

# HUMANITARIAN OUTLOOK FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION



October – December  
2015

## **Acknowledgment**

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report has been developed collectively with humanitarian partners in the region to inform preparedness and advocacy efforts to mitigate and manage humanitarian risk in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region<sup>1</sup>. It presents a four-month trend analysis from June to September 2015 and a humanitarian outlook from October to December 2015. It is the second report in the series and updates the previous scenario report which was published in May 2015.

**Trend Analysis:** Since May, the main regional drivers of humanitarian need continued to be protracted conflict, and economic and climatic shocks, with the initial impact of the El Niño weather system starting to be felt. During the reporting period, the number of refugees increased by 188,000 people, almost exclusively from South Sudan, Burundi and Yemen, representing a 7 per cent increase. However, refugee flows have slowed compared with the previous reporting period linked to the signing of the South Sudan peace agreement and the installation of President Nkurunziza in Burundi. There was an increase in the number of food insecure people by 6.7 million, from 18.5 million to 25.3 million people, as the impact of El Niño is increasing food insecurity in Ethiopia in particular.

**Outlook:** During the outlook period, a resurgence in violence in Burundi and South Sudan could lead to an increase in the rate of both internal and cross border movements. UNHCR is forecasting an additional 194,000 refugees by year-end, bringing the total number of refugees in the region to 3.37 million. However, given an analysis of the trends, it is projected that conflict-related humanitarian needs will remain stable over the coming months and that the major driver of additional humanitarian need will be climate-related. Climatic conditions are forecast to worsen over the coming months, leading to increased food insecurity. Drought conditions persist in South Sudan, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and primarily Ethiopia where number of food insecure increased from 2.9 million people at the start of 2015, to 8.2 million today and the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) projects that it will reach 15 million people by 2016. Excessive rain could lead to flooding, directly affecting more than 2 million people especially in Kenya and Somalia. This could result in localised displacement and increasing the incidence of communicable diseases.

**It is the confluence of conflict, adverse climate events and economic shocks that is of particular concern.**

## I. Risk analysis

**1. El Niño increasing food insecurity:** While the extent of El Niño's impact remains uncertain, FEWS NET has confirmed that the climatic event continues to strengthen. Historically, El Niño events have borne significant impacts in the region: 1.7 million people were affected through displacement and loss of property and livestock during the 1997/8 and 2007 El Niño according to FAO.

**Over the next 3-6 months, the following is expected:**  
**Humanitarian needs resulting from drought conditions recorded until the end of September:** Below-normal rains have resulted in drought like conditions in the northern sector of the region, mostly in Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea, which have already experienced poor cropping and drier-than-normal vegetation conditions this year. According to the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG), Karan/Karma rains were below average, negatively impacting water and pasture regeneration and consequently livestock production, especially in Afar region and Sitti zone of Somali region in Ethiopia. In Sudan below average rainfall (25-80%), delayed and limited the area under cultivation. Low regeneration of pasture conditions impacting negatively on livestock production in Djibouti and Somalia reported below average cereal harvests due to poor rainfall. According to WFP nearly 4 million people, roughly a third of the population in South Sudan, face severe food insecurity and tens of thousands could deteriorate to famine if access is not granted. In one of the hardest-hit areas, Unity State, at least 40,000 people are living in extreme conditions and are facing starvation and death. The number of people in need who are food insecure in need of humanitarian assistance is expected to increase to 32.1mn.

**Excessive rainfall is forecast from October to December 2015/January 2016:** There is increased likelihood of above-normal rains for the equatorial sector in parts of Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Rainfall is likely to continue past the end of the normal season and into January 2016. Above-average rainfall could provide an opportunity for enhanced crop production and replenishment of reservoirs. However, excessive rainfall over a protracted period or heavier rains over a shorter time period could cause severe and sustained flooding which will cause localized displacement, impede crop production and increase post-harvest losses.

<sup>1</sup> This report includes Burundi, Djibouti, Eastern DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and the impact of the Yemen crisis on the Horn

Of particular concern is the flood-prone Shabelle and Juba Valleys in Somalia, the Rift Valley in Kenya, and Northern Tanzania from the Victoria Basin to the coast. Excessive rainfall could also trigger outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid, as well as vector-borne diseases such as malaria. Cholera remains a persistent concern in at least 5 countries, and high Crude Fatality Rate (CFR) rates in Kenya, South Sudan and DRC. There could also be an increased disease burden on animals, such as through outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever. More than 2 million people could be affected by flooding.

Historical patterns show that a strong El Niño event is often, but not always, followed by an El Niña<sup>2</sup> and that the average humanitarian impact of La Niña is greater than El Niño in the Horn. If a La Niña climatic event were to materialize in 2016 the worst humanitarian effects are yet to come.

**2. Conflict incidents have decreased in hotspots in the region, but are likely to increase again to year-end.** Since May, violence has decreased in South Sudan following the peace talks, in Sudan following adverse weather conditions and in DRC. In Burundi conflict incidents decreased while freedom shrank and the incidence of targeted killings and human rights violations increased. The beginning of November saw a sharp rise in both conflict incidents and fatalities. Meanwhile, Somalia saw sustained high levels of violence and fatalities as AMISOM started a major push against Al Shabaab on July 17 and inter-communal violence in the Northern Rift Valley in Kenya increased.

Since May, conflict in South Sudan and Yemen and political unrest in Burundi have resulted in the majority of new refugees in the region, with almost 188,000 refugees seeking international protection in neighboring countries during the period May- September. These crises also account for the majority of internally displaced persons in the region. According to UNHCR estimates, an additional 184,000 may become refugees in the region by the end of the year if the rate of displacement increases compared to the previous quarter. Recently, the number of South Sudanese seeking refuge in neighbouring countries has fallen, even though violence and violations of the ceasefire continue to be reported inside the country. The number of Burundian refugees fleeing the country has stagnated, but the situation inside Burundi remains tense. Prevailing insecurity, arbitrary arrests, violations of human rights continue to prevent voluntary returns at scale. While conflict related displacement slowed down, there has not yet been a decisive change in conflict outlook and resurgence in conflict remains a real possibility.

**3. New economic shocks continue to affect the most vulnerable and reduce their capacity to cope.** Since May, global oil prices have declined by 25 per cent, affecting oil-dependent South Sudan. Tax revenue and donor funding is declining in Burundi. Disruption of trade in Yemen has resulted in rising prices of food and fuel, further affecting already fragile communities and market conditions. According to WFP VAM the cost of the minimum food basket increased severely (>10%) during Q3-2015 in Tanzania. High increases (5–10%) were seen in Ethiopia and Kenya. Price spikes, as monitored by ALPS (Alert for Price Spikes), are evident in 16 countries, including in South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen. These spikes indicate crisis levels for at least one of the two most important staples in the country, including cassava meal, maize, millet, rice, wheat and sorghum. Disruption of remittances, which are a lifeline for an estimated 40 per cent of the Somali population, continues to be a concern as financial anti-terrorism regulation has led to the closure of bank accounts of an increasing number of money transfer organizations that had facilitated the transfer of an estimated US\$1.2-\$1.5 billion annually in remittances. According to a survey conducted by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) of FAO a large proportion of Somalia households that received remittances, reported that their remittance receipts have declined over the past six months.

## II. Challenges

The ability of the humanitarian community to meet growing needs is increasingly constrained by two factors:

**1. Restricted humanitarian access:** Many areas of the region remain hard-to-reach or inaccessible due to a combination of insecurity in northern Kenya, Sudan and Somalia (where the rate of attacks compared to number of staff on the ground is the highest), and notably in South Sudan, where the number of humanitarian workers who have been killed since the start of the conflict in 2013 now stands at 34), bureaucratic impediments (such as restrictive legislation in Sudan, Kenya, South Sudan and Burundi) and logistical constraints.

**2. Underfunding:** Humanitarian requirements for the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa now exceed \$5.7 billion and are set to increase further in 2016, yet funding stands at only 43 per cent funded. The reasons for increased requirements include rising refugee caseloads, rising food insecurity and malnutrition due to increased drought conditions and increased internal displacement. In Ethiopia, the needs identified during the mid-year review, in-

<sup>2</sup><https://www.newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/science-tech/2015-16-shaping-deliver-rollercoaster-strong-el-niño-la-niña>

creased further following a rapid assessment in September and are expected to continue to increase. The Burundi regional refugee appeal was adjusted upward from \$207 million to \$306 million as the projected number of refugees increased from 230,000 to 320,000 by the end of December. Regionally, the shortage of funds for refugee operations is having a tangible effect on the nutrition situation: analysis shows that the nutrition situation of “new arrivals” is actually more stable than the older caseload, where there are emergency threshold nutrition rates (15 per cent Global Acute Malnutrition - GAM) in camps in east Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.

### III. Recommended actions

**1. Humanitarian partners** should step-up preparedness actions, put in place up-to-date and evidence-based and costed **national response plans**, which are operationally relevant, including funding requirements for preparedness and initial response. Clear and consistent messaging regarding the impact of El Niño is crucial. Immediate scaling up preventive and curative nutrition programmes targeting both the moderate and severely malnourished. Regional coordination will continue to be critical to allow for good practice and information sharing between states but also to address cross-border aspects of preparedness and response, such as displacement, spread of human and animal diseases and humanitarian access issue.

