

MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

HEIDEGGER'S TEMPORAL IDEALISM

WILLIAM D. BLATTNER

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This book is a systematic reconstruction of Heidegger's account of time and temporality in *Being and Time*. The author locates Heidegger in a tradition of "temporal idealism" with its sources in Plotinus, Leibniz, and Kant. For Heidegger, time can be explained only in terms of "originary temporality," a concept integral to his ontology. Professor Blattner sets out not only the foundations of Heidegger's ontology, but also his phenomenology of the experience of time.

Focusing on a neglected but central aspect of *Being and Time*, this book will be of considerable interest to all students of Heidegger both inside and outside philosophy.

William D. Blattner is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University.

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FOR MY PARENTS

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A NOTE ON SOURCES

In this study I rely mostly on two texts (at least until the Conclusion, when I turn to later Heidegger): *Being and Time* (1927) and Heidegger's Summer Semester 1927 lecture series, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (*Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, GP). There are two reasons for this.

First, although the publication of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* is providing an extraordinary opportunity to look for clues to the meaning of difficult passages and concepts in *Being and Time* and to inquire into Heidegger's intellectual development, an opportunity exploited, for example, by Kisiel (1993), in general I think it unwise to allow Heidegger's formulations in his lectures to override plausible interpretations of *Being and Time*. Even though Heidegger did approve the texts in the *Gesamtausgabe*'s sequence of lectures, nonetheless *Being and Time* is the published text, the magnum opus of Heidegger's early period. We cannot assume that Heidegger formulated classroom lectures to express his considered judgments precisely, especially given that his audience was likely more familiar with Husserlian and neo-Kantian forms of expression than those that would make up *Being and Time*.¹ It is true that Heidegger rushed *Being and Time*, especially division 2, into print in order to secure a promotion to *Ordinarius*. Still, I think we have every reason to believe that when an author puts something of the magnitude of *Being and Time* into

¹ Carl Friedrich Gethmann takes a similar position (1993, p. 139).

print, even under academic pressure, it is likely that it is more carefully and directly formulated than classroom lectures.

Second, a close look at Heidegger's lectures in the middle and late twenties reveals that despite some of those lectures serving as something like rough drafts of *Being and Time*, especially division 1,² only two of them provide us much help in untangling the theory of time and temporality in the magnum opus: *Basic Problems*, which postdates the composition of *Being and Time* and which I shall treat at length in this study, and *Logic: The Question Concerning Truth* (*Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, Winter Semester 1925/6, *LFW*). In *Logic*, which predates the completion of division 2 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that the "already" and "ahead" that help to constitute the being of Dasein have very little in common with "Now-time," time as ordinarily conceived (§§15, 18). However, in order not to stray too far from the official topic of his lectures, Heidegger explicitly eschews developing a theory of time in *Logic* (§15). So *Logic* foreshadows, but does not spell out, Heidegger's claim in *Being and Time* that the mode of time that structures Dasein's existence is not a sequence of Now's. Heidegger is also clear in *Logic* (§37) that Dasein's temporality is modally indifferent, that is, neither authentic nor inauthentic, a view I defend in Chapter 2. *Logic*, therefore, provides some help, but not much.

Looking backwards from *Logic*, both his Summer Semester 1925 lecture series, *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* (*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, *PGZB*), and his 1924 address to the Marburger Theologenschaft, *The Concept of Time* (*Der Begriff der Zeit*, *BZ*), suggest a relevance to our themes. *The Concept of Time* does, of course, treat the theme that will occupy center stage in this study. But there are definite respects in which it contradicts *Being and Time*. In particular, it represents originary temporality exclusively as authentic, and correlatively it portrays ordinary time as inauthentic. On the other hand, *The Concept of Time* does propound temporal idealism (the doctrine, roughly, that time depends on the human "subject," Dasein), a view that I shall develop through the text of *Being and Time*. In *The Concept of Time* Heidegger writes that "Dasein . . . is time itself" (p. 19). This formulation that "Dasein is time" recurs in *Prolegomena* and *Logic* but is superseded in *Being and Time* by more exact formulations of Heidegger's thought. In this way, it is a primitive exposition of Heidegger's thought, or perhaps an exposition of Heidegger's thought while it was in a primitive stage. *Prolegomena*, despite its title,

² See Kisiel (1993), appendix C, for a "documentary history" of the composition and publication of *Being and Time*.

touches on the topic of time only in its final and highly abbreviated section. Heidegger does reveal there his streak of temporal idealism, but beyond this we learn nothing about his theory of time.

It is an intriguing feature, therefore, of Heidegger's lectures leading up to the publication of *Being and Time* that although he does argue that time depends on Dasein (and also that it is central to the understanding of being and of Dasein), he does not adumbrate his own views about time except in the thinnest way. He gives us some genuine gestures and indications in *Logic*, but no more. Perhaps he does not do more, because the theory of time and temporality in *Being and Time* (and *Basic Problems*) is too radical, too innovative, and too complex to be laid out in the context of the sorts of lectures Heidegger was offering. Heidegger's comments in §15 of *Logic* shunning a fundamental inquiry into the nature of time and temporality support this suggestion. Or maybe he was genuinely unsettled about just how he wanted to work the theory out. This notion is supported by the inconsistencies between *The Concept of Time* and *Being and Time*, which are separated by only two years (dating the latter in 1926, when it was composed).

Three of Heidegger's other lectures are devoted to interpreting (or reconstructing) the thought of others: the ancients (*The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*, Summer Semester 1926), Kant (*Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,"* *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunft,"* Winter Semester 1927/8, *PlvK*), and Leibniz (*Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, Summer Semester 1928, *MAL*). These sources can be occasionally helpful, when Heidegger speaks in his own voice. Mostly he does not, but rather he reconstructs the thinking of others. Any attempt, therefore, to extract Heidegger's own views from these lectures, or better, the parts of these lectures in which Heidegger does not obviously speak for himself, is fraught with risk. I have largely avoided them. The same can be said of Heidegger's other great book from the twenties, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 1929, *KPM*).

We shall see in what follows that Heidegger came quite early on – January 1927, before the extant portion of *Being and Time* was even in print – to doubt the viability of the project of *Being and Time* (see note 2 in the Introduction). We never learn just precisely what gave him pause, but I am willing to speculate that his philosophy of time was a principal obstacle to completing the project. I shall argue that the philosophy of time of *Being and Time* does not work, and that Heidegger's doubts about

his sketches for division 3 of *Being and Time*, which he never wrote, plausibly, though not obviously, may arise from the failures of his philosophy of time. If nothing else, by the time of his writing *Metaphysical Foundations* Heidegger was coming to waver in his commitment to temporal idealism. In Chapter 5 I explore this facet of his career, and in the Conclusion I trace out the way in which temporal idealism slips out of Heidegger's thinking.

Finally, by and large I have used my own translations of passages from Heidegger's works, although I have relied for guidance on the published translations, especially Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Being and Time* and Hofstadter's translation of *Basic Problems*. The only exception to this rule in Heidegger's writings is the couple of passages I use from Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures; for these I rely on Capuzzi's translation. In the Bibliography, I give complete bibliographical references for all of the texts I use, and in the case of Heidegger's works I also list the best English translation of those works.

INTRODUCTION. ONTOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND TEMPORALITY

The official project of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* is an abstract inquiry into the sense (*Sinn*, more colloquially, the meaning) of "being," even though it has become famous primarily for its analysis of the nature of human existence. Heidegger launches his project on the first page of the treatise by way of a quote from Plato's *Sophist* (244a), which he translates thus:

"Then manifestly you are long since familiar with what you actually mean, when you use the expression 'be-ing';¹ we, however, once thought we understood it, but have now become embarrassed." (S&Z, p. 1)

He continues in his own voice:

¹ The word here is "*seiend*," not "*Sein*." "*Seiend*" is the gerund built from the infinitive "*sein*." To emphasize its verbal character, I shall translate it as "be-ing." German uses the infinitive, where English uses the verbal abstract noun; where German writes "*Sein*," "to be," English writes "being." I shall not follow Macquarrie and Robinson in capitalizing the verbal abstract noun "being," for that suggests something too substantive, something thinglike, almost divine. Finally, I shall translate the German "*ein Seiendes*," as Macquarrie and Robinson do, by "an entity," namely, an item that is. (Literally, the phrase uses the participle, "being," and suppresses the nonetheless implicit following noun: "the being item." German can suppress the following noun with impunity, whereas English cannot: in English we cannot write "the turning" when we mean the turning thing, because "the turning" is either a verbal abstract noun or gerund, in either case referring to the activity of turning, not the thing that turns.) I use "an entity" instead of "a being," because it is too easy to confuse "being" and "being."

Do we have today an answer to the question concerning what we actually mean by the word “be-ing?” In no way. And so, it is our task to raise anew *the question concerning the sense of being*. Are we then also merely in the embarrassing situation of not understanding the expression “being?” In no way. And so, it is our task first of all to awaken once again an understanding of the sense of this question. The concrete elaboration of the question concerning the sense of “*being*” is the intent of the following treatise. The Interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon of any understanding of being at all is its preliminary goal. (*ibid.*)

Being and Time intends to develop an account of the sense of “being” by linking being with time; time is to be the “horizon” of “any understanding of being at all.” That is, being is to be interpreted or understood in terms of time. What does Heidegger have in mind by “being”? What is the science of being (“ontology,” *S&Z*, p. 11), and how is it to proceed?

Heidegger never completes his project in *Being and Time*; he never answers his own question What is the sense of being? We are therefore forced to rely on a preliminary definition of “being” found at the beginning of the treatise. *Being and Time* was to consist of two parts, the first systematic, the second historical, or perhaps better, genealogical. The first, systematic part was to consist of three divisions, of which only two were ever published. The answer to the question of being was to have been expounded in division 3.² Fortunately, *Being and Time* deliberately

² Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1991, pp. 16–19) has noted that Heidegger related during his 1941 lecture *The Metaphysics of German Idealism* (*Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus*, *MDI*) that he broke off publication of division 3 after “lively, friendly confrontations” with Karl Jaspers, between the first and the tenth of January 1927, at Jaspers’s home in Heidelberg:

[D]uring the printing [of divs. 1 and 2 of *S&Z*] the third division of the first part of ‘*Being and Time*’ proved to be inadequate. (The decision to break off [publication of *S&Z*] was made during the last days of December, 1926, during a stay in Heidelberg at the home of K. Jaspers, where it became clear to me through lively, friendly confrontations on the basis of the proofs of ‘*Being and Time*’ that the composition [or, elaboration, *Ausarbeitung*], which I had to that point achieved, of this most important division (I.3) had to remain unintelligible. The decision to break off [publication] was made on the day we received word of R. M. Rilke’s death.) (*MDI*, pp. 39–40)

A helpful note (*MDI*, p. 40, n. 3) to this passage by the editor of *MDI*, Günter Seibold, corrects Heidegger’s dating from December 1926, to January 1927. Also, it seems from Heidegger’s correspondence with Jaspers that he was referring to proofs of chapters 3 and 4 of division 2 (see *HJB*, p. 72, and Herrmann 1991, p. 17). Herrmann further collects evidence that suggests that Heidegger’s subsequent, Summer Semester 1927, lecture series, *Basic Problems*, was intended to rework division 3 (1991, pp. 18–19). The evidence consists of

offers preliminary, or what we might call “working,” conceptions of the phenomena that it proposes to explore more precisely later. (Indeed, §2 of *Being and Time* – on “the formal structure of the question concerning being” – insists that one must always have a preliminary grasp of a phenomenon in order to pose a question about it, even the question What is it?) We find Heidegger’s preliminary definition of “being” quite early in *Being and Time*:

In the question we are to work out, *what is asked about* is being – that is, what determines entities as entities, that in terms of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. (*S&Z*, p. 6)

This preliminary definition of “being” raises as many questions as it answers, however.

Some commentators on *Being and Time* focus on the phraseology: being is “that in terms of which entities are already understood.” For example, William J. Richardson (1963, p. 43) takes being to be “that by reason of which [entities] are revealed to [Dasein].” Frederick A. Olafson (1987, p. xvii) reads “being” to mean “presence” to Dasein. Hubert L. Dreyfus (1991, p. xi and ch. 1) takes the being of an entity to be the entity’s intelligibility to Dasein. And Dorothea Frede (1993, p. 57) writes, “‘to be’ means ‘to be already understood as.’” There are two serious difficulties with these approaches, however. First, they represent Heidegger as a *dogmatic* idealist, by having him *define* “being” in a human- or Dasein-related way. Heidegger famously argues (*S&Z*, p. 212) that being, but not entities, depends on Dasein. I shall call this thesis “ontological idealism.” If one of the readings canvased above were right, Heidegger would have nothing for which to argue on p. 212. Ontological idealism would follow from his *stipulative definition* of “being.” That would be a disappointing, because deflationary, interpretation of Heidegger’s ontological idealism, an idea he offers, after all, as rather novel and important. (I shall present my own exposition of the p. 212 passage in Chapter 5.) Second, as Olafson notes,

Heidegger’s marginal notes in his own copies of *Being and Time* and “On the Essence of Ground” (“Vom Wesen des Grundes,” 1929, VWG), as well as a handwritten list of his lectures since the appearance of *Being and Time*. Indeed, the outline in §6 of *Basic Problems* of what Heidegger intended to take up that semester includes “Second Part: The fundamental-ontological question of the sense of being in general. The fundamental structures and fundamental ways of being” (*GP*, p. 32). Unfortunately, Heidegger got far behind his schedule and never took up “the fundamental-ontological question of the sense of being in general.” I shall discuss *Basic Problems*’s contribution to the themes of the missing division 3 of *S&Z* in Chapter 5.

It does appear, however, that even if this construal of the concept of being proves to be justifiable, those who, like Heidegger [according to Olafson], use it in this way must use it in an implicit pairing with a concept of being that is *not* tied to understanding or to *Dasein* and is in fact applicable to anything that can be described as an entity. (1987, p. 140)

In other words, if one defines “being” in any of the ways adumbrated above, then one is still left with our normal concept of being as “that in virtue of which anything that is is.” Philosophy is never satisfying when it moves by redefinition.

We need an understanding of the preliminary conception of being that is not dogmatically idealistic. Heidegger also writes, in the same p. 6 passage, that being is “that which determines entities as entities.” Let me suggest the following approach to this language. We can understand the being of an entity³ to be its ontological framework.⁴ By “ontological framework” I mean that framework in virtue of which an entity is an entity and an entity of the sort it is.⁵ The framework of baseball, as I am using the word, is the configuration of items that make up the game of baseball. An ontological framework is, thus, a configuration of items in virtue of which an entity is an entity and one of the sort it is.

It is important to note that the word “determine” in the phrase “what determines entities as entities” does not have a causal sense. Heidegger is not interested in what creates or produces entities. Indeed, he regards the confusion of being with the causal source of entities as the deepest, persistent error of the ontological tradition. Only entities are causal

³ Heidegger later distinguishes the “being of an entity” from what he sometimes calls “being itself,” which he also calls “the truth of being.” This is, however, a later Heideggerian innovation. *Being and Time* does not know this distinction, or at least not clearly. The Conclusion of this study treats the distinction and how it might emerge out of the early Heidegger.

⁴ Since I first used the language of “frameworks” in my (1994c), I have discovered that Caputo (1977) refers to the aim of Heidegger’s inquiry to be “to find the right horizon, the right framework of conditions, the right structure of being” (p. 91). What I proceed to say can be thought of as a development of this notion of a “framework of conditions” that makes up the being of an entity.

⁵ We typically employ the word “framework” to refer to models that we use in understanding phenomena. So the framework of Newtonian physics is the model of the physical world developed by Newton and his successors. But as we have seen, being cannot be understood to be, in the first instance, the intelligibility (or worse yet, the presence) of entities to *Dasein*. Rather, being is what “determines entities as entities.” This is not an essentially *Dasein*-independent or even *Dasein*-related conception of being, so I cannot use the word “framework” to refer to models of understanding. The solution here is pretty clear, however: “framework” should refer to what is (or would be) modeled by a model of understanding (be there one).

sources of other entities; being is not causally related to entities at all. Confusing being with entities by taking the former to be the causal source of the latter is the heart of what Heidegger later⁶ calls “onto-theology,” the conflation of theology – the study of God, the creative source of entities – with ontology – the study of being. Being, rather, “determines” entities as entities by making up the criterial standards to which entities must conform in order to be entities at all. Being is a framework of items (or aspects of what is) without which entities would not be entities. For example, if persisting through time is criterial for the framework of substantiality, then one standard that items must meet in order to be substances is persistence through time. In this case, persistence through time belongs to the framework of substantiality (the being of substances). So, being “determines” by making up the standards for be-ing.⁷

In defense of the “dogmatically idealistic” reading of “being,” one might draw attention to Heidegger’s early substitution of the “sense of being” for “being.” One must recognize, it could be argued, that for Heidegger being *is* the sense of being for Dasein.⁸ In §2 of *Being and Time* Heidegger spells out the “formal structure” of the *Seinsfrage* (his ontological investigation into being). Being is “what is asked about” (*das Gefragte*) in the *Seinsfrage*. But the sense of being is “what is to be ascertained” (*das Erfragte*) in the *Seinsfrage*, that is, “what is genuinely intended in what is asked about” (S&Z, pp. 5–6). Surely, then, for Heidegger being is what “being” means for Dasein, and this is a Dasein-related conception of being (quite close to the formulations of Dreyfus and Frede).

As forceful as this objection might seem, we must bear in mind that the formal structure of the *Seinsfrage* does not *identify* being with the sense of being. Indeed, it holds onto a distinction between them. It suggests, instead, that in asking about being, we must search for the sense of being. But why? The answer lies in Heidegger’s understanding of the term “sense.” Heidegger defines “sense” thus: “Sense is . . . [that] in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something” (S&Z, p. 151).⁹ In pursuing the

⁶ See “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” (“Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik,” 1957, *OTL*).

⁷ I came to think of being in terms of frameworks of standards by listening to John Haugeland’s seminars at the University of Pittsburgh in the mid-1980s. He moves toward such an idea in print in his (1992, 1998). In the latter article he also points out that this notion of standard should be linked with Kant’s notion of the “conditions of possibility.”

⁸ This is why Heidegger chooses phenomenology as his methodology, one might add. I shall look into Heidegger’s motives for choosing phenomenology shortly.

⁹ I have edited the quotation rather severely, so as to eliminate considerable jargon and unnecessary complications: “Sense is the onto-which of projection, which is structured by fore-having,

Seinsfrage, we are trying to make sense of being. To do so successfully would be to spell out how being makes sense to us, for example, as substantiality. Thus, the answer to the *Seinsfrage* can *only* be the sense of being. But this is not because being *is* the intelligibility of entities to us, but, rather, because a developed understanding of being must make sense of being and, therefore, answer the *Seinsfrage* in terms of something, and that something is by definition the sense of being.¹⁰

Being makes sense to Dasein. Heidegger's most fundamental characterization of Dasein, that in virtue of which he gives it the name "Dasein," rather than "human" (Herrmann 1974), is that it understands being, or as he sometimes says, it is ontological or ontologically (S&Z, p. 12).¹¹ Two pervasive features of our experience and understanding of the world are these: we distinguish between what is and what is not, and we sort what is into distinct categories or modes or ways of being. We distinguish between living and dead persons, between hammers that are available for our use and ones that are broken beyond repair, between stars that shine and those that no longer occur in the heavens. Moreover, we have different ways of understanding these different sorts of being (*Seinsarten*): we have different ontological expectations for humans, equipment, and natural entities. Heidegger devotes some care throughout *Being and Time* to distinguishing these three classifications of entity, which will be more precisely worked out as Dasein, the available (*das Zuhandene*), and the occurrent (*das Vorhandene*).¹² What it takes to be as an entity of each of

fore-sight, and fore-grasp, in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something." The theory of projection and the fore-structure do not add anything needed to our discussion at this point.

- 10 This is why Heidegger substitutes "the sense of being" for "being" in §2 of *Being and Time*, where he discusses the formal structure of inquiry. The substitution does not result from an analysis or definition of "being" itself.
- 11 Haugeland (1982) has suggested the adverbial formulation to underscore that Dasein comports itself, or goes about its business, always so as to understand being. The German is "*das Dasein ist ontologisch*," which could be either adjectival or adverbial.
- 12 Herrmann (1991) comes up with quite a list of sorts of being: "existence [Dasein], Dasein-with [the being of others], availability, occurrentness, life, subsistence [*Besitz*] (pp. 49–50). This list's most plausible addition to the standard three sorts is life. But there is conflicting evidence about whether Heidegger thought of life as a distinct region of being or just a privative form of Dasein. On p. 46 of S&Z Heidegger suggests that life, *as a sort of being*, must be made into a problem. But in the following passage he seems to take both sides: "Life is its own sort of being, but essentially only accessible in Dasein. The ontology of life is carried out by way of a privative interpretation; it determines what must be, so that there can be something like merely-being-alive. Life is neither pure occurrentness, nor however, Dasein. On the other hand, Dasein is never to be ontologically determined by assuming that it is (ontologically indeterminate) life plus something further" (S&Z, p. 50).

these sorts differs from the next. Relying on the preliminary conceptions of the ontological “regions,” or sorts, rather than the full conceptions developed in the course of *Being and Time*, we can characterize them this way. To be as Dasein is to understand oneself, that is, as we shall see later, to comport oneself in such a way that one competently lives out some socially constituted way of being.¹³ To be as available is to be appropriate, suitable, or proper for use in accomplishing some task defined by Dasein. To be as occurrent is to be present independently of Dasein and its social world.

Dasein goes about its business – its scientific, even philosophical, business as well as its mundane business – in terms of the understandings of being and the sorts of being. Every time Smith picks up a hammer and drives in a nail, he relies on an understanding of what it is to be a hammer and also, thus, a piece of equipment. This might suggest that Heidegger thinks of Smith as a philosopher, a theorist of being, but it implies nothing of the sort. Heidegger is clear from the beginning of *Being and Time* that the understanding of being in terms of which Dasein goes about most of its business is pretheoretical, indeed, preconscious, inexplicit. Smith has likely never thought about what it is to be a hammer, nor even what it is to be a piece of equipment. He just learned that one drives nails with hammers, mastered the technique of doing so, and, thus, picks up hammers when needed. Nonetheless, he effectively distinguishes between equipment and nonequipment, and he is competent at telling whether there is a hammer, or more generally a piece of equipment, at hand. Smith understands what it is to be a hammer, just not explicitly. He deals with hammers “pre-ontologically” (*vorontologisch*, *S&Z*, p. 12). The basis for characterizing him thus is that he is competently guided by an inexplicit grasp of the ontological framework of equipment.¹⁴

So, Heidegger argues that our everyday, as well as scientific and philosophical, comportment consists in part of a competence with being, that

I see no reason to add subsistence to the list, since Heidegger was quite critical of the ontology of ideality to which this concept belongs and on this basis *rejects* the concept of subsistence (*S&Z*, pp. 216–17). Dasein-with is not a distinct sort of being, but rather a more specific way in which Dasein can, indeed must, be. Heidegger writes, Dasein-with “is neither occurrent nor available, but rather, is *just as [so wie]* the Dasein itself who frees it” (*S&Z*, p. 118). (To “free” Dasein-with means to let it show up for one.)

¹³ This is consistent with the characterization of Dasein as essentially ontological, because understanding oneself requires understanding being. To understand oneself one must understand the sort of entity one is.

¹⁴ This account is tied together by Heidegger’s interpretation of understanding: understanding is competence (of which more in Chapter 1).

is, ontological frameworks, the criteria or standards for being Dasein, available, or occurrent, indeed, ultimately the criteria for be-ing at all. Being is not some mysterious or transcendent entity hanging around behind the ordinary phenomena of daily life; being is no Wizard of Oz. Rather, being is the framework in terms of which entities are and are what they are. The philosophical enterprise of ontology seeks to develop an explicit theory of being, to spell out the criteria of the most general ontological framework, that of being in general (*das Sein überhaupt*), and those of the various regions, subdomains, or sorts of being. How are we to pursue such a discipline?

Heidegger is searching for the meaning or sense of “being.” That suggests that his enterprise should be a piece of conceptual or linguistic analysis. But this is not Heidegger’s preferred methodological approach: “Only as *phenomenology* is ontology possible” (S&Z, p. 35, emphasis altered), Heidegger declares, in what can only come as a shock to traditional metaphysics. Heidegger’s formal, and alas rather unhelpful, definition of “phenomenology” in *Being and Time* reads thus: “Phenomenology thus means: . . . to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself” (S&Z, p. 34, Greek deleted at the ellipsis). “Phenomenology” is, of course, the name Edmund Husserl chose for his own philosophical method and school, and Heidegger’s use of the term is clearly intended to signal a deep debt to Husserl.¹⁵ But it would be unwise to assume that Heidegger’s phenomenological method aligns closely with any of the various stages of the development of Husserl’s methodological thinking.¹⁶

In Heidegger’s hands, phenomenology is the description of the framework that allows phenomena to be the sorts of phenomena they are. By granting that the term “descriptive phenomenology” is a “basically tautological expression” (S&Z, p. 35), Heidegger allows that phenomenology is a descriptive enterprise. But a description of what? Phenomenology describes the phenomenon “in the phenomenological sense.” Heidegger

¹⁵ “The following investigations only became possible on the ground laid by *E. Husserl*, with whose *Logical Investigations* phenomenology appeared” (S&Z, p. 38).

¹⁶ In the following account of phenomenology I shall not try definitively to prove my interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology, but, rather, try to develop a consistent reading of it that will serve as a springboard for the interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy of time that will follow. For this reason I shall also triangulate my own interpretation in terms of readings offered by others. One anonymous referee for the Press described the following section as “drastic Gordian Knot cutting.” In a sense, that is true. Gordian Knots are to be cut, after all, as Alexander the Great showed us, unless one wants to devote an entire treatise to untying them!

distinguishes between the “ordinary” and the phenomenological concepts of the phenomenon (*S&Z*, p. 31). Ordinary phenomena are all the items that show up¹⁷ for Dasein: cats and dogs, strikes and balls, victories and defeats, stars and aluminum alloys, etc. The phenomenological phenomenon is “what belongs essentially to what shows itself primarily and usually [*zunächst und zumeist*], so much so that it makes up the latter’s sense and ground” (*ibid.*). The “sense and ground” of these phenomena “underlies” them, lets them be the sorts of phenomena they are.¹⁸ The language of “sense and ground” (*Sinn und Grund*) involves precisely the same ambiguity embodied in Heidegger’s preliminary definition of “being.” “Sense” suggests the intelligibility of phenomena to us, whereas “ground” suggests something like the framework that allows phenomena to be the sorts of phenomena they are. I shall resolve this ambiguity just as I did for “being”: ¹⁹ the sense and ground of phenomena is the framework that allows them to be as they are, which as a matter of fact also allows them to show up for us as they are (because we understand phenomena in terms of their ontological framework). Thus, Heidegger writes, “The phenomenological concept of [the] phenomenon means, as what shows itself, the being of entities, its sense, its modifications and derivatives” (*S&Z*, p. 35).²⁰ For Heidegger, *being* is the sense and ground of phenomena, because it is the framework that allows entities to be, and thus to show themselves as, the sorts of entity they are.

This preliminary conception of phenomenology leads us into two inter-related challenges. First, does not the identification of phenomenology as the method of ontology turn ontology into a science of appearances, rather than being? Phenomenology, as the description of a phenomenon,

¹⁷ At this point in *S&Z*, before Heidegger has introduced his own conception of the ordinary and prethematic ways in which things show up for Dasein, he only vaguely explicates what he means by “showing itself to Dasein” by referring “roughly” (*etwa*) to “what is accessible to empirical intuition in *Kant’s* sense” (*S&Z*, p. 31). This delineation of the ordinary phenomenon would of necessity be greatly expanded, once we are familiar with the ways in which equipment, other Daseins, and Dasein itself shows up for Dasein. (The dispute between Carman [1994] and Olafson [1987, 1994] is relevant here. See Chapter 5 for my reasons for siding with Carman.)

¹⁸ Heidegger adds the interpretive suggestion that we should understand the forms of intuition in Kant as the “sense and ground” of ordinary phenomena, which are in turn the appearances that show up with those forms of intuition, space and time (*S&Z*, p. 31).

¹⁹ One might object that since the context here on p. 35 of *S&Z* is an account of phenomenology, not of ontology per se, the ambiguity should be resolved the other way. Phenomenology is concerned, that is, with the ways phenomena show up for us, not with the ways, per se, in which they are. I shall confront this objection below.

²⁰ The formulation here supports my insistence on distinguishing *being* from its sense: Heidegger lists them separately.

that is, a way in which things *show themselves* to us, cannot possibly be the method of ontology, unless one dogmatically assumes some form of idealism, one might object. Second, a challenge to the internal consistency of my reading of *Being and Time*: Does not the realistic reading I have adopted of the preliminary conception of being in *Being and Time* conflict with Heidegger's subscription to phenomenology as his method? After all, phenomenology is generally thought to suspend from consideration all metaphysical questions and positions and to focus exclusively on the way in which things show themselves to us.

The first challenge suggests itself naturally, if we allow the terminology of things "showing up" for Dasein to resonate in a specific fashion. "Jones showed up at the party" means that she arrived and made her presence known to others at the party. If Jones had snuck into the house where the party was being held and stealthily made her way unobserved into a closet, we would hardly say that she "showed up at the party." The language of "showing up," thus, suggests not only that phenomenology is the study of appearances, but also that it is the study of perceptual appearances. Ontology's method, then, would somehow have to be the study of the way things show themselves to Dasein perceptually. Let me first dispense with the worry that phenomenology is a study of *perceptual* appearances, before I come to terms with the more general objection that phenomenology is the study of *appearances*, rather than being. Identifying phenomenology with the study of perceptual appearances arises from misunderstanding the concepts of "phenomenon" and "showing up." Already in Husserl we see that phenomena do not show themselves exclusively to perception. Rather, the object of any intentional state is a phenomenon. Similarly for Heidegger, phenomena are those items that are there for any mode of meaningful comportment. Thus, hammers are there for prereflective action, even when Dasein does not see the hammer, think about it, or pause over it. Just picking up the hammer and hammering with it is meaningful comportment toward it. The hammer shows up for this meaningful comportment, in the sense that the comportment is directed toward it. Heidegger's generic term for the directionality of all such meaningful comportment is "being toward" (*Sein zu*). Phenomenology is not preoccupied with perceptual experience of the world.

Heidegger explicitly addresses the more general objection – that phenomenology is the study of appearances, rather than being – in §7 of the introduction to *Being and Time*. In order to spell out his defense of phenomenology against this objection, we shall have to come to terms with his distinction between phenomena and appearances. As we saw, this general

objection is a natural one (particularly given the use to which the word “phenomenology” has been put in its reception in Anglo-American philosophical circles, viz., as referring to a description of either the way particular things seem to us to be or the contents of our mental experiences; see Schacht 1972, pp. 312–3). Heidegger’s defense against this objection is intended to cover, by the way, not only his own phenomenology but also Husserl’s.²¹ To describe phenomena as “appearances” is to deploy an ontologically loaded concept and, thus, to prejudice the inquiry from the outset. Heidegger characterizes appearances thus (pp. 30–1): phenomena that show themselves and in doing so indicate the presence of items that do not show themselves. For example, a symptom of a disease shows itself and in doing so indicates something that does not show itself, namely, the disease itself. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century representationalist epistemology understands mental representations as appearances in this sense; they show themselves to the mind and thereby indicate (refer to, pick out, intend, etc.) extramental entities that do not show themselves directly.²² If phenomena are appearances, then phenomenology is the science of the way things appear to us, *rather than* the way they are. Therefore, to characterize phenomena as appearances is to impose a theory of appearance and reality on phenomena already. Heidegger writes,

What shows itself is nothing arbitrary, and even less is it something like appearance. The being of entities can least of all be anything like that “behind” which something yet stands, something “that itself does not appear.” (S&Z, pp. 35–6)

²¹ Schacht (1972) erroneously believes that for Husserl the phenomena of phenomenology are what Heidegger calls “appearances.” Husserl’s phenomena are definitely not items that show themselves to us and at the same time indicate the nonphenomenal presence of something “behind” them, as do, e.g., the symptoms of a disease. (See the discussion immediately following of Heidegger’s distinction between “appearances” and “phenomena.”) Rather, Husserl’s phenomenological phenomena immanently structure ordinary phenomena.

²² On this account, moreover, the entities in the world that are indicated by the appearances *cannot* show themselves directly to us. This is a somewhat stronger conception of appearances. Finally, if one adds that the appearances are somehow products of the entities in the world, then one has arrived, *according to Heidegger*, at Kant’s conception of appearance (S&Z, p. 30). I think, however, that Heidegger misreads Kant. Not only does he take Kant’s few remarks about noumenal causation of appearances too seriously, but he also puts far too much weight on the assumption, apparently implicit in Kant’s *language* of appearances, that the appearances are appearances *of* things as they are in themselves. See Prauss (1971, 1974) and Allison (1983) on this issue.

Heidegger can thus be seen to plead, "Do not impose a theory of appearance and reality on the phenomena that show themselves to us. Rather, let us begin reflection on those phenomena and ask ourselves what allows them to be the sorts of phenomena they are."

Given that phenomena are not just what show themselves perceptually, but rather, what are disclosed to human intelligibility in any fashion possible, any attempt to think philosophically about entities or being must let those entities or their being show itself to us. Applying this specifically to phenomenological ontology, Heidegger would note that there is no other way to go about doing ontology, aside from coming to terms with a peculiar sort of phenomenon, namely being, and the way it underlies entities. To object that ontology is "theoretical," rather than "descriptive," is already to misconstrue Heidegger's point, because theory has its own phenomena, that is, entities that are intelligible to it. To object that ontology cannot take the way the world shows itself at face value is either to presuppose that phenomenology cannot be critical (that is, cannot be argumentative and questioning) or to run phenomena and appearances together once again.

Even if one accepts Heidegger's response to the first critical challenge, one might nonetheless think phenomenology an illogical method for ontology, for, after all, does not phenomenology suspend interest in all metaphysical matters and in the being of entities, including the subject or Dasein? This question is especially pressing for my reading of Heidegger, since I have taken such a realistic approach to the preliminary conception of being. (This is the second challenge raised about phenomenology as a method for ontology.) Phenomenology is generally thought to focus exclusively on the way things show themselves to us, their meaning for us. Heidegger might be seen implicitly to endorse this aspect of phenomenology, when he spells out the *Seinsfrage* as searching for the *sense* of being. Moreover, I shall make it a centerpiece of my interpretation of Heidegger that he is a "temporal idealist," that is, one who believes that time would not obtain, if Dasein did not exist. This sounds like a paradigmatically metaphysical thesis, having to do with the dependence of one item on another. It would seem that phenomenology is debarred from considering such topics.

One might find this question especially forceful, if one has the "phenomenological reduction" at the center of one's conception of phenomenology. The phenomenological reduction is the principal, defining, methodological device of Husserl's mature phenomenology. In his lec-

ture series *The Idea of Phenomenology* (*IP*), Husserl states the principle of the reduction thus:

everything transcendent that is involved must be bracketed, or be assigned the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, an index which indicates: the existence of all the transcendencies, whether I believe in them or not, is not here my concern; this is not the place to make judgments about them; they are entirely irrelevant. (*IP*, p. 31)

The reduction asks the phenomenologist to suspend belief in the existence of transcendent items.²³ By “transcendent” we may understand whatever outruns the indubitable evidence afforded by consciousness.²⁴ So, rather than assume that I am now really confronted by a computer keyboard, I am to suspend this belief. I am no longer to “posit” the existence of the keyboard. Further, I am not to concern myself at all with the keyboard itself, for it is transcendent and falls outside the scope of phenomenology. I am to concern myself only with the way the keyboard shows itself to me. (Husserl argues that this *showing* is entirely and indubitably given to me.) This principle requires, *pace* Descartes, that the phenomenologist not concern herself with her own existence, indeed, not concern herself with herself:

The ego as a person, as a thing in the world, and the mental life as the mental life of this person, are arranged – no matter even if quite indefinitely – on objective time; they are all transcendent and epistemologically null. Only through a reduction, the same one we have already called *phenomenological reduction*, do I attain an absolute datum which no longer presents anything transcendent. (*IP*, p. 34)

- ²³ In the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* Husserl refines this by explaining how it could be achieved in one move. The basic assumption of our natural, naive, or commonsensical way of living in the world is that the world exists. “World” here encompasses the totality of transcendencies. In living naturally in the world, we take for granted its existence. The phenomenological reduction puts that assumption out of play and suspends interest in the world insofar as it transcends our experience of it. See *Ideas*, §32.
- ²⁴ Husserl carefully distinguishes two senses of “transcendent” in *IP* (pp. 27–8): the transcendent as what goes beyond the real confines of consciousness, that is, what is not “genuinely contained” in the conscious mental state, and the transcendent as what goes beyond “absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense” (*IP*, p. 28). For Husserl, the latter sense of “transcendent” is the properly phenomenological one.

The self, the person, the thinker – “this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks” (Kant, *CPR*, A346=B404)²⁵ – must be excluded as well, for it is not self-given absolutely. The reduction, thus, puts out of play any assumptions or questions one might have about whether entities *of any sort* exist.

Interpreters of Heidegger’s early thought are not of one mind about whether Heidegger accepts the phenomenological reduction as defining phenomenology. Some argue that Heidegger employs a sort of phenomenological reduction, in which he puts out of play all questions about real existence (Seeburger 1975; Elliston 1977; Crowell 1990). Others disagree (Tugendhat 1970; Schacht 1972; Biemel 1977; Caputo 1977). Steven Galt Crowell offers the (to my mind) most powerful argument for finding a phenomenological reduction in Heidegger’s methodology:

Properly understood, Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology does not “take a stand” regarding the factual presence of any particular object; as ontologist Heidegger “makes no natural judgments of perception,” nor does he compromise the phenomenological field by presupposing positive or physicalistic premises going beyond what shows itself in phenomenological experience. (Crowell 1990, p. 505)

But this is wrong, for Heidegger certainly makes the judgment that *Dasein* exists. In a passage I shall subject to extensive scrutiny in Chapter 5, Heidegger writes,

Nevertheless, it can *now* be said – as long as the understanding of being [and thus *Dasein*], and thereby the understanding of occurrence are – that *then* [viz., when *Dasein* does not exist] entities will continue to be. (*S&Z*, p. 212)

This clearly involves endorsing the judgment that *Dasein* now exists. Heidegger does not embrace the phenomenological reduction. Why not?

His conception of the nature of human existence undercuts the possibility of the phenomenological reduction. In his critique of Husserlian epistemology in his 1925 lecture series *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* (*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes*, PGZB), Heidegger charges Husserl with having failed to inquire adequately into the being of the subject. He argues that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction

lives in the belief that the what of any entity is to be determined by disregarding its existence. If, however, there were an entity *whose what is precisely*

²⁵ This quote shows that moving from Descartes’s substantialist conception of the self to Kant’s “functional” conception (see Sellars 1971) does not save the self from exclusion by the phenomenological reduction.

to be and nothing other than to be, then this ideative [i.e., phenomenologically reductive] reflection would be the most fundamental misunderstanding of such an entity. (PGZB, p. 152)

In order to raise the question what Dasein is, we must take a stand on Dasein's existence. This is a consequence of Heidegger's preliminary conception of Dasein from §9 of *Being and Time*, which I shall explore in Chapter 1: “*The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.* . . . All of this entity’s being-so is primarily being” (S&Z, p. 42). What – or more precisely, who – Jones is is who she takes herself to be in going about her life. For Jones to take herself to be someone in going about her life is for her to commit (“assign,” *verweisen*) herself to certain sorts of activity. And that involves, trivially, a commitment to her own existing: to assign herself to getting to work by 8 A.M. is, *inter alia*, to commit herself to her own existing. It is simply impossible for Jones to ask, in an ontologically coherent fashion, who she is without also committing herself to her own existence.²⁶ Husserl did not see this, because he took the being of the subject to be a quasi-objective sort of being. He took the subject to have an essence definable independently of who it commits itself to be-ing. He wrote as if one could separate one’s conviction that one is from one’s grasp of who one is.²⁷

One might suggest that although Heidegger does not phenomenologically reduce Dasein, he does reduce entities unlike Dasein, that is, the available and the occurrent. But this is also wrong. As I shall explore in my treatment of falling in Chapter 1, in order for Dasein to be, Heidegger will argue, it must interact with the available. It follows from this that the available is. And this is part of Heidegger’s reason for rejecting the problem of the existence of the external world in §43a of *Being and Time* (see Guignon 1983). Note, moreover, that the epistemological problematic that motivates Husserl’s conception of phenomenology in lecture 1 of *The Idea of Phenomenology* is precisely the Cartesian question whether we can

²⁶ This is a more specific version of Ernst Tugendhat’s (1970, pp. 263–4) argument that Heidegger *cannot* adopt the reduction, because (1) only objectively posited entities (i.e., the occurrent) can be reduced, and (2) the principal suggestion of Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world is that neither Dasein nor the available, social paraphernalia with which it is essentially engaged are objectively posited.

²⁷ Caputo suggests that the basic reason Heidegger cannot undertake the phenomenological reduction is that “The being which constitutes the world is thrown into the world and will be wrenched from it. The being which constitutes others is from the very start there, along with them, one with them, dominated by them” (1977, p. 98). But the reason is more fundamental than that. It is not just that Dasein is being-in-the-world and, thus, dominated and defined by the world. This is true. More basic is that the ontological investigator can never reduce his or her own existence.

know the world to exist.²⁸ It is the impossibility of securely establishing such knowledge that precisely leads Husserl to his requirement that we reduce or bracket the world, or set out of play the assumption that the world exists.²⁹ And it is this question – Can I know the world to exist? – that Heidegger rejects so completely in §43a of *Being and Time*. Heidegger, thus, sees no reason to attempt a phenomenological reduction of the entities Dasein finds in its environment.

It is true that in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger embraces the terminology of the phenomenological reduction (*GP*, p. 29). Note that Heidegger did not do so in his published writings, but only in a lecture.³⁰ In any case, the “phenomenological reduction” of *Basic Problems* is not the suspension of belief or interest in the existence of entities, but rather the attempt to uncover entities in their being, to lead our attention back from entities to their being (“re-duce,” lead back). As John Caputo rightly points out, “Obviously, Heidegger is here adopting Husserl’s vocabulary, but he is hardly saying the same thing as Husserl” (1977, p. 88).³¹

The phenomenological reduction was for the mature Husserl the first and essential methodological tool³² of phenomenology, and so, if Heidegger does not embrace it, we may ask in what sense Heidegger really is a phenomenologist. What, if anything, of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology does Heidegger preserve? We can identify several elements of Husserlian phenomenology still at work in Heidegger’s philosophical method. First, Heidegger agrees with Husserl that phenomenology is descriptive: he refers to the “basically tautological expression ‘descriptive phenomenology’” (*S&Z*, p. 35). He writes, at length,

Science “of” the phenomena means this: *such a grasp of its objects that everything that stands to clarify [Erörterung] them must be handled by direct*

²⁸ At a crucial stage of Husserl’s argument, where he tries to explain the difference between philosophy and natural science, he pinpoints the question: “How do I, the cognizing subject, know if I can ever really know, that there exist not only my own mental processes, these acts of cognizing, but also that which they apprehend?” (*IP*, p. 16).

²⁹ This epistemological reading of Husserl is not universally accepted (see, e.g., Stapleton 1983 for a nonepistemological reading of Husserl).

³⁰ See the Note on Sources above.

³¹ Caputo’s argument here is a compelling rebuttal to Frederick Elliston’s claim that Heidegger’s use of the terminology of phenomenological reduction in his version of the attempted collaboration with Husserl on an article on phenomenology for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* “refutes those commentators who claim that Heidegger rejects Husserl’s reduction” (1977, p. 277).

³² Schacht (1972, pp. 305–6) argues plausibly that when Heidegger rejects the idea that phenomenology involves any “technical devices” (*S&Z*, p. 27), he is denying that the phenomenological reduction is essential to phenomenology.

presentation [*Aufweisung*] and direct demonstration [*Ausweisung*]. The basically tautological expression “descriptive phenomenology” has the same sense. Description does not here mean a procedure of the sort used in botanical morphology – the title has, again, a prohibitory sense: avoiding any nondemonstrative determining [*nichtausweisenden Bestimmens*]. The character of the description itself, the specific sense of *logos*, can first of all be fixed by the “thing-ness”³³ of what is to be “described,” i.e., to be brought to scientific determinacy in the manner in which phenomena show up. Formally, the signification of the formal and ordinary concept of the phenomenon entitles [one] to call every presentation of entities, as they show themselves in themselves, phenomenology. (S&Z, p. 35)

In the next paragraph we learn that when we limit ourselves to the phenomenological concept of the phenomenon, phenomenology is restricted to the presentation of the sense and ground of entities, as it shows itself in itself. What sort of “presentation” or description does phenomenology use?

Heidegger notoriously argues that descriptive phenomenology is interpretive, hermeneutic: “In the investigation itself it will emerge that the methodological sense of phenomenological description is *interpretation*” (S&Z, p. 37). Note that Heidegger claims that he will establish this “in the investigation,” that is, presumably in his treatment later in the book of understanding and interpretation. Recall that Dasein’s pre-ontology is generally not explicit, but rather is embedded in the way in which Dasein comports itself toward entities. This thing shows up for Jones as a baseball, because embedded in Jones’s way of going about business in the world is a way of comporting herself toward baseballs, athletic equipment, the paraphernalia of the social world. The phenomenologist’s job is to put Dasein’s ontological pre-understanding into words, to express it where it was heretofore unexpressed. This is an interpretive enterprise, not a naively descriptive one: the phenomenologist must try to say how a particular understanding of being is involved in our prelinguistic practices. Phenomenology must be hermeneutic, *because* it is a description not of (transparent) mental experience, but rather of something *embedded in* all sorts of meaningful comportment, viz., Dasein’s inexplicit being-toward the

³³ The German is “*Sachheit*” (the quotation marks are in the German). Heidegger clearly intends to refer to Husserl’s famed slogan for phenomenology, “To the things themselves!” (*Zu den Sachen selbst!*). Heidegger’s argument is, thus, this: what it is to describe the things themselves depends on the sorts of things one is describing.

being of entities (Caputo 1986a, p. 123).³⁴ Note that in the quoted passage Heidegger argues that “[t]he character of the description itself [that makes up phenomenology] . . . can first of all be fixed by the ‘thingness’ of what is to be ‘described,’ i.e., to be brought to scientific determinacy in the manner in which phenomena show up” (*S&Z*, p. 35). In essence, phenomenological description, because it is a description of something embedded in Dasein’s comportment, can only be interpretive.

One might object that this last characterization of phenomenology, as the interpretation of Dasein’s pre-understanding of being, forsakes the “realistic” reading of being that I attributed to Heidegger on the basis of p. 6 of *Being and Time* (“being – that is, that which determines entities as entities”). After all, when phenomenological ontology goes hermeneutic, it might seem, it becomes an interpretation of Dasein’s understanding of being, rather than a science of being itself. In other words, either I am covertly returning to the “Dasein-related” conception of being dispensed with above, or I am turning ontology into a science of the understanding of being, rather than being itself.

But this objection presupposes that Heidegger’s ontology is uncritical. If we are to inaugurate a study of a phenomenon,³⁵ we must have some conception of it with which to begin. Given that ontology’s object is not a perceptual object, we must first try to put into words our inexplicit, ontological pre-understanding, embedded in generally prelinguistic, non-perceptual modes of comportment, such as wielding a hammer or leading one’s life as a carpenter. But we do not rest content with whatever pre-understandings of being are most readily put into words. Instead, we must dig around among the many ways in which Dasein comports itself to phenomena, to look for alternative conceptions of being, to see which can best account for or explain the “sense and ground” of ordinary phenomena. In this sense phenomenology is, according to *Basic Problems*, constructive (*GP*, pp. 29–30).³⁶ In fact, Heidegger thinks that our first hermeneutic instincts in ontology are usually wrong, that we are inclined to run all the modes of being together and take everything as occurrent.

³⁴ Actually, it is implausible that a mentalistic phenomenology would not be hermeneutic. Husserl thought it would not be hermeneutic, but rather could be an apodictic science of a fully given phenomenon, because he thought that the phenomena of mental intentionality are fully given in experience, transparent. This is a lamentable, Cartesian legacy.

³⁵ What if it is not a phenomenon? Then we could not even have a concept of it, and thus, the idea of having a science of it would not even be formable. Recall that phenomena are what show themselves to Dasein *in any way*, not just what show themselves perceptually.

³⁶ This may fall within the scope of Caputo’s (1977, p. 90) interpretation of *GP*’s use of “construction.”

Careful attention to the manifold ways in which we comport ourselves to entities, however, reveals that we must distinguish at least three sorts of being. Moreover, because we are typically inclined to interpret all entities as occurrent, we tend – and the ontological tradition has tended – to understand being in general as occurrence. But this is a mistake with wide-ranging implications. Overcoming this mistake by “destroying” the taken-for-granted character of traditional interpretations of being is one of the essential elements of phenomenology, according to *Basic Problems* (pp. 30–2; see Caputo 1977, pp. 91–2).³⁷ Phenomenological, hermeneutic ontology is thus critical, interpretive, and explanatory, rather than naively descriptive.

If phenomenology is interpretive, then in what sense can Heidegger consistently say it is descriptive? In the p. 35 passage quoted at length, Heidegger indicates that the term “description” is used primarily in “a prohibitory sense.” But if phenomenological description is interpretive, then what precisely is “prohibited” by calling phenomenology “descriptive”? One might suggest that in much German thought of the day, interpretation and description were taken to contrast with explanation, and, thus, that Heidegger means to exclude any explanatory enterprises.³⁸ The merit of this suggestion hangs on what one means by “explanation.”

I shall argue that at its core Heidegger’s enterprise is explanatory. Heidegger asserts, for example, that ordinary time (the continuous ticking away of empty, purely quantitative moments of time) can be explained by world-time (the qualitative sequence of socially meaningful times, such as dinner time, bedtime, etc.). The explanation involved here is a clarification of the *explanandum* by showing how it depends upon and makes sense in terms of the *explanans*. In this example, ordinary time is leveled off world-time; it is world-time, but considered in abstraction of some of world-time’s core features. This is a kind of explanation, or, at least, I shall use the term “explanation” to cover such accounts. In this sense, Heidegger’s account of temporality and time is “explanatory.”

There may, however, be another kind of explanation that Heidegger would reject. He clearly was impatient with, for example, neo-Kantian and Husserlian accounts of meaning and intentionality that involved positing

³⁷ Kockelmans (1977, p. 117) offers an interesting argument to the effect that ontology must involve a retrieval of the history of ontology, not just because that history has placed blinders on contemporary ontologists, but rather because all understanding is inherently historical.

³⁸ Heidegger, however, expresses some skepticism about the distinction, at least between understanding and explanation, at p. 143 of *S&Z*. At a minimum we can say that he does not place any such distinction at the center of his thinking.

items that are objectively “ideal” such as the ideal content of an intentional mental state, which can be shared by many distinct such states.³⁹ What is wrong with these accounts? Sometimes Heidegger merely suggests that they are unclear. But it is not any old unclarity that is at issue, when Heidegger writes that the concepts of ideality and subsistence derive from the “ontologically unclarified division of the real and the ideal” (*S&Z*, pp. 216–217). Heidegger levels a specific charge of *ontological* unclarity. Heidegger’s discussion of the concept of truth, in which this critique of ideality is embedded, proceeds by turning to a description of the way in which the truth of an assertion shows up for us daily in going about our business. He specifically asks how truth “demonstrates itself.” We can, thus, understand the charge against the ontology of ideality to reside in the claim that proponents of ideality cannot demonstrate the concept for us. And this seems to mean that they cannot show how the concept is embedded in our pre-ontological understanding. The concept does not successfully capture any way in which we comport ourselves. It does not result from a plausible interpretation of our comportment. It is, in this sense, a “free-floating construction”⁴⁰ (*S&Z*, pp. 27–8), “free-floating” in that it is not tied down to any interpretation of concrete, human activity.

My efforts to this point have been to show that there is nothing fundamentally amiss in Heidegger’s suggestion that ontology could be phenomenological. But this is not to say why it *ought* to be phenomenological. Recall that Heidegger’s p. 35 linkage of phenomenology and ontology is quite strong: “*Only* as phenomenology is ontology possible” (emphasis altered). To understand why, we must address another feature of Heidegger’s introductory remarks on phenomenology, one I have ignored until now: he persistently writes of being’s hiddenness, and he links this hiddenness to the demand for phenomenology:

What, according to its essence, is *necessarily* the theme of an *explicit* presentation? Manifestly what does not primarily and usually show itself, what is hidden over against what does primarily and usually show itself, but what at the same time is something that belongs essentially to what primarily and usually shows itself, to such an extent that it makes up the latter’s sense and ground. (*S&Z*, p. 35)

³⁹ The ideality of content is a central theme of Husserl’s phenomenology from beginning to end.

⁴⁰ Heidegger uses the term “construction” here quite differently from the positive way he uses it in *Basic Problems* (see Caputo 1977, p. 90).

Ontology is the study of ontological frameworks. Ontological frameworks make up the “sense and ground” of phenomena. In order for any phenomenon to show itself to Dasein, Dasein must grasp it in terms of such an ontological framework. But an ontological framework is not “the theme” or focus of ordinary experience or life. Ontological frameworks are generally implicit in what shows itself to Dasein. In fact, in order to encounter any entity, an ontological framework must implicitly inform the way that entity shows itself to Dasein. If the ontological framework were explicit, then it would be the focus of the encounter. In order that the entity be the focus, the ontological framework must recede into the background.⁴¹ This has two consequences. First, before commencing with ontology as a philosophical discipline, one has no explicit grasp of ontology’s object, viz., being. Ontology is thus unlike, say, biology, where one has an explicit, albeit rough, grasp on organic life and proceeds from there to a more disciplined, scientific endeavor. So ontology’s first task is, as Heidegger reveals on p. 1 of *Being and Time*, “to awaken once again an understanding of the sense of [the *Seinsfrage*].” This requires an essentially hermeneutic move: the ontologist must first of all try to put into words our pre-understanding of being. To tackle the *Seinsfrage* with “free-floating constructions,” conceptions not based in this hermeneutic beginning, would thus be fundamentally misguided.

Second, the demand that the investigator shy away from “free-floating constructions” is unmotivated, unless the object of the investigation is precisely something implicit in ordinary experience. If the point of our investigation is to understand, say, why salt dissolves in water, or why the American family is undergoing such dramatic changes, the object of the inquiry is an explicit theme of some ordinary experience. The introduction of “free-floating constructions,” that is, structures or entities that are not pre-understood by Dasein, may very well prove the most effective way to answer the questions under investigation.⁴² In contrast, hermeneutic phenomenology is required of ontology, because being is implicit, rather than explicit, in *all* ordinary and indeed scientific experience. We have *no* clear ontological notions to draw from ordinary or even scientific experience or life. Thus, *any* notion that is to play a legitimate role in ontology

⁴¹ This requirement of inexplicitness, or background status, for being is *not* what Heidegger means when, in his later philosophy, he talks of the self-concealing of being. I shall discuss the latter idea in the Conclusion.

⁴² Dreyfus (1980, 1991) interprets Heidegger as arguing that the human sciences must always be hermeneutic in character and must, just like ontology, avoid all “theory,” all “free-floating constructions.” Heidegger does not ever explicitly draw this conclusion, however. (For a critique of Dreyfus’s arguments, see Okrent 1984.)

must be drawn from the *only* source of ontological intelligibility available to Dasein, its pre-ontology. This makes ontology a unique kind of inquiry. But the restrictions inherent in the method of hermeneutic phenomenology are irrational for any other sort of investigation, because they do not suffer from the poverty of sources that characterizes ontology. Therefore, the austere constraints of phenomenology are *only* motivated for ontology.

This leads us to Heidegger's second, substantial agreement with Husserl concerning phenomenology. With Husserl Heidegger takes the point of phenomenology to be to describe the "sense and ground" of phenomena, not the phenomena themselves. Phenomenology is not the cataloging and description of those phenomena that might happen to be relevant to some philosophical⁴³ or theoretical interest. (This is another important way in which the use of "phenomenology" in the specifically phenomenological tradition differs from looser, contemporary uses of the term.) For Husserl, in the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideas)*, the sense and ground of phenomena is, in the first instance, their noemata, roughly, their meanings, and in the final analysis, the absolute consciousness that constitutes these noemata. It is central to Husserl's conception of noemata and absolute consciousness not only that we do not typically encounter them in prephilosophical experience, but also that we cannot. Husserl thinks that in order to get to them, we must carry out his phenomenological reduction, for the reduction breaks the grip of "the natural attitude," that is, our investment in ordinary phenomena.⁴⁴ But we saw that Heidegger cannot embrace this reduction. Despite this significant difference, both authors hold phenomenology to be the uniquely appropriate method of philosophy's search for the "sense and ground" of phenomena. For both authors, phenomenology is the method uniquely suited to ferreting out the sense and ground of phenomena that is merely implicit in prephilosophical intelligibility.

Finally, both Husserl and Heidegger refer to their phenomenology as "transcendental." Heidegger writes,

⁴³ Heidegger thinks that philosophy is only ontology, but I am using the word here in a more usual meaning.

⁴⁴ I mentioned the epistemological motives for the phenomenological reduction: it gets us to something absolutely self-given (*IP*). *Ideas* appears to emphasize the aim of bringing us from our investment in phenomena to an apprehension of their sense and ground. There are certainly, thus, tensions in Husserl's conception of phenomenology, even in his "mature," or transcendental, phase.

Being is the *transcendens* pure and simple. . . . Every disclosure of being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis.* (S&Z, p. 38)

For some phenomenon to be transcendent, for Heidegger in *Being and Time*, is for its showing up for Dasein to be presupposed by anything else showing up for Dasein.⁴⁵ In §69c Heidegger argues that the world is transcendent:

Factually concerned being amidst the available, the thematizing of the occurrent, and the objectivizing discovery of the latter *presuppose the world*, that is, are only possible as ways of being-in-the-world. The world is transcendent. (S&Z, pp. 365–6)

The world is transcendent with respect to our everyday and scientific commerce with entities, because in order for anything to show up in this commerce, it must do so in terms of the world, even if that “in terms of” is limited to the deficient case of showing up (as the occurrent does) as independent of the world. Being is, then, the “*transcendens* pure and simple,” because everything that shows up in any way, the world, Dasein, the available, or the occurrent, all show up in terms of some ontological framework.

Husserl conceives the transcendental character of his own phenomenology rather differently.⁴⁶ For Husserl, his phenomenology is transcendental, because it reveals the transcendental subject. The transcendental subject is the pure, reduced⁴⁷ subject who constitutes the world as what it is. According to the *Ideas*, this subject is divided from the world by an in-principle gulf. Husserl’s notorious thought-experiment of the “annihilation of the world” (*Ideas*, §49) aims to show that even if the world should cease to show up for the subject, the subject could still be aware of its own transcendental life. This is not intended to be a causal claim about the factual requirements of my own awareness. Recall that my own life, even

⁴⁵ I shall discuss the transcendental character of Heidegger’s thought, especially in relation to Kant, in Chapter 5. In distinguishing several uses of the word “transcendental,” I shall refer to the reflective standpoint from which we focus on being, the world, and other tendencies (in the sense of the passages from pp. 38 and 365–6) as the “phenomenological” standpoint. For strategic reasons I shall reserve the term “transcendental” for a different use.

⁴⁶ The following paragraph is based on Caputo’s (1977) discussion of the issue.

⁴⁷ Transcendental phenomenology also involves an “eidetic reduction,” which is a suspension of interest in particularities in favor of their essences. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology doubly reduces phenomena and ends up concerned with the essence of phenomena *qua* phenomena.

my psychological life, has been reduced. It is, rather, a claim about the independence of the essence of my subjectivity from the essence of the world. The transcendental subject, most clearly revealed by the annihilation of the world, does not need the world in this sense.⁴⁸ But for Heidegger, the subject, Dasein, does need the world. It is, essentially, being-in-the-world. There is simply no such thing as meaningful comportment, Heidegger argues, without a world in terms of which it can make sense. Heidegger's strongest formulation of this idea is found in §18 of *Being and Time*, in his treatment of the worldliness (*Weltlichkeit*) of the world: "That wherein understanding assigns itself [to some understanding of itself] and that in terms of which entities [unlike Dasein] are allowed to show themselves is the phenomenon of the world" (S&Z, p. 86). Dasein can only ever understand itself, be intelligible to itself, in terms of the world. There can be no absolute subjectivity.⁴⁹ So, the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger are not transcendental in the same sense.

Husserl's phenomenology is nevertheless transcendental in Heidegger's sense, even though the two philosophers use the word "transcendental" differently. If Husserl were right that all ordinary phenomena show up in terms of their noemata, and that noemata show up ultimately only by way of absolute consciousness, then absolute consciousness would be transcendental in Heidegger's sense. Of course, Heidegger argues at length that being, rather than absolute consciousness, is transcendental. This is one of the central, motivating themes of *Being and Time*. Both philosophers' phenomenologies are descriptions of the transcendental sense and ground of phenomena; this they share in common. Heidegger's phenomenology discards Husserl's phenomenological reduction, his focus on consciousness, and his interest in the ideal meanings (noemata) of phenomena; he trades them in for a hermeneutics of Dasein's pre-understanding of being.

One of the overarching theses of *Being and Time*, and one with which I shall be specifically concerned in Chapter 5, is that ontological frameworks are essentially shot through with temporal elements. Heidegger explains the significance of the title itself of the treatise by informing us early on that

⁴⁸ Stapleton (1983) develops this independence of the transcendental ego in terms of the logic of wholes, parts, and foundations from Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.

⁴⁹ In my discussion in Chapter 1 of death, we shall see that in what one might think to be Heidegger's rough parallel to the annihilation of the world, viz., death (which is, as we shall discover, a condition in which Dasein can find itself and not the ending of its life), Dasein cannot understand itself at all.

Dasein is such that, insofar as it is, it understands something like being. With this connection in mind it will be shown that *time* is that in terms of which Dasein in general inexplicitly understands and interprets something like being. Time must be brought to light and genuinely conceived as the horizon of all understanding of being and every interpretation of being. In order to make that transparent, we must provide an *originary explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, and we must do so in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein who understands being.* (S&Z, p. 17)

Dasein must understand being in terms of time; time is the “horizon” for the understanding of being. But what is it to understand being in terms of time? The formulation suggests that it is to understand the way in which things are by showing how they exist in time. But this suggestion is naive, because it takes too much for granted. Do we really know what time is? As we shall see in the study that follows, Heidegger argues that the common-sense grasp of time is deeply misguided, that it covers up a truer, because more explanatorily adequate, understanding of time and temporality. This naive suggestion boils down to linking being to what Heidegger subsequently calls “intratemporality” (*Innerzeitigkeit*, S&Z, p. 333), or “being-in-time” (*In-der-Zeit-sein*, S&Z, p. 412 ff.). Heidegger will offer his own, novel account of the nature of time, one that focuses on a peculiar and Dasein-related form of time that he calls “temporality” (*Zeitlichkeit*).

Not only is time the horizon in terms of which, Heidegger argues, Dasein understands being, it is supposed to be the final horizon for ontological understanding. Time needs no further horizon in order to make sense. This is an idea that seems sometimes to float just below the surface of *Being and Time*,⁵⁰ it is implicit, one might think, in the very design of the treatise, which culminates in the interpretation of being in terms of time. And in *Basic Problems* Heidegger explicitly states that time is the final horizon:

The sequence, mentioned earlier, of projections so to speak arranged one upon another: understanding of entities, projection upon being, understanding of being, projection upon time, has its end with the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality. (GP, p. 437)

He does not defend this thesis; he remarks simply and evasively, “Here we cannot ground this more originally; for that we would have look into the problem of the finitude of time” (*ibid.*). Moreover, this thesis is not one I would ultimately like to defend. I have argued elsewhere (1995b) against

⁵⁰ I cannot find, however, a direct quote to this effect in *Being and Time*.

understanding Heidegger as skating too close to any kind of dogmatism, as positing ultimate grounds of intelligibility or unquestionable foundations.⁵¹ It is clear that Heidegger was tempted by such final horizons. It is likely that as he wrote divisions 1 and 2 of *Being and Time*, he conceived the thesis that time is the final horizon as to be demonstrated in division 3. We shall never know whether this is so, and if so, how he would have proceeded. But since Heidegger is philosophically better off with this underdeveloped thesis left to the side, I shall make no attempt to develop or defend it.

Heidegger's broad ontology from the final quarter of *Being and Time* and the complicated inquiry into the nature of time that it involves shall be the focus of this study. This inquiry results in a nest of distinctions between different modes of time: originary or human temporality, world-time, and the ordinary conception of time. We shall have to devote much care to spelling out Heidegger's account of these phenomena, but for our introductory purposes here it is only relevant to understand the barest outline of my interpretation as well as the sorts of questions Heidegger will ask and answer about time. Traditional questions, such as whether the units of time are punctal or durative, whether time is absolute or relative, whether it is substantival or relational, and so on, are not addressed at all in *Being and Time*. Heidegger takes himself to have penetrated beyond such questions by inquiring into the basic conceptual aspects of time.

In this book I shall develop an account of originary temporality (*ursprüngliche Zeitlichkeit*) that is, I think, novel.⁵² Originary temporality is not what we would ordinarily call "time." (Heidegger does reserve the words "the ordinary conception of time" [*der vulgäre Zeitbegriff*] for a different phenomenon, after all.) Originary temporality is a manifold of nonsuccessive phenomena that explain ordinary time. The elements of the manifold go by the names "future" (*Zukunft*), "beenness" (*Gewesenheit*), and "Present"⁵³ (*Gegenwart*). They are nonsuccessive in the precise sense that the future does not follow, succeed, or come after the Present, which in turn does not follow, succeed, or come after beenness. They are

⁵¹ It can plausibly be argued, moreover, that the central place Heidegger assigns to Dasein's historicality in the developed account of interpretation and hermeneutics undermines the search for any final horizons. For a convincing exposition of this argument, see Guignon (1983, p. 233 ff.).

⁵² I have offered a preview of it in my (1992) contribution to Dreyfus and Hall (1992).

⁵³ I shall follow Macquarrie and Robinson in distinguishing between "*Gegenwart*" and "*anwesen*" by capitalizing "present" for the former, but not for the latter.

perhaps better thought of in analogy with tenses (Barrett 1968), except that one must not let the ordinary idea that tense implies succession infect the analogy. Heidegger knows quite well that originary temporality is not in any normal sense a form of time: he offers an *argument* that it should be called “originary time” (*ursprüngliche Zeit*, S&Z, p. 329). An argument would be superfluous, if originary temporality were in any normal sense a form of time. I shall develop the suggestion that the sense in which originary temporality is originary time is this: it *explains* ordinary time. It is originary in an explanatory sense.

The specific account I shall provide entails that ordinary time depends on originary temporality. For this reason, I shall characterize Heidegger as a “temporal idealist.” He believes that without Dasein there would be no time. This temporal idealism places him in a venerable, philosophical tradition that includes Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant, and Bergson. I shall use those figures, primarily Kant and Plotinus, to explore Heidegger’s idealism. Furthermore, in the context of *Being and Time*, temporal idealism implies that being depends on Dasein. After all, if the ontological framework of being in general and all its sorts is shot through with temporal phenomena, and if those latter phenomena depend on Dasein, then being must too. One might wonder, however, how I could advance such a claim shortly after arguing for a “realistic,” rather than “Dasein-related,” conception of being. And here is a crucial point: Heidegger’s *preliminary* conception of being is realistic, and he *earns* by his labors in *Being and Time* an idealism about being. If those interpreters who take being to be something like intelligibility were right (I named Richardson, Olafson, Dreyfus, and Frede above), then the entire argumentative thrust of the final quarter of *Being and Time* would be lost. To understand the important, final chapters of *Being and Time*, we must come to terms with Heidegger’s argument for temporal idealism. That is what I aim to do in this study.

To face Heidegger’s temporal idealism much ground must be prepared first. Originary temporality is the heart and basis of that idealism, and so we must develop an account of it. To do that, however, we must first explore Heidegger’s notion of care (*Sorge*), his name for the developed ontological framework of Dasein’s being. Originary temporality is the “sense of the being of care.” Thus, Chapter 1 is an interpretation of care. Chapter 2 offers my reconstruction of originary temporality. To get to the somewhat unusual reading of originary temporality as a nonsuccessive manifold, I must first (in Chapter 1) spell out what in the structure of care forces that concept of temporality on us: Heidegger’s conceptions of

death and nullity. Be forewarned: like many other ordinary words in *Being and Time*, we shall learn that the word “death” does not have its ordinary signification in that treatise. It does not refer to the ending of a human life, but rather to an existential condition in which Dasein is not able to understand itself. After working through the framework of originary temporality, I shall embark upon the lengthy task of developing Heidegger’s temporal idealism. The idealism relies upon drawing a further distinction between modes of time, between what he calls “world-time” (*Weltzeit*) and “the ordinary conception of time.” The explanatory dependence just mentioned is in fact a chain of dependencies: ordinary time (the ticking away of purely quantitative moments) depends on world-time (the succession of qualitatively determinate Nows), whose core phenomenon is in turn the pragmatic Now (the Now that aims us into the purposive future by relying on the given past), which finally in turn depends on originary temporality. Chapter 3 explores world-time, the pragmatic Now, and their dependence upon originary temporality. Chapter 4 works through an account of ordinary time and its dependence on world-time. Only with Chapter 5 shall we be able to understand Heidegger’s temporal idealism and its relation to its philosophical forebears.

There are two issues in the neighborhood of originary temporality I shall not explore in any depth in this study: authenticity and historicality (*Geschichtlichkeit*). Omitting a discussion of authenticity from a study of originary temporality will strike many readers of *Being and Time* as simply incoherent. Many students of Heidegger’s early thought, after all, take originary temporality to be an authentic phenomenon. Authenticity, or the condition of Dasein’s being in which it faces up to the sort of entity it is and lives into its (existential) death and nullity, is an exemplary manner of life for Dasein, a “factual ideal” (S&Z, p. 310) for the life of Dasein. And it is generally thought that Dasein exhibits originary temporality only when authentic. But in Chapter 2 I shall argue that originary temporality is “modally indifferent,” that is, neutral with respect to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein’s existence is always and essentially originally temporal. Given this, the phenomena of authenticity are largely irrelevant to Heidegger’s temporal idealism. Therefore, I shall ignore authenticity and inauthenticity, except where a reference to them is absolutely required.

The omission of historicality from this study may seem odd for a book on Heidegger’s conception of temporality. After all, Heidegger closely links the two concepts; the temporal interpretation of Dasein

supplies, in accordance with its central function, a more originary insight into the *temporalizing*⁵⁴ structure of temporality. This unveils itself [*enthüllt sich*] as the *historicality* of Dasein. (*S&Z*, p. 332)

The existential projection of the historicality of Dasein merely reveals [*bringt zur Enthüllung*] what already lies wrapped up in the temporalizing of temporality. (*S&Z*, p. 376)

This suggests that the concept of historicality is the full elaboration of Heidegger's conception of temporality. Some of the more powerful and influential interpretations of *Being and Time* and its concept of temporality closely identify temporality with historicality (Guignon 1983; Pöggeler 1983). But this identification is erroneous. Heidegger argues that historicality is a phenomenon derivative of temporality:

The analysis of the historicality of Dasein aims to show that this entity is not “temporal” because it “stands in history,” but rather the opposite, that it does and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being [im Grunde seines Seins]. (*S&Z*, p. 376)

Dasein's historicality is the way in which its originary temporality “stretches through time.” Thus, Dasein is historical, because it both is originally temporal and stands “in time,” sequential time. To clarify this line of thought requires having worked through the developed accounts of originary temporality and ordinary time, and thus we shall be able to explore historicality at all only in the Conclusion to this study. A further reason for largely bypassing Heidegger's discussion of historicality is its unclarity; it slips quickly into a treatment of authentic historicality at the expense of that historicality that is modally indifferent. This makes chapter 5 of division 2, on historicality, more useful for understanding authenticity and its temporal interpretation than temporality more broadly.

The exclusion of the themes of authenticity and historicality from this study should make plain that I do not aim here to offer a comprehensive

⁵⁴ Heidegger uses the verb “to temporalize” (*zeitigen*) to pick out the manner in which time obtains. Heidegger argues that time belongs to the being of entities, that it falls on the being side of the Ontological Difference, the difference between being and entities. Being is not an entity, and neither is time. Thus, Heidegger can write neither “being is” nor “time is.” Instead of “being is,” he writes, “it gives being” (*es gibt Sein*), or later “being obtains” (*das Sein ereignet sich*). Instead of “time is,” he writes, “it gives time,” “time temporalizes” (*die Zeit zeitigt*), or “time temporalizes itself” (*die Zeit zeitigt sich*): “Time cannot at all be occurrent; it does not have any sort of being – rather, it is the condition of the possibility that it gives [*es gibt*] such a thing as being (not entities). Time does not have the sort of being of some other thing, but rather, it *temporalizes*” (*LFW*, p. 410). In the Conclusion I shall discuss the notion that “it gives being.”

interpretation of Heidegger's remarks on and phenomenology of time and temporality. My aim, rather, is to explore Heidegger's temporal idealism, his conviction in *Being and Time* that time depends on Dasein. The material I develop in this study, therefore, will be narrowly tailored to working through the theme of temporal idealism, Heidegger's conception of it, his arguments for it, and the consequences of its failure.

My inquiry will have a negative conclusion: Heidegger's arguments for originary temporality and temporal idealism do not work. In particular, Heidegger's elaborate explanatory schemes are in the end unable to explain ordinary time. Originary temporality cannot, thus, be understood as original of time, originary time. And since ordinary time (and hence the modes of being in which it is involved) do not depend on Dasein, Heidegger's temporal idealism collapses. Given that my reading of Heidegger is unusual, one might argue that the failure of Heidegger's system, when construed as I construe it, is sufficient reason to reject my construal. Unfortunately, I find the textual evidence that drives me to my reading of Heidegger insurmountable. I cannot reject the reading to save the philosopher.

In the Conclusion to this study, I shall therefore look into the question What remains of Heidegger's ontological aspirations, once we leave behind those elements that he fails to establish? What sort of an ontology remains, once temporal idealism and originary temporality are removed from *Being and Time*? We shall discover that much of his ontology of Dasein survives, although, of course, the theory of historicality does not. As we have seen, not only the theory of historicality but also ontological idealism (the dependence of being on Dasein), rests upon temporal idealism. And if the ontological idealism that to a large extent defines what is novel in Heidegger's early philosophy of being becomes untenable, we are left wondering what to make of the language of being offered us in *Being and Time*. Therefore, in the Conclusion I shall also look into the demise of Heidegger's early philosophy of being. I shall argue that the collapse of his temporal and ontological idealism pushes Heidegger to some of the leading questions and concepts of his later thought, such as the distinction between the truth of being and being. Although we cannot explain the precise direction of his later reflections by tracing an adamantine chain from the failures of *Being and Time* to the innovations of the later Heidegger, we can see why he came to pose the questions he did as well as why his thought might have taken on a generalized, antimetaphysical cast.

CARE AS THE BEING OF DASEIN

What is Dasein? In the first sentence of the first section of the first chapter of division 1 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger offers a referential definition of “Dasein”: “We in each case ourselves are the entity whose analysis is our task” (*S&Z*, p. 41). But what is it about us that makes us a distinctive phenomenon? What characteristics make us a kind? Heidegger lists two in the next two sentences: “The being of this entity is *in each case mine*. This entity, in its being, comports itself to its being” (*ibid.*). These two characteristics subsequently get the names, respectively, “mineness” and “existence.” To a large extent, the exploration of mineness is delayed until division 2, whereas the systematic development of existence, as well as its relatives and dependents, occupies Heidegger’s efforts in division 1.

In this chapter, I explore existence and its siblings, facticity, falling, and discourse. These four phenomena make up the crucial concept of “care” – the term that replaces “existence” as a more specific and developed name for the being of Dasein. Each of these elements of care will in turn be linked with a series of other terms: “existence” with “understanding,” “projection,” and “ability”; “facticity” with “affectivity,” “attunement,” and “import” (although this last term is not Heidegger’s); “falling” with “being-amidst” and “concern”; and “discourse” with “language.” In sifting through the detailed account of the sorts of entity we are, the account painted by these terms and their connections, we shall be able to depict what Heidegger takes to be the essential features of a normal, or

"everyday," human being. This everydayness, however, will be supplemented by a special condition – Dasein's extreme condition – in which existence and facticity take on an unusual form. This extreme condition is picked out by the terms "death" and "anxiety,"¹ though these words do not have their normal meanings in Heidegger's use of them. We shall end up with a description of everyday Dasein expanded to accommodate Dasein's extreme condition. Chapter 2 will exploit these characterizations to move toward Heidegger's account of originary temporality. In this chapter I shall describe the phenomena of existence, facticity, falling, and discourse, as well as the extreme condition of death/anxiety.

Existence and Understanding

Existentiality, Self-understanding, and Ability

In §9 of *Being and Time*, whose aim is the preliminary presentation of "The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein" (the title of the section), Heidegger explains "existence" thus: "*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. . . . All of this entity's being-so is primarily being*" (S&Z, p. 42). Or, as he puts it in a slightly different way, "this entity, in its being, comports itself to its being. . . . It is *being* that is in each case at issue for this entity" (S&Z, pp. 41–2). He enlarges on this definition later, this time introducing the language of understanding: "Dasein is the entity that in its being comports itself understandingly to this being. The formal concept of existence is herewith indicated" (S&Z, pp. 52–3). Dasein is the entity whose being is always at issue in what it does, that is, the entity who always has an understanding of itself, and whose self-understanding is constitutive of its "being-so," its being what or who it is.

This central, existentialist thesis lies at the heart of Heidegger's conception of human being. Let us formulate it thus:

The Existentiality Thesis: *If Dasein is A, then it is A because it understands itself as A.*

To clarify this thesis, we must specify what Heidegger means by "understanding." To see the dangers of not doing so, consider a rather straightforward, or perhaps untutored, interpretation of the Existentiality Thesis, one based on the assumption that by "understanding" Heidegger has in

¹ Death and anxiety are not exactly the same phenomenon. They are one phenomenon looked at from two angles, the angle of understanding and the angle of affectivity.

mind something like knowledge. In this case, the Existentiality Thesis would entail that Dasein knows about everything that it is (Cartesian transparency taken to an extreme). This would render it impossible that Dasein have any features it does not know about and would probably make self-deception impossible (depending on one's analysis of that phenomenon).

Fortunately, we need not defend this claim, since Heidegger makes clear that by "understanding" he does not have in mind some form of awareness or cognition:

By the term understanding, we mean a fundamental existentiale,² neither a *sort of cognition*, distinguished in some way from explaining and conceiving, nor even cognition in general in the sense of thematically grasping [something]. (*S&Z*, p. 336)

Cognition, Heidegger claims, is derivative of the more basic phenomenon of understanding:

If we Interpret [understanding] as a fundamental existentiale, we thereby indicate that this phenomenon is conceived as a fundamental mode of the *being* of Dasein. In contrast, "understanding" in the sense of *one* possible sort of cognition among others, perhaps distinguished from "explaining," must thereby be Interpreted as an existential derivative of primary understanding, which co-constitutes the being of the There. (*S&Z*, p. 143)

The more basic phenomenon is competence, capability:³

In ontical discourse we often use the expression "to understand something" to mean "to be able to manage a thing" [*einer Sache vorstehen können*], "to be equal to it" [*ihr gewachsen sein*], "to be capable of something" [*etwas können*]. In understanding, as an existentiale, that of which one is capable is not a What, but rather being as existing. (*S&Z*, p. 143)

In fact, the word "understanding" has a number of closely related meanings. We use it principally in two ways: to describe a cognitive stance or propositional attitude toward a content, such as when we say, "I understand the Existentiality Thesis," and to describe a sort of ability we have, as when we say, "I understand the Germans."⁴ In the latter statement we

² An "existentiale" is an essential, ontological feature of Dasein.

³ This interpretive thesis is prominent in the literature. See, for example, Dreyfus (1991), Guignon (1983), and Schmitt (1969).

⁴ It may be that the first use is actually dependent on the second, if understanding a content is a sort of ability, perhaps an ability to use (a linguistic expression of) the content. It is not necessary to take a position on that question.

express the idea not that we grasp some content (though understanding the Germans will likely involve that), but rather that we are competent with certain sorts of people, that we are capable of handling ourselves among them. (We can use the word “know” this way too: “Bo knows baseball.”)

Thus, in Heidegger’s vocabulary, to say that Jones understands something is to say that she is capable of it. To say, therefore, that Jones understands herself as being (or, to be) *A*, is to say that she is capable of being *A*. And indeed, Heidegger endorses this consequence, when he writes, “*Understanding is the existential being of Dasein’s own ability-to-be [Seinkönnen]*” (*S&Z*, p. 144).⁵ Thus, if we wed the Existentiality Thesis to Heidegger’s account of understanding, we see that the former claims not that *Dasein* is aware of whatever it is, but rather that it is capable of whatever it is.

Now, this is a surprising claim. Suppose that Jones is six feet tall. The Existentiality Thesis then seems to imply that Jones is capable of being six feet tall. But what could that mean? Jones may *be* six feet tall, but is she *able* to be, or *capable*⁶ of being, or *competent* at being six feet tall? Jones’s height is one of her properties, not (cap)abilities. Jones is six feet tall and is able to run ten miles per hour. Let us call these two sorts of item, respectively, “state-characteristics” and “ability-characteristics.” Heidegger claims, then, that all of *Dasein*’s characteristics are ability-characteristics.

The Ability Thesis: *All of Dasein’s characteristics are ability-characteristics.*

“But surely,” one might object, “this Ability Thesis is indefensible: Jones has many state-characteristics, such as being six feet tall.” To defend the Ability Thesis I shall argue, first, that the state-characteristic of being six feet tall is closely associated with a self-interpretive ability-characteristic, and, second, that *Dasein* is only to be identified with the related ability-characteristic, not with the state-characteristic. Jones is six feet tall. She also, however, has stature: she comports herself as a tall person. This comportment embodies Jones’s self-understanding of her physical

⁵ Richard Schmitt (1969, p. 179) is, as far as I am aware, the first to see that this line should be read this way.

⁶ One must bear in mind that the words “capable” and “able” have at least two uses. On the one hand, we say that Jones is able to be hungry, by which we mean that she can be hungry, that it is possible that she be hungry. On the other hand, we often use “able” and “capable” in the sense in which they refer to an ability or competence. “Jones is able to drive” almost always has this meaning. It states that she has a certain skill or competence. For the sake of clarity, *I will use “ability” and “capability” only in the latter sense.*

height. Stature, in this sense, is not purely physical, is not the sort of characteristic a tree of the same physical height can have. A person who understands herself as unusually tall might talk down to people, use her height to lord it over them; on the other hand, she might be embarrassed by her height, more shy about physical encounters. Similarly, although being a female is a biological fact about Jones, being feminine is her way of interpreting that biological fact. (Think of the way in which we speak of degrees of femininity and masculinity, and the way in which baby-name books sometimes categorize baby names by how feminine or masculine they are.)⁷ Thus, closely related to the state-characteristics of being six feet tall and female are the self-interpretive characteristics of being tall and feminine.

