboptimal reconnaissance tool over an urban battlefield, where enemy preparation can take place out of sight, e.g., within buildings. Planning also largely disregarded the experience of loyalist Chechen forces (which also included some Russian troops) that had tried to assault Grozny in August, October and November of 1994. If that experience had been studied, the Russian commander would have been aware of the dangers that faced tank columns in Grozny. Only a few weeks before, loyalist Chechen tank formations were surrounded and destroyed by RPG-armed rebels in the city.

All might have gone as planned if Russians expectations had proved correct. But instead of light resistance from a few small bands, the 6,000-man Russian force that attempted to penetrate the city on New Year's Eve found itself fighting an enemy far better prepared for battle and much larger than expected……within the first hour of battle, Russian units were trapped in the streets, their armoured vehicles destroyed by enemy troops shooting from upper and lower stories of buildings that main tank guns could not effectively engage.

Olga Oliker Russia's Chechen Wars 1994 - 2000 ©
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Key points

- Intelligence staff conduct an intelligence preparation of the environment and the intelligence estimate based on the commander's direction.
- These iterative tools are the primary means of determining intelligence requirements and how intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection assets can be used to gather the necessary information.

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