2. In those areas **where El Niño is expected to lead to drought** (i) strengthening surveillance of indicators of food insecurity, livestock deaths, malnutrition, health and WASH, (ii) ensuring assessments of El Niño take into consideration concurrent shocks (El Niño often coincides with economic shocks affecting the most vulnerable) (iii) informing communities in the most at-risk areas through mass communication campaign about the increased risks, and priority prevention measures.

3. In those areas **where El Niño is expected to lead to above average rainfall**, communities should be encouraged to maximize production through the timely provision of appropriate agricultural inputs, increased cropping acreages, water harvesting and use, rangeland restoration, and other livelihood promotion activities. In flood prone areas, sensitization of communities, building and/or repairing infrastructure that would reduce the impact of (e.g. water harvesting and soil conservation infrastructure), capacity building on prevention of postharvest losses and advocacy for replenishment of community and national grain reserves are essential. In addition, national Rift Valley Fever task forces should be activated, surveillance and awareness intensified (vector and disease), and immediate vaccination begun for cattle in all Rift Valley

Fever-prone areas.

**4. National counterparts and development partners** should step efforts to reduce the risks and mitigate the impacts El Niño. Adopt a crisis modifier approach with States and donors reviewing options to reprogramme existing development funding for priority activities that build the resilience of people to shocks (namely livelihood protection/diversification e.g. livestock destocking, fodder, seed inputs, cash etc.).

**5. Donors** should bring forward funding assigned for 2016, where possible, and reviewing options to reprogramme existing funding for priority humanitarian needs and allocating additional resources to cover funding gaps.

### III. Recommended actions


Preparedness	Response & Early Recovery
<p><b>Drought</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase surveillance of food security, livestock death and malnutrition indicators</li> <li>• Given the threat posed by El Nino, all national early warning systems should be quickly tested for unexpected major drought.</li> <li>• Review options to re-programme existing development funding for priority humanitarian needs</li> <li>• Bring forward humanitarian funding assigned for 2016 to allow for prepositioning</li> <li>• Donors and development actors to identify and implement at scale crisis modifier such as Scaling up of social safety nets could prevent sale of livestock in depressed markets and help stabilize food security situation</li> <li>• Donors to provide immediate funding to scale up preventive and curative nutrition programmes targeting both the moderate and severely malnourished</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protection of the remaining livelihoods and assets</li> <li>• Continue crisis modifiers such as Scaling up of social safety nets, destocking and insurance pay-outs</li> <li>• Provision of cash where markets are operational</li> <li>• Supplementary feeding for children and lactating women</li> <li>• Restocking of productive assets for households that have depleted their – restocking with local breeds and local seeds</li> <li>• Support to alternative livelihoods</li> <li>• Malaria surveillance in the year following drought</li> </ul>
<p><b>Good rains</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely provision of agricultural inputs</li> <li>• Increasing crop acreages</li> <li>• Ensure water harvesting and use</li> <li>• Undertake rangeland restoration and other livelihoods promotion activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish grain and seed reserve.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Floods</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen dams and water infrastructure</li> <li>• Strengthen health, nutrition and WASH surveillance systems</li> <li>• Flood sensitization of communities</li> <li>• Develop a mass communications plan for early warning, response information and hygiene messaging</li> <li>• Ensure national and sub-national contingency plans are updated, including stockpiles, contact lists and humanitarian presence mapping (2W)</li> <li>• Develop a logistical plan to tackle access constraints</li> <li>• Prepositioning of humanitarian and livelihoods assistance</li> <li>• Rift Valley Fever Task Forces should be activated, surveillance and awareness intensified (vector and disease) and immediate cattle vaccination in RVF prone areas</li> <li>• Given the threat posed by El Nino, all national early warning systems should be quickly tested for major floods</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prevent excess post-harvest losses due excess moisture</li> <li>• Shelter and food provision for displaced</li> <li>• Provision of cash where markets are operational</li> <li>• Restocking of productive assets for households that have depleted their</li> </ul>




# 1. TRENDS AND OUTLOOK

## 1.1 Climate - El Niño

FEWS NET has now confirmed that an El Niño climatic event is taking place and continues to strengthen over the Horn of Africa. There is a significant chance that this event could be close to or even exceed the strongest levels on record. Peak values may exceed those reached during the 2002 and 2009 El Niño events, and there is an over 95 per cent chance that El Niño will continue through October-December into early 2016. FAO warns that this year's El Niño could match the intensity of recent severe El Niño weather events, including the 1997-98 weather patterns.



*Drought affected people in El Niño years*



Source: EMDAT

*Flood affected people in El Niño years*

**Historic impact:** According to FAO, 1.7 million people were affected through displacement and loss of property and livestock during the 1997/8. In 1997 erratic precipitation resulted in a quarter decline in grain production in Ethiopia. In 1998 torrential rain left large parts of southern Somalia under water, killed 2,000 people and displaced 250,000 and more than 500,000 people were affected in 14 out of the 26 states in Sudan. In addition to flooding, it also caused major animal disease outbreaks, resulting in lengthy export bans. In Uganda, up to 150,000 people were displaced due to floods.


**Historical patterns show that a La Niña event often follows a strong El Niño**

- Very strong El Niño in 1982-1983 was followed by weak La Niña in 1984
- Very strong El Niño in 1997-1998 was followed by a moderate La Niña in 1998-1999
- Moderate El Niño in 1972-73 was followed by two strong La Niña years in 1973-74 and 1975-76
- Moderate El Niño in 1986-1988 was followed by strong La Niña in 1989
- Moderate El Niño in 2009-2010 was followed by a moderate La Niña in 2011 which was the basis for the Somalia famine. The drought was attributed to La Niña conditions- Dutra et al. (2013)

**Historic comparisons also reveal that the average humanitarian impact of La Niña is greater than El Niño in the Horn.** If a La Niña climatic event were to materialize the worst humanitarian effects are yet to come.


**Expected climatic impact:** While there is significant uncertainty about the exact location and impact of El Niño, the predicted impact of El Niño is twofold:

## Drought and flood affected people in Eastern Africa by year



Source: <http://ggweather.com/enso/oni.htm>, EMDAT

## The Oceanic Niña Index (ONI)




### Drought


Drier-than-average conditions have prevailed in Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda. Ethiopia is a particular concern. In Ethiopia, failed spring/belg (mid-February-May) rains increased food insecurity and malnutrition, wreaking havoc on planting and livestock production across the country. This was followed by the arrival of El Niño weather conditions in June 2015 affecting rainfall patterns of the summer/kiremt (June-October) rains that provide much of the country's agriculture harvest and potable water. With approximately 50 per cent of areas planted, in a best case scenario, the October harvest, which feeds 75-80 per cent of the population will reach 50 per cent of normal meher production. South Sudan

is also a concern, where even a moderately drier-than-average season could create a major food security crisis given the current conflict. Dryness has worsened in South Sudan and northern Uganda due to consistently below average rainfall since mid-August. WFP predicts that South Sudan may face drier than average conditions during the last stages of the rainy season, affecting late harvests. In Ethiopia the July-October rains ceased in mid-September. In Sudan, the end of season rainfall (until mid-October) is likely to be average at best. Drought is expected to increase the number of people in need of humanitarian need by 6.8 million by early 2016 to 32.1 million people.

## Regional rainfall anomalies June - August 2015



## Climate outlook for October - December 2015



### Floods

The next rainfall season in the Horn of Africa - not considering central and northern Ethiopia - takes place from October to December 2015, precisely at the peak of the El Niño event now un-folding. Forecasts are indicating that rainfall is likely to continue past the end of the normal sea-son and through January 2016. ECMWF forecasts for this period present a favourable perspective, with above-average rainfall across the region. However, historically, El Niño events at this time of the year are strongly associated with much wetter-than-average conditions across the region. The most likely scenario for the next season is therefore good pasture and crop development, as in the previous season. This will further help to rebuild assets of pastoralist communities. On the downside, there will be an increased risk of flooding along the main river systems in Kenya and Somalia and Tanzania. In Somalia, for example, 900,000 people are living in the riverine areas of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, and could be exposed to flooding. Severe and pro-longed flooding could cause fungal diseases and excessive soil moisture levels, impeding crop production or increasing post-harvest losses. More than 2 million people could be affected by flooding.

### Country impact


**Ethiopia:** El Niño induced unseasonal rains in agricultural areas of Ethiopia's central highlands could increase post-harvest losses. Ethiopia's National Meteorological Agency (NMA) has predicted strong rains along the Omo, Shabelle and Awash rivers. Rains in pastoral areas will in-crease wa-

ter availability and pasture regeneration, however, emaciated livestock are more vulnerable to disease following heavy rains which could result in large-scale livestock deaths as it did in 2011.