Furthermore, self-interpretive characteristics are abilities. One must *know how* to be them. Being six feet tall or biologically female is a state, not an ability; it involves no know-how. But being tall (in the stature sense) or feminine is an ability. It is a way of handling oneself and relating to others. Abilities are easiest to notice when they break down. Imagine someone *bad* at being tall, say, someone who tries to lord it over others physically but fails. He would seem rather foolish trying. He sets his shoulders back, cocks his head downward, and says, "Um, excuse me, please." Being tall is learned, sometimes mastered, and can be done better and worse. We are socialized into or are taught our self-interpretive stature-characteristics, just as with many other, more obviously self-interpretive characteristics (being American, being bourgeois, etc.). These characteristics are one and all abilities. Hence, each of the state-characteristics we have considered (being six feet tall, female) is closely associated with a self-interpretive ability-characteristic (being tall, feminine).

One might think that the force of the argument above depends on contrasting a *physical* state-characteristic with a *self-interpretive* ability-characteristic. But this is not so. Jones is not only six feet tall, but also, say, the leader of her weekly book discussion group. That is clearly self-interpretive: one is not the leader of a group naturally, but rather only by being socially and interpretively situated in a certain way. But is it a state-characteristic? Heidegger would argue not. Jones must *know how* to be a group leader; she must be capable of it. Being a group leader is having and exercising a set of abilities: the ability to organize a group's meeting, the ability to control a discussion, even the ability to use a phone. So what

⁷ For an amusing version of this, look at the chapters "From Madonna to Meryl" and "From Rambo to Sylvester" in Linda Rosenkrantz and Pamela Redmond Satran, *Beyond Jennifer and Jason* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

appear to be interpretive *state*-characteristics turn out, in the final analysis, also to be *ability*-characteristics. Consequently, *none* of Dasein's interpretive characteristics are state-characteristics, and thus the argument does not trade on narrowing our focus on state-characteristics to physical ones.

The second leg of the defense of the Ability Thesis is the more difficult one: the claim that Dasein is only to be identified with these self-interpretive characteristics, not with its factual state-characteristics. Because I have already argued that what appear to be self-interpretive state-characteristics are really ability-characteristics, I can now argue that Dasein is only its ability-characteristics by arguing that Dasein is only its self-interpretive characteristics.

Dasein is properly only its interpretive, or existential, characteristics and is not conceived properly through its factual characteristics:

entities that are not worldless, e.g., Dasein itself, are also occurrent "in" the world, or more precisely stated, *can*, with a certain legitimacy and within certain limits, be *conceived* as merely occurrent. To do this, it is necessary to look completely away from, or better, not to see the existential makeup of being-in.⁸ This possible conception of "Dasein" as something occurrent and only occurrent should not be confused with Dasein's *own* manner of "occurrence." (S&Z, p. 55, note the scare-quotes)

Heidegger makes three significant claims here. (1) One can "with a certain legitimacy" conceive Dasein as something occurrent. In this context, the term "occurrent" appears simply to pick out all things unlike Dasein, that is, nonexistential entities, including the available.⁹ One can therefore "with a certain legitimacy" conceive Dasein as nonhuman, nonexistential. (2) In doing this one must prescind from Dasein's "existential makeup." That is, one can conceive Jones factually, if one abstracts away from Jones's properly Daseinish, existential features. This abstraction thereby grasps a nonexistential element or aspect of Jones, in the first instance, one would think, her biology. (3) This nonexistential abstraction is not the same as Dasein's "proper occurrence," that is, its facticity. "Facticity" is the name that Heidegger gives to Dasein's determinacy as an

⁸ Being-in (*In-sein*) is the way in which Dasein is in-the-world.

⁹ The term "occurrent" has two senses in S&Z. In its narrow and more frequent sense, it refers to the occurrent as defined in the Introduction. In its broad sense, "occurrent" picks out all nonhuman entities, i.e., both the occurrent in the narrow sense and the available. See S&Z, p. 45 for an explicitly broad use of the term. Throughout Chapters 1 and 2 of division 1 (i.e., before the distinction between the occurrent and the available is introduced in chapter 3), Heidegger uses "occurrent" in the broad sense.

existential entity. I shall explore the concept of facticity later in this chapter. Despite Heidegger's referring to it as "Dasein's *own* manner of 'occurrence,' " or even precisely by using "occurrence" here in scare-quotes, he wants to contrast it with whatever might be natural in Dasein. Let me formulate the overall claim of this paragraph in another thesis:

The Duality Thesis: *Dasein can be considered both in its proper, ontological makeup as essentially self-understanding and in an abstracted, factual way as something that merely occurs (esp., naturally).*

This Duality Thesis is central to Heidegger's ontology. Of immediate relevance is this: only with the help of the Ability and Duality Theses can Heidegger maintain the Existentiality Thesis. The general strategy for responding to potential counterexamples to the Existentiality Thesis is to distinguish factual characteristics from the existential ability-characteristics that are interpretations of them. The three theses come together as a package deal in *Being and Time*.

We can clarify the Ability Thesis further by approaching it again from a slightly different angle. Let us begin with a deceptively direct comment by Heidegger early in *Being and Time*:

The characteristics that can be exhibited by [Dasein] are thus not occurrent "properties" of an occurrent entity that "looks" such and so, but rather possible ways for [Dasein] in each case to be and only that. (*S&Z*, p. 42)

One might think this sentence simply says that whatever Dasein is (its characteristics) are possible for it. Of course, this is a mere triviality, since it just states that all of Dasein's (actual) characteristics are possible (characteristics). But Heidegger offers it by way of explicating the Existentiality Thesis: it directly follows the sentence, quoted above, "*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence*" (*S&Z*, p. 42). And it is hard to see how a triviality could explicate something so difficult and putatively innovative as the Existentiality Thesis. In order to see the passage (and hence, Heidegger's entire ontology of Dasein) as more than merely trivial, we must figure out what special content is carried by Heidegger's phrase "possible ways for Dasein to be."

Heidegger suggests that there is a special notion of possibility that applies to Dasein, one quite unlike that that applies to, say, a tree:

Being-possible, which Dasein in each case is existentially, is distinguished just as much from empty, logical possibility as from the contingency of something occurrent, insofar as with the latter this and that can "happen."

As a modal category of being-occurrent, possibility means the *not yet* actual and the *not ever* necessary. It characterizes the *merely* possible. . . . Possibility as an existential, on the other hand, is the most originary and last, positive, ontological determination of Dasein. (*S&Z*, pp. 143–4)

Heidegger is here clearly trying to argue for a third sort of possibility other than logical possibility and the “contingency of something occurrent” (which I shall call “occurrent possibility”). But what sort of possibility is that? To answer this question, it is helpful to examine his characterization of occurrent possibility.

Richard Schmitt (1969, p. 178 ff.) has addressed this passage directly and helpfully. I want to borrow from his reading of it. Unfortunately, one aspect of his interpretation is clearly wrong. He interprets occurrent possibility as “physical possibility.” But this is not right for two reasons. First, occurrent possibility is supposed to apply not only to the naturally and physically occurrent, but to any sort of occurrent item, whether it be physical, mental, mathematical, or whatever. Second, because Heidegger does not carve out any special notion for the available, I suggest that he is here using the term “occurrent” in its broad sense to apply to anything unlike Dasein.¹⁰ If so, “physical possibility” is yet more inappropriate, because not only is the available far from exclusively physical, but also the possibilities that govern even the physically available are not primarily physical possibilities (e.g., how a hammer can be *used*).

Heidegger’s explanation of the concept of occurrent possibility makes no mention of “physical possibility.” He says simply, and unfortunately darkly, that occurrent possibility is the “contingency of the occurrent,” and that “with the latter, this and that can happen.” The idea seems to be this: let me regiment the phraseology “with the latter, this and that can happen” as “with respect to something, some event can take place.” Consider the tree: with respect to the tree, a burning down can take place; put otherwise, the tree can be the subject of a burning down. If this parsing of Heidegger’s language is correct, then occurrent possibility is simply the contingent taking place of an event.

Now, Dasein’s possibilities are, according to this passage, supposed to be different in kind. How? The rest of the paragraph in which this passage occurs focuses on Dasein’s ability-to-be. This leads naturally to the suggestion – this is Schmitt’s significant contribution – that Dasein’s possibilities are abilities. We can say, “The tree can burn down,” but we should not thereby mean “The tree has the ability to burn down,” at least not in

¹⁰ See the previous note.

the precise sense that the tree has some *competence*. But this is what it is to say of Jones that she can be a translator; it is to say that she is able to translate, that she has that competence.

Schmitt's reading of Heidegger's concept of existential possibility fits in neatly with the overall interpretation I am offering. Dasein's possibilities are abilities, and as Heidegger says on p. 42, all Dasein's characteristics are existential possibilities, that is, abilities. Furthermore, the very idea of distinguishing two different sorts of possibility, occurrent and existential, reflects the Duality Thesis. We ought not, in a careful, ontological analysis, conflate the two different ways in which we can consider Dasein: abstractly as occurrent and properly as existential. This distinction runs so deep that we must even introduce distinct notions of *possibility* to do it justice. To reiterate: the Heideggerian defense of the Existentiality Thesis is carried out by way of the Ability and Duality Theses. We end up with a dualistic picture of Dasein, who when conceived properly is characterized only as having self-interpretive abilities, but when conceived improperly (abstractly) is also characterized as having state-characteristics.

Understanding and Projection

We have seen that for Dasein (properly) to be *A*, it must understand itself as *A*. Now, what is involved in understanding oneself as *A*? Heidegger answers this question by introducing his notion of projection (*Entwurf*). The German word "*Entwurf*" does not have all the meanings that the English word "projection" has. Its central sense is that of a plan, sketch, or blueprint. However, Heidegger goes out of his way to indicate that by "projection" he does *not* have in mind anything so explicit and thought-out as a blueprint: "Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a thought out plan, in accordance with which Dasein arranges its being" (S&Z, p. 145). What is Heidegger after with the language of "projection"? He also plays upon the construction of the German word for "projection": "*ent-werfen*" is to throw or cast forth (see Caputo 1986a). He seems rather to want to emphasize this metaphor. Thus, at the beginning of the paragraph in which he introduces projection, he writes,

Why does understanding, in accordance with all essential dimensions of what can be disclosed in it, always press ahead into [*dringt . . . in . . .*] possibilities? Because understanding has in itself the existential structure that we call *projection*. (S&Z, p. 145)

We can see why Heidegger makes these claims, if we bear the Ability Thesis in mind.

Does Dasein relate to its abilities as to thought-out plans? Imagine that after finishing her college degree in German, Jones decides to become a simultaneous interpreter. She sketches out a plan for becoming one: she will go to Georgetown University's Faculty of Languages and Linguistics to learn the craft and then apply for an apprenticeship at the United Nations. That is a plan for being a simultaneous interpreter, is it not? It is a plan for the *project of becoming* a simultaneous interpreter. It is not a plan for or blueprint of the *ability to be* a simultaneous interpreter. And note that being a simultaneous interpreter is an ability: one has to know how to be one. There is no sketch, plan, or blueprint for being this ability.¹¹ In understanding herself as a simultaneous interpreter, Jones does not sketch out a plan of the project of becoming one; rather, she works at and exercises the ability to be one. While learning how to be a simultaneous interpreter,¹² she understands herself as a student of simultaneous interpretation, and, indeed, she is able to be such a student. To understand oneself as something is to have and exercise the ability to be one. And this is what Heidegger means by “pressing ahead into” a possibility, an ability.

But there is a difficulty in developing the concept of projection.¹³ When Heidegger introduces the language of projection, he makes two claims about its relation to Dasein’s possibilities. First, he writes, “. . . in casting, projection casts the possibility as possibility before itself and lets it *be as such*” (*S&Z*, p. 145). So projection constitutes possibility or “lets it be.” Second, “Understanding is, as projection, the sort of being of Dasein in which it *is* its possibilities as possibilities” (*S&Z*, p. 145). Thus, in virtue of projection, Dasein *is* its possibilities. It would seem that these two statements stand in tension. On the one hand, projection seemingly has as its object all the possible ways in which Dasein could be. If this were so, then Jones – who now confronts a range of possible ways to be, including being a doctoral student in German, being a simultaneous interpreter, being a commercial translator – thus projects all of these possibilities. After all, one would think, they are all possibilities for her, and it is projection that lets them *be*. On the other hand, it would seem that projection has as its object that (those) definite possibility(ies) for the sake of which Jones is now acting, her “for-the-sake(s)-of-which.” Heideg-

¹¹ This is one of the principal burdens of chapters 4–6 of Dreyfus (1991).

¹² For a detailed account of ability acquisition that is consistent with Heidegger’s thinking, see Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986).

¹³ I was first made aware of this difficulty by Ted Schatzki, who objected to my taking

ger says that Jones *is* her possibilities.¹⁴ She is the possibility of being a simultaneous interpreter, because she is currently pressing ahead into that possibility. She is not the possibility of being a German doctoral student, because she is not currently pressing ahead into that one. She is her for-the-sake(s)-of-which and not the other possibilities that she forgoes. Thus, there are two functions here: opening up the range of possibilities, and pressing ahead into one of them; Heidegger seems to subsume both of them under the notion of projection.

There is good reason to believe, however, that projection refers only to the second phenomenon, namely, determining oneself as someone by pressing ahead into a possible way to be. Recall that Heidegger explains why understanding always presses ahead into possibilities by pointing to projection:

Why does understanding, in accordance with all essential dimensions of what can be disclosed in it, always press ahead into possibilities? Because understanding has in itself the existential structure that we call *projection*.
(S&Z, p. 145)

Understanding presses ahead into possibilities, precisely because projection makes up understanding, and projection just is pressing ahead into some possibility. Further support for this claim can be found in chapter 2 of division 2. In his treatment of what he calls “guilt,” Heidegger briefly explores Dasein’s inability to be two different possibilities at once. He writes,

as able-to-be [*seinkönnend*], it [Dasein] stands in each case in the one possibility or the other; it is constantly *not* some other possibility and has given it up in its existentiell projection. (S&Z, p. 285)

If projection were the opening up of possibilities as possible, simply as such, then Dasein would not have to give up one possibility in virtue of projecting a different one. Since, however, in projecting the possibility of being a simultaneous interpreter, Jones presses ahead into that possibility, she must give up being a doctoral student. Although she could open up both possibilities, she cannot press ahead into both of them. Therefore, to project oneself upon some possibility is to press ahead into it.

But how is this conclusion consistent with Heidegger’s claim that it is projection that lets possibilities *be*? After all, if Jones can only project

¹⁴ But why would Heidegger then use the plural “possibilities” when describing this function of projection? Because Dasein is never just one for-the-sake-of-which, but rather several or many of them at once. Jones is a simultaneous interpreter, a loyal sister, a conscientious employee, etc.

herself upon one of the possibilities under consideration, then it would seem – if the preceding argument is correct – that the others are not possible for her. But that is a strange conclusion at best. The solution to this worry lies in recalling that Heidegger uses the term “possibility,” when applied to Dasein, to refer to abilities, not simply to ways in which one could be. Although it is possible for Jones to be a doctoral student in German – she could pursue that way of life – she has not set out to do so, she has not developed any of the requisite skills, and she is not in any way pressing ahead into that possibility. Although she has the *potential* to be a doctoral student, she is not (currently) *able* to be one.¹⁵

I shall return (in my discussion of death and anxiety) to some of the consequences of this claim, but now I want to explore a significant qualification on Heidegger’s Ability Thesis, one that will bring into focus the second central element of what comes to be called the “care-structure,” namely, facticity.

Facticity and Affectivity

Dasein has no essence in the normal sense, no way in which it must be regardless of how it understands itself. Put another way, Dasein is what it can be (*S&Z*, p. 145). Dasein is its possibilities. But possibilities are only one side of being. The tree can burn down. Burning down is one of its occurrent possibilities. The tree is also, however, determinate: it has not yet burned down, it stands forty feet high, and so on. Possibility and determinacy together make up a complex, ontological whole. Can the same be said of Dasein? There would seem to be an obstacle to saying so: the Ability Thesis denies that Dasein has any state-characteristics. It claims that Dasein has only ability-characteristics. Because the tree’s standing forty feet high – one aspect of its determinacy – is a state-characteristic, we have specified its determinacy, in contrast with its possibilities, by recurring to state-characteristics. But we cannot do that for Dasein, if the Ability Thesis is correct.

Thus, if the ontological matrix of possibility and determinacy is to be applied to Dasein, Dasein’s determinacy must be understood without the benefit of state-characteristics. In his notion of facticity, Heidegger tries precisely to develop a concept of determinacy that allows us to characterize Dasein as determinate without abandoning the Ability Thesis. The tree’s determinacy – having state-characteristics – is a sort of determinacy,

¹⁵ This contrast makes plain what is wrong with Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of “Seinkönnen” as “potentially-for-Being,” rather than as “ability-to-be.”

called “factuality,” that is alien and unsuited to Dasein. Dasein’s determinacy is called “facticity” and is quite different. How it is different is the subject of this section. Before getting into details, let me offer a guiding suggestion. Consider the tree: how are its possibilities related to its determinacy? The tree’s possibilities are possible (contingent but nonactual) state-characteristics; its determinacy is its actual state-characteristics. In the case of the tree, its possibilities are understood as modified determinacies, modified actualities. In the case of the tree, actuality is “higher than,” that is, conceptually more basic than, possibility. Occurrent possibility “is ontologically lower than actuality and necessity” (S&Z, p. 143). But in Dasein’s case, the opposite is supposed to be true: “Possibility as an existential, on the other hand, is the most originary and last, positive, ontological determination of Dasein” (S&Z, p. 144). In Dasein’s case, we must find a way to understand determinacy as a modified form of possibility, ability.

Facticity: Dasein’s “Specific Way of Occurring.”

The tree is determinate in that, *inter alia*, it stands forty feet high. This determinacy fills out a more basic fact: the tree is actual.¹⁶ The tree’s height is not just a matter of possibility, because the tree is real, actual. The principle in the background here is that the actual is determinate.¹⁷ Because the tree is actual, it cannot just be the case that it is possible that it be thirty-nine feet high, forty feet high, forty-one feet high, etc. It must also be the case that the tree has some specific, determinate height. Heidegger wants to avoid using the word “actual” in describing Dasein’s determinacy, since “actuality” is not a term that will clearly apply to Dasein. In typical Heideggerian linguistic fashion, he writes instead of an entity’s “that it is.” In the case of the tree, he writes of the “factual occurrence” of the tree (S&Z, p. 56 ff.).

How does Heidegger describe the “that it is” of Dasein? He uses two words to get at what he has in mind, “facticity” and “thrownness”:

And indeed the “factuality” of the Fact of one’s own Dasein is ontologically fundamentally different from the factual occurrence of a sort of stone. We call the factuality of the Fact of Dasein, as which every Dasein always is, its *facticity*. The developed structure of this determinacy of being is itself only

¹⁶ It would be more natural to write “the tree exists” here, but the term “exists” is reserved for Dasein.

¹⁷ We need not now consider the stronger claim that the actual is thoroughlygoingly determinate. This was certainly accepted by many traditional ontologists, such as Leibniz and Kant.

conceivable as a problem in light of the fundamental, existential makeup of Dasein, which we shall already have worked out. (S&Z, p. 56)

This characteristic of the being of Dasein, its “that it is,” . . . we call the *thrownness* of this entity into its There, in such a way indeed, that it is the There as being-in-the-world. The expression thrownness should indicate the *facticity of being delivered over*. The “that it is and has to be” that is disclosed in Dasein’s affectivity is not the “that [it is]” that expresses the factuality that belongs to occurrence. . . . *Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something occurrent, but rather a characteristic of the being of Dasein, which is taken up into existence, even if it is primarily pushed away.*¹⁸ (S&Z, p. 135)

These passages, especially the second one, are dense and difficult texts, but let me mine them to a certain depth, in order to sift out the basic line of Heidegger’s thinking on Dasein’s determinacy.

Heidegger must develop a conception of Dasein’s determinacy that derives from or grows out of his conception of Dasein’s possibility, or existentiality: “Facticity is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something occurrent, but rather a characteristic of the being of Dasein, which is *taken up into existence*, even if it is primarily pushed away” (p. 135, emphasis altered). In the passage that introduces “thrownness” (on p. 135), Heidegger uses a particular linguistic device to signal the same general connection I have been trying to make. He characterizes Dasein’s determinacy not just as its “that it is,” but also as its “has to be.” Thrownness is Dasein’s “that it is and has to be.” Heidegger is not suggesting that Dasein is somehow necessary. This is connoted by the English, but not by the original German. Heidegger writes that thrownness is Dasein’s “*Daß es ist und zu sein hat*.” Dasein has its being to be. Dasein has its being and must make something of it, must live it out in a definite way. That is, its being is an issue for it. Dasein’s determinacy, in other words, is internally connected with its existentiality.

Let me thus return to the basic concept of existence and see what notion of determinacy Heidegger wants to connect with it. Dasein exists (in the technical sense) in that its being is at issue for it. We saw above much that is involved in and follows from this claim. One element we did not reflect on is this: to say that Dasein’s being is an issue, that it is a question, is not just to say that it is up for grabs or unsettled. To be an issue, to be in question for Dasein itself, Dasein’s being must *matter* to it. The sense in which this is true is rather weak, however. One can be indifferent to a question. So, for example, say that Jones is indifferent to

¹⁸ “Pushed away” presumably in the sense of disowned in inauthenticity.

the question whether to watch hockey or tennis on the television. There is a question here for Jones, but one that “makes no electric connection with her being,” in William James’s words. One may contrast Jones’s indifference with the attitude of her coffee table, which likewise sits in front of the television, but is not indifferent to the question. The question is not an issue for the coffee table at all, in any respect. In a careful passage in §9, Heidegger writes, the occurrent “is ‘indifferent’ to its being, or precisely stated, it is such that it is neither indifferent nor not indifferent to its being” (*S&Z*, p. 42). So, when I say that its being must matter to Dasein, I mean this in a manner so weak that indifference is compatible with it. What is not compatible with it is only that it should be “neither indifferent nor not indifferent to its being.”¹⁹

This is how Heidegger thinks of Dasein’s fundamental determinacy; we can see this in a feature of the text in which he introduces “facticity.” The quote that defines “facticity” (from p. 56) is preceded by a discussion of the way in which

“The table stands ‘next to’ the door,” “the chair ‘touches’ the wall.” One may not, strictly speaking, talk [here] of “touching.” This is not because in the end, according to a precise measurement, a gap can be found between the chair and the wall. Rather, it is because the chair cannot, at bottom [*grundsätzlich*], touch the wall, even if the gap were null. The presupposition for that would have to be that the chair can *encounter* the wall. (*S&Z*, p. 55)

The chair cannot encounter the wall; that is, the wall cannot mean anything to the chair, cannot even present itself to the chair in the monotonous, indifferent quality of all those questions Jones confronts, but feels indifferent toward.

We have seen that for Dasein to have its being as an issue for it, that being must matter to it, even if only indifferently. This is the minimal content that Heidegger puts into “facticity” and “thrownness.” Its minimality derives from the minimality of that with which it is connected: Dasein’s being being at issue. Dasein’s existentiality or possibility, however, is typically more specific than that. Dasein is not just able-to-be, but also, say, able to be a simultaneous interpreter. The bulk of Heidegger’s treatment of facticity and its cousins focuses on the mattering demands of being more specifically able. He develops his account of these phenomena under the headings of “affectivity” (*Befindlichkeit*) and “attunement”

¹⁹ And thus, John Haugeland is not exactly right when he writes, “The trouble with Artificial Intelligence is that computers don’t give a damn” (1979, p. 619). Rather, they neither do nor don’t give a damn.

(*Stimmung*). I shall explore this account in some detail and then return to the original question of how this is supposed to clarify Dasein's determinacy.

Affectivity: The Ways Things Matter

"What we pick out *ontologically* with the term affectivity is . . . : attunement, being-attuned" (S&Z, p. 134). This attunement discloses Dasein as the entity "to whom Dasein has been delivered over in its being, which Dasein has to be" (*ibid.*). That is, attunement discloses Dasein's thrownness, facticity. What more specifically is attunement? Heidegger identifies it as the "most well-known and everyday phenomenon," and his term for it in German (*Stimmung*) has an ordinary usage in which it means "mood" and "spirits." But Heidegger's development of the concept takes it in a direction different from a traditional description of moods. He writes,

An entity of the character of Dasein is its There in such a way that it is affected [*sich . . . befindet*] in its thrownness, whether explicitly or not. In affectivity Dasein is always already brought before itself, it has always already found itself, not as a perceptual finding itself before itself, but rather as an attuned being affected [*gestimmtes Sichbefinden*].²⁰ (S&Z, p. 135)

He develops his account of attunement in §30 by way of the example of fear. Now, it is always unclear, when confronting an example, how much to generalize from it, and Heidegger does not go out of his way to help us here. I shall in effect take a stand on that question by choosing to focus on the two dominant features of fear: that it has an object (the fearsome), and that it has a self-regarding element as well. Heidegger calls these two items the fear's "in-the-face-of-which" and its "about-which."²¹

The In-the-Face-of-Which of Fear. The in-the-face-of-which of fear is the object or item that one fears, say, the oncoming car as Jones stands in the middle of the boulevard:

²⁰ Alas, this passage cannot really be captured very well in English, for Heidegger is trading on the roots of his word for affectivity (*Befindlichkeit*) in the verb stem "to find." Dasein "finds itself" thus and so by means of an attuned "self-finding" (*gestimmtes Sichbefinden*), rather than as a merely perceptual finding or discovery.

²¹ He lists a third element, "the fearing itself." This is not really a helpful addition to the analysis.

The *in-the-face-of-which* of fear, the “fearsome,” is always an intraworldly encountering²² [entity] of the sort of being of the available, the occurrent, or Dasein-with [*Mitdasein*.]²³ . . . The *in-the-face-of-which* of fear has the character of being threatening. (*S&Z*, p. 140)

Heidegger proceeds with a rather detailed analysis of fearsome items, which is not really to our point. The basic idea is that the attunement reveals an entity in the environment (an intraworldly entity) as fearsome, as being threatening. This fearsome thing is in the environment; it could be a bit of paraphernalia (the oncoming car), a natural thing (a fire), or a person (a mugger). It is not Dasein itself. Heidegger explicitly does not include that category with the others. It is not clear, however, whether this is an artifact of the example, fear, or a general feature of attunement.²⁴ One would hope the former, because there do appear to be attunements that can take Dasein as their object: love and hatred, for example, which can take the forms of self-hatred and self-love.

Attunement reveals that intraworldly item as bearing an import²⁵ for Dasein. When Heidegger explains that fear reveals the fearsome as threatening, he is suggesting that the fearsome is significant, makes a difference to Dasein, for this reason. He elaborates the point thus:

Circumspectively concerned letting-encounter has – as we can now see more sharply on the basis of affectivity – the character of being touched [*Betroffenwerdens*.]²⁶ But being touched by the unserviceability, resistance, threateningness of what is available is ontologically possible only by being-in’s being so determined in advance that intraworldly encountering [entities] can *matter* to it. This ability to have things matter to Dasein is grounded in affectivity, as which it has disclosed the world, for example, in terms of threatenability. (*S&Z*, p. 137)

²² Heidegger uses the word “to encounter” in a way that at first strikes one as backwards (in both German and English): he writes “things encounter Dasein,” and not the other way round. His point here is to emphasize that things show up for us. He aims to reverse the modern metaphors of intentionality, in which the mind is said to have a light or intentional ray that reaches out beyond what Heidegger derides as “the cabinet of consciousness” (*S&Z*, p. 62) and falls upon objects.

²³ “Dasein-with” are others, those whom one encounters in going about business in the world.

²⁴ Anxiety seems to be singled out for having Dasein in both positions, as *in-the-face-of-which* and *about-which*. This is mitigated to some extent, however, since the *in-the-face-of-which* of anxiety is not just Dasein or being-in-the-world, but rather being-in-the-world “as a whole” (*S&Z*, p. 187).

²⁵ The term is Charles Taylor’s (1985, p. 48).

²⁶ “Being affected” would be better here, but I have already used it for “*Befindlichkeit*.” Some relative of “mattering” might also be better, but it has been used for “*angehen*” constructions, one of which is used a little further on in this passage.

Attunement reveals the imports of things, they way they touch Dasein. A car is not just something with which to drive, a means of transportation. Instead, a car is also (all too often) something threatening. The plate on Jones's shelf is not just something with which to serve food, but also importantly something of familial value, something cherished. The over-used joke that Heidegger describes the world in chapter 3 of division 1 of *Being and Time* as one large gas station hits an important nerve of truth about that chapter. Chapter 3 presents the world simply as a set of use-objects, things to be manipulated to complete certain tasks, so that Dasein can be the sort of person it projects itself to be. Heidegger did not, in fact, think of the world that way. In chapter 3 his main purpose is to exhibit certain aspects of the world that undermine several important traditional theses: that the world is a totality of interacting substances (which is undermined by the purposefully functional, essential interrelation of paraphernalia); that the world is known by means of cognition (which is undermined by the precognitive, circumspective character of Dasein's intelligent navigation through the world); and, thus, that Dasein is primarily a knower who stores up information and theories about the world (which is undermined by seeing that the world is not merely an object of belief or theory, and that Dasein is primarily a skilled agent). He accomplishes these goals by means of focusing on the side of Dasein's familiarity with the world that is found in its embodied competences. The one-sidedness of this description is corrected in §29. Intraworldly things have imports; they matter to Dasein.

What Fear Fears about. Dasein does not frighten itself,²⁷ it is not the in-the-face-of-which of fear, but Dasein does fear about itself: "That about which fear fears is the fearful entity itself, Dasein" (*S&Z*, p. 141). There is a straightforward way in which this claim is quite clear. Jones fears the car as she stands in the middle of the boulevard, and she fears about herself, about her safety and physical integrity. Her fear has an "object" (the fearsome, the car), which is not she, yet that fear is nonetheless "self-regarding": it is a fear on behalf of her safety, her life. The road to generalizing Heidegger's account is somewhat complex in virtue of aspects of the phenomena that Heidegger himself spells out. Initially it may seem that Jones herself need not be the person about whom she fears. After all, can she not fear about or for her friend Smith as he stands in the

²⁷ Actually, I am far from certain why Heidegger had such confidence in this. Surely we can frighten ourselves? If he is wrong about this bit of his analysis, nothing much will follow for the larger picture he is painting.

road? In fact, Heidegger identifies three phenomenologically distinct cases here:

But fearing-for can also concern others, and in such cases we speak of fearing for²⁸ them. This fearing for . . . does not catch fear from the other. That is already out of the question in so far as the other, *for whom* we fear, need not on his side fear at all. We fear *for* the other mostly precisely when *he* does *not* fear for himself and foolhardily throws himself up against what threatens him. (S&Z, pp. 141–2)

In this case, Jones fears for someone who does not fear about or for himself. She sees Smith in the middle of the road, blithely reading the newspaper as BMWs rush by. Smith is so absorbed in the reading that he has not noticed the cars; or perhaps he is from New York and does not fear cars in the way that Jones does. Here the fearing is all “on her side.” In a stronger case, only hinted at in Heidegger’s term “fearing with” (*Sich-mitfürchten*), Jones and Smith can fear with each other for him: they look at each other and share a fearful glance as Smith stands in the middle of the street. Here the fearing is “on both sides,” but the life feared for is still his; she is safe on the sidewalk. Finally, there is an even stronger case, perhaps hinted at in Heidegger’s term “fearing along with one another” (*Miteinanderfürchten*):²⁹ Jones and Smith are stuck together on the yellow line, having made together the ill-advised attempt to cross the street. They fear along with each other for their lives. The fearing is “on both sides,” and both lives are feared for. Still, she does fear for his life (and he for hers), and thus this is a case of the fearing for another that Heidegger is interested in.

In both of the first two cases, although it may seem at first that Jones only fears for another, and not for or about herself, Heidegger wants to argue that in fearing for Smith she is also fearing about herself:

One can fear for . . . , without fearing [for] oneself.³⁰ Precisely speaking, however, fearing-for . . . is indeed a fearing [about] *oneself*. One’s being-with

²⁸ “Fürchten für”: Heidegger’s German wants to distinguish linguistically, by means of the prepositions “um” and “für,” between this specific notion of fearing for someone else and the prior notion of fearing about oneself. “For” would also be a natural translation of the “um,” but since this would leave no distinction in the English for Heidegger’s distinction, I shall follow Macquarrie and Robinson’s artifice for distinguishing the “um” and the “für.”

²⁹ To some extent I am inventing meanings for Heidegger’s words, which, needless to say, are not self-defining. However, there must be some reason why Heidegger spoke of fearing-for in three different ways here, and my suggestions seem as good as any.

³⁰ In this passage, Heidegger relies upon the reflexive pronoun in “*sich fürchten*” to make his point that all fearing in the face of anything, and all fearing for others, is also always a fear

the other, which could be ripped from one, is also “feared” [about]. (*S&Z*, p. 142)

Jones *fears* for Smith, rather than simply apprehends that he could very well presently lose his life, because Jones stands in a relation (being-with) to Smith and cares about him. Now, this need not be a terribly emotional thing; Smith need not be a friend. Only a very thin and diffuse care is required. It is in virtue of this diffuse, solicitous being-with³¹ that Jones fears for the other. Conversely, if she loathes Smith completely, she may very well see his being stranded in the middle of the boulevard as an opportunity rather than a threat, and thus not fear at all, but rather excitedly hope for his demise. So fearing for the other requires Jones to fear about her being-with him.

Heidegger makes a correlative point about cases in which Jones fears not for another, but to use Heidegger’s example, “for house and home”:

When we fear for house and home,³² we find no counterexample for the determination above of the about-which of fear [i.e., for the thesis that Dasein always fears about itself]. For Dasein is in each case, as being-in-the-world, concerned being-amidst. Primarily and usually Dasein is in terms of *what* it is concerned about. Its imperilment is a threat to being-amidst. (*S&Z*, p. 141)

As the fire approaches her house, Jones fears the fire (it is the fearsome), and she fears for her house. She may be far away, in a hotel in the next town, utterly safe. Still, she fears for her house. This is possible, Heidegger argues, because she is essentially “being-amidst,”³³ she is essentially engaged with the things of her environment. She fears for the house, because she cares about the house. She cares about the house as a way of being amidst it. This fearing for the house is not based on an egocentric and materialistic thing-lust; rather, it reveals to her about herself that she values the house and her being amidst it. Fearing for house and home, as

about oneself. Again, it is hard for Heidegger’s linguistic signals to make it through translation.

³¹ We have not yet discussed “being-with.” Suffice it for now to say that “being-with” is Heidegger’s term for the background way in which we share the world with others. He takes it to be essential to Dasein that it be with-others.

³² The German is “*um Haus und Hof*,” which is confusing, since “*um*” has been reserved to pick out what we are translating as “fearing about,” rather than “fearing for.” But we fear *for* house and home, not about them. Here Heidegger is pinned down by German idiom.

³³ Being-amidst, which we shall explore below under the heading of falling, is Dasein’s essential interaction with the paraphernalia of life.

well as fearing for others, involves a self-revelation, a disclosure of oneself as caring about things in some definite way.

The attunement of fear not only reveals a fearsome object, and not only sometimes involves another person or thing feared for, but also always discloses something about the fearful one, something that is “feared about.” In the case of fearing for others, Jones’s being-with them is feared about and can be seen to be a deeper ground that makes the fear possible. When she fears “for herself,” when she is stranded in the middle of the boulevard, she clearly fears about her own safety. This fear discloses the way in which certain aspects of herself matter to her. Now, the phraseology (“certain aspects of herself mattering to her”) makes the whole affair sound rather selfish, or at least egocentrically self-regarding. But that is not the point at all. If she were indifferent to her being with Smith, then she would not fear for Smith. Of course, it does not follow that her fear for Smith is a self-absorbed fear. It simply must be grounded in the way her relationship to Smith matters to her. Moreover, Heidegger is not arguing that Jones is only motivated by self-regarding facts. Yet he is making a claim about motivation, and in exploring it, we shall further illuminate his conception of attunement.

Being the Ground of Its Ability

Heidegger argues that there is an intrinsic connection between affectivity and understanding, in that what is disclosed by affectivity serves as the ground for Dasein’s pressing ahead into the self-understandings it pursues:

Possibility as an existential does not mean a free floating ability-to-be in the sense of the “indifference of the will” (*libertas indifferentiae*). Dasein is, as essentially affective, in each case already caught up in determinate possibilities. . . . This means, however, that Dasein is a being-possible that is delivered over to itself; through and through it is *thrown possibility* [*geworfene Möglichkeit*]. (S&Z, p. 144)

Jones is affected by herself, that is, by her abilities, her possibilities, the possible ways to be Dasein. They are disclosed to her as mattering in determinate ways, as bearing imports. And these imports motivate her. It is for this reason that the thrownness of possibilities prevents her ability-to-be from being “free-floating,” a “liberty of indifference.” The thrownness of her possibilities, or better, her thrownness into possibilities, is precisely the fact that her possibilities already matter to her.

Jones is attuned to what makes certain ways of being worthwhile, fun, desirable, scary, noble, exhilarating, and so on. This attunement in turn makes her ability-to-be possible. Her ability-to-be an interpreter is made possible by an affective disposition to be an interpreter. The ability is not, as we have seen, some state-characteristic that she possesses, nor is it some abstract, purely intellectual or purely physical capacity of hers. Rather, it is what Heidegger calls a “thrown possibility,” that is, an engaged ability that requires a certain affective disclosure of herself and the world to make sense for her. She could not be an interpreter, in the sense that she could not throw herself into the subsidiary tasks and wield the requisite paraphernalia, if she did not encounter the possibility (however tacitly) as noble, or desirable, or whatever. The possibility of being an interpreter must matter to her in some way, must be significant in some way. If it were not, then she would be utterly indifferent to it, and thereby unable to be it.

In §58 on “guilt,” Heidegger introduces the language of Dasein’s “being the ground” (*Grundsein*) for its projection. Dasein always projects on the ground of its thrownness, the way things already matter to it. He writes,

Dasein is *existingly* the ground of its ability-to-be *as this entity*, to whom it has been delivered over and as who it can exist solely as the entity that it is. Although it has *not itself* laid the ground of its ability-to-be, it rests in its weight, which attunement makes manifest as burden. (*S&Z*, p. 284)

Jones cannot get outside of her thrownness, of the way things already matter to her. She can only live *as* this ground for her projected abilities. To live as the ground is to live out the ground, to project on the basis of the ground. Thrownness is one’s being thrown into, one’s finding oneself with, ways in which things already matter. And these ways in which things matter ground one’s ability-to-be by providing the affective determinacy necessary to press ahead into the ability-to-be.

Dasein’s facticity, its determinacy, is not its being so tall, having hair of this color, etc. Rather, its facticity is the way things already matter to it. To parallel the Ability Thesis, let me formulate

The Affectivity Thesis: *Dasein’s determinacy consists in the way things matter to it.*

Why should this be the concept of facticity that Heidegger uses? What is his justification for the claim that the peculiar determinacy of Dasein lies

in the way things matter to it, rather than in what we ordinarily would call the “facts” of its life? In using the last phrase I intend explicitly to suggest that by “facticity” Heidegger has in mind none of the things that might ordinarily fall under the expression “the facts of one’s life,” apart from the way things already matter to one. Heidegger does not include not only height and weight and hair color, but past deeds, circumstances of birth, social class, and so on. Why?

Here we encounter one of Heidegger’s central arguments, one taken up, yet significantly misunderstood, by Sartre. That Jones is in a certain factual situation, say, having stolen something, does not itself have any motivational import. She is motivated, rather, by a shame, or a pride, or a fear in the face of this fact. And shame, pride, and fear can have their motivational impacts only in virtue of the way they reveal her possibilities to her. Does she project herself into the possibility of being a thief, or of being a law-abiding person, or being a secretive person? Which of these possible ways to be Dasein she presses ahead into is governed by which of the attunements (most) structure her attitude toward her past deed. What situates her is *not* the deed, but the affective interpretation of the deed. Now, Sartre misunderstood this when he argued that feelings are “essentially conduct”:

I am never any one of my attitudes, any one of my actions. . . . But take a mode of being which concerns only myself: I am sad. One might think that surely I am the sadness in the mode of being what I am. What is the sadness, however, if not the intentional unity which comes to reassemble and animate the totality of my conduct? . . . Moreover is not this sadness itself a conduct? (1953, pp. 103–4)

Sartre embraces Heidegger’s basic point – that some determinate fact about Jones’s body or psyche cannot motivate her, but only the way she is attuned to the significance of that fact – but takes it to mean that feelings and past deeds are not feelings and past deeds, but rather bits of conduct. That attunement is essentially bound up with projective ability does not mean that it just is projective ability. This seems to have been Sartre’s mistake.³⁴

A dualism of interpretation and fact again structures Heidegger’s ontology. Although bodies are factually determinate by having a certain hair color, Dasein is factically determinate by already being attuned to what matters. Existence is ability; facticity is attunement. Dasein is attuned

³⁴ Sartre also seems to have mistaken ability for a form of conduct.

ability and not something with a determinate factual past and an open-ended, possible future. The determinacy that is conceptually linked to projective ability is being already attuned to what matters. These two concepts are inextricably linked, and for this reason existence and facticity are “equi-originary.”

Falling

Textually it is a little unclear how to fill out the structure of care. In §41, which pulls together Heidegger’s account of care, he writes, “The fundamental, ontological characteristics of this entity [viz., Dasein] are existentiality, facticity, and having-fallen [*Verfallensein*]” (*S&Z*, p. 191). Thus, falling (*Verfallen*) is a third element of the care-structure. But the term “falling” does not make its first appearance on p. 191, and in earlier texts it designates not an essential aspect of the being of any Dasein, but rather Dasein’s inauthentic condition. Chapter 5 of division 1 presents the structure of “disclosedness” (*Erschlossenheit*). Officially, care is the being of Dasein, and disclosedness is the way in which that being is disclosed to, or there for, Dasein. Disclosedness would thus be roughly a replacement for the concept of self-consciousness. (Self-consciousness is too mentalistic a term for the ontology that we have been exploring.) Existentiality is disclosed in understanding, and facticity is disclosed in affectivity.

How is falling disclosed? The third element of the disclosedness-structure, as spelled out in part A of chapter 5 of division 1, is discourse. But note that part B of that chapter, an exploration of inauthentic disclosedness, characterizes this disclosedness as “fallen.” This would suggest that falling is a mode of disclosedness and an inessential one at that (since Dasein can, after all, escape inauthenticity). Heidegger hopelessly muddies the waters in division 2, when he writes, “The full disclosedness of the There, which is constituted by understanding, affectivity, and falling, maintains its articulation through discourse” (*S&Z*, p. 349). This list locates falling as a third, coordinate element of the disclosedness-structure and places discourse, which appeared in division 1 to be that third, coordinate element, outside the internal articulation of the disclosedness-structure as a sort of modifying element. (I shall explore the place of discourse in the next section.) There are texts, moreover, in which Heidegger entirely confuses the care- and disclosedness-structures: “As care, that is, existing in the unity of falling, thrown projection, is the entity [viz., Dasein] disclosed as There” (*S&Z*, p. 406). “Projection” (understanding) and “thrownness” (affectivity) belong to the disclosedness-

structure, not the care-structure. In light of this, I have in this study not adhered to any rigorous distinction between care and disclosedness. In spelling out the elements of care, the being of Dasein, I freely make use of the phenomenology that Heidegger develops in his discussion of disclosedness.

Given that the term “falling” moves around in Heidegger’s architec-tonic, it is best to treat it as an ambiguous term and to sort out the various phenomena to which it equivocally applies. Section 41 spells out the existentiality of care by recharacterizing existentiality as “being-ahead” and facticity as “being-already-in.” Coordinate with being-ahead and being-already-in is “being-amidst” (*Sein bei*). Heidegger describes Dasein as being amidst entities that show up intraworldly. The falling that belongs to the care-structure, then, is Dasein’s being-amidst. What is being-amidst?

Being-amidst is Dasein’s essential commerce with entities that show up within the world. Heidegger introduces being-amidst in §12, p. 54 of *S&Z*, where it connotes Dasein’s familiarity with the things of its environment. Heidegger’s specific language in §12 suggests that being-amidst is Dasein’s familiarity with the world. But it is important to remember that by §12 Heidegger has not yet defined his technical term “world.” In §14 (*S&Z*, pp. 64–5) he distinguishes the world as the concrete, social milieu in which Dasein goes about its business from the “world” (always scare-quoted) that is the totality of entities that show up within the world in the technical sense. The world is “that ‘*wherein*’ a factual Dasein ‘lives’” (*S&Z*, p. 65), whereas the “world” is “the totality of entities that can occur [or be present, *vorhanden sein kann*]³⁵ within the world” (*ibid.*). I shall explore the technical conception of the world at greater length below. A preliminary grasp is all we need now. So, the p. 54 introduction of “being-amidst” is ambiguous between the two senses of the word “world.” Heidegger’s p. 192 specification of Dasein’s “being-amidst (entities that show up intra-worldly),” however, clearly indicates that being-amidst is Dasein’s familiarity with the entities that show up within the world, that is, its familiarity with the “world.” Dasein’s basic familiarity with the world is called “being-in,” for after all, it is the world that Dasein is *in*. Dasein is in the world and amidst the intraworldly.

What can we say phenomenologically about this being-amidst? It is clear from p. 54 ff. that being-amidst is not just some kind of causal or

³⁵ If we take “*vorhanden*” to refer to occurrentness, then “occurent” must be taken in the broad sense in which it includes anything unlike Dasein.

objective relation between Dasein and intraworldly entities. In §12 Heidegger contrasts the way in which one thing can be in or amidst another, by being located spatially in or around the other, and the way in which Dasein is in or amidst the intraworldly. Heidegger's distinction applies here just as much to Dasein's being-in-the-world as to its being amidst the intraworldly. Dasein, unlike intraworldly things, is familiar with its world and the things within it:

The expression "am" connects with "amidst;" "I am" thus says: I reside, I dwell in . . . the world, as that with which I am thus and so familiar. Being as the infinitive of "I am," i.e., existentially understood, means residing in . . . , being familiar with. (S&Z, p. 54)³⁶

Dasein always already knows its way around its world. The world is neither strange nor unknown to it. Nor are the things within that world. They too are always already (for the most part) familiar to Dasein. What is it for enveloping entities to be already familiar to Dasein?

"'Being-amidst' the world, in the sense of being absorbed in the world [*des Aufgehens in der Welt*], which is still to be spelled out in more detail, is an existentialia that is founded in being-in" (S&Z, p. 54).³⁷ Heidegger reinforces the suggestion that this is the sense in which he takes falling to belong to the care-structure, when he writes in §41,

And again: the factual existence of Dasein is not only in general and indifferently a thrown ability-to-be-in-the-world, but rather, is always already also absorbed [*aufgegangen*] in the world of its concern. (S&Z, p. 192)

To be familiar with the intraworldly is to be absorbed in it. In going about its everyday business, Dasein constantly makes use of the intraworldly (or fails to do so). In grocery shopping Dasein uses a car, a grocery cart, money, and so on. All activity involves commerce with intraworldly things. Even theoretical contemplation requires some sort of practical setup to make it possible and keep it going, perhaps a quiet study or a chalkboard: "theoretical research is not without its own praxis" (S&Z, p. 358). The term "absorption" might suggest a kind of thematic preoccupation, as if in grocery shopping Dasein must become fixated on its grocery cart. But this cannot be what Heidegger means, for after all, he famously argues, "It

³⁶ Needless to say, this passage only works in German, where "am" is "*bin*," and "amidst" is "*bei*," which Heidegger claims to have an etymological connection.

³⁷ Since it is founded in being-in, which is Dasein's relation to its world, being-amidst cannot be Dasein's relation to the world. Indeed, being amidst the intraworldly is founded in being-in-the-world, as we shall see.

is peculiar to what is primarily available that in its availability it, as it were, withdraws in order to be genuinely [*eigentlich*] available" (S&Z, p. 69). While shopping, Dasein is focused on the task at hand, say, buying milk, bread, and bananas. Dasein is not focused on the paraphernalia it uses:

That amidst which everyday dealings primarily maintains itself is also not the tools themselves, but rather, the work, what is currently to be produced, is what Dasein primarily concerns itself with and is thus also available. (S&Z, pp. 69–70)³⁸

Dasein's absorption in the available is thus not necessarily a thematic absorption.

The sense in which Dasein is absorbed can helpfully be understood as Dasein busying itself with the intraworldly. One can busy oneself with something to which one pays no explicit attention. In shopping, Jones can busy herself with keeping the grocery cart going straight, even though she does this quite unawares, or perhaps by habit. This is one of the central themes of Dreyfus's work (1979, 1991; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986); I shall not rehearse his arguments here. It is sufficient to note phenomenologically how much of one's interaction with intraworldly things goes on subliminally. While watching a baseball game and, say, intently focusing on the action on the field, Jones shifts her position for comfort, leans and stretches to see past the person in front of her, scratches her head, sips her soda, takes a bite of her hot dog, brushes off a fly, and adjusts a ring, all perhaps unawares. In doing all these things, Jones busies herself with the things of her environment.

We saw above that Heidegger offers an explicit argument in chapter 5 of division 1 that understanding and affectivity are interlinked: affectivity discloses the mattering grounds on the basis of which one presses ahead into abilities. Chapter 5 does not present an analogous argument for the interlinkage of absorption with understanding and affectivity. This can be attributed chiefly to the confusion in chapter 5 surrounding the nature of falling. Heidegger also likely thought that he had sufficiently established the point back in chapter 3. There he argues that Dasein's self-understanding is simultaneously an understanding of the intraworldly. We have,

³⁸ This passage could be read in a way unfriendly to my approach: everyday dealing is primarily *amidst* the work, rather than the tools; the former, rather than the latter, is primarily available, precisely because Dasein is thematically preoccupied with the work, rather than the tools. This would identify being-amidst with thematic absorption. (It is worth noting that the "amidst" in the first line of the passage belongs to the verb "maintains itself," not the verb "to be." It is only with the latter verb that it constitutes the technical term "being-amidst.")

in fact, already encountered the heart of the argument, for it lies in what Heidegger subsequently calls the “transcendence of the world.” Heidegger’s definition of the “world,” in the technical sense of the term, reads thus:

That wherein understanding assigns itself [to some understanding of itself] and that in terms of which entities [unlike Dasein] are allowed to show themselves is the phenomenon of the world. (*S&Z*, p. 86)

Any attempt to understand oneself by pressing ahead into some ability-to-be is necessarily an attempt to understand the paraphernalia of the social world. Why? Because Dasein’s abilities-to-be are interdefined with the functional roles served by paraphernalia.

To be available is to be appropriate for or involved in some job specified by Dasein:

Involvement is ontologically characteristic of the available. In involvement there lies: letting be involved with something in something. The relation of “with . . . in . . .” is supposed to be indicated by the term assignment. (*S&Z*, p. 84)

To be available means to be involved in some task or work to be accomplished. “That Wherein there is an involvement is the to-which of serviceability, the for-which of useability” (*ibid.*). In other words, grocery carts are involved in the task of moving groceries around, because their function, their role, is to serve in this work. Heidegger fairly consistently characterizes the nature of involvement as functional and a matter of use (the world as gas station again). But the terminology of “involvement” at least suggests a broader reading of the being of the available. An entity can be involved in a human practice without exactly serving a function in it. It is controversial to claim that paintings, for example, are *defined* by their function in art exhibits. But even if they are not functionally defined, they do play a role, perhaps a nonfunctional one, in art exhibits, museums, and the like, and Heidegger can embrace the weaker thesis that the available is defined by its roles in human life, whether functional or otherwise.³⁹

Tying the available to its role in human life or practice ends up tying Dasein and the available together. What makes art exhibitions what they are? In part, they require Dasein to exercise certain abilities, including

³⁹ Of course, even this weaker thesis would be quite unwelcome to many philosophers of art. And Heidegger himself argues, in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (*UKW*), that works of art require an entirely different conceptualization than the available.

abilities-to-be. There are curators, exhibit designers, janitors, spectators, and so on, each of whom must have a relatively definite set of skills by which to make their way about art exhibits, or perhaps to start them up in the first place. The practical skills are all exercised for the sake of some ability-to-be, pursued in each case by the *Dasein* in question. The exhibit designer must know how to use the phone and generally actually do so. He uses the phone, he exercises his ability, in order to promote the goals specified by his self-understanding as curator:

The totality of involvements itself, however, finally goes back to a to-which in which there is *no* further involvement, which itself is not an entity of the sort of the available within the world, but rather, an entity whose being is determined as being-in-the-world, to the makeup of whose being worldliness itself belongs. This primary to-which is no to-this as a possible in-which of involvement. The primary “to-this” is a for-the-sake-of-which. The “for-the-sake-of,” however, always touches on the being of *Dasein*, to whom in its being this very being is always at issue. (*S&Z*, p. 84)

If Green is to press ahead into the ability to be a curator, he must necessarily assign himself to definite subsidiary tasks, such as organizing exhibitions, coping with the museum's directors, and so on. These tasks all end up involving the available: telephones, spreadsheets, paintings, etc. If Green were to announce that he is and has been for quite some time a curator, but has never done any of the subsidiary tasks involved in being a curator, we should undoubtedly think him crazy. To be a curator *is* to take on those subsidiary tasks.

Thus, the available, its roles, the tasks in which the available serves, and human abilities-to-be are all tied together into a great web of interdefinition. This web is the world. Its structure is called “significance.” “Significance” picks out the “relational whole” of those relations that tie this web together: the functional in-order-to that ties equipment to its utility, the in-which of involvement that ties all available entities to their roles, and the for-the-sake-of that ties those roles to *Dasein*'s abilities-to-be (*S&Z*, p. 87). It is impossible for anything woven together by this web to show up for *Dasein* except in terms of the whole: “Involvement itself as the being of the available is in each case only discovered on the basis of the pre-discoveredness of a totality of involvement” (*S&Z*, p. 85). Each available entity is tied together with other available entities by jointly serving common tasks. Grocery carts, shopping lists, checkout stands, and meat counters are all inextricably tied together by their service in shopping:

There never "is," strictly speaking, *a piece of equipment*. . . . Equipment is, in accordance with its equipmentality, always *in terms of* its belongingness to other equipment: writing utensils, pen, ink, paper, blotter, table, lamp, furniture, window, doors, room. . . . *Prior to* [an individual piece of equipment] a totality of equipment is in each case already discovered. (*S&Z*, pp. 68–9)

Dasein encounters all this equipment, only because it assigns itself to it from some ability-to-be:

In understanding the nexus of relations described above [i.e., significance], Dasein has assigned itself to an in-order-to in terms of an ability-to-be, for the sake of which it itself is, which it has grasped either explicitly or inexplicably, either authentically or inauthentically. (*S&Z*, p. 86)

Dasein is tied into a world, because its abilities-to-be are defined by the entire web of interrelated paraphernalia, tasks, and abilities.

This web is itself set up and maintained not by any individual, but rather by the collective activity of an entire community of Dasein. Clearly, no individual could set up or control the world. Any practical activity on the part of Dasein requires that the world is already on board: it must be "prediscovered." Thus, any individual activity requires that the world be in place already. Heidegger's analysis of the basis of the world, although a bit obscure, seems to suggest that whenever Dasein goes about business in terms of the world, it helps to sustain that world. Wielding a hammer in order to drive in nails sustains the role of the hammer. It reinforces it. How? Here we must come to terms briefly with Heidegger's account of normalized, human comportment. Dasein is fundamentally a normalized entity (Haugeland 1982; Dreyfus 1991). It experiences its own activity as subject to communal or local norms, and that experience tends to reinforce and sustain the basic patterns of the community.

Heidegger spells out the "mechanics" of this process by way of his concepts of distantiality, subjection, averaging out, leveling down, and the one. Heidegger's language here suggests a Kierkegaardian attack on the crowd. But it need not be read in so exclusively negative a light (Dreyfus 1991, ch. 8, 1996). Heidegger does think that the very same phenomena that constitute the world via normalization lead often and naturally to a form of inauthenticity. Normalization has a tendency to slide into conformism, which in turn tends to make Dasein's self-understanding rigid.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ In language that I shall develop shortly, conformist Dasein tends to misunderstand its for-the-sakes-of-which as social statuses.

Normalization itself, however, is modally indifferent, that is, neutral between authenticity and inauthenticity. That is why Heidegger writes, “*The one [which ties together the phenomena to be described] is an existential and belongs, as an originary phenomenon, to the positive makeup of Dasein*” (S&Z, p. 129).⁴¹ The account can be summarized in Haugeland’s words as an account of a conforming entity: Dasein seeks fundamentally to conform to local comportment (1982).⁴² Let me spell this out and then defend it.

Distantiality is Dasein’s agitation with the way in which it differs from others. This differing Heidegger calls “distance” (*Abstand*): “Being-with-one-another is – in a manner generally concealed to itself – unsettled by its care for this distance. Existentially expressed, it has the character of *distantiality* [*Abständigkeit*]” (S&Z, p. 126). From a very early age, Dasein is concerned with (sometimes preoccupied by) the ways in which it differs from others around it. Generally Dasein seeks to minimize its differentiation from others, although of course not completely. Deviance is disturbing. This shows up clearly in one of the most basic community-constituting phenomena, language. If Smith mispronounces “contradict” as “counterdict,” Jones is likely to correct him, usually by pronouncing the word correctly, emphasizing, even exaggerating, the pronunciation: “CONTRA-dict,” she will say (Dreyfus’s example, 1991, p. 152). This sort of correction – an attempt to normalize behavior – is most apparent in the relation between adults and children, especially parents and children, but it is not entirely absent anywhere. Etiquette often holds one back from correcting others, but this is a secondary sort of limitation on a basic tendency.

Distantiality puts one in subjection (*Botmäßigkeit*) to others. The tendency toward minimizing difference creates a conformity. It is this conformity, or better, the models or standards to which Dasein is supposed to conform, that measures differentiation. It is Jones who corrects Smith, because Smith deviates from the established, communal norm. It is Smith who mispronounces the word, and thus it is Smith who gets corrected. Dasein “itself is not; the others have taken away its being. . . . One oneself belongs to the others and solidifies their power” (ibid.). By seeking to normalize its comportment, Dasein “solidifies the power” of the others,

⁴¹ For a defense of this sort of approach to the one, see Dreyfus’s (1996) response to Olafson’s (1994) criticisms.

⁴² I do not intend to signal agreement with Haugeland’s (1982) attempt somewhat to naturalize conformity. Such naturalization is inconsistent with the existential dualism of *Being and Time*.

because it sustains communal norms by enforcing them. And it is worthy of note that Dasein corrects the comportment not only of others, but also of itself. If Jones hears herself mispronounce a word, or notices a lapse in her etiquette, she typically tries to correct it. The lapse usually disturbs not just the others, but Jones too. Dasein is a corrective entity, and this correctiveness is directed to oneself, not just others. This correction results in averageness (*Durchschnittlichkeit*) and leveling down (*Einebnung*). Comportment becomes averaged out; its potential differentiations are lost to a large extent. Moreover, this averageness, because it has a normative pull on Dasein, even leads sometimes, if not often, to a squelching of creativity, innovation, and individuality (enter Kierkegaardian themes).

The general pattern of normalized comportment and the phenomena that constitute it (distantiality, subjection, averaging out, and leveling down) make up what Heidegger calls “the one” (*das Man*):

“The others,” as one calls them in order to cover up one’s essentially belonging to them, are those who primarily and usually “are there” in everyday being-with-one-another. The who [i.e., who is primarily and usually in the world] is not this one, nor that one, not one oneself, and not several nor the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, *the one*. (*S&Z*, p. 126)

The one is a pattern of comportment, a way of being-in-the-world. It is the way in which one participates in normalized comportment. This participation is simultaneously living in accordance with normalized comportment patterns and enforcing them. Most of Dasein’s activity is in the mode of the one: “In terms of [the one] and as it I am primarily and usually ‘given’ to myself. Primarily Dasein is the one and usually it remains so” (*S&Z*, p. 129). Heidegger chooses the term “one” for two reasons. First, it suggests the impersonality of the phenomenon: normalized behavior is not cut to Jones or to Smith but rather applies to all. Second, it connects with the common German phraseology “One doesn’t do that” (*Man tut das nicht*). When Smith’s son belches during the local congressman’s speech, Smith leans over and says, “One doesn’t do that!” The one is what one does and does not do; also essential to what one does and does not do is the attempt to normalize comportment.

The predisclosure of the world is possible, because the one has already constituted the world. “The one-self⁴³ . . . articulates the assignment nexus of significance” (*S&Z*, p. 129). The world is the web of inter-defined equipment, roles, tasks, and abilities-to-be. No individual, as we

⁴³ That is the self, i.e., Jones or Smith, in the mode of the one.

saw, could be responsible for the world, or else that individual would be unable to encounter equipment (because unable to discover the totality in terms of which equipment makes sense). But if Dasein's comportment is taken over from a preexisting community – taken over through socialization into that community, paradigmatically in being raised in it – and if that comportment is normalized, then it has built into it a subjection to local norms. Picking up a hammer in order to drive in a nail involves participation in the practices that, to use another term of Haugeland's (1982), institute that world. The world is a set of institutions, that is, patterns of comportment set up and maintained by force of the one, which are embodied in the activity of each Dasein. To be *in* a world is, thus, to have imbibed from some preexisting context a repertoire of comportments that are keyed into and reenforcing of a web of institutionalized in-order-to, in-which, and for-the-sake-of relations.

All of this is required in order for Dasein to be absorbed in, busied with, the available. To be busied with the available is to put it to use in, or more generally, to let it play, some role in an institutionalized web of relations among the available, tasks, and Dasein's for-the-sakes-of-which. This being-busied requires that Dasein be in the mode of the one, that it be a one-self. It is thus that Heidegger can write, "The available has at best appropriatenesses and inappropriatenesses" (S&Z, p. 83). Heidegger contrasts appropriatenesses with properties, the sort of features possessed by the occurrent. Something occurrent, something that is *not* defined by a world, has properties, general features that inhere in it. The occurrent is not, in its being, appropriate or inappropriate for anything. Quasars are in themselves neither appropriate nor inappropriate birthday gifts. In themselves they are just a definite configuration of electromagnetic and related phenomena. But toys are appropriate birthday gifts, for children at least. Toys are *defined* by the roles they play in human activity. Because that activity is normalized, there is normative force to the statement "One plays with toys." That makes toys appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others. If the world were not normalized, then Dasein's activity would merely be *regular*, and the available would only *typically* be deployed this way or that. But it is not; it is *to be* deployed this way or that, that is, characterized by appropriatenesses.

So we have seen that Dasein's essential self-understanding, its existentiality, requires of it that it be absorbed in the available. If Heidegger is right, then he is justified in adding falling – understood as this absorption, being-busied – to the care structure. Heidegger's phenomenology of the world underwrites the mutual implication of existentiality (under-

standing) and falling (absorption). We have seen, moreover, that existentiality (understanding) and affectivity (attunement) imply each other; the two together make up the structure of attuned ability. For the care-structure to be genuinely “equi-originary,” however, absorption and affectivity must mutually imply each other as well.⁴⁴ And Heidegger claims they do, though he devotes less attention to this than to the two other mutual implications:

there is a *third* essential determination of affectivity to note, which mostly contributes to a more penetrating understanding of the worldliness of the world. . . . Circumspectively concerned letting-encounter has – as we can now see more sharply on the basis of affectivity – the character of being touched [*Betroffenwerdens*]. But being touched by the unserviceability, resistance, threateningness of what is available is ontologically possible only by being-in's being so determined in advance that intraworldly encountering [entities] can *matter* to it. This ability to have things matter to Dasein is grounded in affectivity, as which it has disclosed the world, for example, in terms of threatenability. Only what is in the affectivity of fear, or fearlessness, can discover the environmentally available as threatening. The attunedness of affectivity existentially constitutes Dasein's openness to the world. (*S&Z*, p. 137)

In order for available things to show up as suitable, serviceable, or reliable for this task, for example, Dasein must be attuned. Let me focus the analysis on reliability for two reasons. I shall rely heavily on an analysis of reliability in Chapter 3, and reliability seems most unlike the sorts of motivating imports, such as fearsomeness, we have heretofore examined.

We cannot forget that Heidegger is discussing here discovering something as, for example, serviceable *in pursuing a task*. One can stand back from what one is doing, look over a hammer, determine that its head is loose, appeal to some experiential generalization to the effect that loose hammer heads sometimes fly off and hurt people, and then conclude that the hammer is not serviceable. But Heidegger is interested in encountering a hammer as unserviceable in the midst of pursuing a task. This is why he interjects into the passage above that “letting-encounter is primarily *circumspective*, not just a sensing or staring.” “Circumspection” is Heidegger's term for the way in which Dasein navigates through its everyday pursuit of tasks involving the available. In order to be able to discover the hammer as serviceable or unserviceable, reliable or unreliable, dangerous

⁴⁴ That is, exploiting transitivity is too weak to generate the strong conclusion Heidegger wants.

or safe insofar as he is pursuing a task, Smith must be attuned to whether anything is amiss in what he is doing. Olafson articulates the point well:

Once again, it is important to emphasize that what is uncovered in the modality of [attunement] is indivisibly a state of the self and a state of the world. . . . *Dasein's* being an entity for which things matter or make a difference is the ground of the world's being in a favorable or unfavorable configuration, for there is no way in which the concerns of the self can be separated by a distinction of reason from the world in which they are deployed. (Olafson 1987, p. 107)

Only if he has a sense for whether things are going well or ill, whether the job is getting done properly, can something show up in the midst of using equipment as reliable. The hammer shows up as reliable, because in using it Smith senses that his activity is going well. Thus, attunement is a kind of sensibility.

Smith can sense that things are going well or ill, only if features of the situation make a difference to him. Here we must be a little careful, for we do say such things as "I'm playing this softball game, but I don't really care about it." This "not really caring" is a way of letting things matter:⁴⁵ even while playing the game and not really caring about it, I still see things in the situation as making a difference, although that difference is not terribly important. When the opposition's cleanup hitter hits a line drive past me at third base, I see that as making a difference. I do not just observe it going by and register its path: I see it as a success for her, and a failure for me. Because I "don't really care," though, this failure does not "hit very deep," but it does affect me. It is only because it makes a difference to me as third baseman that I can see it as a failure. In order for it to make a difference to me as third baseman, I must care about the role I am playing

45 "Primarily and usually we only meet up with specific attunements that tend to 'extremes': joy, sadness. A faint uneasiness or a gliding contentment are already less noticeable. But that *unattunedness* [*or not being in any mood*], in which we are neither in a bad mood nor in a good mood, seems not to be there at all and yet is there. But all the same, in this 'neither-nor' we are never not attuned. . . . If we say that a well-disposed person brings spirits to a group, that only means that raised spirits or a boisterous mood is produced. It does not mean, however, that there was no attunement there beforehand. There was an unattunedness there, which apparently is difficult to ascertain and seems to be something indifferent, but which in no way is indifferent. We see anew: attunements do not suddenly emerge in the empty space of the soul and then disappear again; rather, *Dasein* as *Dasein* is from the ground up always already attuned. There is always only an alteration of attunements" (*GBM*, p. 103).

in the game, even if this caring is what Heidegger sometimes calls “pallid indifference.”⁴⁶

Thus, caring about options and discovering things as reliable, for instance, are interdependent. Heidegger makes this concrete in his discussion of fear. Recall that he distinguishes what *Dasein fears* and what *Dasein fears about*. The point is that Jones can fear a bear, for instance, only because she fears about herself or some possibility of her being. Fearing a bear is not just judging that it can damage something. It is caring about one’s life, and so, it is a fearing, because one cares about one’s life. Thus, fearing the bear presupposes fearing about oneself, and this can be generalized. The line drive, or the loose hammer head, or whatever, make a difference, because they are involved in abilities-to-be (to be a third baseman, amateur carpenter) that make a difference to one, that one cares for. Says Heidegger, “That *about which* the fear fears is the fearful entity itself, *Dasein*. Only an entity, for whom its being is at issue, can fear” (*S&Z*, p. 141). So things make a difference, because abilities and options and even life make a difference to *Dasein*.

Conversely, *Dasein* cannot disclose itself in an attunement without at the same time discovering intraworldly paraphernalia in terms of some import. We saw above that to be attuned is *inter alia* to disclose some possibility of one’s being in terms of an import. If the arguments of this section to the effect that all possibilities of *Dasein*’s being, all its abilities-to-be, involve available paraphernalia are correct, then affective attunement to the imports of those abilities-to-be “trickles down” to the way in which the paraphernalia show up for *Dasein*. Because Jones attunedly throws herself into being a student, that ability’s paraphernalia show up for her as serviceable (or not), reliable (or not), even exciting (or not). Some paraphernalia show up for her as obstacles, say, the registrar’s office’s forms to be filled out in triplicate, while other paraphernalia show up for her as useful, say, her new laptop computer. Could Jones actually throw herself into being a student without any paraphernalia showing up

⁴⁶ Heidegger goes a bit further and argues that even “theoretical, pure discovery” requires attunement: “But even the purest *theoria* has not left all attunement behind it; what is merely occurrent shows itself in its pure look to *theoria*’s looking, only if *theoria* lets the occurrent come towards it in its *calm* lingering amidst . . . [ruhigem Verweilen bei . . .]” (*S&Z*, p. 138). Thus, because things make a difference to me, they *look* different to me when I do look at them, and so the features discovered by sense-perception are also dependent upon affectivity: “And the ‘senses’ can be ‘touched’ and ‘have a taste for,’ in such a way that the touching shows itself in affection [*Affektion*], only because they belong ontologically to an entity that has the sort of being of affective being-in-the-world” (*S&Z*, p. 137).

in terms of such imports? There is no such thing as a student for whom nothing is either useful or impedimental, reliable or unreliable.

Therefore, falling – understood as Dasein’s absorption in, or being busied with, the intraworldly – is equi-originarily involved in the care-structure. Dasein is not just attuned ability, but rather, falling (busied), attuned ability. This structure is the one that ultimately is underwritten by the structure of originary temporality that we shall investigate in the next chapter. We shall see that existentiality, ability, projection, being-ahead presuppose a futural dimension to Dasein’s being. Facticity, affectivity, attunement, being-already presuppose a past dimension. And falling, absorption, being busied with, being-amidst presuppose a Present dimension. Heidegger hews to a tripartite analysis of care, because he hopes to map that analysis onto a temporal interpretation of the being of Dasein. However, it is not always clear that Heidegger’s analysis is tripartite. Discourse competes for equi-originary status in at least the disclosedness-structure.

Discourse

Chapter 5, part A, of division 1 of *Being and Time* clearly implies, as we saw above, that the disclosedness-structure is made up by understanding, affectivity, and discourse (*Rede*). We also noted above that Heidegger complicates matters by writing, in chapter 4 of division 2, “The full disclosedness of the There, which is constituted by understanding, affectivity, and falling, maintains its articulation through discourse” (S&Z, p. 349). This might suggest a four-part analysis of disclosedness. It is worthy of note, however, that this passage, when taken most literally, states that disclosedness is tripartite (understanding, affectivity, falling) and that this structure “maintains its articulation” through discourse. This in turn implies that discourse is a phenomenon that modifies disclosedness.

I shall explain in Chapter 2, after some of the essential concepts of originary temporality are on the table, how the confusion here partly arises from the pressure Heidegger feels to align each element of the care/disclosedness structure with an aspect of originary temporality, its future, Present, or past. Still, since Heidegger clearly understands discourse as central to the ontological makeup of Dasein, an account of care as the being of Dasein would be incomplete without a discussion of discourse. Let me work through an account of Heidegger’s concept of discourse before I move on to Dasein’s extreme condition, death/anxiety.

What is discourse in *Being and Time*? It is tempting to understand discourse as linguisticality, particularly in light of the “linguistic turn” that philosophy, including the thought of the later Heidegger, took midcentury. Heidegger’s discussion of discourse is shot through with formulations that either suggest or clearly imply that discourse is language. I want to resist this temptation, however. To advance an interpretation of discourse as only inessentially linguistic, it is useful to begin with Guignon’s (1983, §9) interpretation of the proper place of language in *Being and Time*. He contrasts rival views of the relation between language and Dasein’s being-in-the-world, which he calls the “instrumentalist” and “constitutive” views. Although I shall argue that Guignon’s menu of options is too narrow, by exploring these two views about the relation between language and being-in-the-world we shall be in a better position to see what Heidegger’s view in *Being and Time* is.

The instrumentalist view of language represents language as a tool for expressing prelinguistic significances:

The first [view of language] may be called an *instrumentalist* view. On this kind of model, language is regarded as a sort of *tool* – one type of equipment among others which contributes toward making up the intelligible world. . . . From the instrumentalist’s standpoint, our ability to use language is grounded in some prior grasp of the *nonsemantic significance* of the contexts in which we find ourselves. (Guignon 1983, p. 117)

On this view Dasein has a prior, or more basic, grasp of some field of significances or meanings, and it uses words as tools for picking out or drawing attention to these significances. For example, food has the non-semantic significance of satisfying hunger, and Dasein uses a word-tool, “food,” to designate this significance. Guignon cites as reason to interpret Heidegger this way Heidegger’s comment that “[t]o significations words accrue” (*S&Z*, p. 161). Also suggestive of instrumentalism is Heidegger’s §17 treatment of signs, wherein he defines a sign as a “piece of equipment whose specific equipment-character resides in indicating” (*S&Z*, p. 77). We cannot assume that words are signs for Heidegger, but it is often and plausibly thought that words and signs are basically the same sorts of entity. Nonetheless, there is compelling reason to believe that instrumentalism does not represent Heidegger’s considered judgment. Heidegger explicitly denies that language is a tool and criticizes the linguistics of his time for treating it as if it were (*S&Z*, p. 166). So what is his view?

Guignon has suggested that Heidegger has a constitutive view of language:

The second conception of language might be called a *constitutive* view, a type of position which can be found in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. It pictures language not so much as a tool on hand for our use as a *medium* in which man dwells. On the constitutive view, language generates and first makes possible our full-blown sense of the world. The constitutivist maintains that the mastery of the field of significance of a *world* (as opposed to, say, an animal's dexterity in its natural environment) presupposes some prior mastery of the articulate structure of a language. (1983, p. 118)

On this view, linguistic comportment is an indispensable aspect of the repertoire of activities that institutes the world in which we live. Put less technically, Dasein's world is in part and essentially constituted by Dasein's language. Heidegger focuses the contribution of language (and discourse) in the power of articulation. He defines discourse as the "articulation of [the] intelligibility" of the world (*S&Z*, p. 161). Language articulates the world, that is, organizes it and institutes its infrastructure. We need a language in order to institute and tell apart chefs and waiters, patrons and proprietors, hammers and nails.

Guignon has done much to clarify the range of possible interpretations of the place of language in *Being and Time*. Unfortunately, he overlooks a third view that could be advanced, which we may call "derivativism",⁴⁷ one prominent example of this is Dreyfus's interpretation of discourse (1991, ch. 12). Derivativism holds simply that language is derivative of some more basic aspect of being-in-the-world. Instrumentalism is a kind of derivativism, because it takes language to be based upon a more basic, nonlinguistic phenomenon. But instrumentalism takes itself out of contention by gratuitously specifying that words are tools, which wreaks ontological havoc for a Heideggerian. Language (or discourse) is supposed to belong to the disclosedness-structure, or at least to be a factor in the analysis of Dasein, and so to understand language as a tool is to regard

47 Guignon (1983, p. 120 ff.) offers an in-principle argument against derivativism (and not just instrumentalism, which shows that instrumentalism was from the beginning a red herring). I do not consider the argument, because I cannot understand exactly what Guignon means when he writes, "The ability to grasp the fields of contrast between different meanings and to engage in evaluations of these meanings requires that one first have acquired an understanding of the kind of 'multiplicity' (to use Wittgenstein's term) that is contained in the grammatical structure of the world" (p. 120). I do not see why the grammatical structure of language might not be thought to "accrue" to a structure of the world. On p. 121 Guignon sets in apposition "grammar" and "our public understanding of what it is to be" (i.e., our pre-ontology). If he means to identify the two, I do not see how this identification is anything more than metaphorical. I do not understand what the word "grammar" is supposed to mean here. Perhaps this is related to my inability to think along with Wittgenstein.

one aspect of Dasein as a tool. And that is ontologically confused! But surely we can accept that language is based on a more basic phenomenon without saying that it is a tool? This view could be summed up by *part of Guignon's account of instrumentalism*: "our ability to use language is grounded in some prior grasp of the *nonssemantic significance* of the contexts in which we find ourselves" (1983, p. 117). When Heidegger writes that "[t]o significations words accrue" (S&Z, p. 161), he need not be read as an instrumentalist; the word "tool" just does not appear in this sentence. The sentence does suggest, however, a derivativism: significations are more basic than words, and words are founded upon them.

What might a coherent derivativism look like? This will be a derivativism that holds language to be based upon what Heidegger calls "discourse." What sort of a foundation might this be? "The having-been-expressed-ness [*Hinausgesprochenheit*]⁴⁸ of discourse is language" (S&Z, p. 161). Discourse can be put into words, expressed. Language is, thus, a phenomenon that requires discourse, for its role is to put discourse into words. Language puts phenomena that were there before into words. Language explicates in words and, thus, requires discourse.

More specifically, language puts significations into words. What is a signification? A signification is a *relatum* of the relation, signifying (*Bedeuten*). And what is signifying? Heidegger introduces the technical sense of the term "to signify" back in §18, in his account of significance as the structure of the world. There he asks what the "relational character" (*Bezugscharakter*) of assignment relations is. Recall that assignment relations are the in-order-to, in-which, and for-the-sake-of relations that make up the structure of the world. The nature of these relations is to assign one item to a role in another. So, for example, hammers are assigned (practically subordinated) to driving in nails, which in turn is assigned to carpentry, which finally is assigned to being-a-carpenter. Heidegger generalizes by writing that "we fix the relational character of these relations of assignment as *signifying*" (S&Z, p. 87).⁴⁹ Heidegger clearly uses the verb "to signify" here so as to connect it to the word "significance" (*Bedeutsamkeit*). Hammers and tasks are significant in virtue of being woven into the web of assignment relations. Thus, Heidegger writes, "The relational totality of this signifying we call *significance*" (ibid.). The totality of sig-

⁴⁸ "Aussprechen" and "Hinaussprechen" mean, literally, to speak out. I shall use, for the sake of elegance, the verb "to express" to translate these words.

⁴⁹ He seems to be drawing on the basic root of the German verb translated by "to signify" (*bedeuten*), which is to point. Hammers point to driving in nails, which points to building bookshelves, which points to being-a-carpenter.

nifications is significance. Significations, what language puts into words, are thus elements of significance.

Significance can be thought of as a structured field. It is something like a network, with distinct and differentiated, yet interdependent, elements making it up. The author's workshop – pen, computer, paper, printer, books, novels to be written, etc. – is such a field of interdependent equipment, functional roles, and tasks. The structuredness of the field is its articulation. Here I am using “articulation” in the sense in which a skeleton is articulated (the example is Dreyfus's, 1991, p. 215). There are two concepts in the neighboring bushes: articulation in the sense of possessing or producing differentiated structure, and articulation in the sense of putting into words. I shall use the verb “to articulate” and its derivatives to designate the phenomena of possessing or producing structural articulation and the verbs “to express” and “put into words” to refer to phenomena of linguistic expression.⁵⁰ Discourse is the articulating of this field, that is, the dimension of Dasein's comportment in virtue of which the field gets articulated. Language is the expressing, or putting into words, of this prelinguistic articulation.

To articulate a field is to differentiate its elements and interrelate them. The articulating of the workshop of the author is the comportment through which pens, computers, paper, printers, books, and novels to be written are differentiated, distinguished. This differentiation requires, however, that they be interrelated: pens, paper, and the like are in order to write a novel. Pens are for use in writing on paper. And so on. The body of §34 on discourse is an analysis of what it takes for comportment to be articulating in this sense. Heidegger's analysis isolates three – or maybe four –⁵¹ elements essential to articulating comportment: the about-which of discourse (*das Worüber der Rede, das Beredeten*), what is discoursed as such⁵² (*das Geredete als solches*), and communication (*Mitteilung*).

⁵⁰ I shall follow MacQuarrie and Robinson's practice of using the capitalized verb “to Articulate” to translate Heidegger's “*artikulieren*” and “to articulate” to translate “*gliedern*.” Note that the two German verbs do *not* neatly map onto the two senses of “to articulate” that I have distinguished.

⁵¹ It is hard to tell the difference between communication (*Mitteilung*) and making-known (*Bekundung*).

⁵² I use what is very nearly a barbarism here so as to avoid MacQuarrie and Robinson's unnecessarily linguistic rendering “what is said in the talk as such.” Heidegger does subsequently write of the “said [*das Gesagte*] as such,” but this may be an analogy or example worked out in terms of language. Haugeland (1982) has suggested “telling” for “discourse,” which nicely maintains the ambiguity between prelinguistic and linguistic phenomena. It also would allow for a more elegant rendering of the first two elements of the analysis of discourse: the about-which of the telling and what is told as such.

The about-which's of the discourse are the elements that are differentiated and interrelated by the discursive comportment. The comportment that articulates the workshop of the author must differentiate the various elements that make up that workshop. These are what the discourse is about. What is discoursed as such is the way in which the about-which's of discourse get differentiated and interrelated by the discourse. Thus, in articulating the workshop, Dasein must differentiate pens as tools with which to write from paper as a tool on which to be written, and those from novels as tasks to be served by pens and papers.

Communication is a more difficult element to grasp. We tend to think of communication as almost essentially linguistic, and we typically think of communicating as bringing about a like-mindedness in another person. To communicate one's idea to Jones is, we think, to bring it about that she is thinking of the same idea as we are. Heidegger is critical of the traditional, what he suggests to be "transportation," account of communication: "Communication is never anything like a transportation [*Transport*] of experiences, for example, intentions and wishes, from the inside of one subject into the inside of another" (*S&Z*, p. 162). Sometimes we may experience communication that way, especially when we are struggling at it. But these are secondary and unusual situations. Normally, communication is going on all the time without even any thematic awareness of one's distinctness from the next person. In §33 (on assertion) Heidegger offers an alternative phenomenology of communication. To communicate is to share a being-toward some phenomenon (*S&Z*, p. 155). Heidegger is playing on the roots of the German word for communication, *Mit-teilung*, sharing-with. In §34 Heidegger links communication with "making known" or "making manifest" (*Bekundung*). To communicate is simply to make something publicly available.

