

(1.) The being of entities does not lie in the activity of encountering, but the encounter of entities is the phenomenal basis, and the sole basis, upon which the being of entities can be grasped.

*Only the interpretation of the encounter with entities can secure the being of entities, if at all.* It must be stated that the entity as an entity is 'in itself' and independent of any apprehension of it; accordingly, the being of the entity is found only in encounter and can be explained, made understandable, only from the phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the structure of encounter

Martin Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time, Theodore Kisiel, Trans., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 217.

(2) Nature has to be made present and accessible in its perceptual being and regularity in such a way that all of those moments are excluded which, though conditioning our access to the observation of nature, interfere with it. This tendency first developed in such a way that rather than erecting a nexus of particular laws, it secured fundamental concepts. This happened in Greek philosophy.

Martin Heidegger, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to *Being and Time* and *Beyond*, John Van Buren, Ed., (State University of New York Press, 2002), 171.

(3) Modern physics led to the discovery of laws of motion, defining them in a way that was free of any reference to the contingencies of its access, measurement, and defining of them. The *theory of relativity* took seriously this idea of an *absolute* knowledge of nature. It is not a theory about the relative validity of physical laws; rather, it inquires into those conditions of definition and measurement that make it possible for nature to be grasped purely in terms of itself and for its laws of motion to be understood.

Martin Heidegger, Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to *Being and Time* and *Beyond*, John Van Buren, Ed., (State University of New York Press, 2002), 171.

(4) Every explanation, when we speak of an explanation of nature, is distinguished by its involvement in the *incomprehensible*. It can be flatly stated that *explanation is the expository interpretation of the incomprehensible*, not so that this exposition would let us comprehend the incomprehensible, for it remains incomprehensible in principle. *Nature is what is in principle explainable and to be explained* because it is in principle incomprehensible. It is *the incomprehensible pure and simple*. And it is the incomprehensible because it is the "*unworlded*" world, insofar as we take nature in this extreme sense of the entity as it is discovered in physics.

Martin Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time, Theodore Kisiel, Trans., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 217-218.

(5) An example of an intraworldly entity is nature. It is indifferent in this connection how far nature is or is not scientifically uncovered, indifferent whether we think this being in a theoretical, physico-chemical way or think of it in the sense in which we speak of "nature out there," hill, woods, ... This being is intraworldly. But for all that, intraworldliness does not belong to nature's being. Rather, in commerce with this being, nature in the broadest sense, we understand that this being *is* as something extant, as a being that we come up against, to which we are delivered over, which on its own part already always is. It is, even if we do not uncover it, without our encountering it within our world. Being within the world *devolves upon* this being, nature, solely when it is *uncovered* as a being.

Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Albert Hofstadter, Trans., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, Revised Edition 1988), 168, 169.

(6) Intraworldliness is accordingly not an extant property of present-at-hand things in themselves. Present-at-hand things are ... the kind of things they are, even if they do not become intraworldly, even if world-entry does not happen to them and there is no occasion for it all. Intraworldliness does not belong to the essence of occurrent things as such, but it is only the transcendental condition, in the primordial sense, for the possibility of present-at-hand things being able to emerge as they are.

Martin Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 194.

(7) [T]he spiritual, which is at issue here, offers less resistance than in the field of natural science, where nature immediately takes its revenge on a wrongheaded approach.

Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 203.