**Kenya:** Most parts of Kenya have a 45 per cent chance of seeing above average rainfall, with some potential pock-ets of drought (Kenya Meteorological Department). Some 23 counties are at risk for flooding, flash floods and land-slides. In Western Kenya, the enhanced rainfall could interfere with harvesting activities in parts of the Rift Valley. The eastern arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) and the pas-toral areas of Northeastern Kenya areas will likely experience improved pasture conditions and water availability during the season.

**South Sudan:** After a good start of the season, conditions turned dry from July onwards. Central Equatoria and Jonglei states have been particularly affected by the lack of rain. Although the rains have since improved, more rain-fall is required to avoid significant impact on rain-fed crop production. Forecasts for the later stages of the season from ECMWF and IGAD (October to December 2015), indicate that there is increased likelihood of near normal to below normal rainfall for most of South Sudan. This forecast is mostly relevant to more southern areas of the country that has continued to receive rainfall during this period. If this forecast is realized, there is no major im-provements in pasture and crop status expected. In the south-east of South Sudan, there is increased likelihood of above normal to near normal rainfall, linked to El Niño en-

## Expected flood affected people by end 2015



hanced rainfall during the Short Rainy season in Kenya and southern Ethiopia. This should provide favourable conditions for the second crop season in most of the Greater Equatoria States and recovery in pasture resources in Eastern Equatoria.

**Sudan:** Significantly below-average rainfall during the start of the season has delayed planting and negatively impacted the main sorghum and millet producing areas in central and eastern Sudan. While the main harvest in November is expected to provide immediate relief, it is likely to be reduced if seasonal rains continue to be below average. Weather forecasts for the next 6 months indicate a continuation of significantly below-average rainfall.

**Somalia:** Most parts of Somalia are predicted to see above average rainfall. To date, above-average rainfall has already been reported across Somalia during the second rainy (Deyr) sea-son, leading to flood risks in both the Juba and Shabelle River valleys. Previous El Niño events have been linked to flooding, loss of crops, livestock, lives, and stored harvests from the Gu sea-son. The current Gu sea-

son harvest is projected to be below average after erratic rainfall from April to June 2015.

**Uganda:** Predicted heavy rains over the next four months could lead to floods, particularly in the mountainous areas of western, south-western and eastern Uganda (Uganda Meteorological Department). People living in the highland areas on the slopes of Mt. Elgon may be exposed to landslides and flooding in parts of Teso sub-region and West Nile and other lake shores.

## 1.2 Conflict and Displacement


### 1.2.1 Conflict

Four countries in the Greater Horn and Great Lakes Region continue to experience high levels of conflict namely, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia, whilst political violence continues in Burundi. Since May, there have been decreased levels of violence following peace talks in South Sudan, a seasonal reduction in conflict in Sudan due to adverse weather (although violence is still high compared to the same period of the last few years), a drop in violence in DRC and Burundi, while Somalia saw sustained high levels of violence and fatalities as AMISOM started a major push against Al-Shabaab on July 17. IINSO has reported a high level of Armed Opposition Group (AOG) activity in Kenya with an increase in inter-communal violence in the Northern Rift Valley and Al Shabaab activity in North East. Despite the drop in overall incidents during the reporting period, the ongoing attacks against civilians and violations of international humanitarian and human rights law necessitates that Protection of Civilians remain a key priority in these conflict and violence affected countries.

**South Sudan:** On 17 August, the Former Detainees and SPLM/A-IO signed an IGAD-mediated peace agreement, and on 26 August, President Salva Kiir signed the same


agreement – albeit with 12 pages of reservations. On 28 August, both Parties declared a ceasefire and on 17 September the Uganda Peoples' Defense Force (UPDF) announced that in line with the agreement, Uganda would withdraw its troops. Following the signing of the peace agreement in late-August the number of conflict incidents in the country have dropped which could potentially be a sign of change in the trajectory of violence and displacement in South Sudan. Despite the signing of the peace agreement and cautious optimism for normalcy to return to pave the way for recovery, South Sudan will nevertheless continue to go through challenging and volatile times. Given that none of the previous agreements have been implemented, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict is unlikely to be implemented on time and in full. Since signing of the peace agreement, multiple violations of the ceasefire have been reported and a group of defected South Sudanese rebel officials have rejected the peace agreement. The decision by President Kiir to increase the number of States from 10 to 28 has been condemned by IGAD as a violation of the Peace Agreement and by opposition politicians as a violation of the Constitution. Ongoing insecurity and a continuation of violence against civilians, particularly in the Upper Nile region, are forecast over the coming months.

**Proliferation of conflicts (as of October 2015)**



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

## Conflict events by country (Jan-Sep 2015)



Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Projects - ACLED ([www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com)) as of 29 Sep 2015


**Burundi:** The Burundian Electoral Commission declared incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza winner of the 21 July presidential election for a controversial third term, for which he was inaugurated on 20 August. President Nkurunziza's decision to run and his re-election, considered by most observers as not credible and a violation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, plunged Burundi into its deepest political crisis since the end of the country's civil war and heralded a new period of uncertainty. Since August, violence has reduced, however the demonstrations against the third mandate have been replaced with targeted killings of human rights defenders and opponents, and clashes between the security forces and unidentified armed groups. Both sides are radicalizing, as demonstrated by the murders of key personalities such as General Adolphe Nshimirimana, a close advisor to President Nkurunziza, and retired Colonel Jean Bikomagu, the former head of Burundi's national army. International condemnation followed the attempted assassination of acclaimed human rights defender Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa. Since the onset of the crisis, over 130 people have been killed in election-related violence. Targeted extra-judicial killings and arbitrary arrests of opponents of the government has also resulted in the flight of many active civil society actors, including journalists and human rights defenders.

**Sudan:** Root causes of armed conflict (both Government/non-state armed groups and inter-communal/inter-tribal) in Sudan remain unresolved despite tentative indications of openness of the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) to implement a cessation of hostilities. Sporadic conflict and associated protection challenges/human rights violations are likely to continue. Weather conditions may compound conflict drivers, e.g. by reducing grazing land. Grazing issues and competition over resources have been key factors behind increased inter-tribal conflict in Darfur in recent years. On 21 September 2015 President Omar al-Bashir declared a two-

month cessation of hostilities (CoH) in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur, and general amnesty for leaders and members of non-state armed groups taking part in the National Dialogue conference. The Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) expressed their readiness to sign the CoH for six months, provided that GoS commit to an inclusive dialogue process. This is a positive development, however, so far no leaders of the SRF have attended the conference.

**DRC:** The conflict situation remains largely unchanged. Two decades of armed conflict have created a complex landscape in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Currently, there is a myriad of over fifty armed groups of all sorts and shapes across the Kivu, Maniema and Orientale provinces. These groups include also foreign-armed elements like the Lord's Resistance Army, Force for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Allied Defense Forces (ADF), and National Liberation Force (FNL). Almost all these groups have committed gross violation of human rights. Political participation, land and scramble for mineral resources are among the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC. Many efforts have been carried out over the years to bring peace, the last of which in 2013 when thirteen countries of the region and four guarantors (United Nations, African Union, the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and the Southern Africa Development Community) signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC and the Great Lakes region supported by the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mr. Said Djinnit. A Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) is in charge of reviewing progress in the implementation of the regional commitments whilst a National Oversight Mechanism reviews progress of national commitments. One of the challenges in the implementation of the framework is the disarmament of armed groups, including the Hutu-dominated Defense Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which remains active in eastern DRC and opposed to Rwanda's President, Paul Kagame who accuses it for having been responsible of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

**Somalia:** During the May-September period, Banadir (Mogadishu), Bakool, Bay, Hiraan, Galga-duud, Lower Shabelle and parts of Middle Shabelle were the regions most affected by conflict. Incidents included military operations, active hostilities, inter-clan conflicts, civil unrest and other forms of violence against civilians. Al Shabaab continued to carry out complex attacks with improvised explosive devices, grenades and suicide bombings that targeted civilians and Government personnel in hotels and public institutions, particularly in Mogadishu. Risks of exposure to indiscriminate violence remain high.



## 1.2.2 IDPs

The region hosts more than 11 million IDPs, half of whom are either living in DRC or Sudan. Since May, the number of IDPs has increased most in South Sudan due to ongoing violence and lack of humanitarian access. Yemen saw a 130% per cent increase in the number of internally displaced people due to the escalation of violence as people look for safety. Movement during 2015-2016 into neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan and the Gulf Countries will continue and might accelerate.

**The number of IDPs as a result of conflict is expected to moderately increase. The number of people displaced due to flash flooding could add another 2 million displaced.**

**South Sudan:** An estimated 1.6 million people are now internally displaced in South Sudan, including an increasing number of people in UN Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites. In the last week of September, 1,203 people arrived at the Bentiu PoC, bringing the number of people sheltering in UN Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites to 200,000 the highest number since the conflict began. Of the 90 per cent of IDPs who are located outside of the PoC sites, many are on the move fleeing violence and living in extremely difficult conditions, including in remote swamps and bushland. Unless the cessation of hostilities is respected by all par-

ties, the number of IDPs is expected to increase.