The language Heidegger uses here is shot through with linguistic suggestions, and thus to work out a derivativism about language, it is necessary to sift out a non- or prelinguistic understanding of the phenomena. I shall use two examples, the second a special, yet important, case of the first. As Smith walks on the sidewalk, he makes known that sidewalks are for walking on. He differentiates sidewalks from roads and gardens, which may border the sidewalks on either side. The differentiation involved has its about-which's (sidewalks, gardens, etc.) and its discourses as such (sidewalks are to be walked upon, roads not). The very act of walking on the sidewalk offers the differentiation publicly. Because Dasein is a conforming entity, as explored above, Smith's behavior either sets up or sustains the normalized comportment of walking on sidewalks, or it gets

corrected by other Daseins who object. Every act of walking on a sidewalk tends publicly to communicate, that is, make known, that sidewalks are to be walked upon. This is easiest to see in deviant cases. On blocks with many children present, parents swing forcefully into action if someone walks in the street. Walking in the street makes publicly known that streets are for walking in. Parents, wanting to squelch that comportment, either directly correct the offending person or talk to their children about how the offending person ought to be corrected.

Much of behavior goes on in private, one might object, and thus cannot conceivably be thought of as communicating, making publicly known. Reiss sits alone in her secluded, mountain retreat, writing her novel in private. Heidegger takes this sort of case to be a degenerate case of communication. Dasein is always essentially “being-with” (*Mitsein*), even if it is as a matter of fact alone: “Being-with existentially determines Dasein also when no other is factically present [*vorhanden*] and perceived. Dasein’s being-alone is also being-with in the world” (*S&Z*, p. 120). As Reiss sits in her mountain retreat writing a novel, she makes known or manifest the workshop of the author. She writes with the computer, thus, as it were, stating publicly that computers are to be written with. No one, as a matter of fact, is there to confront her public statement, but if someone were there, he or she would share her being-toward her workshop. Making publicly known (i.e., communicating) does not require another person to receive the communication; communication is not, after all, transportation. Rather, communication requires a public domain in which one can, in principle, make known that things are interrelatedly differentiated as one takes them in one’s comportment to be.

By including communication in the structure of discourse, Heidegger states that communication is essential to discourse: one could not interrelatedly differentiate without communicating. But why? Can Jones not differentiate secretively? For example, can she not have a private differentiation between two sorts of cat, say, and take them to be related to different purposes? Perhaps some are for painting, others for petting. This sort of question suggests that Heidegger needs some kind of Wittgensteinian private language argument. He wants to deny the possibility of private discourse. But I do not think that Heidegger had such an argument in mind; at least, one cannot find such an argument in *Being and Time*. Heidegger’s point might turn out to be a little more circumscribed. Discourse is the articulating of significance. Significance is the structure of the world. We saw in the previous section that the world is an essentially social phenomenon, because it is instituted by normalized

comportment. No individual can be responsible for the world; that requires a community of normalizing entities. Discourse, insofar as it is defined as the articulating of the structure of the world, must be public, and that means that Heidegger is well justified in regarding communication (in his sense) as essential to it.

We can render this line of thought a little more substantive, if we reflect on the ontology of Dasein. If Jones privately establishes some differentiation between two classes of cat, she must do so in pursuit of some goal or task, and this in turn must be tied into some ability-to-be for the sake of which she is going about business. Now, in order for Jones to be able to press ahead into some for-the-sake-of-which, she must do so in terms of the worldly structures that define it. Jones may differentiate cats to be petted from cats to be painted, because she is an amateur painter. Given that this is a normalized for-the-sake-of-which, it is in principle publicly available to her friends and neighbors that she is such a painter: they see her with paint, brushes, cats on pillows in good light, and so on. Given this, her differentiation between classes of cat is in principle publicly available, because it shows up in the course of her activity. Others can observe what she does and normalize it. Her differentiation, even if as a matter of fact ("factically") private, is in principle public. In this sense, it is communicative.

Thus, discourse is communicatively differentiatory interrelation. Here we can see an important difference between the way in which Dreyfus develops his derivativist reading of Heidegger and the way in which I explore derivativism here. Dreyfus's account takes discourse to be posterior to a prior articulatedness of significance. Dreyfus writes, "Ontological telling [i.e., discourse] refers to everyday coping as manifesting the articulations already in the referential whole which are by nature manifestable" (1991, p. 217). But this does not quite get at the derivativism that one might be able to find in *Being and Time*. Discourse does not limp along after significations but, rather, institutes them in the first place.

Language can bring this discourse to words. Jones can say, "Pens are for writing on paper," and thereby put some discursive activity into words. Indeed, words do sometimes accrue to significations. But language does sometimes *itself* institute differentiations. This is perhaps easiest to see in the case of phenomena that are based upon information: the difference between a computer's central processor and its data bus is an essentially informational difference (although, of course, it is realized in some physical apparatus); without language and symbol systems, there could be no such difference. Similarly, legal distinctions are inherently instituted by

language: the difference between a civil and a criminal procedure requires language (centrally, the legal code) in order to be. It is instituted by the linguistic behavior of those enmeshed within the legal system. We could multiply such examples indefinitely. Clearly, language can articulate.

Therefore, neither constitutivism nor derivativism is exactly right. In some cases, no doubt, the linguistic expression of an articulation is derivative of a more basic form of differentiatory comportment (discourse). But sometimes the most basic form of discourse in the vicinity of a difference is itself linguistic. Could Dasein, in Guignon's words, have "mastery of the field of significance of a *world* (as opposed to, say, an animal's dexterity in its natural environment)" without "some prior mastery of the articulate structure of a language" (Guignon 1983, p. 118)? No argument has been produced within the Heideggerian context to suggest not. We can see, however, that understanding *our* world requires language, that much of it indeed is linguistically instituted. The view I am ascribing to *Being and Time* is, thus, in the spirit of derivativism. What we should call it is less important than being straight about what it maintains: discourse is communicatively differentiatory comportment that articulates that nexus of significations. Discourse is not essentially linguistic, although language is a common and important form of discourse that institutes much of the world with which we are familiar today.

The Everyday and Dasein's Extreme Condition

Let me step back from the details of this analysis and describe generally what a case of Dasein "looks like" through the lens of Heidegger's ontological analysis. Jones is our exemplary case of Dasein. She is able to be a simultaneous interpreter of German. This is an ability-characteristic. This ability in turn depends on some specific way of being attuned to the significance of it, say, finding simultaneous interpretation exciting. Moreover, being able to be a simultaneous interpreter involves projecting oneself, throwing oneself into the ability. This in turn requires absorption in the tasks and paraphernalia of simultaneous interpretation. Dasein in its everydayness is characterized by a set of ability-characteristics, which are possible ways to be Dasein, attunements, which are ways to be sensitive to the significances of things, and absorption in the paraphernalia involved in its abilities. Dasein is also always discursively articulating the world and thereby instituting the differences that make it up. *Dasein is discursive, absorbed, attuned ability.*

But everydayness is only one of the several ontologically significant modes in which Dasein can be. Notoriously, authenticity contrasts with everydayness, and inauthenticity may as well.⁵³ Both authenticity and inauthenticity are responses to a condition of Dasein – which Heidegger calls “extreme” (*äußerst*, e.g., *S&Z*, p. 250) and “exceptional” (*ausgezeichnet*, e.g., *S&Z*, p. 251) – that conflicts with this description of everydayness. The condition goes by two names, “death” and “anxiety.” “Death” picks the condition out by way of its existentiality, “anxiety” by way of its facticity.⁵⁴ We must now explore this exceptional condition. With it in mind, we shall be able to understand some of the most difficult aspects of Heidegger’s conception of originary temporality.

Death/Anxiety

We can find in the descriptions of existentiality and facticity what we can call “thin” and “thick” phenomena, which in turn give rise to “connected” and “disconnected” modes of existentiality and facticity. Consider existentiality. Dasein’s being is at issue for it; that is, its being is in question, is to be interpreted through self-understanding. Self-understanding interprets Dasein’s being by, as it were, answering the question, by projecting itself forth into some concrete ability. The “thin” phenomenon is the questionability, the being at issue of one’s being: “Then [if we understood matters aright] Dasein would be being-questionable” (*BZ*, p. 28).⁵⁵ The thick phenomenon is the provisional answer to the question, Dasein’s ability to be someone concrete. Similarly, consider facticity. Dasein’s being matters to it. It cannot be neither indifferent nor not indifferent to its being, or that being would not be at issue for it. This is the “thin” phenomenon of facticity or thrownness. In order for Dasein to be thickly existential, it must also be concretely invested in or sensitive to some import the ability carries. This is the “thick” phenomenon of facticity.

We must distinguish these thin and thick phenomena, because they can come apart. When they do, they give rise to a disconnected or uncanny condition. Imagine, then, that although Jones’s being is at issue for

53 That is, it may be that Heidegger envisions three, existentiell (or existentially concrete) modes of human existence: authenticity, inauthenticity, and everydayness, which would on this view be modally indifferent. Dreyfus (1991) reads Heidegger this way.

54 Actually, it turns out that death/anxiety is also correlated with reticence as a mode of discourse. I shall not emphasize this element of the account, however, for it will not help develop the points central to the theory of originary temporality.

55 I quote this passage with some trepidation, since in most other respects I do not find *The Concept of Time* helpful.

her, she is not able to project herself forth into any definite ability. She is disconnected from any answer to the question Who am I? Under what circumstances would Jones be thus unable to project herself? If pressing ahead into concrete abilities requires that Jones determinately care about them, and not just that her being matter to her in the thin sense, then if she failed to care determinately about concrete abilities, she would be unable to project herself into any of them. So suppose that Jones were thoroughly indifferent to all ways of being Dasein. Suppose she just “didn’t give a damn.”⁵⁶ Put another way, suppose that all possible ways to be Dasein were, in fact, equally irrelevant to her. In that case, she would not be able to project herself forth into any abilities. We could describe this condition as “total insignificance” and the existentiality that accompanies it as an “inability-to-be.” Those are the descriptions that Heidegger gives to anxiety and death, respectively:

The total insignificance which announces itself in the nothing and nowhere [i.e., in anxiety] does not mean the absence of the world, but rather means that intraworldly entities are in themselves so totally unimportant, that on the basis of this *insignificance* of the intraworldly, the world in its worldhood is still uniquely obtrusive. (*S&Z*, pp. 186–7)

[Dasein’s] death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. (*S&Z*, p. 250)⁵⁷

So, anxiety/death is the condition in which Dasein is reduced to the thin phenomena of facticity and existentiality. In it, the thin and thick phenomena are prized apart, and Dasein is left disconnected. It is disconnected, indeed, in the double sense of affectively cut off from and disabled from being anyone in particular. Dasein becomes purely thin facticity and existentiality.⁵⁸

But why should we believe that such a condition is possible? We have been able to describe such a situation by means of Heidegger’s vocabulary, but perhaps it is not really possible. There are two strategies for arguing that anxiety/death is possible. The first is to describe the condition phenomenologically, as Heidegger does best in his §40 treatment of anxiety, and ask the reader to find the description plausible. The second

⁵⁶ See note 19 in this chapter.

⁵⁷ “*Sein Tod ist die Möglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-könnens.*” “Dasein” is here used verbally rather than substantively, i.e., in English, “be-there” rather than “Dasein.” Since being-there is Dasein’s way of being, death is the possibility of no longer being able to be in the way in which Dasein is.

⁵⁸ I develop and defend my interpretation of death and anxiety at length in my (1994a).

strategy is to argue that such a condition must be possible, given what we already know about Dasein. Let me first explore Heidegger's phenomenology of anxiety, before I turn to the second strategy. The phenomenology of anxiety helps, moreover, to explain just what this condition of death/anxiety is.

Anxiety is the condition in which Dasein is indifferent to everything. The kind of anxiety that Heidegger has in mind is not a specific type of discomfort with some particular object or contingency. It is not the sort of thing one suffers before a job interview. Rather, it reveals the whole world in a definite way. Heidegger contrasts anxiety with fear, in which one fears some fearsome thing that approaches one from somewhere:

Thus, anxiety also does not "see" a definite "here" and "there," whence the threatening thing approaches. That the threatening thing is *nowhere* characterizes the in-the-face-of-which of anxiety. The latter [anxiety] "does not know" what it is in the face of which it is anxious. (*S&Z*, p. 186)

So, Heidegger has in mind an attunement in which one feels anxious but cannot put one's finger on some particular object of one's anxiety. Indeed, he goes further than this. One could, for example, be sad but not know precisely what it is that makes one sad. ("I'm blue, but I don't know why.") Heidegger, however, intends to describe an attunement in which what bothers one is to be found nowhere in particular. So, is it therefore nonexistent?

But "nowhere" does not mean nothing; rather, therein lies region in general, disclosedness of the world in general for essentially spatial being-in. The threatening thing, thus, cannot approach out of a definite direction within the vicinity; it is already "there" – and yet nowhere; it is so near that it stifles one and steals one's breath – and yet it is nowhere. (*ibid.*)

Whatever it is about which one is anxious, it definitely is not nothing at all; it is not nonexistent. It is so real that one feels cramped, confined, stifled; if the attunement becomes acute enough, one loses one's breath. Yet one cannot find the thing about which one is anxious. Where is it? It seems to be nowhere.

Heidegger seeks to connect anxiety's striking "from nowhere" with its global significance:

In the in-the-face-of-which of anxiety the "it is nothing and nowhere" is manifest. The residence of the intraworldly nothing and nowhere means phenomenally: *the in-the-face-of-which of anxiety is the world as such*. The total insignificance which announces itself in the nothing and nowhere does not

mean the absence of the world, but rather means that intraworldly entities are in themselves so totally unimportant, that on the basis of this *insignificance* of the intraworldly, the world in its worldhood is still uniquely obtrusive.

What stifles [us] is not this or that, but also not everything occurrent together as a sum, but rather the *possibility* of the available in general, that is, the world itself. (*S&Z*, pp. 186–7)

Anxiety reveals everything intraworldly as insignificant. What does Heidegger have in mind here? In order for some intraworldly bit of paraphernalia to be significant for Dasein, several links in a chain must be in place: the paraphernalia must be defined in terms of some task in which it is involved; the task must ultimately be defined in terms of the for-the-sakes-of-which in which it assists; and Dasein must assign itself to some for-the-sake-of-which connected with one in which the tasks serve.⁵⁹

So, for everything within the world to be insignificant, this relational whole must somehow be torn apart. But how? Do chairs cease being assigned to their tasks? How could they be chairs, if they were severed from their tasks? The ground-level connection between paraphernalia and its tasks cannot be severed.⁶⁰ Perhaps the roles that pieces of equipment play are severed from for-the-sakes-of-which? In this case, a chair would still be used for sitting on, but this would have nothing to do with being a bank teller, or accountant, or any other way of being Dasein. This could not be the answer either, for the tasks that define chairs are what they are only insofar as they serve in for-the-sakes-of-which. The only link left in the chain of significance is Dasein's *self*-assignment to for-the-sakes-of-which. This link must be broken. Everything within the world becomes insignificant in that it no longer helps Dasein understand itself. It no longer shows up for Dasein as having anything to do with it.

Anxiety reveals the world, the entire matrix of relations that normally connects Jones's self-understanding with chairs and hammers and also for-the-sakes-of-which, as unconnected to Jones, that is, as insignificant. The nexus of in-orders-to and for-the-sakes-of-which remains intact, so much so that, "the world in its worldhood is still uniquely obtrusive"

59 That is, for pianos to be significant for one, one need not actually press ahead into being a pianist, or piano salesperson, or piano tuner, or whatever. As long as one's for-the-sakes-of-which are somehow interdefined with, say, being a pianist, then pianos can inherit some of the significance of one's own for-the-sakes-of-which. Clearly this significance will be pretty diluted. So, if – to rephrase the point – pianos make sense in terms of the same world in which one lives, then they can show up as obstacles, for example.

60 It is not that the briefcase shows up as a weird piece of leather with no function. It is a briefcase, used for carrying papers and books around.

(*S&Z*, p. 187). But the world does not relate to Jones and her self-understanding. In a way, *she* ceases to make sense to herself, for she is cut off from the context that lets things make sense. The briefcase still makes some kind of sense: it is what one uses for carrying papers and books around. But she does not make sense: she is not assigned to any way to be Dasein. Thus, that in the face of which one is anxious is nowhere and nothing, because it is everywhere and everything: it is the framework of all things and human activity. It is, in short, being-in-the-world. "If accordingly nothing, that is the world as such, turns out to be the in-the-face-of-which of anxiety, then this means: *that in the face of which anxiety is anxious is being-in-the-world itself*" (*S&Z*, p. 187). Being-in-the-world, one's familiarity with and investment in the world, is the object of anxiety.

Everything within the world becomes insignificant, because nothing matters to Dasein. Anxiety is the condition in which nothing matters. One might object here, on purely Heideggerian grounds, that affectivity or mattering is essential to Dasein, and thus that this condition identified with anxiety is impossible by Heidegger's own lights. Indeed, Heidegger argues in *S&Z*, p. 144, that Dasein does not have the "liberty of indifference." Affectivity is an "existentiale," that is, an ontological feature of Dasein.

Here we must draw a distinction between anxiety and not being affective at all. Dasein is essentially affective, that is, its abilities-to-be must show up for it bearing imports. To fail to be affective is not to be free of attunement, of needless, distorting affect, but rather not to be an agent at all. On the other hand, agency can break down, can, as it were, suffer a paralyzed condition, in which one's possibilities do show up for one affectively, but the import they all bear is one of indifference, irrelevance. The liberty of indifference that Heidegger means to exclude would be the (impossible) condition in which, as he puts the point in the context of describing the *occurrent*, Dasein's "being can be to it neither indifferent nor not indifferent" (*S&Z*, p. 42). This formulation recognizes that for Dasein's being to be indifferent to it is a way for it to matter, as Heidegger would say, a "deficient" way; irrelevance is an import possibilities can bear. If all her possibilities are indifferent to Jones, there is still an *issue* about who she should be; if there were no issue at all, then she would be neither indifferent nor not indifferent. Global indifference to one's possibilities is anxiety. Not being affective is in principle impossible; suffering anxiety is in principle possible.

Although this account of anxiety is, in some ways, paradigmatically

find the description to resonate with one's own experience. The concept of anxiety is by design extreme; it is easy to find it implausible. For this reason, it is wise to turn to the second strategy, to show that Heidegger's ontology of Dasein, as heretofore developed, actually implies the possibility of death/anxiety.

The Unattainability and Nullity Theses

To see why Heidegger is committed to the possibility of death/anxiety, it is helpful to reflect on what might make death/anxiety impossible. Suppose that Dasein is safely someone. For example, suppose that Jones has succeeded in her dream of becoming a simultaneous interpreter. What I mean by saying that she is "safely" a simultaneous interpreter is this: suppose that she has made herself a simultaneous interpreter, and now that ability describes her, indeed, describes her in such a way that it is now impossible that she might tomorrow find herself to be no one in particular. To render this less abstract, let me use the fact that being a simultaneous interpreter is, according to Heidegger, an ability.

Abilities are typically thought to be what I shall call "attainable." Consider the following scenario. Jones sets out to develop the ability to ride a bike. She works at it for a year, and at the end of that year, she is a skilled bike rider. Suppose that she happily rides her bike for ten years and then decides never again to ride a bike. That decision does not undo the ability to ride a bike. She still has it; she simply chooses not to exercise it. Admittedly, the ability will slowly deteriorate, if she sticks to her resolve not to ride bikes. Nonetheless, the ability persists beyond her decision not to exercise it. I shall describe the situation here thus: Jones has *attained* the ability to ride a bike, because there came a point after which it was true to say of her that she can ride a bike, even if she never exercises that ability again. She has added the ability to her repertoire of skills, and there it remains, unless it deteriorates because of desuetude. Abilities are typically attainable.

Notice, however, a contrast, implicit in this last paragraph, between the ability to ride a bike and being a bike rider. When Jones decides never again to ride bikes, she may still have the ability to ride a bike, but she is no longer a bike rider. The ability to ride a bike is not self-interpretive;⁶¹ being a bike rider is an interpretation of that ability. It too is an ability, as

61 In language I develop shortly, I should categorize the ability to ride a bike as "intermediate."

all self-interpretive characteristics are, but it is shed when Jones decides not to ride bikes anymore. This ability must be exercised, acted upon, endorsed, or in Heidegger's language, pressed ahead into, in order to be one of Jones's abilities. Note that this means that being a bike rider is not attainable. There can be no point at which Jones is a bike rider, even though she has decided never to exercise that ability again. Being a bike rider requires that one press ahead into it, that one project it forth for oneself. This is what I shall call

The Unattainability Thesis: *Dasein's proper ability-characteristics are not attainable.*

This is to say that Jones is never "safely" a bike rider, never a bike rider in such a way that tomorrow she cannot find herself to be one no longer.

Before proceeding, let me correct one oversimplification in which I have just indulged so as to explain the point directly. I wrote about "deciding" not to ride a bike again, or "deciding" not to be a bike rider. Given the Unattainability Thesis, these formulations make it sound as if Dasein were radically free of its abilities: all it need do is decide not to press ahead into an ability in order to cease to be characterized by it. If this were right, then Dasein would indeed possess the kind of radical freedom criticized effectively by Heidegger himself in his discussion of nullity (about which shortly), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, part 3, chs. 2 and 3), and Charles Taylor (1976).⁶² It would be able to alter itself at will simply by deciding to do so. But recall that Dasein's ability is not a "free-floating liberty of indifference"; it is, rather, thrown ability. This is to say that the question is not whether Dasein "decides" to press ahead into this or that ability, but rather, whether it finds itself affectively oriented toward doing so. (That is why in the final sentence of the preceding paragraph, I write of Jones's "tomorrow finding herself" no longer a bike rider. Here I presuppose a change of attunement to have come over her.)

Let me approach this same argument in less technical terms. Must Dasein be someone in particular? It has no essence, as we saw, and so no specific ability-to-be is "hard-wired" into it and thereby unavoidable for it. But perhaps Dasein has contingently come to be someone in particular, and it cannot just shake that person off. This formulation captures what is so plausible about attainability: Dasein cannot just decide not to be who it

⁶² If Taylor and (implicitly) Merleau-Ponty are right that Sartre believed in *Being and Nothingness* (1953) in radical freedom, then this would be a point of crucial divergence between the existential phenomenologies of *Being and Nothingness* and *Being and Time*.

already is. As we have just seen and shall see in more detail, Heidegger agrees with that. He does not agree, though, that Dasein is thereby immune from being no one in particular. Dasein can come to be no one in particular, although not by choice. If Jones were, right now, safely able to be an interpreter, then the question Who am I? would be settled for her. But it is not. Dasein's existentiality entails that this question can never be settled, and thus that it can never inalienably be some human possibility.

One might object at this point that the Unattainability Thesis is surely wrong: if Jones works hard at becoming a simultaneous interpreter, passes her exams, gets a job doing it, and performs acceptably in that job, clearly she is a simultaneous interpreter. This is a fact about her. To see why this objection is not right, we must focus on the distinction between the *social status* of being a simultaneous interpreter and the self-understanding, the ability-to-be, of being one. In earlier work I (1992), following Haugeland (1982), referred to for-the-sakes-of-which as "roles." But "role" is a term better suited to a social status than to a for-the-sake-of-which. Indeed, "role" is a very strong term;⁶³ by "social status" I want to pick out something weaker, perhaps better described by Anthony Giddens's concept of a "social position":

A social position can be regarded as "a social identity that carries with it a certain range (however diffusely specified) of prerogatives and obligations that an actor who is accorded that identity (or is an 'incumbent' of that position) may activate or carry out: these prerogatives and obligations constitute the role-prescriptions associated with that position." (1984, p. 84)

The social status or position of being an interpreter is that of one who is committed to accomplishing these tasks (translating this speech, attending this function, etc.) and who is permitted to undertake those other ones (buy special tickets to the opera, etc.). A social status involves a set of criteria or (vaguely) rules that govern one's prerogatives and obligations. These criteria are not always sensitive to whether one wishes any longer to occupy the status in question, although most do have provisions for escaping or resigning them. For example, the social status of being a parent is not something one can just wake up one morning no longer affectively disposed to pursue and *insofar forth* no longer occupy. (We have a term for

⁶³ Giddens has summarized the criticism by many of the term "role" thus: "The notion of role, as many critics of its profligate use in the social sciences have pointed out, has some conceptual precision only if applied in contexts of social interaction in which the normative rights and obligations associated with a specific identity are relatively clearly formulated" (1984, p. 86).

parents who delusionally behave as if it were so easy to escape the obligations of parenthood: "deadbeat" parents.) There are, however, ways to resign parenthood, through adopting one's children out, for instance. So we can see that one can have safely attained the social status of being a parent. By parity of reasoning, one *can* have safely attained the social status of being an interpreter: waking up tomorrow utterly indifferent to interpretation does not undo the obligations or forfeit the prerogatives of being an interpreter, even if one may resign this status (up to the limits consistent with employment and contract law, presumably).

Nonetheless, if one found oneself utterly indifferent to interpretation, one would no longer act *for the sake of* being one. One can occupy the social status, even though one does not press ahead into being the associated for-the-sake-of-which. Conversely, one can press ahead into a for-the-sake-of-which, for example, of being a graduate student, without having the social status. Consider Holmes, who throws himself into a graduate-level education, say, by "taking" (auditing and maybe even doing the assignments for) a series of graduate level courses in philosophy, without ever applying for graduate school. It sounds silly to say of Holmes that he "is a graduate student," but that is because we are thinking of the social status or position with its obligations, some essential ones of which Holmes leaves unfulfilled. But what is Holmes doing? For the sake of what is he acting? He is acting for the sake of some self-understanding, in this case, as a student of a certain sort, one in pursuit of a graduate-level education. Holmes can press ahead into this self-understanding the rest of his life, even if he never applies for admission to a graduate school.⁶⁴

Bear in mind, in accordance with the discussion of normalization above, that the assertion here is *not* that Holmes could press ahead into being a student come what may, or independently of anything he does. He must certainly read some books, do some thinking, do some listening, even perhaps do some writing (although, of course, there are some official graduate students who do no writing). For-the-sakes-of-which are not private dramas played out in the mind independently of how one acts in the world. Nothing could be farther from Heidegger's conception. Heidegger is claiming that the for-the-sake-of-which of being a (graduate) student is not pinned down and exhausted by any explicit criteria, by any

64 This example plays on the foul line, because the idea of a "graduate" student is almost essentially that of a student with a certain social status. Perhaps being a student (in the sense of being a scholar) is the for-the-sake-of-which shared by Holmes and the graduate students next to whom he sits in class. (And others likely pursue this for-the-sake-of-which too: some undergraduates, some post-docs, and even some instructors.)

formulable “obligations and prerogatives.” What the student does must *make sense as student-comportment*. Holmes’s comportment does just that. (Many instructors, including me, have had a Holmes in their classes.) It is comportment that is clearly aimed at a certain self-understanding that we can talk about in terms of becoming educated. But it is not comportment that is subject to the kind of close, criterial scrutiny to which official graduate students are subject. Thus, Dreyfus is right when he analyzes role-talk (and, I would add, social status-talk) as looking at comportment “from the outside (so to speak)” (1991, p. 95). Social status-talk approaches comportment from the angle of the obligations and prerogatives associated with it, and not in terms of its for-the-sake-of-which. The Unattainability Thesis applies only to for-the-sakes-of-which, not to social statuses.

Here it is useful to introduce some further analysis of Heidegger’s dualism. We have seen that Heidegger draws an ontological distinction between Dasein’s properly existential abilities and facts that pertain to Dasein. Dasein *may* be considered as something occurrent, with its position, size, shape, and so on, described factually. But this is not to consider Dasein properly. Dasein is an existential entity, and thus, only to be truly identified with its factual and existential attributes. Heidegger thinks this “amphibiousness” of Dasein gives rise to “intermediate phenomena” by way of “ontological co-determination.” This is not a theme one finds in division 1 of *Being and Time*; it enters with division 2 and the discussion of death. Heidegger distinguishes between “death” (*Tod*) and “demise” (*Ableben*). Demise is the ending of a human life, that is, the termination of the course of life, the career, as it were, of a Dasein. Death, as we have seen, is a condition (clearly antedating demise) in which Dasein is unable to understand itself. Dasein can be seen not only as an existential entity, but also as something occurrent. What is Dasein *qua* occurrent? It is a living organism. Like all living organisms, the organic life of occurrent Dasein ends (although we presumably must leave it to the biologists and physicians to decide precisely what it is for organic life to have terminated). The ending of the life of some living organism is “perishing” (*Verenden*, S&Z, p. 247). Perishing is an occurrent phenomenon; death is an existential phenomenon. Demise is an “intermediate” phenomenon, induced by the mixing of existential and occurrent phenomena:

Even if Dasein’s physiological death is not ontically isolated, but rather co-determined by its originary sort of being, and even if Dasein can also end without authentically dying, and even if *qua* Dasein it does not simply per-

ish, nonetheless since Dasein “has” its physiological death, of the sort had by what lives, we indicate this intermediate phenomenon by “*demise*.” (*S&Z*, p. 247)⁶⁵

The intermediate phenomenon (*demise*) is the perishing of the human organism insofar as it is modified by Dasein’s distinctive way of being. Dasein’s *demise* is the end of its pursuit of tasks, goals, and projects, an ending that is forced by organic perishing. *Demise* is, thus, the possible and certain event that brings Dasein’s living to a close.⁶⁶

Similarly, social statuses are intermediate phenomena, the result of the ontological co-determination of for-the-sakes-of-which by facts. To consider Dasein as an interesting, physiological phenomenon with an organic beginning (birth) and end (*demise*) is to prescind from the way in which it exceeds the bounds of facts. It is to try to “register it in its state of being [*Seinsbestand*] as something *occurrent*” (*S&Z*, p. 145). Of course, one is not entirely neglecting Dasein’s distinction from mere organisms, for one presumably pays attention to Dasein’s use of language and other distinctive traits of the species *homo sapiens*. Similarly, to consider Dasein in terms of its social statuses is to overlook the way in which it always exceeds the bounds of those social statuses. If we describe Holmes purely in terms of his social statuses, we will entirely miss his pursuit of being a student. To describe the teleological and affective unity that his action embodies in virtue of this for-the-sake-of-which, we must appeal to more than simply his social statuses. Holmes’s activity is not entirely governed by what he is required and allowed to do. Rather, it is ultimately organized by what he presses ahead into being. To conceive Holmes’s life solely in terms of the settled, social facts that pertain to it is to describe Holmes as more than merely an organism (for organisms we do not describe in this way, and biology is not outfitted with the concepts to do so). Doing so treats Holmes neither as purely *occurrent*, nor as properly existential. It is to approach him as an intermediate phenomenon. And Holmes’s case is just a particularly clear example for bringing into focus the general ontology of Dasein.

65 The point of the passage is twofold: to grant that Dasein has a physiological death, that it in some sense perishes; and to indicate that Dasein’s perishing is “co-determined by [Dasein’s] originary sort of being,” i.e., that it is distinctive in virtue of the distinctiveness of its way of being.

66 *Demise* is not in and of itself inauthentic; it is simply an intermediate phenomenon. One way inauthenticity can arise is when one understands oneself as an intermediate phenomenon, rather than as an existential entity. Such a misunderstanding would lead one to think of oneself as suffering *demise*.

Now, before the objection I conceded that Dasein cannot shake off who it (already) is (attuned to be); it cannot will, choose, or press ahead into not being who it has been. It is stuck with who it has been. This is part of what is involved in the notion of it being determinate. It is a Fact, it would seem, that Jones is already an interpreter and, thus, cannot choose not to be (although she may be able to choose no longer to be one). Why does this not conflict with the Unattainability Thesis? Because it is simply to say that Dasein cannot choose or press ahead into its determinacy, its affectivity. That simultaneous interpretation is exciting for Jones is something that guides her projection and is not constituted by that projection.⁶⁷ (This is part of why Heidegger uses the term "*Befindlichkeit*" for affectivity: it is a condition in which Dasein *finds* itself.) This is consistent with the Unattainability Thesis. It would only conflict with that Thesis, if we supplemented it by claiming that some attunements are built into, or are essential to, Dasein, that is, if it is guaranteed that Dasein find itself attuned in some definite way(s). But this too would conflict with Dasein's lack of an essence.

Another term of art Heidegger uses to describe this characteristic of attunement is "nullity." He characterizes Dasein's being the ground as "null." Recall that attunements are grounds for Dasein's projection, which is why projection is not "free-floating." In chapter 2 of division 2, Heidegger writes,

[Dasein] is never existent *before* its ground, but rather in each case only *in terms of it and as it*. Being the ground therefore means *never* to have power over one's ownmost being from the ground up. This *not* belongs to the existential sense of thrownness. Being the ground *is* itself a nullity of itself.
(*S&Z*, p. 284)

Dasein cannot choose, control, determine, or press ahead into how things matter to it.

The Nullity Thesis: Dasein cannot press ahead into its attunements.

Thus, not only can Dasein never safely be anyone in particular, but also it cannot press ahead into how things matter to it.

Not only is the Nullity Thesis consistent with the Unattainability Thesis, but, in fact, it ends up cooperating with the latter thesis to establish the

⁶⁷ To suggest that it could be is precisely the problem with radical freedom: one would have to project oneself onto some way in which one's possibilities matter, before one could project at all. And that is patently impossible. Projection could never get started, or else it would be entirely arbitrary, meaningless. This is the critique of radical freedom, found in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Taylor, to which I referred earlier.

possibility of death/anxiety. Because Dasein cannot safely be anyone in particular, it could find itself tomorrow utterly indifferent to all the things it might be. That is, it might find itself no one in particular. This threat is supported by the Nullity Thesis, because the condition (anxiety) in which nothing differentially matters to Dasein is an attunement, and attunements simply beset one. Anxiety may beset Jones, and if it does, Jones will then find herself to be no one in particular. She cannot arrange her life, either public or emotional, so as to avoid this possibility. Attunements are not under Dasein's control. Furthermore, she cannot "press her way out of," or control, anxiety. If one suffers anxiety, one cannot simply project oneself out of it in order to be otherwise attuned. Attunements beset one, and one is, for the meantime, stuck with them. If anxiety should strike, one could not avoid it, and one could not select a different attunement with which to replace it.

Therefore, these two theses, which follow from Heidegger's most basic descriptions of Dasein, together entail the constant possibility of death/anxiety. Dasein cannot avoid that possibility by making itself safely someone in particular. And it cannot take hold of its life so as to forge its way out of anxiety. It is part of Dasein's being that death is always possible, that anxiety may at strike it any time. We shall see that Heidegger takes the two theses (Unattainability and Nullity) to require us to adopt a highly unusual – indeed, he describes it as "violent" or disruptive – interpretation of Dasein's temporality. Let me now turn to that argument.

ORIGINARY TEMPORALITY

Care requires a special interpretation of the temporal structure of Dasein, indeed, one that “does violence” to our ordinary understanding of ourselves and our temporal structure, says Heidegger. Care is not a phenomenon that runs its course in time. Dasein is not, as Heidegger says, “intratemporal” (*innerzeitig*). The future, Present (*Gegenwart*),¹ and past into which Heidegger analyzes originary temporality are not successive (S&Z, p. 350). If one did take originary temporality to be successive, “care would then be grasped as an entity that occurs and runs its course ‘in time,’” in which case “the *being* of an entity of the character of Dasein would then become something *occurent*” (S&Z, p. 327). In other words, a proper understanding of care demands that we interpret Dasein as having a temporal structure that is quite unlike anything we might expect: a non-successive manifold of future, Present, and past. Ultimately, the Unattainability and Nullity Theses from Chapter 1 force the temporal interpretation of Dasein’s being to this unusual mode of time.

Needless to say, the suggestion of a nonsuccessive mode of time is puzzling. In this chapter I shall first explain the very idea of a temporal interpretation of Dasein’s being. Given the strangeness of the result of

¹ Recall that “present” shall be capitalized when translating “*Gegenwart*” or referring to the temporal present, but left lowercase when translating “*anwesend*” or referring to being present the way in which, say, a student can be present in a classroom. (This is not to deny that the latter concept, upon further analysis, might depend upon the former.)

this interpretation (viz., nonsuccessive time), I shall ask, What would it take for a temporal interpretation of Dasein to be in a position to argue for such a strange conclusion? Heidegger's basic strategy is to represent originary temporality as the "explanatory core" of ordinary time (or more precisely, world-time, on which in turn depends ordinary time). That is, originary temporality is a phenomenon that lies at the heart of world-time and that is allegedly able to explain world-time. World-time, thus, depends on originary temporality, and the latter makes the former what it is, namely, a mode of time. This is the cash value of Heidegger's cryptic, Latinized claim that "*a potiori fit denominatio*" (S&Z, p. 329), "the name derives from the more powerful." That is, world-time is called "time" because it has the features that originary temporality explains. After the introductory section on the very idea of temporal interpretation, I shall move through some preliminary, textual details in the next section to the three final, important sections: the detailed, temporal interpretation of existence and facticity; the clarification of the finitude of originary temporality and the priority of the originary future; and an exploration of the idea that originary temporality provides unity to the care-structure. I shall argue that, in the end, much of what lies at the bottom of the argument that this chapter seeks can be developed only *after* an examination of world-time (Chapter 3).

Heidegger's Notion of the Temporal Interpretation of Dasein's Being

What is it to offer a temporal interpretation of some phenomenon? As a first attempt, let us say that to do this is to exhibit the temporal structure of that phenomenon. So, for example, a temporal interpretation of substantiality might claim that to be a substance is in part to persist through change. Here the temporal concepts of persistence and change are essential to the concept of substantiality. This would be a very unadorned notion of temporal interpretation, which would amount simply to exhibiting temporal structures. Now, Heidegger *is* doing this, although he is also doing *more*. And it is the "more" that makes his style of temporal interpretation both interesting and, ultimately, highly controversial. What more is Heidegger after?

Heidegger's style of temporal interpretation advances beyond the unadorned notion by aiming for what I shall call "temporal-ontological significance." Heidegger would not accept the unadorned notion of temporal interpretation as it stands, because he does not take the notion of

time at face value (a point he makes clear in §15 of *Logic*). That is, time and hence temporal structures are not simply given in an uninterpreted fashion. In order to exhibit the temporal structure of some phenomenon, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of time, or better, the nature of the mode of time in terms of which the phenomenon makes sense. For example, simply to say that to be a substance involves persisting through change is not to specify what persistence is, much less to specify how the elements of time – most likely, moments – hang together. Is persistence endurance through a sequence of disjoint or independent instants, or is it presence in a continuum of dependent time segments, or what? Put more directly, in order to offer a temporal interpretation of some phenomenon, one must specify the structure of time in terms of which that phenomenon makes sense. If the temporal interpretation of some phenomenon sheds interesting light on the nature of time, then that interpretation has temporal-ontological significance.

In the preceding paragraph I moved awkwardly between talking of the “structure of time” and the “mode of time.” The former formulation suggests that there is some phenomenon, called “time,” that is unambiguous in its structure; it presumes that there is time and that it has a structure. The latter formulation, however, implies that “time is said in many ways,” that is, that time and its structure come in several varieties. (This last notion invites the question, What makes them all time then? – a question that, as we shall see, will be of great significance for this study.) We cannot yet say which formulation is better, because we do not yet know whether there is good reason to speak of varieties of time or rather of the structure of the unambiguous phenomenon of time. Heidegger will conclude that there are several modes of time – which principally go by the names “originary temporality,” “world-time,” and “the ordinary conception of time” – but we do not yet have his arguments for this claim on the table. I shall, henceforth, discuss “modes of time,” because that is the concept with which Heidegger will end up.

Heidegger proposes to exhibit the temporal features of Dasein’s being and in the process to point to the mode of time in terms of which those features make sense. We do not have an a priori guarantee that Dasein’s being will have any interesting temporal features. The claim that it does must be borne out in the actual business of interpreting it. Heidegger suggests early on in *Being and Time* that Dasein’s being does have interesting temporal features (S&Z, p. 17), but we should understand all such early comments in *Being and Time* to be promissory notes. It is only with §65 that Heidegger begins to redeem these notes. Furthermore, it could

turn out that the temporal features of Dasein's being shed no interesting light on time. That is, it could be that Dasein's being has no temporal-ontological significance. Again, although Heidegger early on claims it does (also *S&Z*, p. 17), §65 is the first genuine attempt to back up that claim.

One might already object, "What business is it of Heidegger's to say what the structure of time is, or to speculate on modes of time? Surely such claims could be supported only by an independent metaphysics of time, or even a physics of time. The temporal interpretation of Dasein's being could proceed only on the basis of such an inquiry that is already complete." But this objection is, after all, rather dogmatic. By what right can anyone claim that there is an independent discipline called "metaphysics" that has a privileged claim on the concept of time? (Moreover, by what right can one claim that such a metaphysics is provided only by physics?) The post-Kantian tradition in which Heidegger is operating took to heart Kant's attempt to render philosophy Critical. It is not easy to specify just what it takes for philosophy to be Critical, but it certainly is central to philosophical Criticism to require that all assumptions be open to question.² Heidegger would argue that whether he is in a position to make claims about the structure or modes of time will simply come out in the wash: it will depend upon how convincing his arguments are that such claims are worthy of our credence.

Heidegger's temporal interpretation of Dasein's being becomes even more controversial when we take seriously his conclusion that the mode of time in terms of which Dasein's being makes sense is quite unlike time as ordinarily conceived in that it is not *sequential*. (I shall defend this reading of Heidegger's text shortly.) Heidegger argues that the mode of time ("originary temporality") that is appropriate for the temporal interpretation of Dasein's being is not a mode in which the future succeeds the Present, which in turn succeeds the past. Originary temporality will turn out to be a temporal manifold that can be present in any given moment of sequential time: a future, Present, and past that are all there at, say, 1:30 A.M., 9 November 1992, or 3:05 A.M., 10 October 1995. Here it is necessary for the reader to put off any skepticism, until I have had a chance to run through Heidegger's argument for this unconventional conclusion. For now, I want to discuss further the very idea of drawing such a conclusion. I shall first situate the conclusion hermeneutically within the inter-

² I have made a start on these questions, especially as they apply to Heidegger, in my (1995b).

preutive strategy of *Being and Time* and then consider in a general way why Heidegger might think such a conclusion could be justified.

In §63 Heidegger reflects on “the hermeneutic situation that we have attained with respect to the Interpretation of the sense of the being of care.”³ There he argues,

Dasein’s *sort of being* thus *demands* of an ontological Interpretation, which has set as its goal the originariness of its phenomenal demonstrations, *that it conquer the being of this entity in the face of its own tendency to cover things up* [Verdeckungstendenz]. Thus, the existential analytic constantly has the character of *doing violence* to the claims, or better, the contentment and tranquil obviousness, of everyday interpretation. (S&Z, p. 311)

Heidegger’s interpretation of the being of Dasein up to this point (§63) has arrived at the conclusion that Dasein has a tendency to cover itself up. It obscures from itself the genuine character of its being, because that character is unsettling. In particular, the phenomena of death and nullity, which we examined above, manifest Dasein in a fundamentally uncanny, unsettled, disoriented mode. That such a condition should be possible for Dasein is so disruptive that Dasein usually seeks to obscure its possibility. This in turn requires that an Interpretation of Dasein’s originary sort of being disrupt our everyday or usual understanding of the sorts of entity we are. This disruption, which Heidegger here provocatively calls “*doing violence*,” is a necessary consequence of the dynamics of Dasein’s self-understanding. It finally calls for the temporal interpretation of Dasein’s being itself to disrupt our everyday understanding of our temporal structure. Now, this last consequence leads to a final disruption, namely, that of our everyday understanding of time itself. The immediate point of running through this chain of disruptions is to show how Heidegger’s attempt to “*do violence*” to our ordinary conception of time is of a piece with, and falls out of, his disruption of our ordinary conception of our own being.

Now, one might argue at this point, “Any claim to the effect that the mode of time in terms of which Dasein makes sense is not sequential is simply a nonstarter. Time is a sequence; that is what time (in part) is. It is plainly a conceptual howler to offer an account of a mode of time that is *not sequential*.” Heidegger would probably respond here as he responded to the earlier “metaphysics” objection. Is it not just dogmatic to assert that

³ There is a technical infelicity in this expression: care is the being of Dasein, and thus Heidegger should write either “the Interpretation of the sense of the being of Dasein” or “the Interpretation of the sense of care.”

one *already knows* what the structure of time is, so that one need not even entertain the idea that there might be such a thing as nonsequential time? The issue is not that simple, however. It is possible, after all, to violate the terms of a concept so egregiously that we are justified in claiming that one is using the wrong word or concept. The notion of nonsuccessive time might seem to be such a violation, for we do ordinarily think of time as essentially sequential. Why should we have confidence that Heidegger is *not* egregiously violating the limits of the concept of time in this way?

Heidegger's strategy will be to argue that we can explain time as ordinarily conceived in terms of originary temporality. Originary temporality is called "originary temporality," because it is supposed to be *originary of*, the *origin of*, time. The sense in which it is originary of time here is explanatory: originary temporality explains time:

So, when we have shown that the "time" that is accessible to Dasein's intelligibility is *not* originary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic⁴ temporality, then we are justified, in accordance with the proposition, *a potiori fit denominatio*, in labeling *temporality*, which has just been exhibited, *originary time*. (S&Z, p. 329)

Of course, just to say that *x* explains *y* is not yet to argue that *x* is a form of *y*, nor that *x* can legitimately be understood as "originary *y*."⁵ Heidegger cannot, thus, simply argue that originary temporality explains ordinary time. Rather, the title "originary" is earned by the *sort* of explanation he offers of ordinary time. He will argue that we can analyze ordinary time into a set of conceptual moments, each of which is derivable from originary temporality. These conceptual moments are derivable in the sense that they can be seen to be modified forms of the features of originary temporality. Furthermore, that the identified conceptual moments of ordinary time should obtain together (as a unit) and thereby make up the phenomenon they are (viz., time) is also derivable from originary temporality:⁶

⁴ See my discussion of Dahlstrom's interpretation later in this chapter.

⁵ The economic, military, and colonial competition of the German and British Empires after 1871 may explain World War I, but it would be a stretch to describe it as a form of World War I. The chief difference between this sort of explanation and the sort of explanation that is present in Heidegger's account is that in our historical example we are explaining the war causally, whereas obviously we will not explain time causally.

⁶ I shall explore the explanation involved here and the correlative relationship between originary temporality and ordinary time in detail in Chapter 3.

Why do we further designate the unity of the future, beenness, and the Present in this originary sense as time? Is it not something else? The question is to be answered negatively, as soon as one sees that the Now, then, and formerly [Heidegger's terms for the elements of time as understood in an everyday way]⁷ are nothing other than temporality that speaks itself out. It is only for this reason that the Now is a characteristic of *time*; it is only for this reason that the then and the formerly are *timelike*. (*GP*, p. 380)

The unity of the conceptual moments that make up ordinary time makes ordinary time what it is or, in Heidegger's idiom, lets time be time. In this sense, originary temporality explains ordinary time. This characterization is, needless to say, rather abstract. It is not possible to render it more concrete, until we have explored enough of the detail in Heidegger's account to approach the explanation directly, and that will have to wait until Chapter 3.

I shall describe the analytic result here elliptically by saying that *originary temporality is the "explanatory core" of ordinary time*. But the reader must bear in mind that the sense in which originary temporality is the explanatory core of ordinary time is rather complex. Originary temporality is not the essence of ordinary time: it does not make up the defining features of ordinary time. Indeed, because the conceptual moments of ordinary time are modified versions of the features of originary temporality, it is not even appropriate to say that originary temporality comprises a set of features that properly speaking belong to ordinary time. The blander, and therefore less suggestive, term "explanatory basis" does not, however, convey the sense in which originary temporality lies at the heart of ordinary time for Heidegger. Originary temporality and ordinary time are not two otherwise unrelated phenomena, one of which happens to explain the other. Rather, we shall see, originary temporality modifies itself – its own features – so as to yield the more complex phenomenon that is ordinary time. The conceptual features that define ordinary time are derived from originary temporality insofar as originary temporality can be modified to make them up. Thus, in short, we shall see why Heidegger may regard himself as justified in calling originary temporality "originary time" by seeing precisely and in detail how he interprets ordinary time as a modified form of originary temporality.

⁷ They are the elements of "world-time," which is more basic than ordinary time, as we shall see. I explain below the complexities introduced by the distinction between world-time and ordinary time.

Now, demonstrating all this involves three tasks: first, describing originary temporality and identifying the conceptual moments of it that will later prove to be central to ordinary time; second, identifying the conceptual moments of ordinary time that will subsequently be shown to be derivable from originary temporality; and, third, describing the modification that Heidegger claims relates the two sets of moments and showing how originary temporality explains the modification. The second of these tasks is an account of ordinary time. The third of these tasks requires that we have completed the second. Thus, we shall not be able to explore the form of explanation Heidegger offers us until we have run through Heidegger's accounts of the several modes of time.

When we do turn to exploring ordinary time and its derivation from originary temporality, we shall confront an essential wrinkle in the story: What is ordinary time? Let me motivate this question in two ways. First, is ordinary time time as it is understood by common sense? To answer yes is to tie the fortunes of Heidegger's ontology to the assumptions of common sense, which might, after all, be benighted. By what right can one set up common sense as the arbiter of the nature of time? One might answer that Heidegger is trying to legitimate using a particular word in his account, viz., "temporality," and thus he must tie his use of this word to ordinary language's use of it. This philosophical justification by ordinary language falls short of its mark, and for familiar reasons. It is certainly the case that a philosophical use of a word must have *some* connection to its everyday use, or else it would be hard to know what one is doing in using the word, apart from being provocative. But establishing *some* connection is not difficult. Furthermore, ordinary language is in part a commonsensical *theory* or account of phenomena, and to that extent, it can be wrong. Here the Kantian, Critical tradition is a useful corrective to the excesses of ordinary language philosophy. Second, time is not simply given to us for our direct inspection, so that we may gather its features from an unproblematic observation of it. Recurring yet again to the Kantian, Critical, philosophical tradition, we cannot just dogmatically assume that we have undistorted access to any phenomenon. To do so would be to buy into the Myth of the Given (Sellars 1991), to renounce the philosopher's task of justifying her account of phenomena.

In chapter 6 of division 2 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes between what he calls "world-time" and what he calls "the ordinary conception of time" (ordinary time). The distinction, very roughly, is this: world-time is the time in which we go about business as we are engaged in the everyday activities of social life. It is qualitative, in that it is marked out,

or dated, by worldly goings-on: lecture time, lunch time, and so on. It is also what Heidegger calls “significant.” World-time times are times *in order to* do this or that: lunch time is usually time to eat lunch, although sometimes time to run an errand. Ordinary time, in contrast, is a pure sequence of contentless and insignificant moments. Most trained philosophers, and many nonphilosophers, assume that time just is ordinary time. But this assumption, without argument, is dogmatic. Heidegger will argue that ordinary time depends on world-time.

If ordinary time depends on world-time, then Heidegger may construct his argument for the explanatory priority of originary temporality by arguing that originary temporality makes up the explanatory core of world-time. This is in fact what he does. This presents us with yet another obstacle: we cannot understand Heidegger’s argument that the features of originary temporality are shared by world-time until we have his account of world-time on board. So in this chapter I shall limit myself to explaining Heidegger’s originary temporality and identifying the features of it that are supposed to explain world-time. The reader will have to wait until Chapter 3 for the comprehensive account of world-time, and until Chapter 4 for Heidegger’s justification of the thesis that ordinary time depends on world-time.

The nest of tasks within tasks and promissory notes has grown rather complex, so let me review the order of presentation, before I move on.

- In this chapter I shall examine Heidegger’s conception of originary temporality. I shall explore his arguments for the claim that the temporal mode in terms of which Dasein’s being makes sense is a nonsequential mode and explain what that means. I shall have to expend some effort justifying my interpretation of *Being and Time*, for it is unusual, to say the least. We shall end up with an account of originary temporality and an identification of a set of features that will figure centrally in the explanations of world-time and ordinary time.
- In Chapter 3 I shall present Heidegger’s phenomenology of world-time and show how the features identified in Chapter 2 are modified so as to make up the explanatory core of world-time.
- In Chapter 4 I shall spell out Heidegger’s conception of ordinary time and show how it depends on world-time.

Before getting down to details, however, I must clear out of the way one potential misconception about originary temporality, namely, that it is the

temporal structure of authentic Dasein, as opposed to everyday, as well as inauthentic, Dasein.

The Modal Indifference of Originary Temporality

Some passages in §65 of *Being and Time* suggest that originary temporality is the form of the existence only of authentic Dasein. For example, Heidegger writes, “*temporality unveils itself as the sense of authentic care*” (S&Z, p. 326). In the same paragraph he writes,

In coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness enpresentingly brings itself into the situation. Only insofar as Dasein is determined as temporality is the indicated authentic ability-to-be-a-whole of forerunning [*vorlaufenden*] resoluteness possible for it. – We call this phenomenon, which is unitary in the form of the future that has been and enpresents, *temporality*. (S&Z, p. 326)

Originary temporality seems to be the temporal structure of authentic Dasein, for “resoluteness,” that is, authentic disclosedness, is linked here with temporality.

But this and similar passages are misleading.⁸ Section 65 does focus on authentic temporality, which is the reason so many commentators have taken originary temporality to be authentic temporality.⁹ But §65 argues merely that authentic temporality is possible, only because Dasein is temporal in a more fundamental way. In the quoted passage, I suggest, the second sentence is the key: “Only insofar as Dasein is determined as temporality is the indicated authentic ability-to-be-a-whole of forerunning resoluteness possible for it.” Compare this sentence with these passages:

⁸ As I indicated in the Note on Sources, *The Concept of Time* (*Der Begriff der Zeit*, 1924, BZ) represents originary temporality as authentic, which shows either that Heidegger chose to misrepresent his thinking, or that he had not yet settled on the theory of *Being and Time*.

⁹ Herrmann (1974, p. 83), Pöggeler (1982), and Okrent (1988, ch. 6) get it right on this point. Fleischer (1991) argues that Heidegger's reasoning points him toward the position that I take here, but that Heidegger then systematically conflates authentic and originary temporality. Olafson is unclear: when he identifies the agent's active relation to time with the “*Augenblick*” (the authentic Present), he implies that originary temporality is authentic (1987, p. 91). Unfortunately, this is not consistent with the view that originary temporality is the structure of agency (p. 90), for the two claims together imply that inauthentic Dasein just looks at things and does not act, which Heidegger clearly does not believe. For other examples of interpretations that take originary temporality to be authentic, see Dahlstrom (1995), whom I discuss at length shortly, Heinz (1986), Marx (1971, part II, ch. 2), and Hoffman (1986, ch. 2). (Note that Hoffman's interpretation is more complicated, for he distinguishes three modes of temporality: authentic temporality, inauthentic temporality, and the temporality of anxiety.)

Forerunning [i.e., the *authentic* version of the future] makes Dasein *authentically* futural, and indeed in such a way that forerunning itself is only possible insofar as Dasein, *as an entity*, always already comes toward itself at all [*überhaupt*], that is, insofar as it is futural in its being at all. (*S&Z*, p. 325)

If resoluteness makes up the mode of authentic care, but it [viz., care] itself is only possible through temporality, then the phenomenon that has been attained with respect to resoluteness [viz., the temporal form of authentic existence] must itself only represent a modality of temporality, which makes care possible as such at all. (*S&Z*, p. 327)

In other words, Heidegger says that Dasein can only be authentically futural insofar as it is futural at all, or futural in a more general sense. Since §65 follows upon the discussion of forerunning resoluteness, Heidegger begins his treatment of Dasein's temporality by focusing on authentic temporality. However, in order to understand how authentic temporality is possible, he must show how it is a mode of a more basic sort of temporality, the sort of temporality that Dasein cannot help but have, the sort of temporality that characterizes Dasein's being as such. Thus, in the passages in which Heidegger seems to say that temporality is an authentic phenomenon, he in fact says quite the opposite: *authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality*.

Here it is worth bearing in mind that death and nullity are themselves modally indifferent phenomena. Neither is strictly speaking either authentic or inauthentic.¹⁰ Rather, authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of being induced by reactions to (confrontations with) death and nullity. If Dasein turns away from death and nullity, buries itself in the idle talk of the one, and gives in to tranquilization, then it is inauthentic. But if it holds on to death and nullity, courageously faces the finitude and nullity of its being, and presses ahead with its life anyhow, it is authentic. Thus, authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of Dasein's modally indifferent being, namely, care. Care has a temporal structure, which Heidegger aims to make explicit in §65, and that temporal structure itself

¹⁰ Again, *The Concept of Time* misrepresents Heidegger here: it is written as if death is an authentic phenomenon. *BZ*'s treatment of death, however, is clearly contradicted by *S&Z*: *BZ* characterizes death as Dasein's "being-at-its-end" (p. 16), whereas *S&Z* denies this and argues that only something occurrent can be at-its-end (p. 245). On the latter point, as well as a defense of the modal indifference of death, see my (1994a). Note that this discrepancy between *BZ* and *S&Z* evidences the underlying differences between the two treatments of originary temporality: death is not Dasein's being-at-its-end, because death is not the terminal moment in the career of Dasein. That moment is demise, not death. *BZ* appears to align death with authentic demise, because it lacks the crucial, ontological insight that Dasein's temporality is quite unlike the structure of ordinary time.

has authentic and inauthentic modes, correlating with authentic and inauthentic care.

In a recent article, Daniel O. Dahlstrom (1995) criticizes my evidence for the modal indifference of originary temporality (as well as, and principally, Margot Fleischer's [1991] approach to these issues).¹¹ In order to develop his arguments, and undermine my own, Dahlstrom distinguishes originary temporality from the temporality of "Dasein in general." Dahlstrom appears to conceive the latter as simply an abstract formulation of the temporal contours of any Dasein in any mode of being, whether in particular it be authentic or inauthentic. "Temporality in general" – to which Dahlstrom appears to think Heidegger often refers simply as "temporality" – is by definition modally indifferent. Originary temporality, on the other hand, is the most fundamental form of human temporality, the form that explains or gives rise to all other forms of temporality. Therefore, it also lies at the explanatory core of human being. Originary temporality, Dahlstrom argues, is authentic, which is why Heidegger so often deploys the conjunctive term "authentic and originary temporality." This approach is the most powerful attempt of which I am aware to defend the interpretation of originary temporality as authentic. Its power derives to a great extent from its attempt to neutralize the evidence on which I rely by distinguishing between an allegedly sterile and abstract "temporality in general" and a purportedly deeper and more concrete phenomenon of originary temporality.

I do not think, however, that this crucial distinction works out, and with its collapse Dahlstrom's powerful arguments are significantly compromised. To begin, note that the term (*überhaupt*) that Dahlstrom translates as "in general" in "temporality in general" can also be read, as I do, to mean "at all." So, when (p. 325, quoted earlier) Heidegger states that Dasein can be "authentically futural" only in virtue of "coming toward itself *überhaupt*," he can mean, and I think it makes more sense to read him as meaning, that authentic futurity depends on futurity at all, that is, the futurity in virtue of which Dasein is in any way futural. In developing his distinction, Dahlstrom exploits a conception of "origins" according to which the originariness of an origin lies in its making up the source of a derivative phenomenon's possibility.¹² But note that in the p. 325 passage that I quoted, Heidegger states that "coming toward itself *überhaupt*"

¹¹ I must thank an anonymous reviewer for the Press for bringing Dahlstrom's article to my attention.

¹² At least, this is what I take Heidegger to mean in the p. 334 passage that Dahlstrom quotes in this context (1995, p. 113).

makes possible the authentic future. So temporality *überhaupt* is an originary phenomenon, one that makes possible authenticity. Heidegger often does deploy the term “authentic and originary temporality,” and this term clearly must refer to authentic temporality. But the term makes sense, even on my approach, for it can be heard as emphasizing that authentic temporality is a mode of originary temporality. What Heidegger variously calls “temporality,” “temporality *überhaupt*,” and “originary temporality” is more basic than authentic temporality, not by being an abstraction, but rather by making up the most fundamental mode of temporality, the mode that can be modified so as to constitute either authentic or inauthentic temporality.

Dahlstrom’s most powerful argument, however, is textual.¹³ He quotes against me the p. 329 passage that I rely on heavily:

So, when we have shown that the “time” that is accessible to Dasein’s intelligibility is *not* originary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic temporality, then we are justified, in accordance with the proposition, *a potiori fit denominatio*, in labeling *temporality*, which has just been exhibited, *originary time*. (*S&Z*, p. 329)

This passage identifies the mode of temporality from which ordinary time arises as authentic temporality. The mode of temporality from which ordinary time arises must surely be “originary temporality” – and I do not dispute that assumption – and so it appears that originary temporality is authentic. Dahlstrom describes this evidence as a “substantial hurdle” for any view that takes originary temporality to be modally indifferent, and it is. Insofar as originary temporality is originary in virtue of making up the origin of ordinary time (as well as world-time), Dahlstrom’s reading implies that ordinary time (and world-time) are inauthentic phenomena. I shall argue extensively, however, that they are not. If they are not, then we cannot explain the origin of ordinary time as a degeneration of an authentic phenomenon into an inauthentic phenomenon.¹⁴ Despite this, I must confess that the p. 329 passage that Dahlstrom cites does state the

¹³ He also argues that Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as potentiality supports his view. But as I argued in Chapter 1, the translation of “*Seinkönnen*” as “potentiality-for-being” is deeply misleading. Dasein’s *können* is an ability, not a potentiality.

¹⁴ I say this, even though Heidegger’s famous comment that “all ‘arising out of’ [or ‘derivation’] in the ontological field is degeneration” (*S&Z*, p. 334, which Dahlstrom quotes in support of his view on p. 113 of his article) does entail that the derivation of ordinary time from originary temporality implies some kind of degeneration. I dispute here *only* that the degeneration is specifically from authenticity to inauthenticity.

view for which he argues, and I can find no way to reread it to help my interpretation.

In summary, the direct evidence concerning the question whether originary temporality is authentic or modally indifferent is not dispositive, even though the passages I quote above from pp. 325 and 327, especially the p. 327 passage that *directly* states that authentic temporality is merely a modality of (originary)¹⁵ temporality, are very strong. I do not believe that there are any equally forceful texts directly addressed to this question that gainsay my interpretation. Further, each way of reading Heidegger's larger ontological schemes – those pertaining to the origin of ordinary time out of some form of human temporality – has textual evidence to support it. Dahlstrom can, to my chagrin, cite what otherwise is my favorite passage (the p. 329 passage),¹⁶ because it states as clearly as Heidegger does anywhere in *Being and Time* what he means by one form of time "arising out of" another. So much else – the details that I shall spell out in Chapters 3 and 4 – in Heidegger's development of this theme, however, contradicts Dahlstrom's reading that I find myself forced to my conclusion.¹⁷

The Temporality of Care

Now we can finally turn to Heidegger's specific temporal interpretation of care. Here we shall examine his account of Dasein's temporality as a nonsequential manifold of future, Present, and past. I shall not discuss the originary Present in this chapter but rather delay its presentation until Chapter 3. I do this because the originary Present is closely tied to world-time and what Heidegger calls the "temporality of circumspective concern." Teasing out the nature of this tie will require much effort and really only makes sense after we have world-time and the temporality of circumspective concern on board. I shall also treat §68d's discussion of the temporality of discourse only so far as to argue that it is almost entirely vacuous. So, in this chapter I shall principally examine the temporal interpretations of Dasein's existentiality and its facticity.

¹⁵ Again, Dahlstrom's distinction between originary temporality and "temporality in general" can serve to reinterpret the passage. But as I argued, that distinction does not survive scrutiny.

¹⁶ My interest in this passage led me to mistranslate it in my favor in my (1992).

¹⁷ For further evidence for my conclusion, see *LFW*, §37, as well as nn. 25 and 33 in this chapter; Chapter 3, nn. 23 and 39; and Chapter 5, n. 41. On the other hand, Dahlstrom could take comfort in the lengths to which I must go in Chapter 4 in evading Fleischer's approach to ordinary time.

A Temporal Interpretation of Self-interpretive Abilities

Heidegger already hints at the direction of his temporal interpretation of Dasein's self-understanding in §31 on understanding. He writes:

On the basis of the sort of being through which the existentialia of projection is constituted, Dasein is constantly "more" than it factually is, if one wanted to and could register it in its state of being [*Seinsbestand*] as something occurrent. It is, however, never more than it is factically, because the ability-to-be belongs essentially to its facticity. But Dasein is also never less; that is, it *is* existentially what it in its ability-to-be is *not yet*. (*S&Z*, p. 145)

Here Heidegger identifies what Dasein existentially *is* with its abilities-to-be, that is, with its possibilities, and both of these with what it is *not yet*. The sense in which Dasein is not yet what it is able to be might appear to be rather straightforward. Consider Jones studying to be a simultaneous interpreter: she aims to become a simultaneous interpreter. She has not accomplished her aim yet, for she is still working toward it. So she is not yet a simultaneous interpreter, but nonetheless acts for the sake of being one. That is, the following claim seems commonsensical enough:

- (1) Dasein is *not yet* what it presses ahead into,

which is Heidegger's claim in the quoted passage. But further examination reveals (1) to be far less commonsensical than it appears.

Consider Jones's situation not while she is studying to be a simultaneous interpreter, but, rather, once she has become one. We saw in Chapter 1 that Heidegger argues that Jones is a simultaneous interpreter only if she currently presses ahead into that possibility. The straightforward temporal analysis of her situation would be to say that she is a simultaneous interpreter and continues to work at being one. But if (1) is true, then we must say that Jones is still at this point *not yet* a simultaneous interpreter. In thinking about what Heidegger is up to here, we must bear in mind that being a simultaneous interpreter is not supposed to be just the social status of having some post, some job. Rather, with for-the-sakes-of-which Heidegger always only has in mind abilities-to-be, for-the-sakes-of-which, that exceed the contours of the obligations and prerogatives of social statuses. If all he had in mind were the social status, it would be preposterous for him to say that Jones is not yet a simultaneous interpreter. Even with this caveat in mind, however, (1) still seems to entail a false claim about Jones's condition at that time: that she is not yet a simultaneous interpreter. Surely she is one, even though she must continue to work at and to exercise her ability to be one.

The normal grammar of the temporal adverb “not yet” is at odds with Heidegger’s thesis (1). Consider the sentence “Al Gore is not yet president.” In uttering this sentence in 1998, one implies (at least) that Al Gore is not now president. On the other hand, if Al Gore is sworn in as president in January of 2001, it would then be false to say, “Al Gore is not yet president.” That is, in ordinary language

x is not yet F

entails that

x is not now F

These considerations about the normal grammar of “not yet” yield a difficulty for Heidegger when combined with one of the results of Chapter 1. If Dasein is able to be some ability-to-be, then it presses ahead into it. Hence, generalizing,

(2) Dasein is pressing ahead into all its abilities,

which in conjunction with (1) yields

(3) Dasein is not yet any of its abilities.

If he is using “not yet” with its standard grammar, then (3) in turn entails that

(4) Dasein is not now any of its abilities.

The oddity of (4) is stretched to absurdity, when we note that Heidegger has argued, first, that this is always true, so that Dasein is never any of its possible ways to be, and, second, that this is not some contingent although consistent failing of some particular person (a loser), but rather an ontological feature of Dasein. That is, if Dasein is ontologically consigned never to be any of what it sets out to be, then it is inappropriate at best to say of Dasein that it is not yet what it is setting out to be. For, after all, to say that Dasein is not yet A is to imply that it is at least possible that Dasein will be. However, in fact it seems that Dasein can never be A . Or at least all of this will follow, *if Heidegger is using “not yet” with its standard grammar*. Clearly, he is not.

So how is Heidegger using “not yet”? The concept of Dasein’s originary temporality is an interpretation of the care-structure. That is, Dasein’s being not yet A in virtue of its self-understanding or existentiality is to be understood in terms of Dasein’s being “ahead-of-itself.” (Recall that

“ahead-of-itself” is the official, §41 term for existentiality as part of the care-structure.) But of the “ahead-of-itself” Heidegger writes,

The “ahead” does not mean the “in advance” in the sense of the “Not-yet-now – but later.” (*S&Z*, p. 327)

The standard use of the phrase “not yet” can be cashed out with “not-yet-now – but later.” That is, when we say, “Al Gore is not yet president,” we mean that he is not now president, but will be (or is likely to be) president later. In saying this, we view his being president or his ascending to the presidency as an event that will likely occur in the future. We think of this event as now futural, someday to be Present, and then thereafter to be past. We think of the event as falling in a temporal series or succession.

But this is not how Heidegger thinks of Dasein’s existential futurity. He writes,

“Future” does not here mean a Now, which *not yet* having become “actual,” sometime *will be*, but rather the coming, in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost ability-to-be. (*S&Z*, p. 325)

He underscores his point in writing that if the “ahead” (in “ahead-of-itself”) had the temporal signification of “not-yet-now – but later,”

Care would then be grasped as an entity that occurs and runs its course “in time.” The *being* of an entity of the character of Dasein would then become something *occurent*. If such a thing is impossible, then the temporal signification of the expressions referred to above must be different. (*S&Z*, p. 327)

In other words, the future to which Heidegger refers is not a future that lies “in advance” of the Present, that is, a future that will (likely) someday be Present:

Temporalizing does not mean a “succession” of the ecstases [i.e., of the past, Present, and future]. The future is *not later* than beenness, and this is *not earlier* than the Present (*S&Z*, p. 350)

The originary manifold of the past, Present, and future does not make up a sequence of Nows. The future is not something that is not yet actual, but likely someday will be. The future is not going to be.

In *Logic*, Heidegger gives us an indication that he has something radical up his sleeve, but he does not say just what:

Already and ahead [the already and ahead that help to make up care] as temporal characteristics do not concern an entity that takes place “in time”

[*das "in der Zeit" fällt*], i.e., can be determined in each case in its Now and insofar forth according to earlier- and later-than. Thus, although it is determined by temporal characteristics, care is indeed not temporally determined in the sense that it *qua* entity takes place "in time." That does not, however, mean that it is something extra-temporal [*etwas Außerzeitliches*]. That is to say, if it is fundamentally something that does not take place "in time," then it also cannot be something extra- or supra-temporal [*etwas Außer- oder Überzeitliches*]. For extra-temporal and supra-temporal items are only modifications of being-in-time, presuppose the latter as a possibility. Care is, thus, not temporally determined in this sense. Can it be [temporally determined] at all? What would that mean? Care is – in the structure already explained – the being of Dasein. Thus, not itself an entity, and of course, not at all an entity in the sense of something occurrent. If already and ahead had the significations of temporal determinations, i.e., if they determined the how of being-in-time, then that would mean: care *qua* being is a temporally determined entity. Taking being as an entity is manifestly non-sensical, and in the preceding suggestion in a twofold way, insofar as it is first clearly non-sensical to take the being of an entity (Dasein) as an entity in the sense of entity that is entirely contrary to Dasein. Care is not only not temporally determined in the manner stated, but rather, cannot be [temporally determined] at all. But already and ahead are temporal characteristics! Thus, the only remaining possibility is that their timelike [*zeithafter*] sense is not the sense thus far explained, but rather, a different one. But in which other sense?

[T]his is primarily dark, and we stand once again at the beginning of our considerations. Nonetheless, we have won, if not something positive, then at least prohibitively something essential, namely, the reference to [the idea that] if the already and the ahead are temporal phenomena, the most natural [*nächstliegende*] Interpretation of time as Now-time does not help us. (*LFW*, pp. 242–3)

In both *Being and Time* and *Logic*, Heidegger actually runs a double argument. He argues that treating the temporal characteristics of Dasein as belonging to ordinary time involves two errors: it treats the being of Dasein as an entity, and it treats Dasein as something occurrent. I shall explore the first error in Chapter 4, where I consider the way our understanding of time degenerates from a conception of something belonging to the being of entities to that of an entity. It is the second error that will concern us here: conceiving the temporal characteristics of Dasein as belonging to Now-time, ordinary time,¹⁸ treats Dasein as something occurrent. In *Logic* Heidegger does not explain in just what way Dasein's

¹⁸ Actually, world-time is also a form of Now-time, as we shall see in Chapter 3.

originary temporality differs from Now-time, but in *Being and Time* he does: he denies that originary temporality is successive. In particular here, the future does not succeed the Present.

This thesis is the temporal expression of the Unattainability Thesis. The future – Dasein’s for-the-sakes-of-which – is not going to be, because self-interpretive abilities are not attainable. If they were attainable, then Jones could come to be a simultaneous interpreter after having striven to be one for a number of years (compare with the bike-riding example in Chapter 1). In this case, “Jones is not yet an interpreter” would mean “She is not now one – but may be one later.” But it is precisely this that Heidegger denies. He claims, instead, that the “not yet” is not “successive,” that is, it should not be conceived as something out there in the future coming to the Present. Rather, it is a “not yet” that maintains its futurity, even though it cannot be Present. It is a nonpresentable, or less cumbersomely, an unattainable¹⁹ future.

Let us grant that Heidegger does mean that although Jones is not yet a simultaneous interpreter, she will never be one, and not because she is a failure, but because abilities are not attainable. This then invites the question Should we not just deny that Jones is not yet an interpreter? That is, Should we not just deny (1) above? I want to separate out two aspects of this last question and treat them distinctly. To ask whether we should not just deny (1), because it entails that the originary future cannot come to be Present, that is, does not come after the Present, is tantamount to asking whether Heidegger is not simply abusing the concepts of the future and the Present. It is to suggest that *because* originary temporality is nonsuccessive, it is not a mode of time. Recall that the strategy for defending Heidegger’s claim that originary temporality is a mode of time, even though it is nonsequential, will turn on an attempt to explain the features of ordinary time (by way of world-time) in terms of originary temporality. As I explained in the first section of this chapter, all I am in a position to do at this point is to identify the feature of the originary future central to Heidegger’s subsequent explanation of world-time.

The feature of the originary future on which will turn its explanation of the world-time future is *purposiveness* or *teleology*. The originary future is purposive in that it is the way in which Dasein presses ahead into possibilities. To throw oneself into the possibility of being a simultaneous interpreter is to have an aim or a purpose, for one’s actions to have a

¹⁹ It is important to bear in mind the technical meaning of the terms “attainable” and “unattainable” from Chapter 1.

point. Heidegger makes this clear by using the term “for-the-sake-of-which” to describe what Dasein presses ahead into. In doing things a simultaneous interpreter does, Jones acts for the sake of being one. Heidegger, like many of his predecessors in the idealist tradition in the philosophy of time (about which more in Chapter 5), thinks of our futurity as essentially purposive and of the future into which we press as essentially teleological.

One might object that purposiveness entails sequential futurity, and thus that this originary, purposive future must be a sequential one. That is, one might argue that

Jones acts for the sake of being *A*

entails,

Jones is trying to accomplish something (being *A*) that is not yet actual, but which may later come to be actual.

The objection asserts that it is nonsense to talk about a future that is *both* teleological *and* nonsequential.

Although there is an important insight in this objection, it does not impugn Heidegger's account of originary temporality. The objection makes plain that it is not possible to act for the sake being a simultaneous interpreter without acting so as to attempt to accomplish something. In this case, Jones must surely on some occasions act so as to succeed at interpreting something, must leave home to get to work at some time, and so on. But it does not follow from this that her acting for the sake of being a simultaneous interpreter is itself aimed at a future to come. It does not follow that she must be trying to accomplish being a simultaneous interpreter. Acting for the sake of being *A* may *require* attempting to accomplish something, but it need not itself *be* such an attempt. When we turn to Heidegger's explanatory derivation of the world-time future from the originary future, we shall see that he in fact exploits this requirement on acting for the sake of being something. He will use it to argue that the originary future requires the world-time future, and thus that originary temporality requires world-time. Seeing how this is compatible with the dependence of world-time on originary temporality must wait until Chapter 3.

What we can note now is this: there is a difference between pressing ahead into an ability-to-be and pursuing the tasks or goals that flow from that ability-to-be. Pressing ahead into some for-the-sake-of-which is purpo-

sive, although not goal-directed. Consider the concepts of success and failure that attend our pressing ahead into the future. One can be a failure at being, for instance, a professor. But failing at being a professor is better characterized as falling short of the internal standards of the profession than failing to achieve some goal(s). To see this, note that the standards inherent in the life of a professor are ongoing measures of success that do not cease to apply, once some achievement has been attained. They are standards that help to make up the framework of being a professor, and one can fall short of those standards. For example, one's teaching can be ill received. Contrast the standard of inspiring students with the goal of winning a teaching award. The latter can be effected, and once effected, the activity organized in its pursuit is completed. One's teaching activity must then be reorganized around some other goal, or else one will lose interest in teaching. But the standard of inspiring students is continuously applicable and never becomes idle.²⁰ When someone who is acting for the sake of being a professor, rather than for some ulterior self-understanding, loses interest in being a professor, it is not simply that the goals prescribed by being a professor cease to attract her,²¹ for after all, if I am right, being a professor is not itself a goal and is not exhausted by any definable set of goals. Rather, the standards that articulate success at being a professor no longer strike her as all that important, or urgent, or as no longer relevant to who she is, or perhaps simply as boring.

If I am right that being a professor is not a project focused on a definable goal, then we cannot understand the larger-scale organization of one's activity for the sake of being a professor strictly in means-ends terms. One need not first read Kant and then Carlyle, because the goal of having read Kant subserves the goal of reading Carlyle. Instead, the projects of reading Kant and reading Carlyle make sense as ways of being a professor, things a professor might reasonably do. Both projects issue from one's self-understanding as a scholar of modern thought, but not as means to ends. Or, at least, it can sometimes go this way. Sometimes, obviously, one imagines a large-scale project that dictates that one read both authors. But sometimes one's interest simply takes one from Kant to

²⁰ There is a clear sense in which even such intrinsic standards can become obsolete, if, for instance, they no longer fit the social context in which they make sense. For example, the standards constitutive of being a milk delivery man have been rendered otiose by social change.

²¹ Professorial goals might cease to attract a burnout, precisely *because* the intrinsic standards cease to have a hold on her.

Carlyle. Thus, we can evaluate whether some project makes sense as a professorial project without having to ask what further goal it subserves. Perhaps it subserves no further goal. Perhaps it is simply the way one goes about being a professor.

This formulation should not suggest, however, that there are brute facts, such as how one is currently going about being a professor, that do not admit of deeper, purposive clarification. It insists only that the deeper clarification need not be of the means-end variety. The purposes that internally make up being a professor are not goals. Rather, they are conceptions of what is at stake in being a professor, say, the education of students or the development of human knowledge. She who acts for the sake of being a professor always grasps these purposes in terms of their significances or imports. For example, perhaps professors typically conceive the education of students as worthwhile, or generous, or even just exhilarating. Insofar as one's professorial activity aims at these purposes, it subjects itself to the standards inherent in them, standards that articulate what it is to educate well, for example.²²

Returning now to the broader issues at stake in Heidegger's temporal interpretation of existentiality, one might object that Heidegger has stripped down the concept of the future so far that all that remains to us is the concept of purposiveness itself. This objection really is twofold. First, it seems as if Heidegger just *substitutes* purposiveness for futurity and perversely claims that we ought to call purposiveness "the originary future." Because he has stripped away the normal implications of our language about the future, namely, that what is futural is yet to come, all he has left us with is purposiveness. Second, if this is true, and even if it were not otherwise illegitimate, it is hard to see how the originary future could illuminate or explain existentiality. Originary temporality is supposed to be the "sense of care," that is, that in terms of which care makes sense. But how can the originary future explain or shed light on existentiality or purposiveness, if it just *is* the latter? Clearly, it cannot. To answer this twofold objection, I must say something about how the originary future is other than simply purposiveness.

In pressing ahead into some way to be, Dasein is *aiming* for something. We have seen that Dasein's aiming for something is not simply intending a goal, and so a goal's status as to-be-realized cannot spell out the futurity of such aiming. Rather, Dasein's pressing ahead into a for-the-sake-of-which gives it *direction*. It is crucial that the for-the-sake-of-which cannot be either

²² For a development of the themes just touched upon, see my (in press).

Present or already there, because then Dasein could not press ahead into it. (This is the reasoning for the Unattainability Thesis.) Perhaps, one might respond, this “purposiveness” is directed to something nontemporal, rather than to something futural; after all, its aim cannot come to be. But this cannot be so, because the direction or aiming of pressing ahead precisely gives structure and content to our ordinary intentions to realize goals. Jones intends to get to work by 8 A.M., *because* she presses ahead into being a simultaneous interpreter. This would be unintelligible, if the pressing ahead aimed for something either non-temporal, Present, or past.²³ So, the purposiveness that is Dasein’s existentiality has an ineliminable explanatory relevance to the (ordinary) temporal structure of other aspects of Dasein’s activity, here its intentions to realize tasks.

A final, this time textual, objection: my entire interpretation of Heidegger’s account of originary temporality is based on a misunderstanding, one might argue. The originary future will not come to be someday, because it is being toward (intentional directedness to) something temporal, rather than the temporal item Dasein is directed toward. That is, when Heidegger denies that the “ecstases” are sequential – as when he writes, “Temporalizing does not mean a ‘succession’ of the ecstases. The future is *not later* than beenness and this is *not earlier* than the Present” (*S&Z*, p. 350) – he is denying only that Dasein’s being toward the future is off in the future itself. Heidegger distinguishes the “ecstases” of originary temporality from the “schemata.” The ecstases are Dasein’s modes of temporal understanding: there is a future-directed ecstasy, a Present-directed one, and a past-directed one. The schemata are what one is directed to by the ecstases. They are off in the future, contemporaneous, and already gone by. Heidegger’s point is, thus, simply parallel to Husserl’s assertion (*CW4*) that retention and protention are not in the past and the future. They are the means whereby we retain and anticipate moments of time other than the Present. This objection must be especially compelling for those who are impressed by the similarities and connections between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s phenomenologies of time.²⁴

²³ This is a hint of the sort of reasoning that Heidegger uses to argue that originary temporality should be considered a form of time or temporality: originary temporality possesses key features that, once modified, explain time as ordinarily conceived.

²⁴ In Chapter 4 I shall argue, in contrast, that Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness lines up pretty well with what I shall call “disengaged temporality,” that is, the understanding of time that opens up ordinary time for Dasein. It, thus, ends up several rungs down the latter of dependencies in Heidegger’s system.

But the objection falls short of its mark; Heidegger is quite clear that the schemata are also neither futural nor past in a sequential sense. Heidegger identifies the schema of the originary future as the *for-the-sake-of* itself: “The schema in which Dasein comes toward itself *futurally* [zukünftig], whether authentically or inauthentically,²⁵ is the *for-the-sake-of* itself” (*S&Z*, p. 365). The arguments I have spelled out are precisely directed to establish the thesis that the *for-the-sake-of*-which itself, and thus the *schema* of Dasein’s futurity, is not sequentially futural. Hence, the objection from the analogy to Husserl collapses, and this in turn should cast suspicion on the analogy itself. Heidegger’s and Husserl’s phenomenologies of time are worlds apart. For Heidegger, neither Dasein’s direction into the future nor the future into which it is directed is yet to come, sequentially later.