**Burundi:** Within Burundi, due to fear and intimidation, the country is witnessing new caseloads of internally displaced, although the exact number of IDPs cannot yet be determined. No formal IDP sites have yet emerged inside Burundi, as people are being hosted by families and friends and are reluctant to identify themselves as IDPs for fear of reprisal if linked to a political agenda. This unknown caseload is in addition to the pre-existing 77,600 IDPs who were displaced as a consequence of the 1993-2005 civil war. Given the acute need for data on population movement and related humanitarian needs, IOM is rolling out the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) to shape the humanitarian response.


**Somalia:** A major push by AMISOM to dislodge Al Shabaab and forced IDP evictions has displaced over 42,000 people since July. In South-Central Somalia civilians continue to be caught in the cross fire of armed hostilities and displaced people continue to face forced evictions, discrimination and gender-based violence, and lack adequate protection and durable solutions. Among the most affected areas are settlements for displaced people in the capital, Mogadishu.

# 2,976,309 CURRENT SCENARIO

EXISTING REFUGEES AS OF  
MAY 2015

**187,767**  
TOTAL INCREASE (MAY-SEP)

**16.3%**



Creation Date: 7 October 2015

SOURCES: UNHCR portal (<http://data.unhcr.org/>), IOM Yemen Crisis Situation Report

**Sudan:** The possible resumption/escalation of military operations/activities in Darfur and/or the Two Areas upon conclusion of the rainy season in the fourth quarter of the year (as has been the case in 2013 and 2014) may lead to further increases in displacement. Civilians in areas perceived as sympathetic to armed opposition groups are likely to continue to be affected by displacement and a range of protection threats, including indiscriminate attacks, lack of basic services, destruction of civilian objects and access denials, particular in Jebel Marra, SPLM-N-controlled territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Civilians in areas of heightened inter-communal/inter-tribal tension, e.g. relating to competition between pastoralist groups and between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, are likely to be affected by short-term and in some cases longer-term displacement.


## 1.2.3 Refugees

Thus far this year, 386,000 people have been displaced by the crises in South Sudan, Burundi and Yemen, an increase of over 188,000 in the number of refugees compared to May, increasing the number of refugees in the region to more than 3 million refugees. Under current planning assumptions, **UNHCR projects the number of**

**refugees to increase further - by another 184,000 people - through to the end of the year. Planning figures are subject to revision.**

If an upsurge in the eastern DRC conflict leads to new regional outflows at the same time as post-election violence in Burundi, this would likely threaten regional peace and stability, with particular implications for Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda.

### Weekly refugees influx (Burundi situation)



Source: UNHCR data portal (<http://data.unhcr.org>) as of 7 October 2015


# 3,164,076 MOST LIKELY SCENARIO

REFUGEES CASELOAD AS OF SEP 2015

**184,210**

PROJECTED ARRIVALS (OCT-DEC 2015)


↑ 5.8 %




Creation Date: 7 October 2015

SOURCES: UNHCR portal (<http://data.unhcr.org/>)

## Weekly refugees influx (South Sudan situation)



### Total arrivals from the Yemen Crisis



Source: UNHCR data portal (<http://data.unhcr.org/yemen>)

**Burundi:** Over 200,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries since 1 April – including 98,266 people between May and September. The actual number is likely to be significantly higher, as many who have left the country are residing with family and friends and have not registered as refugees. The rate of outflow has declined since May, and since the end of July, the number of people registered as refugees in neighbouring countries has remained stable, with the exception of Tanzania, where the number of refugees increased by 20,000. By end August 2015 over 75,500 Burundian refugees had been registered in Rwanda many of whom were still hosted at the reception centres in Bugesera, Nyanza and Nyagatare awaiting transfer to Mahama refugee camp. During the subsequent transfers from the reception centres to the refugee camp there were 5,000 – 6,000 “no-shows” who may have returned spontaneously to Burundi, continued to other asylum countries, most likely Uganda, or might have moved from the reception centres to live in neighbouring local communities. As a result of the “no-shows”, the number of registered Burundian refugees was revised to about 69,000. UNHCR projects that by year end 320,000 Burundi refugees will seek international protection in the region.

**South Sudan:** Since the beginning of the year, 161,305 refugees have fled South Sudan, including 73,383 between May and September, bringing the number of refugees who have fled to Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda since December 2013 to 633,121. However returns have been reported, despite reports of violations of the ceasefire. Despite the signing of the peace agreement, UNHCR is currently projecting the number of refugees to increase by 52,814 in the last three months of this year – thus reaching a total of 685,935 by the end of 2015.

**Yemen:** Since March, the conflict in Yemen has intensified. Air strikes, armed clashes and shelling are directly affecting 21 out of 22 governorates. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas, attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the recruitment of children are

widespread and have created a large-scale protection crisis. On 6 October, the Houthi rebels sent a written notification to the United Nations Secretary-General accepted a UN Security Council resolution that calls for an end to violence, including a ceasefire. On 17 October the Yemeni government officially agreed to attend a new round of UN-facilitated peace talks that will be held in Geneva by the end of this month, raising new hope. Since May the number of people fleeing Yemen to the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Puntland, south-central Somalia and Somaliland) continued to rise, although at a decelerating pace: 72,193 people (of whom 16,773 refugees) from Yemen have arrived in the Horn of Africa, according to UNHCR. The UN refugee agency projects a further 31,157 people to arrive by the year end, including around 5,000 refugees.

### 1.2.4 Third Country Nationals/Returnees/Migrants

The number of people fleeing Yemen to the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Puntland, south-central Somalia and Somaliland) continued to rise. Since March 2015, according to UNHCR, IOM and OCHA reports, more than 72,193 people have arrived in the Horn of Africa from Yemen, of whom 16,773 are refugees. Whereas the overwhelming majority of arrivals in Somalia are of Somali origin, almost half the arrivals in Djibouti are Yemeni nationals. This number is expected to increase to 103,350 by the year-end, as the conflict continues unabated.


Migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia are continuing to undertake the often perilous journeys from the Horn of Africa to Europe (via South Sudan, Sudan, and Libya), and South Africa (via Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe). These mixed migration flows include refugees, asylum-seekers, displaced persons, victims of exploitation and abuse, unaccompanied children, persons with health needs, environmental migrants and migrant workers. Political instability in transit countries such as Libya has created a security vacuum,

which makes it easy for smugglers to operate and transport people through the country. Dire abuses and human rights violations related to smuggling and human trafficking are increasingly reported in the region.

Yemen is a major country of destination and transit (to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States) for mixed migrants from the Horn of Africa. According to RMMS, Yemen's mixed migratory patterns fluctuate and are driven by a wide range of factors often linked to crises in the countries of origin, sea conditions and the application of stringent border controls in the Gulf States etc. Before 2008, Somalia was the country of origin of most refugees/asylum seekers in Yemen; however since 2008 Ethiopians have made up the majority of new arrivals with a smaller group comprising Eritreans. Despite the ongoing conflict, reports indicate a continued flow of migrants from the Horn of Africa into Yemen and onwards to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These flows are facilitated by smugglers and traffickers who share false information that Yemen has ample work opportunities for reconstruction of the country, encouraging migrants to risk their lives. It is estimated that approximately 10,000 to 12,000 migrants arrived in Yemen between April and September, an average rate of approximately 2,000 migrants per month. If this trend continues, it can be estimated that roughly 6,000 migrants are likely to cross into Yemen between October

and December, majority of whom are Ethiopians.

Migration flows across the Mediterranean to Europe have been on the rise despite the increased death risks as smugglers and traffickers disregard the safety of migrants by putting them on old, unseaworthy fishing boats and small rubber dinghies, which are much overloaded and prone to capsizing. According to the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), approximately 30,000 irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa were reported in Europe between April and June 2015 (mainly Eritreans 17,440, Somalis 6,293 and Sudanese 3,511). A similar number is expected between October and December.



## 1.3 Economic shocks

Economic shocks across the region primarily affect the most vulnerable or compounds humanitarian needs.

**South Sudan:** The price of crude oil has declined by 20 per cent to around US\$50 per barrel. This is hurting oil exporting countries in the region, most notably South Sudan, where output has also fallen as a result of the conflict. Combined with a fixed transportation fee structure, this has resulted in lack of government income and shortage of foreign currency, leading to a sharp depreciation of the South Sudanese pound [from 5.5 in January to 16 to date], price inflation, and shortages of fuel and flour. As an example, SABMiller, who opened a major brewery in Juba as the single biggest investment in South Sudan besides oil industry, may be forced to scale down production as a result. The situation is however beneficial for fuel importers: retail prices for fuel continued to fall in Tanzania, contributing to a 20.3 per cent drop in the quarterly price of gasoline and a 21.8 per cent drop in diesel prices from Q2-2014. In Kenya, gasoline prices dropped by 22 per cent, and year-on-year diesel prices fell by 25.8 per cent.