A Temporal Interpretation of Determinate Mattering

Just as Heidegger hints at the futural direction of existentiality and understanding in §31 of *Being and Time*, so he hints at the past direction of facticity and affectivity in §29. The hint is a little less obvious and is not really drawn out explicitly until §41. First, recall that affectivity, and hence facticity, are associated with thrownness. “Thrownness” is an abstract noun built on a past participle. It is supposed thereby to pick out something that has a past aspect to it. Second, through affectivity Dasein *finds* itself. One can only find something, if it is already there. One cannot find the future, at least not while it is future. These hints are explicitly developed in §41, where Heidegger claims that Dasein’s facticity makes up its being *already* in a world:

It belongs to [being-in-the-world], however, that Dasein, delivered²⁶ over to itself, is [or has been] already in each case thrown *into a world*. Being-ahead-of-itself [viz., existentiality] means, more fully stated: *being-ahead-in-already-being-in-a-world*. (*S&Z*, p. 192)

So Dasein’s facticity makes up its already being in a world, or as we saw in Chapter 1, Dasein’s determinacy, its already being who it is.

As we did above for the “not yet,” we can formulate this “already” into a claim that will have surprising consequences:

²⁵ More evidence for the modally indifferent character of originary temporality.

²⁶ Note the *past* participle here too.

(5) Dasein is *already* what it factically finds itself as.

Consider, again as we did for existentiality, a parallel ordinary language claim involving “already”: “Bill Clinton is *already* president.” If Bill Clinton is already president, then that presumably entails that at some time – a time *before* he was president – he was *not yet* president. That is,

x is (now) *already F*

entails that

x was (back then) *not yet F*,

as long as “*F*” ranges over a domain of changing items.²⁷ Because the “*F*” is supposed to range over attunements, and because attunements change, the entailment should hold. (It does not hold, for example, for Jones’s being human. She has always already been a human, and thus she was never not yet a human. But being human is not an attunement.) However, the entailment cannot apply to (5). To see this, recall Heidegger’s interpretation of the “not yet”: Dasein is not yet what it presses ahead into (claim [1] above). This,²⁸ along with (5) and the standard grammar of “already,” in turn implies that

If Dasein is (now) *already F*, then it was (back then) pressing ahead into *F*.

But this is precisely not the case, according to Heidegger. Recall the Nullity Thesis from Chapter 1: Dasein cannot press ahead into its attunements. Ontologically attunements are not the sort of thing into which Dasein can press ahead. So Heidegger is not using “already” in its stan-

²⁷ The point of this restriction is that it is odd, in ordinary language, to use the word “already” adverbially to modify a condition that is unchanging. It may be that nothing is unchanging, in which case it will be hard to get a grip on this oddness. But suppose, e.g., that the universe did not come to be in the Big Bang, but rather has always been. It would then be odd to say, “The world already exists.”

²⁸ I am treating (1) as a biconditional: “Dasein is not yet *F* if and only if it presses ahead into *F*.” In order to generate the nonsequential interpretation of “not yet,” all we need is the right-to-left conditional half of this biconditional: “If Dasein presses ahead into *F*, then Dasein is not yet *F*.” And I relied only on this conditional in my argument. However, to generate the nonsequentiality here, we need the left-to-right conditional half. Is (1) a biconditional? “Dasein is not yet what is able to be” sure *reads* like an identification, i.e., a biconditional. In any case, to save the sequentiality of the future while giving up the sequentiality of the past is, exegetically and probably philosophically too, bizarre at best. To do so would be to develop different philosophical interpretations of two otherwise closely interrelated parts of our temporal language.

dard grammar. "Dasein is (now) *already F*" does *not* entail "Dasein was (back then) *not yet F*."

This is another manifestation of Heidegger's denial of the sequentiality of originary temporality. Originary temporality consists of a past, Present, and future, but they are not a past, Present, and future that follow upon one another. The future never will be Present, and the past never was. Just as Heidegger denies that the "not yet" means the "not yet now – but later," so

just as little does the "already" mean a "No-longer-now – but earlier." (S&Z, p. 327)

Or, as he puts it in *Logic*,²⁹

Does the already – as a structural moment of the already-being-amidst – say as much as "already has been?" Should it be said, being-already is essentially no longer be-ing in the Now? And should that then mean, insofar as being-already, being-in-the-world is a mode of the being of Dasein, Dasein as already-being-amidst is already no longer? So that in every Now, in which it is, it is no longer, i.e., is not? Such a thing can manifestly not be meant. The already is, rather, a characteristic of the being of Dasein; it is supposed to determine its being positively and precisely not express a being-no-longer. (*LFW*, p. 241)

The standard use of the term "already *F*" entails "once not *F*" (in the case of changing phenomena), and "once not *F*" along with "already now *F*" entails "earlier, but no longer, not-*F*;" that is, "no-longer-now – but earlier." We ordinarily think of what already is as once having not yet been. But this is not how Heidegger is using his terminology.

The chief difference between the arguments concerning the future and the past, as I have presented them, is that the latter are parasitic upon the former. That is, in order to show that Heidegger's use of "already" is deviant from ordinary usage, I relied on some of the apparatus from the discussion of the future, in particular, claim (1). That and the Nullity Thesis cause the trouble.

Just as for the originary future, I must say something about how the originary past involves more than simply determinacy, for if it did not, it would straightaway collapse into facticity. This would be a problem for the same two reasons the parallel issue posed a problem for the originary

²⁹ In *Logic* he also indicates that a "correlative" analysis is due for the "ahead" in "being-ahead-of-itself," but he does not give it (*LFW*, p. 242). So I could not quote *Logic* in dealing with the originary future.

future: first, it would cast doubt on the classification of the originary past as a temporal phenomenon; and second, it would disable the originary past from explaining or illuminating facticity or determinacy. The determinacy of Dasein's being-in-a-world and being-its-self is not just exhausted by it having differential attunements. A crucial element of Heidegger's analysis of this determinacy or facticity is that Dasein *finds* itself with it, that it cannot control or press ahead into its determinacy. As we saw, attunements beset Dasein. Dasein can press ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which, but it cannot press ahead into, aim for, attunements. Its attunements are *already* characteristic of it.

This description involves – a critic might note – a move from characterizing facticity or determinacy as beyond Dasein's control to describing it temporally as "already." But surely not everything beyond Dasein's control is "already." Some aspects of the world, even of Dasein, are necessary, some inevitable, but surely not all these are "already." However, Heidegger could respond, Dasein's attunements are neither necessary nor inevitable, for if they were, then Dasein would, contrary to supposition, have an essence.

Perhaps then, the critic could answer, Dasein's attunements are just contingently out of its control; they are neither necessary nor inevitable, but not for that reason "already." Still, Heidegger would reply, this suggestion is not strong enough to account for the phenomenology: attunements are not one of those features of our experience, such as earthquakes and wars, that we have contingently failed to control thus far. It is a universal, because ontological, feature of our experience that our going about business in the world is always informed by attunements that ground and guide our pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which. They must be already on board, so to speak, if we are to press ahead into our possibilities, because there would be nothing to guide our projection. The notion that attunements are, or could be, under our control, or selected in our pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which, adds up to the idea of radical freedom dismissed by Heidegger in his very conception of affectivity, thrownness, and being the ground. The Nullity Thesis excludes radical freedom, and the Nullity Thesis drives us, Heidegger argues, to the nonsequential temporality of our being-already.

The "alreadiness" of Dasein's determinacy, therefore, consists in that determinacy functioning as a ground on which Dasein projects, a ground that must be already operative for Dasein to be able to project. Nonetheless, this alreadiness is not a sequential past; it does not characterize how Dasein either was or has been (in the ordinary sense of "has been"). It

characterizes how it *is*. But because this “*is*” has a past characteristic, Heidegger uses the clumsy phrase, “Dasein in general *is* as I *have been*” which he immediately abbreviates – and it is important to see that this is only an abbreviation³⁰ – as “I *have been*” (*S&Z*, p. 326). He subsequently uses the term “*beenness*” (*Gewesenheit*) to pick out the past element of originary temporality. Finally, note that the *givenness* – the being already in place so as to be operative – of facticity is the temporal feature of it, on which Heidegger shall rely to explain the world-time past.

The Priority of the Future and the Finitude of Originary Temporality

Heidegger concludes §65 of *Being and Time* thus:

We [may] pull together the preceding analysis of originary temporality in the following four theses: time is originary as the temporalizing of temporality, as which it makes possible the constitution of the care-structure. Temporality is essentially ecstatic. Temporality temporalizes itself originally out of the future. Originary temporality is finite. (*S&Z*, p. 331)

We may analyze the first of these theses into two components: (1) originary temporality is originary of time, and (2) originary temporality makes care, the being of Dasein, possible. Component 1 is an expression of Heidegger’s temporal idealism, and it is, therefore, the topic of this entire study. Component 2 states that originary temporality makes care as such possible. Insofar as this claims that originary temporality helps make sense of care by revealing its temporal structure, component 2 is the focus of this entire chapter. But insofar as it implies that originary temporality is the organizing or unifying ground of care, it focuses on something I shall treat in the final section. The second thesis states that originary temporality constitutes Dasein’s being-outside-itself, its openness to entities. It makes up a fundamental kind of being-toward that makes possible all other forms of being-toward. We shall see that originary temporality does this by lying at the foundation of Dasein’s ability to grasp being. I shall treat this dimension of originary temporality in Chapter 5. Thus, the first and second theses cannot be adequately discussed until later. The third and fourth theses, however, focus somewhat more narrowly upon origin-

³⁰ It is far easier to see that this is an abbreviation in German, than in English, for the verb that helps construct the past participle of “to be” is itself “to be.” It would be as if one wrote, in English, “Dasein *is* as I *am*-been,” which one then immediately abbreviated to “Dasein *is* been.”

ary temporality as such, and unlike the others, we can discuss them in a self-contained way here. Let me treat them *seriatim*.

The Priority of the Future. Heidegger does not say much by way of explaining the priority of the future. This is what he says:

Originary and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future, so much so that it, futurally having been [*zukünftig gewesen*], first of all awakens the Present. *The primary phenomenon of originary and authentic temporality is the future.* The priority of the future will itself be modified in accordance with the modified temporalization of inauthentic temporality; however, it will also show up again in derivative “time.”³¹ (*S&Z*, p. 329)

In what sense is the Present “first of all awakened” by the future (or by futural having been)? Originary temporality is a temporal manifold that is ontologically suited to, indeed more strongly, is the ontological sense of, Dasein as ability, as something that presses ahead into its self-understanding. It is precisely because Dasein from the ground up is defined by its existentiality, its questionability, the requirement that it can only be who it is by pressing ahead into it, that the Unattainability Thesis holds. And originary temporality is the form of time that expresses or captures the Unattainability Thesis. The sense of Dasein’s existentiality is its originary future. The originary future, therefore, has a preeminent role to play in fixing the sort of temporality exhibited by Dasein. The originary Present (and past) must conform to this. Specifically, it is at bottom Dasein’s existentiality (indeed, Heidegger’s existentialism) that forces the analysis to the thesis that originary temporality is nonsequential. In my account of the originary past, I derived its nonsequentiality from the nonsequentiality of the originary future. In the account I shall provide in Chapter 3 of the Present, we shall see that the Present (both the originary and the pragmatic, or derivative, Present) arises out of the originary

³¹ This passage explicitly only addresses the priority of the future in authentic temporality. The paragraph in which it is embedded wobbles back and forth between authentic temporality and vaguer formulations that can cover originary temporality as such. So perhaps the future is prior only in authentic temporality? That cannot be Heidegger’s thought, for the p. 331 passage that summarizes the four theses about originary temporality clearly applies the priority of the future to originary temporality as such. One might argue that the textual tensions evident here are resolvable, if we accept that originary temporality is authentic, rather than modally indifferent. That is true, but is hardly sufficient evidence to overwhelm the far more extensive evidence for the contrary conclusion that originary temporality is modally indifferent.

future and past. Therefore, the future is explanatorily primary in originary temporality: it explains the nonsequentiality of the past and Present.³²

The Finitude of Originary Temporality. The finitude of originary temporality is not the stopping of time, not even of the (putative) subjective time of human experience that ceases with demise:

With the thesis of the originary finitude of temporality we do not dispute that “time goes on” [*die Zeit weitergeht*], but rather, it is simply supposed to capture the phenomenal characteristic of originary temporality, which shows itself in what is projected in the originary, existential projection of Dasein itself. (S&Z, p. 330)

The finitude of originary temporality does not conflict with the carrying on of ordinary time. That one might perceive a conflict arises from a preoccupation with ordinary time:

The attempt to ignore the finitude of originary and authentic temporality, and therewith of temporality,³³ or even to hold it to be “*a priori*” impossible, arises out of the constant pressure of the ordinary understanding of time. (ibid.)

For ordinary time to be finite would be for it to end or stop, or more precisely – time itself cannot stop, because to stop is to have a final phase *in time* – for there to be a final moment of time; perhaps the “Big Crunch” that cosmologists conjecture might be the final destiny of our universe. Sequences or series end, stop, or have a final element. But originary

32 As we shall see in Chapter 3’s discussion of simple versus explanatory dependence, this is true, even though each of the ecstases of originary temporality requires the others. As Heidegger says here, “This should indicate that the future has a priority in the ecstatic unity of originary and authentic temporality, even though temporality does not first arise through a heaping on and succession [*Anhäufung und Abfolge*] of ecstases, but rather always temporalizes itself in the equi-originariness of the ecstases” (S&Z, p. 329).

33 Like Heidegger’s discussion of the priority of the future, his development of the thesis of the finitude of originary temporality strongly suggests that originary temporality is authentic, although the flavor of this here is somewhat weaker than in the preceding discussion. Nonetheless, there are points at which Heidegger indicates that his argument has the same logical structure as I identified in my general treatment of the modal indifference of originary temporality: authentic temporality can be finite, because originary temporality in general is finite. The clearest of these points is the one to which this note is attached: “The attempt to ignore the finitude of originary and authentic temporality, and therewith of temporality” (my emphasis). The emphasized clause would be redundant, if originary temporality just were authentic. Furthermore, the point is that to ignore the finitude of authentic temporality requires one to ignore what makes that finitude possible, viz., the finitude of originary temporality in general.

temporality is no sequence or series, as we have seen. Thus, for it to be finite is something entirely different:

[Dasein] does not have an end at which it merely stops, but rather, it *exists finitely*. (*S&Z*, p. 329)

So to figure out what Heidegger means by the finitude of originary temporality, we must come to terms with the notion of existing finitely.

The finitude of existence derives from the concept of death. (Heidegger makes this abundantly clear in the paragraph on pp. 329–30 of *S&Z*, where he introduces the finitude of originary temporality, a paragraph that begins “Care is being toward death.”) In chapter 1 of division 2, Heidegger repeatedly characterizes death as the “end of Dasein.” But we saw above that existential death is not the ending of a human life, and that is because Dasein is not a human life, but rather an attuned, absorbed, discursive ability. We need a concept of end that is appropriate to this ontological framework.³⁴

In what sense could an ability be said to have an end? As we saw above in our discussion of the Unattainability Thesis, abilities-to-be are not like tasks or projects, which do culminate in an achievement and can, therefore, break off or complete themselves with their ending. In the discussion of death Heidegger tips us off to the direction he is heading by indicating, in a footnote, a debt to Jaspers’s concept of a “limit-situation.” He writes,

For the following investigation, one should see especially: K. Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*.³⁵ . . . Jaspers conceives death by means of the clue of the phenomenon, set forth by him, of “limit-situations,” whose fundamental significance ranges beyond all typologies of “attitudes” and “world-views.” (*S&Z*, p. 249 n.)

There are several points of contact between Heidegger’s discussion of death in *Being and Time* and Jaspers’s in *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*.³⁶ Let me summarize some aspects of that connection in three theses. First, Heidegger takes over from Jaspers the idea that one can define and delimit the concept of human existence by describing its limits. Second, limit-situations are situations or conditions of human existence in which

³⁴ For a more extensive development the themes that follow, see my (1994a).

³⁵ Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 6th ed. (Munich: R. Piper, 1985). (Heidegger refers to the third edition, and to pp. 259–70, on death. The entire section on *Grenzsituationen* is found on pp. 229–80.)

³⁶ I investigate the details of this Heidegger–Jaspers connection in my (1994b).

one confronts a limitation of human existence. Finally, although Jaspers and Heidegger have very different ways of thinking about this, each understands the relevant existential limits to arise from structural tensions within human existence.

If we allow Heidegger's reference to limit-situations to guide us from the concept of ending *qua* stopping to that of limitation, we can make progress in coming to terms with Heidegger's line of thought. Dasein is an ability-to-be, and if we examine the ways in which an ability can be said to have limits, I think we can see how Heidegger understands existential death to be a sort of end. Abilities are limited by the situations in which they are stifled,³⁷ prevented from being exercised. One's ability to breathe is stifled by a lack of oxygen, one's ability to see by an absence of light. In the absence of light, the ability to see is not nonexistent; it is simply stifled. Suppose we call situations in which an ability cannot be manifested, because stifled, a "limit-situation" for that ability, so that utter darkness is a limit-situation for sight. Limit-situations (*Grenzsituationen*) help to define an ability, by revealing its limits (*Grenzen*), limits that function as the boundaries of the ability, its ends, in a recognizable sense of that term. The finitude of an ability (its "endliness," *Endlichkeit*) is spelled out by its limits.

Death is the limit-situation that defines the limits of Dasein's ability-to-be. Dasein's being is an ability-to-be. The end or limit of this ability is the inability-to-be. The condition Heidegger calls "death" is a limit-situation for that ability-to-be, one in which Dasein confronts this limitation. Moreover, this limitation arises out of a tension in the very structure of human existence: Dasein's being is always at issue for it, yet there is a condition in which Dasein cannot respond to that issue. Death is the condition in which Dasein is unable to be-there, because it is unable to exercise its ability to determine who it is. This is to say that death is a limit-situation in which the ability-to-be is stifled, in the way in which the ability-to-see is stifled by the absence of light. This situation occurs when Dasein is beset by anxiety, in which it is indifferent to all its possibilities, in which all possibilities are equally irrelevant to it. Dasein exists finitely in that it exists as an ability that is in part defined by the limits it runs up against in death/anxiety.

Originary temporality, as the sense of care, is finite too. The originary future is one's teleological projection into some ability-to-be. This tele-

³⁷ I use this term intentionally to hook up with Heidegger's description of anxiety: "The threatening thing . . . is already 'there' – and yet nowhere; it is so near that it stifles one and

ological projection is finite in the sense developed earlier: it is in part defined by the limits exposed in death. The limitations revealed in death imply the Unattainability Thesis. Originary temporality is finite in the specific sense that its future is unattainable. And as we have seen, because the originary future is unattainable, it is not a not-yet-Now. The finitude of originary temporality, thus, turns out to be another way of looking at its nonsequentiality. *Originary temporality is finite simply insofar as it is not successive.*³⁸

Interlude: The Temporal Vacuity of Discourse

We saw in Chapter 1 that there is some considerable ambiguity about the status of discourse within the structure of disclosedness, specifically whether it is an element coordinate and equi-originary with existentiality, facticity, and falling, or whether it has some looser role. We saw that discourse is constitutive of being-in-the-world, and so it would seem to earn a place in the structure of disclosedness (and care, presumably). Although Heidegger endorses this supposition in chapter 5 of division 1, he backs away from it in chapter 4 of division 2. In the latter context he is developing the temporal structure of Dasein's being. In particular, in § 68 on the temporality of disclosedness, Heidegger systematically treats the futurity of understanding, the beenness of affectivity, and the Presence of falling/being-amidst. He is left with no tense with which to align discourse. He writes,

The full disclosedness of the There, which is constituted by understanding, affectivity, and falling, maintains its articulation through discourse. Thus, discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in one determinate ecstasy.
(*S&Z*, p. 349)

Add to this that Heidegger has essentially nothing to say about the temporality of discourse, and we have an adequate explanation for why at precisely that point he should remove discourse to a subordinate status within the disclosedness structure.

What does Heidegger say about the temporality of discourse?

Because nevertheless discourse expresses itself factically and usually in language and speaks primarily in the manner of the concerned-discursive

³⁸ We see that the objection that originary temporality cannot be finite, for after all, "time goes on," even after Dasein passes away, overlooks precisely what is conceptually unique and extraordinary about originary temporality: its nonsequentiality.

addressing of the “environment,”³⁹ *enpresenting* has a *preeminent* constitutive function. (*ibid.*)

This last claim is much weaker than it seems. It suggests simply that since Dasein is primarily and usually preoccupied with its concernful dealings with intraworldly things, its language tends to be preoccupied with that as well. This, finally, is mirrored in the primary and usual temporalization of discourse in *enpresenting*, which, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 3, is the ecstasy through which we encounter intraworldly things in their temporal dimension. But this does not say very much, after all: because Dasein primarily and usually discursively articulates (and talks about) the intraworldly, the temporality of discourse is primarily and usually dominated by *enpresenting*. Heidegger offers nothing distinctive to say about the temporality of discourse.

This is reflected in the scantiness of the text on the temporality of discourse: two paragraphs, one of which we have just examined. The second paragraph merely suggests that there is something to be learned about the existential-temporal significance of the grammatical categories of the tenses, temporal stages, and temporal aspects. Heidegger then passes this project off into a promissory note. He justifies issuing a promissory note partly by claiming that one cannot really approach the problem until “the fundamental connection between being and truth is spun out of the problematic of temporality” (*ibid.*). He does not make clear why the existential-temporal inquiry into language must wait for the inquiry into the connection between being and truth to have finished up, whereas the temporal interpretation of understanding, affectivity, and falling need not. In short, Heidegger appears to have nothing to say about the specifically temporal analysis of language or discourse.

Originary Temporality and the Unity of Care

What is Heidegger looking for in searching for the temporal “sense” of Dasein’s being? His answer: “In the question about the sense of care we are asking: *What makes possible the totality of the articulated, structural whole of care in the unity of its developed articulation?*” (*S&Z*, p. 324). That is, we are seeking for that which explains the totality of Dasein, that which accounts for Dasein’s unity. Thus, Heidegger’s basic suggestion is this: seeing how

³⁹ The scare-quotes around “environment” indicate that Heidegger means the things occurring or available *in* the environment, the “intra-environmental,” so to speak. This parallels his use of “world” in scare-quotes to pick out the intraworldly.

existentiality and facticity are temporal sheds light on why they belong together. Care is a unity, and originary temporality helps us to understand just how. The assumption lying behind this strategy is that originary temporality on its own has a sort of unity that it can “lend” to care. Put more cautiously, the temporality in terms of which care is described is of itself a structural unity, and thus care can be described as unitary (or more unitary than it would otherwise be) in virtue of participating in that structure. So the basic suggestion turns out to be this: by seeing that existentiality is futural and that facticity is past, we see how the two are united, viz., as two elements in the temporal manifold of human existence. The past and the future possess the unity of time, and that unity can be conferred on what participates in its structure.

There are two obstacles to this approach to the unity of care, however. First, as we have seen, my explanation of originary temporality eliminates most of what ordinarily would be called its “temporal” features and reduces it to a phenomenon very close to care. And if originary temporality is so intimately related to care, then it is hard to see how it can helpfully⁴⁰ explain the unity of care. Second, although the essential unity of time is a venerable, philosophical thesis, usually the temporality that is thought to be essentially unitary is quite unlike Heidegger’s originary temporality. Kant, for example – who could be expected to be a central influence on Heidegger here – thought of time as essentially unitary, precisely because he thought of it as a pure, contentless, sequential flow. Let me consider these difficulties *seriatim*.

The originary future is a “not yet” that is not a future Now, and the originary past is an “already” that is not a past Now. The “not yet” makes sense in terms of purposiveness, the “already” in terms of givenness. Purposiveness and givenness just about are existentiality and facticity by other names (at least when we note that the givenness in question is given determinacy). So it would seem that originary temporality is disabled from helpfully explaining the unity of care, because the explanatory force seems rather to go in the reverse direction. The point can be made even more challenging by noting that Heidegger’s official description of care, “ahead-of-itself-in-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-amidst (intra-worldly encountering entities)” (*S&Z*, p. 192), already involves as much

⁴⁰ I qualify with “helpfully” here, because I argued that, e.g., the futurity of existentiality is formally distinct from existentiality itself and, thus, is in principle able to illuminate it. The question here is the more substantive one: How much help can the originary future really be, given that its central feature is purposiveness, a notion that we understand already in the concept of existentiality?

of a temporal reference as my account adds with the concept of originary temporality. "Being-ahead" and "being-already-in" are the purposive aiming, or directionality, and the given determinacy that I identify with the future and the past, and thus they are already present in the structure of care as defined in §41 of *Being and Time*.

Much of this objection is correct, but its conclusion does not follow. The p. 192 definition of care does involve the temporal elements constitutive of originary temporality, but that does not prevent the latter from explaining the unity of care. Care is not to be unified by some extrinsic structure that it happens to embody; it is unified by a structure that is uniquely its own. In identifying originary temporality, Heidegger is not applying a template to an independent phenomenon; he is drawing out and bringing into view the structural heart of care. He is *interpreting* care. Recall from the Introduction to this study that ontological interpretation, or hermeneutics, is the explicitation of structures that lie hidden *within* the phenomena and make sense of them. Care's characterization as existentiality, facticity, and falling does not appear to involve overtly temporal features, whereas the p. 192 formula does. That formula, we can now see, is a transitional one, aiming us ahead into the explicitly temporal account of chapters 3 and 4 of division 2. The originary temporality of §§65 and 68 is the temporal heart of the phenomena described on p. 192, which itself is the essential skeleton of what Heidegger represents by way of existentiality, facticity, and falling. Heidegger is not introducing an independent, unifying scheme to explain care; he is showing how care's internal structure is inherently unified *because* originally temporal.

But can originary temporality do the unifying work for which Heidegger has it slated? Philosophers have often argued that time is inherently unitary, but Heidegger's originary temporality is not time as we ordinarily think of it. So we cannot just presume that it can perform the unifying work Heidegger claims it does. There is a long tradition in the philosophy of time of thinking of time as inherently unified, either because past, Present, and future are conceptually linked with one another, or because time is a continuous flow, each of whose elements is made possible by the whole, rather than vice versa. Kant certainly thought of time in the second way (see Blattner 1995c). Neither of these paths are open to Heidegger. He cannot appeal to the conceptual unity of time, because, after all, he has replaced our ordinary temporal concepts with his own. He cannot appeal to the unity of the continuous flow of time, because he does not think of time as a flow. Here we touch on a significant point worth dwelling on briefly.

Some readers of Heidegger have thought of his originary temporality as some kind of primordial flow of time. For example, some interpret Heidegger's originary temporality as "dynamic" (Barrett 1968; Starr 1975; Langan 1983; Heine 1985; Makkreel 1987). By "dynamic" these interpreters seem to mean either that time flows continuously (*dynamic* as opposed to *static*), or that it is an A-series rather than a B-series (*tensed* rather than *untensed*). Neither of these views captures Heidegger's arguments. First, Heidegger clearly associates the "flow" of time with the ordinary conception of time (S&Z, p. 422). More importantly, even a continuous (as opposed to discrete) sequence is a sequence; even if sequential time is continuous, nevertheless the past is earlier and the future later than the Present.⁴¹ Second, an A-series (that Barrett [1968] and Olafson [1987] associate with originary temporality) is likewise a sequence; what makes it A, rather than B, is that it is a tensed sequence.⁴² Thus, Heidegger cannot appeal to the putative primordial unity of some undifferentiated flow of time.

To what can Heidegger appeal? What unifying claim can he make on behalf of originary temporality? If Heidegger is right, originary temporality is a manifold of elements that are modified so as to be central (or "core") to ordinary time, but it lacks successiveness. Successiveness can plausibly be seen as a disunifying feature. Time would be more unified, would it not, if it lacked successiveness, that is, if its elements were not spread out or extended?

Temporality temporalizes itself wholly [*ganz*] in every ecstasy; that means that the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling, that is, the unity of the care-structure, is grounded in the ecstatic unity of the current, full temporalization of temporality. (S&Z, p. 350)

Although the three elements of originary temporality are differentiated, they are not distinct. They are not distinct enough to succeed one another, even if that succession should be specified as continuous and, say, "primordial": "the stretchedness of temporality [i.e., the interlinkage of its ecstases] . . . [is] alien to every continuity of an occurrent entity" (S&Z, pp. 423–4). Even if one runs the moments of time into one another,

⁴¹ This observation will complicate our assessment of Bergson's relation to Heidegger in Chapter 5.

⁴² Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, Heidegger's "world-time" (which contrasts with originary temporality) is clearly tensed (because indexical), if for no other reason than that it is a sequence of "Nows," relative to each of which earlier Nows are "formerly" (*Damals*) and later Nows are "then" (*Dann*).

declares them to be continuous and thus not discretely identifiable, still, that sort of unity is inferior to the connection of the several ecstases of originary temporality to one another.

Everything hangs, then, on whether Heidegger can make the argument stick that originary temporality is a form of time more basic than, because explanatory of, ordinary time (or, as we shall see, more precisely world-time). If that argument works, then we can conclude that originary temporality is ordinary time stripped of one of its disunifying features. We shall discover, unfortunately, that Heidegger's argument for this central element of his temporal analysis of *Dasein* fails. Its failure brings many in its wake. Assuming that Heidegger cannot establish his central claim on behalf of originary temporality, one consequent failure we can thus already see is that because originary temporality cannot be understood as the explanatory core of ordinary time, we cannot understand how it does its unifying work for care. The argumentative strategy behind Heidegger's claims on behalf of the unifying force of originary temporality hangs on the argument that time is dependent on originary temporality. The two rise or fall together. Alas, they fall.

Let me now proceed to explain the argument for the dependence of ordinary time on originary temporality and examine just why it fails. In Chapter 3 I shall explore world-time, the form of temporal understanding that makes it intelligible to *Dasein* (time-reckoning and pragmatic temporality), and the argument for the dependence of world-time on originary temporality. In Chapter 3 I shall also explain the failure of that argument. In Chapter 4 I shall look into the putative dependence of ordinary time on world-time. Chapter 5 will characterize the sort of temporal idealism we shall have discovered in Heidegger, and the Conclusion will investigate the consequences of its failure for Heidegger's larger, ontological project.

WORLD-TIME AND TIME-RECKONING

World-time is the flow of time experienced by Dasein in an everyday way. Originary temporality is not successive, but world-time is. World-time is the sequence of qualitative or contentful moments or spans of time that Dasein encounters in its everyday going about business. It is this sequence that Dasein thinks about when it reflects on time in a mundane fashion. In this chapter I aim to explicate Heidegger's phenomenology of world-time; to explain the sort of human temporality in virtue of which, Heidegger argues, Dasein is able to encounter world-time; and to explain how world-time is supposed to be dependent upon originary temporality. This last task continues the argument launched in Chapter 2 for the thesis that originary temporality is indeed a mode of time, albeit a rather unusual one. For this claim depends, as we recall, upon the assertion that originary temporality consists of a set of features that, when modified, make up world-time, or as I abbreviated this idea above, that originary temporality is the explanatory core of world-time.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first I present and clarify Heidegger's phenomenology of world-time. Here I attempt to describe the way in which Dasein ordinarily and prereflectively encounters time. In the second and third sections I develop the thesis that world-time explanatorily depends upon originary temporality. I approach that thesis from two "sides," that of the understanding and that of the understood. From the side of the understanding, we shall explore Heidegger's

reasons for thinking that Dasein is able to experience world-time only because it is originally temporal. The argument proceeds by way of what Heidegger calls “the temporality of circumspective concern,” what I shall for short call “pragmatic temporality.” It claims, first, that in order to experience world-time, one must embody pragmatic temporality, and second, that in order to embody pragmatic temporality, one must embody originary temporality. The second of these two claims I shall call the “Pragmatic Temporality Dependency Thesis.” Pragmatic and originary temporality are temporal modes characteristic of the understanding. (They are manifolds of what we saw in Chapter 2 Heidegger calls “ecstases.”) From the side of the understood, we shall investigate Heidegger’s argument that world-time itself – and not just the experience of it – depends on originary temporality (or on its temporal schemata, as Heidegger calls them). I shall call this latter claim the “World-Time Dependency Thesis.” Let us start with world-time.

World-Time

Before we begin with details, a preliminary terminological note is in order. World-time is a sequence of times called “Nows.”¹ This sequence is a tensed sequence: at any time, one Now is Present, the rest are either future or past. Heidegger enshrines this indexicality (or tense-relativity) of world-time in the terminology he uses to talk about world-time: the Now is situated in the midst of “the formerly” and “the then.” Heidegger’s terminology is just a bit unsettled, but not in a way that will cause any serious interpretive problems. Mostly Heidegger uses “formerly” and “then” to pick out the past and future, but in one passage in *Being and Time* he states that these temporal adverbs are words Dasein uses in directing itself toward the past and future, which he here calls “the Earlier” and “the Later”:

¹ Heidegger uses “now” not just adverbially to specify the time current for some case of Dasein he is analyzing, but also as a distributive singular term (“the Now”) to designate the phenomenon that characterizes in a general way each world-time time and, relatedly, as a sortal (“one Now”). In the latter uses, I shall capitalize “Now,” as Heidegger does (because in the latter use it is a substantive). All this is complicated by the fact that much of Heidegger’s treatment of world-time is in “the formal mode,” analyzing our language of time, rather than “the material mode,” analyzing time itself. So Heidegger sometimes uses phraseology such as “every ‘then,’” which officially means every adverbial expression “then,” but usually aims to describe the world-time future as such. In translating his text, I shall respect his phrasing, and this will lead me not to capitalize “then” in such occurrences.

The horizon of the retaining that speaks itself out in the “formerly” is the “*Earlier*” [Früher], that for the “then” the “*Later on*” (“future”) [Späterhin (*künftig*)], that for the “now” the “*Today*” [Heute]. (*S&Z*, p. 407)

This would suggest that the ecstasy of retaining, which expresses itself in the adverbial language of “formerly,” is directed to the horizon of the Earlier; the ecstasy of awaiting, which expresses itself adverbially with “then,” is directed to the horizon of the Later on; and the ecstasy of enpresenting, which expresses itself adverbially with “now,” is directed to the Today. Heidegger does not stick too closely to this terminology: he seldom uses the language of “the Earlier” and “the Later on,” and he almost always substitutes “now” for “the Today.” (In *Basic Problems* he uses “then” and “formerly” to pick out what he here calls “the Earlier” and “the Later.”) I shall use the admittedly less elegant language of “formerly” and “then” so that my writing is consonant with Heidegger’s text.

Heidegger describes four central characteristics of world-time, namely, “datability,” “spannedness,” “publicness,” and “significance.” Let me treat them *seriatim*. It is worth noting in advance, though, that the philosophical tradition has not recognized all of these characteristics; it has overlooked significance altogether and has given short shrift to datability. The “leveled-off” version of time that the tradition has offered us is “the ordinary conception of time.” I take up the ordinary conception of time in Chapter 4.

Heidegger introduces the concept of *datability* (*Datierbarkeit*) thus:

Every “then” however is *as such* a “then, when . . . ,” every “formerly” a “formerly, when . . . ,” every “now” a “now, when. . . .” We call this apparently obvious relational structure of the “now,” “formerly,” and “then” *datability*. (*S&Z*, p. 407)

In other words, Dasein’s experience of the Now is not just of an abstract moment, but rather of a time when such and such happens. Jones’s everyday experience of the Present is of a “now that I am typing.” She thinks back to the time when she was eating lunch, the “formerly, when I was eating.” Every time is demarcated by some event that marks it as the specific time that it is. This time, the Present, differs from the previous time, the immediate past, in part because the dating event differs. It is now, that she types, and was formerly, when she was walking down the hall. Heidegger wants to emphasize that this datability is not “calendrical in the narrow sense” (*GP*, p. 371); that is, he does not mean simply that Dasein orders times according to a calendar, day by day, or even hour by

hour. Rather, the point is that in its everyday dealings in the world, Dasein relates to times as contentful, as "times, when *x*."

One apparent difficulty with this view is that it seems to require too many events in order to be able to describe the infinitely many times that elapse in every minute. Because every minute is divisible at least into sixty seconds, Dasein must be able to associate an event with each of these sixty seconds. But does Dasein experience so many events? Does Heidegger's theory entail that Jones must experience a Now, when she begins to twitch her arm, and a Now, when her arm moves two centimeters, and so on? To date times by referring them to events, the objection concludes, can in no way capture the full scope of times that exist, since Dasein simply does not experience that many events.

But Heidegger does not accept an antecedent view of which and how many times there are to be dated and then try to show that they can be dated by his account. Instead, his account purports to describe which times Dasein does in fact experience. That is, he offers us a phenomenology of the everyday experience² of time, a phenomenology that tries to show that the times that Dasein experiences are intrinsically dated by events. As the objection makes plain, however, this phenomenology does not reveal seconds, at least not normally, and certainly not nanoseconds, at least not normally.³ Heidegger does not deny that there are seconds, and that they are continuously ticking away while Jones's Now, when she types, elapses. This clock-time, as we can call it, is not world-time. In its daily activities Dasein does not usually experience clock-time, although in certain sorts of breakdown it can.⁴ As she types, she is absorbed in her thoughts and writing. She does not experience seconds at all. For her there is just the Now, when she types. The next time is for her the Now, when she goes home, or the Now, when she goes to the library.

The objection does point, however, to one consequence of Heidegger's

² As well as an account of our everyday language of time. He often refers to world-time as "time spoken out" and says that our understanding of time speaks itself out (*spricht sich aus*) in our words "now," "then," etc. Thus, he offers us an account of the use of these words as well. Therefore, Sellars is not far from the mark, when he writes, "for longer than I care to remember I have conceived of philosophical analysis (and synthesis) as akin to phenomenology" (1978, p. 170).

³ If a scientist is speaking of the events in an experiment she is conducting, and she says, "now the electrons are colliding," she is plausibly experiencing a nanosecond. Because Heidegger does not have a psychological theory of our confrontation with time, he need not postulate a mental state co-extensive in time with the event confronted.

⁴ When I discuss the ordinary conception of time in Chapter 4, I shall take up the situations in which the experience of time can "level itself off" into an experience of clock-time as such.

account of the Now: it is spanned. Heidegger calls this feature of the Now its “spannedness” (*Gespanntheit*):

Not only is the “during” spanned, but also every “now,” “then,” “formerly” has, along with the structure of datability, a spannedness of varying duration [*Spannweite*]: “now,” during the break, during supper, in the evening, in summer; “then,” during breakfast, while we climb, and the like. (S&Z, p. 409)

Every “now” lasts for a while. The Now, when Jones types, lasts from the formerly, when she was walking to the computer, to the then, when she goes to the library. She is now absorbed in her typing. But she types while prepared to go to the library, when she finishes. This Now, when she types, reaches out into the future and touches the then, when she goes to the library, and reaches back into the past, to the formerly, when she was walking to the computer. So, spannedness is actually a twofold feature of the Now: it is both the noninstantaneity of the Now, and the Now’s being extended *from* the Earlier *to* the Later. The latter is Heidegger’s phenomenological version of Aristotle’s claim that the Now stretches from the Before to the After.⁵

So, thus far we have seen that the experience of time, as Dasein is absorbed in the daily goings-on of life, is of a dated Now, a Now that has duration or span, and that lasts or spans from a formerly to a then. Although datability has been somewhat overlooked by the tradition, this much does not sit at odds with the traditional account of time. The feature of world-time that definitively sets it apart from the traditional account is *significance* (*Bedeutsamkeit*):

The current [*jeweilige*] “now, that this and that” is as *such* in each case *appropriate* and *inappropriate* [*geeignet und ungeeignet*]. (S&Z, p. 414)

Every Now is the right time for one thing, the wrong time for another. The right and the wrong time for what? He says,

Interpreted⁶ time has from the beginning the character of “time for . . .” [*Zeit zu . . .*] or “the wrong time for . . .” [*Unzeit für . . .*]. [Dasein’s everyday experience of time] . . . understands time in relation to an in-order-to, which in turn is finally pinned down by a for-the-sake-of of Dasein’s ability-to-be. (ibid.)

⁵ Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s treatise on time can be found in *GP*, §19a, pp. 327–61.

⁶ I shall show below why Heidegger uses the term “interpreted” here. It is a deliberate word choice.

We can understand the significance of world-times by way of the notion of “timing.”⁷ It is good timing is to do things when they fit the situation, bad timing to do them when they do not. In virtue of what is this the time to do α , but the wrong time to do β ? Heidegger says that the Now is always understood in reference to an in-order-to.⁸ In other words, since Dasein is always pressing ahead into some possibility (pursuing some for-the-sake-of-which), it understands the Now as either the right or the wrong time to work on this or that activity. If Smith understands himself as a baseball expert and is, thus, engaged in reading the *Bill James Baseball Abstract*, the Now shows up for him as the wrong time to do the dishes, but the right time to read. If while he is reading he realizes that he has to get to the daycare center, it becomes the wrong time to read, but the right time to get into his car. As he looks at his watch, he does not just see that the hands point to the “4” and the “6”; he sees that it is time to go to the car. Dasein does not usually experience abstract, contentless moments or Nows that must have an interpretation subsequently added to them but, rather, Nows that are significant, that is, Nows that are appropriate or inappropriate for certain activities.

The significance of a time for some activity could be constituted either instrumentally or conventionally. If Smith assigns himself to the task of lecturing, he thereby undertakes to walk to the lecture hall. Some time will then show up for him as the right time to leave his office.⁹ Which time

⁷ For an instructively different concept of timing, see John E. Smith's work on the topic (1969, 1986). Smith is concerned with the “*kairos*,” which is the singular, opportune moment for doing something. Thus, presidential candidates search for the opportune moment for throwing their hats in the ring (a lesson that should have been learned by the poor Republican candidate – was it Richard Lugar? – who threw his hat in the ring on the day of the Oklahoma City bombing). This notion of timing is both more “dramatic” than Heidegger's, because it pertains to turning points or critical moments and also is concerned with singular actions and their opportune moments, rather than with action-types and the appropriate times for them (this last point I owe to John Haugeland).

⁸ Note that Heidegger characterizes the assignment relation as “signifying” (*S&Z*, p. 87), and so time's association with an in-order-to makes it significant time.

⁹ Does he even further experience some time as the right time to lift his left foot (as he walks)? Probably not, although perhaps. If he has trouble walking (his left leg has fallen asleep), he might very well have to assign himself from the task of walking to the task of getting to the elevator, and thence to the task of lifting his left foot. Usually, however, being a master of the skill of walking, he experiences a time simply as the right time to walk to class. There need be no notion here of a basic action (smallest possible unit of action), although it is plausible to speak of actions experienced as basic. Richard M. Gale has suggested that one can use the notion of “recipe-basic.” An action is recipe-basic if the agent who performs it cannot provide a recipe for performing it (Gale 1971, p. 45). Heidegger could say that an action delimits the Now, if the agent would not (as opposed to cannot) offer a recipe for performing it.

that is depends greatly upon the extent of Smith's experience with navigating the local environment as well as upon Smith's skills. The rightness of the time is dictated nonetheless by instrumental considerations. Conventionally, Smith's task of lecturing is articulated and established as what it is by the community of agents with whom he shares his public world. As we saw in Chapter 1, there are norms that govern the behavior of lecturers and students, and even bystanders listening in to the lecture (e.g., "Do not talk in the doorway"). The lecturer is not supposed to belch, pick her nose, stand on her head, and so on, all else being equal. Norms govern activity conventionally, and these norms help define the complex of right and wrong times to do things. Thus understood, the appropriateness (both instrumental and conventional) of time is a pervasive feature of experience. Dasein confronts time as the right time to do some things, and the wrong time to do others.

The final feature of world-time is its *publicness* (*Öffentlichkeit*):

In their "primary" [*nächsten*] being-with-one-another several people can say "now" "together," while each dates the said "now" differently: now, when this or that takes place. The "now" that has been spoken out is said by everyone in the publicness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world. The time of current Dasein that has been interpreted and spoken out is, thus, always already *publicized* on the basis of Dasein's ecstatic being-in-the-world. (S&Z, p. 411)

In other words, Jones may currently be absorbed in writing, while Smith is absorbed in reading, but each can say "now" and understand the other. This may seem trivial, and indeed it is obvious as a piece of phenomenology, but it needs to be brought forth explicitly here, because Heidegger has tied down the dating, and hence one would assume the identity, of the Now to the current absorption of Dasein. When Smith says "now," he means "now, when I am reading." When Jones says "now," she means "now, when I am writing." Nonetheless, Heidegger claims that each can understand the other.

Heidegger argues that the publicness of the Now is possible on the basis of Dasein's being-with-one-another (S&Z, pp. 410–11). All of one's projects and for-the-sakes-of-which are part of a social world, a "with-world," according to Heidegger. There are two aspects to the sociality of this world. First, the community *institutes* practices.¹⁰ What counts as pursuing a certain activity, for example, lecturing, is determined by the com-

10 Recall the discussion of the institution of the world in Chapter 1.

munity. It is wrong (improper) to lecture by handing out beer and singing. These proprieties are not just convenient ways of avoiding harm or obviating insult (though they are often that too). They are norms that determine what it is, for example, to lecture. One can, on occasion, violate these norms. The norms must be in place in general, however, or there would not be enough regularity to make up a practice; that is, there would not be enough regularity for a cohesive society. These norms are enforced, as we saw, through correction. Second, agents' activities are *coordinated*. All human activities and projects take account of the place of others in them. Although writing is something that one often does alone, it is coordinated with the activity of others. It is often for others, or if not, it is to be hidden from others. It is in a language communally understood (typically), done on paper or computer disks bought from others, and so on. Activities, roles, and practices mesh with one another, not perfectly, but well enough that action is not too often in a state of breakdown or collapse due to failed coordination. This implies that others can understand one's actions as well. They know what one is doing, when confronted with it, and know how to act appropriately in response to it. Others can "take account of" what one does.

Because the activity of writing is socially constituted in these two senses, Smith can both monitor Jones's writing (censure her, for example, if she does it at the wrong time or in the wrong way) and can take account of it and its temporal features in his own action. Thus, when Jones says "now," Smith can understand how Jones dates the Now. His being-with accounts for her, that is, treats her as writing. He sees her sitting at her desk with pen and paper, has been socialized into understanding that to be how one writes, and knows how to behave appropriately in this context. Jones's saying "now" is public.

So for Heidegger the everyday experience of time is of the Now that spans from the formerly (the Earlier) to the then (Later on), which is dated by some event or activity in the world, which is significant in that it is appropriate or inappropriate for actions, and which is public, accessible to all. This time is clearly also a sequence of Nows, a formerly followed by a Now followed by a then. Let us look into the sequentiality of world-time a bit more thoroughly. We saw above that the Now spans from a formerly to a then. What is the nature of the Earlier from which the Now spans? My earlier example was this: Jones is now writing; this Now spans from her walking to the computer. But this latter time (formerly, when she was walking to the computer) is a Now also, but with one difference: it is no longer Present. Indeed, the formerly is the no-longer-Now. Although the

formerly is no longer, is not current, it still counts as a Now, because it shares the structure of the Now: "The 'formerly' harbors within itself the 'now no longer.' . . . The 'formerly' and the 'then' are understood together in terms of a 'now' . . . , " (*S&Z*, p. 406). The "formerly" itself is spanned (from a before-it to an after-it),¹¹ significant (it was the right time to walk), dated – perhaps by Jones's walking or by something Jones did or saw while walking – and public. Thus, it is structurally identical with the current Now; it just is not current.

This argument strikes right to the heart of the matter. For the everyday experience of time, every time, every Now, is structurally identical with every other. How do the many Nows upon which one can reflect differ? Past Nows are no longer now, future ones are not yet now, and the Present one is now. Also, they differ in their *content* (their dating and their significance).¹² So, everyday experience indeed encounters a sequence of Nows, although it is not the regular sequence of identical instants envisioned by the tradition, by the ordinary conception of time.

The Understanding of World-Time and Its Bases

What makes it possible for Dasein to encounter world-time? What is the form of understanding in virtue of which Dasein understands world-time? And what are the bases of that understanding? Heidegger's exploration of these questions leads him ultimately to the conclusion that Dasein is able to understand world-time, only because it is an originally temporal entity. Dasein's experience of world-time is grounded in its originally temporality. The argument for this conclusion requires several significant steps, which I want now to outline before setting into details. First, one understands world-time by reckoning with time. Time-reckoning is the mode of understanding in virtue of which Dasein is able to encounter and to understand world-time. Second, time-reckoning depends upon pragmatic temporality. Pragmatic temporality is the mode of understanding that gives Dasein access to the everyday, or what I shall call the "pragmatic," Now. Third, pragmatic temporality depends upon originally tem-

¹¹ Linguistically this is represented in the fact that the simple past tense is connected systematically to the past perfect and a "past future" (typically expressed through a subjunctive, e.g., "at 10 this morning Smith asked whether Jones would leave" or through a past progressive, e.g., "at 10 this morning Jones was going to leave").

¹² This is a tremendous difference from ordinary time. For the ordinary conception of time, the Nows or moments differ only in their mutual interrelations. Because Heidegger has built content into the Now, the Nows of world-time can differ also with respect to their contents.

porality (the Pragmatic Temporality Dependency Thesis). If all three of these claims are warranted, we may conclude that the experience or understanding of world-time depends upon originary temporality. And this demonstrates the dependency claim I aim to explore in this chapter “from the side of the understanding.”

The Experience of World-Time and Time-Reckoning

We have seen that world-time is the sequence of Nows that are spanned, dated, public, and significant. There are specific structures of human understanding that make it possible for us to experience such a sequence: *reckoning* is the form of understanding that is directed to world-time, Heidegger argues. Reckoning is a way of understanding fundamental to human existence and directly responsible for Dasein’s ability to engage with objects instrumentally. Let me first discuss reckoning in general and then turn to time-reckoning.

Reckoning. Reckoning is at the heart of what Heidegger calls “concern” (*Besorgen*). In my example from Chapter 1, Jones has assigned herself to being a simultaneous interpreter. Being a simultaneous interpreter is a public category, a for-the-sake-of-which that is instituted by and coordinated with the community around one. To be a simultaneous interpreter, Jones must do many sorts of things and abstain from others. She must speak clearly, translate accurately, and work in real time; she must show up to work at the appointed time and not miss important events. Because she has been given a certain event to work, she must turn up at it, not drift away mentally, and so on. She is concerned with the event, in Heidegger’s sense of “concern.” She is concerned with it by understanding it as a task that is, say, *in order to* fulfill her job contract. It is precisely this in-order-to relation that assigns her from the goal or task of fulfilling her contract to the task of working this event. And this task leads her to further tasks: finding the person to interpret, speaking clearly, and so on. She concerns herself with a task by trying to accomplish it. She is led to some particular way of trying to accomplish it by reckoning with it. To reckon with the event is to fit it into a nexus of tasks, abilities,¹³ and equipment, in such a way that she attempts to accomplish it.

One might call this reckoning “means-ends” intelligence, so long as one does not take this to mean “means-ends” reasoning in a more ex-

¹³ Abilities, because of course Jones aims to fulfill her job contract for the sake of being a simultaneous interpreter.

plicitly mentalistic sense. By no means does Jones always reflect on how to go about working the event. Sometimes, indeed often, she just does it (see Dreyfus 1991, chs. 4–6).¹⁴ She does it in virtue of the understanding that she has of interpreting, her understanding of how it fits in with other tasks, abilities, and equipment. Reckoning is not so much an activity, as a way of understanding: Dasein copes with the tasks and abilities around it by carrying them out by means of (other) tasks and pieces of equipment, and by doing this for the sake of some ability it has projected itself onto.

There are of course situations – all too many of them – in which Jones must explicitly reflect on her tasks and how to accomplish them. Let us consider an example. Breakdown situations occur, when Dasein's ongoing attempts to carry out a task fail and activity is interrupted.¹⁵ If Jones has assigned herself the task of finding her translatee and discovers that she cannot figure out who that person is, she has failed and is left standing before her task reflecting on how she might accomplish it. Sometimes she can anticipate a breakdown, and so she reflects in advance to head off the situation. For example, knowing that her translatee is shy, she digs up some intelligence on how to loosen him up: talk about trains, perhaps.

Heidegger has phenomenological accounts of these situations and Dasein's responses to them. Heidegger calls reflection upon one's task when it goes wrong and approaching it from a new angle “interpretation” (*Auslegung*). Planning ahead how to carry out one's task he calls “deliberation” (*Überlegung*):

All preparing, setting aright, repairing, bettering, filling out are accomplished by laying apart [*auseinandergelegt*] the circumspectively available [entity] and concerning oneself with what has become visible in accordance with this laying-apart. That which has been circumspectively laid apart with respect to its in-order-to, that which has been *explicitly* understood has the structure of *something as something*. To the circumspective question what this determinate, available [entity] is, the answer is given that interprets the entity circumspectively: it is in order to [or for]. . . . By circumspectively interpreting entities, dealing with what is intraworldly available “sees” this [entity] as table, door, wagon, bridge; it does not necessarily also already need to lay [entities] apart in a determining *assertion*. (S&Z, pp. 148–9)

¹⁴ How does one know *what* to do? One has been socialized into a normalized way of doing it. See Chapter 1's discussion of socialization and normalization.

¹⁵ Not all cases of failure are thus breakdown situations, because Jones is sometimes presented with situations of failure in which she need not actually stop to reflect. Perhaps she is practiced at dealing with obnoxious translatees, or with microphones that have gone dead, and she has developed (or been socialized into) ways of coping with these sorts of situations prereflectively.

When Smith fails to accomplish the task of stirring his pea soup with a wooden cooking spoon – say it breaks in the thick soup – he lays the spoon apart by seeing it thematically *as* a spoon, *as* something with which to stir.¹⁶ He then readjusts to the breakdown situation by looking around the kitchen. Perhaps he sees some other implement, a large carving knife, *as* something with which to stir. He has now laid the knife out as something with which to stir, and he then completes his task with his makeshift spoon.¹⁷

Things do not always go so smoothly, though. Sometimes one must reflect on the task more thoroughly. Readjusting by interpreting some other entity as able to play the role of the missing or broken piece of equipment will not always suffice. Sometimes deliberation is called for:

We call *deliberation* the specific, circumspectively interpretive bringing closer of what one concerns oneself with. The schema peculiar to it is the “if-then”: if for example this or that is to be produced, put to use, or prevented, then it requires this or that means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities. (S&Z, p. 359)

Since the plastic peg on his lamp, which holds the arm in place, has broken, Smith must figure out how he can put the lamp back to use. He reasons, *if* the arm is to be held in place, *then* he needs a hard piece of something, about an inch long. He looks around in his toolbox for something fitting this description, and he finds a screw. He interprets the screw as a substitute lamp peg. He has deliberated. This is a rudimentary form of planning ahead. What distinguishes it from interpretation is that Smith must stop to reflect not just on the equipment around him, but on how to get the job done. That is why Heidegger says that its “schema” is the “if-then.” Smith must figure out how to get from here to there.

Time-Reckoning. Reckoning takes these several forms: smooth movement about the assignment nexus, interpretation, and deliberation. We have

¹⁶ As opposed to the normal mode, which is simply to use the spoon, while probably focusing on the job that needs to get done.

¹⁷ Note that Heidegger hereby connects his conception of hermeneutics with his account of interpretation. Hermeneutics is the activity of rendering thematically explicit something that is embedded in meaningful activity, in the case of hermeneutic phenomenology something that also makes possible that activity. Hermeneutics is linguistic and not necessarily concerned with the practical relations that institute the means-end structure of the world. This distinguishes hermeneutics (*Interpretation*, *Interpretierung*) from the more basic phenomenon of everyday interpretation (*interpretation*, *Auslegung*).

seen how these various forms of understanding¹⁸ work themselves out, when the object of reckoning is a piece of equipment and its assignment to a task. But what is it to reckon with time? A caveat to the reader: I shall begin by describing time-reckoning phenomenologically. This description is tantamount to the converse of the claim centrally at issue here: if Dasein reckons with time, it will encounter world-time. What is ultimately to be established, however, is this: to encounter world-time, Dasein must reckon with time. In order to support the latter, central claim, all that is necessary is to show that some one aspect of the experience of world-time requires time-reckoning. To do this, I shall focus on the *significance* of world-time.

First, the phenomenology:

In using a clock to ascertain what time it is, *we say*, whether explicitly or not: *now* it is such and such [a time], *now* it is the right time to . . . , or there is still time to . . . , namely *now*, until. . . . Looking at the clock is grounded in and guided by one's taking-time-for-oneself [*Sich-Zeit-nehmen*]. What already indicates itself with the most elementary time-reckoning becomes clearer here: directing oneself *according to time* by looking at a clock is essentially *saying now*. (*S&Z*, p. 416)

Dasein reckons with time by arranging its tasks in time. Jones is an interpreter and a friend, which means that she is referred to the tasks of both abilities, say, being at this function and meeting Smith for lunch. In order to carry out both of these subsidiary tasks, Jones must arrange them in time. She cannot try to take care of both tasks simultaneously. They have to be placed carefully in the schedule, so that they are both doable. Jones thus assigns herself first to the lunch with Smith and then to the function she must work. She reckons with the timing of these events, and in doing so she makes 12:30 P.M. the right time to lunch with Smith 2:00 P.M. the right time to work the function. Ultimately this trail leads to equipment. In order to interpret this speech, Jones must turn on the microphone.

Thus, whenever Jones reckons with time, she encounters equipment and events. If it is the right time to start translating, and she carries this task out, then it is the time *when* she speaks into the microphone, or the time *when* she pauses for the speaker to begin a new line of thought. Time-reckoning involves experiencing not just significant but also dated times. Dasein can effect more precise methods of dating through interpretation and deliberation. In fact, given the complexity of the life Dasein typically

¹⁸ They are all, according to Heidegger, modes of understanding. Why? Because they are all modes of competence.

chooses to lead, it must engage in a lot of interpretation of and deliberation about time. For this reason, it has taken up the practice of *quantifying* and *measuring* time. It is important to see that for Heidegger time measurement is just a precise way of reckoning with time:

the essence of concern with time does *not* lie in the use of numerical determinations in dating. What is existential-ontologically distinctive about time-reckoning may not, therefore, be found in the quantification of time but, rather, must be conceived more originally in terms of the temporality of the Dasein that reckons with time. (*S&Z*, p. 412)

By wearing watches and giving them the precision of minutes and seconds, Dasein can juggle quite a few tasks into a single day. Clocks are simply a device Dasein uses to reckon with time, that is, to determine which times are the right times to *x*.

We have seen how time-reckoning directs Dasein to dated and significant time. But how are spannedness and publicness selected by time-reckoning? Recall the phrase that Heidegger uses, “taking time for oneself” (*Sich-Zeit-nehmen*). This word has a twofold significance. First, Dasein takes time for its tasks, that is, it appropriates time in order to carry out its tasks. In this sense, to take time is to assign it an appropriateness, to make it the right time to *x* and the wrong time to *y*. Second, Dasein must take time, because its tasks take time. One cannot interpret a speech in an instant; it takes time. For this reason, Dasein must take its time. The right time to translate is spanned.

This shows how time-reckoning leads us to experience a spanned, in the sense of a durative, Now. But what about the Now’s span *from* the Earlier *to* the Later? Once again, because she must arrange tasks during the day, so that she does one thing first, and another second, Jones confronts this Now as the time to eat lunch with Smith, and the next one as the time to catch a cab to the official function. Her Now spans from the one task to the next. This is a result of arranging several tasks in time. But what if one had only one ten-minute task to perform everyday and spent the rest of one’s day just relaxing in a nearly vacant state?¹⁹ In this case, 10:00 would be the time, say, to sweep the hall, and the rest of the day would be the time to sit on the sofa. Now, the right time to sweep would span from the formerly (the right time to sit on the sofa) to the then (the right time to sit on the sofa). There are right and wrong times even for

¹⁹ I am usually loath to consider seemingly frivolous counterexamples, but I think this one makes an interesting point.

internally unstructured playtimes. (The very word “playtime” is a testament to this fact.) So arranging tasks in time makes the Now the time that spans from the formerly (the right time to y) to the then (the right time to z). Time-reckoning directs Dasein to a spanned Now in both senses of “spanned,” namely, durative and spanning *from y to z*.

What of publicness? The world in which Dasein lives is essentially a with-world, that is, a world shared by others. Recall that this sharing has two dimensions, institution and coordination. In order to share the world in these two senses, taking time must be shared as well. If the audience is to show up at the same time as the speaker and the interpreter, there must be some *public* system of time-reckoning. The reckoning must be coordinated. Moreover, the one specifies which times are the right times to do standard things. The community institutes the rightness of some times. If Smith asks to schedule his lecture at 2:00 A.M., he will be corrected: one does not lecture at that time. Because the tasks carried out by Dasein are the tasks of a shared world, world-time must be shared. This lays down certain obvious constraints on what events can be used to date time. Smith cannot tell a student that he will hold his office hours when he feels like it, or when he thinks of Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, or anything like this. This would be a private dating system, which could not possibly satisfy the twin demands of sharedness, namely, communal coordination and institution.

Thus, since there is a basic practical requirement that Dasein arrange its tasks so that it can carry them out, it reckons with time. The time made accessible by this time-reckoning is spanned, public, datable, and significant. It is world-time. The essential feature of reckoning with x is to fit x into the structure of assignment relations by letting x be in order to y . Now, it might seem from §15 of *Being and Time* that it is only equipment (or paraphernalia, intraworldly entities defined by the tasks in which they are involved) that is in order to accomplish some task. If this is so, then it would follow that reckoning deals only with equipment. If this were right, and if the phenomenology explored above is right, it would seem that world-time is, therefore, a piece of equipment. But world-time is not equipmental. Rather, it belongs to the structure of the world:

As the right time to . . . , publicized time essentially has the character of the world. For this reason we call the time that is publicized in the temporalization of temporality *world-time*. And we do not call it this because it is *occurrent*²⁰ as an *intraworldly* entity, which it can never be, but rather, because it

20 The passage makes better sense if we read “occurrent” here to mean “occurrent in the broad sense.” See note 9 in Chapter 1.

belongs to the world in the existential-ontologically interpreted sense. (S&Z, p. 414)

The central feature of the world is that it comprises a nexus of assignments (*Verweisungszusammenhang*). The hammer is assigned to the task of hammering, pulling nails out, and so on. Hammering is assigned to other tasks, such as hanging pictures, building bookshelves, and so on. This entire network of tasks terminates in the for-the-sakes-of-which, upon which Dasein projects itself. Concern's purview is not limited to equipment or even to the available, and thus the extension of that purview to world-time does not imply that world-time is equipmental or even available.

All this is chiefly to explore the phenomenology of time-reckoning and thereby to introduce and clarify that concept. The central business at hand, however, is to support the claim that in order to experience world-time, one must reckon with time. To demonstrate this, we need only show that there is some one feature of world-time with which we could not plausibly be acquainted without time-reckoning. It is easiest to see how to argue for the assertion that it is through time-reckoning that times can be *significant* for Dasein. What makes 12:30 P.M. today the right time for lunch with Smith? Jones has to be back at work at 2:00 P.M., and it takes twenty minutes to get back to work. That makes noon a little early for lunch, assuming Jones typically aims for an hourlong lunch with her friends. Noon is the wrong time for lunch; it is wrongly timed, too early. Half past noon is the right time; it is timed properly. When Jones's colleague approaches her on the way to lunch and wants to talk shop, Jones knows, this is the wrong time to talk shop, because if lunch is pushed back, she will miss the 2:00 P.M. assignment. Jones thus experiences the time as the wrong time to talk shop. In virtue of what modes of understanding does Jones experience these times as significant? Clearly time-reckoning lies at the basis of her experience. Jones is coping with lunch and a job assignment, because she is reckoning with her daily tasks. And unless Jones were further reckoning with the times of these tasks, she would not encounter noon as the wrong time for lunch.

One might think that this example is biased in favor of the claim to be established. After all, it is an example that quite plainly involves fixing the significance of times by juggling a schedule. But what about more general features of significance, such as that lecture time is the wrong time to agonize aloud over what car to buy, or that dinner time is the wrong time to belch? The first of these would-be counterexamples is easier to cope

with than the second. It is fairly plausible that lecture time is the wrong time to agonize aloud over cars, just because doing so interferes with getting the task of lecturing done. This is analogous with Jones finding 12:15 P.M. the wrong time to talk shop: doing so would interfere with getting to lunch on time. But one might think that it is just plain inappropriate to agonize about consumer purchases during lecture, almost as surely as it is to agonize over one's family troubles. This renders the first would-be counterexample much like the second, that dinner is the wrong time to belch. It might seem there is no reckoning going on here: Dasein has just been socialized into a system of etiquette or mores, and these mores simply proscribe belching during dinner. But appearances are deceiving here. Smith assigns himself to the task of dinner. His self-assignment further assigns him to the tasks involved in dinner: preparing or buying it, setting the table, sitting down to eat, and so on. This navigation from the task of dinner to the subtask, say, of putting a plate at each place on the table, is a good example of what Heidegger means by "reckoning" or "concern." The same self-assignment that refers Smith to the task of setting the table refers him likewise to the task of not belching. Typically, Smith does not have to think about this task; he has been well reared, and it is second nature not to belch. But sometimes, perhaps, he has to work at the task, if, for example, his stomach is upset. The fact that Smith does not typically have to think about not belching does not entail that it is not a task. He refrains from belching in order to eat dinner appropriately. His self-restraint here is a matter of concern or reckoning, and its temporal dimension – that one does not belch *during* dinner – is time-reckoning.

Therefore, since Dasein encounters times as significant in virtue of time-reckoning, it must reckon with time in order to experience world-time. We have, thus, seen what Heidegger takes to be the foundation in our understanding for our ability to experience world-time: time-reckoning. This is the first of the three claims we need to establish that the experience of world-time is grounded in originary temporality. Next we must look into Heidegger's concept of pragmatic temporality to see how it lies at the basis of time-reckoning.

Pragmatic Temporality as the Basis of Time-Reckoning

Dasein's grasp of world-time is grounded in the enterprise of reckoning with time. Such reckoning is the arranging of tasks and activities within the series of dated, spanned, significant, and public Nows. The next stage

of Heidegger's analysis zeros in on the very grasp of a Now. In the discussion of time-reckoning, we took for granted that Dasein can grasp a Now. Pragmatic temporality – what Heidegger officially calls the “temporality of circumspective concern” – explains how Dasein can grasp that very Now. Note, by the way, that since the world-time future is the not-yet-Now, and the world-time past is the no-longer-Now, the grasp of the Now is not only essential to understanding the world-time Present, it is also essential to understanding the past and the future of world-time.

It is important to see that pragmatic temporality, whatever it turns out in detail to be, is modally indifferent between authenticity and inauthenticity. It is a common claim in the secondary literature that Dasein's reckoning is inauthentic.²¹ Typical reasons for holding this are these. First, as Heidegger often says, Dasein's reckoning is mediated by the one. This would imply that reckoning is inauthentic, only if mediation by the one inherently makes phenomena inauthentic. But it does not, as we saw in the discussion of normalization in Chapter 1.²² Second, the temporal structure of pragmatic temporality is a retentive-awaiting enpresenting (see *S&Z*, p. 353), and this latter structure is sometimes thought to be inherently inauthentic. Heidegger does occasionally suggest this (one might get this impression from *S&Z*, §65), but it does not represent his considered judgment in *Being and Time*. The argument embedded in this reason founders on a non sequitur, on reasoning from the consequent: in inauthenticity Dasein tries to understand itself by way of retentive-awaiting enpresenting (that is, it tries to understand itself as something available), and so inauthentic temporality can be characterized as a misguided retentive-awaiting enpresenting. But it does not follow that *all* retentive-awaiting enpresenting is inauthentic.

Positive evidence that reckoning is modally indifferent can be found in this passage from §69a on reckoning with equipment:²³

²¹ This claim is a natural partner of the idea that originary temporality is authentic. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the latter idea, as well as a list of some commentators who make it. Although natural partners, the claims do not entail each other. As far as I can tell, Pöggeler holds that pragmatic temporality is inauthentic, but not that originary temporality is authentic (1982, p. 85). This is consistent, albeit wrong (and hard to motivate).

²² See especially note 40 in Chapter 1.

²³ Insofar as interpreting reckoning as inauthentic is the natural partner of interpreting originary temporality as authentic (see note 21 in this chapter), evidence that supports the modally indifferent character of reckoning also indirectly supports the modally indifferent character of originary temporality.

We chose the using, handling, production of the available and their deficient and indifferent modes, that is, being-amidst what belongs to everyday needs, as exemplary phenomena of being-amidst. . . . The authentic existence of Dasein also holds itself in such concern – especially when it remains “indifferent” [*gleichgültig*] to it. (S&Z, p. 352)

Being-amidst is the third element of the care structure: it is our relation to the intraworldly, paradigmatically, equipment. Its temporal sense we shall see to be “enpresenting” (*Gegenwärtigen*), and ultimately, pragmatic temporality. Being-amidst is an essential element of the care structure; everything Dasein does involves reckoning with the world. Being a teacher requires using chalk or books or some object for teaching. It requires reckoning with time, in order to organize one’s lectures, and so on. Even a deeply meditative “mystic” sitting alone at the pinnacle of the Feldberg (a short hike from Heidegger’s ski hut in Todtnauberg) in the Black Forest would need to reckon with something: the ground to sit on, at least. This is just as true of authentic Dasein as it is of inauthentic or everyday Dasein (if everyday Dasein instantiates a third mode that is neither authentic nor inauthentic). Thus, authentic Dasein reckons. And how else could it be? No matter what specific content one gives to Heidegger’s notion of authenticity, one could never describe a case of Dasein that had no practical, reckoning interaction whatsoever with the paraphernalia of the world. Reckoning is not inherently inauthentic.

What is the temporal structure of our grasp of the Now of world-time? To elucidate this question, let me focus on reckoning with equipment. We shall see that the analysis can be easily extended to reckoning in general:

In the simplest wielding of a piece of equipment there lies letting-be-involved [*Bewendenlassen*]. The in-which of the letting-be-involved has the character of the for-which; with respect to this the piece of equipment is usable, or better, in use. The understanding of the for-which, that is of the in-which of involvement, has the temporal structure of awaiting [*Gewärtigens*]. Only by awaiting the for-which can concern at the same time come back to something, with which there is an involvement. The *awaiting* of the in-which in unity with the *retaining* [*Behalten*] of the with-which of involvement makes possible in its ecstatic unity the specifically manipulative enpresenting of the piece of equipment. (S&Z, p. 353)

Recall from Chapter 1 that the in-which of involvement is the task one aims to accomplish in dealing with the available. There is some confusion

in Heidegger's text surrounding the identification of the with-which of involvement. I take the with-which to be the wherewithal: the set of equipment and materials with which Dasein operates.²⁴ With this terminology on board, let us turn to Heidegger's phenomenology of the temporal framework of equipment use.

The most proper encounter with equipment is in using it, putting it to work. To put a piece of equipment to work, Dasein must let it play its pre-defined role in accomplishing the task. Dasein understands itself by projecting itself upon some self-understanding, some way of being that it pursues. Because Dasein has done this, it turns the focus of its activity to some task to be accomplished. Understanding herself as a teacher, Brown turns to lecturing to her students, and thence to *equipment*, for example, a lectern, a blackboard, chalk, a lecture hall, lights, and so on. Now, what is it to put the chalk to use in a task? It is to aim at bringing the task about, completing it, to look forward to the task's realization. Brown cannot put the chalk to use *now*, unless she aims at something in the *future*, namely the task's realization. This aiming into the future structures Brown's involved, practical use of the equipment. Heidegger's technical term for the prospective grasp of the task is *awaiting*. Brown *awaits* the completion of her task; she awaits having completed it.²⁵

Looking forward to a task is not the only requirement on using a piece of equipment; Brown must also rely on the wherewithal. As she writes on the blackboard, she finds that she has run out of room. She picks up the eraser and makes some room. She does not have to stop, make a plan for how to make room on the board, and then execute the plan. She would only have to carry out such a reflective procedure, if the eraser were not *already available*. This is the reason Heidegger, in his phenomenology of equipment use, says,

²⁴ Heidegger seems to be of two minds about the with-which (*Womit*). At *S&Z*, p. 84, where Heidegger originally introduces the with-which along with the language of involvement (*Bewandtnis*), he treats the with-which as the piece of equipment one wields. However, on p. 352 Heidegger indicates that the nexus of equipment or what we can call the piece of equipment's "co-equipment" (i.e., the other pieces of equipment that are involved along with the one currently in use) are the with-which of involvement. Developing the second line of thought, I have taken up a suggestion first made to me by John Haugeland, that we understand the with-which as the "wherewithal," that is, as what Dasein relies on in accomplishing this task with this piece of equipment. This includes the co-equipment, materials, supporting props, and so on.

²⁵ "Awaiting" sounds passive, but it is not meant to be. One should treat it simply as a technical term.

concernful dealings never maintain themselves amidst an individual piece of equipment. The use and manipulation of a determinate piece of equipment remains as such oriented to an equipmental nexus. When, for example, we look for a "mislaid" piece of equipment, the item sought is neither merely nor primarily intended in an isolated "act," but rather the circle of the equipmental whole is already pre-discovered. All "getting down to work" and handling of equipment does not strike an isolated, pre-given piece of equipment from nowhere, but rather in handling a piece of equipment, it comes from out of the work-world, which in each case is already disclosed, back to a piece of equipment. (*S&Z*, p. 352)

In other words, all dealings in the world require some wherewithal by means of which to execute the task, and this wherewithal most significantly includes the individual piece of equipment that Dasein wields and its co-equipment, which lies ready for it to turn to. This wherewithal must be *pre-given* or *already available*.

An individual piece of equipment cannot show itself in use, unless the wherewithal that defines it lies in the background; the wherewithal must already be there. This is not just to say that Brown must be situated somewhere, although this is true as well. The point is that the piece of equipment must be situated too. Now, what is it for Brown to encounter a piece of equipment as situated? It is for her use of it to rely on the wherewithal that makes up the current work-world. The wherewithal is what comes along with equipment, backs it up. She does not have to go through the circuitous process of making the eraser available anew, when she needs it; it is already available. She cannot put the chalk to work, unless the background wherewithal is taken for granted. So deploying a piece of equipment presupposes background wherewithal to be pre-given, already available.

Brown's relation to this background wherewithal is *retention*, in Heidegger's technical vocabulary. To retain is to bring along with, to maintain contact with. Its primary form in practical dealings in the world is *relying on* the wherewithal. For even if she does not now have to use the eraser, she is relying on it. She comports herself in such a way that she can use it, if she wants to, or if it becomes appropriate to do so. Heidegger underscores that he does not mean to say that Brown must thematically remember the eraser: "But also the retention of that with which there is an involvement does not signify a thematic holding fast [of the with-which]" (*S&Z*, p. 353). Brown's retention of the wherewithal is not a cognitive grasp on the just past, although that might be present too, but rather a practical *reliance*

on the wherewithal. Reliance on wherewithal is not, primarily and usually, a cognitive affair: the entire time Brown is in the classroom today, she might not even ever either explicitly or implicitly think about, attend to, or perceive the wherewithal. She just relies on it.

So she awaits or looks forward to the task she aims to complete, and she retains or relies on the wherewithal. Without these elements of retaining and awaiting, the use or deployment of a piece of equipment would not be possible; without the objects of the awaiting and the retaining, that is, without the tasks and wherewithal, the pieces of equipment would not be possible at all.

The third element of the structure is the actual use or deployment of a piece of equipment. To deploy a piece of equipment is to grasp it from out of its equipmental whole and turn it to the task one awaits. This is to bring it into current use, to use it now. One *en-presents* the piece of equipment. The only way to make the piece of equipment the object of one's current use is to use it, to make it present to one's current manipulation. Thus, awaiting, retaining, and enpresenting (that is, looking forward to a task's realization, relying on the wherewithal, and deploying a piece of equipment) are inextricably bound up with one another.

This is the pragmatic temporality of equipment-use: awaiting a task, enpresenting equipment, and retaining the co-equipment. This is, furthermore, more broadly the temporal structure of activity insofar as Dasein is absorbed in work, insofar as it reckons. In reckoning with tasks themselves, and not just equipment per se, Dasein looks forward to the realization of a task, enpresents the object of its concern, and relies on wherewithal (now to be thought of more generically). When Smith assigns himself to attaching the second shelf on his bookshelf, he looks forward to the realization of the overall project of building the bookshelf, and he relies not only on his tools, but also on the tasks he has already completed, for example, the construction of the frame of the shelf. When Jones jumps into the cab to find her way from lunch with Smith to her job, she looks forward to accomplishing the task of interpreting her subject during a speech and relies on not only many kinds of equipment, but also on her prior preparation of the subject material (learning any technical terms in advance, for example) and her prior planning of the day's activities. Reckoning is in general awaiting-retaining enpresenting.

Reckoning with the available requires pragmatic temporality. But what of time-reckoning and *its* relation to pragmatic temporality? Pragmatic temporality makes possible Dasein's understanding of world-time, be-

cause world-time is based on its understanding of the pragmatic Now. Pragmatic temporality is the understanding of the fundamental structure in terms of which world-time makes sense. By way of interpretation this fundamental structure (the Now) becomes elaborated into the world-time sequence of Nows. It is when Dasein must reckon with time by interpretation that world-time comes more broadly into view.

Consider the following phenomenological question: How can world-time be the way in which time shows up in our ongoing, everyday activity, if it is a sequence of Nows, and if everyday activity is a form of absorption in work? After all, if one is absorbed in work, one does not confront a sequence of Nows. Other Nows are not at issue. As Brown lectures, absorbed in her task, there is only the Now, when she lectures, and its boundaries, the formerly and the then. The time that she encounters in working is the basic framework of the Now. On the basis of this structure she copes with her task and the time it takes to pursue it. But often she must deal with time less smoothly, in breakdown. In breakdown she must interpret time itself (not just equipment and tasks), and world-time is the structure of this encounter with time. Before proceeding to details, let me justify my claim that Heidegger sees world-time this way.

First, the connection between world-time and pragmatic temporality can be seen in that world-time is called “the time with which we are concerned” (*die besorgte Zeit*). There are two sections of *Being and Time* on world-time: §§79 and 80, “The Temporality of Dasein and Concern with Time” (*Die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins und das Besorgen von Zeit*) and “The Time with Which We Are Concerned and Intratemporality” (*Die besorgte Zeit und die Innerzeitigkeit*). We are *concerned* with time, and the temporality of concern is pragmatic temporality.

Second, Heidegger describes world-time as “interpreted” (*ausgelegte*) time. Why? That world-time is the framework that manifests itself in breakdown and, hence, is the temporal framework arrived at through interpretation clearly explains why Heidegger would call world-time “interpreted” time. Heidegger writes, “Awaiting-retaining enpresenting interprets *itself*” (*S&Z*, p. 408). Awaiting-retaining enpresenting is, as we have seen, the structure of pragmatic temporality; it experiences the Now that spans from the formerly to the then. Under what circumstances would this pragmatic structure interpret *itself*? When the understanding of time that confronts the pragmatic Now breaks down. This suggestion is also supported textually by the sorts of activity that Heidegger associates with world-time:

As concerned reckoning up, planning, providing, and preventing, it [concern] always already says, whether aloud or not: “*then*” – that should take place, “*before*” – that is done with, “*now*” – that is repeated, which “*formerly*” went wrong and got away. (S&Z, p. 406)

Reckoning up (or calculating, as in settling a bill), planning, making provisions (looking out for the future), preventing (or averting) – these are all forms of interpretation. When Brown is absorbed in smooth, ongoing work, she does not do this. It is only when “felt difficulty” arises, when breakdown occurs, or when action does not achieve its goals, when it has problems, that she does these sorts of things.

What then is the relation between pragmatic temporality and world-time? Pragmatic temporality is the understanding of the Now and its two boundaries, the formerly and the then. While absorbed in work, Brown *looks forward* to the completion of her task. The future shows up for her as the future in which her work is done. Also, she *uses* the tool *before her*. She encounters it in person; it is present to her. Her Present is the Present in which she wields this tool. Finally, she relies on the wherewithal that is *already* available to her; she maintains its availability. Let us trace how this structure becomes an awareness of a whole sequence of Nows in the mode of world-time.

While absorbed in lecturing, Brown does not heed a then, three hours hence, when she drives home. She is not distracted by these other events, other times. But what happens when her activity suffers interference? We saw that Dasein responds to interference with either interpretation or deliberation. While lecturing, a (maladjusted) colleague enters the room to ask Brown whether she wants to get coffee afterwards. This breaks in upon Brown’s activity and brings her explicitly to confront this Now as the wrong time to arrange a coffee, the right time to lecture. Given the surprising and disrupting situation, Brown quickly interprets the Now as the right time to shoo the colleague away, perhaps by saying, “Let’s talk later,” and as she does this she aims her action at getting to the then, when she is lecturing again. So Brown becomes explicitly aware of the Now as the wrong time to make a coffee appointment, the right time to drive her colleague away, and as pointing to the then, when she is lecturing again. She has interpreted time, and a small slice of the world-time has come into view.

As she interprets time, she is not absorbed in her work, confronted only by the Now of her work. Her interpretation takes aim at this Now and

other times as well, times hence and times past, all of which she interprets so as to get lecturing going again. By interpreting the then, when the colleague is gone (i.e., when she has accomplished the task of driving her colleague away), as a then, the right time to return to lecturing, she interprets the then in the full structure of the Now adumbrated above in connection with world-time. It is dated and significant, for it is *when* the colleague is gone and the *right time* to return to lecturing. Because it is significant, it is in order to do something, here lecture, and because lecturing takes time, it is spanned. It is spanned from *its* formerly, when the colleague was bothering her, to *its* then, when the class is over. Finally, all this is public, humorously available to all the students in the class. Thus, the act of interpretation opens up to view a future Now.

Sometimes, however, the breakdown is more severe than in this scenario, and Brown must engage in deliberation, not just interpretation. This full-scale reckoning, examples of which I gave above, directs itself to a more substantial sequence of Nows. There are even cases in which one must direct oneself to one's whole life, when buying life insurance, or when losing one's job, for instance. Here it is essential to see only that deliberation and interpretation are of a kind. Deliberation is more comprehensive than interpretation; it responds to a more substantial threat to ongoing activity. (It is typical of deliberation to direct itself toward fairly articulated sequences of Nows.) The basic features, however, are the same.

We can now comfortably proceed to reasons for believing the second step of the overall argument of this section of the chapter, viz., that time-reckoning requires pragmatic temporality. The dependence of time-reckoning upon pragmatic temporality is twofold. Reckoning with time is reckoning with Nows, and pragmatic temporality is the fundamental capacity through which the framework of the Now is available to Dasein. We have seen that the Now with which time-reckoning deals is the Now that is dated, spanned, significant, and public. These are also features of the Now of pragmatic temporality, as we have seen. But this is no coincidence, for time-reckoning concerns itself with this current Now in which Brown works. And when world-time comes broadly into view, pragmatic temporality interprets, or even deliberates about, the Now and its position in world-time.

World-time is thus a sequence of pragmatic Nows, which shows up for Dasein in interpretation, when time-reckoning interprets (and deliberates about) the Now. But even when smoothly coping with the Now and

its position in world-time, time-reckoning is dealing with the pragmatic Now, which is made available to Dasein by pragmatic temporality. Therefore, reckoning with time depends on pragmatic temporality.