### Brent oil prices by week (2015)



Source: Energy information administration ([www.eia.gov](http://www.eia.gov))

**Burundi:** If instability intensifies and disrupts the upcoming harvest in Burundi, humanitarian needs will increase, as some 90 per cent of the population in Burundi relies exclusively on agriculture. In addition, while tax revenue were up 21 per cent in the first quarter compared to 2014, they fell 29 per cent in the second quarter. **This trend has continued: tax revenues were 32 per cent and 25 per cent below target in August and September respectively.** Several donors have indicated that they may review, reduce and/or suspend aid to the Government of Burundi, following the election of President Nkuruziza for a third term. If all of the European Governments (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and EU) and the United States were to suspend their aid, this would reduce development assistance by 50 per cent to the Government of Burundi, which accounts for approximately half of its national budget. Foreign aid finances more than half of the social sectors [60 per cent of the health budget and

80 per cent of the agricultural budget] which are now facing budgetary pressures. The Government of Burundi has requested UNICEF to procure essential drugs, as the country is now lacking essential medicine, and the provision of nutrition assistance is interrupted. If unaddressed, this, combined with existing high levels of chronic vulnerability in Burundi, could lead to rising acute humanitarian needs in the coming months.

**Somalia:** In July 2015, FSNAU conducted an assessment of remittances in selected urban areas and among internally displaced populations (IDPs) across Somalia as part of its 2015 Post Gu seasonal food security and nutrition assessment. Among households that received remittances, except in Banadir, a large proportion (23-49%) reported that their remittance receipts have declined over the past six months.

**Ethiopia:** As a result of the failed 2015 belg harvest food shortages, market prices have already started to shift, with the price of food staples such as lentils 73 percent higher than at the same time last year (Addis Ababa, August 2015). In contrast, the price of livestock is falling by as much as 80 per cent (northern Somali region, August 2015)<sup>1</sup>. As a result of these price changes, the purchasing power of drought affected smallholder farmers is threatened as they can buy less and less with the money that they have. These price trends are in line with El Niño analogue years identified by Ethiopia's National Meteorological Agency (NMA).

According to WFP VAM the cost of the minimum food basket increased severely (>10%) during Q3-2015 in Tanzania. High increases (5–10%) were seen in Ethiopia and Kenya. In Tanzania, regular rainfall patterns favoured stability of maize prices in the northern regions around Lake Victoria (-4% Kagera; 0% Mara); however, lower stocks and growing export demand from neighbouring countries drove maize prices up by 7 to 40 percent in the other regions. In South Sudan, nominal prices continued to increase from the previous quarter (sorghum +14%; wheat flour +7%) and reached record levels compared with Q3-2014 (+112% sorghum and +225% wheat flour). The escalation of the conflict, currency depreciation, as well as US dollar and fuel shortages continued to disrupt markets and generated major seasonal price increases in Western Bahr El Ghazal (+30% sorghum and +18% wheat flour) in Warrap (+52% wheat flour) and in Central Equatoria (+47% sorghum). In Kenya, disputes between companies and small producers over domestic cows' milk prices led to increased volatility; prices went up by 14 percent from Q2-2015. In the SNNP region of Ethiopia, prices for fava beans escalated from Q2-2015 (+29%), especially reflecting the severe impact of inadequate belg rains.

Price spikes, as monitored by ALPS (Alert for Price Spikes), are evident in 16 countries, including in South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen. These spikes indicate crisis levels for at least one of the two most important staples in the country, including cassava meal, maize, millet, rice, wheat and sorghum.

## 1.4 Food insecurity and malnutrition


Protracted conflict and economic shocks affecting the most vulnerable have resulted in continued food insecurity in the region, and the areas affected by excessive drought as a result of El Niño have seen deteriorating food security situations, especially Ethiopia. **The number of people who are food insecure is expected to increase by at least 10 million by the end of the year. In the absence of sufficient funding and adequate response, malnutrition is expected to rise further especially amongst displaced populations.** The regional food and nutrition situation marginally improved in some parts of the Greater Horn due to the influence of long rains, but some deterioration was seen in pastoral areas affected by El Niño. An estimated 25.3 million people are currently in food inse-

cure in the region.


The areas of major concern where “Crisis” and “Emergency” food and nutrition insecurity exist include parts of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Ethiopia, north-eastern Kenya, parts of Karamoja in north-eastern Uganda, Darfur in Sudan and internally displaced persons (IDP) sites in Somalia.** Conflicts and/or political tension in South Sudan, Burundi and eastern DRC are the major drivers of the current food and nutrition insecurity observed in the affected areas.

The number of cases of severe and moderate acute malnutrition among children has significantly increased in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and this trend is likely to persist over the coming months. The findings of nutrition surveys conducted in parts of Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan indicate serious to critical emergency level of global acute malnutrition in the general population. In Somalia and South Sudan, survey results indicate a very worrying nutritional situation of young children with rates of malnutrition in Unity State in South Sudan being twice the emergency threshold (more than 30% GAM). Immediate


**Q3-vs Q2 (April-June)**



**Q3-2015 vs Q3-Baseline (July-September)**



## Food security map



Sources: FSNWG, FEWSNET (October-December 2015), Ethiopia HCT document (<http://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-slow-onset-natural-disaster-sep-2015>) for early 2016<sup>3</sup>.

scale up of nutrition programming as well as programming for food security, health, water, sanitation and hygiene is immediately required.

**Burundi:** The first signs of a slow-onset emergency in Burundi that are not related to El Niño are emerging. For example the GAM rate has more than tripled from 2.5 per cent to 8.3 per cent in Nyanza-Lac commune since 2014. Overall 36 per cent of households are affected by food insecurity, 7 per cent of them (about 700,000 people) are severely food insecure, as of August 2015. Humanitarian partners will continue to carry out assessments to monitor the situation.


**Ethiopia:** Failed spring/belg rains increased food insecurity and malnutrition, wreaking havoc on planting and livestock production across the country. This was quickly

followed by the arrival of El Niño weather conditions in June that affected rainfall patterns of the summer/kiremt rains that provides much of the country's agriculture harvest and potable water. This combination will result in a slow-onset emergency in Ethiopia. The number of food insecure could surpass 15 million people, an increase from 2.9 million people food insecure at the start of 2015.

**Sudan** continues to face both acute and chronic malnutrition issues, with the national GAM average for the country at 16.3 percent. In some localities of eastern Sudan and North Darfur, the GAM rate average is above 28 per cent.

In **South Sudan**, according to IPC, an estimated 3.9 million people (3.1 million in Crisis and 800,000 in Emergency) or 34% of the population are classified as severely food and nutrition insecure and are unable

<sup>3</sup>excluding CAR; source: FSNWG.



Sources: Government of Ethiopia<sup>1</sup>, FSNWG

to meet their food needs in September. This is an 80% increase compared to the same period last year. Of extreme concern is the estimated 40,000 people in Unity State who are experiencing catastrophe and could deteriorate into famine in the absence of urgent and immediate humanitarian access. The overall nutrition situation in August-September remains Critical with GAM prevalence above the Emergency threshold (GAM >15%) in the conflict affected states of the Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States) and the perennially high malnutrition prevalence in the states of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap. According to UNICEF some 237,000 children are estimated to be suffering from severe acute malnutrition.

**Somalia:** According to the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) the number of people who face food crisis or emergency increased by 17 per cent to 855,000 from 731,000 six months ago. The number of people in food stressed situations remained at 2.3 million. More than two thirds, or 68 per cent, of the people who are in crisis and emergency are internally displaced people. Additionally, nearly 215,000 children under the age five are acutely malnourished, of whom almost 40,000 are severely malnourished and face a high risk of disease and death.


## 1.5 Communicable diseases

The region continues to be affected by outbreaks of communicable diseases, particularly in overcrowded settlements and along the water bodies usually contaminated by sewage and human excreta. Excessive rainfall due to El Nino will increase the risk of outbreaks of waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid, shigellosis, hepatitis A and E due to unsafe drinking water and inadequate

sanitation. This flooding situation will then exacerbate the currently ongoing cholera outbreaks in Tanzania; South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. The other effect of the flood is the increasing risk of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue, Chikungunya and yellow fever. There could also be an increased disease burden on animals such as through outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever. Population displacement due to flooding can result in crowding in resettlement areas, raising the risk of transmission of certain communicable diseases. Measles, acute respiratory infections (ARI), and meningococcal disease are transmitted from person to person, and the risk is increased in situations of forced relocation to shared areas of high ground, often with inadequate shelter.

Population displacement due to flooding can result in crowding in resettlement areas, raising the risk of transmission of certain communicable diseases. Measles, acute respiratory infections (ARI), and meningococcal disease are transmitted person to person, and risk is increased in situations of forced relocation to shared areas of high ground, often with inadequate shelter.