The Derivation of Pragmatic Temporality from Originary Temporality

“Because Dasein exists essentially as thrown and falling, it interprets its time in the manner of time-reckoning” (*S&Z*, p. 411). In chapter 4²⁶ of division 2 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger centrally argues that pragmatic temporality is derivative of originary temporality. What is the relation of derivation that holds between pragmatic temporality and originary temporality? Heidegger lays down the basic claim in §65 of *S&Z*:

So, when we have shown that the “time” that is accessible to Dasein’s intelligibility is *not* originary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic²⁷ temporality, we are justified, in accordance with the proposition, *a potiori fit denominatio*, in labeling *temporality*, which has just been exhibited, *originary time*. (*S&Z*, p. 329)

Heidegger’s basic pattern of argument is that pragmatic temporality “arises out of” (*entspringt aus*) originary temporality. But what is the force of this claim? Perhaps, in a rather straightforward sense, that pragmatic temporality depends on originary temporality: there could be no pragmatic temporality without originary temporality, yet there could be originary temporality without pragmatic temporality? I shall call this putative relationship between pragmatic temporality and originary temporality “simple dependence.”²⁸

Can the thesis of simple dependence be maintained? Let us consider the two future dimensions: pressing ahead into the for-the-sake-of-which

²⁶ But note that the sentence just quoted occurs in chapter 6 of division 2.

²⁷ Recall my discussion of Dahlstrom’s interpretation of Heidegger in Chapter 2.

²⁸ William Barrett objects to Heidegger at this point: “[I]t is just this derivative status accorded to the flow of time [pragmatic temporality] that we must now question. . . . It is the contention of this paper that the three tenses [Barrett’s term for originary temporality] are the tenses they are because time does flow; and, conversely, that if time did not flow, there would not be the three tenses” (Barrett 1968, pp. 363–4). For Barrett to respond to Heidegger’s thesis of the derivativeness of pragmatic temporality by arguing that there could not be originary temporality without it presupposes that what Heidegger means by that thesis is that there could not be pragmatic temporality without originary temporality, but not vice versa. Hoffman makes another well-worked-out attempt along these lines: “But, on the other hand, Dasein’s coming face-to-face with the ultimate meaning of its Being – with finite temporality – demolishes the entire significance of the ordinary world and hence also the significance of commonsensical time” (Hoffman 1986, p. 78).

and awaiting the task. Simple dependence in this case would entail that one could not await tasks, unless one pressed ahead into abilities. Heidegger does argue for this claim. Tasks are in part defined teleologically by the abilities in which they, in turn, serve. Hammering is a task that typically serves, *inter alia*, in the larger task of building bookshelves, which in turn serves in one's ability to be a carpenter, or a homeowner, or whatever. It is through this complex network of further tasks and for-the-sakes-of-which that the task of building a bookshelf gets its place and meaning; unless one were pursuing one of these for-the-sakes-of-which, one would not be building a bookshelf. To build a bookshelf in part *is* to press ahead into one of these for-the-sakes-of-which. It is true that there could be no pragmatic future without the originary future.

So perhaps simple dependence is vindicated? No, for it is just as true that one could not press ahead into abilities, unless one were also trying to accomplish tasks. One must look forward to the realization of some task, if one is to take up and throw oneself into some for-the-sake-of-which, some ability-to-be. One cannot throw oneself into being a teacher without taking up the tasks assigned to that ability, either lecturing, or grading, or supervising, or discussing. A person who does none of those things, who pursues none of the tasks that serve in being a teacher, is not a teacher, does not understand herself as a teacher. So there could be no originary future without the pragmatic future. The dependence is symmetrical. *Simple dependence does not hold.*

This argument is so simple that one wonders how anyone could have attributed simple dependence to Heidegger. But the problem here lies with some of Heidegger's incautious formulations. In *Basic Problems*, for example, he explains the originariness of the originary future thus:

If we await any happening, we always comport ourselves in our Dasein in some way to our ownmost ability-to-be. That very thing that we await may be any event, any process at all; even so, in the awaiting of the process itself our own Dasein is always co-awaited [*mitgewärtigt*].²⁹ (*GP*, p. 374)

Here he argues that the originary future is the "origin" of the pragmatic future, because Dasein could not pragmatically await without also, as he says here, "co-awaiting itself," that is, without pressing ahead into abilities.

²⁹ "Co-awaiting oneself" is Heidegger's term in *Basic Problems* for the originary future. It is a terribly misleading term, however, for it suggests that the pragmatic and originary futures are of a kind. They are not. Note my general principle, explained in the Note on Sources, that one must in general take the formulations of *Being and Time* to defeat those in the lectures.

Thus, here Heidegger argues for the originariness of originary temporality by claiming that there could be no pragmatic temporality without it. But the “no *x* without *y*” claim only grounds an *asymmetrical* relation of derivation, dependence, or originariness, if the “no *x* without *y*” pattern is also asymmetrical. Clearly, however, it is not. So Heidegger’s claim here is at best misleading.

What then is the relationship that Heidegger calls “derivation” or “arising out of”? Although the pragmatic future and the originary future mutually require each other (simple dependence does not hold), the originary future *explains* the pragmatic future. Recall that “*Because* Dasein exists essentially as thrown and falling, it interprets its time in the manner of time-reckoning” (*S&Z*, p. 411, my emphasis). This relationship can rightly be called “dependence,” although it is not simple dependence.³⁰ We may now formulate the Pragmatic Temporality Dependency Thesis more carefully thus:

The Pragmatic Temporality Dependency Thesis: *Pragmatic temporality depends explanatorily upon originary temporality.*

In what way does originary temporality explain pragmatic temporality? Let me focus first on the explanatory dependence of the pragmatic future upon the originary future. The pragmatic future is teleological in character: one is looking forward to, or aiming at the completion of, the task in which the equipment serves. This teleology of the pragmatic future derives from the teleology of the originary future. Why does Smith aim at the completion of the task of building this bookshelf? Because he is pressing ahead into the ability to be a carpenter.

To deepen and explore the explanation that Heidegger offers us here, let me work through an objection to it. One might object³¹ to what I have just written that I show here only how one particular for-the-sake-of-which explains one particular pragmatic end, not how originary teleology explains pragmatic teleology. That is, one might object that my explanation

³⁰ In the *Categories*, chapter 12, Aristotle may make room for dependence by nature, even when two phenomena mutually imply each other with respect to existence (1963, 14b9, pp. 39–40). The extra condition is that one phenomenon cause the other. Rather than causation, we have here explanation. Actually, by “cause” Aristotle may well mean “explain,” as some have argued (Hocutt 1974). If this reading is accurate, then Heidegger’s conception of dependence here is quite close to this form of priority or dependence by nature in Aristotle. (I write that “Aristotle *may* make room,” because Alfonso Gomez-Lobo has warned me that the passage in the *Categories* is problematic and may not mean what it seems to my untutored eye to mean.)

³¹ An anonymous reviewer for the Press did so object.

operates at the wrong level of analysis. To drive the point home, one might add³² that in order to develop an explanation at the right level of analysis, Heidegger (or I) would have to show that nothing can have a pragmatic end without having a for-the-sake-of-which (that is, that there can be no non-Daseinian teleology). And that is a tall order indeed!

This objection makes three subtle errors, which when exposed can help to clarify Heidegger's account. First, the objection mistakes the kind of dependence that is at issue in the explanation. The objection assumes that Heidegger's claim

(1) That Dasein has for-the-sakes-of-which explains why it has particular ends

is to be analyzed thus:

(2) Having particular pragmatic ends requires having for-the-sakes-of-which.

But to clarify (1) by way of (2) is to understand the dependence of the pragmatic future on the originary future as *simple dependence*, for it is to assume that having pragmatic ends requires having for-the-sakes-of-which, but not vice versa. After all, if the requirement relation is not asymmetrical, then it cannot ground an asymmetrical dependence relation, as we saw above. And as we have seen, despite some of Heidegger's incautious formulations, this simply *cannot* be what he means to demonstrate, for the requirement relations here are symmetrical.

Second – and to see this error, we must ignore the first error – the objection assumes that (2) further implies that

(3) Nothing can have pragmatic ends, unless it also has for-the-sakes-of-which.

That is, the objection assumes that the dependence articulated in (2) would disable *anything* from having a pragmatic end, unless it also had for-the-sakes-of-which. In other words, it would allow us to claim that cats do not have pragmatic ends, because they do not have for-the-sakes-of-which. They are not Dasein, do not participate in the many structures that allow Dasein to have for-the-sakes-of-which, and so they cannot aim at any concrete, pragmatic end. This might seem difficult to prove, for it broaches the entire, murky, complex question of animal teleology, and to many it

³² The anonymous reviewer did so add.

might also seem impossible to prove, because false. After all, surely my cat Peanut aims at the pragmatic end of eating the nesting robins on my porch. But Heidegger need not deprive Peanut of his pragmatic teleology here. All he needs for his argument here is to show that *Dasein* cannot aim for particular ends, unless *it* presses ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which.³³

Third, the objection assumes that to show that pragmatic futurity depends upon originary futurity, Heidegger must argue for more than simply the generalization of the example I presented immediately prior to considering this objection. That is, because my example (of Smith and his bookshelf) was arbitrary, we may generalize it thus: *Dasein* aims for the pragmatic ends it pursues, because it presses ahead into the for-the-sakes-of-which by which it understands itself. This generalization articulates that pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which explains pursuing pragmatic ends by *selecting* them. Now, need Heidegger demonstrate anything more than this? The objection seems to suppose that there would have to be something more to the dependence of pragmatic on originary teleology than this. But what more could there be?

One might think that the general features, originary and pragmatic teleology, must be tied together into a special dependence relation that exceeds the dependence articulated in the generalization in the previous paragraph. But why would this be so? Are the features somehow free-floating properties looking for substances in which to inhere? Are they qualities waiting to splash onto objects? Clearly not: originary teleology just is *Dasein*'s pressing ahead into some for-the-sake-of-which, and pragmatic teleology just is *Dasein*'s aiming to accomplish some pragmatic goal.

Perhaps the objection supposes merely, in a somewhat outdated vocabulary, that originary and pragmatic teleology are faculties, and the particular aimings in the Smith example are acts of those faculties, and that, further, Heidegger must show the dependence of the pragmatic upon the originary faculty and not just the dependence of the acts. But to import a faculty-act distinction here, and to reify the faculties into things requiring independent explanations, is to treat *Dasein* as something occurrent. It is

³³ In any case, since *Dasein*'s pursuit of pragmatic ends is integrally bound up with its self-understanding by way of for-the-sakes-of-which, and presumably feline teleology is not, *Dasein*'s pursuit of pragmatic ends is quite a different sort of phenomenon than feline teleology. As I argued in my review (1991) of Mark Okrent's superb *Heidegger's Pragmatism* (1988), trying to build *Dasein*'s teleology out of animal teleology is misguided, because *Dasein*'s teleology is surely quite unlike animal teleology.

to proceed as if there are boxes or containers (the faculties)³⁴ into which for-the-sakes-of-which can be tossed, and then to ask how one container depends on the other.³⁵

The critic might next try to shed the outdated and misleading vocabulary of faculties and argue, instead, that what needs to be shown is that *that Dasein pursues pragmatic ends at all* is explained by *Dasein pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which*. This much, however, can safely be granted, for it follows from the generalization that my argument does support. After all, for each pragmatic end, Dasein would not pursue it, unless it pressed ahead into some for-the-sake-of-which. Thus, unless it pressed ahead into some for-the-sake-of-which, Dasein would not pursue any pragmatic end. Therefore, that Dasein pursues pragmatic ends at all is explained by its pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which. I can find no way to spell out the critical intuition without importing optional ontological presuppositions that Heidegger would reject.

So, what precisely is the explanatory dependence on which Heidegger relies? Pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which (in general) explains pursuing pragmatic ends (in general), because the former selects the latter. Its pressing ahead explains why Dasein pursues the ends it does. Significantly, this explanation makes sense, even though it is true that the two aimings require each other. Dasein *could* not press ahead into its for-the-sake-of-which, unless it also pursued the pragmatic ends involved in that for-the-sake-of-which, and vice versa. The explanation, however, relies on the claim that Dasein *would* not pursue the pragmatic ends it does, unless it were pressing ahead into the for-the-sakes-of-which by which it understands itself. The for-the-sakes-of-which select the pragmatic ends, and not vice versa. If we ask, Why does Smith aim to build a bookshelf? the answer is something like, He understands himself as a carpenter, and that for-the-sake-of-which refers him to building a bookshelf. The converse does not work: Why does Smith understand himself as a carpenter?, answered by, He is building a bookshelf, and that project refers him to

³⁴ This analogy suggests a connection with Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle's treatise on time (*GP*, §19a, pp. 327–61). Aristotle describes time as a sort of container of objects. Aristotle's description already treats time as a sort of entity, as a thing, rather than as a structure of the being of entities. This is part of the reason why Heidegger rejects it. Perhaps the objection I am considering here is unwittingly relying on an Aristotelian approach to time.

³⁵ Note that this distinction is different from the distinction between an ability and its exercise. The faculty putatively in view here is the faculty by which Dasein has the abilities it does in the first place. Thus, my defense here does not contradict the many places in which I appeal to the distinction between an ability and its exercise.

understanding himself as a carpenter. Its failure does *not* rest upon Smith's ability to understand himself as a carpenter without pursuing *any* pragmatic ends, but rather upon the way in which self-understanding selects pragmatic ends, and not vice versa.

Thus, the crux of Heidegger's claim turns on this thesis:

- (1) The teleology of the originary future explains the teleology of the pragmatic future.

This is the first thesis that we can analyze out of Heidegger's more general thesis that pragmatic temporality is derivative of originary temporality. The derivation is explanation, even though the two phenomena are mutually dependent in the sense that each requires the other. The specific nature of the derivation relation in the case of the future is that the originary future explains the teleology of the pragmatic future.

What are the derivation relations in the cases of the past and Present? Consider the past. The discoveredness of things as reliable is explained by the way things matter to Dasein:

Earlier we said: the world, which has already been disclosed beforehand, lets intraworldly entities encounter. This prior [*vorgängige*] disclosedness of the world, which belongs to being-in, is co-constituted through affectivity. Letting encounter is primarily *circumspective*, not merely a sensing or staring. Circumspectively concerned letting-encounter has – as we can now see more sharply on the basis of affectivity – the character of being touched [*Betroffenwerdens*.³⁶ But being touched by the unserviceability, resistance, threateningness of what is available is ontologically possible only by being-in's being so determined in advance that intraworldly encountering [entities] can *matter* to it. This ability to have things matter to Dasein is grounded in affectivity, as which it has disclosed the world, for example, in terms of threatenability. Only what is in the affectivity of fear, or fearlessness, can discover the environmentally available as threatening. The attunedness of affectivity existentially constitutes Dasein's openness to the world. (*S&Z*, p. 137)

The disclosedness of the way things matter to Dasein involves a discoveredness of wherewithal or equipment as (un)serviceable, (un)steady, or put generically in the language I used above, (un)reliable, and the latter discoveredness is necessarily an aspect of the former disclosedness. That Smith discovers the nails as already there to be relied on while he

³⁶ See note 26 to Chapter 1.

hammers is explained by his caring about the abilities into which he presses ahead.

(2) The given determinacy of the way for-the-sakes-of-which matter explains the given determinacy as (un)reliable of the wherewithal of equipment use.

That the for-the-sakes-of-which already matter explains why the wherewithal already matters.

As in the preceding discussion, Heidegger is not claiming that Dasein's for-the-sakes-of-which could matter to it, while intraworldly entities did not. He is not claiming a simple dependence of pragmatic upon originary mattering. Rather, originary mattering (the way Dasein's for-the-sakes-of-which matter to it) explains by selecting pragmatic mattering (the way intraworldly entities matter to Dasein). Again, if we ask, Why does Smith rely on his work tools? we may answer by pointing out that his self-understanding as a carpenter appeals to him as vigorous, or worthy, or exciting. Reversing this explanation yields non-sense.³⁷ Although Smith's for-the-sake-of-which *could* not matter to him without intraworldly entities mattering to him too (and vice versa), the intraworldly entities *would* not matter to him, unless his for-the-sake-of-which mattered to him (but *not* vice versa).

Finally, what about the mode of the Present? Recall that in Chapter 2 I deferred the discussion of the originary Present until Chapter 3, because (I indicated) the originary and pragmatic Presents would turn out to be so deeply intertwined that trying to untangle them would wreak havoc. So, in looking into the pragmatic Present, we shall also be spelling out, for the first time, the originary Present.

What is the originary Present? To understand the nature of the originary Present, and of the dependence of the pragmatic Present on it, we must turn to §68c, where Heidegger investigates the "temporality of falling," that is, the mode of originary temporality that structures falling and being-amidst. What does he say there about the originary Present?

Perceiving [Vernehmen] in a broader sense lets the available and occurrent encounter "in person"³⁸ in themselves with respect to their look [*hinsichtlich*

³⁷ We cannot answer the question Why does Smith's self-understanding as a carpenter appeal to him as vigorous? by answering, Smith relies upon his work tools.

³⁸ The German word here is "*leibhaftig*" (the scare-quotes are Heidegger's). Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "bodily" to try to get at the roots of the word, but it means something more like "in person." Kersten translates it as "in person" in his translation of

*seines Aussehens]. This letting-encounter is grounded in a Present. It gives the ecstatic horizon within which entities can be *present* in person [leibhaftig anwesend]. (S&Z, p. 346)*

This matches pretty well the less informative statement he makes in §65:

Resolved being-amidst what is available in the situation, that is, letting what is environmentally *present* encounter in action [*handelnde*], is only possible in an *enpresenting* of the entity. (S&Z, p. 326)³⁹

So the originary Present is Dasein's practical, circumspective reckoning, paradigmatically with equipment, insofar as it is engaged in action.

But this is curious. Recall Heidegger's characterization of the pragmatic Present:

The *awaiting* of the in-which in unity with the *retaining* of the with-which of involvement makes possible in its ecstatic unity the specifically manipulative *enpresenting* of the piece of equipment. (S&Z, p. 353)

What is the difference? Both the originary Present and the pragmatic Present seem to be an *enpresenting* (letting be present in person) insofar as Dasein goes about business. This overlap in Heidegger's expositions of what we should expect to be two different notions of the Present, the originary and the pragmatic, is accompanied by an unparalleled overlap of terminology: he uses the same word ("enpresenting") to pick out the two modes of the Present, whereas (in *Being and Time*) he uses different terms for the differing forms of the two other modes ("coming-toward-itself" or "future" versus "awaiting," and "coming-back-to" or "beenness" versus "retaining"). In fact, the identification is much stronger: in the little two-page introduction to §69, he writes,

The Interpretation of the temporality of circumspective, as well as theoretically concerned, being-amidst *intraworldly* entities, entities that are

Husserl's *Ideas* (see p. 327). Husserl uses it to get at the nature of originary givenness, that the object is given as really and truly being there, in person, not as having been there, as seeming to be there, nor by way of a representative. Heidegger quite likely intends to refer back to Husserl's discussion.

39 This passage is somewhat complex, because Heidegger here addresses the conditions of the possibility of *authentic* or *resolved* action. The point is, though, that such action is only possible in an *enpresenting*, which is the originary Present. Thus, he continues: "Only as the *Present* in the sense of *enpresenting* can resoluteness be what it is: undistortedly letting what it grasps in action be encountered." In other words, it cannot be this undistorted use of equipment, unless it is that as the originary Present, that is, *enpresenting*. Recall the argument of Chapter 2 that §65 attempts to step back from the conditions of the possibility

available and occurrent, at the same time shows how this same temporality is already in advance the condition for the possibility of being-in-the-world, in which being-amidst *intraworldly* entities is in general grounded. (S&Z, p. 351)

That is, the temporality of circumspective concern (pragmatic temporality) is the condition for the possibility (i.e., the temporal sense) of being-amidst. But the condition for the possibility of being-amidst should be the originary Present, should it not? After all, originary temporality is supposed to be the sense or temporal interpretation of care, and being-amidst belongs to the care-structure. Why do Heidegger's descriptions and terminology overlap for the Present? Indeed, why does Heidegger just about identify the two modes of the Present?

Our clue here is provided by Heidegger's discussion of the Present in §69c:

Existing for the sake of itself in its abandonment to itself as thrown, Dasein is at the same time enpresenting as being-amidst . . . The horizontal schema of the *Present* is determined through the *in-order-to*. (S&Z, p. 365)

The originary Present opens up the entire field of the *in-order-to*. That is, the *in-order-to* encompasses both the *with-which* (the wherewithal) and the *for-which* (the task), for the object of our reckoning serves along with the wherewithal in the task. The *in-order-to* is the entire relational whole that binds together the *with-which* and the *for-which* and thereby structures an actual reckoning, paradigmatically again, a use of a piece of equipment. So according to the passage above, originary enpresenting is directed at this entire relational whole. Thus, the awaiting and retaining that help to make up pragmatic temporality are moments of enpresenting. *Pragmatic temporality turns out to be an elaboration of originary enpresenting.* This leads us to

The Embeddedness Thesis:⁴⁰ *Pragmatic temporality is one element (the Present) of originary temporality.*

Let me elaborate on the Embeddedness Thesis. The originary Present is the temporal sense of Dasein's being-amidst the intraworldly. What is it to be originally confronted, for example, by a piece of equipment? To

⁴⁰ Margot Fleischer (1991) has also noted the closeness of the connection between pragmatic temporality and the Present ecstasy of originary temporality. On p. 59 she comes near to seeing the Embeddedness Thesis. Her analysis leads her instead directly to the idea that Dasein is "in" time like anything else: that its life runs its course in time. This is both true and important, but there is more to be learned by looking closely at §§68c and 69.

wield it, to use it for getting a task done. This use of the equipment involves retaining the wherewithal of the activity and aiming for the realization of the task in which the equipment serves. Thus, the originary Present (enpresenting) is engagement with *all three dimensions* of pragmatic temporality. Recall that the future of pragmatic temporality borrows its teleological character from the future of originary temporality, and that the past of pragmatic temporality borrows its given determinacy as mattering from the past of originary temporality. But the past and the future of pragmatic temporality still belong inherently to the structure of the in-order-to, and this structure is revealed in the originary Present. Thus, the entire pragmatic framework belongs to the originary Present.

There is an additional level of complication here. The structure from the awaiting to the retaining is the understanding of the Now. But it is essential to the Now that it is part of a sequence of Nows. An understanding of a sequence, however, is in no way represented in the structure depicted here. To get the understanding of a sequence, Dasein must interpret the structural unit that ranges from the awaiting to the retaining as *iterated*. It must understand the object of awaiting, for instance, as a time whence a future Now departs; it must understand the object of retaining as a time whither a past Now ends. That is, it must apply the very same structure of awaiting-retaining enpresenting to what is awaited and retained; it must understand the horizons of realization and retention as themselves Nows. Another way of looking at the iteration point is this: one may say “when my task is done,” because one aims to realize the task in some then, a not-yet-Now. But one may not say (according to Heidegger’s account) “when I have pressed ahead into this ability,” because the originary future is not later than the originary Present; it is not a not-yet-Now. The concept of *when*, of temporal position, is a concept proper to time-reckoning. The Now is always the Now, when one reckons with such-and-such item. One can say “when my task is done,” because the awaiting of the task iteratively applies the entire framework of the in-order-to to the awaited and retained. The awaiting is directed to another Now. And the same holds *mutatis mutandis* of the past.

Heidegger expresses the notion of iteration in §79, where he actually derives world-time (and pragmatic temporality) from originary temporality:

If awaiting, in understanding itself in the “then,” interprets itself and hence understands what it awaits in terms of its “now,” then the “and not yet now” lies in the “declaration” [*Angabe*] of the “then.” (*S&Z*, p. 409)

In §69a he writes that in pragmatic temporality enpresenting “leaps away from” (*entspringt*) and dominates the other modes of temporality.

Rather, [letting-be-involved] constitutes itself in unity with an awaiting retaining, so much so, that the enpresenting that leaps away from them makes possible the characteristic “absorption” of concern. (S&Z, p. 354)

Heidegger is here playing with the word “*entspringen*.” It is hard to translate this word in these passages, for it can mean either (or both) “arise out of” and “leap away from” (in the sense of freeing itself from).

Heidegger’s discussion of inauthentic temporality in §68c exploits this double meaning. For example, when working with the notion of curiosity, which Heidegger interprets as the relentless search to experience something new, he describes the *entspringen* of enpresenting from awaiting:

Curiosity is constituted through an irritated [*ungehalten*] enpresenting, which by only enpresenting, thereby seeks to escape from [*entlaufen*] the awaiting in which it is nonetheless “contained” [*gehalten*] as irritated [*ungehalten*]. The Present “leaps away from” [*entspringt*] the awaiting that belongs to it and does so in the sense of escape that we have emphasized. (S&Z, p. 347)⁴¹

He fills this in by interpreting the awaiting that goes along with enpresenting as a “leaping after” (*nachspringen*) the Present. He concludes, “through the awaiting that leaps after, enpresenting is more and more abandoned to itself” (*ibid.*), and then later,

The characteristics of falling that we have described . . . mean, with respect to their temporal sense, that the enpresenting that “leaps away” seeks, according to its ecstatic tendency, to temporalize from out of itself. (S&Z, pp. 347–8)

In inauthentic temporality, awaiting is understood as a kind of enpresenting. This makes the enpresenting dominant in such a way that Heidegger refers to inauthentic temporality as an “awaiting-retaining enpresenting” (*gewärtigend-behaltendes Gegenwärtigen*).

In pragmatic temporality as well enpresenting dominates retaining and awaiting.⁴² How? Awaiting and retaining are understood as *also* having

⁴¹ I thank Toni Koch for his help in translating this passage.

⁴² I have mixed the discussions of curiosity and circumspection, even though the former is clearly inauthentic and the latter is modally indifferent. I interpret inauthentic temporality as the attempt to understand oneself in terms of the temporal framework of reckoning.

the form of enpresenting. They are directed to a not-yet and an already, but the not-yet is understood as a not-yet-*Now*, and the already is understood as an already-*Now*, that is, a no-longer-*Now*. This is the view expressed in the passage from *S&Z*, p. 409, quoted earlier. So, the characteristic features of pragmatic temporality arise from the originary Present insofar as it applies the entire framework of awaiting-retaining enpresenting to what is awaited and what is retained, that is, insofar as awaiting and retaining are understood as kinds of enpresenting.

Heidegger's word-play with "*entspringen*" tends to obscure, especially in translation, his account of the "origin" of pragmatic temporality. Heidegger characterizes the dependence of pragmatic upon originary temporality as the former *arising out* of the latter. This arising, this dependence, is precisely the pragmatic Present's leaping away from and dominating the other modes of originary temporality. The Embeddedness Thesis and the concept of iteration articulate how pragmatic temporality is dependent on originary temporality. It is not just that one could not be pragmatically temporal without being originally temporal. Simple dependence is not the claim. Rather, Heidegger argues that originary temporality explains pragmatic temporality. Pragmatic temporality is a fragment or phase of originary temporality, but one whose complete explanation demands reference to the elements of originary temporality. This is true simply insofar as pragmatic temporality is the originary Present. It is more interestingly true insofar as the originary future explains the pragmatic future, and the originary past explains the pragmatic past. Enpresenting applies itself to its own internal, futural and past horizons (to the pragmatic not-yet and already) so as to yield an experience of a sequence of *Nows*.

The Derivation of World-Time from Originary Temporality: The World-Time Dependency Thesis

Let us grant that Dasein's ecstatic ability to encounter world-time depends upon originary temporality by way of pragmatic temporality. But is it also true that *world-time itself* depends on originary temporality? Is the World-

that is, in terms of pragmatic temporality. So, inauthentic temporality is Present-dominated, because pragmatic temporality is Present-dominated. It is true that §68c is mostly concerned with inauthentic temporality, and this is, I must admit, evidence for a different approach to the entire issue, one according to which originary temporality is authentic and pragmatic temporality inauthentic in such a way that the origin of the latter in the former may be explained by appeal to Dasein's flight from anxiety and death. I shall consider this issue explicitly at the end of this chapter.

Time Dependency Thesis true? Is there a dependency “on the side of the understood” as well as “on the side of the understanding?” Heidegger thinks so:

So, when we have shown that the “time” that is accessible to Dasein’s intelligibility [viz., world-time and ordinary time] is *not* originary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic temporality . . . (*S&Z*, p. 329)

*the thrownness of Dasein is the ground for there “being” time publicly.*⁴³ In order to secure the intelligibility of the proof [*Nachweis*] of the origin of public time out of factual temporality . . . (*S&Z*, p. 412)⁴⁴

first we are to understand that temporality, as ecstatic-horizontal, temporalizes something like *world-time*, which [in turn] constitutes the intratemporality of the available and occurrent. (*S&Z*, p. 420)

Just as with the dependence relations on the side of the understanding, the relations on this side are not relations of simple dependence. They are explanatory relations. We may formulate the World-Time Dependency Thesis thus:

The World-Time Dependency Thesis: *World-time depends explanatorily upon originary temporality.*

As I indicated in Chapter 2, Heidegger’s view is that originary temporality makes up the explanatory core of world-time. That is, world-time can be analyzed into a set of conceptual moments, each of which can be seen to be a modified version of some feature of originary temporality. Moreover, that the modified conceptual moments that make up world-time should obtain together as a unity, and thereby constitute world-time, can be explained by interpreting world-time as a derivative of originary temporality. World-time is a modified, and therefore dependent, version of originary temporality.

It is time now to explore the modification that allows world-time to be interpreted as a version of originary temporality. Let me first reason backwards (from world-time to originary temporality) to *describe* the modification. World-time is a sequence of dated, spanned, significant, and public

⁴³ “*die Geworfenheit des Daseins ist der Grund dafür, daß es öffentlich Zeit ‘gibt.’*” One might think that Heidegger is speaking here only of why public time is there *for us*, why it is *given to us*, and therefore, that he is only referring to the derivation on the side of the understanding. But the verb “to give” is playing a different role here. Heidegger uses it to avoid saying “time is.” See note 54 in the Introduction.

⁴⁴ I am unsure just why facticity and thrownness are emphasized in this passage.

Nows. These Nows have an internal structure: they are times in which Dasein reckons with something in order to accomplish some task and by relying on some wherewithal. The accomplishing and the relying are sequential relations: one points into the world-time future, and the other points into the world-time past. If we strip the sequentiality out of this Now we are left simply with purposiveness and determinate mattering. Further, what comes of the datability, spannedness, significance, and publicness of the world-time Now, if we strip sequentiality out of it?

- *Datability* – the Now is the time, when . . . – loses its connection to temporal position. The dating of the Now ceases to place the Now into an ordered sequence, this Now before that one. The dating becomes, therefore, simply the connection of the Now to an intraworldly event that defines it. It becomes, in short, being-amidst.
- *Spannedness* – that the Now spans from a formerly to a then – ceases to connect the Now to an earlier and a later Now. The span is reduced to an intrinsic connection between being-amidst this event (what remains of datability) and the originary teleology (what remains of pragmatic teleology, after sequentiality has been abstracted out) and the originary, given determinacy (what remains of pragmatic, given determinacy) that contextualizes it.
- *Significance* – that the Now is the right time to do x – ceases to aim the Now into a then, when this task is complete, because the Now no longer spans to a then. This dating event is no longer appropriately subordinate to a later dating event, but rather, being-amidst (what remains of the dating event) serves appropriately in the originary teleology (what remains of pragmatic teleology).
- *Publicness* – that the Now is accessible to all – does not undergo, so far as I can tell, any significant modification by stripping sequentiality out of the Now.

We can, thus, see that originary temporality comprises a set of core features – public, originary teleology, given determinacy, and being-amidst, in their intrinsic unity – that when modified (by sequentiality) make up the defining features of world-time.

With this analysis on board, we can see how Heidegger's argument must run: Heidegger aims to explain why world-time consists of the conceptual moments that make it up – why there are those conceptual moments, and why they obtain as a unity – by interpreting world-time as a derivative of originary temporality. It is not just a brute fact that world-time is what it is. It is what it is *because* it is a derivative of originary

temporality. Recall that I interpret a crucial passage on p. 329 of *Being and Time*, namely,

So, when we have shown that the “time” that is accessible to Dasein’s intelligibility is *not* originary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic temporality, then we are justified, in accordance with the proposition, *a potiori fit denominatio*, in labeling *temporality*, which has just been exhibited, *originary time*. (*S&Z*, p. 329)

to mean that world-time can be analyzed into a set of conceptual moments that can in turn be explained as modified elements of originary temporality. Originary temporality can thereby be seen to be the source of time *insofar as it is time*. And this is why Heidegger calls originary temporality “originary time.” He expresses himself at greater length and with somewhat greater clarity in *Basic Problems* (in a passage I quoted in part in Chapter 2):

The comprehension [*Auffassung*] of time as a sequence of Nows does not know the origin of this time out of originary time and overlooks all the essential moments [*Momente*] that belong to the sequence of Nows as such. According to ordinary understanding, time is in itself a free-floating sequence of Nows. It is simply there; one must recognize its givenness. Now that we have characterized temporality in a rough way, the question arises, whether we can let the sequence of Nows explicitly arise out of [*entspringen*] temporality, and let it arise with respect to its essential structures – significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. If time as the sequence of Nows is temporalized out of [*aus*] originary temporality, then *these structures must be ontologically intelligible in terms of the ecstatic-horizontal makeup of temporality*. . . . If it is possible – if it is even necessary – to show that what one generally knows as time arises out of what we have characterized as temporality, then the designation of what ordinary time arises out of as originary time is thereby justified. Why do we further designate the unity of the future, beenness, and the Present in this originary sense as time? Is it not something else? The question is to be answered negatively, as soon as one sees that the Now, then, and formerly are nothing other than temporality that speaks itself out. It is only for this reason that the Now is a characteristic of *time*; it is only for this reason that the then and the formerly are *time-like*. (*GP*, pp. 379–80)

Originary temporality is originary time, because originary temporality explains world-time’s essential features, datability, significance, spannedness, and publicness. Heidegger puts this point here in especially strong

terms, for he says that the Now and world-time are only time, because they arise out of originary temporality.

Heidegger undertakes the explanatory project in §79, chapter 6 of division 2, "The Temporality of Dasein and Concern with Time." This section thus promises, according to its title, to examine the connection between originary temporality and time-reckoning. It also provides enough material, however, to construct the explanation of the putative connection between world-time and originary temporality. In this section Heidegger often expresses his points on "on the side of the understanding," but in *Basic Problems* he more directly puts his points on the other side. Let us construct the detailed explanations of each of the features of world-time *seriatim*.

Datability. Heidegger asks, "*to what does such datability essentially belong, and wherein is datability grounded?*" (S&Z, p. 407). This is a funny question. In fact, it is not at all clear what could even count as an answer. Heidegger is aware of the strangeness of the question, for he follows it up thus: "Can we ask any more superfluous question than this one?" (ibid.). What would make this question *superfluous*, rather than *unintelligible* or too murky? It would be superfluous, if the answer were obvious, or if the question asks for an explanation where none is sensibly to be expected. Thus, Heidegger suggests that for common sense the answer is obvious: time just is the framework in which things occur and, so, show up for us. Heidegger:

"As everybody knows," by "now, when . . ." we mean a "point in time" [Zeitpunkt]. The "now" is time. It is undeniable that we understand the "now – when," "then – when," "formerly – when" also in such a way that they are connected with [zusammenhängen mit] "time." (S&Z, p. 407)

Essentially, common sense would just reject the question: time *simply is* datable. That is what it is to be time, to be the Now. Events occur in time, and so events date times.

But Heidegger offers an answer to the question, and the iterativity framework adumbrated above will help us to understand his otherwise opaque answer. He writes,

Why does Dasein also express, though mostly without uttering it, a "now, when . . .," "then, when . . .," "formerly, when . . ." whenever it addresses the entities with which it is concerned? Because interpretively addressing . . . co-expresses *itself*, that is, co-expresses *being-amidst* the available, which circumspectively understands the available and discoveringly lets the available encounter, and because this interpretive addressing and discussing

that co-expresses *itself* is grounded in an *enpresenting* and is only possible as an *enpresenting*. (*S&Z*, pp. 407–8)

To be a time, when . . . , is to be a time, when a certain event happens or a piece of equipment is used. Dasein's being amidst intraworldly things explains the dating of a world-time Now in terms of some happening or equipment-use. Why is this the time when the food is served? Because Dasein goes about business in the world in a definite manner so as to be amidst food. That is, because Dasein goes to eat lunch now, and the serving of the food is what it is concerned with. At any given time infinitely many events are taking place, and a great many of them are directly or indirectly accessible to Dasein. Yet this is the time when the food is served, not the time when the light flickers, not the time when the man in line ties his shoe, etc. Why? Because Dasein is now concerned principally with lunch, not with lighting or shoes. Because Dasein is concerned with lunch, it is amidst the intraworldly entities that are caught up in the task of lunching. Being-amidst is Dasein's opening up to intraworldly entities, and this opening up explains how time is dated. Heidegger sums the explanation up thus:

The *datability* of the “now,” “then,” and “formerly” is the *reflection* of the *ecstatic* makeup of temporality and *for that reason* it is also essential to the time that has been spoken out itself [i.e., to world-time]. The structure of the datability of the “now,” “then,” and “formerly” is evidence that *the latter* [viz., world-time] *is itself time from the stem of temporality*. (*S&Z*, p. 408)

One might object that times can be dated by happenings that are not caught up in Dasein's ongoing enterprises, and thus that Heidegger's explanation of datability fails. For example, as the food is served, a person screams loudly, disturbing and distracting everybody in the restaurant. Throughout the rest of lunch, Smith, Brown, and Jones all refer back to that scream. “Do you remember when that guy screamed? Well, just before that Jones had argued that . . .” A time in this scenario is dated by an event that appears to be uninvolved in the enterprise of lunching. But appearances are deceiving here. The scream is involved in the lunching enterprise precisely as an interference. The scream stopped everyone in their verbal and physical tracks; it was an obstacle. Being an obstacle is a deficient mode of being involved in a task.⁴⁵ Thus, even in this case time is dated by the being-amidst that belongs to the manifold of originary temporality.

45 See Heidegger's discussion of obstinacy (*Aufsässigkeit*), *S&Z*, pp. 73–4.

Spannedness. Heidegger writes,

Awaiting-retaining enpresenting only interprets [time in terms of] of a spanned “during,” because it is thereby disclosed to *itself* as the ecstatic *stretchedness* of historical [i.e., originary] temporality, even if this disclosedness is unknown to it. (*S&Z*, p. 409)

As we saw earlier in this chapter, since Jones's Now is a Now in which she uses this piece of equipment to accomplish this task, it stretches or takes time from the encounter with the piece of equipment to the realization of the task. This span of the pragmatic Now is to be explained in terms of the “ecstatic stretchedness” of “historical temporality.” In other words, originary temporality has a property that Heidegger calls “stretchedness,” and this property explains the stretch or span of the use of equipment from the with-which to the task.

What is the *stretchedness* of originary temporality? Heidegger introduces the terminology in his chapter on historicality (chapter 5 of division 2), but we need not actually look there.⁴⁶ In *Basic Problems* Heidegger explains the span/stretch of the Now in terms of the *unity* of the three ecstasies of originary temporality:

In every spoken [*gesagtem*] Now spannedness is spoken too [*mitgesagt*], because in the Now and the other time-determinations an enpresenting expresses itself, which temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with awaiting and retaining. In the ecstatic character of temporality there originally already lies a stretchedness, which enters along with it into the time that has been spoken out. Insofar as every awaiting has the character of a toward-itself [the originary future] and every retaining the character of a back-to [the originary past], . . . and insofar as every toward-itself is in itself a back-to, [originary] temporality is *in itself stretched* as ecstatic. Temporality is, as the primary outside-itself, stretchedness itself. (*GP*, p. 382)

How does the unity of originary temporality explain this stretch? We saw in Chapter 2 that the three “ecstasies” of originary temporality are necessarily united; they come as a package deal. We have also seen that the originary future (the not-yet of abilities) explains the pragmatic future (the not-yet of tasks), and that the originary past (the alreadiness that characterizes the way things matter to Dasein) explains the pragmatic past

⁴⁶ That is a good thing for my interpretation too, because I take historicality to be what results, if originary temporality is placed in time. Thus, the ontological genesis of historicality requires intratemporality, which in turn requires ordinary time (if the argument to be examined in Chapter 4 is right). Therefore, historicality could not explain world-time.

(the alreadiness of the wherewithal's making a difference). Because the originary Present, thus, requires the originary future and originary past, and these in turn give rise to the pragmatic future and pragmatic past, in order to be what it is the originary Present requires the pragmatic future and pragmatic past. "On the side of the understanding," one cannot encounter equipment (in the Present) without retaining wherewithal as reliable and looking forward to the task. In other words, it is not just a brute fact that the pragmatic Now spans from a no-longer-Now to a not-yet-Now, and not just a brute fact that pragmatic temporality involves, along with the wielding of the equipment, a prospective anticipation of realizing a task and a retentional grasp on what is reliable and what not. In order to do anything, Dasein must project itself onto a for-the-sake-of-which, and it must pursue a task in order to do that: the enpresenting of equipment requires that Dasein pursue a task. Similarly, Dasein must find itself already caring about its for-the-sakes-of-which, if it is to do anything, and caring about these demands that it be sensitive to the hindering or promoting significance of equipment: the enpresenting of equipment requires that Dasein be sensitive to the significance of equipment for its task.

"On the side of the understood," we may ask, Why does the Now stretch at all? One might answer, Because the events that date it are not instantaneous. But this is no answer, because it does not clarify why these events are not instantaneous. So let us ask more specifically, Why does the Now stretch to a then, when the task is accomplished, and from a formerly, as the task got underway? That is because the Now is the time of Dasein's engagement with the world and the intraworldly entities within in. The stretchedness of the world-time Now is explained by originary temporality's uniting into one manifold the task, the use, and the wherewithal. The then is kept distinct from the current Now, yet also linked to it, by being the goal of the Now's striving. Similarly, the formerly is kept distinct yet united, by being the point of departure of the Now's striving (the point at which one relies on the wherewithal). Originary temporality explains the differentiated unity of these phenomena and, thus, why the Now stretches from a formerly to a then. The Now is spanned, because originary temporality is ecstatically manifold, yet unified, that is, ecstatically stretched.

Significance. The explanation of significance is much simpler. Recall that Heidegger says, "the horizontal schema of the *Present* is determined through the *in-order-to*" (S&Z, p. 365). The originary Present just is Da-

sein's encounter with the intraworldly, and this encounter discovers entities as serving in tasks (as *in order to* tasks). And as we have seen, Dasein can discover entities as serving in tasks, only because it itself aims for some for-the-sake-of-which. It is this connection of encountering the intraworldly with self-projection onto for-the-sakes-of-which that marks the Now as the right time to do *x*, and the wrong time to do *y*: these appropriatenesses are derived from the relation of the originary Present to the originary future. It is this connection within originary temporality that leads Heidegger to say that the schema of the Present is the *in-order-to*. Dasein expresses this schema by saying such things as "now is the right time to drive in the nail."

Publicness. Heidegger's explanation in *Being and Time* of the publicness of world-time is compressed. He writes,

As disclosed, Dasein exists factically in the manner of *being-with* others. . . . The time of current Dasein that has been interpreted and spoken out is, thus, as such in each case already publicized on the ground of its [Dasein's] ecstatic being-in-the-world. (*S&Z*, pp. 410–11)

This passage suggests, rather vaguely, that because originary temporality ("ecstatic being-in-the-world") is determined by *being-with*, world-time is public. In *Basic Problems* he expresses the idea a little more thoroughly:

The Now and every time-determination that has been spoken out is *publicly accessible* for the understanding of everyone in *being-with-one-another*. This moment of the publicness of time is also grounded in the ecstatic-horizontal character of temporality. Because the latter is in itself outside itself, it is as such in itself already disclosed and open for itself according to the directions of its three ecstases. Thus, every Now that has been said, spoken out, is immediately and as such known by everyone. The Now is not any odd thing, which only this person or that could somehow come across, not something that one person could know about and another not; rather, in the *being-with-one-another* of Dasein itself, i.e., in common being-in-the-world, there already lies the unity of temporality itself as something open for itself. (*GP*, p. 382)

This passage makes rather clearer that Heidegger intends to argue that *being-with* implies the publicness of originary temporality, and that publicness is then inherited by derivative world-time. This, then, boils down to the explanation I gave earlier in this chapter for the publicness of world-time. In introducing the publicness of world-time, I showed how Heideg-

ger believes that the demands of social institution and coordination that apply to Dasein's activities carry over into the Now. In Chapter 1 I emphasized the social constitution of the teleology and mattering of Dasein's activities and, thus, of Dasein's originary temporality. Heidegger's thesis is, therefore, this: the Now is public, because originary temporality is public, and originary temporality is public, because Dasein's activity is essentially constituted by being-with-one-another.

If the arguments work thus far, they would show that world-time can be interpreted as a modified version of originary temporality, what comes of originary temporality, if its features are sequential. But why should those features be sequential? The imposition of sequentiality upon originary temporality so as to constitute world-time is absolutely central to the explanation offered above, and so, unless that imposition of sequentiality is itself explained by originary temporality, the explanation is incomplete. Without it sequentiality remains an unexplained, explanatory residuum in Heidegger's account. Since it is doing the work in the modification of originary temporality into world-time, the modification would, therefore, itself be unexplained. And if the modification itself remains unexplained, then we have no explanation at all! Therefore, we must see how originary temporality is supposed to explain sequentiality.

Sequentiality. It is notable that Heidegger does not list sequentiality along with datability, spannedness, significance, and publicness as a distinct feature of world-time. But of course it is, and as the preceding analysis has shown, sequentiality lies at the foundation of the distinction between originary temporality and world-time. Given how important sequentiality is, therefore, it might strike one as odd that Heidegger does not list it and discuss it directly. The explanation for this peculiarity of the text is, I believe, that Heidegger associates sequentiality especially closely with spannedness, and as we shall see, his analysis of sequentiality can be found in his treatment of spannedness. We can find a powerful rationale for the organization of Heidegger's analysis here. Insofar as one thinks of spannedness as being the Now's span *from the Earlier to the Later on*, spannedness all but is the successiveness of world-time. Successiveness as such is a simpler concept than spannedness: to be successive, world-time Nows need not be durative; they could all be punctal or instantaneous. But spannedness (as Heidegger is thinking about it) is the *successive duration* of the Now, its span from the Earlier to the Later on.

At the beginning of his discussion of spannedness in §79 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes,

If awaiting, in understanding itself in the “then,” interprets itself and hence understands what it awaits in terms of its “now,” then the “and not yet now” lies in the “declaration” [*Angabe*] of the “then.” Enpresenting awaiting understands the “until then” [*bis dahin*]. Interpreting Articulates this “until then” – namely, it “has its time,” as the *in-between* [*das Inzwischen*], which at the same time has the relation of datability. (*S&Z*, p. 409)

Heidegger frames the explanation of sequentiality here in terms of what I earlier called “iteration”: awaiting awaits a Not-yet-now, because it interprets the then as another Now. It reapplys the framework of the Now to the object of its futural orientation. This is about all that Heidegger says here, and so he does not give us too much to go on. We are forced, therefore, to use only what we have and to extrapolate an explanation of sequentiality in terms of iterativity from our earlier discussion of this issue.

What would Heidegger's explanation of sequentiality in terms of iteration be? Sequentiality is the successiveness, the “one-after-the-other-ness,” of world-time Nows. Iteration is the proposed structure wherein the *terminus ad quem* of the current Now, the then, when the task has been accomplished, is itself a Now, with its own datability, spannedness, significance, and publicness. To explain sequentiality in terms of the iteration of the originary Present, Heidegger thus must present some reason why the originary Present would iterate. If we can see why it would, we can see how it would “give rise to” a sequence of world-time Nows. We have seen that the stretch of the world-time Now is to be understood in terms of the unity of originary temporality. The stretch to the *terminus ad quem* of the Now is explained by the originary future's giving rise to the purposive direction toward the task. How can we understand why that purposive direction to the task should iterate? That is, *why should that terminus ad quem itself have a future then relative to it*, given that we must here understand the then, the *terminus ad quem*, purely in terms of its status as object of purposive striving? (That is all we have a right to assume at this point.) In order to answer this question, we must have some reason to think the originary future would impose a further pragmatically futural reference onto the *terminus ad quem*, so that it would itself have a task to which it is purposively directed.

The reason for which we are looking may well be this: the originary future imposes a structured, chainlike teleology on tasks. For-the-sakes-of-which generate entire chains of tasks, so that Brown writes on the chalkboard in order to clarify the spelling of a name, which she does in order to further her lecture, which she does in order to convey the course mate-

rial, which she does in order to teach these students, which she does for the sake of being an educator. We have here an entire chain of in-orders-to, so that tasks themselves serve in further tasks. Thus, if the then, as *terminus ad quem* for the Now, is defined by the task at hand, that task is itself involved in further tasks, and this further reference iterates the structure.

We may draw reason to ascribe this explanation to Heidegger from an analysis of the little that he does say about this issue. The closest he comes to explaining why the object of Dasein's awaiting should be a Now is that Dasein must reckon with the object of its concern. He writes,

Abandoned to the "world," which is discovered with its factual There, and referred [*angewiesen*] to it, Dasein awaits⁴⁷ its being-in-the-world in such a way that it "reckons" with and "relies" upon [mit dem und auf das "rechnet"] that with which there is for the sake of its ability-to-be an involvement that is in the end exceptional. (*S&Z*, p. 412)

In this passage Heidegger is also moving into a discussion of why it should be that the cycle of day and night is fundamental to world-time. Our concern is, in contrast, with the implication embedded in the first two-thirds of the sentence, an implication that is repeatedly suggested by §§79 and 80, that world-time arises out of Dasein's need to reckon with the world and intraworldly things. Usually this implication is expressed in a highly elliptical comment to the effect that world-time arises out of Dasein's falling, or being-amidst (see, e.g., the first paragraph of §79, p. 406).

Unpacking this suggested explanation demands careful analysis, however. After all, the need for time-reckoning does not explain world-time itself. Time-reckoning, we saw earlier in this chapter, is required in order to fit a multiplicity of tasks into a definite temporal sequence. This observation already assumes, however, that the time with which Dasein is dealing is sequential or successive time. But, of course, it is precisely the successiveness of time that we are trying to explain here. So if we rephrase the explanation carefully only in terms of phenomena that are available at this stage of the derivation of world-time, what remains is the suggestion that Dasein's assignment to multiple tasks explains the successiveness of world-time. That is, sequentiality is to be explained by the for-the-sake-of-

⁴⁷ This is the only example I have found in *Being and Time* "of Dasein awaits itself," the form of expression Heidegger uses in *Basic Problems* to pick out the originary future. In *Being and Time*, it is simply an aberration.

which generating a sequence of tasks. The analysis in terms of iteration just fills in the details in the suggested explanation.

One might immediately object that the explanation, if it works, is *too powerful*, for the chainlike iteration we rely on here should apply just as well to the for-the-sakes-of-which themselves. And if it did, that would impose sequentiality on the for-the-sakes-of-which. That in turn would render originary temporality sequential, which contradicts the entire, Heideggerian framework. The intuition that drives this objection is that the for-the-sakes-of-which form up into chains, so that, for example, Brown's acting for the sake of being an educator is in turn for the sake of some deeper level of self-understanding.⁴⁸ But the objection misses its mark, for the iteration it suggests is the wrong kind of iteration to generate sequentiality. It is crucial to the iterativity framework described in the previous section of this chapter that *the originary Present* iterates itself, that is, that being-amidst, enpresenting, is reapplied to its own future. The Now's pragmatically teleological *terminus ad quem*, which prior to iteration cannot be understood to be sequential, becomes sequential insofar as the originary Present is applied to it. A further application of the originary future would not do the trick, because it is the originary Present that would convert the otherwise nonsequential *terminus ad quem* into another Now, another Present.

One might also object that this explanation, even if it works for most cases, does not work for those cases in which the task is immediately subordinate to some for-the-sake-of-which. In such a case, there is no further task in which the proximate task at hand serves and, thus, no further, futural reference to be wrung out of the imposition of purposiveness by the for-the-sake-of-which. It is not clear that for the iteration to be imposed, the task at hand must itself serve in some further task. All that should be necessary is that the for-the-sake-of-which impose some further futural reference. That can arise by the for-the-sake-of-which specifying further, though not necessarily superordinate, tasks to be performed. So,

⁴⁸ I grant the intuition here for the sake of argument, but it is unclear that Heidegger would accept it. When he writes, in §18, that "The totality of involvements itself, however, finally goes back to a to-which in which there is *no* further involvement, which itself is not an entity of the sort of the available within the world, but rather, an entity whose being is determined as being-in-the-world, to the make-up of whose being worldliness itself belongs. This primary to-which is no to-this as a possible in-which of involvement. The primary 'to-this' is a for-the-sake-of-which" (S&Z, p. 84), he may well intend to deny that for-the-sakes-of-which form up into such chains. In the final section of this chapter, I shall assume that for-the-sakes-of-which *can* form up into chains, but the assumption will not be crucial to any argument I offer.

for example, being an educator can refer Brown to chatting with an eye to inspiring students, even after finishing lecturing and independently of lecturing altogether. (This is why Brown can teach students who never enroll in a course with her. She talks shop with one of her department's majors, even though that major never takes a class with her.) Thus, the then, when lecturing is complete, is itself a Now with purposive direction, because the governing for-the-sake-of-which imposes a further, albeit not superordinate, task. Iteration is preserved, even in the case of a task that is immediately subordinate to its for-the-sake-of-which.

Summary

Let me step back now from the details of the preceding explanations and review the overall structure of Heidegger's argument for the World-Time Dependency Thesis. Heidegger analyzes world-time as a sequence of dated, spanned, significant, and public Nows. Sequentiality figures in this conceptual analysis of world-time not simply insofar as world-time is meant to comprise a sequence of Nows. Sequentiality has a deeper role to play. Each of the other features of the Now (the features that define the Now internally as a Now: datability, spannedness, significance, and publicness) can be interpreted as a modified version of a feature of originary temporality. The modification in question is the imposition of sequentiality on originary temporality. That is, if the relevant features of originary temporality are modified by way of the imposition of sequentiality, the conceptual yield is a sequence of world-time Nows.

Central to this explanation is, therefore, an explanation for why *Dasein* should impose sequentiality upon originary temporality so as to modify it into world-time. Recall, in parsing this question, that originary temporality and world-time are interdependent in the sense that each requires the other. Heidegger does not claim that the dependence of world-time on originary temporality is simple dependence. He grants that originary temporality *could* not obtain without world-time (and, of course, vice versa). Heidegger's claim is, rather, that world-time *would* not obtain without originary temporality, but *not* vice versa. Originary temporality explains *why* world-time obtains: world-time is a modified version of originary temporality, where the modification itself is explained by the structure of originary temporality. Finally, the features of world-time that are explained by this derivation from originary temporality are the defining features of world-time. Originary temporality explains why world-time *as such* obtains, why the features of world-time obtain together as a unit, why

the *unitary* phenomenon that makes up world-time obtains. That is, originary temporality explains why world-time is what it is, namely, time:⁴⁹

the Now, then, and formerly are nothing other than temporality that speaks itself out. It is only for this reason that the Now is a characteristic of *time*; it is only for this reason that the then and the formerly are *time-like*. (*GP*, p. 380)

An Excursus on Existential Spatiality

To underscore just how strong the World-Time Dependency Thesis is, let me contrast it with Heidegger's account of "existential spatiality." He presents the latter account in division 1, chapter 3, §§22–24. The mere fact that this discussion first arises so early in *Being and Time* shows that it cannot be as ontologically "loaded" as his discussion of temporality. This suspicion is borne out by Heidegger's actual discussion. It is not necessary to present too many of the details of the account. It is sufficient to contrast the ontological status of originary temporality with that of existential spatiality.

To work our way into Dasein's existential spatiality, let us begin with Heidegger's account of the existential spatiality of intraworldly available entities. According to this account there is an existential region (*Gegend*) that Dasein encounters in its engaged concern. Pieces of equipment have a place in the workshop, a spatial place: the screwdriver belongs in the toolbox, for example. Also, the accessibility of things is not immediately derivable from their objective, physical position in space:

For him who, for example, wears glasses, which are so close in terms of distance that they "sit on his nose," this piece of equipment that he uses is more remote [*weiter entfernt*] from him than the picture on the opposite wall. This piece of equipment has so little nearness [*Nähe*] that it often at first [*zunächst*] cannot be found at all. (*S&Z*, p. 107)

"Remote" and "near" are the words Heidegger uses to describe existential distance.⁵⁰ In the example, Smith's glasses are relatively unavailable, because he does not have access to them. They are so closely tied to his body that they rarely obtrude into his vision. He does not see them; he sees

49 Because originary temporality is not itself the set of defining features of world-time, however, it is imprecise to describe it as the essence (or Aristotelian formal cause) of world-time. It explains that essence.

50 Heidegger makes this confusing by using "*entfernt*" as an adjective for "existentially remote" and "*Ent-fernung*" as a name for the aspect of existential spatiality that allows things to be existentially near or remote.

through them. So although they are objectively much closer than the picture on the opposite wall, he could spend an hour looking for them before he realizes they are on his nose.⁵¹ Heidegger also gives the example of an objectively short walk being existentially long, because it is difficult (*S&Z*, p. 106). This very roughly characterizes the existential spatiality of *intraworldly things*.

Dasein's existential spatiality is its "de-severing" (*Ent-fernung*)⁵² and "orientation" (*Ausrichtung*). De-severing is roughly the establishment of remoteness and nearness through *Dasein*'s interest in a situation. That is, something can be more or less accessible to *Dasein*, either because it is physically (bodily) easier or harder for *Dasein* to get to it, or because it is socially more or less available to *Dasein*. As Brown looks down to second base from first after hitting a single in softball, second base looks farther away, indeed, is farther away, because it is going to be hard for her to get there. If she were just jogging around the diamond, it would neither look nor be so far away. Similarly, if a fellow leaves a one hundred dollar bill sitting in front of him on a table in a crowded office, Jones may be only an arm's length from the coveted bill, but that both looks to be and is one of the longest arm's lengths one can imagine. The social inaccessibility of that bill is so great that it is quite existentially remote from her. This existential remoteness and nearness of *intraworldly things* is, thus, dependent upon *Dasein*'s bodily capacities and the social expectations that concern *Dasein*'s behavior and that of others. *Dasein* is spatial in that it discovers its environment in these terms. It de-severs or institutes the existential remoteness and nearness of *intraworldly things*.

Dasein is also oriented: "Every nearing has in advance already taken on a direction [*Richtung*] in the region, from out of which what is de-severed approaches, in order to be come upon with respect to its place" (*S&Z*, p. 108). Smith is sitting at his desk so as to be oriented to what is on it; he has the desktop in front of him. His space is front-dominant. The region in which he operates is structured according to the direction of his interest. Similarly, "in terms of this orientation the fixed [*festen*] directions of left and right arise" (*ibid.*). Smith is right-handed, and so his space is right-

⁵¹ I shall never forget the time, when I was a boy, when my father fretfully searched the house for his glasses. He was wearing them the whole time!

⁵² Although the translation of "*Ent-fernung*" by "de-severing" – in which I follow Macquarrie and Robinson – is far from ideal, the otherwise superior alternative, "dis-tancing," would suggest a close association with distalitity (*Abständigkeit*), *Dasein*'s concern with the way it differs from others. In the German, however, there is no close connection, since the two words are built out of different roots, so I have settled for the awkward "de-severing."

dominant: if a friend throws a set of keys to him, but a foot to his side, they would be much nearer to him on his right side than on his left, because he is better at catching things with his right hand than his left. So Smith is spatial also in the sense that his space is oriented to right and not left, to front and not back, and so on. Things to his front and right are nearer to him than things objectively equidistantly far from him, but behind him and to his left.

This theory of existential spatiality is not, however, a theory of the “origin” of space.⁵³ It is a theory of the spatial structure of the world as dependent on human interests, and a theory of how Dasein discloses and institutes that space (by de-severing and orientation). So the theory of spatiality does present a kind of “world-space”: “*Space is neither in the subject, nor is the world in space*. Space is rather ‘in’ the world, insofar as being-in-the-world, which is constitutive for Dasein, has disclosed space” (*S&Z*, p. 111). The nearness and remoteness of things depends upon one’s interest in them; apart from the human world of concerns and prohibitions, and so on, there can be no existential nearness and remoteness. But Heidegger does not claim that there is a special sort of space that is prior to this existentially significant space. He writes:

Space is not located in the subject, nor does the subject observe the world “as if” it were in a space, but rather the subject, when understood in an ontologically proper fashion, Dasein, is spatial in an originary sense. And because Dasein is spatial in the sense described, space is seen to be an Apriori. This title does not mean that space belongs antecedently to a subject, which is primarily still worldless, and which projects space from out of itself. Apriority here means: the precedence of the encountering of space (as region) in the current, environmental encountering of the available. (*ibid.*)

Despite the use of the term “originary,” which might otherwise suggest a parallel with the theory of originary temporality, this analysis operates entirely at the level of the discussion of world-time and the pragmatic Now: in order to account for how we can encounter world-time, Heidegger posits various structures of the understanding of time: reckoning with it by retaining, enpresenting, and awaiting. There is, however, no even more originary structure of the understanding of space that is directed to

⁵³ In a bizarre and convoluted argument (§70), Heidegger attempts to derive existential spatiality from temporality. He admits, in “Time and Being,” that “the attempt in *Being and Time*, §70, to trace the spatiality of Dasein back into temporality does not stand up” (*ZS*, p. 24). I shall not concern myself in this study with the argument in §70.

places that are not next to one another, as there is a structure of the understanding of a more originary temporal manifold that is not successive. Of course, the way in which existential places are spatially related to one another is not reducible to objective spatiality. But neither are the temporal relations between world-time Nows reducible to objective (ordinary) time. The only unusual version of space is the region, which Heidegger could have called “world-space,” in step with his naming significant time “world-time.”⁵⁴ Whereas the ecstases of originary temporality open Dasein up to a temporal manifold that is not successive, de-severing and orientation do not open Dasein up to a spatial manifold that is not spread out.

The Failure of the Argument for the World-Time Dependency Thesis

The explanation of sequentiality does not, alas, succeed, and with its failure is thereby joined the failure of the entire explanatory strategy. Whether that strategy could be salvaged depends entirely on whether a replacement explanation can be found.⁵⁵ The explanation of sequentiality in terms of the iteration of the Present has generated a sequence, but unfortunately not the right one. It has explained a chain of purposive references: *x* is in order to *y*, which is in order to *z*. But this is not the right sequence to make up the sequence of world-time times. It looks right, when we examine carefully chosen examples, such as those I offered above, for instance, that of Brown lecturing and then chatting. On further examination, however, we can see that world-time times do not neatly form a purposive chain. Brown does indeed pick up the chalk in order to lecture, and the then, when she is done writing on the chalkboard, does precede the then, when she is done lecturing. But suppose that right after the lecture she heads to the movies. As she lectures, the then, when the lecture is complete, is the then, the right time to go to the movies. But this sequence of world-time times (lecture before movies) is not imposed by any for-the-sake-of-which.⁵⁶ It is only a result of having to fit several tasks

54 The analogy here only goes so far: world-time is the one overarching, public framework in which all events and things show up; the region is a local, spatial structure, that seems in some ways to be personal. For example, a walk that is hard for Smith might be easy for Brown, and vice versa, and whereas Smith is right-handed, Brown might be left-handed. Dreyfus (1991, ch. 7) aptly criticizes Heidegger for being unable to get a notion of public space out of his discussion of de-severance and orientation.

55 I, however, have none to offer.

56 That lecturing is “more important” than the movies is not an explanation, for after all, had it been more convenient, she might very well have gone to the movies before the lecture.

into a given time sequence. But, of course, it is precisely the sequentiality of time that we are trying to explain.

There is a second, closely related reason why the explanation fails. Although originary teleology may well⁵⁷ iterate, and like world-time would then do so transitively, its iteration would not necessarily impose any iteration on the tasks subordinate to it. Dasein's originary future may well have internal structure: Brown presses ahead into being a teacher, because she presses ahead into being an educator considered more broadly (she could have been a basketball coach, preacher, rabbi, guru, etc.).⁵⁸ One ability may well be for the sake of another. But *that* transitive chain does not explain the transitive *succession* of world-time Nows, because it need not impose a chain of Nows *at all*. There is no reason why all of Brown's actions (wieldings of equipment) that are for the sake of being a teacher cannot also serve in education, whereas none other of her actions do. There is more than one way to go about being an educator, but in pressing ahead into one of these ways of being an educator (viz., being a teacher), all of what Brown does to be an educator is comprised in what she does to be a teacher. So it follows from this that the iterated and transitive structure of the originary future (*x* for the sake of *y*, which in turn is for the sake of *z*, so that *x* is for the sake of *z*) does not necessarily impose any iteration at the level of tasks. Put more concretely, there is a futural then relative to Brown's current then, but *not* because there is a for-the-sake-of-which superordinate to her proximate for-the-sake-of-which, *not* because being a teacher is for the sake of being an educator.⁵⁹ Thus, the iterative transitivity of the originary future, if it obtains at all, cannot explain the sequentiality of world-time.

One might argue that these objections are too fine grained for the explanation of world-time that Heidegger offers. After all, one might point out, the elliptical passages from which I drew support for my elaboration of the explanation in terms of iteration do not specify that the sequence of world-time Nows must reflect the sequence of tasks dictated by the for-the-sake-of-which. Those passages only referred more vaguely to

⁵⁷ I use this cautious formulation, because it is unclear that Heidegger would accept iteration internal to the originary future. See note 48 in this chapter. If Heidegger would reject such iteration internal to the originary future, then this objection would not hold.

⁵⁸ This is why it makes more sense to say of being a teacher that it is *for the sake of* being an educator, than that it *is* being an educator.

⁵⁹ Of course, sometimes the structure might work out right, e.g., Smith was a fiancé for the sake of being married, and what he did for the sake of being married succeeded what he did for the sake of being a fiancé. Some teleological iteration, as I have called it, might fit the pattern, but not all would.

world-time arising from Dasein's need to reckon with, or juggle, its tasks. Perhaps, then, the explanation should be revised to state merely that since Dasein has many tasks to perform, it must "place" them into different times, and that in turn requires that there be a sequence of times. However, the need to place tasks into different times does not itself explain why those times form up into a sequence. The only way to derive the requirement that the times make up a sequence is to rely upon the teleological sequentiality of the tasks themselves. And as we have seen, *that* sequentiality does not generate the proper world-temporal sequence.

Before settling on my skeptical conclusion that Heidegger's derivation of world-time does not work, let me comment briefly upon an objection to the entire strategy I have been using throughout this chapter. One might think that in order to save Heidegger's project, we should deemphasize the passages upon which I have relied to reconstruct Heidegger's argument and highlight instead the passages in which he seems to imply a very different explanation. The derivation of world-time from originary temporality relies, we have seen, upon the language of "falling," which I have systematically read as referring to being-amidst. But perhaps "falling" ought there to be read as Dasein's flight from anxiety and death, its flight into the inauthenticity of the everyday public. It is true that §68c is mostly written in this light.

But there are two powerful reasons to reject this objection and the general strategy it suggests. First, as we have seen, the text of *Being and Time*, although somewhat ambiguous, is most consistently and plausibly read to state that both originary temporality and world-time are modally indifferent phenomena. The suggested explanatory strategy requires that originary temporality be interpreted as authentic and world-time as inauthentic. This reading is very hard to make consistent with most of Heidegger's characterization of both modes of time. Second and more immediate to our present concerns, §§79 and 80 make little appeal to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Some use of the distinction can be read into these sections, but Heidegger relies on almost none of the conceptual tools he would be entitled to use, if this were in fact his intention. For example, he does not say anything like that Dasein distracts itself from the anxiety-producing confrontation with originary temporality by becoming lost in world-time. Section 81, which chronicles the derivation of ordinary time out of world-time, has a much stronger connection to the resources of the theory of authenticity and inauthenticity than do §§79 and 80. But in Chapter 4 I shall explain (in footnotes, chiefly) why even that derivation should not be construed in the manner

suggested. So it will not do any good to follow this path in trying to rescue Heidegger's derivation.

Therefore, one element of the derivation or explanation of world-time by originary temporality fails. Consequently, there is a residuum of unexplained "time-likeness," namely sequentiality, in the sense of "one-after-the-other-ness." And recall that if this sequentiality cannot be explained by originary temporality, then the explanations of the other four features of the world-time Now, viz., datability, spannedness, significance, and publicness, fail as well. After all, those explanations function by arguing that these features are modifications of features of originary temporality, features that arise out of originary temporality by the imposition of sequentiality.

This failure would, however, leave room for the possibility that world-time is actually a composite phenomenon, one that arises from the interpretation of time in terms of the four explained features. That is, if originary temporality and ordinary time can be understood to be two distinct, independent phenomena, world-time could be interpreted as the product of imposing structures that arise out of originary temporality upon ordinary time, which is already and independently sequential. This would entail that without originary temporality, there would be no world-time, but ordinary time would remain, devoid of content, significance, and publicness.⁶⁰ This is a comfortable position for a naturalist to hold. But Heidegger is no naturalist. In Chapter 5 I shall discuss the role of Heidegger's failed temporal idealism in *Being and Time*, and in the Conclusion I shall assess what remains of Heidegger's ontology, once that idealism is excised. Before I can do that, however, it is necessary to examine the way in which natural time – which Heidegger calls the "ordinary conception of time" – is supposed to depend upon world-time.

60 The world-time Now has content in several respects: it is dated by events; it is spanned so as to "contain" what it spans; and it is significant in the sense of being the right time to x . If severed from the explanatory derivation from being-amidst, the Now could be potentially, although not necessarily, dated. It could by nature span only the internal, formal, temporal structure it encompasses, if any. (After all, the ordinary Now might turn out to be instantaneous.) And it would lose its significance.

THE ORDINARY CONCEPTION OF TIME AND DISENGAGED TEMPORALITY

How does Heidegger conceive time in the traditional sense, time as the insignificant series of moments (perhaps even spanless instants) that belong to nature? Thus far Heidegger has introduced us to originary temporality and world-time. The former is the nonsequential manifold of being-ahead, being-amidst, and being-already. The latter is the sequential series of times that are dated, significant, spanned, and public. But does Dasein not sometimes experience time in the traditional sense, the pure ticking away of moments independent of human concerns and planning? Yes, there is such an experience of time, and it is not just an illusion. The tradition has not just made a mistake. Dasein does sometimes encounter times that are “contentless.” These times are distinguishable from one another insofar as they form a sequence, a series defined by the relations *earlier than* and *later than*, and insofar as one of them is in each case current, and the rest are either past or future. How does Heidegger fit this conception of time, which he calls the “ordinary” conception, into his system?

The Change-Over from the Occurrent to the Available

In order to come to terms with ordinary time and the way it depends on world-time, we must first understand the emergence of the occurrent out

of the available.¹ I shall give here a very compressed version of this emergence, for it is the focus of some debate what exactly it is. The version that I offer is not wholly uncontroversial.² In order to understand the emergence of the occurrent out of the available, we must have a grasp first of what the occurrent is, and then of how Dasein comes to encounter occurrent entities.

The concept of the occurrent is the counterconcept to the available; it is the concept of what is *not* involved human practices. Recall that the definatory feature of the available is its involvement in these practices. The available is the paraphernalia, props, and equipment of human activity. But there are things unlike Dasein that are not involved in human practices, that are neither tied to tasks nor bound up with a work-world, for example, a rock. Of course, one might designate it as a prop of some sort, say, home plate on a softball field. One might also use it for some purpose, perhaps to throw at a rattlesnake. But in and of itself a rock is neither of these things. It is just a hunk of stone. The same is true of a galaxy, an electron, and many other things besides. There is a distinction to be drawn between a field, for example, just as a grassy meadow, and a field as a grazing pasture, or as a softball field. For something to be a softball field it must serve as the locale *for* playing softball. This is why there are no softball fields in Namibia; one does not play softball there (I assume). There are, nonetheless, meadows in Namibia. Occurrent things are things without definatory proper uses or roles in human activity.

One of Heidegger's fundamental phenomenological claims is that the normal condition of Dasein is to be engaged with its concerns, that is, its tasks and equipment. It does not normally stare at a rock nor gaze into a pasture. W. B. Macomber puts the point lucidly:

Seeking to avoid any construction, Heidegger portrays Dasein in its most ordinary manifestation, as it reveals itself first and foremost in the routine of its daily existence (*Alltäglichkeit*). Kant begins the *Critique of Pure Reason* by watching a scientist peering through the lens of his microscope. Heidegger begins by considering man – perhaps Kant's scientist – shaving, answering the doorbell, shifting his newspaper from one hand to the other in order to get out money for the bus. (Macomber 1967, p. 34)

¹ I shall present here what I take to be Heidegger's view of "the change-over." I find, however, the account deeply flawed. Joseph Rouse (1985, 1987) has offered what is to my mind a fatal critique of Heidegger's theory. In my (1995a) I endorse, expand, and develop some of the consequences of Rouse's critique.

² For a full and well worked out version of this transition, see Dreyfus (1991, ch. 5). Also helpful is Guignon (1983, ch. 4).

Any “holding back from manipulation” (to use Heidegger’s words) is an interlude in ongoing practice or forced upon Dasein by severe breakdown. Heidegger’s paradigm case of the emergence of the occurrent is in breakdown:

Conspicuousness [which is a mode of breakdown] gives the available piece of equipment as unavailable in a certain way. But therein lies: the unusable [thing] merely lies there – it shows itself as a tool-thing [*Zeugding*], which looks thus and so and which in its availability was also constantly occurrent as looking thus and so. Pure occurrentness announces itself in the piece of equipment, only to withdraw once again back into the availability of what Dasein is concerned with, that is, of what Dasein finds as [needing to be] put back into order. (*S&Z*, p. 73)

Smith is working on the soup, and the stirring spoon breaks. Moreover, suppose Smith does not just readjust, but for some reason cannot continue stirring. In such a situation he might find himself staring at the spoon, looking at it as a mere piece of wood. If it had simply cracked, he might interpret it as a broken spoon, but if the break is so severe that the spoon is useless, he is more likely to see it as jagged wood. The ex-spoon is merely occurrent before him (see *S&Z*, p. 74). The hunks of wood that lie before him, floating in his soup, are no longer assigned to the task of making soup. They are no longer suitable for that. They have become mere things.

The watershed in the development of the spoon into ex-spoon into mere thing is the point at which Smith interprets the ex-spoon as utterly unsuitable for use (that is, he does not even treat it as fixable) and, hence, ceases to assign it to a task.³ This is the crucial point, for here the item is no longer (un)available: it is not defined in terms of, involved in, a function and context. This uninvolvedness is the feature of a thing in virtue of which it is occurrent, rather than available. Recall the discussion of interpretation and deliberation in Chapter 3: Dasein interprets when it adjusts to the situation by taking one thing explicitly as in order to serve in some task. So Smith could here interpret a large carving fork as something with which to stir. Or, if no such fork is to hand, or if Smith is a little less skilled in the kitchen, he may have to think his problem out like this: “If I am to stir my soup, I must find something large and rigid and clean enough with which to stir it. Ah, ha! There’s a carving fork in the drawer here – saw it yesterday – and I can use that.” In this scenario, Smith has

³ One does sometimes reassign broken pieces of equipment to other tasks, even at the limit, as memorabilia or conversation pieces (such as bats that professional ballplayers have broken).

deliberated, because his experience has taken the form of the “if . . . , then” Interpretation and deliberation are ways of being explicitly focused on one’s task and how to get it done. In interpretation and deliberation, one still encounters the available. But if Smith’s breakdown is so severe, or if Smith is so inclined to “give up,” that he neither interprets nor deliberates his way out of the situation, if he no longer experiences the spoon or anything else as something with which to stir, but just stares at the broken spoon, seeing it as a hunk of wood, then Smith encounters the *occurrent*.

There is controversy about exactly how Heidegger understands the various stages of development that lead from the involved, ongoing use of a piece of equipment to a theoretical, scientific grasp of it, but let me stake out this (only somewhat controversial) ground. In §69b of *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses the difference between these two sentences:

- i The thing, which we call a “hammer,” weighs two pounds.⁴
- ii The hammer is too heavy.

Heidegger uses (i) as an example in the midst of a discussion of theoretical science, but he does not mean to suggest that (i) is paradigmatic of such science (as one might be inclined to take it). His point is simply to pick out sentences that attribute a context-independent property to a thing, that is, a property not defined in terms of its role in human activity. That the hammer weighs two pounds is a context-independent property of it, because it weighs two pounds no matter what culture it is found in, no matter how it is used, no matter what its function in human life may be. Sentence (ii) assigns a context-dependent property to something that is available. The property of being too heavy is context-dependent, for to be too heavy is to be too heavy for someone in some situation and relative to some task.

Heidegger is concerned with the “change-over” (*Umschlag*) between the understanding of a thing manifest in (ii) and the understanding of it manifest in (i). He says of (i):

[It is not that] we distance ourselves from manipulation, nor [that] we merely look *away* from the equipmental character of this thing, but rather that we look *at* the encountering and available [entity] “anew,” as *occurent*.

⁴ I have altered the example somewhat. Heidegger says, “the entity that lies before [us], and that we already know as a hammer, has a weight, that is, the ‘property’ of heaviness: it exerts a force on what lies under it: it falls if the latter is removed” (S&Z, pp. 360–1).

The understanding of being, which guides our concerned dealings with entities, has changed over. (S&Z, p. 361)

In what does this change-over consist?

In the “physical” assertion “the hammer is heavy” [my example: “this thing weighs two pounds”], not only is the equipmental character of the encountering entity *overlooked*, but rather at the same time, what belongs to every available entity is overlooked: its place [*Platz*]. Its place becomes indifferent. But not as if the *occurrent* thing had lost its “location” [*Ort*]. The place becomes a spatio-temporal point [*Raum-Zeit-Stelle*], a “world-point,” which does not stand out from any other. Therein lies: the environmentally circumscribed manifold of places that belong to available equipment is not only modified into a pure manifold of points, but rather, the entity that belongs to the environment is completely *released* [from its place]. The totality [*All*] of what is *occurred* becomes the theme. (S&Z, pp. 361–2)

When Smith comes to stare at the broken spoon as a hunk of wood, it is not just that he is holding back from manipulating it; after all, he might do that if it were too hot (in which case it would not be *occurred*, but rather, “*unavailable*”). He must understand it in a new way, as not having a place. In the passage above, Heidegger means something quite spatial by “place.” Equipment has its designated place, where it belongs: the hammer belongs in the toolbox. But we can generalize the notion. The point is that the ex-spoon become hunk of wood does not belong anywhere. It no longer has a task (making soup), and so, it no longer belongs in the kitchen. It has been released from a tie to a place, a work-world, and a task. It is context-free. It no longer makes sense only in terms of its co-equipment (wherewithal) and task.

Heidegger has further theory to adumbrate concerning the move from this sort of context-independence into being grasped by theoretical cognition. What he has to say about that is not too important in detail, but its central theme will concern us later, at least momentarily. So let me put that aside until the end of this chapter.

The Change-Over in the Understanding of Time

What becomes of our understanding of time in such a change-over? Heidegger says,

Objectifying being-amidst intraworldly, *occurred* entities has the character of an *exceptional enpresenting*. It is distinguished from the Present of circumspection before all else by this feature: the discovery that belongs to the

science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of what is occurrent.
(*S&Z*, p. 363)

Heidegger adds a footnote to the italicized term “enpresenting,” and this footnote throws further light on what he is up to:

This thesis, that all cognition [*Erkenntnis*] has its goal in “intuition” [*Anschauung*], has this temporal sense: all cognition is enpresenting. Whether every science and even philosophical cognition aims for enpresenting, remains here undecided. – Husserl uses the expression “enpresenting” to characterize sense-perception. Cp. *Log. Investigations*, 1st ed. (1901), vol. 2, pp. 588–620. The *intentional* analysis of perception and intuition in general would have to lie close to this “temporal” identification [*Kennzeichnung*] of the phenomenon. That and how the intentionality of “consciousness” is grounded in ecstatic temporality will be shown in the next division.⁵ (*ibid.*, note)

Heidegger has packed a great deal here into references to Husserl and Kant. (The reference to Kant is in the first line of the note: the thesis that “all cognition has its goal in ‘intuition’” is drawn from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, A19=B33. Heidegger makes it a centerpiece of his interpretation of the *Critique* in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*; see esp. §4.) In order to understand what Heidegger is up to here, let us turn to Kant’s theory of temporal synthesis and Husserl’s account of time-consciousness.

Kant and Husserl on Temporal Synthesis and the Consciousness of Time

Kant and Husserl develop a theory of human awareness of time that is intended to solve a basic problem about that awareness: how the mind can be aware at any given moment of a *content* that can be grasped only by being aware of an entire spread of time. If one is aware at some moment of a basketball shot, one must be aware not only of the ball’s position just now, but also of its position in the immediate past and its probable positions in the immediate future. Kant’s basic solution, when refined in Husserlian fashion, presents a plausible and powerful theory of such

⁵ This refers presumably to the next division of *S&Z*, which, alas, was never written.

awareness. Heidegger essentially adopts this theory as an account of the nature of Dasein's experience of time after the changeover in the understanding of being.

Kant's most thorough discussion of "temporal synthesis" is to be found in his doctrine of the threefold synthesis in A.⁶ Apprehension is the "intuition," literally "looking at," or more colloquially, perception, of an object; typically an apprehension is an image of the object (cf. A120–1). Kant intends to investigate what sorts of unity (both of the apprehending and of the apprehended) are presupposed by this apprehension. The apprehension is not an undifferentiated state, nor is it an incoherent swirl of sense-data. It is a perception of a sensory object. And such perception must have certain characteristic forms of unity. What are they?

No object is perceived as instantaneous.⁷ The object is perceived as taking up some time, and the perception itself of the object takes up time. So every apprehension (intuition) is a temporal manifold: Jones's apprehension of a cat consists of a series of phases, and these successive phases are successive states of her mind directed at the successive phases of the cat. Kant then says,

6 The best detailed interpretation of the threefold synthesis in A is in H. J. Paton (1976, vol. 1, ch. 19, pp. 357–81). My discussion is greatly influenced by Paton's interpretation. I find that Robert Paul Wolff's (1963, pp. 125–31) treatment of the threefold synthesis makes two crucial errors: (1) he represents the three phases of synthesis as distinct, each a layer added on top of the previous layer, and this leads him to entertain such questions as whether Kant should have put the synthesis of reproduction before the synthesis of apprehension; (2) he takes the syntheses to be (very fast) *processes* of thought, and he analyzes the rule-likeness of these processes by arguing that they are rule-governed *activities*. As will become clear, the syntheses are structures of unity, rather than activities for generating such unity.

7 Proving this is the burden of the Axioms of Intuition. It is presupposed by the analysis of the A-Deduction. One might argue that the true starting point of the A-Deduction analysis is that the apprehending of any object itself endures. But nothing about the perceived lapse of time in an object follows from the lapse of time in the apprehending of it. So I shall treat this assumption as a phenomenological starting point. (Husserl makes the same assumption, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter.)

One might object that if this can only be proven in the Axioms, there is a circle in Kant's argument: If the arguments of the Axioms rely on the results of the Deduction (which they do), how can Kant rely on an assumption here, in the Deduction, that he can only prove later, in the Axioms? The answer is that this argument from the Deduction is not part of the *progressive* argument of the *Critique*. It is the progressive argument that attempts to provide transcendental, and therefore incontrovertible, guarantees for Kant's metaphysics and epistemology. The argument here is *regressive*, that is, it takes some cognitive achievement for granted (such as that the mind can perceive a temporally extended object) and analyzes what is required of the mind for this achievement to be possible. (For more on the distinction, see Baum 1979, pp. 6–7.)

In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the *synthesis of apprehension*. (A99)

There are two models that Kant might have in mind here, and it is worth contrasting them. (1) Kant's reference to the unity that is present in the representation of space might indicate that he has in mind that for Jones to perceive a spatial region, she must run through and hold together the various subregions that make up the region. She must apprehend each subregion in turn and hold them together as she proceeds. The holding together would be something like building a brick wall: one places each brick on top of the other, eventually getting the whole.⁸ This process of building, however, is a step-by-step, successive process. So to perceive a space, Jones must perceive every subregion successively, and out of the representations of these subregions she must construct the representation of the entire region. Although this is how we go about drawing a sketch of a region (on paper or even in imagination), it cannot be how we perceive a spatial region. Let t_1 and t_2 be two successive moments of time. At both t_1 and t_2 Jones perceives the *entire* region. So how can she perceive only part of it at t_1 and then the next, and consequently the whole, at t_2 ? The account, thus construed, is implausible. A similar problem besets the "empirical version" of this alleged synthesis. Jones's cat is white and furry. Does she first perceive his white(ness) and then his furri(ness) and then a moment later compound them into a perception of a cat? Again, this is implausible, for she perceives the whole cat at the first moment in question, and so there is no time in which to construct him.

(2) Kant does not mean that we construct the apprehension out of contentful aspects (or even regions) represented in the perception. Instead, he points out that as Jones perceives the cat, she must hold together the several phases of the perception. There is the phase of her perception at t_1 and the phase at t_2 , and she must "run through them," that is, have each of them in turn, and "hold them together," that is, grasp them as one whole perception. (Note that Kant's word translated as "held together" is "*zusammennehmen*," which could be rendered "taken together.") Let me flip around to the side of the object and make the same point over again. In setting up the synthesis of apprehension, Kant says,

8 The example of building a brick wall belongs to Wilfrid Sellars. I heard it in lectures at the University of Pittsburgh during the mid-1980s. I assume it is in print somewhere, but I cannot find it.

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold, which indeed would not be represented as a manifold, if the mind did not distinguish the time in the sequence of one impression upon another. (A99, translation altered)⁹

Jones perceives her cat as enduring through time, and to do this – that is, to have a perception of a cat at all – she must be able to perceive it as enduring from phase to phase. She need not actually focus attention on the progression of phases as such, but rather must perceive them as adding up to the endurance of a cat through time.

In order to be able to do this – perceive the cat as enduring through time – is it sufficient that Jones have a sequence of intuitions (or as Kant says, “impressions”) of cat-phases? No, for as Kant says, she must be able to perceive this manifold of phases *as a manifold*. What does Kant mean here? He says of the synthesis of apprehension, that “it is directed immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a manifold, and as contained *in a single representation*, save in virtue of such a synthesis” (A99). In other words, she cannot just have a manifold of “impressions” of cat-phases, but she must also grasp these impressions in one representation of one and the same cat. A manifold of representations is not a representation of a manifold. They must be taken together as phases of one perception of a cat. This taking them together as one representation is the *synthesis of apprehension*.

Kant then adds to this account the claim that there is a pure synthesis of apprehension that accompanies the empirical one described above:

This synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised *a priori*, that is, in respect of representations which are not empirical. For without it we should never have *a priori* the representations either of space or of time. They can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in original receptivity. We have thus a pure synthesis of apprehension. (A99–100).

In order to perceive her cat, Jones must hold together the impressions of the several phases of her cat’s existence during the time of perception. This is necessary for perceiving the cat as enduring through time, and if she did not perceive the cat as enduring through time, she would not

⁹ I have cut out Kant’s explicit reason for this, stated in the succeeding clause, because I do not think it makes the point. I am not sure what Kant had in mind by saying that “each representation, *in so far as it is contained in a single moment*, can never be anything but absolute unity” (*ibid.*).

perceive a cat at all. To perceive a cat as enduring through time, she must perceive it as taking up some span of time. She must perceive it as a cat that endures from t_1 to t_2 , and this requires apprehending the span from t_1 to t_2 .¹⁰ In holding together the several impressions of the cat-phases as a perception of a cat, she is holding together the time of the cat's endurance as well. She could not do the former unless she did the latter. Thus, holding together the time-span is presupposed by perceiving the cat at all. Kant's name for such a synthesis directed at the temporal aspect of a perception, a synthesis that is presupposed by the empirical synthesis of the cat, is the "pure, *a priori* synthesis of time." It is pure, because it is directed at just the temporal aspects of the perceptions. It is *a priori*, because it is necessary for the synthesis involved in perceiving the cat (the empirical synthesis directed at a concrete object). One should not get the idea that we must first put time as a whole together so that we can then put together the perception of a cat. Each phase is given as in time, and the pure synthesis is required to perceive some sequence of times as the time of the cat, the span in which the cat endures.

Thus, the perception of an object requires (a) having a temporal manifold of impressions of a temporal manifold of phases of the object, (b) taking those phases as phases of one object, by (c) unifying the impressions together into a perception of an enduring object; these all in turn require (d) the perception of the object as in a time span, which requires (e) the successive perceptions of the moments in which the object-phases are perceived, which finally presupposes (f) holding together all these moments as moments that make up the time of the object, the time through which the object endures. Element (f) is the pure synthesis of time, which is "exercised" *a priori*.¹¹ If any of these aspects of the perception of the cat were absent, Jones would be unable to perceive the cat, because she could not perceive the cat as an object enduring through a succession of moments of time, that is, as an object taking up time.

¹⁰ This apprehension, however, is not an independent or even separable apprehension. It is implicit in the empirical apprehension of the cat. Kant is investigating the forms of unity presupposed by the empirical apprehension of an object. He is not positing further apprehensions behind the ones we take ourselves to have.

¹¹ Since (as per the previous note) I understand the elements posited by Kant's analysis to be the forms of unity implicit in our mundane, empirical perceptions, let me cash out the term "exercised" (*ausgeübt*) thus: to say that this synthesis is exercised *a priori* is to say that the forms of unity expressed in it hold *a priori* for empirical perception. Thus, although I do not agree with Patricia Kitcher's reading of "synthesis" itself, I understand the transcendentality or apriority of synthesis the way she does (see 1982, p. 56). I see no need for Paul Guyer's analysis (1987, pp. 133–9).

Now, what is involved in the “holding together” that helps to make up the synthesis of apprehension? Kant argues:

When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise. (A102)

In order to hold together the various phases of the cat, to hold together the several successive impressions of cat-phases, Jones must reproduce the first impression while she experiences the second. That is, if she has impression I_1 at t_1 and I_2 at t_2 , at t_2 she must retain a grasp on I_1 . The problem here is created by the fact that the phases of the perception are successive. She cannot experience I_1 and I_2 together just by having them, because they do not occur together. To hold them together, she must, so to speak, bring I_1 along with her into the next moment. One of Kant’s more famous examples is that of counting (A103): If Jones resolves to count to 12 and, so, starts off, “1,” “2,” and so on, but while she says “2” does not remember that she has just said “1,” then she is not counting to 12. It would even be too strong to say that she is reciting a list of numbers. To recite a list of numbers, she must understand the entire action as a recitation of a list, and so she must, while she says “10,” remember that she has recently said “3,” for otherwise she would not be engaged in *one act of recitation*. Thus, if she “dropped out of thought” the earlier phase of the activity, the activity could not be an activity at all. If she did not retain a grasp on having counted “1,” then her counting of “12” would just be a saying of “12,” not the culmination of her counting to 12. And the same holds for a recitation of a list of numbers.

Similarly, Jones perceives several cat-phases. But she does not, of course, perceive each independently of the other. The first phase has significance for the second, and so on. Note that the point here is not that if she were not aware of her current perception-phase as part of (an attempt at) a representation of a cat, she could not be said to be representing a cat. We are not concerned here with the way self-consciousness enters into the very act of representation. Rather, the point is just that she

must have some memorial or quasi-memorial – I shall draw this distinction out in a moment – grasp on what she has perceived, in order that she be able to perceive what she is now perceiving as being what it is (falling under some concept, say, of a cat). This synthesis accomplished in memorial or quasi-memorial consciousness is the *synthesis of reproduction*.¹²

Kant analyzes Jones's grasp on the earlier phases as reproducing the earlier phases while perceiving the later ones. So, as she has I_2 at t_2 , she generates another representation, a reproduction of I_1 , at t_2 . At t_2 she has both I_2 and a reproduction of I_1 . She must remember the earlier phases, and this reproduction is just an act of remembering. I have hedged on whether to say “memorial” or “quasi-memorial”; Husserl will argue that the quasi-memorial consciousness needed here neither is nor could be reproductive memory. Husserl offers his concept of retention, of which more shortly, to do the work of Kant's reproduction.

As in the case of apprehension, Kant states that there is a pure version of the synthesis of reproduction. The pure synthesis of reproduction is involved in the perception of the time of an object, the perception of an objective time span. In this case, the synthesis works out to be Jones's remembering t_1 while perceiving t_2 . She must remember t_1 while she perceives t_2 , or else she could not perceive her cat as enduring through a span, because she could not perceive the span itself. The span extends from t_1 to t_2 , and to perceive this span she must remember t_1 at t_2 .

Kant then adds the third moment to this threefold synthesis:

If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. (A103)

¹² Guyer has suggested that Kant is arguing for considerably more here, namely, that “my representation of a manifold requires the *interpretation* of my present representational state as representing a temporal diversity of states” (1987, p. 149), and that this applies in the first instance to *self-awareness*. Thus, Guyer takes this passage at least to hint at the necessity for rules that govern our ability to fix the location of our own mental states in a temporal sequence. The position Guyer attributes to Kant is indeed one of Kant's views, but Kant is not adumbrating it here. Guyer himself does not take this passage from A99 to spell the argument out in any detail; he reserves that for the Refutation of Idealism. However, it is not plausible to ascribe this view to Kant here. That doctrine is a consequence of the view of synthesis outlined in the A-Deduction, when that view is applied to empirical self-awareness as well (and Kant does apply it there), but the argument from A99 concerns only the nature of synthesis itself.

Suppose that Jones merely reproduced the earlier impression at the later stage. Suppose, that is, that she just had two representations in her mind at once: I_2 and the reproduction of I_1 . Would that be the perception of a cat? No, for she must recognize them both as phases of her single perception of the cat. She must have some concept of how the phases of a cat hang together. Can the cat pop into and out of existence, can it do three and one-half backwards flips? In order to be able to connect the two impressions – I_1 and I_2 – together into the *one* representation of a cat, she must be able to bring them under her concept of a cat. They must recognizably be impressions of the phases of a cat. The *synthesis of recognition*, recognizing the phases as phases of an object (of this sort), is required to apprehend a temporal object.

Kant construes the unity of the phases of a cat as being rule-governed:

Thus we think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can always be represented. This unity of rule determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of apperception possible. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object = x, which I think through the predicates, above mentioned, of a triangle. (A105)

That is, it is a necessary condition on being a triangle that a figure have three sides, and so we can construe the concept of a triangle as a rule for identifying something as a triangle.¹³ This rule dictates how we can and cannot synthesize the manifold. If the temporal phases of a representation do not conform to the rules that constitute the concept of a cat, then it cannot be a representation of a cat. Kant takes all concepts to be rules, and thus he extends the analysis of the concept of a triangle to all concepts, including the concept of a cat.¹⁴

In his discussion of the synthesis of recognition Kant does not mention a pure, a priori counterpart. What does this show? Nothing but carelessness on Kant's part. Indeed, there must be a synthesis of the pure manifold of the time of an object. The concepts that effect this synthesis are the *categories*. This is a point that comes out far more clearly in the B-Deduction, but it is nonetheless present in A. He says,

¹³ Kant notoriously interprets concepts in general as rules. (For more on this topic, see Stern 1974.)

¹⁴ N.B.: this is different from whether there is a clearly specifiable essence to being a cat, for the rules here in question must govern my ability to make sense of cat behavior, and such government will far outrun the resources of a mere essence or definition.

In the understanding there are then pure *a priori* cognitions which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances. These are the *categories*, that is, the pure concepts of understanding. (A119)

What could such a synthesis be? That is, what sort of a concept is it that unifies a time span? Is it the concept of a time span? Not quite. The time spans that one perceives here are the time spans that are taken up by objects. The concept that must unify the pure synthesis therefore must be the concept of a *time of an object*. That is, it must be the concept of a time span insofar as that span is the time of an object. This is what Kant has in mind with the “concept of an object in general.” Kant believes that there are general and necessary features of the time span that any object can take up. These features are spelled out through the categories (see Kitcher 1987). For example, one of the concepts that unifies the time span is that of extensive magnitude, from which Kant infers, in the Axioms, that every object takes up time.

Above I mentioned that although Kant describes the synthesis of reproduction as a sort of memory – hence the term “reproduction” – there is good reason to say that it cannot really be memory. Husserl has provided the arguments here in his distinction between memory and retention. Husserl also fills out the Kantian analysis by emphasizing the important role played by retention’s anticipatory counterpart, protention. Let us now look at Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness in order to complete the historical contextualization and theoretical development of Heidegger’s views on disengaged temporality.

In Husserl we find formulated an argument for the claim that temporal synthesis is required in order that we can be aware of objects enduring through time. Let me here briefly lay out this argument from the opening paragraphs of section 2 of Husserl’s *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*.¹⁵ My goal is to use it as a device for digging out some of the premises that lie hidden within the thesis that consciousness of objects requires temporal synthesis. This thesis, shared by Kant and Husserl, is more clearly formulated in Husserl than in Kant, and the presuppositions of the thesis are far more explicitly presented by Husserl than by Kant.

¹⁵ Henceforth cited as “CW 4” in references and “Lectures” in the text. I shall quote the translation by John Barnett Brough, in vol. 4 of Husserl’s *Collected Works*, which in turn is a translation of vol. 10 of *Husserliana*, the German-language collected works of Husserl.

In §7 of his *Lectures* (CW4, pp. 21–5), Husserl offers his explicit argument for the necessity of temporal synthesis. He presents the argument as a way of mining the insights of two misleading, but partially correct, understandings of the way in which one can grasp temporal objects, that is, temporally extended objects as temporally extended.¹⁶ We can call the first thesis that of the “momentariness of consciousness,”¹⁷ and the second the “thesis of the specious present”¹⁸:

(MC) In order to comprehend any two things, A and B, in relation to each other, one must have one mental state, which exists in some Now, directed at A and B. So a fortiori, in order to comprehend A as preceding B, one must have one momentary mental state directed at both A and B.

(SP) The apprehension of two phases of an enduring object can be spread out through an enduring act of apprehension. The time of the apprehension is a specious present.

Each of these theses has an element of truth but misses a central feature of time-consciousness. (MC) correctly points out that in order to have a perception at t_2 of an object that endures from t_1 to t_2 , Jones must have more “in mind” at t_2 than just the contents of her sensory confrontation with what is before her at t_2 . A succession of perceptions is not a perception of succession, as we saw in our discussion of Kant. But (MC) does not explain how the experience at t_2 can comprehend temporally diverse contents. How is it that at t_2 we are aware of anything more than what we experience at t_2 ? (SP) tries to account for this, but does so in the wrong way. (SP) claims correctly that Jones’s perception at t_2 is a perception of a temporal object, and this temporal object is spread out through time, is temporally extended. The content of the perception is not instantaneous. Moreover, Jones’s perception of a melody, to use an example that Husserl used so effectively and famously, takes time, as does the melody. (SP) conceives, then, that in order for Jones’s perception of the melody to comprehend temporally diverse contents, it must itself be temporally diverse. It imagines that the temporal extension of the experience ex-

¹⁶ I shall henceforth use the phrase “temporal object” as short for “temporally extended object – whether a thing or event – as temporally extended.” Husserl: “By *temporal objects* in the specific sense we understand objects that are not only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in themselves” (CW4, p. 24).

¹⁷ Husserl cites William Stern for the name of the thesis, “the dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness,” on p. 22 of CW4 (see n. 3).

¹⁸ Husserl attributes this thesis to Stern himself (CW4, p. 22, n. 5).

plains the temporal extension of the contents. But that, of course, ignores the insight of (MC).

So, (MC) and (SP) indicate some genuine insights, but not only do they conflict with each other, but also neither can individually explain temporal awareness. They leave us with three desiderata to satisfy jointly in one theory of time-consciousness:

- i In order to apprehend A and B (a temporal manifold) in relation to each other, one must have one momentary apprehension directed at both A and B.
- ii One unitary apprehension can comprehend a temporally diverse range of contents (a temporal manifold).
- iii One unitary perception can itself be temporally diverse (a temporal manifold).

In order explicitly to tie the discussion back to Kant, I have reintroduced Kant's term "temporal manifold." Thus, Husserl's theory of time-consciousness aims to account for how a perception can both grasp a temporal manifold as a temporal manifold and do so in one instantaneous or momentary apprehension, as well as endure through time itself.

How does Husserl develop a theory that jointly satisfies (i) and (ii)? To satisfy both of them, Husserl needs a theory that shows how one can comprehend temporally diverse phenomena and do so in one moment of consciousness. To do this, he introduces the conception of a manifold of what he calls "retentions," "originary impressions," and "protentions." Let us work with the example of the perception of a melody, Husserl's example. Suppose that from t_1 to t_2 Jones listens to a melody. At t_1 she has before her mind the sensory content, A \flat . At t_2 she has F before her mind, and between t_1 and t_2 she has other notes before her mind. (i) forces us to the following choice: either she has all the notes before her mind at t_2 , or at t_2 she cannot be said to hear the whole melody, but rather only F. Husserl says,

The matter seems very simple at first: we hear the melody, that is, we perceive it, for hearing is indeed perceiving. However, the first tone sounds, then comes the second tone, then the third, and so on. Must we not say: When the second tone sounds, I hear *it*, but I no longer hear the first tone, etc.? In truth, then, I do not hear the melody but only the single present tone. That the elapsed part of the melody is something objective for me, I owe – or so one will be inclined to say – to memory; and that I do not presuppose, with the appearance of the currently intended tone, that this is

explanation, for everything we have said carries over to the individual tone. Each tone has a temporal extension itself. When it begins to sound, I hear it as now; but while it continues to sound it has an ever new now, and the now that immediately precedes it changes into a past. Therefore at any given time I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation. This seems to lead back to Brentano's theory. Here, then, a deeper analysis must begin. (CW 4, pp. 24-5)

Husserl first argues that this line of thought, taken through to its conclusion, entails that in fact one only perceives an instantaneous slice of a tone, a tone-phase. But this is counterintuitive, for we certainly would say that at t_2 one perceives the melody, or at least a tone, and not just an instantaneous tone-phase. In a similar, but clearer, passage in his *Experience and Judgment* (*EJ*), Husserl argues,

But the apprehending regard is not directed toward the *phase* actually sounding now, as if the sound which is apprehended were purely and simply the sound taken in this strictly momentary now. To lay hold of such a now, such a phase of duration, as a moment and to make it an object for itself is rather the function of a specific act of apprehension of another kind. If we apprehend the sound as enduring, in short, as "this sound," we are not turned toward the momentary and yet continuously changing present (the phase sounding now) but *through* and beyond this present, in its change, toward the sound as a unity which by its essence presents itself in this change, in this flux of appearances. (*EJ*, p. 107)

But how can this be? How can Jones perceive the melody, indeed even the tone, at t_2 ? Husserl answers by explaining that her current perception at t_2 of the melody is a continuous manifold of what he calls "retentions" and is capped off by an originary impression. The *originary impression* is the instantaneous sensory content which gives something *as now*. In the case of a melody, it would be, at each moment, the sensory presentation of some instantaneous phase of a tone or of silence. The originary impressional content at t_1 shifts continuously into a past content as time passes:

The tone-now present "in person" continuously changes . . . into something that has been; an always new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification. . . . The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the *impressional* consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new *retentional* consciousness. (CW 4, pp. 30-1)

So sensory content enters consciousness as impression and slides off or transforms itself into a past content. A *retention* is the consciousness of some content *as past*, or better, *as just having been*:

But it surely does belong to the essence of the intuition of time that in each point of its duration (which we can make into an object reflectively) it is consciousness of *what has just been* and not merely consciousness of the now-point of the object that appears as enduring. (CW 4, pp. 33–4)

As Jones has at t_2 the originary impression of F, she retains the content A \flat . This retention gives the A \flat *as just having been*, just as the originary impression gives the F *as now*. This accounts for how she can, *in an instant of consciousness*, be aware of a temporally extended object. She can be aware at t_2 of the melody from t_1 to t_2 , because at t_2 she does not just have the originary impression of F, but also the retention of A \flat .

What hangs on the difference between retention and originary impression? In §12 of *Lectures*, Husserl argues that retention is “a unique kind of intentionality” (CW 4, p. 33, from the title of §12). Retention’s intentionality is “unique” in the sense that it is a source of intentionality independent of originary impression.¹⁹ That is, consider the following account of retention as a foil to Husserl’s: What is given to consciousness is a manifold of sensory material. One must interpret some of this material *as now*, some *as just having been*. So at t_2 Jones is given both of the sensory contents, F and A \flat . She then interprets F as now and A \flat as just having been. (This act of interpretation would probably be something like Kant’s notion of subsuming content under concepts.)²⁰

Husserl argues that this cannot be the correct account. If at t_2 Jones were given both of the sensory contents, F and A \flat , she would not hear a melody, but rather two notes sounded simultaneously. Husserl tries to drive the point home phenomenologically through a contrast between a retention of A \flat and an impression of an echo of A \flat :

The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone “primarily remembered”²¹ in the now: it is not really on hand in the retentional consciousness. But neither can the tonal moment that belongs to this con-

¹⁹ The term is “*eigentümliche Intentionalität*” (see CW 4, p. 33). The concept can also be thought of as originary intentionality. It is a form of intentionality that originates or is ultimately responsible for a kind of intentionality. In the passage quoted above from CW4, p. 33, Husserl refers to “originary consciousness”; “*originares Bewußtsein*.”

²⁰ This would be one element of Guyer’s (1987) interpretation of Kant’s synthesis of reproduction.

²¹ “Primary memory” is another term for retention.

sciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it, pictorialize it; but that already presupposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. We cannot deny, of course, that there are echoes. But when we recognize and distinguish them, we can easily confirm that they obviously do not belong to retention as retention but to perception. The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and is absolutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just past. The echoing itself and after-images of any sort left behind by the stronger data of sensation, far from having to be ascribed necessarily to the essence of retention, have nothing at all to do with it. (*CW 4*, p. 33)

The point here is this: The distinction between echoes and genuine sounds, however hard it may sometimes be to draw, is one to be made between different ways of interpreting current sensory content. This is nothing like one's grasp on $A\flat$ as we hear F (in the melody). There is a difference between hearing the melody as involving $A\flat$ by retaining $A\flat$, and hearing the melody as involving $A\flat$ by hearing an echo of $A\flat$. If one confused the echo with a genuine sound being played by the musician now, one would hear it as two notes sounded simultaneously, not as a melody.²² This shows that the note $A\flat$, given in some way at t_2 , is not given by a sensory content. It is simply given as just having been and is integrated into one's unitary perception of the melody. Sensory content gives material as now; the only question about the sensory content is whether it is a genuine sound, or an echo, or an after-image, and so on.

Therefore, there is a difference in kind between originary impression and retention. Originary impression gives contents as now by means of sensory content before the mind. Retention gives contents as just having been and does not give them by means of sensory content. Intending some content ($A\flat$ in the example) as just having been is not a matter of interpreting some given sensory content as just having been, and so the givenness of $A\flat$ as just having been is not derivative of originary impression. It is an act that constitutes one's awareness of contents as just having been. This is (most of) what Husserl means by claiming that retention is "a unique kind of intentionality."

²² That is, the notes $A\flat$ and F would be heard as two notes sounded simultaneously, rather than as the melody $A\flat$ -F. According to Husserl's model, if one retained $A\flat$ and were also fooled by an echo of $A\flat$, one would hear the melody, $A\flat$ -(F and $A\flat$).

So at t_2 Jones has an originary impression of a tone-phase of the note F and a manifold of retentions that give her what she has just heard as just having been. That is, the manifold of contents she heard between t_1 and t_2 are given as having been by a manifold of retentions.²³ We have seen that the way to accommodate both of (i) and (ii) is to posit both originary impression and retention and to distinguish between them in the way that Husserl does: originary impression is the presentation of sensory content as now; retention is the presentation of nonsensory content as past. But what if what is retained is a sensory content, such as a tone? The point is that the retention is the intending of the-tone-as-past; it is not an intending of a tone (a given sensory content on hand in consciousness) that is then interpreted or construed as past.²⁴ This analysis is likewise to be extended to a primary form of expectation ("protention"), which intends some contents (or range of contents, more likely) as future, as coming, but is not the construal or interpretation of given sensory material as future. This leaves us, then, with a manifold of retentions and protentions along with an originary impression, and this manifold together makes up one's perception at t_2 of the melody from t_1 to t_2 , in fact along with protentions of what will or may come of the melody by t_3 .

Desideratum (iii), however, asserts that the perception of a melody can itself be temporally manifold; that is, one can have a perception of a melody from t_1 to t_2 that itself lasts from t_1 to t_2 . This is part of the truth that was supposed to be contained in (SP). So, how does Husserl account for the fact that Jones's perception of the melody is a steadily changing manifold of retentions, protentions, and originary impressions, which over time adds up to the changing perception of a changing melody? Here we must turn to Husserl's doctrine of the "sinking away" of contents into the retential manifold.²⁵

²³ Husserl is anxious throughout the early parts of *CW 4* to argue that this manifold of retentions is continuous: "Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum" (*CW 4*, p. 31). I do not want to investigate this aspect of Husserl's account, although it does have an important role in *CW 4*. See appendix I in the second part of part B of *CW 4* for Husserl's treatment of continuity as well as Izchak Miller (1984, ch. 6).

²⁴ The semantic content of the intentional state (what Husserl calls the "noematic sense") is the same, although qualified by a past tense. There is no sensory content, that is, no sensory filling that "animates" the state. (There is no sense-data or hyletic data, or if these concepts are dispensed with, we can say that there is no sensation going on.)

²⁵ "Herabsinken." Cairns (1973, p. 69) recommends "sinking into the past" for "Herabsinken," and Brough (the translator of *CW 4*) follows him. This is not quite right, however. The *Herabsinken* that Husserl means here is the sinking of contents into the retential manifold (he uses it to pick out line A-F in the diagram of time in Miller 1982, p. 135), and this

Husserl argues that the originary impression that presents a content to consciousness as now via sensory material immediately sinks away into retention; that is, it immediately changes over into a retention of the content (absent the sensory material). Recall, he argues:

The tone-now present “in person” continuously changes . . . into something that has been; an always new tone-now continuously relieves the one that has passed over into modification. . . . The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the *impressional* consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new *retentional* consciousness. (*CW* 4, pp. 30–1)

As Jones hears A_b at t_1 that content (A_b) immediately changes over into a retentional content of the A_b that has just been. As time passes, the content (A_b) slips further back into the retentional manifold. As the content sinks further back into the retentional manifold, it is given as “more past.” The depth in the retentional manifold constitutes intentionality of the depth of the past. This sinking away is a continuous modification of the content. Husserl also introduces, in passing and with little fanfare, the notion that the retentional manifold has a finite depth. After a while, one ceases to retain what has just been. Contents slip out of the end of the manifold, so to speak. Presumably, this depth is a variable matter, and Husserl does claim that it is conceivable that the retentional manifold be infinite and, thus, retain everything. This does not, however, seem actually to be the case (*CW* 4, p. 32, esp. n. 1).²⁶

So, desiderata (i), (ii), and (iii) are jointly satisfied by a doctrine that posits a continuously modifying retentional manifold that grasps contents as just having been, as well as introduces an in-kind distinction between originary impression and retention. The continuously modifying retentional manifold explains how at t_2 Jones can grasp A_b as just having been and then a moment later grasp it as just having been, where this having-been is a little “more past” than a moment before. It explains how she can be aware at t_2 of items as now *and* of items as just having been, and thus how in an instant she can have an intentional awareness of temporally diverse contents. The continuous modification of the manifold explains how the perception of the melody changes from t_1 to t_2 : contents sink

is not itself a form of sinking into the past. It is rather the sinking of contents into a manifold in such a way that they are grasped as (further) past. So I shall use “sinking away.”

²⁶ For a graphic presentation of this, see Husserl’s “diagram of time” (*CW* 4, p. 29). Better still is Miller’s version of the diagram (1984, p. 122). (For a condensed version of Miller’s account of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness, see Miller 1982.)

away deeper into the retentional manifold.²⁷ The in-kind distinction between originary impression and retention makes sense of the phenomenology of the process, showing how the grasp in an instant of temporally diverse contents need not be misconstrued as the interpreting of sensorily presented data.

We must distinguish not only between retention and originary impression, but also between retention and *reproductive memory*. Husserl distinguishes one's implicit grasp on the past from explicit acts of recollection or memorial reproduction. In order to make clear what retention is, let me contrast it with a series of other sorts of states.²⁸ First, as we saw above retention is not an after-image, echo, or anything like this. These are dying presentations of sensory content. If retentions were after-images, and if Kant is right that one must retain the just past in order to perceive the present, then all of one's perceptions would be clouded by trails, echoes, and the like. But clearly this is not so. Retention cannot be the presence of sensory content in one's perception. One grasps all sensory content as now, as present. After-images are grasped as present and as traces of what just was. Sometimes one mistakes after-imagery for real perception. This is possible, because the after-image is a sort of sensory content. Retention is not. After-images and echoes are unusual states of perception; retention is constitutive of perception as such.

Second, retention is not being reminded of something. If Jones is sitting in her study reading, and she hears her cat banging on the screen door, that reminds her that he is outside. She had forgotten that he was out there but was reminded of it. Consider also a similar phenomenon: something "ringing a bell." Suppose someone is reading a list of names to Jones, and one of them "rings a bell." Although she does not quite remember who this person is, her mind is taken, confusedly, into an attempt to call explicitly to mind a memory of a person. These examples rely upon either explicitly trying to direct one's mind to something that is not now present, or explicitly finding one's mind directed to something that is not

²⁷ Why is the perception of the melody lived through (*erlebt*) as one experience, rather than simply as a manifold of conscious states? Jones's retention at t_2 of A_b is also a retention of her consciousness at t_1 of A_b . She retains not only the object, but also her having perceived the object. (Thus, in Brough's words [1977, p. 94], Husserl "is evidently arguing from the premise that consciousness is self-consciousness.") In general, Brough's account of double-intentionality and absolute consciousness is the best and clearest account of this material. I am intentionally paying no heed to the distinction Brough draws between earlier and later versions of Husserl's theory of time-consciousness. Those details and distinctions are too fine-grained for my purposes.

²⁸ This is the work of §12 of Husserl's *Lectures*.

now present. They are explicit reachings-back into memory to pull something forward and make it conscious. They are not examples of retention either. As Jones sees a basketball shot five feet from the basket, this does not remind her of its having been ten feet from the basket: she is not thinking about its having been ten feet from the basket at all. She is just watching the shot. Moreover, it does not ring a bell with her, say, as similar to what it looked like ten feet from the basket. As she watches the ball travel from Magic Johnson's hands to the rim of the basket, and then drop through, she grasps each phase of the shot in the context of what she has seen and what she will see.

Third and finally, reproduction or recollection is not retention either. Reproduction can be more like a single image drawn up from past experience or more like reliving an entire sequence of events. In both cases, Husserl argues that in reproduction a past is given as then-present. As Jones relives an experience, traces it through its development from beginning to end, some point in the sequence of experiences is given as then-now. I use the curious term "then-now" because the now in the experience is not actually given as now *simpliciter*. It is given as now relative to the recollection, though, and this is a crucial fact about recollection as reliving. In the case of the single image from the past, it is given as then-now as well, although this character of it is not quite as important, because there is no sequence that is relived, phase by phase. Still, the reproduced image is loaded with then-retentions of what preceded it and then-projections of what will follow it. This character of the then-now reveals that every recollection brings with it its own manifold of then-originary-impressions, then-retentions, and then-projections. As Jones relives the shot by which the Lakers won game three of the 1987 NBA championship, she at one stage relives the phase of it in which Magic Johnson is letting go of the ball. This phase is relived in the context of what had then just happened and what was then just to come.²⁹ The then-now is relativized to the then-just-past and the then-just-to-come. Recollection has roughly the same internal structure as does perception, although this entire structure is relativized to a past.

Retention, however, is part of perception. It constitutes one's grasp on what has just happened, so that one can perceive things on the horizon of

²⁹ That it is a matter of what was then just to come, rather than what might then just come to be, is crucial in the case of recollection. Of course, the open-endedness of the future is not entirely obliterated, for reliving the shot still induces a weakened form of tension due to the possibility of Magic missing the shot. One relives expecting that the next phase will come, all the while conscious of the possibility that it *could well not have come*.

what has just happened. Moreover, it is implicit, not explicitly grasped by the mind. The object of a retention does not obtrude into one's field of vision, does not make up (some of the) sensory content of what one now sees (as do after-images and echoes). Neither does retention come with its own retentional and protentional manifolds (that would be a circular analysis), as does reproduction or recollection. Retention is not reliving or any of the other phenomena on that order. In order to perceive at all, Jones must "not drop out of her mind" what has just happened. This "not dropping out of mind," as Kant put it, is essential to all acts of perception. Memory, on the other hand, is an explicit calling back to mind of something one formerly experienced, and it involves its own manifold of (relativized) impression, retention, and protention. (Similar points can be made, *mutatis mutandis*, for protention and expectation.)

Now we are in a position, moreover, to see why Husserl introduces the term "originary impression," rather than use the term "perception," to pick out the presentation of sensory content as now. "Perception" is the entire state that apprehends the object. It contains within it an originary impression along with retentional and protentional manifolds. In the argument offered above that retention is not derivative of originary impression, Husserl relied upon the claim that at t_2 one perceives the melody. Since the melody endures from t_1 to t_2 , and since the content of what is given at t_2 makes sense in terms of what has just been, the perception cannot be just the presentation of current sensory content. Husserl at that point thus drives a wedge between the presentation of current sensory content and the perception of a temporal object. The former he calls "originary impression" and the latter "perception."

Husserlian Time-Consciousness as Disengaged Temporality

We were led into the discussion of Kant's and Husserl's theories of time-consciousness by Heidegger's references to them on p. 363 of *Being and Time*. In the midst of explaining what he has in mind by disengaged temporality, Heidegger refers to Kant and Husserl. Now that we have their theories on board, we can see how they fit into Heidegger's larger scheme. The references here to Kant and Husserl suggest the point of Heidegger's comment that "the discovery that belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of what is occurrent." Heidegger's argument – if it be elaborate enough to warrant such a term – is really just a wave of the hand toward the arguments of Kant and Husserl. Both Kant and Husserl argue that in order for Jones's perception to be

about a cat, it must submit to what Kant calls the “synthesis of recognition.” For example, Jones must anticipate that should she walk around the cat, she will see its backside, and so on. Her experiences must exhibit a certain sort of regularity, the sort implicit in the concept of an object of perception:³⁰

Thematizing [which is characteristic of our experience of the *occurrent*] objectifies. It does not first “posit” the entity [that is experienced], but rather it frees it in such a way that it is “objectively” questionable and determinable. (*S&Z*, p. 363)

If this coherence were not present, Jones would not be able to ask herself such questions as Was that a cat? After all, the “object” of her experience would lack the unity that would allow her to ask about *it*. What she *looks forward to* is the characteristic perceptual (disengaged) discoveredness of the object of her perception. Similarly, she must *retain* the past in such a way that her current perception makes sense. The perceptual experiences that culminate in her cat-perception have to exhibit the right sort of coherence. She cannot take the cat just to have popped into existence. Note that Kant and Husserl here demand not that her current experience have the right sort of ancestry (although as a matter of further analysis, they do demand this as well), nor that her future experiences be of items exhibiting the right sort of coherence. They demand that her *current* protentions of what will be and her *current* retentions of what has happened have the right sort of *content*. This is the argument to which Heidegger refers.

Heidegger’s disengaged “awaiting” is what Husserl calls “protection,” and the disengaged retaining “retention.” It is significant that what is anticipated and what is retained are of the same kind as what is enpresented. Recall that in the case of pragmatic temporality, Jones looks forward to the realization of her task, and she retains the wherewithal, while she enpresents the piece of equipment. There is a diversity here of the sorts of items aimed at by the several modes of temporal awareness. But in the case of the temporal structure of the perception of the *occurent*, what is awaited and what is retained are of the same kind as what is enpresented. There is no need here for the additional step of demonstrating the emergence of the future (and the past) as full-blown not-yet- and no-longer-Nows, as there was in the case of pragmatic temporality. Here the future to which Jones looks forward and the past that she retains are

³⁰ In Husserl’s framework, this work is performed by the noematic sense of the perception.

already understood as of the same kind as the Present. Each is a Now in which she has disengaged experiences. Let us call the Now in which one confronts disengaged objects the “disengaged Now.” We can see that its structure is importantly different from that of the pragmatic Now.

Disengaged Temporality as Leveled-Off Pragmatic Temporality

In Chapter 3 we saw that Heidegger believes both that pragmatic temporality is dependent on originary temporality (or to be more precise, on its ecstases), and that world-time is dependent on originary temporality (or its schemata). To understand this we needed to look at two arguments, one “on the side of the understanding,” the other “on the side of the understood.” We need to do the same here, for Heidegger believes not just that disengaged temporality is derivative of pragmatic temporality, but also that ordinary time is dependent upon world-time. We therefore have two further theses:

The Disengaged Temporality Dependency Thesis: *Disengaged temporality depends explanatorily upon pragmatic temporality.*

The Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis: *Ordinary time depends explanatorily upon world-time.*

Heidegger defends both Dependency Theses by arguing that disengaged temporality and ordinary time are “leveled-off” versions of, respectively, pragmatic temporality and world-time:

In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of Nows, datability as well as significance *are missing*. The characteristic of time as a pure succession does *not* allow either characteristic “to come to the fore” [*zum Vorschein kommen*]. The ordinary interpretation of time *covers* them *up*. The ecstatic-horizonal makeup of temporality [the temporality of concern, I assume], in which the datability and significance of the Now are grounded, is *leveled off* through the cover-up. (*S&Z*, p. 422)

What is the concept of *leveling off* here? Heidegger suggests that pragmatic temporality is modified by having some of its features “covered up.” The words “covered up” imply that the features persist but are simply not noticed. When we discuss the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis, we shall see that Heidegger in fact believes that the disengaged Now *is* the world-time Now with some of its features covered up or hidden. What we need to understand first is how the “cover-up” on the side of the understanding comes to be.

Heidegger seems to offer two accounts of the leveling-off of time. One account – the one adopted in her interpretation by Fleischer (1991) – suggests that ordinary time arises by way of the practice of using clocks:

If Dasein publicizes time along with the disclosedness of the world, and if, insofar as Dasein reckons with time in reckoning with *itself*, it also always already concerns itself with time along with the discoveredness of intra-worldly entities that belongs to the disclosedness of the world, then the comportment in which “one” explicitly orients oneself to time lies in the use of a clock. (*S&Z*, p. 420)³¹

Accordingly, how reads the definition of the *time* that is made manifest on the horizon of the circumspective, concerned use of a clock that takes time for itself? *It is the counted that shows itself in the enpresenting and counting pursuit of the moving arm [of the clock], in such a way, indeed, that the enpresenting temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting that are accessible in the horizons of the Earlier and the Later.* (*S&Z*, p. 421)³²

We call the world-time that is “sighted” in such a use of the clock “Now-time.” (*ibid.*)

I noted in Chapter 3 that using clocks belongs in the first instance to time-reckoning and, thus, to pragmatic temporality. But Heidegger here suggests a process whereby one ceases to see the clock’s “reading” of “12:00” as meaning lunch time and begins simply to count the Nows as they tick by. The more one is directly and exclusively concerned with the ticking away of moments as such, the more one levels off world-time by overlooking some of its features, notably datability and significance. But this account is incomplete at best, for it does not explain why it is that Dasein comes to be oriented to the ticking away of moments as such. For this reason, I suggest that this is not so much the explanation for the emergence of disengaged temporality that it appears to be, but rather, much more an attempt to show how *once disengaged temporality has already emerged*, an account of time primarily oriented to clocks makes sense.

³¹ I have taken some liberties with the torturous grammar here: “Wenn mit der Erschlossenheit von Welt Zeit veröffentlicht und mit der zur Erschlossenheit von Welt gehörigen Entdecktheit des innerweltlichen Seienden immer auch schon besorgt ist, sofern das Dasein mit sich rechnend Zeit berechnet, dann liegt das Verhalten, in dem ‘man’ sich ausdrücklich nach der Zeit richtet, im Uhrgebrauch.” I have put the if-clauses into the active voice, and thereby interpolated “Dasein,” because we do not have a natural passive voice construction for “to concern oneself with.”

³² The language of “counting” is introduced explicitly so as to connect with Aristotle’s definition of time.

To show how disengaged temporality emerges in the first place, Heidegger offers a second account, which ties the emergence of disengaged temporality (and ordinary time) to the ontology of the *occurent*:

This leveling cover-up of world-time, which consummates [*vollzieht*] the ordinary conception of time, is not accidental. Rather, precisely because the everyday interpretation of time maintains itself uniquely within the field of vision of concerned intelligibility and only understands what “shows” itself on this horizon, the structures [of datability and significance] must elude it [the everyday interpretation]. What is counted in concerned measurement of time, the Now, is understood along with the available and the *occurent* in [Dasein’s] concern [with those entities]. Insofar as *this* concern with time turns back upon [*zurückkommt*] the time that is understood along with [the available and the *occurent*] and “observes” it, it sees the Now, which indeed is also somehow “there,” on the horizon of *the* understanding of being by which this concern is itself constantly guided. The *Nows* are, thus, also in a certain way *occurent too*; that is, entities *and also* the Now encounter. Although this is not explicitly said, the *Nows* are *occurent* just like things, and so, they are “seen” on the horizon of the idea of *occurrence*. (*S&Z*, pp. 422–3)

The suggestion here is that disengaged temporality arises by understanding time just like one understands *occurent* entities. In other words, if one applies the same understanding of being to time that one applies to the *occurent*, one will arrive at disengaged temporality. In fact, this explanation involves a twofold development: first, we must see why there is a way of understanding time that is uniquely appropriate to the *occurent* and that ought to be understood as a leveled-off version of pragmatic temporality, and second, we must see why Dasein comes to think of that time as not just being *appropriate to* the *occurent*, but as *itself being* *occurent*. I shall put off discussing the second development until I explore the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis.

Heidegger does not do much to clarify the first of these two developments, which indicates, I suggest, that he takes the explanation to be rather straightforward. The best candidate for a reason why it would be straightforward would have to be that it parallels directly the emergence of the understanding of the *occurent* out of the understanding of the available.³³ If this interpretive strategy is to work, we must see how Heidegger might characterize the change-over from the available to the *oc-*

³³ That is, given that the topic here is obscure, not to say esoteric, the only explanation why it would be straightforward would have to be that Heidegger takes himself to have explained the matter *already*.

current as a *leveling-off*. Drawing on our discussion above of that change-over, we can easily see why he might call it a “leveling-off.” When Smith’s understanding of the entity before him changes over from an understanding of a spoon to an understanding of a hunk of wood, he levels off or covers up certain features of the spoon. He ceases to pay attention to those features of it in virtue of which it is involved in cooking, for example, its being appropriate for stirring. He comes to focus exclusively on features of it that are context-independent, such as its size, shape, color, or texture. Similarly, when Smith ceases to be engaged in cooking, and thus ceases to encounter the Now, the time to cook, he comes to encounter a disengaged Now bereft of significance and datability. The Now is no longer the right time to cook, and it is no longer the time just before dinner time, say. Features of both the entity before Smith and the Now he encounters are covered up or overlooked, precisely those features that belong to Smith’s engagement in the activity of cooking.

Let me raise two objections to this line of thought. First, the characterization of the change-over as leveling-off does not do justice to natural science’s autonomous contribution to Dasein’s understanding of the occurrent. At the end of this chapter, I shall argue that time, as discovered by natural science, is ordinary time supplemented by additional features, the most basic of which is mathematical determinability. The time of natural science, according to Heidegger’s conception, depends upon ordinary time, because it is an inflated or filled-out version of the latter. That natural science makes its own contribution to the understanding of time is no objection to either of the Dependency Theses as developed through the concept of the leveling-off of temporality, for Heidegger interprets natural science’s contribution as an augmentation of a conception of time that has already been leveled off.

Second, one might object to the terminology of “cover-up.” Is there something sinister, untoward, or even illusory about the change-over? The words “leveling-off” and “covering up” suggest a particular theory of the origin of the change-over, namely, that it is motivated by Dasein’s inauthentic flight from the anxious disclosedness of the sort of entity it really is. Some of Heidegger’s treatment of these issues implies that he is thinking in this way, but not all of it by any means. He writes,

The ordinary representation of time has its natural right. . . . This interpretation of time only loses its exclusive³⁴ and preeminent right, if it claims to supply the “true” concept of time and to be able to present the only possible horizon for the Interpretation of time. . . . The interpretation of the full

34 I do not know why he uses this adjective (*ausschließliches*).

structure of world-time, which is drawn out of [originary] temporality, first provides the clue for “seeing” the cover-up that lies in the ordinary conception at all and assessing the leveling-off of the ecstatic-horizontal makeup of temporality. The orientation to the temporality of Dasein at the same time makes it possible, however, to demonstrate the provenance and the factual necessity of this leveling cover-up as well as to test the ordinary theses about time in their own terms.³⁵ (S&Z, p. 426)

The ordinary conception of time “has its natural right”; that is, it is not false, illusory, or reprehensible in some way. Its origin is natural. It is a leveling-off, in the first instance just because it involves overlooking some of the constitutive features of world-time. It is a cover-up for the same reasons. It need not be seen, as Heidegger sometimes admittedly does see it,³⁶ as a *motivated* cover-up, an attempt to flee from the terrible truth of finite temporality. (Finite or nonsequential temporality embodies a difficult truth, because it is the sort of temporality appropriate to an entity that exists finitely, that is, that can die existentially, that can cease to be able to make sense of who it is, because everything it might be is equally irrelevant to it.) Here I frankly am asking the reader to ignore certain aspects of Heidegger’s text. I do so, however, both because Heidegger’s text involves divergent and conflicting lines of thought, and because I aim to spell out Heidegger’s philosophy of time without relying upon the implausible theory of the motivated cover-up.³⁷

One might ask here, Is this phenomenological priority of world-time over the disengaged sequence merely genetic? That is, does the defense of the Disengaged Temporality Dependency Thesis merely claim that if one is to experience the disengaged sequence, one must *first* experience world-time? The defense does not make merely a genetic claim. Dasein’s

35 This last clause refers to Heidegger’s account of how Dasein comes to think of time as endless, irreversible, and transitory (or becoming).

36 *The Concept of Time* deploys an especially strong version of the motivated cover-up account. In Chapter 2 I commented on the ways in which BZ’s portrayal of Heidegger’s thought is especially primitive.

37 Note that the motivated cover-up theory could fill the gap I identified above in the account of the origin of disengaged temporality out of clocks and counting Nows: one counts Nows, because one is hiding from the anxious truth about finite temporality. This is probably why Fleischer (1991) adopts the clock and counting story: she views ordinary time as a motivated cover-up. I find the motivated cover-up theory implausible enough that I do not want to tie the theory of temporality and time to it. *Note, finally, that even if one is convinced that the motivated cover-up account is needed to explain the leveling off of world-time into ordinary time, that does not entail that originary temporality is authentic. That is, ordinary time might be an inauthentic modification of world-time, whereas world-time, and the originary temporality upon which it depends, are modally indifferent.*

understanding of world-time does not just precede (or even just temporally encompass, in the sense of surround on both sides) its understanding of disengaged time. Rather, Dasein arrives at its understanding of the disengaged sequence by modifying its understanding of world-time, just as it arrives at its understanding of the occurrent by modifying its understanding of the available. That is what the change-over is: a modification in Dasein's understanding. It is not just that Dasein first understands the available and world-time, and then second understands the occurrent and ordinary time, as if there were simply two phenomena with only a tenuous, historical relation here. Rather, Dasein's understanding of ordinary time is a modification of its understanding of world-time. Of course, the word "modification" is doing a lot of work here, and one might question just what it is supposed to mean. After all, one can modify the design of a car, but it does not follow that somehow the second design is dependent on the first, as if it could not be arrived at independently of the first. Thus, we need a somewhat fuller development of this idea.

Dasein's encounter with the occurrent is an *interlude* in its ongoing encounter with the available, an interlude that *only makes sense* in terms of the background phenomenon. That is, Dasein could not understand the disengaged sequence without being able to understand world-time. This is because one cannot sustain an uninterrupted understanding of one's environment³⁸ as occurrent but must always revert back to world-time. The occurrent nature in which one can find oneself located has no practically significant locations or times in it. There is no time to eat, no time to rest, and so on. Dasein would never take any action whatsoever, if it were to find itself in a purely occurrent environment. Dasein's entire meaningful orientation to its environment, its orientation in terms of how and when to take action, is in terms of the existential and the available. Its meaningful orientation to time is in terms of originary temporality and world-time. Consequently, Dasein's experience of ordinary time is necessarily only an interlude in its experience of world-time.

From here it is only a short argument to the conclusion that the understanding of ordinary time depends on that of world-time. If one cannot sustain an understanding of ordinary time, but must always revert back to an understanding of world-time, and if one's access to ordinary time is by way of leveling off world-time, then the modification is dependent upon the modified, unlike in the car design case. In that case, the intuition is

³⁸ I do not mean this in Heidegger's technical sense (one's proximate world), but rather in a general sense, as "one's surroundings."

that the engineering team, say, might have developed the idea of the “fifth-generation” Honda Accord without ever having come up with the idea of the “fourth-generation” Accord. But consider how one might judge the situation if one found out (improbably) that one could not sustain the idea of the fifth generation, but had always to revert to the fourth generation. Assume (contrary to fact) also that the fifth-generation Accord is simply the fourth-generation model with several features added (intermittent rear wiper, cup holder, etc.). (This is more like the relation between various “trim lines” of a single model of a car.) One could in this case think of the fifth generation as a “spin-off” of the fourth and would be justified in saying that one’s understanding of it is dependent upon that of the fourth. And this is the situation with respect to ordinary time and world-time: ordinary time is a “spin-off” of world-time. Dasein always comes to confront an ordinary time Now by leveling off world-time, and Dasein cannot maintain this leveling-off, but must always return to the fuller bodied world-time in order to go about business.

Therefore, disengaged temporality – Dasein’s understanding of ordinary time – is parasitic upon pragmatic temporality, because it is a partial interlude in Dasein’s ongoing, background orientation to time as world-time. It is important to note that this argument concerns only the dependence of Dasein’s understanding of the *occurrent* upon that of the *available*, and not the dependence of the *occurrent* itself, the *understood*, on the *available*. It is consistent with the argument to this point that although Dasein cannot understand ordinary time except parasitically by way of understanding world-time, nonetheless, ordinary time is independent of world-time.

Ordinary Time as Leveled-Off World-Time

Spelling out the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis

But Heidegger wants and needs³⁹ the stronger claim too: ordinary time itself, and not just the understanding of it, depends on world-time (the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis). Heidegger’s clearest statements of this Thesis assert the dependence of ordinary time not just on world-time, but on *originary temporality*, or even Dasein. The stronger dependency

39 Without it, he cannot be a temporal idealist, and without it, the argument that *originary temporality* is a form of time (because it is the explanatory core of time as we know it) loses all force.

claim follows, of course, from the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis together with the World-Time Dependency Thesis:

The ecstatic-horizontal makeup of temporality, in which the datability and significance of the Now are grounded, is *leveled off* by this covering-up [of datability and significance]. (*S&Z*, p. 422)

In *Basic Problems* he writes,

There is no nature-time, inasmuch as all time belongs essentially to Dasein.
(*GP*, p. 370)

That is, there is no time that belongs inherently to nature independently of Dasein. As we shall see in Chapter 5, nature itself does not depend on Dasein. Nature is an occurrent entity, and Heidegger does not adopt an idealism about occurrent entities. (How he can avoid doing so will require much analysis.) Although nature is independent of Dasein, its time is not. That is, there is no nature-time. In *Introduction to Metaphysics* (*EM*) he declares,

There is, in itself, the possibility that humans not be at all. There indeed was a time when humans were not. But strictly speaking, we cannot say: there was a time when humans *were* not. In every *time*, humans were and are and will be, because time only temporalizes itself insofar as humans are. There is no time in which humans were not, not because humans are from eternity and to eternity, but rather because time is not eternity, and time only temporalizes itself in each case in every time as human-historical. (*EM*, p. 64)

Heidegger could not put the stronger thesis – that all time depends on Dasein – more clearly than this. How does ordinary time depend upon world-time?

Suppose, returning to an example from earlier, that Smith is contemplating his ex-spoon become hunk of wood. He must at the same time be using equipment. This means that while he stares at the hunk of wood, he is also confronting the Now that is the right time to cook soup. But insofar as he experiences the hunk of wood as merely occurrent, he confronts a disengaged Now. What is the relation between the pragmatic Now, the right time to cook soup, and the disengaged Now of the hunk of wood? One wants to say that they belong to the same sequence, or at least to the same sequence under two different descriptions. It is hard to imagine what might even be meant by claiming that there are two se-

quences here.⁴⁰ Let us work on the hypothesis that the two sequences are in some fashion the same sequence.

What is the relation between the two Nows, or the two descriptions of the same sequence? As we have seen, Heidegger believes that the disengaged sequence (ordinary time) is a leveled-off version of world-time:

In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of Nows, datability as well as significance *are missing*. The characteristic of time as a pure succession does *not* allow either characteristic “to come to the fore” [*zum Vorschein kommen*]. The ordinary interpretation of time *covers* them *up*. The ecstatic-horizonal makeup of temporality [the temporality of concern], in which the datability and significance of the Now are grounded, is *leveled off* through the cover-up. (S&Z, p. 422)

This passage, which I used above as an expression of the Disengaged Temporality Dependency Thesis, also expresses the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis. I discussed the leveling-off of pragmatic temporality into disengaged temporality earlier. Much of what I said then transfers to the present context: the difference between world-time and the disengaged sequence is that the disengaged Nows are neither datable nor significant, as the world-time (pragmatic) Nows are. Recall that it is datability and significance that contentfully distinguish the Nows from one another in world-time. Without these relations, the Nows of this disengaged sequence are *qualitatively alike*. Their content has been leveled off, flattened out:

[Ordinary] Nows are, as it were, shorn of these relations [of datability and significance] and, as thus shorn, line themselves up simply one after the other, in order to make up a succession. (S&Z, p. 422)

To clarify the matter somewhat, let me connect the leveling-off of time with the leveling-off of the available into the occurrent. Consider Heidegger's comment that

the unusable [thing] merely lies there – it shows itself as a tool-thing [*Zeugding*], which looks thus and so, and which in its availability was also constantly occurrent as looking thus and so. (S&Z, p. 73, quoted above)

When the ex-spoon becomes hunk of wood, Smith understands the hunk of wood as having been there all along. So if Smith takes the hunk of wood

⁴⁰ One is reminded of Kant's comment, “The appearances would then relate to two different times, and existence would flow in two parallel streams – which is absurd” (CPR, A188–9=B231–2).

to have been there all along, even though he does not confront the spoon as a hunk of wood, he also takes the disengaged sequence of contentless Nows to have been there all along, even though he had not confronted such a sequence while stirring with the spoon. Could there be a Now, which is the right time to cook, without the Now without content? If the disengaged Now just is the world-time Now without content, then the existence of the world-time Now entails the existence of the disengaged Now. After all, the guiding hypothesis (which I can see no way around) is that the “two” Nows are identical. In other words, the disengaged Now would be the world-time Now insofar as Dasein overlooks its content. It would not be a separate item bearing some queer relation to the world-time Now.⁴¹

Here we encounter a crucial disanalogy with the relation between the available and the occurrent. Just as earlier, one simply could not have this spoon in one’s hand unless one has this hunk of wood in one’s hand as well. (Does this entail that the spoon is really just a hunk of wood that Dasein interprets as having a certain function? In fact, Heidegger claims precisely the opposite: “*availability is the ontological-categorial determination of an entity as it is ‘in itself’*” (*S&Z*, p. 71). A spoon is in itself something that is available. It is not in itself a mere hunk of wood over which Dasein lays a functional interpretation.) But once the spoon has degenerated into ex-spoon and further into mere hunk of wood, *there is no longer a spoon there, just something that is occurrent*. But the same is not true of the “two” Nows in question here. One of the premises on which this discussion has so far proceeded is that even while Smith stares at the hunk of wood, he uses some (other) piece of equipment,⁴² and thus that he also confronts the Now insofar as it has content. He can never cease to confront the world-time Now (albeit not necessarily explicitly), as he can cease to confront the available spoon.

An Argument for the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis

None of this is yet to justify Heidegger’s claim that the disengaged sequence should be understood as a leveled-off version of world-time, in-

⁴¹ Thus, the relation between world-time and ordinary time, just like the relation between originary temporality and world-time, is not simple dependence. Instead, Heidegger must recur to explanatory dependence, which is why formulated both the Dependency Theses at issue in this chapter in terms of explanatory dependence. The leveling-off is the explanation here.

⁴² It does not matter whether that piece of equipment is assigned to the same task as the spoon.

stead of understanding world-time as an inflated version of the disengaged sequence. After all, Dasein's disengaged understanding of time might well depend on its engaged, pragmatic understanding of time, even while the dependency is reversed on the side of the understood, that is, even while world-time depends on ordinary time. What argument does Heidegger offer us for the Ordinary Time Dependency Thesis? Heidegger's basic pattern of argument is this: we can explain the primary features of ordinary time if we view it as derivative of world-time. In particular, we can understand the (what we shall see to be merely *prima facie*) continuity, irreversibility, and infinitude of ordinary time, if we see it as a world-time leveled-off.

Continuity

The sequence of Nows is unbroken and without holes. As "far" as we push forth into the "parts" of the Now, it is always still Now. One sees the constancy [*Stetigkeit*] of time within the horizon of an indissoluble [*unauflösbar*] entity that is occurrent. One seeks [to solve] the problem of the continuity [*Kontinuität*] of time, or better, one lets the aporia stand, in the ontological orientation to an entity that is constantly occurrent. Thus, the specific structure of world-time, that it is spanned at the same time as it has datability, remains *covered up*. The spannedness of time is not understood in terms of [*aus*] the horizontal *stretchedness* of the ecstatic unity of temporality, which has publicized itself in the concern with time. That in every instantaneous Now it is in each case already Now must be conceived in terms of what is *still* "earlier" and what every Now derives [*entstammt*] from: in terms of the ecstatic stretchedness of temporality, which is foreign to every [concept of the] continuity of the occurrent, but which in turn represents [*darstellt*] the condition of the possibility of access to an entity that is constantly occurrent. (S&Z, pp. 423–4)

Heidegger argues that the continuity of the disengaged sequence can be explained by appeal to the stretchedness of temporality. Crucial to the argument is Heidegger's construal of continuity as spannedness, in particular, as the spannedness of the Now from the Earlier to the Later-on, without break. Moreover, if the Now spans from the Earlier to the Later-on, and if the Earlier and Later-on are themselves Nows, as they must be in light of the iterativity of the Present, then they in turn span to Nows before them and after them. Thus, the unbrokenness of the Now stretches out into earlier and later Nows, and thereby into all of time.

But by what right does Heidegger offer his own account of continuity? After all, we have well worked-out, mathematical conceptions of con-

tinuity. Why do we need Heidegger's apparently Pickwickian concept? We shall see that Heidegger takes mathematical conceptions of ordinary time to be elaborations of more basic conceptual materials, elaborations that only become possible in virtue of the mathematical projection of nature that takes aim at the prior domain of the *occurrent*. (I shall have more to say about this shortly.) Here he tries to offer a conception of continuity that is premathematical and, therefore, plausibly appropriate to ordinary time in general, or as such: "The sequence of *Nows* is unbroken and without holes. As 'far' as we push forth into the 'parts' of the *Now*, it is always still *Now*." The mathematical projection of nature makes mathematical conceptions of continuity available to help us spell out the unbrokenness of the sequence of *Nows*.

Heidegger's account of continuity compresses a two-step analysis into one claim. It is a consequence of

(A) The spannedness of the disengaged sequence can be explained by appeal to the spannedness of world-time.

and

(B) The spannedness of world-time can be explained by appeal to the stretchedness of originary temporality.

(A) and (B) together entail Heidegger's thesis. We discussed (B) in Chapter 3, and thus we need only explore (A) here. (A) will satisfy us in our current inquiry, for it would suggest that we have something to gain philosophically by understanding the disengaged sequence as a leveled-off version of world-time. So let us look into (A).⁴³

Heidegger's idea seems to be this. The pragmatic or world-time *Now* is spanned, and when it is leveled off into the ordinary *Now*, the span remains as a residuum of the leveling-off. He portrays the leveling-off of world-time to involve the covering-up of the datability and significance of the *Now* (p. 422, quoted earlier); spannedness is not covered up. Nor, for that matter, is publicness. The ordinary *Now* retains its span and its publicness. Here it is important to see that the spannedness of the world-time *Now* does not depend upon its significance or datability. The world-time *Now* is not spanned because it is the right time to do *x*, nor is it spanned because it is dated by some event or thing. Rather it is spanned because

43 Gale (1963, pp. 227–9) is not right that Heidegger's argument turns on the question What holds time together? for this question assumes that there are independently existing *relata* to be held together.

originary temporality itself is a unity (see the explanation in Chapter 3). So the datability and significance of the Now can be covered up, whereas the span of the Now (and its publicness)⁴⁴ remain visible.

While in the grip of the ordinary conception of time, which overlooks the origin of ordinary time out of world-time, and the latter out of originary temporality, we do not understand *why* the ordinary Now is spanned (and public). Thus, an intellectual problem emerges within that interpretation, namely, to explain the spannedness or continuity of ordinary time. As Heidegger says, “One seeks [to solve] the problem of the continuity of time, or better, one lets the aporia stand, in the ontological orientation to an entity that is constantly occurring” (*S&Z*, p. 423). Because the explanation of the span of ordinary time is not understood from within the ordinary interpretation of time, the span of the ordinary Now must come to seem contingent or intellectually optional. The question can then arise whether the ordinary Now is unbroken and without holes, or whether instead Nows arrange themselves discretely. Much of the traditional problematic of the continuity of time emerges in this context. Heidegger, therefore, offers us an explanation not just of why the ordinary Now is spanned, but also why this is both problematic and questionable for the traditional discussion of time.

Inreversibility

However, despite all leveling-off and covering-up, originary temporality manifests itself in this in itself transitory, pure sequence of Nows. The ordinary interpretation determines the flow of time as an *irreversible* [*nicht-umkehrbares*] succession. Why does time not allow itself to be reversed? In itself, and precisely in light of an exclusive look at the flow of Nows, one cannot understand why the sequence of Nows should not now be able to be set into the opposite direction. The impossibility of reversal has its ground in the provenance of publicized time out of temporality, whose temporalization, primarily futural, “goes” ecstatically to its end, indeed so much so, that it “is” toward its end. (*S&Z*, p. 426)

Once again, Heidegger offers an explanation of the relevant feature of ordinary time by reference to some feature of originary temporality: the priority of the future. If the explanation is to work, however, it must traverse through world-time. So, just as above, world-time must have some feature, explained by the priority of the future in originary temporality, which in turn is leveled off into the irreversibility of the future in ordinary

44 The publicness of world-time rests on the publicness of originary temporality, which itself rests on being-with.

time. Let me suggest that the feature of world-time in question is itself an irreversibility, but a more robust irreversibility than that exhibited by ordinary time.

World-time is irreversible: one cannot “go backwards” through world-time, and the Great Depression will never come to be before the Enlightenment. Why? Heidegger argues (implicitly, if my analysis of the passage above is correct) that world-time is irreversible, because the future has priority in originary temporality. In what sense is the future prior or preeminent in originary temporality? We saw in Chapter 2 that this pre-eminence boils down to the determination of the contours and texture of originary temporality by the originary future, by the teleological directedness of pressing ahead. For example, the originary past is the determinate, affective givenness of one’s *for-the-sakes-of-which*. The originary past is the ground for the originary future. This is translated into world-time thus: the world-time past is the being already available (in the first instance, the reliability) of the wherewithal, so that one may aim for the realization of the task in sight. Therefore, there is a directional flow to world-time: the past must be already available, so that one might strive for the future. World-time flows from its past to its future, and it could not be otherwise. This specific sort of flow derives from the correlative features of originary temporality.

This irreversible flow of world-time is subsequently leveled off into the thinner sort of irreversibility characteristic of ordinary time. The Nows of ordinary time are contentless, and thus they are not associated with wherewithal and tasks. Yet they remain irreversible, simply irreversible, not contentfully irreversible. But why? Because ordinary time is leveled-off world-time, and irreversibility is proper and necessary to world-time. Just as with continuity, what this shows is that the irreversibility of ordinary time becomes free-floating and, thus, can become contingent, intellectually optional. The irreversibility of ordinary time is grounded in the irreversibility of world-time, which itself has to do with world-time’s contentful features and, in turn, arises from originary temporality. When the origin of ordinary time out of world-time is obscured, it is no longer obvious why ordinary time should be irreversible. Questions can then be raised about whether it really is irreversible, or whether irreversibility is an ineradicable illusion of our perceptual situation.⁴⁵

45 Here Heidegger has competition from traditional metaphysics of time: causal theories of time sometimes purport to explain the irreversibility of time in terms of the directionality of causality. An unusual version of this may be found in Leibniz’s philosophy of time. I shall discuss Leibniz’s theory, and his explanation of directionality, in Chapter 5.

Infinitude

Most urgently, the central thesis of the ordinary interpretation of time, that time is “endless” [or infinite, *unendlich*], manifests the leveling-off and covering-up, which lies in such an interpretation, of world-time and thereby of temporality at all. Time gives itself primarily as an unbroken sequence of Nows. Every Now is also already just-now [*Soeben*] and also a forthwith [*Sofort*]. If the characterization of time focuses primarily and exclusively *on this sequence*, then no end and no beginning may be found in it as such. Every last Now is *as Now* in each case always *already* a forthwith-no-longer, thus, time in the sense of no-longer-Now, of bygones [*der Vergangenheit*];⁴⁶ every first Now is in each case a just-now-no-longer, thus time in the sense of not-yet-Now, of the “future.”⁴⁷ Time is, therefore, endless “on both sides.” This thesis about time only becomes possible on the ground of an orientation *to a free-floating in-itself of an occurrent sequence of Nows*, whereby the full phenomenon of the Now, with respect to datability, worldliness, spannedness, and Dasein-like publicness, has been covered up and has sunken away into an unrecognizable fragment. (*S&Z*, p. 424)

Heidegger’s explanation here of the endlessness of the ordinary Now is more complex, and superficially more puzzling, than the explanations of continuity and irreversibility. Heidegger seems to portray the endlessness of ordinary time as a consequence of covering up its connection with world-time, which in turn implies that world-time is not endless, that it is finite. But what can “finite” here mean? If it means finite in the sense of having a beginning or end (or both), then the suggestion would be that world-time has a beginning or end (or both). Perhaps the idea would be that because time is significant in virtue of Dasein’s time-reckoning, before Dasein existed, and after it passes away, there would be no world-time. In which case, of course, world-time is finite (in this sense). If this is what Heidegger means, we have found an awkward result for my interpretation, for, after all, we would seem to be in the position of asserting that the leveling-off of world-time into ordinary times creates ordinary times (those before Dasein’s emergence and after its demise) that do not belong to world-time. But at best this sits at odds with saying that there is only one sequential time, that world-time and ordinary time are the same

46 The bygone (*das Vergangene*) is what has gone by, what has slipped into the sequential past. Heidegger uses the term to contrast with beenness (*Gewesenheit*) and with the Dasein that has been there (*dagwesenes Dasein*). Beenness is the originary past; bygones is the sequential past.

47 “Future” is scare-quoted, because it is not the originary future (*Zukunft*), but rather a Now to come, a sequential future.

sequence, but understood differently. So might Heidegger mean that world-time is finite in the technical sense in which the term is used to describe originary temporality? No, he cannot mean that, for as we saw in Chapter 2, the finitude of originary temporality is its non-sequentiality. Let me try to reconstruct a more suitable reading of the passage.

World-time must be in-finite, end-less, in the technical sense of Chapter 2, for it is successive, sequential. But this sense of end-lessness does not directly imply infinitude, or endlessness, in the sense of proceeding sequentially without limit (in both directions, of course). Let me call the first sense “endlessness” and the second “infinity.” Because world-time is endless (sequential), every bygone time is a Now with its own horizons of past and future. Thus, every no-longer-Now has a no-longer-Now relative to it. And the same may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, for the future. Thus, sequential time appears to be infinite. Is world-time infinite, or only ordinary time? Heidegger argues that time shows up as infinite, “if the characterization of time focuses primarily and exclusively *on this sequence*,” viz., the Now-sequence. So if one focuses on the sequentiality of time, one will be led to assert its infinitude. But Heidegger implies that this assertion is made possible by a cover-up of the definatory features of world-time. Why? The contrast seems to be between focusing on the sequentiality as such, to the exclusion of all else, and keeping all of the features of world-time in view. The suggestion is, thus, that infinitude first becomes an issue when we grow distracted or absorbed in sequentiality. But Dasein cannot become so absorbed, while it is oriented to world-time, for that requires an engagement with the other dimensions of the world-time Now, such as significance.

Therefore, on a closer examination, Heidegger does not actually assert that ordinary time is infinite, nor does he deny that world-time is infinite. Rather, he is describing how the question arises, whether time is infinite, namely in virtue of an absorption in the sequentiality of sequential time. And so, the final two sentences also put the bulk of their weight upon the course of our reflections, not on features of time:

If “one thinks,” in orientation to being-occurrent or not-being-occurrent, the sequence of Nows “to the end,” then such an end cannot be found. From this, that *this thinking* time to the end *must always still think* time, one concludes that time is endless [infinite]. (*ibid.*)

The sequentiality of time cannot be thought through to the end, and thus we infer that there is no end to time. Heidegger here actually simply borrows a pattern of argument from Kant’s Antinomies: we are obliged to

press ahead in thought from conditioned to condition, in this case, from a Now to its limit, and from this limit, conceived itself as a Now, to its limit. Our need to think time out strives for completion, and because the series can never end, we must posit it as infinite. (The argument is much like the arguments for the antitheses in Kant's Antinomies.) Heidegger tries to assimilate this pattern of argument into his framework. The assimilation is attempted by taking the cover-up of the finitude of originary temporality, which hides the origin, and thus the explanation, of world-time, to allow one to focus exclusively on sequentiality at the expense of all else. But it remains unclear why we should feel impelled to think this sequentiality through "to its end," as Heidegger says, that is, to its completion. Kant does have an explanation for this, but it belongs to his theory of reason; Heidegger cannot rely upon it. We should, therefore, conclude that this argument not only antedates *Being and Time* (which is no objection to Heidegger using it, after all) but is also incomplete outside its Kantian context. Heidegger's attempt to use it for his own purposes is misguided and unworkable.

In general, Heidegger's argument for his thesis that ordinary time is leveled-off world-time amounts to this: it has explanatory power. Heidegger believes he can explain features of ordinary time that are otherwise hard to understand or explain. But one might object that although Heidegger has produced explanations of continuity, irreversibility, and maybe infinitude, they are not necessarily the *only* explanations of those characteristics. In fact, has not it been one of the outstanding goals of the philosophy of time precisely to explain those features of time (or perhaps explain them away), and have not other theories offered explanations? Yes, they have. Here we must say two things on Heidegger's behalf. First, Heidegger does not presume to offer the *only* explanations of continuity, irreversibility, and infinitude. All he needs to do is offer explanations that can show how it is plausible to view ordinary time as world-time leveled off. Second, he has an account of why it can come to seem intellectually optional to explain these features of time, or why one might find it permissible to explain them away: once the origin of ordinary time out of world-time is overlooked, the reasons why ordinary time should seem to be continuous, irreversible, and infinite are lost from view.

The Ontological Leveling-Off of World-Time

In the previous section we saw that Heidegger claims not only that world-time is leveled off into ordinary time by being stripped of its significance

and datability, but also that it comes to be seen as itself occurrent, rather than just as the temporal framework of the occurrent. Time belongs on the “being side” of the Ontological Difference (which is why Heidegger writes not that “time is,” but rather that “time temporalizes itself”),⁴⁸ but the leveling-off of world-time ultimately moves it onto the “entity side” of the Difference. World-time belongs to the framework of the world: it belongs to the structure of significance, which is itself the *worldliness* of the world:

we call the time that is publicized in the temporalization of temporality *world-time*. And we do not call it this because it is *occurent* as an *intraworldly* entity, which it can never be, but rather, because it belongs to *the world* in the existential-ontologically interpreted sense. (*S&Z*, p. 414)

World-time is not an available entity, but rather a dimension of the being of the world. But when the significance of the world-time Now is covered up in the leveling-off, time’s connection to the being of the world is also hidden. “The *Nows* are thereby [i.e., through the leveling-off] also in a certain way *occurent too* [mitvorhanden]: that is, entities *and also* the Now show up” (*S&Z*, p. 423). Heidegger also refers to the ordinary conception of time as that of “*a free-floating in-itself of an occurrent sequence of Nows* [*eines vorhandenen Jetzt-Ablaufs*]” (*S&Z*, p. 424). Time, thus, comes to be seen simply as a something with certain features. It is turned into an entity. But why an occurrent entity, rather than some other ontological sort? Simply because the understanding of being in terms of which Dasein understands things as it levels off world-time is the understanding of the occurrent. World-time loses not only its datability and significance, but also its belongingness to the being of the world. It becomes another, albeit important, occurrent entity in nature. So its status as ontological is leveled off to the ontic. It is, we may say, “ontologically leveled off” as well.

Ordinary Time, Natural Science, and the Mathematization of Time

We saw that Dasein shifts from understanding things as available to understanding them as occurrent during the “change-over.” I pursued the change-over up to the point where Dasein is poised to broach natural science. Ongoing activity breaks down, and Dasein is left staring at a hunk of decontextualized wood and metal. The most significant move on the way from everyday life to natural science is a decontextualization that

⁴⁸ See note 54 in the Introduction.

"releases" entities from their reference to human practices and tasks. In order to be able to grasp these entities scientifically, as opposed to just stare at them out of context, we must – as Dreyfus has pointed out (1991, p. 81), relying on a widely accepted tenet of contemporary thinking about science – reorder⁴⁹ them in terms of some theoretical framework. There is no such thing as theory-neutral observation or scientific practice. This new framework, Heidegger argues, is not task-oriented. The reordering of globs of earth in terms of mass, force, and so on does subject them to a holistic framework by means of which they are grasped and dealt with by scientists. But that framework does not stipulate that globs of earth are "in order to" throw at a friend, for instance. It does not specify the purpose of its objects, or at least, it has refused to do so since the Scientific Revolution, when final causes were driven from scientific theories.

What becomes of the understanding of time, when natural science, particularly mathematical physics, comes on the scene?

The classical example of the historical development of a science is the rise of mathematical physics, but it is also at the same time an example of the ontological genesis of a science. What is decisive for its unfolding lies neither in a higher regard for the observation of "facts," nor in the "application" of mathematics in determining natural processes – but rather in the *mathematical projection of nature itself*. This projection discovers in advance something that is constantly occurring (matter) and opens the horizon for being guided by a regard for nature's quantitatively determinable, constitutive moments (motion, force, location, and time). . . . In the mathematical projection of nature what is likewise primarily decisive is not the mathematical as such, but rather that it *discloses* an *Apriori*. (S&Z, p. 362)

That is, the single most important feature of mathematical physics, as a science, is its understanding of nature as something that is "written in the language of mathematics." It is constitutive of mathematical physics that it understands naturalness as involving mathematical determinability. This is part of what counts as natural, part of the being of the natural (which is why Heidegger says that the mathematical projection *discloses*, rather than *discovers*). Heidegger has much (that is very compressed) to say about the "full existential concept of science" (S&Z, p. 363), but we already have what is relevant to the discussion of time on the table. Natural science

⁴⁹ In (1991) Dreyfus uses the term "recontextualize." This is confusing, however, since the new "context" is not a pragmatic context, and thus the properties objects within it have are not "context-dependent." Dreyfus (in correspondence) suggested "reorder" to me as a replacement term.

supplements the understanding of what is occurrent with additional features (that is, its concepts include the concept of the occurrent and more), the most basic of which is mathematical intelligibility. The understanding of the occurrent is more basic than that of nature and is an element of it. Dasein must already have the notion of the occurrent in order to be able to conceive nature (as projected by physics).

Let me give an example of how this characteristic of the mathematical projection of nature turns up in the discussion of time. Phenomenologically, world-time and ordinary time are continuous, because the Now spans up to the then and back to the formerly; both world-time and the disengaged sequence are "unbroken and without holes," as Heidegger says. But the classical discussion of time takes continuity to be a mathematical feature of time; witness the discussion of Zeno's paradoxes, for example, in terms of mathematics and set theory. Most often the understanding of continuity as a mathematical feature of time is not even discussed as a presupposition. It is taken for granted. Why? Because these discussions of time proceed within the horizon of an "a priori"⁵⁰ mathematical projection of nature. The traditional discussion of time in philosophy is directed either toward ordinary time as such or toward a supplementary projection of time, usually a mathematical one. What is essential for our interests here is that the latter discussions are conceptually dependent upon the understanding of ordinary time. And if Heidegger's explanation of ordinary time is correct, then both sorts of traditional discussion are secondary to Heidegger's.

In conclusion, ordinary time depends explanatorily upon world-time, for it is a leveling-off of world-time. This entails that ordinary time depends ultimately upon originary temporality, for world-time itself depends on originary temporality. This in turn implies that Heidegger is a temporal idealist, that is, one who believes that time depends upon human beings (in this case, Dasein). Without Dasein (and hence its temporal form of being), there would be no other modes of time. Next I shall turn to an explicit development of the theme of temporal idealism in *Being and Time*.

⁵⁰ A priori not in Kant's sense, that is, not as something that is necessarily true and knowable independently of fact. Rather, the mathematical projection of nature is a priori in the sense that it is required, if we are to experience nature. It is phenomenologically a priori.

HEIDEGGER'S TEMPORAL IDEALISM

Dasein, conceived in its extreme possibility of being,¹ is *time itself*, not *in time*. (*BZ*, p. 19)

Not: time is; rather: Dasein temporalizes qua time its being. Time is not something that occurs somewhere externally as a framework for worldly occurrences; time is just as little something that rattles along somewhere in consciousness; rather, it is what makes possible being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-amidst, i.e., the being of care. (*PGZB*, p. 442)

time is not only and not primarily the schema for determining the ordering of changes, but rather, is actually² Dasein itself. (*LFW*, p. 205)

So, when we have shown that the “time” that is accessible to Dasein’s intelligibility [viz., world-time and ordinary time] is *not* originary and, what is more, that it arises out of authentic³ temporality. . . . (*S&Z*, p. 329)

1 *BZ*, as noted in Chapter 2, conceives death, and thus Dasein’s unique form of time too, as an authentic phenomenon.

2 The adjective here is “*eigentlich*,” which there is not much reason to suppose Heidegger is using technically. *BZ* interprets death, nullity, and Dasein’s own form of temporality as authentic. I should like to say that by his writing of *LFW* Heidegger has come around to the view that they are modally indifferent, but *LFW* does not treat Dasein’s own form of time in sufficient depth for us to be able to tell. In §15 he argues that if he were to digress into what he later calls “originary temporality,” he would not be able to come back around to the topic of the lecture series.

3 See my discussion of Dahlstrom’s interpretation of this passage in Chapter 2.

first we are to understand that temporality, as ecstatic-horizontal, temporalizes something like *world-time*, which [in turn] constitutes the intratemporality of the available and occurrent. (*S&Z*, p. 420)

There is no nature-time, inasmuch as all time belongs essentially to *Dasein*. (*GP*, p. 370)

There is, in itself, the possibility that humans not be at all. There indeed was a time when humans were not. But strictly speaking, we cannot say: there was a time when humans *were* not. In every *time*, humans were and are and will be, because time only temporalizes itself insofar as humans are. There is no time in which humans were not, not because humans are from eternity and to eternity, but rather because time is not eternity, and time only temporalizes itself in each case in every time as human-historical. (*EM*, p. 64)

In these passages Heidegger states clearly that he is a temporal idealist. He argues for the thesis that time as ordinarily understood ultimately depends upon originary temporality. I interpreted the dependence in question to be an explanatory dependence, since the simpler notion (which I called "simple dependence" in Chapter 3) of asymmetrical requirement cannot be sustained. Instead, the features that make up originary temporality are modified so as to constitute world-time; world-time turns out to be a modified, derivative form of originary temporality. Now, since originary temporality is the mode of time that structures *Dasein*'s being, and since therefore it obtains as the form of *Dasein*, time is explanatorily dependent upon an essentially human phenomenon. Time requires *Dasein*.