**Cholera:** From Tanzania to South Sudan, cholera – and the threat of a cholera outbreak – is a major public health concern for governments and the international health community. Cholera has already affected thousands and the crude fatality rate is above emergency threshold level in three out of five countries (South Sudan 2.9%, Kenya - 1.9%, DRC- 1.0%, Uganda - 0.8%, Tanzania -0.7%. There is a risk of the outbreak spreading to areas hosting refugees outside South Sudan. In addition, the risk of cholera outbreaks remains in endemic zones of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most recently the cholera outbreak has moved from East to West along the Congo River. The number of cholera cases has been increasing rapidly since



mid-August: 693 new cases reported over 7–13 September, four times the number reported in the last week of August. 800 new cholera cases have been reported in Kindu health zone in Maniema since mid-September (14–23 September). As of 3 November South Sudan is free from Cholera according to the World Health Organization and the Ministry of Health.

**Measles** outbreaks have been reported in the DRC, Sudan and Ethiopia. In the DRC, a cumulative total number of 28 506 cases including 389 deaths (CFR 1.4%) have been reported as of 30 August 2015. Katanga province is the most active hotspot in the country with 75 % of reported cases and has killed 315 people and infected at least 20,000 as of 30 August. The Sudanese Ministry of Health has recorded 2,896 confirmed measles cases including 43 deaths, and 4,545 suspected measles cases by the end of July. South Sudan reported a cumulative number of 433 cases including 13 deaths as of 15 September. Ethiopia had more than 15,000 suspected measles cases, of which some 7,200 were confirmed this year.

**Dengue fever:** its incidence is seasonal and is usually associated with warmer, more humid weather. There is some evidence to suggest that increased rainfall in many locations can affect the vector density and transmission potential. El-Nino may also act indirectly by causing changes in water storage practices brought about by disruption of regular supplies. Dengue outbreak in Somali region in Ethiopia was confirmed by WHO and government authorities. Incidence rates of diarrhea and malaria are much higher among refugees at entry points than in

camps. Recent re-search published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences with a focus on South-east Asia states that El Niño could spark dengue fever epidemic, due to high temperatures. It is also reported in a recent publication that 22 countries in the Africa Region experienced sporadic cases or outbreaks of dengue fever between 1960 and 2010 (Amarasinghe A et al.). More recently, outbreaks were reported in Kenya and Seychelles in 2011 and 2013, respectively. Floods can create breeding sites needed by the for dengue vectors. The Seychelles epidemic followed exceptionally heavy rains and floods. ENSO (El Niño Southern Oscillation) could affect dengue through rains and floods.

**Malaria:** Major epidemic of falciparum malaria may occur in a population that has no immunity. In addition, mortality and morbidity due to malaria may coincide with a Rift Valley Fever (RVF) and dengue epidemics in the same region. In areas affected by drought, malaria caseload be com-pounded by widespread food shortages with acute malnutrition especially among children under five years old. An increased risk of malaria is associated with excessive rainfall and with drought affected areas with a time lag. The 1997/98 El Niño was associated with heavy rainfall and flooding in north-eastern Kenya. The subsequent malaria epidemics in this area were attributed to El Niño. From January to May 1998, a major epidemic of falciparum malaria occurred in a population that had no immunity as it was the first such outbreak since 1952. Two years of drought had pre-ceded the outbreak. Brown et al. (1998) reported an attack rate of approximately 40% in the town of Wajir, Kenya. Mortality and morbidity due to malaria

was coincident with a Rift Valley Fever (RVF) epidemic in the same region. Three districts in Kenya reported a 6-fold increase in malaria cases in the first 2 months of 1998 compared to the same period in 1997 (Allan et al., 1998). (Source; WHO).

**Polio:** But success also continues to be reported. Since the last case in central Somalia on 11 August 2014 no wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) case have been reported in the Horn of Africa. Despite that there has been no case on wild poliovirus in the Horn of Africa, South Sudan has experienced an outbreak of vaccine derived polioviruses (VDPV) which has not been fully responded to due to insecurity. With the current peace agreement in the country, there will be intensified implementation of immunizations activities, including outbreak response, and strengthening of diseases' surveillance activities which will require additional funding for execution. The population immunity to polio is also low due to interrupted routine immunizations services delivery and there will be need to accelerate re-establishment of routine immunization services in static and outreach posts.

## 1.6 Humanitarian space and access

Concerns about the rise of violent extremism and the stability of states, combined with a heavy election schedule, have the potential to override States willingness to implement their international humanitarian obligations and adherence to humanitarian principles. High levels of violence are also preventing aid workers from carrying out their work. Humanitarian access is shrinking across the region and continues to impact most significantly humanitarian operations in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. These challenges are likely to persist in the next three months or more.

**Somalia** Humanitarian access in Somalia is severely constrained and multiple security incidents continue to be reported. In the first seven months of 2015, over 80 security-related incidents impacted humanitarian organizations in Somalia. Some critical indicators, such as numbers of aid workers killed and injured, have not improved from last year, with 10 humanitarian workers killed and 17 injured during the first seven months of 2015. Arrests and brief abductions of humanitarian workers also remain frequent: at least 33 were arrested and eight abducted. Although there had been some significant improvements in terms of kidnappings for ransom, with no such cases registered in 2013 and 2014, during the second quarter of 2015, Al Shabaab demanded ransom for three humanitarian workers abducted in April in Gedo region. The three were only released two months later, following extensive community-level negotiations.

**South Sudan** Active hostilities and insecurity continued to disrupt the humanitarian response and restrict road, river and air access. Large parts of Greater Upper Nile, but also parts of Lakes, Western Equatoria and Western Bahr El Ghazal face access constraints. On occasion, this forced humanitarian organizations to reduce their staff levels or pause programmes in and around the conflict-affected areas, in particular in southern Unity State and parts of Upper Nile State. Humanitarian deliveries were also constrained by road and river checkpoints and demands for illegal taxation or extortion. Humanitarian facilities have been attacked and looted, and personnel subjected to assaults, threats, harassments, detention, abduction and killings, with at least 34 fatalities among aid workers since 15 December 2013.

In the period 14 April- 19 August, there have been 13 verified attacks on, or military use of, schools; six verified attacks on, and military use of, hospitals; and 19 incidents of denial of humanitarian access.

A recent survey conducted by the South Sudan NGO Forum found that the majority of NGOs perceived an increased level of access constraints between 1 January 2015 and the survey date of 5 June. It also found a wider prevalence of some access constraints over others, with a variance linked to their locations and type of operations. Some constraints were higher than anticipated: 15 per cent of NGOs reported experiences of forced recruitment of their staff, whereas other constraints were lower than anticipated- movement of goods, for example. Population in Leer was deprived of access to medical care after well-organized armed men looted the MSF compound twice, on October 2 and 3.

**Sudan:** Structural humanitarian access restrictions remain in many parts of Sudan, particularly in Darfur's Jebel Marra and the Two Areas, where it is likely that the humanitarian impact of the conflict has deepened, yet it is difficult for the aid community to respond as cross-line access remains cut off. Even in government controlled areas in White Nile, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, the aid community has no free access and does not have a satisfactory overview of needs or freedom to monitor the response. In 2014, the number of humanitarian staff in Darfur decreased by 20 per cent. In 2015 this number decreased by a further 9 per cent. The decrease has impacted the well-functioning of the Cluster system, in particular the capacity of Clusters to maintain effective Area coordination in the field. Given that significant humanitarian access challenges faced by the humanitarian community in Sudan, maintaining the status quo in terms of presence, financial support is often seen as a measure of success.

**Yemen:** The conflict has also taken a toll on aid workers.

As of 27 August, five humanitarian workers had been killed since March 2015.

**Kenya** In the first half of 2015, humanitarian access and delivery of essential basic social services was significantly constrained by increased inter-communal conflict and terrorist attacks, notably in northern Kenya, upper-eastern and Coast regions, with education and health sectors being the most affected.

Across all conflict-affected counties, 1,600 teachers (1,200 from the north-east and 400 from North Rift counties) are not on duty, out of which 1,200 have refused to resume their duties in northern Kenya citing insecurity, or transferred to other areas. This has affected both access to, and quality of, education for 80,000 school pupils, resulting in the closure of 122 schools with 32,000 pupils unable to access schooling in northern Kenya, upper-eastern and Coast regions. The departure of large numbers of health workers in northern Kenya due to insecurity impacted negatively on the quality of health and nutrition services provision in most health centers. (Data on the impact in terms of numbers is still unavailable from the Ministry of Health). In several parts of the region, community health workers have been left to provide maternal, child health and nutrition services. A planned polio vaccination campaign in northern Kenya had to be postponed indefinitely due to insecurity. Humanitarian access challenges are also affecting life-saving nutrition interventions and preventive high-impact nutrition services in north-eastern Kenya.

A total of 465,000 emergency-affected children continue to remain out of school due to multiple shocks as a result of drought, chronic food insecurity, lack of access to safe water and conflict-related displacement. A planned polio vaccination campaign in northern Kenya had to be postponed indefinitely due to insecurity. Humanitarian access challenges are also affecting life-saving nutrition interventions and preventive high-impact nutrition services in north-eastern Kenya.