Unlike Kant, Heidegger does not trumpet his temporal idealism, and for this reason it is easy to overlook just how strong a theory he is advancing. Why did Heidegger not call himself a "temporal idealist"? We can see three reasons. First, his account leads him to classify originary temporality as a form of time. Ordinary time and world-time, therefore, depend upon a deeper form of *time*, not on something nontemporal. This first reason strikes even deeper, when we conjoin it with the second reason: he is not inclined to write quite literally that time depends on *Dasein*, for after all, originary temporality does not exactly *depend* on *Dasein*. Rather, originary temporality is the "sense of the being of *Dasein*," that is, the temporal framework in terms of which the manifold elements of *Dasein*'s being make sense and win a deep unity. In fact, originary temporality explains *Dasein*, more than the other way about. Something like a literal temporal idealism would come more clearly into focus, if originary temporality did depend on *Dasein*, for then the chain of explanatory dependencies would

hit bottom with Dasein itself, and not just originary temporality. Nonetheless, without Dasein in the picture, originary temporality would not obtain,⁴ and for this reason, something like temporal idealism is in the offing. Third and finally, “temporal idealism” implies that time depends on ideas, on a Cartesian-Kantian-Husserlian subject. But, of course, Dasein is not such a subject.⁵ Thus, Heidegger’s formulation of his position is far more indirect and technical than, say, Kant’s. He expresses it in the difficult passages just quoted. Perhaps this explains why temporal idealism has not played a large role in commentary on *Being and Time*. Despite all this, we can see that Heidegger is committed to a thesis that in somewhat less technical language can easily be described as an “idealism” about time:

Temporal Idealism: *If Dasein did not exist, time would not obtain.*⁶

It is true that Heidegger sometimes seems to waver a bit with respect to temporal idealism. Dreyfus (1991, p. 259) quotes him saying, in his Summer Semester 1928 lectures, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (MAL), that

the question of the extent to which one could conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way . . . is a question that I am myself not able to decide, one which is still completely dark to me. (MAL, p. 271)

Heidegger here confesses uncertainty about temporal idealism. But this should not be surprising, because, after all, the arguments that I have been presenting for temporal idealism do not obviously achieve their goal. In fact, I have suggested, they fail. Heidegger was no doubt aware of their difficulties, and those difficulties seem to have led him, in unusual candor, to grant that his temporal idealism and its broader consequences might not be sustainable. It is also unsurprising that if he is to admit such a thing anywhere, it would be in lectures given during the very time when he should have been thinking through the crucial, outstanding part of *Being and Time*, division 3 on “Time and Being.” Perhaps the failure of division 3 ever to appear and Heidegger’s subsequent abandonment of

⁴ Recall that time neither is, nor is not, because it is ontological, not ontic. It falls on the being side of the Ontological Difference. See note 54 in the Introduction.

⁵ Heidegger says as much on p. 259 of *Contributions to Philosophy* (BzP). I discuss the passage in note 42 in the Conclusion.

⁶ This last claim is, of course, compatible with its converse, which also happens to be true, since Dasein (originary temporality) and ordinary time mutually require each other.

temporal idealism, of which more in the Conclusion to this study, are products of his having seen the insuperable difficulties with which the theory of *Being and Time* is plagued. On the other hand, we find perhaps his strongest statement of temporal idealism in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* from 1935. In his early thought, dating from at least 1924,⁷ Heidegger appears committed to temporal idealism, though uncertain just how to carry it out.

Heidegger's temporal idealism places him in a venerable tradition. In this chapter I shall explore the historical context and philosophical ramifications of Heidegger's temporal idealism. I shall first try to illuminate the ways in which Heidegger's idealism is indebted to Kant, Plotinus, and Bergson, and I shall use Leibniz as something of a preparatory figure for both Plotinus and Kant. Heidegger is indebted to Kant, on the one hand, and Plotinus and Bergson, on the other, in two quite different ways. From Kant he inherits and modifies the framework of transcendental idealism. From Plotinus and Bergson he gains the resources to develop a specifically explanatory idealism, that is, an idealism whose central tenet is that time depends upon humans explanatorily. I then want to explore the role of Heidegger's idealism in *Being and Time* and to reflect on the significance for that treatise of the argumentative failure I identified in Chapter 3. Heidegger argues for his famous thesis that being depends on Dasein on the basis of temporal idealism. He also claims to be able to clarify the unity of Dasein and world in terms of insights that depend argumentatively upon temporal idealism. Thus, both those claims collapse along with temporal idealism. In the Conclusion to this study I shall offer some reflections on what remains of *Being and Time*'s ontology, once we have removed temporal idealism and all that depends upon it.

Heidegger's Transcendental Idealism

Idealism and the Two Standpoints in Kant

Kant enframes his discussion of the reality or ideality of time within a distinction between two standpoints from which one may ask about the status of natural things. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he distinguishes the empirical or human⁸ standpoint from the transcendental standpoint. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, he writes,

7 The list of quotes that begin this chapter starts with BZ (1924).

8 He uses the term "human" at A26=B42, while discussing the ideality of space.

If we abstract from *our* mode of inwardly intuiting ourselves – the mode of intuition in terms of which we likewise take up into our faculty of representation all outer intuitions – and so take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. (*CPR*, A34=B51)

From the human standpoint there is time outside, or independent of, the mind. But the human standpoint is not the only one we can occupy. We can abandon this standpoint and take up a different standpoint, namely, the transcendental standpoint, which does not share the assumptions of the human standpoint. When we do this, we are considering things as they are in themselves. From the transcendental standpoint there is no time independent of the mind. Kant speaks of time as *empirically real* and *transcendentally ideal*.

More specifically, the empirical reality of time appears to rest on the objective validity, with respect to all objects of our intuition, of the representation of time: “What we are maintaining is, therefore, the *empirical reality* of time, that is, its objective validity in respect of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses” (*CPR*, A35=B52). This is to say that given the conditions for the possibility of human intuition, or “sensibility” – that is, sensory experience as of objects – every object we experience we must experience as in time.⁹ This amounts to what Henry E. Allison calls the “apriority thesis” (1983, p. 82), viz., that time is an a priori form of the represented in all human intuition. To be a “form of the represented” is to be an ordering exhibited by objects of intuition¹⁰ (*CPR*, A20=B34). For this form to be a priori is for us to be able to know a priori that objects will conform to or exhibit it. Kant’s term for the a priori form of the represented is “the form of appearance” (*ibid.*). In this case, all objects are represented as before, or after, or simultaneous with one another, as occupying a place in time. Because time is an a priori, and hence necessary, form of appearance, any object that can be given to us in intuition will be given as in time. We can know a priori that the representation of time will apply to all such given objects, and thus, that that representation is “objectively valid.”

Yet time is nonetheless transcendentally ideal, because if “we abstract from *our* mode of . . . intuiting . . . , and so take objects as they may be in

⁹ Kant by and large does a poor job of motivating this premise. I shall exploit this fact shortly.

¹⁰ I have elided the distinction between representation and intuition or sensibility, although it is important within a more developed Kantian context not to do so. In the end, however, the conditions of human intuition or sensibility constrain human representation at large, because human understanding must take as its material the representations of sensibility. I touch on this issue in my discussion of the dependence of being on Dasein in Heidegger.

themselves, then time is nothing" (*CPR*, A34=B51).¹¹ This is to say that if we think about things as they are regardless of whether they are or can be objects for our intuition, then we must deny that they are in time. Kant seems to think that it is impossible that time should be both an *a priori* form of appearance and a real thing, or form of things, subsisting of itself independently of human powers of intuition. But it is difficult to say just why he thinks this. Allison (1983, pp. 104–11) does an excellent job explaining why Kant can plausibly take himself to have excluded Leibnizian and Newtonian alternatives to his view, but Allison is less persuasive (1983, pp. 111–14) in explaining how Kant could exclude this so-called neglected alternative (and Allison's is the best attempt of which I am aware to resolve this difficult issue). The neglected alternative is precisely the possibility that time be at once a form of appearance and a form of things as they are in themselves. Allison's reconstruction of the argument seems to rest on the following inference: if we grant that time is a form of the represented, then we have built a reference to the human mind into the very *concept* of time. Hence, it makes no sense to ask whether time could also be a form of things as they are in themselves:

The key point, however, is that such a form [of the represented], like Kant's form of sensibility₂ [i.e., "a form of *objects qua sensibly intuited*"; p. 107], pertains only to what is represented in virtue of a specific mode or manner of representing. A reference to mind and its capacities is, therefore, built into the very notion of such a form. (Allison 1983, pp. 112–13)

But this is a fallacious argument, essentially a sense-reference confusion. An analysis of "the very notion" of *a form of appearance* (or of the represented) involves a reference to the mind. The concept of time is not, however, the same *concept* as the concept of a form of appearance. Kant has only provided reason to believe the two concepts to be co-referential. Thus, the conceptual dependence of forms of appearance on the mind does not establish the conceptual dependence of time on the mind. Kant has argued only that we can know *a priori* that anything we are capable of representing will be represented as in time. This is far from a conceptual analysis of time. Allison has not successfully excluded the neglected alternative. So Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of time is at least incomplete, if not simply unsuccessful. Heidegger uses an alterna-

¹¹ Two other passages of note: "Time is therefore a purely subjective condition of our (human) intuition" (*CPR*, A35=51). "If we take away from our inner intuition the peculiar condition of our sensibility, the concept of time likewise vanishes; it does not inhere in the objects, but merely in the subject which intuits them" (*CPR*, A37–8=B54).

tive argument, as we have seen – although we also saw that it does not work either. My chief interest now, however, is to develop the concept of the differing standpoints from which we may ask whether time depends upon human beings.

To work through the differing standpoints, we must distinguish two things one might mean by “the transcendental standpoint.” In Kant, the transcendental standpoint is in the first instance the standpoint one occupies, when one asks after the conditions for the possibility of a priori knowledge (*CPR*, A11–12=B25). From this standpoint one discovers that space and time are forms of appearance (for that is the only way to explain their status a priori as objects of intuition). From this last claim arises a distinction between two standpoints or attitudes from within which one may ask which things exist and what they are like. The empirical standpoint accepts the conditions of human sensibility as governing our answers and, thereby, endorses the independent existence of tables, chairs, Newtonian matter, and especially time and space. Specifically, it endorses the existence of time, because the representation of time is objectively valid, as explained earlier. What one can also call the “transcendental standpoint” (because its possibility only arises through the discovery of the conditions of sensibility) does not accept the conditions of sensibility as governing our answers. It wants to know what things are like independently of those conditions. (It turns out that all we can learn here is something negative, namely, that they are not spatiotemporal.) So the term “transcendental standpoint” really gets used in two ways: (1) to refer to the standpoint one occupies in asking after the conditions for the possibility of a priori knowledge; and (2) to refer to the standpoint from which one asks after the nature of things independent of the conditions of sensibility discovered from the transcendental standpoint in the first sense. In discussing Kant, I shall refer to the transcendental standpoint in the first sense as “the epistemological standpoint”; the second transcendental standpoint I shall continue to call “transcendental.”

In his account of empirical reality, Kant improves upon Leibniz’s notion of the “*phenomenon bene fundatum*.¹² Like Kant, Leibniz regarded time as an appearance. Admittedly, his reasons were different in character: they turned on his worries about the reality of relations (coupled with his relational view of time), as well as concerns about the reality of the continuum. Leibniz’s arguments thus were not epistemological, but

¹² For an overview of Leibniz’s views on well-founded phenomena, see Rescher (1967) and Broad (1975).

rather straightforwardly metaphysical. Nonetheless, Leibniz wanted to distinguish between appearances in some privileged sense and illusions. Part of Leibniz's motivation here is surely that once we come to regard time and space as appearances, we are left classifying physics as a science of illusion, unless we can forge some distinction between appearance and illusion. Leibniz's strategy was to suggest that some appearances are agreed upon by all minds, indeed, must be agreed upon by all minds. There is a "preestablished" harmony, instituted by God, among the contents of all the metaphysically real minds ("monads"). The objects of this harmony are the *phenomena bene fundata*. They are the appearances that come with an intersubjective and divine imprimatur.¹³

Kant shared Leibniz's goal of preventing the idealizing of time from collapsing the distinction between science and illusion. He was also attracted by the basic gist of Leibniz's phenomenalist solution: the rational agreement of all minds underwrites what we could call a "well-founded objectivity." Thus, Kant writes in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (PAFM), "Therefore objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everybody) are equivalent concepts" (p. 42). The crucial term here is "necessary": apriority raises the representation of time to a status superior to mere illusion, even accidentally intersubjective illusion.

Kant could not be satisfied with Leibniz's particular strategy, however, because Leibniz cannot show that it is necessary that we experience nature as spatiotemporal. Leibniz relies upon dogmatic assumptions about God and the preestablished harmony he institutes. So Kant wants to win his results from an epistemological reflection on the nature of human powers of representation, rather than a dogmatic metaphysics. According to Kant, all minds are constrained, by their form of representation, to experience all objects as in time, and thus time is not some fleeting figment of my imagination nor even a defect of my sensory apparatus. Rather, it is the very form of that apparatus. Hence, although time is not transcendentally real, it is not a whim or a distortion either. It is empirically real. Furthermore, "by nature . . . taken substantively (*materialiter*), is meant the sum of appearances insofar as they stand, in virtue of an inner principle of causality, in thoroughgoing interconnection" (CPR, A419n = B446n). Kant hopes to extend his empirical realism vis-à-vis time to nature, by interpreting nature as a system of temporal appearances.

¹³ Leibniz also regarded the *phenomena bene fundata* as those that correlate with metaphysically real structures in the monads, thus giving them a kind of double certification.

One might argue that Kant is demoting time and nature from the position of independence of the human mind that was ascribed to them by the realists Galileo, Descartes, and Locke. And one might object that Kant's (and Leibniz's) conception of objectivity is deflationary. These worries develop because Kant denies that time, and thus nature, can be said to exist from the transcendental standpoint. We shall see that Heidegger avoids denying the transcendental reality of nature; he evades commitment to a transcendental idealism about nature and entities. He restricts himself to a transcendental idealism about time and being. In order to see how Heidegger does this, we must work through a series of other issues. First we must understand in what sense we can find transcendental and empirical standpoints in *Being and Time*.

Idealism and the Two Standpoints in Heidegger

Heidegger too writes of two standpoints from which one asks whether there are things independent of Dasein:

Of course, only as long as Dasein *is*, that is, the ontical possibility of the understanding of being is, "is there" being. If Dasein does not exist, then "independence" "is" not either, nor "is" the "in itself." Such a thing is then neither understandable nor not understandable. Then also intraworldly entities neither are discoverable, nor can they lie in hiddenness. *Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not. Nevertheless, it can *now* be said – as long as the understanding of being, and thereby the understanding of occurrence are – that *then* entities will continue to be.

As we have indicated, the dependence of being, not of entities, on the understanding of being, that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on care. . . . (S&Z, p. 212)

He refers to the two standpoints as "then" and "now." The question whether things exist independently of Dasein merits different answers from the different standpoints. If we *now* ask the question Are there entities independent of Dasein? the answer is "yes." Indeed, *now* we can say that entities will continue to be, even if Dasein does not. The idea seems to be this: if we *now* ask ourselves, Will the sun continue to exist, even if Dasein dies out? the answer we give is "yes." Why? Because we understand the sun as something *occurrent*, and occurrence is independence of human practices. If we *now* ask the same question of Smith's hammer, the answer is "no." Hammers are not *occurrent*, but rather *available*. For something to be available is for it to be involved in human practices. Hammers are defined in terms of the human skills for using

them and the human practices (of carpentry and retail hardware, for example) in which they are involved. If Dasein did not exist, and thus, if these skills and practices did not exist, hammers would not exist either. So now we can say that hammers will not continue to exist after the demise of Dasein. This contrasts with how we answer the parallel question about the sun.¹⁴

Dreyfus¹⁵ clarifies Heidegger's view by relying on Arthur Fine's treatment of scientific realism (1986, esp. chs. 7–8). Fine introduces what he calls "the core position." He writes,

Let us say, then, that both realist and antirealist accept the results of scientific investigations as "true," on par with more homely truths. (I realize that some antirealists would rather use a different word, but no matter.) And call this acceptance of scientific truths the "core position." (1986, p. 128)

This core position – empirical realism¹⁶ – simply holds that there are no general reasons to doubt the truth of scientific claims, and there is no need to distinguish scientific claims from ordinary ones, in order to say of the former that they are true in some strange or attenuated way.¹⁷ Fine suggests that this empirical realism is implicit in natural scientific practice and in the beliefs of many ordinary nonscientists as well. Physicists talk, for instance, about electrons, and empirical realism holds that they exist.

¹⁴ The issue is actually a bit more complicated than this, since everything hangs on whether one thinks that the hammer is the very same entity as (is numerically identical with) the hunk of metal and wood out of which it is made. If the two items are numerically identical, then the hammer does survive the demise of Dasein, though not as a hammer.

¹⁵ I want to adopt, yet modify, Dreyfus's (1991) "hermeneutic realism." The section on realism is to be found on pp. 251–65. Hermeneutic realism is introduced on p. 254. Beyond endorsing the ontic claims of natural science – which I will explore in a moment – Dreyfus's "hermeneutic realism" has two aims. First, the hermeneutic realist "spells out what everyday scientific practices take for granted, namely that there is a nature in itself, and that science can give us a better and better explanation of how that nature works." (Dreyfus's use of "in itself" here reflects his elision, of which more below, of the transcendental and empirical standpoints.) Second, the hermeneutic realist "seeks to show that this self-understanding of modern science is both internally coherent and compatible with the ontological implications of our everyday practices" (p. 254). This account is helpful and a good guess at one thing Heidegger was up to in §43c of *Being and Time*.

¹⁶ Fine's core position is the heart of Kant's empirical realism, although it does not insist on any kind of necessity or apriority in our knowledge. Kant justifies claims to necessity and apriority from the epistemological standpoint. Fine does not operate at this level and, thus, makes no such claims. Fine's core position may also be the crux of Husserl's natural attitude, insofar as it is applied to science. We could call it the "natural scientific attitude."

¹⁷ This either is or is very close to the "epistemological realism" of Paul Horwich (1982).

Dreyfus does not identify Heidegger just with Fine's "core position," but with Fine's stronger view, the "natural ontological attitude" (NOA).¹⁸ This cannot be quite right, however, since two of the distinguishing features of Fine's NOA are incompatible with Heidegger, even on Dreyfus's interpretation of him. First, Fine defines his NOA as rejecting "*all* interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc., of truth, just as it rejects the special correspondence theory of realism" (1986, p. 149). But Heidegger certainly does provide a theory or interpretation of truth. NOA only accepts a Tarski-Davidson disquotational account of truth, but Heidegger, for better or worse, offers much more (*S&Z*, §44). (It is not important to explore Heidegger's account here. Suffice it to say that it proposes far more than Tarski-Davidson.) Second, Fine explicitly states that his NOA is anti-essentialist, in that it rejects any attempt to specify some invariant element or method in science (1986, pp. 147–9). However, as we saw in Chapter 4, Heidegger believes that science differs essentially from ordinary practice in that it decontextualizes entities, and that science and everyday practice thereby take differing ontological stands toward everyday paraphernalia and natural things (and Dreyfus reads Heidegger this way too). In a footnote, Fine takes a swipe at those whom he calls "main-line hermeneuts," to whom he assigns, *inter alia*, the thesis that science has to do with a "dehumanized" world (1986, p. 148n). Hence, the assimilation of Heidegger's view to Fine's NOA is incorrect, though Fine's "core position" does capture Heidegger's empirical realism.

Therefore, empirical realism asserts, for example, that the sun exists independently of *Dasein*, that is, that it would persist, even if the human race died off. This is a claim to which current science is committed, and empirical realism accepts its truth, just as it accepts the truth of ordinary claims, such as that there is a glass of water on the table in front of Jones.

What is the other standpoint ("*then*") to which Heidegger refers? Heidegger describes this other case as obtaining "when *Dasein* does not exist." His precise words offered in explanation of what he means are these:

If *Dasein* does not exist, then "independence" "is" not either, nor "is" the "in itself." Such a thing is then neither understandable nor not understandable. Then also intraworldly entities neither are discoverable, nor can they lie in hiddenness. *Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not. (*S&Z*, p. 212)

¹⁸ Fine indicates that his NOA is very close to – if not identical with – Horwich's (1982)

(I shall, for brevity's sake, call this the "then passage.") I want to explore two readings of this passage, a weak one and a strong one.

Why would independence not "be,"¹⁹ if Dasein did not exist? Well, independence is presumably independence of (*i.e., from*) Dasein, and so, if Dasein did not exist, then nothing could be independent of it. (Neither could anything be dependent on it then.) No Dasein, no independence. Furthermore, intraworldly entities could not be discovered, because Dasein is the one who discovers them. (Since there would be no one to succeed or fail at discovering them, it is misleading to say that they would lie hidden.) No Dasein, no discovery. Moreover, if there were no Dasein, nothing could be understood. (It would even be inappropriate to say that things were not understood, because that ordinarily implies that there would be a *failure* of understanding.) No Dasein, no understanding. Finally, and almost trivially, if Dasein did not exist, there would be no one to say either that entities exist, or that they do not. No Dasein, no language, no saying. So the weak reading – by "weak" I here mean the reading that construes Heidegger as claiming less – points out that independence, discovery, understanding, and language depend on Dasein, and thus without Dasein there can be none of these things.

There are two defects of this weak reading. First, it represents the "then passage" as asserting something that is merely trivial: if Dasein does not exist in two thousand years, then at that point there will be no Dasein to say that entities are, nor any Dasein from which things can be independent. The weak reading undercuts the apparent strength of the claims in the "then passage" by taking them to assert only a trivial dependence of a relational concept (independence) on Dasein and the trivial dependence of some of Dasein's activity (discovery, understanding, language) on Dasein. It would be a most disappointing, interpretive result, if we had to ascribe such triviality to the passage. Of course, this does not exactly *refute* the weak reading.

Second, the weak reading implies that Heidegger here presupposes the "Dasein-related" conception of being that I discussed, and rejected, in the Introduction. The whole point of the "then passage" is to motivate (or perhaps clarify) Heidegger's obscure, but important, claim that being depends on Dasein. So in the first sentence of the next paragraph he concludes,

¹⁹ Independence "is," rather than is, because it falls on the being side of the Ontological Difference.

As we have indicated, the dependence of being, not of entities, on the understanding of being, that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on care. . . . (*ibid.*)

The dependencies listed in the “then passage,” when understood according to the weak reading, can indicate, or clarify, or imply the dependence of being on Dasein, only if being is either a relational phenomenon, relational to Dasein, or an activity of Dasein. That Dasein, when it does not exist, cannot understand being, only implies that being depends on Dasein, if being is the intelligibility to Dasein of something. Recall that some commentators – in the Introduction I listed Richardson, Dreyfus, Olafson, and Frede – take Heidegger simply to *mean* by “the being of an entity” something like an entity’s intelligibility to Dasein. Aside from the shortcomings of this approach simply as an interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of being,²⁰ it also seriously deflates the argument in and about p. 212. In fact, p. 212 would, if the weak reading were right, not really be an argument at all. It would simply point out a triviality: if the being of an entity is that entity’s intelligibility to Dasein, and if Dasein does not exist, then the entity has no being, because it would not be, in that case, intelligible to Dasein. So what alternative have we to the weak reading?

The strong reading proposes something nontrivial, something that does not rest on the Dasein-related conception of being. Consider the last sentence of the “then passage”: “*Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not.” If Dasein does not exist, we can say neither that there are entities, nor that there are not entities. The weak reading of this sentence takes it to mean that if Dasein does not *exist*, it cannot, of course, *say* whether there are entities. But perhaps Heidegger is not saying that *under the circumstances* of Dasein’s nonexistence, Dasein cannot say whether there are entities, but rather, that *of those circumstances* Dasein cannot say, and so on. An argument for the latter claim can be derived from a standard account of the presuppositions of questions. In order to develop this argument, let me approach the prohibited statements – “Entities then depend on Dasein” and “Entities then do not depend on Dasein” – as answers to a question, namely, Do entities then depend on Dasein? (which I shall henceforth refer to as “the unanswerable question”).

²⁰ In the Introduction I quote Olafson as pointing out, rightly, that this account of being turns Heidegger’s philosophy of being in *Being and Time* into an act of redefinition.

The unanswerable question is senseless, because one of its presuppositions is false. As a model for the sort of failure here, consider the following example: it is senseless to ask Who is the president of England? because there is no presidency of England. This question is not properly asked *of* the circumstances obtaining in England, not because no one speaks English there and thus could understand the question, nor even because no one there has the concept of a president, but rather because the governmental system of England does not allow that this question should be asked *of it*. The question gets no grip *on* (not just *in*) England, because it makes an assumption about England that is false, namely, that it has a presidency.²¹ The question makes no sense in this respect: no answer to it can have a truth value.²² Let me offer this as a way of understanding why Heidegger says that “Dasein cannot say” either of the prohibited statements.²³

Questions are often asked in terms of a *framework*. For example, the question What was Willie Mays’s batting average in 1959? is asked in terms of the framework of baseball. This framework makes a number of presup-

21 One might ask, “Is not the right answer simply, ‘*No one* is president of England?’” This answer, however, is really just a disguised way of rejecting the question. It does not directly answer it. We can see this by contrasting this case with the same answer, *mutatis mutandis*, given in response to the question Who is president of the United States?” asked after the president dies, but before the vice president has been sworn into office. Here it is literally and directly true that no one is president of the United States.

22 Nuel Belnap and Thomas Steel (1976, pp. 108–19) use the term “S-presupposes” to describe what is going on here: the question Who is president of England? S-presupposes the statement There is a presidency of England, because the truth of the latter statement is required for any answer to the former question to have a truth value. It would not significantly alter my analysis if one chose to use Belnap and Steel’s own notion of interrogative presupposition, namely, that a question presupposes a statement, if the truth of the statement is logically implied by every true answer to the question. If one did use their notion, then one would say the question is “false.”

23 Dreyfus’s formulation of what Heidegger is doing here could lead one astray, and so let me say something about it. He talks about what would have been the case if “Dasein *had never existed*” (1991, p. 257). This is not really helpful, because there is nothing fundamentally different about asking about what is going on in the possible situation in which Dasein does not exist, and what went on before Dasein, and what will go on after Dasein. All are issues that natural science can, in principle, address. After all, natural science could ask the question What would have become of the California condor, if human beings had never existed? It may be that it is hard to come up with evidence about what would have been, if Dasein had never been, but such questions hardly seem ruled out of court a priori. Dreyfus knows this, which explains why he attaches the stipulation that we are asking this question, when “it makes no sense.” But by singling out the question What would have been the case . . . ? he gives the impression that there is something special about that question, in contrast with questions about dinosaurs and the like. But the stipulation that he adds (we are asking the question when “it makes no sense”) is doing all the work.

positions: the existence of baseball fields, bats, balls, umpires, players, and so on. It presupposes that a player's batting average is the number of hits he gets per at bat. (This particular question, moreover, assumes among other things that Willie Mays was a baseball player who batted.) If one or more of the presuppositions made by this framework were false, we could say that the question would be senseless. (If the framework were legitimate, but some particular, material presupposition of the particular question were false, then the question would likewise be senseless.) In asking this question of 1959, we are trying to make sense of something in 1959 in terms of the framework of baseball. If the circumstances should resist that framework, in that one of the presuppositions of the framework were false of 1959, then we could not ask any question of 1959 in terms of that framework. This does not concern the circumstances *under* which one asks the question. (It is true that one could not ask the question, unless one "occupied" the framework of baseball, that is, unless one were familiar with that framework.) It concerns, rather, what happens when one asks a question *of* some circumstances that resist the framework of the question, in that some material presupposition made by the framework is not true *of* those circumstances.

How do we distinguish those circumstances of which Heidegger's question – Do entities then depend on Dasein? – is askable from those of which it is not? Heidegger connects the senselessness of his question with *being*'s dependence on Dasein. I think we can well see why. If, as I suggested in the Introduction, being is the ontological framework that determines whether something of some specific ontological sort is, then without being in place, the question Does that thing exist? is senseless. If we ask Would the sun exist? of circumstances that resist the ontological framework of the question, then the question is senseless. So the Heideggerian empirical standpoint is one in which in asking the unanswerable question we abide by the rules of the ontological framework of the question. From the transcendental standpoint, in contrast, we do not abide by the rules of the ontological framework; instead, we suspend them. But why would we suspend the rules of the ontological framework? Because if being depends on Dasein, then when Dasein does not exist, neither does the question's framework. The unanswerable question, after all, asks whether things would exist if Dasein did not.

What does Heidegger mean, when he says that being, the ontological framework, depends on Dasein? When we examine the meaning of the word or concept of being, that is, when we examine what we mean by

"being," we find that the structures that we identify with being depend on Dasein. Here we can return to Kant. In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant argues that our concept of an object must refer to the temporal structure of things. He argues for this in two stages (Kitcher 1987). First, he argues in roughly the first half of the B-Deduction that the concept of an object must be applicable to sensory objects and is spelled out by the categories. Second, in the second half of the B-Deduction he points out that a problem thus arises for the concept of the object. Sensory objects are known empirically, but the categories must be applicable a priori. So how can the categories, and that means in turn the concept of an object, apply to sensory objects? The solution is to remind the reader that sensory objects also have an a priori form, viz., time, and that the categories can thus apply to the temporal form of sensory objects. The categories are then understood as rules for the time-determination of sensory experience. This means, however, that our concept of an object can only apply to temporal things. And because Kant has argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic that time depends on us, he concludes that all objects depend on us.²⁴

Heidegger runs an analogous argument and, so, turns out to be a Kantian in a fairly detailed sense.²⁵ First, when we examine the sense of the being of natural things – indeed, he claims with full generality, if we examine the sense of being in general – we find that our understanding of being makes sense of things in terms of time. If Heidegger were talking about concepts, he would say that our concept of being applies only to temporal things. His own nonmentalistic way of putting the point is to say that time is the in-terms-of-which of Dasein's projection of being. Heidegger calls this the "Temporality" (*Temporalität*) of being,²⁶ and he thinks it one of the most important innovations of the *Critique* (see *LFW* and *KPM*). It gets us to an analog of Kant's result in the B-Deduction:

- (a) The understanding of being (Kant: the concept of an object) discloses (Kant: refers to) the temporal structure of things.

²⁴ This spells out the inference from the dependence of time to the dependence of nature and objects more generally, which I took for granted earlier.

²⁵ The chief disanalogy between their positions is, as we shall see in some detail, that although both are "ontological idealists" – both regard being/objectivity as dependent on Dasein/the subject – Kant, but not Heidegger, is an "ontic idealist" – one who regards entities, or more precisely in Kant's case, nature, as dependent on Dasein/the subject.

²⁶ In the next section of this chapter.

As we have seen, Heidegger also believes that time depends on Dasein. This is temporal idealism.

- (b) If Dasein (Kant: the subject) did not exist, time would not obtain.

Heidegger can marry temporal idealism to the Temporality of being and conclude that being depends on Dasein. That is, (a) and (b) entail

- (c) That in virtue of which an entity is an entity (Kant: an object is an object) depends on Dasein (Kant: the subject).

I shall call this conclusion, in its Heideggerian guise, “ontological idealism”:

Ontological idealism: *Being²⁷ Depends on Dasein.*

Thus, (a) and (b) are independently supported claims, which in turn imply (c). Heidegger does not get (c) by redefinition, as he would, if he embraced the Dasein-related conception of being. He does not just claim that being is intelligibility, and that intelligibility (trivially) depends on the one to whom things are intelligible. Rather, he argues that the structures in terms of which Dasein understands being are temporal structures, and that those structures – and not just the understanding of them – depend on Dasein. What can we conclude? The item picked out by “being” depends on Dasein. That is, being depends on Dasein.

Let me now draw together my reading of the “then,” or transcendental, standpoint in Heidegger: How are we to characterize the other case, “then”? The empirical standpoint is that, for example, of natural science, which (now) holds that the sun is not causally dependent on Dasein. Hence, it claims that the sun would exist, even if Dasein did not. The transcendental standpoint, however, asks the same question while thinking away Dasein. To think away Dasein, however, is to think away time, which entails thinking away being, and that is in turn the framework on which depends the truth value of answers to the question Do entities then depend on Dasein? From this transcendental standpoint, the question makes no sense, at least insofar as its answers cannot have truth value. This is why Heidegger writes in the “then passage” that “*Then* it can be said neither that entities are, nor that they are not.”

Our reflections, according to both Heidegger and Kant, are classified

²⁷ Again, the claim here is *not* that entities depend on Dasein. See note 25 in this chapter.

as either empirical or transcendental by whether they operate under or suspend a certain set of conditions.²⁸ For Kant, these conditions are those of sensibility or intuition, the principles that express what orders all human sensory intuition. For Heidegger, these conditions are those of the ontological framework, the principles that spell out the sense of being. Both Heidegger and Kant also work with a transcendental standpoint in another sense of that term. What I have called Kant's "epistemological standpoint" is the reflective posture of the mind as it works through the conditions for the possibility of its a priori knowledge. We find a correlative standpoint in Heidegger, what we may call his "phenomenological standpoint," his stance as he puts into words the sense and ground of all phenomena, their ontological framework. Time is assigned to the conditions of sensibility/ontological frameworks from the epistemological/phenomenological standpoint. So far, then, Heidegger and Kant are both transcendental idealists. They both take time to be transcendently ideal, or dependent upon the human mind/Dasein, when considered from the transcendental standpoint. Heidegger is, in considerable detail, a Kantian, transcendental idealist about time.

Let me pause to consider four objections to my reading of the standpoints "then" and "now" in Heidegger:

(A) One might object that the final result of the transcendental standpoint, *viz.*, that *then* we cannot answer the question, is trivial. After all, if we think away the framework that allows the answers to a question to have truth value, *of course* we cannot answer the question. This is not much better than the following thought-experiment: "Imagine that France has no governmental system. Now, who is president of France then?" Is this all Heidegger is doing? No, he is saying more than this: Since being depends on Dasein, there is *prima facie* a problem about asking of circumstances in which Dasein does not exist whether there are natural things. The reasoning here exposes that problem. Given this problem, let us distinguish two standpoints from which to ask questions. The empirical standpoint does not think away the being of natural things, even though it can think Dasein away. The dependence of time, and hence the being of

²⁸ As I indicated in note 45 to the Introduction to this study, I am deliberately using here the term "transcendental" differently than Heidegger uses it. He uses "transcendental" the way I am using "phenomenological," and it is no doubt partly for this reason that Heidegger does not describe himself as a "transcendental" idealist. (Recall also that at the beginning of this chapter I discuss why Heidegger does not use the term "idealism" to describe his position.)

natural things, is known only from the phenomenological standpoint,²⁹ and thus the empirical standpoint ignores it entirely. The transcendental standpoint does not ignore that dependence, but rather clearly focuses on it, and then draws the inevitable conclusion that we cannot answer the question we are asking.

(B) One might try to argue, however, that if my reading is right, Heidegger is claiming (implausibly) that natural science is just making a mistake by ignoring a philosophical fact, namely, the dependence of time on *Dasein*.³⁰ As I have indicated, natural science does rest upon ignoring an important philosophical claim, but this does not mean that natural science rests on a mistake. Natural science is not making a philosophical (either a phenomenological or a transcendental) claim at all. Natural science must play by the rules of its ontological framework, the framework of the *occurent*. It is not in the transcendental business of saying what might be the case independently of this framework. (Nor is it in the phenomenological business of analyzing this framework.) Time is basic to this framework, and so, natural science asks its questions assuming time as a given. If natural science were to try to ask about the nature of things independently of the basic structure of *occurrence*, it would no longer be natural science.

(C) But this defense suggests a further and more far-reaching challenge, one to the very idea that Heidegger could think that such a transcendental standpoint is coherent or conceivable. Heidegger insists that all understanding takes place in the context of an involvement in the world, and hence the detached, uninvolved perspective of the transcendental standpoint is simply impossible, one might argue. Indeed, its impossibility has much to do with what is wrong with traditional philosophy.³¹ In more detail, one could say that since all understanding presupposes an understanding of being, no understanding can take place absent an ontological framework. If one thinks away the ontological framework – as I am arguing one does from the transcendental standpoint – then one can say nothing at all. The rules of the ontological game are no longer in place. If this is right, then the claim that from the transcendental standpoint one can say neither of the prohibited statements turns out to be a

29 Being is a phenomenological topic. From the empirical standpoint of natural science time is known as an entity. For the last point, see Chapter 4.

30 I owe this objection to Mark Lance.

31 The objection in this form was put to me by Bert Dreyfus during an oral presentation of an early version of my (1994c).

disappointing consequence of a more general and debilitating failure of the transcendental standpoint as I have described it.³²

The general thrust of this objection is correct. However, one can say *something* from the transcendental standpoint, although not because something makes sense from *within* it. Rather, the transcendental standpoint is defined in terms of a thought-experiment. This thought-experiment makes a presupposition – namely, that we are talking about a situation in which there is no Dasein – and we may exploit the consequences of this presupposition. Heidegger claims (from the phenomenological standpoint) that the absence of time, and thus being, follows from this presupposition. The transcendental standpoint discharges the conditionals discovered from the phenomenological standpoint and merely draws two negative conclusions: there “is” *then* no time and no being.

(D) Dreyfus suspects that temporal idealism conflicts with empirical realism. Dreyfus (1991) reads Heidegger as a scientific realist of sorts, and he seems to think that this scientific realism conflicts with temporal idealism. Because the (or, a) theory of time seems to belong to physics,³³ Dreyfus does not want to interpret Heidegger as a temporal idealist. But temporal idealism does not conflict with empirical realism. From within the empirical standpoint we can think Dasein away and ask what is or would be the case in its absence. We ask what happened *before* humans came to be, what is likely to happen *after* they pass away, and what would have happened, if they had *never* been. These are all questions about past, future, and possible *times*. Thus, they indicate that we are asking our questions from the empirical standpoint. We are thinking Dasein away, but not time. But (from the phenomenological standpoint) time does depend on Dasein, and so if we leave the empirical standpoint behind, move to the transcendental standpoint, and think time itself away, we find that the criteria that would determine answers to our questions have been thought away as well. From this transcendental standpoint, our questions cannot be answered, not because we cannot figure out how to answer them, but rather because the framework that should determine an answer is now gone. There is no conflict between empirical realism and transcendental, temporal idealism.

32 The objection in this developed form was offered to me by Mark Lance and Ted Schatzki.

33 This theory is likely a theory of an entity called “time” and thus is a theory of a phenomenon at the far end of the structure of derivation that Heidegger develops with respect to modes of time. Recall that after world-time has been leveled off to form ordinary time, ordinary time can also then be construed as an entity. This entitative time, like all modes of time in the derivation structure, is derivative, but not illusory.

Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger as a scientific realist is a minority position, certainly, but he does have texts to back up his view, and one of them in particular might seem to conflict with my reading of Heidegger. Dreyfus relies on *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (MAL), where Heidegger introduces and deploys the concept of "world-entry." Heidegger writes of world-entry:

World-entry happens when transcendence happens, i.e., when historical Dasein exists; only then is a being-in-the-world of Dasein existent.³⁴ And only when this is existent, have occurrent entities in each case also entered into world, i.e., become intraworldly entities. And only Dasein *qua* existing gives the opportunity for world-entry. (MAL, p. 251)

Thus, world-entry is the showing up of occurrent entities within the world, their being (or becoming) intraworldly. This passage is true by definition, because given that world-entry is showing up for Dasein in terms of its world or, perhaps, becoming intraworldly (i.e., the sort of thing that shows up for Dasein in terms of its world), something can "enter into world" only when Dasein is. More controversial and difficult to interpret is Heidegger's further claim that

World-entry and its happening is the presupposition not for occurrent entities first becoming occurrent entities and coming into what manifests itself to us as their occurrentness and which we understand as such, but rather, merely for occurrent entities announcing themselves precisely in their not needing world-entry with respect to their own being. (ibid.)

This appears to say that occurrent entities would be occurrent, even if Dasein did not exist. And this seems in turn to challenge my reading of Heidegger, since according to it not only would occurrentness not "be," if Dasein were not, but also occurrent things would neither be nor not be, if Dasein were not.

The difficulty with this passage from *Metaphysical Foundations*, however, is that it conflicts with the literal text of *Being and Time*, p. 212, not just with my interpretation. However one reads it, p. 212 of *Being and Time* literally states that independence (occurrence) neither is nor is not, when Dasein does not exist, and also that occurrent entities then neither are nor are not. So what are we to say about the concept of "world-entry" and the passages from *Metaphysical Foundations*? The last line of the second passage on p. 251 in fact says something quite unexceptional in the

³⁴ Technical infelicity: being-in-the-world is never existent; it is existence.

framework of *Being and Time*: it says that the *concept* of occurrentness involves no reference to Dasein. That is, the occurrent is precisely what does not depend upon Dasein or its practices. The “does not depend” must clearly be spoken from the empirical standpoint, although the analysis that results in this cashing-out of occurrentness proceeds from the phenomenological standpoint. After all, from the transcendental standpoint, we discover that without Dasein there would “be” no being, and hence no occurrentness, and that therefore there would neither be nor not be occurrent entities. So, *Metaphysical Foundations* need not be read so as to give aid and comfort to any kind of scientific realism beyond the empirical sort discussed above. The conflict Dreyfus sees between temporal idealism and scientific realism is based on a conflation of empirical and transcendental standpoints.

Transcendental Idealism and the Ontological Difference

Let me return now to the comparative development of the idealisms of Kant and Heidegger to draw out a substantial disanalogy between the two thinkers, one that favors Heidegger. Kant infers that because the structures (space and especially time) in virtue of which there are objects for human cognition depend on the subject, all objects of human cognition do as well. So Kant concludes that nature depends on us, at least when we consider nature from the transcendental standpoint. If Heidegger and Kant held parallel positions, Heidegger should be able to draw a far stronger inference: because being depends on Dasein, all entities should in turn depend on Dasein too. But Heidegger explicitly *denies* this: “the dependence of being, *not of entities*, on the understanding of being” (S&Z, p. 212, my emphasis). Kant need not claim that all entities depend on us, because he argues only that *objectivity* depends on us; he does not claim that *being* depends on us. Heidegger does assert that being depends on Dasein, and so he seems saddled with the view that all entities depend on Dasein too. Thus, reading Heidegger as a Kantian idealist appears to force on him a thesis he explicitly denies.

However, *Kant's* position is not coherent, and I want to argue briefly that if we examine the way in which it is incoherent, Heidegger, as I understand him, is exculpated. Kant's transcendental idealism is puzzling. No judgment from the transcendental standpoint about the way things are can have truth value. Consider the judgment form “*x* exists,” made of circumstances in which we do not exist, from the transcendental standpoint. “Existence” – as well as “possible existence” and “necessary

existence" – are categories of the understanding, to be found in the Table of Categories under the heading "Modality." In order for these categories to be able to contribute to a judgment that can have truth value, they must be "schematized," that is, have their application spelled out in terms of the temporal features of the things or situations that they describe. In other words, their only possible application is to temporal things. (This is the Temporality of being, or step [a] in the argument above for the dependence of objectivity/being on the subject/Dasein.) But when we do not exist, there is no time, according to Kant's temporal idealism. Therefore, the judgment form, " x exists," cannot have truth value, when used from the transcendental standpoint.

Let me distinguish the issue that I have just raised from another related, but nonetheless distinct, question. The related question is raised by those, such as P. F. Strawson (1966) and Jonathan Bennett (1966), who take Kant to be a verificationist. They argue that Kant is a verificationist in the sense that he believes that the meaning of a concept is spelled out by the experiential evidence that we could have to apply it. But according to Kant's doctrine of the in-principle unknowability of things as they are in themselves, there could be no evidence to apply the concept of the thing as it is in itself. Hence, the concept is meaningless. But more recent interpretations (Matthews 1982; Allison 1983) of Kant point out that he does not claim that concepts without empirical application are meaningless, but only that they cannot contribute to truth-valuable judgments. There are nonempirical concepts, such as that of the thing as it is in itself, God, and the soul, which although they have no empirical application, still are not meaningless. Nevertheless, even though these concepts have meaning independent of experience, apart from application to possible experience they cannot be used to form judgments that could be true or false.

This returns us to the problem raised earlier. Although (if Matthews and Allison are right) the concept of existence may well not be utterly meaningless apart from experience, apart from experience it cannot be used to form judgments that are true or false. Thus, the judgment "There is some way things are as they are in themselves" is not just unknowable and irrefutable by us. It cannot have truth value. There might still be a role for this judgment – or at least the concept of the thing as it is in itself, a thing as it is utterly independently of us – to play in transcendental (epistemological) philosophy, although it cannot be a fact-stating role.

And here the other shoe drops: it follows that we cannot say from the transcendental standpoint that entities depend on us. To say that one

thing depends on another is at least to say that in that possible situation in which the second thing does not exist, the first thing does not exist either.³⁵ But from the transcendental standpoint within Kant's system, no judgment of the form " x then exists" can have truth value. This is because, as we have seen, the conditions that give reference and truth valuability to " x exists" are suspended by the transcendental standpoint. Hence, it follows that no judgment of the form, "If the subject did not exist, then x would not exist either" can have truth value.

Now let us take up the transcendental standpoint in *Being and Time*. Think away not just Dasein, but also time. Of this possible situation, what are we to say? Well, *ex hypothesi* time does not obtain. Since Heidegger embraces the Temporality of being, then being "is" not either. But what about entities? The competing claims or judgments, that entities then are and that they are not, are both incapable of having truth value. So we cannot say of that situation that entities are. Neither can we say that in that possible situation in which Dasein does not exist, entities are not. But we have to be able to say this, if we are to say that entities depend on Dasein. So we cannot say that entities depend on Dasein. Of course, we also cannot say that they do not depend on Dasein. We can, however, say that being depends on Dasein, because as we saw, the situation is *ex hypothesi* one in which time, and hence being, is not to be found. Moreover, the prohibited statements all concern whether entities are, because it is the ontological framework that is suspended from the transcendental standpoint. But this does not prevent us from assessing whether being obtains, for being is not an entity, and thus our ability to assess whether it obtains is not impugned by suspending the ontological framework.

Therefore, Heidegger formulates his position with great precision, when he asserts that being, but *not* entities, depends on Dasein. He is a transcendental idealist about being, but not about entities. This is *not* because, from the transcendental standpoint, entities are independent of Dasein; it is *not* because he is a transcendental realist about entities. *Rather, it is because one can be neither a transcendental idealist nor a transcendental realist about entities, if one is a transcendental idealist about being.* This is something that Kant did not understand. He failed to understand it, because he did not work through the implications of his own account of the truth valuability of judgments. Or to put the point from a more Heideggerian perspective, he failed to understand this, because he did

35 This is true for both simple and explanatory dependence.

not properly draw the distinction between being and entities. He did not understand the Ontological Difference.

The Temporality of Being

Heidegger writes in chapter 2, §5 of the introduction to *Being and Time* that

Dasein is such that, insofar as it is, it understands something like being. With this connection in mind it will be shown that *time* is that in terms of which Dasein in general inexplicitly understands and interprets something like being. Time must be brought to light and genuinely conceived as the horizon of all understanding of being and every interpretation of being. In order to make that transparent, we must provide an *originary explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, and we must do so in terms of temporality as the being of Dasein who understands being.* (S&Z, p. 17)

Here he is articulating his thesis of the Temporality of being.³⁶ The thesis holds that being is to be understood in terms of time. Expressed in the terms I developed in the Introduction, the ontological framework is a temporal one. “The ontological framework” here is intended to cover both the “regional” frameworks of Dasein, the available, and the occurrent, as well as the “general” framework of being *überhaupt*, being in general. In this section I want to look back at the discussions of originary temporality, world-time, and ordinary time and show how they can be parlayed into accounts of the Temporality of the regional frameworks with which they are associated. Then I shall look into Heidegger’s steps toward clarifying the ontological framework of the occurrent in the widest sense in *Basic Problems*. I shall deny that *Basic Problems* even vaguely sheds light on either the ontological framework of being in general or the more limited framework of the occurrent in the widest sense. Division 3 of *Being and Time*, which was never published, was not even delivered in lecture form.

Heidegger’s hunch, expressed in the p. 17 quotation with which I began this section, is that the best hermeneutic account of being is Temporal. The proof must be in the pudding, however, as Heidegger well knew and stated directly in that same passage. He must concretely go about the business of showing that the fundamental structure of the being of Dasein, the available, and the occurrent is Temporal. He must

³⁶ Recall that the Temporality of being is the first premise in the argument considered earlier for the dependence of being on Dasein.

concretely demonstrate the Temporality of these regions of being. He must then draw these demonstrations together into an account of how being in general is Temporal. Let me take up these tasks *seriatim*. My treatments of the regions of being can be brief, because so much of the way has already been prepared.

Chapter 2 above was essentially a study in how the being of Dasein, viz., care, is to be understood Temporally. Heidegger analyzes care in terms of existence, facticity, and falling. These in turn receive Temporal interpretations in terms of a futural being-ahead, a past being-already, and a Present being-amidst. This manifold of nonsequential phenomena is called "originary temporality." As we saw, its claim to be a mode of time is intricate and in the end unsuccessful. Still, the thesis is that Dasein's being is fundamentally structured by a temporal manifold that gives unity to existence, facticity, and falling.

Chapter 3 did not directly take up the Temporal interpretation of the being of the available, but we can quickly see how that goes. To be available is to be involved in human practices. Such involvement requires that the entity be defined by some task in which it is involved along with other paraphernalia (the wherewithal) and to be put to use (or able to be put to use) in accomplishing that task. This threefold analysis of availability likewise receives a Temporal interpretation. Definition by a task is a futural condition, since the equipment is in order to realize some *future* goal, where the specific sense of "future" is fixed by the futurity that belongs to the pragmatic Now. Being involved along with wherewithal is a past condition, since the wherewithal is *already* and reliably there for use in the same task. Finally, being put to use is a Present condition, since putting to use involves presence in person to Dasein in a Now. (Being able to be put to use is, thus, parasitic upon a Present condition.) The being of equipment is essentially Temporal. Its Temporal significance is spelled out by the structure of the pragmatic Now.

Chapter 4 likewise did not emphasize the Temporal interpretation of the occurrent, but again its being is fundamentally Temporal. To be occurrent is to occur stably through a span of Nows. Disengaged temporality awaits a future and retains a past that are formally identical with the Present it now experiences. Thus, the occurrent's persistence through the qualitatively empty sequence of Nows is likewise a Temporally ontological fact about it. To be a cat is to occur in a regularly feline way through time. To be an object more generally, Kant and Husserl, as well as Heidegger in their debt, argue, is to occur in a regular way, where the object's past, Present, and future are linked together by the norms that

govern the type of object it is. Regular persistence through ordinary time is, thus, the Temporal sense of occurrentness.

The regional ontologies of these sorts of being are Temporal. Heidegger's ultimate aspiration, however, and the stated final goal of *Being and Time*, is to spell out the Temporal determination of being in general ("we must provide an *originary explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being*," S&Z, p. 17). The treatments of the regional ontologies go some way toward this goal. After all, if one can spell out the ontologies of Dasein, the available, and the occurrent, and then show how the Temporal phenomena that lie at the hearts of those ontologies belong together in a complex hierarchy – as the temporal idealism argument aims to show – one has exhibited the articulation of the Temporal sense of the being of the various regions of being. Of course, one suppressed assumption here is that one has exhausted the field of sorts of being. One must know that there are these three modes of being *and no other*. Otherwise the hierarchy does not bind together being *in general*. Heidegger seems not to have thought, however, that there were only these three regions of being and no more.³⁷

Olafson, uniquely if I am not mistaken, believes that Heidegger did indeed have an answer to the question of the sense of being in general: being is presence. "‘Presence’ is the term that Heidegger uses to express the fundamental character of being as such" (Olafson 1987, p. xvii). Olafson is wrong in important ways, as has been shown by Taylor Carman (1994). Carman points out (pp. 207–8) that Olafson incorrectly states that "presence" (*Anwesenheit*) is used "extensively" in *Being and Time* (Olafson 1987, pp. xvii–xviii). Carman also notes that Heidegger identifies the understanding of being as presence with the "ancient" interpretation of being, not with his own. Carman seals his case with his remark that "Indeed, nothing more clearly captures the traditional metaphysical conception of being and time that *Being and Time* itself intends to undermine than the single word ‘presence’" (1994, p. 208).

We see this in more detail by looking at the role that the word "presence" really plays in *Being and Time* and by examining Heidegger's discussion of presence (*praesens*) as a Temporal determination of being in the *Basic Problems*, §21. Recall from Chapter 3 that Heidegger identifies presence as the horizontal schema of "perceiving in a broader sense":

³⁷ He considered at least the being of the living, though in some places he suggests that life is a privative concept parasitic upon Dasein (S&Z, p. 50).

Perceiving [*Vernehmen*] in a broader sense lets the available and occurrent encounter “in person” in themselves with respect to their look [*hinsichtlich seines Aussehens*]. This letting-encounter is grounded in a Present. It gives the ecstatic horizon within which entities can be *present* in person [*leibhaftig anwesend*]. (S&Z, p. 346)

By “perceiving in a broader sense” Heidegger means to extend the conception of perceiving beyond “seeing” in the sense of “perceiving with corporeal eyes” (*ibid.*). One might argue that the extension of the concept of perception here is from the quite narrow one of visual perception to the broader, let us say, Husserlian, concept of intuition. And this perhaps motivates Olafson to claim, stunningly and in utter contradiction with almost the entirety of *Being and Time*, that “perception, or *aisthesis*, is the primary form assumed by subjectivity in the ontological interpretation of it that [Heidegger] is proposing” (Olafson 1987, p. 55; quoted by Carman 1994, p. 208). But Heidegger makes quite clear that he means nothing of the sort:

Showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding – the circumspection of concern is understanding as *common sense* – the priority of pure intuition, which corresponds noetically with the traditional, ontological priority of the occurrent, is undercut. (S&Z, p. 147, also quoted by Carman 1994, pp. 208–9)

Instead, Heidegger here clearly “broadens” the concept of perception to include the skillful but precognitive encounter with equipment during use, the encounter in which it withdraws into transparency. Heidegger wants “presence” to cover this sort of discoveredness for Dasein too.

What does such precognitive discoveredness have in common with “presence” in its more traditional use, that is, presence to mind or experience? Heidegger’s answer is this: its temporal makeup. Moreover, the temporal makeup is both temporal (*zeitlich*) and Temporal (*Temporal*). Say that Dasein encounters a hammer both visually and circumspectively. Heidegger argues that both these encounters are ways of approaching entities dominated by enpresenting. As we have already seen Heidegger argue, “This letting-encounter is grounded in a Present. It gives the ecstatic horizon within which entities can be *present* in person” (S&Z, p. 346). From *Being and Time* we gather the following about the deeper, “presential” unity of these forms of understanding. In pragmatic temporality, which makes it possible for Dasein to discover the available, the Present dominates, in that the pragmatic future and past are understood,

respectively, as Nows-to-come and Nows-gone-by. Dasein's temporal understanding of the occurrent is simply a thinned out, or leveled-off, version of this pragmatic temporality. The core of it is simply taking something as being there now for Dasein. We have seen, in much detail, how Heidegger's explanation of disengaged temporality in terms of pragmatic temporality is supposed to go. In *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger does not fill much in the unified sense of the "presence" that makes up the being of the available and the occurrent. That is, there he does not develop the horizontal concept of presence.

This would have been part of the project of division 3 of part 1 of *Being and Time*. The absence of the division, thus, leaves a substantial lacuna in Heidegger's account. Indeed, that third division of part 1 of *Being and Time* would have also spelled out Heidegger's account of the Temporality of being in general. As I noted in the Introduction (note 2) to this study, Heidegger said during his 1941 lecture *The Metaphysics of German Idealism* that he broke off his publication of division 3 after "lively, friendly confrontations" with Karl Jaspers around New Year's Day, 1927. He there refers to a working "composition" or "elaboration" (*Ausarbeitung*) of division 3, which he rejected after his discussions with Jaspers (MDI, pp. 39–40). Heidegger intended his 1927 lecture series *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* to rework the unpublished division 3. Unfortunately, Heidegger got far behind his lecture schedule and only began to discuss the first "chapter" of the second "part" of the lecture material, which is where all the division 3 issues would have been discussed. The first chapter treats the Ontological Difference from the perspective of temporality and Temporality. It consists of four sections, §19 on "time and temporality," §20 on "temporality and Temporality," §21 on "Temporality and being," and §22 on "being and entities: the ontological difference."³⁸ The material in this chapter names, but does not develop an account of, presence as the horizontal schema of enpresenting. (He uses a Latinate term, "*Praesenz*," for this schema, which I shall follow Hofstadter as rendering in Latin as "*praesens*," so as to distinguish it from "presence," "*Anwesenheit*.") A discussion of the Temporality of being in general and the Temporal unity of the many sorts of being would logically have been placed in the intended third chapter of the second part of the lecture series, which was to take up "the problem of the possible modifications of

³⁸ I have written the titles in lowercase so that one can tell whether the reference is to temporality or Temporality.

being and the unity of its manifoldness" (*GP*, p. 33). Heidegger never reached this point. The lamentable fact is that he never completed the ontological task of *Being and Time*. Furthermore, since the 1926–7 "composition" or "elaboration" of division 3, to which I referred earlier, does not survive – assuming that it was composed in the sense of written out, rather than just worked out in Heidegger's head – we do not possess any indications of how he would have completed it.

On p. 439 of *GP* Heidegger says that proceeding with an explication of the Temporal sense of *praesens* is not really possible at this point in the lecture series.³⁹ So he intends only "by way of a detour to give a presentation of how there lies in the *praesens* that belongs to availability an abundance of developed structures" (*GP*, p. 439). Indeed, it is unclear just how far the reach of *praesens* is supposed to extend. Most often Heidegger identifies *praesens* as just quoted: the Temporal sense of the being of the available. There is some reason to believe, however, that he meant it a little more broadly, as Herrmann (1991, p. 41), for instance, understands him. The title of §21a of *Basic Problems* is itself tellingly ambivalent: "The Temporal interpretation of being as the being of the available. *Praesens* as the horizontal schema of the ecstasy of enpresenting." The first sentence of the title suggests the narrow reading: *praesens* is the Temporal sense of availability. But the second sentence suggests something broader: *praesens* is the horizontal schema of enpresenting, which is after all the ecstasy that dominates both pragmatic and disengaged temporality. At the beginning of §21, he writes,

The point is to grasp how, on the basis of the temporality that grounds the transcendence of Dasein, the Temporality of Dasein makes the understanding of being possible. Temporality [*Temporalität*] is the most originary temporalization of temporality as such. We have, thus, always already oriented the investigation to the question of the possibility of a determinate under-

³⁹ Why is a little unclear. He points out that we lack "a full mastery of phenomenological method" as well as "certainty in going into this dimension of the problem" (*GP*, p. 439). The "full mastery" could not conceivably have been developed before the intended third part of the lecture series, "The scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology" (*GP*, p. 32). This would suggest that, *pace* Herrmann (1991), *GP* was not intended to work through division 3 of *S&Z* to its conclusion; after all, that division would surely have to work out the account of *praesens*. The "certainty" (*Sicherheit*) to which Heidegger refers on p. 439 would likely be the sure-footedness of a phenomenological investigation embarked upon *after* the idea of phenomenology had been clarified. Needless to say, Heidegger was forever putting off issues until after some later, momentous investigation that never came.

standing of being, the *understanding of being in the sense of being-occurrent in the broadest signification.* (*GP*, p. 429)⁴⁰

He offsets this suggestive comment, however, by ending §21 thus:

We shall seek a Temporal Interpretation of the being of the primarily occurring, of availability, and show, in an exemplary way, with respect to transcendence, how the understanding of being is possible. (*GP*, p. 431)

It is hard to know exactly what Heidegger is up to. On balance, most of his discussion is devoted to developing the temporality of missing something and being surprised, “privative” modes of pragmatic temporality that Heidegger had already described in *Being and Time* (*S&Z*, pp. 355–6) and, thus, that cannot be of much use to us.

The thread in §21a that promises some hope is Heidegger’s claim that *praesens* is the horizontal schema of enpresenting:

Enpresenting, whether it be authentic in the sense of the moment [*des Augenblicks*] or inauthentic,⁴¹ projects what it enpresents, [i.e.,] what can possibly be encountered in and for a Present, upon something like *praesens*. . . . The Present projects itself in and of itself ecstatically upon *praesens*. *Praesens* is not identical with the Present, but rather, as the fundamental determination of the horizontal schema of this ecstasy helps to make up the full structure of the Present. (*GP*, p. 435)

This claim, if we are to take it at face value, extends the significance of *praesens* beyond availability to any mode of being that is understood primarily through enpresenting, and that includes the occurrent. *Praesens* would then be the Temporal sense of the being of the occurrent in the broadest sense. Unfortunately, Heidegger says nothing further to elaborate what this horizontal schema would amount to. He restricts himself to structural comments about its relation to enpresenting. He does not deliver on his suggestive comments. The semester was ending, and Heidegger was eager to make at least sketchy comments on the main themes of chapter 1 of the second part of the lecture series. It must be

⁴⁰ Note that this passage also weighs heavily against Olafson’s claim that presence is the sense of being in general, since Heidegger is quite clear that he is here only bothering with the sense of the being of the occurrent in the broadest sense, what Herrmann (1991, p. 41) rightly identifies with the being of what is not like Dasein (*das Nichtdaseinsmäßige*).

⁴¹ The moment is the authentic mode of the Present. This parenthetical comment also contributes to the evidence that both originary and pragmatic temporality are modally indifferent.

noted as well, however, that there is no indication that Heidegger even saw *how* to spell out even *praesens* helpfully.

I must therefore conclude that the thesis of the Temporality of being, which not only is crucial to Heidegger's temporal idealism, but also the foundation of his approach to the question of being, is never defended adequately. Worse yet, it is never even developed, with or without support, at all. It is unclear whether Heidegger knew how to proceed here. The only indication we have that he thought he knew where he was going is the implication from his 1941 lecture comment that he had discussed his plans for division three of *Being and Time* with Jaspers. He also relates in that same comment, however, that through these discussions he saw that his planned approach to division 3 "had to remain unintelligible" (*unverständlich bleiben müsse*, MDI, p. 40). It is unclear how strongly he meant this. Did he mean that he realized that his approach did not really make sense? Or that it was pedagogically unwise? Or that it was too sketchy to be helpful? We do not know. All we have is the published record, which gives us no insight into Heidegger's direction of inquiry.

Heidegger and the Plotinian Tradition

We have been exploring Heidegger's debt to Kant and his appropriate placement within the tradition of Kantian, transcendental idealism. His own idealism is not identical to Kant's by any means, but it is surely a descendent of it and an intended improvement upon it. Kant does not represent the only lineage of Heidegger's temporal idealism, however. Heidegger is also deeply influenced by Plotinus and the tradition inspired by him. Plotinus developed explanatory, temporal idealism, that is, the thesis that time depends explanatorily on humans. Heidegger's own explanatory idealism improves, I think, upon features of Plotinus's view that make the latter, in the end, unworkable. Rather than pursue a strictly historical discussion of the Plotinian tradition, I want to show how we can think of Heidegger's view as the last in a series of views that begins with Leibniz. Leibniz is a Plotinian, but his account is more rudimentary than Plotinus's, which thus makes it a good place to begin.

To approach Leibniz, let me start by noting a significant difference between his temporal idealism and Kant's. For Kant the status of time as an *a priori* condition of representation is inexplicable:

This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce *a priori* unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by such and so

many, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or *why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition.* (CPR, B145–6, my emphasis)⁴²

Not only can time not be explained by locating its source in something noumenal outside the subject, but in fact, we cannot explain time's apriority at all. Reference to any features of the empirical self would surely be insufficient in an attempt to explain the apriority of time, since after all, the empirical self is the self as it appears and is, thus, already subject to the condition of time. No reference to features of the "noumenal self," that is, to the self as it is in itself (if there even be one), can help out for the simple reason that we have no knowledge of the noumenal self. (This follows *a fortiori* from the thesis that we have no knowledge of things as they are in themselves – apart, perhaps, from the negative knowledge that they are neither spatial nor temporal nor subject to the categories of the understanding – and is drawn out brilliantly and at great length in the Paralogisms chapter; see Sellars 1971.)⁴³ In a suggestive passage from a 26 May 1789 letter to Marcus Herz, Kant writes in response to Leibniz, "If we wanted to make judgments about their origin [the origin of the faculties of intuition and understanding] . . . we could name nothing beyond our divine creator" (KPC, p. 154).⁴⁴ This "judgment" is, of course, a cipher, since such dogmatic explanations of the world and ourselves in terms of the qualities of God are precisely the sorts of judgment that Kant wants to banish from philosophy. So Kant denies that we can explain or ground the appearance of time.

In what way could one ground the appearance of time? Leibniz's strategy is to posit an extratemporal structure that is correlative and isomorphic with time.⁴⁵ (This is, as we shall see, a version of Plotinus's general strategy.) The nature of the correlative structure would then depend on how one conceives time. Leibniz seems to think that the following features of time must be grounded in the extratemporal structure:

⁴² I thank Richard Aquila, Ian M. Betteridge, Terry Godlove, Bob Howell, Nick Perovich, and J. Michael Young, all of whom responded to a query for the location of this passage that I placed on the Kant-L electronic bulletin board, 19 July 1994.

⁴³ It is worth noting here that in his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger claims that there is a deep explanation for why we perceive things under the form of time, but on this score he is wrong. See *KPM*.

⁴⁴ I thank Kurt Mosser for this passage.

⁴⁵ My approach to Leibniz is deeply influenced by Wilfrid Sellars's (1965) understanding of his metaphysics.

- T₁ Time consists of elements ordered by the relation *succession*, which is irreflexive, antisymmetrical, and transitive.⁴⁶
- T₂ Time is directionally ordered.
- T₃ There must be qualitative variation across the elements of the time series.

How does Leibniz propose to explain these features of time? What is the correlative, extratemporal structure? The elements that correlate with the moments of time are descriptions of the state of a monad. (These descriptions must be timeless, or the account is circular.) The relation that orders these states is *appetition* or *aiming-for*. This relation, moreover, can explain feature (T₂), for appetition or aiming-for is directional: if state S_1 aims for S_2 , then S_1 points to or intends S_2 . Pointing-to and intending are directional. Furthermore, it is a condition on S_1 intending S_2 that S_1 and S_2 vary qualitatively.

Leibniz says as much in his "Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics":

If a plurality of states of things is assumed to exist which involve no opposition to each other, they are said to exist simultaneously. Thus we deny that what occurred last year and this year are simultaneous, for they involve incompatible states of the same thing.

If one of two states which are not simultaneous involves a reason for the other, the former is held to be *prior*; the latter *posterior*. My earlier state involves a reason for the existence of my later state. . . .

Time is the order of existence of those things which are not simultaneous. (1969, p. 666)

S_1 is prior to S_2 just in case (1) S_1 and S_2 are (qualitatively) differing states, and (2) S_1 is the reason for S_2 . In §15 of the *Monadology* (1969, p. 644) Leibniz states that if S_1 and S_2 are two states of the same monad, and one is the reason for the other, then this succession of states is appetition. There he characterizes appetition as a principle of *change*, which would make it a principle of alteration in time, but in order to make the idealist account of time work, we would have to abstract from the temporal

⁴⁶ I omit betweenness as a property of the series. Leibniz accepts betweenness as a property of the succession relation, but rather than grounding it in the betweenness of the *explanans* relation, he seems to infer backwards from the successiveness of time to the successiveness of the *explanans* (see Anapolitanos 1986).

dimension, which is what I have done.⁴⁷ So appetition is the principle of qualitative variation across states of a monad, such that one intends, aims for, or is the reason for the other.⁴⁸

But in everything said so far about Leibniz's account, there is no explanation for why the atemporal, teleological order of monadic states should appear to us as *time*, rather than as some other transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive, directional relation that orders qualitatively varying states. As far as I can tell, Leibniz never provides this explanation. This unanswered question is: Why do monads perceive the atemporal, teleological order of states of monads as a temporal order? Why do monads perceive things as in time? That is, we have trouble bringing together the two realms, noumenal and phenomenal; we have trouble showing why the noumenal realm should show up as the phenomenal realm that it does. (It is quite likely Kant's awareness of just this problem, indeed of the general problem of explaining the phenomenal in terms of the noumenal, leads him to the pared-down version of idealism we looked at earlier.)

One way to try to bridge the gap between atemporal *explanans* and temporal *explanandum* is to shy away from such a radical idealization of time. This is Plotinus's (1988) strategy. For Plotinus it is not enough to say that time is unreal, or better, less real than the understanding or intellect; one must add that time is the *product* of the understanding. It is vital to see in what way this differs from Kant's theory. For Kant, because time is a form of inner intuition, the subject can only be described temporally, as a temporally ordered sequence of experiences.⁴⁹ But for Plotinus and Leibniz the subject can be described extratemporally. Plotinus distinguishes the intellect (or understanding) from the soul. The intellect is the eternal realm of Platonic ideas as grasped by thought. The soul is the temporal realm of sequential thinking and desires. The presence of time in the soul is grounded in a fact about the soul, namely, that the soul has desire:

⁴⁷ I recognize that this is a controversial interpretation of Leibniz. However, it seems to hold out the best chance of making the accounts of space and time symmetrical. Leibniz does not consistently claim that the accounts *should* be symmetrical, and in many places he assumes that monads are temporal (see, e.g., Russell 1937, p. 128; Leibniz 1969, pp. 531, 534, and 643).

⁴⁸ Bas Van Fraasen (1985) claims that Leibniz has a causal theory of time. This is basically correct, except that he does not mention two important, differentiating features of this causal theory: the theory is idealist in that the relation that grounds time is a relation among states of the subject; and the causation is teleological, not efficient.

⁴⁹ There is no (cognitively integratable) description of the noumenal subject, of the subject *qua* transcendent being. There is a description of the a priori structures of the subject, but it must be understood that this description is of the phenomenal subject, although only insofar as its structures are prerequisite for a priori cognition.

before, when [the soul] had not yet generated this 'before' or felt a need of the 'after,' Time rested along with Eternity in Being, but was not yet Time, but it too was at rest in Eternity. But since there was an officious nature [viz., desire]⁵⁰ that wished to rule itself and that chose to seek after more than it presently had, this nature moved, and time moved with it, and in always moving on to what came next, to what comes after and is not the same, and having made progress in this journey, we produced time as the image of eternity. (Plotinus 1988, p. 262, notes deleted)

Desire is striving after something that one does not have, and so if desire is to be satisfied, it must *come to* have (acquire) its object. For this reason, there must be time: the soul has desires, and in order to fulfill them, it creates time:

For since the soul possessed an unquiet power [viz., desire], which always wished to transfer what it saw in that realm to something else, the soul did not wish to have all of it be present to it at once. . . . [F]irst of all the soul temporalized itself, and produced time instead of eternity, then it also made what came into being a slave of time, by making the whole of it to be in time, and by including all of its processes in time. (*ibid.*)

Without time, the soul's desires could never be satisfied.

We see that for Plotinus time is *necessitated* or *required* by a state of the subject (Manchester 1978). Kant merely claims that time is the form of inner intuition, which is not much more than a phenomenological claim that we can only experience ourselves under the form of time. Leibniz posits a teleological structure "behind" time as which time can appear, although he never explains why that structure should appear as time. But Plotinus offers an explanation of the presence of time in the soul: time is a necessary condition on the satisfaction of desires that the soul has. So, Plotinus's account is this: time is a necessary condition on the life of the soul as described extratemporally. Note that time is caused by the soul, and that the soul requires time. Thus, time and soul require each other. Time depends on the soul, however, because the soul explains time. Plotinus's temporal idealism is an *explanatory* idealism.

The very notion embodied in both the Leibnizian and the Plotinian idealisms in the philosophy of time is dubious, however, because we cannot conceive appetition, aiming-for, or desire apart from time. If Jones desires tortilla chips with salsa, it is (in part) because she does not now have them but wants to come to have them. How can one possibly formu-

⁵⁰ See Strange and McGuire's note 101 (in Plotinus 1988), flagged to the phrase "officious nature."

late a statement describing Jones as desiring tortilla chips without mentioning that she does not have them now, but wants to come to have them, to have them later, or as soon as possible, or something like this? In other words, is it not true that only temporal beings can desire or aim for? If this is correct, then any nontemporal description of an entity as desiring or aiming for something is incomplete. Desire and aiming do not just require temporality but are inconceivable apart from it. They cannot explain temporality, because what they are cannot be formulated apart from temporality.

We saw a similar issue arise in our discussion in chapter 2 of Heidegger's notion of a teleology that is not inherently sequentially temporal. In defending Heidegger against the correlative objection (viz., that to characterize Dasein as aiming for its for-the-sake-of-which, we must characterize it in terms of sequential temporality, *pace* the theory of origin-ary temporality), I noted that Dasein's aiming for its for-the-sake-of-which (its being-ahead-of-itself) is not an attempt to accomplish anything. Desires are attempts to accomplish or change something: they can be successfully fulfilled or not, just as attempts can be successfully completed or not. For this reason it is plausible that the concepts of desire and attempt are inherently sequentially temporal. Thus, whereas Plotinus's theory of temporal idealism appears to get into difficulty by using an inherently sequentially temporal notion to explain time, Heidegger – perhaps well aware of Plotinus's difficulty – carefully avoids the problem.

So should we view Heidegger's temporal idealism as reformed Plotinianism? Heidegger owes much, namely, his basic strategy, to Plotinus. But he is not simply a reformed Plotinian, and for two principal reasons. First, Plotinus's extratemporal description of the subject is an eternal one. Heidegger wants nothing to do with eternity, at least in any recognizable sense of the term. There are, of course, many, and powerful, reasons why Plotinus and Leibniz rely on the concept of eternity, reasons having to do with their basic metaphysical postures as well as their religious orientations.⁵¹ Plotinus and Leibniz merely spell out the Platonic view that time

⁵¹ I do not mean to suggest that their religions somehow infected or misdirected their philosophizing. Rather, their religions were in many ways integral to their philosophies. Heidegger took a somewhat more radical stance on this issue, at least with respect to what we should say today: "The assertion of 'eternal truths' as well as the conflation of the phenomenally grounded 'ideality' of Dasein with an idealized, absolute subject belong to the residue of Christian theology within the philosophical problematic, which has not been even nearly radically expelled yet [*den längst noch nicht radikal ausgetriebenen* – I read the "*längst noch nich!*" as modifying the "*radikal*"]" (*S&Z*, p. 229).

is the “image” of eternity, when they offer an eternal structure of which time is something of an imitation. Heidegger (*S&Z*, p. 423) explicitly ties the Platonic view to the ordinary conception of time. In *Logic* he argues,

Thus, although it is determined by temporal characteristics, care is indeed not temporally determined in the sense that it *qua* entity takes place “in time.” That does not, however, mean that it is something extra-temporal [*etwas Außerzeitliches*]. That is to say, if it is fundamentally something that does not take place “in time,” then it also cannot be something extra- or supra-temporal [*etwas Außer- oder Überzeitliches*]. For extra-temporal and supra-temporal items are only modifications of being-in-time, presuppose the latter as a possibility. (*LFW*, p. 242)

He puts all his cards on the table in a powerful footnote in chapter 6 of division 2 of *Being and Time*, a mere ten pages before the end of the treatise:

That the traditional concept of eternity in the sense of the “standing now” (*nunc stans*) is drawn out of the ordinary conception of time and is limited by the orientation to the idea of “constant” [or standing] occurrentness requires no detailed exposition. If the eternity of God were to be construed philosophically, it could only be understood as a more originary and “infinite” temporality. Whether the *via negationis et eminentiae* could offer a possible path here remains undecided. (*S&Z*, p. 427, n. 1)

Here he makes it clear that although he does not exclude the possibility of reinterpreting the concept of divine eternity,⁵² the traditional conceptions of eternity as either a Now outside of time (a “standing Now”) or an unchanging and sempiternal Now comprehensive of time belong to the framework of the Now. And the Now, of course, belongs to sequential time. Dasein’s originary temporality is supposed to be prior to the Now and anything dependent upon its framework, including eternity.

Second, Plotinus finds one directional state of the subject in which to ground the directional, successive series of time: desire. In this regard Leibniz, who grounds time in a relation correlative and isomorphic with succession, viz., appetition, directly follows Plotinus. Time is, in an important sense, a “mirror” of a nontemporal but correlative relation for both thinkers (for Plotinus, see the introduction, p. 252, by Strange and McGuire to Plotinus 1988). Plotinus’s account is still superior to Leib-

⁵² Thus, even on this issue, Heidegger is not so much hostile to Christian dogma as to its traditional, philosophical interpretation, and presumably to the priority that the dogma is sometimes thought to have in philosophical analysis.

niz's, because it appears more likely to be able to explain why that mirrored relation grounds *time*. But Heidegger's approach is rather different, and in a way in which he is indebted to Bergson.⁵³

Bergson (1910) holds that successive time is utterly illusory, its appearance the product of a misleading projection of space onto a more originary, nonsuccessive form of time, which he calls "*durée*." Bergson's official conclusion parallels Heidegger's: the past, Present, and future do not succeed one another. As Bergson says, the three dimensions, or tenses (past, Present, future) of time are purely qualitative. It is a little hard to know just what Bergson is driving at, because his argument for the purely qualitative character of time falls so woefully short of its conclusion; this suggests that Bergson's theory might be rather different. He is concerned to avoid conflating space and time, that is, using properly spatial concepts to characterize time. He argues that number cannot apply to *durée*, because number presupposes spatial multiplicity (1910, pp. 104–5). This argument turns on associating number (through counting) with discrete multiplicity. From this he infers that *durée* is a "continuous or qualitative multiplicity" (*ibid.*). But, of course, continuity and qualitativeness are different concepts. Bergson has only argued for the former. Furthermore, throughout *Time and Free Will* Bergson systematically conflates organic unity and continuity. He argues that if we avoid rendering *durée* discrete, then we are left with a "self in which *succeeding each other* means *melting into one another* and forming an organic whole" (1910, p. 128). Thus, he infers from continuity to organic wholeness; this shows that he means by "continuity" something like a multiplicity the elements of which do not exist *partes extra partes*. But this by no means even suggests that time is purely qualitative.

Bergson's arguments, therefore, are rather confused. Because Bergson really only offers reasons to think time continuous, I shall distinguish between his "conclusions" (what he can plausibly conclude from his arguments) and his "official doctrine" (what he announces as his view). So

⁵³ In *The Concept of Time* Heidegger appears much closer to Bergson than he really is when he seems to endorse Bergson's critique of the spatialization of time in his treatment of the homogenization of time (BZ, p. 24). The Bergsonian account there of homogenization is replaced in S&Z by the theory of leveling-off. The favorable references to Bergson here do indicate, however, that at least in 1924 he took himself to have learned something from Bergson. By the time he became clearer about his conception of originary temporality, his distance from Bergson must have appeared to him to have been increased greatly, and this perhaps obscured what he had learned from Bergson. By the time he wrote *LFW*, when Heidegger has come around to his conception of originary temporality, he places Bergson into the Aristotelian tradition in the philosophy of time (*LFW*, § 21), just as in S&Z.

Bergson's conclusions describe a theory quite like the one William Barrett attributes to Heidegger. Bergson might be seen to say that

time is basically given as a temporal spread or field, and not as a sequence of disjoint Nows. Not a present Now, then another present Now, and another, etc. etc., but the whole spread – and an indefinitely finite spread at that – of future-present-past (where the hyphenization of these three terms is intended to signify the holding together of future-present-past as a unifying synthesis). (Barrett 1968, p. 356)

But even if the originary field of time is not broken down into *units* that succeed one another, surely one still cannot avoid the consequence that the future is *later than* the Present. Even Bergson's *durée*, *if continuous*, must be a temporal field in which the future is later than the Present. (Bergson concedes successiveness in his *Creative Mind* [1947, p. 176],⁵⁴ which on this score is clearer than *Time and Free Will*.) One might balk at the phraseology that declares the future to be *after* the Present, because it seems to posit independent units that bear relations to one another, but surely Bergson's durational field and Barrett's "indefinitely finite spread" span from the earlier to the later. This span may be, as it is for Bergson, "organic" or "continuous," and thus not discrete, but it is still a span.

Bergson's official doctrine, however – that time consists of qualitative, nonsuccessive tenses – we may view as having influenced Heidegger deeply.⁵⁵ The notion that the past, Present, and future of some special form of time might be something like purely qualitative, as opposed to successive, provides an interesting approach to understanding the metaphysical character of Heidegger's originary temporality. We can think of

54 This passage was drawn to my attention by Ronald Bruzina's presentation of his (in press), which he read at a conference entitled "More Phenomenology of Time," hosted by Lester Embree and John Brough at Florida Atlantic University, November 1995.

55 At least one commentator, Philip Merlan (1947), takes Heidegger and Bergson to hold essentially similar positions. Merlan argues that "a certain affinity between Bergson and Heidegger seems to me evident" (p. 46), and he then proceeds to distinguish "pure duration" from "spatialized time." This could not be farther from what Heidegger is up to. In n. 111 on p. 46 Merlan expresses dismay that Heidegger "speaks of Bergson rather haughtily." Perhaps the haughtiness is misplaced, but Heidegger certainly should have underscored the great distance that lies between his own view and Bergson's. Merlan's willingness to view Heidegger through Bergsonian spectacles leads him to offer a bogus argument for the unexperienceability of death: to "make up the distance" between now and death, one must travel half the temporal distance between now and death, and then half of what remains, etc. (p. 36). This Zenonian argument is not only totally out of place in discussing the possibility of the *experience* of death, but it is even further out of place in Heidegger's nonsequential framework. (Zenonian arguments – although I hope not this one! – are integral to Bergson's position.)

Heidegger's originary temporal manifold as consisting of three tenses, three qualities⁵⁶ that do not succeed one another, but rather characterize the condition of Dasein. If we bear in mind that originary temporality explains ordinary time, we can even say that these qualities or tenses characterize Dasein at any Now of ordinary time.⁵⁷ In order for the concepts of these tenses to be understandable as having some nonsuccessive significance, one must specify their content independently of successive time. This is just what Heidegger tries to do in his account of originary temporality. I devoted some effort in Chapters 2 and 3 to getting clear on what that content is. Heidegger's achievement was to have taken Bergson's one enduring insight – that nonsuccessive time would have to be the tenses shorn of their successive content – and to have developed it into an elaborate theory. The price Heidegger pays, however, is that the return trip to successive time never reaches its goal.⁵⁸

Heidegger's temporal idealism is thus clearly a development of the received tradition in the philosophy of time. From Plotinus and Leibniz he picks up the idea that time is grounded in a nontemporal, teleological state or structure of the subject, for Plotinus desire, for Leibniz appetition, for Heidegger what he calls "being-ahead." Like Plotinus and Leibniz, but unlike Kant, Heidegger does want to ground time, to show that it is required by the structure of the subject. This sets Plotinus, Leibniz, and Heidegger apart from Kant, whose denial that we can in any way explain why time is an a priori form of representation leaves time ungrounded. (Whether that is a drawback will depend on whether one thinks time needs grounding. A reason to think it does is this: if we can in no way explain why time is an a priori form of representation, then it is unclear why we should accept the claim that it is. Kant is asking us to accept time simply as *given* as an a priori form of representation. As Hegel made plain, that is surprisingly dogmatic for the inventor of modern, Critical philosophy.) Although Heidegger is, thus, close to Plotinus and Leibniz, he parts company with them in their general strategies for grounding time. They

⁵⁶ As long as we do not load the word "quality" up with ontological presuppositions, i.e., take a quality to be what inheres in a subject.

⁵⁷ They certainly do not characterize Dasein eternally. Heidegger would say that in the first instance they characterize Dasein simply as such. But because originary temporality requires and explains world-time (and hence, ordinary time), the tenses characterize Dasein at any moment of world-time (or ordinary time).