## 1.7 Civil society space


There is a trend of legislation that limits civil society activities in a number countries in the region, namely Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan. For instance, Kenya is attempting to amend the Public Benefit Organisations (PBO) Act, 2013, to include restrictive clauses. The original Act has not yet been implemented, but efforts to amend it will undermine the original purpose of creating an enabling environment for civil society, including accountability, transparency and constructive engagement with government. In Uganda, non-governmental organisations (NGO) Bill, 2015, was introduced in April this year with the potential to restrict humanitarian operations. It has provisions aimed at “regulating”, “streamlining”, “coordinat-

ing” and “monitoring” the work of NGOs. It seeks to regulate NGOs and criminalises non-compliance. There are concerns that the Bill’s provisions could undermine flexibility and response times of humanitarian activities and adversely impact the autonomy and fundamental rights of NGOs will be at risk.

## 1.8 Funding

Humanitarian appeals have grown by more than 600 per cent in the past decade. The global humanitarian appeal now stands at nearly \$20 billion. Most humanitarian funding this year will be allocated to just five protracted emergencies-- in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In some cases, humanitarian organizations have become the default providers of essential services: clean water and sanitation; healthcare; education. This fosters dependency and crowds out funding from development partners and national governments.


### Global Humanitarian Funding



Source: OCHA FTS (<http://ftsbeta.unocha.org>)

Of the combined humanitarian appeal of \$19.54 billion to assist over 114 million people in 35 countries, \$5.7 billion is needed in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. Funding requirements have risen as a result of increased need due to El Niño and increased displacement. In Ethiopia, with the additional needs identified during the mid-year review, requirements increased from \$386 million to \$432 million. The Burundi regional refugee appeal was adjusted from \$207 million to \$306 million as the projected number of refugees was increased from 230,000 to 320,000 by the end of September 2015. Humanitarian partners anticipate that about half of a million people would be affected by a continued political crisis within the next six months. These include (i) 100,000 people expected to seek asylum in the neighboring countries, (ii) 50,000 Burundian refugee returnees, (iii) 50,000 internally displaced Burundians and their host communities, and (iv) hundreds of thousands of other Burundians, including old caseloads of returnees and IDPs.

## Funding status as of 1 November 2015 (USD million)





However, this requirement is increasingly unlikely to be funded at acceptable levels. To date, the global humanitarian requirements are only 42.6 per cent funded, leaving a shortfall of more than \$11.25 billion. The aggregate funding level for humanitarian appeals in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region is 42.8 per cent- in line with the global average. Regional refugee appeals are particularly poorly funded, with the South Sudan, Burundi regional refugee plans 22 and 28 per cent funded respectively.

The shortage of funds has tangible effects in refugee and non-refugee settings:

- The shortage of funds for refugee operations has first and foremost a general effect on the level and quality of international protection. Secondly it has a tangible effect on the nutrition situation. Analysis indicates that the “new arrival” nutrition situation is actually more stable than the older caseloads, where there are emergency threshold nutrition rates (15 per cent GAM) in camps in east Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti.
- In Karamoja, Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) is at critical levels in all seven districts. Analysis shows that the GAM rate has steadily increased every lean season since 2012 and is at the highest levels since 2010. Due to shortage of funds, there will be 30 per cent food ration cuts from September for all refugees on food assistance (excluding persons with specific needs).

## Global Humanitarian Funding 2015





## 2. VULNERABILITY HOTSPOTS

The region exhibits high levels of spatial variation in vulnerability, and areas with high poverty and/or multi-dimensional poverty are both highest hit by the El Niño phenomenon and exhibit the highest humanitarian need. Certain regions are particularly at risk due to the compounding effects of multiple threats. The summary below indicates vulnerability hotspots in order of priority for preparedness and response interventions:

### 1. Northern, northeastern, and large parts of central Ethiopia:

**Ethiopia:** El Niño is already having a significant impact. Ethiopia has two very important harvests each year. In 2015, the first harvest (May-June) failed, and the El Niño-affected summer rains (July-October) are weaker in intensity and coverage, were characterized by long dry spells and early cessation which led to crop losses and increased livestock deaths. Estimates are that 15 million people require food assistance by early 2016, more than the number of people registered in Ethiopia during the 2011 Horn of Africa drought. The nutrition situation is critical throughout the country, in July, the number of children under-5 that required nutritional support was on par with May 2011, the peak of the Horn of Africa drought.

### 2. Greater Upper Nile in South Sudan

continues to be of concern, with highest multi-dimensional poverty level, intensifying conflict and economic collapse. Although the 28 August ceasefire and peace agreement may improve humanitarian access, insecurity will likely still severely re-strict humanitarian space. Rains are falling less abundantly and later in the year, while the flood season could be more pronounced due to El Niño.

### 3. Darfur and Two Areas, Sudan:

The projected burden of acute malnutrition for 2015 is two million children, with approximately 550,000 children under age 5 suffering from SAM and 1,450,000 children under age 5 suffering from moderate acute malnutrition (MAM). The situation in Sudan is serious, with eight States being home to more than 100,000 acutely malnourished children. Five of these States are not currently affected by any conflict

4. **Northern Burundi, Kirundo,** southern (Makamba) and capital (buumbura/marie) – Bujumbura, the centre of economic activities, has been paralyzed for months, causing a major slow-down of the already weak economy. Meanwhile, current lean season is expected to last longer in most border provinces (ex. Kirundo – bordering with Rwanda, and Makamba bordering with Tanzania) due to the cross-border movements. Also, owing to the security situation, sea-sonable workers (both within and to neighboring countries) have seen their livelihoods disrupted.

5. **South-central Somalia:** Compared to six months ago, the number of people who face “Crisis” or “Emergency” levels of food insecurity increased by 17 per cent, from 731,000 to 855,000. The number of those in food-stressed situations remained at 2.3 million. The lack of improvement is due in large part to an early end of Gu rains, leading to below-average cereal production. In total, 3.1 million people require humanitarian assistance. Compounding concerns including continuing insecurity; underfunding of the humanitarian appeal; inflow of migrants and refugees from Yemen; and restrictions on remittances.

6. **Karamoja, Uganda:** Prevalence of GAM is at critical levels in 4 of the 7 Karamoja districts. Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) is at critical levels in all 7 districts. Analysis shows that the GAM rate has steadily increased every lean season since 2012 and is at the highest levels since 2010. Two-thirds (67 per cent) of households have no food stocks. The remaining 33 per cent that had food stocks expected them to last an average of 4-5 weeks from the time of the assessment. Moreover, more than half of households do not own any livestock. Compared to the IPC analysis in June 2015, the food security situation has deteriorated, with the per cent of moderately food insecure households (IPC Phase 3) increasing from 24 per cent to 37 per cent, and severely food insecure households (IPC Phase 4) from 6 per cent to 8 per cent. Low funding levels have forced humanitarian agencies to cut food rations by 30 per cent for all refugees by 30% food from September excluding persons with specific needs.

7. **Northern Kenya:** This region remains a conduit and corridor for proliferation of small arms home to extremely marginalised and vulnerable populations at sustained risk of terrorist attack and is forecast to be heavily affected by El Niño impacts. Long Rains Assessment (August 2015) findings indicate northern Kenya counties with above-critical GAM levels (>15 per cent) with the situation being at very critical level (>=20 per cent) in Turkana and Mandera Counties. Kenya con-

tinues to host the second highest number of refugees in Africa, but funding levels have forced humanitarian agencies to cut food rations by 30 per cent for all refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab.

#### **8. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):**

The region is facing continued high levels of food insecurity; a massive caseload of internally displaced people and ongoing armed conflict and violence with the prevalence of high number of national and foreign armed groups. The number of refugees from Burundi is rather stable. and cholera seems endemic.

#### **9. Western Tanzania:** This region has faced a major outbreak of cholera, and is currently hosting more than 81,000 refugees from Burundi. In addition due to the upcoming election there is the risk of election related violence. [awaiting receipt of Tanzania Contingency plan]

#### **10. Djibouti:** The country is experiencing an increase in mixed migrants coming across the Gulf of Aden in to the most vulnerable regions like Obock. IOM and UNHCR data shows that since March 25,561 persons

have arrived in Djibouti, almost half of whom are Third Country Nationals transiting to the final destination. Despite being a middle income status country the country continues to face high rates of food insecurity and malnutrition, severe scarcity of drinkable and usable water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, and severely limited access to basic health care throughout most of the country. The presence of refugees and migrants, including long-standing refugees from Southern Somalia and new refugees from Yemen, who themselves are highly vulnerable, puts an additional pressure on vulnerability to food insecurity and malnutrition in the country. Humanitarian appeals are traditionally underfunded due to the middle-income status of the country.

#### **11. Eritrea:** Eritrea may experience drought, affecting both cereal production and pastures in different parts of the country. According to satellite-based monitoring, significant soil moisture deficits persist in most Red Sea coastal agro-pastoral areas and are expected to negatively affect most of these livelihood systems.

## **ANNEX 1: Preparedness actions taken**

As the impact of El Nino is predicted to be the most significant change in the driver of humanitarian needs over the next three months, preparedness efforts in the region have focused in mitigating its impact as much as possible. This should not be mere preparedness for El Nino but also include other hazards that are likely to increase humanitarian need i.e. a escalation in violence conflict and economic shocks

Humanitarian teams across the region are also currently developing yearly humanitarian response plans to address protracted humanitarian needs in addition to new humanitarian needs. This section provides an overview of preparedness actions related to El Nino and offers general recommendations to influence humanitarian response plans that address both new and protracted needs.

Country	Planning scenario	Contingency Plan in place	Preparedness Action	Challenges
Burundi		<p>There is a national multi hazard contingency plan including floods.</p> <p>humanitarian partners have developed a six-month "preparedness and response plan"</p>		<p>The capacity of the national platform for disaster preparedness and response activities is still weak.</p> <p>The number and capacity of international emergency partners in the country remain limited.</p> <p>Stocks in country are insufficient if the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance reaches beyond 10,000 in several days or weeks</p> <p>There are also existing logistics gaps in warehousing and transport capacity in terms of storage units and the availability of trucks.</p>
Djibouti	Djibouti is more prone to droughts but sometime hit by flashfloods.	There is a national contingency plan inclusive of floods	During the past floods, the Government of Djibouti was supported by the American and French armies present in this country. Most of the support provided was logistical (trucks, pumps, etc.).	

Country	Planning scenario	Contingency Plan in place	Preparedness Action	Challenges
Eritrea	Drought is considered a medium risk but could have a strong impact. In 1999, 2.3 million people were drought affected and 1.7 million in 2008. The probability of floods is Eritrea is considered as low Eritrea is not a country of priority for the El Nino threat.	There is no official national or UN El Nino contingency plan for multi hazard in Eritrea		
Ethiopia	At least 15 million people will require food assistance, 1.5 million people will require supplementary feeding. Nearly 450,000 cases of severe acute malnutrition, 450,000 livestock deaths and some 1.8 million people to be without water for extended periods	Sub-national preparedness plans in place for every region Based on national disaster management structure	National Disaster Risk Management Task Force meets weekly to review Ministry Action Plans, parcel out funding and to oversee the UN and partners efforts to help fill gaps. Productive Safety-Nets Programmes ongoing Government leading on health, water, food distributions and agriculture interventions	Funding constraints: donors have been requested to bring 2016 funds forward, review options to re-programme existing development funding, seek additional resources and support country-level pooled funds.
Kenya	An estimated 800,000 people displaced by floods and 2.5 million people affected	National El Nino contingency plan, led by the National Disaster Operations Center Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) Multi-Hazard contingency plan Kenya County-level contingency plans in most of the at-risk counties	National El Nino Task Force established to operationalize the contingency plan. KRCS ready to respond to up to 150,000 people displaced by floods. National mass communication plan in place and operational Prepositioning ongoing.	Absence of Disaster Management Policy; unclarity on roles, responsibilities and triggers Low stockpiles and lack of information on stockpiles Capacity to respond at county and sub-county level.
Rwanda	Rwanda is not in the list of the El Nino potentially strongly affected country	The Government has developed hazard-specific national contingency plans (i.e. earthquake, floods, landslide, fire, drought, El Nino, Mass Movement of Population and Refugee Influx and presently developing one for technological hazard).		
Somalia	Between 500,000 and 900,000 affected people	El Niño contingency plan in place	Partners, are scaling up El Niño preparedness activities, including pre-positioning aid supplies and boats in areas most likely to be affected by flooding. They are also working with local authorities and community leadership to strengthen local response capacity, reinforce river embankments and raise awareness, including through distribution of climate monitoring information.	Access to affected people Absence of Government coordination forum for El Nino Funding constraints
South Sudan	N/A	UN and partners are awaiting the IPC updates before looking at El Nino impact and planning A UN 'most likely' contingency plan (related to the ongoing peace deal) up to the end of 2015 is in place	National Floods Task Force has been established and floods contingency plan is being updated.	N/A
Sudan	Potential increased conflict between farmers and pastoralists due to El Nino related new or increased migration areas. Possible significant displacement in Darfur and southern border areas.	A national specific emergency response framework is under development Humanitarian partners working on multi-hazard early warning plan.		Funding gaps for livelihoods interventions A number of aid items that could be used for prepositioning (such as emergency shelter and NFU-kits) are held up at the Port Authorities.
Uganda	Up to 20,000 people could be affected by landslides or floods in the mountainous sub-regions of Elgon and Rwenzori. Another 10,000 people are likely to be displaced by floods in the low lying sub-regions of Teso, Lango, Bukedi, Ntoroko and West Nile.	OPM El Nino Preparedness and Contingency Plan in place	NECOC is coordinating, collecting and sharing forecast information with district officials and other relevant stakeholders. The Government-led DRR taskforce has met to discuss and sectoral, district contingency plans are being developed.	Heavy equipment at the district-level from the Ministry of Works and Transport in disrepair. Hospitals and Health Units need prepositioning of drugs Ministry of Education, Science and Technology recommended to map out schools likely to be cut-off by floods during examination time to work out alternative routes. Lack of funding

## ANNEX 2: Recommended preparedness actions

1. Humanitarian partners should step-up preparedness actions, focusing on those most critical for each country/region, such as ensuring appropriate logistical and coordination arrangements, stockpiling and pre-positioning relief items, and capacity building of IGAD Member States, in line with the new IASC Emergency Response Preparedness guidelines. Efforts should prioritize addressing or mitigating the issues that are likely to most challenge a timely and effective response. Contingency plans should be up-to-date and operationally relevant, including funding requirements for preparedness and initial response. Regional coordination will continue to be critical to allow for good practice and information sharing between states but also to address cross-border aspects of preparedness and response, such as displacement, spread of human and animal diseases and humanitarian access issue. Development and private sector actors should participate in this process so they can identify ways in which they can help reduce the risk and/or mitigate the impact of the crisis.
2. National counterparts and development partners should step up risk reduction and livelihood support/diversification efforts to reduce the risks and mitigate the impacts of perceived risks, in particular El Niño. As a result of warnings, development actors should be increasing the level of inputs to development programmes, projects supporting resilience and social safety net programmes; broadening their scope; bringing in additional resources from elsewhere; front-loading sensitive pipelines; calling down contingencies; bringing forward funding from next year; and reallocating funds pro-actively. Governments should identify the priority areas in which they need support. Government and donor support to the various social safety net mechanisms that are in place in respective countries, which serve to address longer term, chronic vulnerability, to help minimize any deterioration in their livelihoods as result of the climatic threats
3. Donors should support critical early humanitarian action by immediately bringing forward funding assigned for 2016, where possible, and reviewing options to reprogramme existing funding for priority humanitarian needs and allocating additional resources to cover funding gaps. This will require donors to base funding on early warning/forecasting and expand flexibility of both development and humanitarian financing to adapt to changing situations (such as crisis modifiers).
4. In those areas where El Niño is expected to lead to drought conditions, recommended actions include: (i) strengthening surveillance of indicators of food insecurity, livestock deaths, malnutrition, health and WASH, (ii) ensuring assessments of El Niño take into consideration concurrent shocks (El Niño often coincides with economic shocks affecting the most vulnerable) (iii) informing communities in the most at-risk areas about the enhanced risk, prevention and what to do if the risk materializes, (iv) updating or developing contingency plans, (v) immediately bringing forward humanitarian funding assigned for 2016 to enable prepositioning of relief items, (vi) adopting a crisis modifier approach with States and donors reviewing options to reprogramme existing development funding for priority activities that build the resilience of people to shocks (namely livelihood protection/diversification e.g. livestock destocking, fodder, seed inputs, cash etc.), (vii) building and/or repairing infrastructure that would reduce the impact of drought on the population (e.g. water harvesting and soil conservation infrastructure), and (viii) scaling up social safety nets to prevent sale of livestock in depressed markets and help stabilize the food security situation.
5. In those areas where El Niño is expected to lead to above average rainfall, communities should be encouraged to maximize production through the timely provision of appropriate agricultural inputs, increased cropping acreages, water harvesting and use, rangeland restoration, and other livelihood promotion activities. In flood prone areas, sensitization of communities, ensure national contingency plans as well as local plans in hotspot areas prone to flooding are

updated, prepositioning of humanitarian and livelihood assistance, strengthening of surveillance systems for health, nutrition and WASH, repair and maintenance that would reduce the impact of floods, soil conservation and water-harvesting infrastructures, capacity building on prevention of postharvest losses and advocacy for replenishment of community and national grain reserves are essential. In addition, national Rift Valley Fever task forces should be activated, surveillance and awareness intensified (vector and disease), and immediate vaccination begun for cattle in all Rift Valley Fever-prone areas.

6. In protracted and complex humanitarian contexts in the region, recommended actions include: (i) strengthening tracking of internal displacement, (ii) promotion and advocacy for the protection of civilians (iii) strengthening risk analysis and monitoring (including humanitarian projections); (iv) strengthening peacebuilding and mediation in the most at risk areas, (v) identifying targeted and limited geographical areas for inter-sector interventions and micro planning including to address access challenges, (vi) clearly communicating the impact of underfunding, (vii) increasing development funding for resilience-building activities, and (viii) ensuring development plans address the root causes of risks and support durable solutions



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