⁵⁸ Plotinus and Leibniz cheat toward time by using appetitive states to ground time and, thus, make the return trip only by departing from a loaded origin, whereas Heidegger avoids cheating but cannot make the return trip. Prospects for the Plotinian tradition in the philosophy of time are dim.

both ground time in a kind of “shadow time,” a correlative “mirrored” time (eternity) that hangs behind time and gives rise to it. The difficulty that arises for both of them is that the relations that induce and explain time appear to be parasitic upon the conceptual framework of time, which thus undermines their ability to *ground* time. Heidegger wants instead to strip succession out of time, leaving only the pure tenses, not unlike in Bergson’s official doctrine. The two great differences between Bergson’s and Heidegger’s theories, however, are first, that Heidegger does not contradict the theory’s aspiration by arguing that the nonsuccessive tenses are continuous, and, second, that he actually provides a detailed account of the nonsuccessive content of those tenses.⁵⁹

Temporality, Dasein, and World

Before turning to the significance of the failure of Heidegger’s temporal idealism, I want to draw out one further explanatory aspiration of that idealism. Temporal idealism performs two essential, explanatory functions in *Being and Time*: it explains the unity of Dasein and world and the dependence of being on Dasein. We have already discussed the latter issue, and now we can turn to the former. The unity of Dasein and world is the topic of §69c, “The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World.” Section 69c is, however, ambivalent about just exactly what it wants to show, and most of my effort below will be directed to determining just what its thesis is. Heidegger suggests that Dasein and world are identical with each other, but his argument only approaches the conclusion that they belong to a unitary phenomenon. As we shall see, unfortunately, not even this argument works, for it inherits the defects of Heidegger’s discussion of the unity of originary temporality, which we examined in Chapters 2 and 3.

On p. 364 of §69c, Heidegger writes, “Dasein *is* its world existingly” (*S&Z*, p. 364). What does this mean? We have known since early in *Being and Time* that Heidegger believes, at a minimum, that the world belongs to the being of Dasein. After all, another name for that being is “being-in-the-world.” It is unclear whether Heidegger’s claim on p. 364 that Dasein *is* its world is supposed to be stronger than the initial claim. To explore a possible difference here, let me reformulate the initial claim of long-

59 Heidegger’s conception of the subject as Dasein is so different from anything in Bergson that their resulting metaphysical views could not possibly resemble each other very closely.

standing thus: the world is a factor in the analysis of Dasein.⁶⁰ Dasein is not the world, but rather an individual person. To be able to make sense out of the comportment (or more broadly, the life) of any individual person, we must refer to the world: the tasks (in-orders-to-which) that she takes up, the equipment (defined by those tasks) that she wields, and so on. Without reference to these structures, human comportment would appear simply as meaningless motions through objective space and ordinary time. But Heidegger's claim seems to say something stronger: that Dasein *is*, that is, is identical with, its world. This would not be just to say that the world is a factor in the analysis of Dasein, but rather that Dasein and world are one and the same entity.

There is linguistic reason to believe that Heidegger means the stronger thesis, that Dasein is the world. Heidegger left a clue indicating the stronger thesis in his §14 terminology concerning the world. There, after distinguishing the ontic and ontological senses of "world," as well as the existential and nonexistential senses, and after fixing the term "world" as referring to the ontic and existential phenomenon – that is, as referring the social milieu of Dasein – Heidegger reserves the word "worldly" (*weltlich*): "The derivative 'worldly' then means terminologically a sort of being of Dasein and never a sort of being of entities occurrent 'in' the world. The latter we call belonging to the world or intraworldly" (S&Z, p. 65). It is Dasein who is worldly. This is a nice term, since it connects (in both English and German) with the ordinary term "worldly," which refers to someone familiar with or an expert about the world (see VWG, p. 141 ff.). Since being-in-the-world is fundamentally a familiarity (*Vertrautheit*) with the world (S&Z, p. 54), Dasein is ontologically familiar with the world and the things in it; it is ontologically worldly. One would expect, then, that the abstract noun "worldliness" would refer to the feature of Dasein that it is worldly. But initially it does not. In §14 Heidegger uses "worldliness" to refer to the sort of being of the world; it captures the existential and ontological meaning of the word "world" (S&Z, p. 65).

60 I base this formulation on Schatzki (1988), who refers to the "intelligibility-determining factors" (p. 245) that we use in order to make sense of the lives of individuals. He emphasizes that his ontology is individualistic, although in analyzing what makes the lives of these individuals intelligible, we must refer to some non-individual phenomena (pp. 247–8). (His examples include "institutions, historical events, economic systems" and "rules, paradigms, customs, and . . . setting"; p. 248.) Schatzki carries this individualism over into his interpretation of Heidegger in his (1992). There he argues that Dasein is an individual person and would add that the world is simply a factor in the analysis of the intelligibility of individual lives.

This is obscured in the English translation, where Macquarrie and Robinson use "worldhood" to translate "*Weltlichkeit*." But "*Weltlichkeit*" is simply the abstract, nominal derivative of the adjective "*weltlich*," worldly. The being of the world is worldliness. But it is Dasein who is worldly. The being of the world is, thus, a way of being of Dasein. And this is what Heidegger appears to claim on p. 364: Dasein *is* its world.

Whatever Heidegger wants to establish on p. 364, the argument for it is found in the next two paragraphs. We can determine what the claim on p. 364 ought to mean by seeing what its argument can plausibly be thought to aim for. (Of course, it is always possible that Heidegger's argument might fall far short of its goal; there may very well be a gap between what Heidegger did write and what he ought to have written.) The two paragraphs are these:

We have determined the being of Dasein to be care. The latter's ontological sense is [originary] temporality. That and how temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the There has been shown. World is co-disclosed in the disclosedness of the There. The unity of significance, that is, the ontological makeup of the world, must then likewise be grounded in temporality. *The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in temporality as an ecstatic unity having something like an horizon.* The ecstases are not simply enrapturings to . . . Rather, a "where-to" of enrapturing belongs to the ecstasy. We call this where-to of the ecstasy the horizontal schema. Each of the three ecstases has a different horizontal schema. The schema in which Dasein comes toward itself *futurally*, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the *for-the-sake-of-itself*. We conceive the schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in affectivity as something thrown as the *in-the-face-of-which* of thrownness or the where-to of abandonment. It indicates the horizontal structure of *beenness*. Existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as thrown, Dasein is at the same time enpresenting as being-amidst . . . The horizontal schema of the *Present* is determined through the *in-order-to*.

The unity of the horizontal schemata of the future, beenness, and Present is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. The horizon of the whole of temporality determines that *in terms of which* the factually existing entity [viz., Dasein] is essentially *disclosed*. Along with factual Da-sein [being-there] an ability-to-be is in each case disclosed and in each case in the horizon of the future; a "being-already" is disclosed in the horizon of beenness; and what Dasein is concerned with is discovered in the horizon of the Present. The horizontal unity of the schemata of the ecstases makes possible the originary connection of the *in-order-to* relations with the *for-the-sake-of*. Therein lies this: on the basis of the horizontal makeup of the ecstatic unity

of temporality, something like a disclosed world belongs to the entity that is in each case its *There*. (S&Z, pp. 364–5)

These two paragraphs suggest two distinct arguments. First, “*The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in temporality as an ecstatic unity having something like an horizon.*” This sentence suggests that the unity of ecstasy and horizon underwrites the unity of Dasein and world. This in turn implies that Dasein is to be found on the ecstasy side of the ecstasy-horizon unity, and world on its horizon side. There are two reasons to doubt that this approach has much to offer. First, it reinstutes a subject-object-like dichotomy between Dasein and world and then asks that the rather abstract structure of originary temporality should bridge that dichotomy. But Heidegger’s whole strategy throughout *Being and Time* is to dispense, as much as possible, with dichotomies that need to be overcome. Second, for this explanation to be illuminating, we would have to have a deeper account of the unity of ecstasy and horizon. But Heidegger gives no such account. One might propose that perhaps he intended to offer that account in division 3, but this would be highly speculative. Moreover, at the end of §69c, Heidegger writes as if he has just provided the account that makes sense of the unity of Dasein and world: “By tracing back being-in-the-world to the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality, the existential-ontological possibility of this basic makeup of Dasein is made intelligible [*verständlich*]” (S&Z, p. 366).

Second, “The horizontal unity of the schemata of the ecstases makes possible the originary connection of the in-order-to relations with the for-the-sake-of. Therein lies this: on the basis of the horizontal make-up of the ecstatic unity of temporality, something like a disclosed world belongs to the entity that is in each case its *There*.” This suggests that the unity of the schemata themselves clarifies the unity of Dasein and world. The world consists of the in-order-to relations in their interconnection with the for-the-sakes-of-which. Dasein is its for-the-sakes-of-which. The world, the social milieu, is made up of all the involvement relations that organize equipment and tasks. The in-order-to is the horizontal schema of the Present, and the for-the-sake-of-which is the schema of the future. If the schemata belong essentially to the ecstases, and if the ecstases are intrinsically unified, then the schemata are intrinsically unified too.

In Chapter 2 we looked into Heidegger’s conception of the intrinsic unity of originary temporality. If that unity can carry any analytical weight, then that weight can be transferred over to the unity of the schemata. And the unity of the schemata turns out to be the unity of Dasein and world.

This approach to §69c is quite different from that explored under the first interpretation. According to this approach, Heidegger is not attempting to overcome a Dasein-world dichotomy, but rather to allow the intrinsic unity of originary temporality to underwrite the mutual interconnection of world (in-order-to structure) and Dasein (for-the-sake-of-which). That is a mutual interconnection already explored in chapter 3 of division 1, principally in §18. Here it is tied to the unity of originary temporality. Just as care's unity was already visible before the temporal analysis, so too is the unity of Dasein and world. The temporal analysis simply seeks to deepen that unity by viewing it in terms of the supposedly more tightly unified structure of originary temporality. Now that we know how the explanation is supposed to go, we can see that all it does is tighten up the connection between Dasein (for-the-sake-of-which) and world (in-order-to structure). It does not *identify* them. This implies that all Heidegger deserves, if his argument works, is the weaker claim found early in *Being and Time*: the world is a factor in the analysis of Dasein.

Does the argument work? Does the unity of originary temporality carry sufficient analytical weight to "make intelligible" the unity of Dasein and world? Recall from Chapter 2 that the unity of originary temporality is to be understood thus: consider the intrinsic unity of time and remove from time the disunifying element of succession. We are left with a timelike structure more unified than even sequential time. This line of argument succeeds, only if Heidegger's account of originary temporality as a mode of time succeeds, which account in turn depends upon Heidegger's temporal idealism. (Recall that originary temporality is a mode of time, because it explains world-time and, hence, ordinary time.) But we saw in Chapter 3 that these arguments do not work. Thus, Heidegger's explanation of the unity of originary temporality fails, and so do whichever explanatory adventures are based on it. Hence, originary temporality cannot impart a deeper form of unity to Dasein and the world than that with which we are already familiar. Section 69c ends up adding nothing helpful to §18. Its legitimate intention was to do so, but it cannot.

As noted parenthetically earlier, Heidegger's intention in §69c may very well have been to argue for the stronger thesis, namely, that Dasein and its world are identical; his language surely suggests that. If so, however, the argument of that section falls quite far short of its conclusion. With no other argument to rely on, we can only conclude that the italicized "is" in the claim on p. 364 means something like "is deeply unified with" or "makes up one unitary phenomenon with," rather than "is numerically identical with." There would be additional difficulties in making

sense of the stronger claim in *Being and Time* anyhow. It is notoriously difficult to know whether Dasein is supposed to be an individual person (as most interpreters think), a way of life (Haugeland 1982), a “‘living’ (currently being lived) *way of life*” (Haugeland 1992, p. 35), or some hybrid of these suggestions. *Being and Time* puts the issue here profoundly but gives only an indistinct answer. The balance of interpretive weight rests with the “individualistic” reading (Schatzki 1992). But note that the “individualism” here is not atomistic: the world, an irreducibly social phenomenon, is a factor in the ontological analysis of Dasein. Given that Dasein is a person – as I have assumed all along by giving personal surnames (Jones, Smith, Brown, and others) to my Daseins – and given also that the world is social, it would be difficult to see how Jones, say, could be numerically identical with the world. Assuming, thus, Heidegger to have been arguing for the weaker claim – viz., that the unity of originary temporality illuminates the unity of Dasein and world – it is nonetheless true that his attempt to render the unity of Dasein and world more intelligible fails.

Heidegger is a temporal idealist. His temporal idealism is developed out of ideas derived from two lineages within the idealist tradition in the philosophy of time: Kant’s transcendental idealism and Plotinus’s explanatory idealism. Heidegger ends up with a distinctive fusion of the two traditions. His fusion is only made possible, however, by his own novel contribution: the notion of an underlying, nonsequential, quasi-temporal manifold that explains time as it is ordinarily thought of. This manifold of tenses (perhaps inspired by Bergson) is the origin of time, originary temporality. Heidegger is thus an explanatory, transcendental idealist about time. The complexities of his position plausibly represent decided advances over those of his predecessors. Unfortunately, even these advances do not save the temporal idealism from ruin. The central argument examined in Chapter 3 fails, and with it fails temporal idealism in *Being and Time*. This failure is not an isolated and easily excised one, however. Heidegger bases his arguments for the dependency of being on Dasein and the deeper unity of Dasein and world on his temporal idealism. Neither of these arguments survives the collapse of temporal idealism. What, then, are we to make of Heidegger’s ontology? Where are we left in the aftermath of this collapse?

CONCLUSION. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE OF HEIDEGGER'S TEMPORAL IDEALISM

We can divide the labors of *Being and Time* into three broad sets: an innovative array of ontological categories, prominent in which is a technical development of an ontology of the human that had been emerging within the existentialist tradition; an attempt to link ontology decisively with the philosophy of time; and a novel conception of a philosophy of being. The first set of labors – the new ontological categories – are undoubtedly the most successful of *Being and Time*. Heidegger uses a broadly phenomenological methodology in order to ground his categories of the occurrent, the available, and Dasein. He devotes greatest attention to Dasein: he develops a well-worked-out version of some of the basic ideas of the existentialist tradition, spins them into a general antinaturalism (existentialist dualism), and uses this in turn to criticize many aspects of the received philosophical tradition. But all along he avers that this dimension of his project is only preparatory. His ultimate goal is his philosophy of being. What I mean by that opaque but common term is this: Heidegger aims to set out an account of being, to understand its articulation into traditional ontological conceptions, such as “what-being” and “that-being,” to grasp its connection with Dasein, and perhaps most importantly to come to terms intellectually with the very distinction between being and entities, the Ontological Difference.

The philosophy of time that occupies the final quarter of *Being and Time* sits between the ontological investigations of the first sixty-four sec-

tions of the treatise and the planned philosophy of being, never completed, but intended for division 3 of part 1. Its location reflects, moreover, its position within the philosophical architecture of *Being and Time*. The account of originary temporality embodies a reinterpretation and deepening of the ontology of Dasein, just as the theories of world-time and ordinary time reconstrue and develop the ontologies of the available and the occurrent. These temporal reinterpretations of the regional ontologies of Dasein, the available, and the occurrent exhibit the Temporality of being: the thesis that time is the horizon for the understanding of being, that being is shot through with temporal determinations. Finally, the dependence of world-time and ordinary time on originary temporality underwrite a robust temporal idealism that places Heidegger firmly within a tradition whose leading authors are Kant and Plotinus. In sum, originary temporality, the Temporality of being, and temporal idealism make up the central notions of Heidegger's philosophy of time.

To reach his philosophy of being Heidegger must cross through his philosophy of time. Ontological idealism is one of the central theses of the planned philosophy of being. We find this ontological idealism in §43c of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger declares that being, but not entities, depends on Dasein. Moreover, we can, see from *Basic Problems* that Heidegger intended to argue for the dependence not just of being on Dasein, but also of the Ontological Difference. Although he never explains it, he writes:

The distinction between being and entities is *there* [ist . . . da] latently in Dasein and its existence, even if it is not explicitly known. The distinction *is there*; i.e., it has the sort of being of Dasein; it belongs to existence. . . . The distinction between being and entities is temporalized in the temporalizing of temporality. (*GP*, p. 454)

The ontological idealism of *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems* is thoroughgoing. But as we have seen (Chapter 5), the argument for ontological idealism involves two premises that belong to the philosophy of time: the Temporality of being and temporal idealism.

Thus, the philosophy of time found in §65 ff. of *Being and Time* is absolutely central to the treatise's philosophical conclusions, both its ultimate construal of the ontology of Dasein and its intended philosophy of being. That philosophy of time is no external appendage, no mere decoration on an otherwise integral system. It sits at its core.

Now we are forced to stare directly in the face of the consequences of the failure of Heidegger's philosophy of time: if the philosophy of time is

a failure, as I argued it is, then the entire effort of *Being and Time* is called into question. We must, then, ask: What of *Being and Time* can survive the demise of its philosophy of time? Heidegger's ontology of Dasein can escape the collapse of his philosophy of time rather well intact. We must simply forsake the deepening that §65 ff. were supposed to provide. The only substantial piece of the ontology that we shall have to forsake is the theory of historicality. The integrity of the ontology of Dasein contrasts markedly with the almost complete failure of the planned philosophy of being. Without the support of temporal idealism, ontological idealism has no legs to stand on. As we shall see, this awkward situation can help us to understand some aspects of the development of Heidegger's thought after *Being and Time* and into his later phase.

Originary Temporality and the Ontology of Dasein

Recall that originary temporality consists of a manifold of nonsequential aspects of activity, which Heidegger claims to underlie time as we ordinarily experience it. Teleological directedness, affective determinacy, and presence in person (the three ecstases of originary temporality) are not straightforwardly aspects of time. Heidegger's claim that they are – that they make up an originary, temporal manifold – is based on the thesis that they can explain time. Recall the labyrinthine argument of Chapters 3 and 4, which attempts to trace out the chain of dependencies from natural time back to originary temporality. If that reasoning succeeds, then Heidegger has earned the premise for his argument encapsulated in the slogan "*a posteriori fit denominatio*": because originary temporality is the explanatory core of time, it is a form of time. Thus, the very claim that originary temporality is a form of time depends on temporal idealism. But because the argument for temporal idealism fails, we have no reason to accept the thesis that originary temporality is a form of time.

What are we then to make of the temporal analysis of Dasein's being? What can be salvaged from it, and what must be discarded? Let us grant the Unattainability Thesis, since although Heidegger takes it to have temporal implications, it is not itself strictly speaking part of the temporal analysis, or reinterpretation, of Dasein's being. Hence, we accept that self-understanding has no goal that Dasein aims to realize in the future. We have no reason any longer to assent to the claim, however, that the for-the-sake-of-which is futural in some other sense, that it lies "ahead" of current activity in some nonsequential sense. We can still agree that Dasein's pressing ahead into a for-the-sake-of-which explains why it aims for the

goals it tries to realize. But that pressing ahead is no longer to be thought of as an essentially temporal activity. This is not to say, however, that it "takes place" somehow outside time, perhaps eternally. Rather, we can no longer find any temporal-ontological significance in the analysis of Dasein's pressing ahead. Certainly we would now say that this pressing ahead takes place currently and explains how we forge into the (world-time) future. But it itself is not a forging ahead into anything but such a world-time future, and it could only be the latter dependently, as it were, by explaining why and how we do so forge ahead. Parallel observations are in order for the originary past and Present. Affective determinacy, even if it does explain why we experience things as already given in the way we do, is not itself a form of pastness. Presence in person to manipulative dealings, even if it does explain why things show up for us as Present, is not itself a special form of the Present.

Although Heidegger may have come upon some real insights into the structure of human activity in his analyses leading up to the temporal interpretation of Dasein's being, the temporal interpretation itself is mistaken. Human activity is always deeply guided by what Heidegger calls "pressing ahead into for-the-sakes-of-which," and this pressing-ahead is not aimed at a realizable goal. This Unattainability Thesis is both controversial and ontologically interesting, even if in the end it cannot drive a radically new temporal analysis of Dasein's being. The Unattainability Thesis is logically connected with two of the more contentious conceptions of *Being and Time*: Heidegger's existential dualism and his concept of death. The Unattainability Thesis is a consequence of Heidegger's dualism, and the latter emerged, we recall, in trying to defend the Existentiality Thesis, viz., that if Dasein is *A*, it is *A* because it understands itself as *A*. (Recall as well that the Existentiality Thesis is Heidegger's principal ontological innovation in division 1, chapter 1, §9.) The Unattainability Thesis in turn underwrites the concept of death, for it is a condition for the possibility of existential death as Heidegger conceives it. Finally, Heidegger's conceptualization of death is central to his development of, and argument for, the "factual ideal" of authenticity. Heidegger may himself have sought to defend the Unattainability Thesis ultimately in the interests of developing a new temporal interpretation of human existence, but the ontology of Dasein that he generates along the way is both intriguing and capable of surviving the demise of that temporal interpretation. Parallel points can be made about the Nullity Thesis.

The Unattainability Thesis and its attendant ontology may survive the

(*Geschichtlichkeit*) cannot. Heidegger's conception of historicality in division 2, chapter 5, of *Being and Time* requires the account of originary temporality explored earlier in this study. It is surely not surprising that if the philosophy of time in the final quarter of *Being and Time* is unworkable, the chapter on historicality, ensconced within the middle of that final quarter, would turn out likewise to be indefensible. Indeed, what makes Heidegger's approach to historicality unique also proves its undoing: it is a conception of a nonsequential historicality, just as originary temporality is a nonsequential temporality.

Historicality, as Heidegger conceives it, is the ontological result of placing an originally temporal entity into sequential time:

The analysis of the historicality of Dasein aims to show that this entity is not “temporal” because it “stands in history,” but rather the opposite, that it does and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being [im Grunde seines Seins].

All the same, Dasein must also be called “temporal” in the sense of being “in time.” (S&Z, p. 376)

In this passage Heidegger makes clear that originary temporality explains historicality and at least suggests that Dasein's intratemporality – its being-in-time – helps to constitute its historicality. The second point militates against the standard reading of historicality in *Being and Time*, viz., that historicality is the full conceptual development of originary temporality (Guignon 1983; Pöggeler 1983).¹ The first point indicates that historicality is, thus, surely dependent upon originary temporality for its legitimacy. It is important to note that denying Dasein's historicality in Heidegger's sense is not necessarily to deny that Dasein is historical in some more conventional sense. We need not disallow that Dasein “stands in

¹ In the Introduction I quoted two passages that conflict with my interpretation: S&Z, pp. 332 and 376. I hope that the plausibility of the account of historicality to follow, as well as the way it dovetails with the rest of this study, can overcome the force of those two passages. One further passage may contradict my reading: “In order, with the help of the time of intratemporality, to divest the ordinary characterization of the historical of its illusory obviousness and exclusiveness, historicality should first be ‘deduced’ purely from temporality, as the connection among the ‘objects’ also demands” (S&Z, p. 377). This may imply that historicality can be derived from originary temporality without the conceptual materials provided by sequential time, intratemporality. However, Heidegger may also just mean to say that we need not understand historicality as a form of intratemporality, as does the ordinary conception of the historical as the bygone (about which more shortly). This reading can find some comfort in the next sentence from p. 377: “Insofar, however, as time *qua* intratemporality also ‘derives’ from the temporality of Dasein, historicality and intratemporality prove to be equi-originary.”

history," nor, indeed, that it stands in history in some peculiar way. We do, however, lose our warrant for endorsing Heidegger's specific conception of historicality. The question then emerges: Do we simply lose argumentative support for a conception that makes sense independently of the framework of originary temporality?

The very concept of historicality is vitiated by the collapse of originary temporality, for historicality is conceptually, and not just argumentatively, dependent upon the nonsequential framework. To make this clear, let me begin by explaining why a certain, historically plausible approach to Heidegger's conception of historicality is exegetically incorrect. Dilthey's writings would be a natural frame of reference for the concept of historicality, given their influence on Heidegger and the references to them in division 2, chapter 5.² This is the strategy of two of the more powerful readings of chapter 5 of division 2, those of Gadamer (1975) and Guignon (1983). Both turn to the concept of "effective history," that is, history understood in terms of how it effects, or shapes, or governs, or perhaps determines the Present. Guignon even uses Heidegger's *Habitationsvortrag*, "The Concept of Time in Historical Science" ("Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft," 1915, ZBGW), as support for this interpretive angle. There Heidegger does seize upon the notion of effective history:

The goal of historical science is thus to present the context of effectiveness and development [*Wirkungs- und Entwicklungszusammenhang*] of the objectivations of human life in their uniqueness and singularity as this is made intelligible by their relation to cultural values. (ZBGW, p. 369, as translated by Guignon 1983, p. 80)

Given how much water flows under the bridge between 1915 and 1927, and especially in light of the significant innovations in the philosophy of time that Heidegger develops in the mid-1920s, it would be surprising, to say the least, if his 1915 approach to historicality remained intact in 1927.

Indeed, in *Being and Time* Heidegger clearly distances himself from this notion of effective history. In §73, "The Ordinary Understanding of History and the Historizing [*Geschehen*]³ of Dasein," Heidegger draws a con-

² "The completed exposition of the problem of history grows out of the appropriation of the work of Dilthey" (S&Z, p. 397). Note, however, that Heidegger clearly indicates that Dilthey's (and Yorck's) ontology is inappropriate to Dasein. Both are subject to the "unbroken domination of traditional ontology" (S&Z, p. 403).

³ I follow Macquarrie and Robinson by translating "*geschehen*" in these contexts as "to historicize." "*Geschehen*" is an ordinary, German verb that means "to happen." Heidegger emphasizes its connection to the German word for history, viz., "*Geschichte*," and so it makes sense, even if

trast between “the bygone” (*das Vergangene*)⁴ and history. The bygone is occurrent (in the broadest sense): it is those events and things that have slipped into the sequential past, that are no longer now. To see that this is what Heidegger means, it is useful to look carefully at a passage from §73:

Among the significations of the expression “history” that indicate neither the science of history nor also this as an object,⁵ but rather, this not yet objectified entity itself, the signification in which this entity is understood as bygone [*als Vergangenes*] lays claim to a preeminent use. This signification announces itself in such talk: this and that already belongs to history. “Bygone” here means: no longer occurrent or also: still occurrent, but without “effect” [*Wirkung*] upon the “Present.” To be sure, the historical as the bygone also has the contrary signification, when we say: one cannot extricate oneself from history. Here history means the bygone, but still effective [*Nachwirkende*]. (*S&Z*, p. 378)

Effective history is made up by events and things that have gone by, that are no longer Present, that do not belong to “what is actual ‘now’ and ‘today’” (*des jetzt’ und ‘heute’ Wirklichen*) (*ibid.*), although they continue to have effect on the Present. Effective history is a form of history conceived in terms of the ontological framework of the occurrent:

Manifestly, Dasein can *never* be bygone [*vergangen*], not because it is not transitory, but because it essentially never can be *occurrent*; rather, if it is, it *exists*. In the ontologically strict sense no longer existing Dasein is not bygone, but it has *been-there* [*ist . . . da-gewesen*]. (*S&Z*, p. 380)

Why should that be so?

What has gone by, the bygone, whether effective upon the Present or not, belongs to sequential time, but Dasein does not. A conception of historicality that is ontologically appropriate to Dasein does not look to past events or things, even human events. It must, rather, describe the result of placing originary temporality into sequential time. That is, historicality is the manner in which an originally temporal entity “stands in time.” This is important to clarify, for Heidegger’s implication that Dasein is transitory⁶ might, at first glance, suggest that Dasein’s temporality is not

it is rather inelegant, to use “to historize” for “*geschehen*.” Heidegger wants, after all, to suggest that only Dasein historizes and that this historizing has interesting features that make it quite distinct from the happening of events.

⁴ I use the term “the bygone” to render “*das Vergangene*,” to mark out clearly the contrast with Dasein’s originary past, *Gewesheit*.

⁵ I.e., what is studied by the science *qua* object of science.

⁶ “[N]ot because [Dasein] is not transitory.”

nonsequential, but just sequential in some interesting and distinctive way. Heidegger is not here retracting his conception of nonsuccessive temporality. Rather, he is inquiring into the ontological result of placing an originally temporal entity into time.

What, more precisely, could this mean? The answer should lie in §74, "The Basic Makeup of Historicality." However, as I mentioned in the Introduction, chapter 5 of division 2 quickly slips into a treatment of authentic historicality and never elaborates an account of modally indifferent historicality. Section 74 should be the locale for developing the conception of historicality. Unfortunately, with the second paragraph, which begins with a characterization of resoluteness, Heidegger launches into a phenomenology of authentic historicality. In §75, "The Historicality of Dasein and World-History," Heidegger turns from authentic historicality to inauthentic.⁷ There is simply not much to go on in reconstructing a conception of modally indifferent historicality.⁸ Division 2, chapter 5 is not well thought through; it misses what ought to be its proper topic.

We can nonetheless glean some idea of the direction in which Heidegger was, and should have been, thinking from his treatment of authentic historicality. Placing originary temporality into time involves conceiving of the threefold structure of care and disclosedness as realized at different times. Dasein is always characterized by having for-the-sakes-of-which into which it presses ahead, a matrix of differential mattering that is the ground for this pressing ahead, and the enpresenting of tasks and paraphernalia in order to understand itself in terms of its for-the-sakes-of-which. If we think of this threefold structure as realized sequentially and differently at different times, the question arises, How do these varying realizations of originary temporality hang together through time? What does he say about the authentic mode of such unity through time?

Heidegger describes authentically historical Dasein as reaching back into its heritage (*Erbe*) in order to take over (*übernehmen*) possibilities of the Dasein that has been there (S&Z, p. 383). He characterizes this act as

⁷ Moreover, we cannot reread the account of inauthentic historicality as one of indifferent historicality. It is too bound up with phenomena like fleeing from death to be salvageable for that purpose.

⁸ Surely some would argue that this is evidence that I am wrong that originary temporality is modally indifferent, rather than authentic. And I must confess that this argument is not without weight. But the evidence presented in Chapter 2, as well as in footnotes along the way in this study, for the contrary thesis is strong enough, and intimately enough connected with the specific texts on originary temporality, to outweigh the counterevidence provided here in chapter 5 of division 2.

"handing traditional possibilities down to oneself" (*sich überliefern der überkommener Möglichkeiten*). He is clear that this handing down need not be explicit, for he says that Dasein hands down traditional possibilities, "although not necessarily *as* traditional" (S&Z, p. 383), and when it is explicit, he gives it the special title "retrieval" (*Wiederholung*) (S&Z, p. 385). He also indicates that this retrieval is not just a repetition⁹ by identifying it as a "rejoinder" (*Erwiderung*). Whatever its precise texture is supposed to be, it is clear that nothing like this would be conceivable, if possibilities were tasks. Or at least, one would be able to hand down to oneself only tasks left incomplete. One does not hand down tasks, and much less events or memories, but rather possibilities.

But how could it be that the possibility of some past world could "persist" so as to be a possibility for today's Dasein? Possibilities are not things, like relics or heirlooms, which lie strewn about the world, ready to be picked up and handed down. Only an entity who had one foot in the past could maintain an openness to possibilities that have been there. But what is it to "have one foot in the past"? Put otherwise, what is it to have a heritage, and not just a past, a series of stages gone by? To have a heritage is to be thrown into a traditional matrix of differential mattering, for some set of possibilities already to matter to one. They need not matter, as we have seen, *as* traditional. To have a heritage is, rather, to inherit – to grow up into – a pattern of possibilities that matter. The inheritance of those possibilities from one's community, through the way they matter to one, is what makes one's existence historical. Existence is not made historical by rummaging around in ancient legends or trying to flee into a past era. Existence is historical insofar as there is a continuity of what matters in a community.¹⁰

9 This is a needed comment, since the German word "*Wiederholung*" can mean repetition. Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "repetition." Compare a relevant passage on retrieval from *EM*. "To ask, How does it stand concerning being?, that means nothing less than to re-trive [wieder-holen] the beginning of our historical-spiritual Dasein, in order to transform it into another beginning. It is even the governing form of history, because it begins in the fundamental happening [*im Grundgeschehnis*]. A beginning is not, however, retrieved insofar as one spirals back to it as something prior and still well known and purely to be imitated, but rather, insofar as the beginning is begun again even more originally and indeed with all that is alien, dark, insecure, that a true beginning carries with itself. Retrieval, as we understand it, is anything but an improved continuation of what has been done [*des Bisherigen*] with the methods of what has been done" (*EM*, pp. 29–30). ("Das Bisherige" strikes one here as a term for what Heidegger calls "the bygone" [*das Vergangene*] in S&Z.)

10 Community is required here, since one must inherit one's possibilities from somewhere, grow up into some milieu. Heidegger emphasizes community and its authentic historicality on S&Z, p. 384.

Heidegger characterizes the historizing of authentic Dasein as its destiny (*Schicksal*) (S&Z, p. 384). He repeats the terminological affiliation of “authentic historicality” and “destiny” on p. 385: “Only authentic temporality, which is at the same time finite, makes something like destiny, that is, authentic historicality, possible” (S&Z, p. 385). “Destiny” he defines as “freely for death *hand[ing]* itself *down* to itself in an inherited, but just the same chosen, possibility” (S&Z, p. 384). This is a description of authentic historicality, and thus, we must employ it cautiously. If we remove the references to freedom and choice from the account of destiny, we can glimpse the modally indifferent core of historicality. Dasein’s historicality has to do with its relation to its possibilities and the way they matter, and not to events or stages of development that have gone by. The heritage is a reservoir of for-the-sakes-of-which into which one is thrown by being raised into a community. The historical character of the heritage lies in the continuity across times in the matrix of for-the-sakes-of-which. But this continuity is not made up by the persistence of some occurrent or available things. Rather, this continuity is constituted by finding oneself already differentially attuned to traditional for-the-sakes-of-which (though, as Heidegger says, not necessarily as traditional). These for-the-sakes-of-which need have no “shadowy reality” in order still to belong to this heritage; nor need they be bygone, yet still effective. Rather, they only must be handed down by Dasein to itself through the offices of its thrownness into what matters.

This – thrownness into a communal reservoir of possibilities that already matter – may well be what Heidegger means by “birth,” although it is rather unclear. Heidegger never defines “birth” for us, even though his first pass at what “historicality” means refers to Dasein’s “stretching between birth and death” (S&Z, p. 373). We should not just assume that the birth referred to here is the beginning of a human life span. As we saw earlier in this study, Dasein’s death is not the event, which Heidegger calls “demise,” at the end of the life span of a human being. Death is, rather, an existential condition in which Dasein can find itself. Similarly,

Understood existentially, birth is not a bygone [event] in the sense of something no longer occurrent, just as little as the sort of being of what is outstanding, what is not yet occurrent but coming, is appropriate to death. Factual Dasein exists born [*gebürtig*], and born it dies in the sense of being toward death. Both “ends” and their “between” *are*, as long as Dasein factically exists, and they *are* as they can only be on the ground of the being of Dasein as *care*. (S&Z, p. 374)

Heidegger pretty clearly indicates here that birth is no more an event in (or of) the life span of a human being than death is. Moreover, neither birth nor death is an “end” in any conventional sense of the term. (Hence, he puts “ends” in scare-quotes.) His use of the term “ends” suggests that existential birth, like existential death, is a limit-situation, rather than the ending of some series. Just as death is a limit on Dasein’s ability, so is the nullity of thrownness, Dasein’s inability to get back behind its thrownness and take control of it. This inability just is its thrownness into a traditional reservoir of for-the-sakes-of-which that already matter. And this thrownness, this nullity, this inability to escape tradition and who we already are is what I am suggesting Heidegger might mean by “birth.” If I am right, then we would have a way of reading “birth” roughly parallel¹¹ to the interpretation of death offered in Chapter 1. I cannot, however, find any particular text to support my suggestion.

So the concept of the heritage is neither an occurrent and sequential concept, such as the bygone phases of one’s development, nor a purely originary concept, such as beenness, the mattering of possibilities.¹² This heritage is a traditional reservoir of already differentially mattering possibilities, for-the-sakes-of-which. It is the continuity across times of the originally temporal manifold. It is important to see that this continuity is not the persistence through change of a thing. Heidegger emphasizes this, when he discards the *lebensphilosophisch* conception of history as the persisting-changing nexus of experiences [*Erlebnisse*] on the grounds that it construes Dasein as occurrent (S&Z, p. 373). What element of this conception is in particular responsible for the ontological error? Some (e.g., Dreyfus) would no doubt argue that considering Dasein as a nexus of experiences, which are subjective episodes, rather than existential conditions, is the source of the error. And, indeed, once one has taken Dasein as a subject, one is committed to an interpretation of it as occurrent. But there is a more specifically temporal-ontological error at hand. Dasein is not a *persisting-changing* nexus of anything. The concepts of persistence and change, or more precisely, the concept of persistence through

¹¹ Although not precisely: I have not indicated how birth would be a condition in which one can at times find oneself, as I did for death.

¹² Nor is it an “intermediate” concept in the technical sense of Chapter 1: intermediate concepts apply to the aspects of Dasein induced by its occurrent reality. For example, demise is an intermediate concept: the ending of Dasein’s course of life. This is an event. Dasein’s history is not a characterization of past events, as it would be if it were an intermediate concept.

change is an occurrent concept. It is a concept that is quite obviously tied to the framework of sequential time. For-the-sakes-of-which do not persist but, rather, continue to matter.

Now, it may seem that this conception of a heritage is relatively unproblematic, that it does not in the end depend upon the controversial account of originary temporality. After all, it is not clear that we have to embrace a nonsequential temporality in order to talk about such a heritage. We can extract the notion of a heritage, in Heidegger's sense, from his larger conception of originary temporality, but with his account of originary temporality we must also lose his *identification* of the historical "past" with the heritage. If we take the heritage *to be* the historical "past," we are not classifying bygone events as part of the historical "past." One might have thought that to Jones's history belongs, say, the events of her high school years, or that to American history belongs the Constitutional Convention. But Heidegger focuses instead on the heritage of possibilities into which Jones or Americans find themselves thrown, which as for-the-sakes-of-which are originally futural and, thus, do not belong to the ordinary future, some not-yet-Now. Recall the earlier quotation: "Only authentic temporality, *which is at the same time finite*, makes something like destiny, that is, authentic historicality, possible" (*S&Z*, p. 385, my emphasis). Stripped of its reference to authentic temporality this passage would say that only finite, that is, as we saw in Chapter 2, nonsequential, temporality makes historicality possible. Why? Because historicality is the result of putting an originally, nonsequentially temporal entity "into time." That is, we must think of the nonsequential, originally temporal manifold as developing through sequential time. We should not think of some human or personal "history" that can be identified independently of the manifold of originary temporality. Rather, that manifold constitutes the being of Dasein. *It is put into time in division 2, chapter 5.* There is no prior conception of "history" that is modified by the subsequent application of the conceptual framework of originary temporality.

Thus, although Heidegger's conception of historicality might provide much of interest in constructing a related account, it cannot be accepted wholesale, if we reject the theory of originary temporality. There is no reason to conceive of the past simply as a heritage, rather than as a series of events or stages of development, if we have not already excluded those sorts of item from the originary conception of Dasein. It is the radically nonsequential notion of originary temporality that does this exclusionary work. The specific account of historicality, at least insofar as we can glean

it from division 2, chapter 5, therefore, depends upon the theory of originary temporality and must fall with it.

A New Philosophy of Being

It is only after he abandons the idea that there is some nonsequential form of time that structures Dasein's activity and explicates its being that Heidegger can embrace one of the cardinal theses of his later thought: that being is presence. As we saw in Chapter 5, Olafson's (1987) view that throughout the Heideggerian corpus the sense of being in general is presence is wrong. In *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems* being cannot be presence, because existence, Dasein's sort of being, is grounded in a form of temporality that is not based on Presence. In those early texts, presence (*Anwesenheit*) rests on the dominance of the Present (*Gegenwart*), the Now, and makes up the horizon of "*being in the sense of being-occurrent in the broadest signification*" (GP, p. 429). This is clear throughout §21 of *Basic Problems*. But Olafson's position that for Heidegger being means presence is plausible in a general sort of a way, because that is Heidegger's view throughout much of his corpus. "Time and Being" ("Zeit und Sein," 1962, ZS) has some especially direct statements to this effect, for example:

Whence do we derive the right to characterize being as presence [*Anwesen*]?¹³ The question comes too late. For this characterization of being long ago decided itself without our help or without owing in any way to us. Thence we are bound to the characterization of being as presence. It has its bindingness from the beginning of the unconcealment of being as something sayable, i.e., thinkable. (ZS, p. 6)

For later Heidegger, being means presence.

Heidegger could have said no such thing in *Being and Time*, because Dasein is not present (or primarily present) according to the early Heidegger. *The analysis of originary temporality is inconsistent with the later thesis that being means presence*. As Carman acutely remarks, "Indeed, nothing more clearly captures the traditional metaphysical conception of being and time than *Being and Time* itself intends to undermine than the single word 'presence'" (1994, p. 208). *Being and Time*'s critique proceeds at two levels: Heidegger rejects, and never reembraces, the identification of being with presence to human cognition, and he attacks the identifica-

¹³ "Das Anwesen" is the verbal abstract noun built on the verb, "to presence," or perhaps a little more easily, "to be present." Thus, many translators translate it with "presencing."

tion of being with a temporal form dominated by the Present in any sense. The former rejection rests on Heidegger's anticognitivist phenomenology and interpretation of human existence. I can find no evidence that he ever abandons it. But the latter critique rests on his account of originary temporality. With the demise of the "violent" temporal analysis of the final quarter of *Being and Time*, the way is open for Heidegger's later thesis that throughout Western history being means presence, even today and for Heidegger.

The collapse of Heidegger's early, temporal analysis of existence also, however, calls into question his ultimate goal in *Being and Time*, his philosophy of being. *Being and Time* has been read for many years principally for its novel ontology (and for its existentialism). Its philosophy of time has received little systematic attention. As for the philosophy of being, it can be said that whereas *Being and Time* never quite gets to its topic, later Heidegger does, though admittedly in a somewhat different voice.¹⁴ After working through the argumentation of Heidegger's philosophy of time, and after recognizing the connection between his philosophy of time, specifically, his temporal idealism, and his philosophy of being, we have some basis for informed speculation about why Heidegger abandons the early project, why he never wrote division 3, never completed his early philosophy of being: the argument for it does not work. I want to emphasize that what follows is a quick treatment of how some of the principal themes of Heidegger's later philosophy of being could be seen to emerge out of the specific way in which his early philosophy of being, grounded in his temporal idealism, fails. I shall not be in a position here to prove that the approach I sketch definitely works. The reader should consider it more a research program than the result of a detailed demonstration.

My basic suggestion is this: Heidegger's early philosophy of being is focused on his ontological idealism, the thesis that being (but not entities) depends on Dasein. That ontological idealism is grounded, as we have seen, in his temporal idealism. If Heidegger came to believe that his temporal idealism was unsubstantiated – and we have no direct proof that he did – then he would also have reason to abandon his ontological idealism. And this, I want to argue, is precisely what characterizes the transition from the early to the later Heideggerian philosophies of being.¹⁵ Heidegger rejects his early ontological idealism and adopts a

¹⁴ For a dissenting opinion on the common distinction between the early, existentialist Heidegger and the later ontological visionary/mystic, see David Farrell Krell (1986).

¹⁵ I am adopting and modifying Olafson's (1987) interpretation of Heidegger's *Kehre* as a rejection of his early ontological idealism.

quasi-mystical stance toward the obtaining of being, a stance that is neither idealistic nor realistic in any recognizable sense.

We find support for this suggestion in a well-known passage from one of Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures, "European Nihilism" ("Der europäische Nihilismus," 1940, *EN*). To see the passage as supporting the suggestion, we must understand ontological idealism as a form of "subjectivism":¹⁶

In *Being and Time*, on the basis of the question of the truth of being, no longer the question of the truth of entities, an attempt is made to determine the essence of man solely in terms of his relationship to being. That essence was described in a firmly delineated sense as *Da-sein*. In spite of a simultaneous development of a more original concept of truth (since that was required by the matter at hand), the past thirteen years have not in the least succeeded in awakening even a preliminary understanding of the *question that was posed* [i.e., the question of the truth of being]. On the one hand, the reason for such noncomprehension lies in our habituation, entrenched and ineradicable, to the modern mode of thought: man is thought as subject, and all reflections on him are understood to be anthropology. On the other hand, however, the reason for such noncomprehension lies in the attempt itself, which, perhaps because it really is something historically organic and not anything "contrived," evolves from what has been heretofore; in struggling loose from it, it necessarily and continually refers back to the course of the past and even calls on it for assistance, in the effort to say something entirely different. Above all, however, the path taken terminates abruptly at a decisive point. The reason for the disruption is that the attempt and the path it chose confront the danger of unwillingly becoming merely another entrenchment of subjectivity; that the attempt itself hinders the decisive steps; that is, hinders an adequate exposition of them in their essential execution. Every appeal to "objectivism" and "realism" remains "subjectivism": the question concerning being as such stands outside the subject-object relation. (*EN*, pp. 141-2)

In order to think this passage through, we must first deal with a new term and a new distinction. The passage focuses on "the question of the truth of being." This is a novel term, and it implies a distinction between being and the truth of being.¹⁷

After *Being and Time* Heidegger began to emphasize a distinction between the truth of being and being. Heidegger's terminology for refer-

¹⁶ I shall discuss in a moment to what extent this characterization is legitimate and faithful to Heidegger's text.

¹⁷ Note that the passage begins by talking about "the truth of being" and ends with a reference to "being as such." The two terms refer to the same thing, as I will explain shortly. Being as such is *not* being.

ring to this distinction varies throughout his corpus. He uses “being,” “the being of entities,” and “beingness” to refer to being in the sense in which I have discussed it thus far in this study: “what determines entities as entities” (*S&Z*, p. 6), the framework of conditions that an item must meet to be an entity. In his later thought, beginning in the 1930s, Heidegger sees a need to introduce a new concept, the truth of being. (Referring to *a new concept* here may well be misleading, since many versions of it can be found in Heidegger’s later corpus, and as we shall see, Heidegger thinks of the truth of being as in an important sense inconceivable.) Let me say something about why this felt need arises and in doing so about the content of the concept itself.

“Being is” is impossible language, for it implies that being is an entity. We do, nonetheless, need some way to talk about the happening or occurrence or obtaining of being, because, after all, being must obtain in order that entities can be: being determines entities as entities. One might suggest that being has conceptual status, that it is a concept, or that being is something ideal, an *abstractum*. Or one might think that since being is a set of conditions, perhaps standards, that govern whether entities are, being “holds sway” or “is valid.”¹⁸ However appealing these suggestions might appear to be, they cannot in the end be all that helpful, for concepts, ideals, *abstracta*, and validities are entities. They *are*. Their ontologies are no doubt vague – and this makes up one of Heidegger’s principal objections to them – but even if we worked out a legitimate ontology for one of these regions of being, we still could not place being in it. Being is no entity. So, since Heidegger cannot say “being is,” he writes instead “there is being,” “it gives being,” “*es gibt Sein*,”¹⁹ which has the great virtue (in German) of not using the inappropriate verb “to be” in describing being. This phraseology may well avoid uttering the impossible “being is,” but it nonetheless relies on a largely unexplored concept of the “giving” of being. And what are we talking about, when we use such language?

Later Heidegger’s many and varied ruminations on the question of the truth of being, *Ereignis*, being as such, the clearing, all aim to cope with this very question. So I am making two assumptions here. First, along with

¹⁸ Heidegger uses the terminology of “holding sway” (*walten*) in *EM*, but in light of the argument I am offering, we cannot take him to mean anything much like the Neo-Kantian conception of validity.

¹⁹ For our purposes, most significantly in his p. 212 statement of ontological idealism: “Only so long as Dasein is, ‘is there’ being” (*S&Z*, p. 212).

Okrent (1988, pp. 223–6) I assume that although the precise texture of Heidegger's thought from the early 1930s until his final writings in the 1960s is quite variegated and difficult to pin down, all of these phrases²⁰ – “the truth of being,” “the obtaining” (*das Ereignis*),²¹ “being as such,”²² “lingering” (*wesen*),²³ “the clearing,”²⁴ and sometimes confusingly even

²⁰ But not usually, I think, “*Seyn*.” Throughout the passages I use below from *BzP* Heidegger uses “*Seyn*” for “being.” Of course, there may be a systematic ambiguity about “*Seyn*,” as there sometimes is for “being.” This ambiguity is to a certain extent embodied in Heidegger's use of “being as such” sometimes as a name for the truth of being. In his “Letter to Father Richardson” (*LFR*, 1962) Heidegger renders “*Seyn*” as “being as such” (p. xvii). This conflicts with the way I read “*Seyn*” in *BzP* (see n. 22 in this chapter.) Perhaps that is all right, since the two texts were written almost thirty years apart. More awkward is a use of “*Seyn*” in the Note (§9) to “On the Essence of Truth” (“*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*,” 1930, *WW*): “*Seyn* as the governing distinction between being [*Sein*] and entities” (p. 198). Perhaps we can fall back on the fact that the relevant paragraph of the Note (1949) and *BzP* (1936–8) were written about eleven to thirteen years apart. Although “*Seyn*” appears to be used to refer to the truth of being in 1962, and maybe merely to the Ontological Difference in 1949, it also seems pretty clearly to be used as a substitute for “*Sein*” in the later 1930s.

²¹ For example, “The truth of being [*des Seyns*], in which and as which its lingering [*Wesung*] self-openingly conceals itself, is the *Ereignis*” (*BzP*, p. 258). It is important to note that Heidegger is using the term “*das Ereignis*,” “the obtaining,” in a novel way. He does not mean to suggest that being is event-like: “What we are now saying [about the obtaining] allows, indeed in a certain way requires, that we say how one should not think the obtaining. We can no longer represent what is named by the name ‘the obtaining’ by way of the guide provided by the common meaning of the word, for it understands ‘obtaining’ in the sense of occurrence [*Vorkommnis*] and happening [*Geschehnis*] – not out of properizing [*Eigen*] as the clearing, keeping reaching and sending [*lichtend verwahrenden Reichen und Schicken*]” (*ZS*, p. 21. “Reaching” is the term that Heidegger uses to denote the “giving” of time as the sense of being).

²² This a puzzling term, since if it is used the way I suggest, it does not mean what its surface grammar implies it should mean, viz., being. In *ZS* he refers to “thinking being . . . into what is proper to it – in terms of obtaining – without reference to the relation of being to entities” (p. 25, “*Sein . . . in sein Eigenes zu denken – aus dem Ereignis – ohne Rücksicht auf die Beziehung des Seins zum Seienden*”). In the protocol to the *ZS* seminar Heidegger is recorded as explaining “to think being without entities” thus: “‘Thinking being without entities’ does not, therefore, mean that the relation to entities is inessential to being, that we should reject this relation; rather, it says [we should not] think being in the style of metaphysics. . . . We are thinking primarily of the metaphysical characterization [*Gepräge*] of the Ontological Difference, according to which being is thought and conceived for the sake of entities, so that being, irrespective of its being a ground, stands under the subjection of entities” (*PS*, pp. 35–6). “The subjection of being to entities” may refer to any one of a number of considerations, one among which is certainly the subjectivism discussed in the Nietzsche lectures and opposed by later Heidegger (on all of which, more in a moment). The point in the passages from *ZS* and *PS* may be that when we think the truth of being, we are thinking being with respect to its truth or obtaining. Still, it is *being* we are thinking.

²³ In the first paragraph, written in 1949, of his Note (§9) to *WW*, Heidegger states that the question What is the essence of truth? must be reversed into What is the truth of essence?

just “being” – are ways of talking about the same thing. I shall not directly defend this first assumption, since that would require too extensive a philological and exegetical inquiry. Instead, I shall take it on credit and hope it pays its way. Second, with these words Heidegger tries to talk about the “giving” of being. As Okrent puts it: “What occurs in *Ereignis* is a happening of being” (1988, p. 246).²⁵

To defend this second assumption I turn to three later texts: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of Obtaining)* (*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, 1936–1938, *BzP*), the “Letter on Humanism” (“Brief über den Humanismus,” 1949, *BH*), and “Time and Being.” I must make clear in advance, however, that there is nothing in *Being and Time* to support the identification of the clearing (to choose words that do occur in *Being and Time*), for example, with the “giving” of being. Most of the later terminology (such as “the obtaining” and even “the truth of being”)²⁶ never appears in *Being and Time*, and as I have already indicated, the very problem they are intended to name either is not at all present in *Being and Time*, or only dimly and in the background.²⁷

By “truth of essence” I do not think he means that essence (*Wesen*) is true, but rather that essence has a truth-like character. Moreover, he emphasizes in this note that essence (*Wesen*) has a verbal character, that it is “essencing” (*wesen*), that we are interested in. This can be seen in his writings from the mid- to late thirties, where he uses “wesen” as a verb that expresses, in Albert Hofstadter’s words, “being’s own way of occurring, happening, being present, not just for our understanding, will, and perception, but as the being it itself is” (1971, p. xviii). Three passages from this period well exemplify this: “In the midst of entities as a whole an open place [*Stelle*] lingers [*west*]” (UKW, p. 38), where an open place here seems to mean being. “But at the same time being [*Seyn*] ‘is’ not at all, but rather lingers [*west*]” (*BzP*, p. 255). “Lingering [*Wesung*] is the truth that belongs to being [*Seyn*] and arises from it” (*BzP*, p. 259). Importantly, “to linger” (*wesen*) does not explicate the meaning of being, as some read it (Richardson 1963, p. 228). I translate “wesen” as “to linger,” because in *EM* (p. 55) Heidegger offers “to linger” (“verweilen”) as one of the principal meanings of the “wesan” root of “Sein.”

²⁴ Throughout *BzP* Heidegger uses “clearing” (*Lichtung*) and “truth” (*Wahrheit*) virtually interchangeably. He uses “clearing” this way all the way through into his latest pieces, such as *ZS* and *PS*. Even in *Being and Time* the clearing is identified with truth: on p. 133 of *S&Z*, Heidegger introduces “the clearing” as another name for disclosedness, which he subsequently identifies with truth (§44). Heidegger does not, however, give any indication in *S&Z* that the “giving” of being is to be understood as the clearing, truth, or disclosedness of being.

²⁵ Below I shall argue against Okrent’s specific way of developing this idea.

²⁶ I can find no occurrence of “the truth of being” in *Being and Time*, and Feick lists none in her (1968). He does, however, refer to “phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being)” (*S&Z*, p. 38, emphasis removed), which he titles “*veritas transcendentalis*” (transcendental truth).

²⁷ Olafson (1987, p. 182) argues that Heidegger’s comment that “once entities are discovered, they show themselves precisely as entities that beforehand already were” (*S&Z*, p. 227; I have modified the translation by Macquarie and Robinson, p. 269; Olafson inex-

In *Contributions*, Heidegger writes:

The *Seinsfrage* is the question of the truth of being [*Seyns*]. When historically completed and conceived, it becomes the *fundamental question* [Grundfrage] over against the previous question of entities (the leading question [*Leitfrage*]) in philosophy. . . .

And so: if entities are, being must linger. But how does being linger? But are entities? How else could thinking resolve itself here except in terms of the truth of being? The latter can, therefore, no longer be thought in terms of entities; it must be thought through solely in terms of itself. (*BzP*, pp. 6–7)

We see here in *BzP* not only a direct identification of obtaining, lingering, and the truth of being (all of which supports the first assumption above), but also a clear statement that with all of this language Heidegger wants to talk about the “giving” of being. In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger writes,

But is it not said in *S&Z* (p. 212), where the “*it gives*” comes to word: “Only as long as *Dasein* is, is there [*gibt es*] being?” Certainly. That means: only as long as the clearing of being obtains, does being convey itself to man.²⁸ (*BH*, p. 333)

Here Heidegger clearly understands “there is [*es gibt*] being” and “the clearing of being obtains” to refer to the same thing.²⁹ In “Time and

plicably alters the meaning of this passage by rendering it to say “as precisely the entities that they already were beforehand,” which if it were right, would not support the inference he draws from the comment) implies an extension of “the range of truth and thus of being as presence back in time to a point at which there may have been no *Dasein* and thus no presence in any actual form.” This line of reasoning rests on identifying being with the disclosedness to *Dasein* of entities (for in *Being and Time* truth is disclosedness). This represents the dogmatically idealistic reading of being’s dependence on *Dasein* that I criticized in the Introduction and Chapter 5.

²⁸ “nur solange die *Lichtung des Seins* sich ereignet, übereignet sich *Sein* dem Menschen.”

²⁹ One might object that my use of this passage is furtive. After all, Heidegger argues here, essentially, that he never asserted ontological idealism in *Being and Time*. So I cannot both use this passage and read *Being and Time* as ontologically idealistic. The objection’s reading of the passage from *BH* is correct: he does implausibly argue here that *Being and Time* is not ontologically idealistic. Although the objection’s premise is right, it still misses the point. I do not offer *BH* as a reliable guide to *Being and Time*; indeed, Heidegger’s later writings are largely quite misleading as direct readings of the earlier treatise (and it is not their aim to be such readings in any case). I want to show, rather, that the language of “the clearing,” “the truth of being,” etc., in the later writings addresses an issue that arises deep within the infrastructure of *Being and Time* but is never directly explored there.

The claim made here in *BH* that *Being and Time* is not ontologically idealistic is, nevertheless, interesting and worth considering. It clashes directly with my interpretation of the earlier text. Let me then treat the *BH* passage as a direct reading of p. 212 of *S&Z* and

Being" Heidegger first swaps the "to give" of "it gives being" for "to send" (*schicken*), which he promptly reads as a "destiny" (*Geschick*) (ZS, p. 19). Then he writes, "Being, letting-be-present is sent in obtaining [*im Ereignen*], time is reached in obtaining [*im Ereignen*]. Time and being obtain in the obtaining [*ereignet im Ereignis*]" (ZS, pp. 22–3).³⁰

Heidegger's point in all this is that what we cannot talk about by saying "being is," and what we can only talk around by saying "'there is' being," "it gives being," we should think as the obtaining or truth of being. Being is not; rather, it obtains, it is unconcealed, true. "Truth" is a word with which we are at least familiar, and so we might think it will give us some leverage on Heidegger's later thinking about the "giving" of being. What is Heidegger telling us about the obtaining of being, when he names it "the truth of being"? Our first instinct here may well be to hunt down an account of truth in the later Heidegger and invest that in a conception of the truth of being. But this would be exegetically misguided.

Throughout Heidegger's later corpus, wherever we look for such an account of truth or the truth of being, we meet instead a murky statement of the self-concealing inherent in the truth of being (Bruns 1989, pp. 165–73). A splendid example of this may be found in *BzP*:

Being [Seyn] lingers as the obtaining. This is no proposition, but rather, the inconceivable concealment of lingering, which only opens itself up to the full, historical completion of initiating thought. (*BzP*, p. 260)³¹

Heidegger reveals three relevant ideas here. The sentence "Being lingers as the obtaining" is not a proposition. The lingering of being is concealed and will only be available to "initiating thought." And the concealment of

argue against it as such. Heidegger's *BH* gloss on *S&Z*, p. 212 is highly implausible, if for no other reason than that it *reverses the conditionalities of the p. 212 thesis* (Olafson 1987, p. 169). *Being and Time* says: only as long as Dasein is, is there being. Here in *BH*, Heidegger glosses that thus: only as long as the clearing of being obtains, does being convey itself to Dasein. Let me regiment these two claims thus: (1) "There is being, only as long as Dasein is." (2) "Being conveys itself to Dasein, only as long as the clearing of being obtains." The antecedent and consequent of these two claims are reversed. That being obtains, that there is being, is found in the antecedent of *Being and Time*'s sentence, but in the consequent of *BH*'s. Thus, the *BH* reconstruction of *S&Z*, p. 212, cannot be right.

³⁰ See note 21 in this chapter for a comment on the "reaching of time."

³¹ "Das Seyn west als das Ereignis. Das ist kein Satz, sondern die unbegriffliche Verschweigung des Wesens, das sich nur dem vollen geschichtlichen Vollzug des anfänglichen Denkens eröffnet." "Initiating thought" (*anfängliches Denken*) is Heidegger's name for the thought that strikes back to the truth of being and thinks it anew, rescuing it from millennia of forgetfulness. This thought has not yet been carried out, not even in Heidegger's own work, not even in *BzP* (see §1, p. 4 ff.).

lingering is inconceivable. In short, the sentence proposes nothing to our understanding, because the obtaining is not available to us, and moreover this unavailability is itself not understandable. Crucial to our concerns here is primarily that the obtaining is not available to us. By ZS Heidegger has forcefully articulated the idea: "The sending in the destiny of being was described as a giving, whereby the sender itself withdraws itself and in self-withholding withdraws from unconcealment" (ZS, p. 23). Although being (which by ZS has been explicated as presence) can be understood, the truth or obtaining of being cannot. What does this mean?

Okrent suggests that the later Heidegger's principal claim in the neighboring bushes is that nothing grounds, or explains, being:

neither the fact that there is any understanding of being at all nor the fact that there is the particular one there is at any given time can be explained, accounted for, or grounded in the being of any being, including Dasein. (Okrent 1988, p. 246)

According to Okrent, the error of traditional metaphysics is to try to ground being. Everything Okrent says here is correct, as far as it goes. But Heidegger has more in mind; indeed, he is suggesting something incompatible with other aspects of Okrent's interpretation. Okrent believes he can say what the truth, or obtaining, of being is:

What occurs in *Ereignis* is a happening of being: that is, a specific way in which being is understood and thus, in accordance with Heidegger's prevailing verificationism, is. (ibid.)

Okrent rightly points out that for the later Heidegger there is no ground or explanation for *why* there is an understanding of being. But he wrongly claims that the obtaining of being can be analyzed by way of verificationism. And Okrent is wrong not just because Heidegger is not a verificationist.³²

There can be no analysis of the obtaining of being. All Heidegger's talk about the self-concealing of obtaining points to this. If Okrent were right that Heidegger offers us an analysis of the truth of being, then we should be able to find it somewhere. But we cannot.³³ If we look through the

³² I shall argue in a moment that later Heidegger cannot be a verificationist.

³³ I do not mean to imply that Okrent gives us no reason to accept his interpretation. Indeed, what makes *Heidegger's Pragmatism* such a remarkable achievement is precisely the way Okrent parleys his verificationist reading of early Heidegger's account of the conditions for the possibility of the understanding of being into a reading of the later Heidegger's

section of *Contributions* devoted to truth, sections (c)–(e) of “The Grounding” (“*Die Gründung*”), we find only variations on the idea that the truth of being is a self-concealing. And in the contemporaneous lecture series *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”* (*Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik,”* Winter Semester 1937–8, *GFP*), a lecture series devoted almost entirely to a discussion of truth, Heidegger writes of the “abandonment of entities by being”:

What if this abandonment of entities by being were an *obtaining*, which comes from entities as a whole, indeed in such a way that precisely this obtaining is least visible and experienceable, because most thoroughly concealed and hidden . . . ? (*GFP*, p. 185)

We see here two important ideas: that being and its truth are “denied” to us, and that this denial is precisely the obtaining of being. This thought is echoed (as well as developed at greater length) in “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being” (“*Die Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus,*” 1944–46, *NDHB*), published as part of the Nietzsche lectures:

In the meantime, it has become clearer that being itself obtains as the unconcealment in which entities are present [*anwest*]. Unconcealment itself, however, remains concealed as such. Of itself, unconcealment as such keeps away, keeps to itself. *The matter stands with the concealment of the obtaining of concealment. It stands with the concealment of being as such. Being itself stays away.* (*NDHB*, pp. 213–14)

The upshot of this is that the truth of being is a self-concealing; we cannot say what the truth of being is. This is what Heidegger calls “nihilism.” This nihilism is not some contemporary or recurrent cultural phenomenon. Rather, it is the very obtaining of being in the West.

Okrent might object that I am overreading these passages, that the sense in which the truth of being is denied to us need only be understood as our inability to ground or explain it. And indeed we cannot. But Heidegger’s language is far stronger than this. Not only can we not ground or explain the truth of being, we cannot say what it is at all. This is why we have not yet thought the obtaining, why Heidegger conceives his

antimetaphysical stance. Okrent manages to find a systematic argument in the later Heidegger, where most, including me, find largely *Kulturkritik*, mysticism, and genealogy. But I have two principal reservations about Okrent’s approach. First, the interpretation of Heidegger as a Husserlian verificationist is not convincing. Second, ontological verificationism violates the very antimetaphysical stance of the later Heidegger. (I will consider and reject Okrent’s defense against this charge.)

later reflections only as aiming toward a future era in which we can think it. Thinking the obtaining belongs to the future, not to the Present, not even to Heidegger's own writings:

The "Contributions" question in a path which is for the first time being opened up through the transition to another beginning, into which Western thinking is now entering. This path brings the transition into the open of history and founds the transition as a sojourn, which perhaps will last a long time, during whose accomplishment the other beginning of thinking remains always only what is anticipated, though still already decided. (*BzP*, p. 4)

Heidegger's thirty-year-long avowal that we have not yet thought the truth of being, an avowal that reaches a febrile pitch in his comment that serves as the title of his *Spiegel* interview, "Only a god can save us now," clearly implies that we cannot yet say what the truth of being is. Indeed, if Okrent were right that the self-concealing of obtaining amounts to the impossibility of grounding being (the impossibility of metaphysics), then after we are "saved by a god," we should be able to ground being. Metaphysics would be possible. But that cannot be his ideal! Rather, he must mean that we cannot yet provide any analysis of the truth of being; we cannot say what it is. After breaking through into initiating thought, we shall be able to say what the obtaining *is*, but not to *ground* it.

It is instructive to compare Heidegger's idea here to a similar claim he makes about language in *On the Way to Language* (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 1950–9, US). Gerald L. Bruns illuminatingly explains Heidegger's idea as that we cannot provide a theory or analysis of language:

But Heidegger is not to be thought of as intervening in philosophy of language with a counter-theory. On the contrary, in the way-making or punning that brings language as language to language, the being or nature or reality of language, or whatever *Sprachwesen* means – what belongs to language essentially – conceals itself: "*In diesem Weg, der zum Sprachwesen gehört, verbirgt sich das Eigentümliche der Sprache*" (US, 260–62). (Bruns 1989, pp. 171–2)

I would add to Bruns's reflections that *das Sprachwesen* is not the essence or reality or being of language, but rather its lingering, its *wesen*. As Bruns himself points out, here Heidegger is thinking of the lingering of language as the truth of being.

One might object at this point that if we can provide no analysis of the truth of being, if we can offer no conception of it, then we cannot deploy the term philosophically, and we cannot provide any reason to accept that

there is such a thing as the truth of being (this is the criticism that animates ch. 5 of Pippin 1991). In response, one might be tempted to point to the mythico-poetic character of Heidegger's later thought and concede that he is not doing philosophy at all, and thus that Pippin is right, but that his commentary is not an objection. However, such a response would be both a little too easy as well as unfair to Heidegger. Here two points are in order. First, we have arrived at searching for something to say about the truth of being by way of a philosophical path. *Being and Time* introduces us to the *Seinsfrage* and persuades us to see that there is a question, What is the sense of being? *Being and Time* also impels us to reject any identification of being with an entity or domain of entities, such as Platonic ideas or fregean senses. This leaves us, then, with the question What is it for being “to be”? Of course, this “‘to be’” is not just initially puzzling and problematic, but also finally impossible. And it is in response to this worry that we are led to ask after the obtaining of being. So there is something to reflect on here (what Heidegger calls “the matter of thinking” [*die Sache des Denkens*]), even if we cannot quite put our fingers on what it is.

Second, even if we can provide no philosophical analysis, and much less a metaphysical explanation, of the obtaining of being, we are not necessarily without words with which to talk about it. Heidegger seems to think we have a kind of hermeneutic access to the truth of being, albeit one that is quite indirect.³⁴ He believes that we can find in language traces of an “original experience” of the truth of being. These traces are deposited in some fundamental pre-Socratic (and more generally, Greek) words, such as “*aletheia*” and “*phusis*,” as well as in some basic Germanic words, such as “*Waldung*,” “*Feldung*,” and “*Lichtung*” (“the clearing”).³⁵ The two words on which Heidegger focuses most consistently throughout his career are “*aletheia*” (“truth,” hence our concern with the “truth of being”) and “the clearing.” We can both feel the metaphors with which he is working as well as see how he modifies them between 1927 and 1964 in these two passages, the first from *Being and Time* and the second from “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (“*Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens*,” 1964, EP):

³⁴ Here I am trying to reconcile my view in this Conclusion with my position in (1995b). I cannot make the reconciliation complete, for the historical stories of the rise of the epochs of being, or of the advent of Western history, seem to be excluded by the position for which I argue here.

³⁵ See especially EP, pp. 71–2.

The ontically figurative discourse of the *lumen naturale* [the natural light] in human beings means nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it *is* in such a way as to be its There. It is “illuminated” [*erleuchtet*], says: it is lighted in itself *as* being-in-the-world, not by another entity, but rather, so that it itself *is* the clearing. Only for such an existentially lighted entity does the occurrent become accessible in the light, concealed in the dark. Dasein brings its there with it by nature; not only does Dasein never lack it, but rather, if it did, it would be an essentially different sort of entity.³⁶ *Dasein is its disclosedness.* (*S&Z*, p. 133)

The clearing in the woods [*Waldlichtung*] is experienced in contrast with the thick [*dichten*] forest, which was called “thickness” [*Dickung*] in earlier language. The noun “clearing” [*Lichtung*] derives from the verb “to clear” [*lichen*]. The adjective “light” [*licht*] is the same word as “light” [*leicht*.]³⁷ To clear [*lichen*] something means: to make something light [*leicht*], something free, something open, e.g., to make the woods free of trees in a place. The free [space] that thus arises is the clearing. What is light [*Das Lichte*] in the sense of the free and open has nothing in common, neither linguistically nor in fact, with the adjective “light” [*licht*], which means “bright” [*hell*]. This is noteworthy in differentiating between clearing [*Lichtung*] and light [*Licht*]. Nevertheless, there is the possibility of a factual connection between the two. Namely, the light can fall in the clearing, in its open, and allow brightness to play with darkness. But the light never first creates the clearing, but rather, the former, the light, presupposes the latter, the clearing. Still, the clearing, the open, is not only free for brightness and darkness, but also for resonance and dying away, for sounding and abatement. The clearing is the open for everything pre- and absent. (*EP*, p. 72)

From 1927 all the way through to 1964, Heidegger is committed to the notion that in order for anything to present itself and stand out as what it is, there must be a clearing in which it may do that. The metaphor of clearing is somewhat complex, conjuring images of a lighted space in which things may shine forth and of an open space in which things may take a stand as what they are.³⁸ In *Being and Time* the images of light and lighted space predominate. Heidegger accentuates this by offering the

³⁶ A free translation of “*Das Dasein bringt sein Da von Hause aus mit, seiner entbehrend ist es nicht nur faktisch nicht, sondern überhaupt nicht das Seiende dieses Wesen.*”

³⁷ The adjective “*leicht*” means light, in the sense of not heavy, and easy. “*Licht*” in German has the senses of bright, luminous, transparent, and clear. Heidegger’s point in this paragraph is to try to argue that light, such as the *lumen naturale* in humans, can only illuminate something in the clearing, in the open space where light can stream in.

³⁸ Krell (1986, ch. 5) also develops metaphors of lightness, in the sense of not being heavy, argues that they supplant those of light, and connects them with what he takes to be the pervasive existentialism of the later Heidegger.

clearing as a successor to the idea of the natural light in human beings: the clearing, identified with Dasein in the passage from *Being and Time*, is our power to illuminate things. In *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger works with his reading of *phusis* in early Greek philosophy to point to both metaphorical dimensions: the lighting or shining (*leuchten, scheinen; EM*, p. 54) of entities and their arising to take a stand (*Aufgehen, in-sich-aus-sich-Hinausstehen; EM*, p. 11). The lighting or shining to which Heidegger refers is not, however, in *Introduction to Metaphysics* understood as something especially human: it is the shining forth of entities. By "The End of Philosophy," finally, the metaphors of open space have completely supplanted those of light, and Heidegger in fact argues that our ability to illuminate things presupposes the open space in which they can take a stand and be illuminated. The point common to all these texts, and the central theme of Heidegger's thinking from 1927 to 1964, is that what he comes to call "the obtaining" has the character of an unconcealment, a clearing, an opening. This is the "matter of thinking."

In short, philosophical analysis and transcendental argumentation can move us to the point of seeing that there is something that we would need to be able to analyze to make philosophy whole, but which we cannot: the clearing, the truth of being. Careful readings of pre-Socratic thought and its degeneration, as Heidegger sees it, through the history of Western philosophy, give us an extraphilosophical prise on the clearing. But philosophy cannot analyze the clearing:

But whence and how is there [*gibt es*] the clearing? What speaks in the It gives?

The task of thinking would then be the abandonment of previous thinking [i.e., philosophy] to the determining of the matter of thinking. (*EP*, p. 80)

With all this in mind, we can return to the original passage from "European Nihilism" (pp. 141–2). Heidegger there says that *Being and Time*'s approach to the truth of being is subjectivistic. He does not explain what he means by this.³⁹ But if we focus on the ontological idealism of *Being and Time*, we can see one sense in which that treatise clearly is

³⁹ One might suggest that what I below call the "broader meaning" of "subjectivism" – viz., drawing the truth of being into the subject-object relation – must be what he has in mind, since it is the only meaning he specifies. But that *cannot* be what he means, for after all, the subjectivism for which he in the first instance criticizes *S&Z* contrasts with a possible "'objectivism' and 'realism,'" and thus clearly there are *two* forms of subjectivism in play in the passage.

subjectivistic: it represents being as dependent upon Dasein (Olafson 1987, ch. 7). Also note that Heidegger states that the reason that *Being and Time* breaks off where it does is that he recognized the subjectivistic character of *Being and Time*. So in “European Nihilism” Heidegger gives us some reason to believe that he rejected *Being and Time*’s philosophy of being precisely because it is ontologically subjectivistic.

The passage from “European Nihilism” also makes clear that Heidegger does not see himself as returning to any kind of “realism” or “objectivism” about being after *Being and Time*. He argues that a realism or objectivism about being would be just another form of subjectivism. Here he must obviously be using the term “subjectivism” in a broader or more inclusive way than that just explored. His explanation of it is this: realism or objectivism about being posits being as standing within the subject-object relation, and by implication, so does subjectivism in the narrower sense. But what could Heidegger mean by this? Surely not simply that being stands outside the subject-object relation he so acutely criticizes in *Being and Time*, for the latter treatise goes to great lengths to move not only being, but also Dasein, world, truth, and many other phenomena outside *that* relation. So in what sense can Dasein be called a “subject” even in *Being and Time*? Clearly, Dasein is a subject in that it understands; it is an understander. And the “object” of such a subject is an understood. Thus, if this line of reconstruction is sound, Heidegger argues here in *Nietzsche* that *the truth of being* stands outside of the understander-understood relation. It is important to bear in mind that this does not entail that *being* stands outside that relation. We must keep the distinction between the truth of being and being squarely in front of us. *Being* is understood. Nowhere does Heidegger (at least, nowhere that I have seen) back off the basic premise of *Being and Time* that entities are understood in terms of being, and that being is understood in terms of its sense, the sense of being. Here in *Nietzsche* he only denies that the truth of being is something understood.

At this point we have generated *two* different senses of “subjectivism”: *Being and Time* is subjectivistic, in a narrow sense, in that it portrays being as dependent upon Dasein; it is subjectivistic in a broader sense, for it represents the truth of being as something understood. What is the internal connection between the two uses of “subjectivism”?

Heidegger’s only half-articulated thought here is plausibly this: ontological idealism (the dependence of being on Dasein) is subjectivistic in the broader sense, because it represents the truth of being as standing within the subject-object relation, in this case, within the relation between

understander and understood. Why? To say that being depends on *Dasein* is to claim to understand the truth of being. Ontological idealism claims to clarify the truth of being, the obtaining of being, by explicating the conditions under which being obtains: there is (*es gibt*) being if and only if *Dasein* exists.⁴⁰ The argument then is this: ontological idealism purports to specify some of the conditions under which “there is” being. Hence, ontological idealism claims to specify some of the conditions of the possibility of the truth of being. Insofar as the subject-object relation has become, with *Being and Time*, the relation between understander and understood, ontological idealism draws the truth of being into the subject-object relation. Furthermore, realism or objectivism about being is likewise mired in subjectivism in the broader sense, because it claims to know something – that being is independent of *Dasein* – that we could only know if we were in possession of a philosophical analysis of the truth or obtaining of being.

Now we can see as well that Okrent’s verificationist account of the truth of being likewise runs afoul of Heidegger’s later “antisubjectivism.” Verificationism precisely offers an account of the truth of being: being obtains if and only if it is understood. Okrent tries to eschew this consequence by denying that “the fact that there is any understanding of being at all . . . can be explained, accounted for, or grounded in the being of any being, including *Dasein*” (Okrent 1988, p. 246). On its surface this is odd, since one would expect that “the fact that there is any understanding of being at all” is the fact that *Dasein* exists. But Okrent explains (ch. 8) that the existence of *Dasein* is not to be identified with “the fact that there is any understanding of being at all,” because Okrent interprets *Dasein* individualistically and the understanding of being socially. That is, the sociality of the understanding of being imposes constraints on there being an understanding of being that exceed any conditions that qualify the existence of *Dasein*. But as I have argued elsewhere (1991), Okrent’s

⁴⁰ I am, thus, reading the basis of Heidegger’s rejection of his early ontological idealism differently than Olafson does (1987, ch. 7). I described my interpretation as a modified version of his, because I follow him in focusing on ontological idealism. But on p. 155 Olafson argues that “the only plausible interpretation” of the argument from the Nietzsche lectures “is that [Heidegger] had come to think that by associating being so closely with one kind of entity – *Dasein* – he had failed to do justice to the radical distinction between being and entities and had thus lapsed into the very metaphysics that he had ostensibly repudiated.” The substance of Olafson’s reading of the passage from *Nietzsche* is fascinating and gives us much to think about, but it is not *the only plausible* interpretation. In a way, I am marrying Olafson’s emphasis on ontological idealism to a more radical version, inspired by Bruns (1989), of Okrent’s (1988) focus upon the inexplicability of being.

strategy is dashed upon the palpable sociality of Dasein in *Being and Time*. Therefore, we must view verificationism as itself subjectivistic: it offers a philosophical account of the truth of being.

One might object at this point that contrary to what I am suggesting, later Heidegger still believes that being obtains if and only if Dasein does. He may no longer be an ontological idealist, for his critique of metaphysics implies that we cannot view Dasein as a metaphysical explanation of being, that is, view being as somehow dependent on Dasein. But surely Heidegger does remain committed to the thinner claim that being obtains if and only if Dasein exists. In *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger refers to the “belonging together of being and the human essence” (“die Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Menschenwesen”) (p. 108). There are two ways of coping with these messy, exegetical realities. On the one hand, *Introduction to Metaphysics* is a transitional text (Okrent 1988, ch. 7). Heidegger’s mode of expression here is close to the ontological idealism of *Being and Time*. Note, as well, that *Introduction to Metaphysics* is also temporally idealist (p. 64), just as my interpretation of Heidegger’s early argument for ontological idealism implies it should be. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, thus, belongs in this regard to the period of *Being and Time*, rather than to the later period. On the other hand, Heidegger here (and in many later passages in which he discusses the belongingness together of being and Dasein) gropes toward an idea that only clearly emerges in *Contributions*: being needs Dasein in order to be manifest, in order to make itself available, in order to be fathomed.⁴¹

By *Contributions* Heidegger has altered his formulation just enough to skirt around the implication of ontological idealism.⁴² He does speak of Dasein as “grounding the truth of being,” such as in this passage:

⁴¹ See note 47 in this chapter.

⁴² As we did for *BH* earlier, we must now come to terms with a passage in *BzP* that appears to argue that *Being and Time* is not ontologically idealistic. Heidegger writes that the notion that “through the understanding of being (entities are meant here too) being becomes ‘dependent’ upon the subject, and that everything points to an ‘idealism,’ whose conception remains, moreover, dark” (*BzP*, p. 259) is a “crude misunderstanding.” But if we put this sentence in the context of what precedes it, we can see clearly that Heidegger is not even really denying the view that I attribute to him in *Being and Time*: “If, without listening to what was said in *Being and Time* about the understanding of being, one takes understanding as a sort of determinative cognition [*feststellendem Erkennen*] of the inner ‘experiences’ of a ‘subject’ and, correspondingly, the understander as an I-subject, then any conception of what was meant by the understanding of being is pointless. For then . . . ,” and what follows is the sentence already quoted. Heidegger is eschewing here an understanding of Dasein as a cognitive I-subject, and the “idealism” he is rejecting is clearly a traditional idealism. This passage does not cut against reading *Being and Time* as ontologically idealist in the way I have pursued in this study. In any case, even if Heidegger did mean to argue in

Da-sein: not something that can simply be found in occurrent humans, but rather, the ground of the *truth* of being, which ground is required by the fundamental experience of being as obtaining. (*BzP*, p. 170)⁴³

We should immediately be on guard against any oversimple reading of such a passage, for if Heidegger meant to say that *Dasein*, the entity we ourselves in each case are, grounded the truth of being, then *Contributions* would be a paradigm text of the metaphysical tradition: it would assert that an entity, *Dasein*, grounds the truth of being. In fact, we must look closely not only at his uses of the term "ground" (*Grund*) and the related term "grounding" (*Gründung*), but also at "*Dasein*," or as he writes it here, "*Da-sein*."

"*Da-sein*" no longer designates an entity, viz., us. Rather, it is the name for a mode of being into which we can enter, when we think the truth of being:

The There [*Das Da*, the "*Da*" of "*Da-sein*"] obtained from being itself, and man in consequence obtained as the guardian [*Wächter*] of the truth of being and so belongs to *Da-sein* [i.e., being-there] in an exceptional and unique way. (*BzP*, p. 299)

In the history of the truth of being, *Dasein* is the essential *intermediate case* [*der wesentliche Zwischenfall*], i.e., the irruption [*Ein-fall*] of that between, into which humans must be dis-placed [*ver-rückt*], in order first to be *themselves* again. (p. 317)

When we can think the truth of being, then we can enter into the role of the "guardian" of the truth of being. Thus, Heidegger writes:

Nonetheless, *Da-sein* and humans stand in an essential relation, insofar as *Da-sein* means the ground of the possibility of future being human [*des künftigen Menschseins*], and [insofar as] humans are futurally, insofar as they take over being the There, assuming that they conceive themselves as the guardians of the truth of being, which guardianship is indicated as "care." (*BzP*, p. 297)

BzP that *Being and Time* is not ontologically idealistic, that would carry no more weight than the similar argument we considered for *BH*, for the later Heidegger neither is nor intends to be an exegete of *Being and Time*.

43 "Da-sein: nicht solches, was am vorhandenen Menschen einfach vorfindbar sein könnte, sondern der aus der Grunderfahrung des Seyns als Ereignis ernötigte Grund der Wahrheit des Seyns." The "*Da-sein*" that begins this passage is the title of §170, and I have interpolated the colon to suggest the break between the title and the first, uncapitalized word of the section.

Here Heidegger clearly states that we are not to think of Da-sein even as our sort of being, as if “Da-sein” had replaced “existence.” Rather, Da-sein grounds a *possible, future* sort of being, a way we can come to be, a way he consistently identifies with “the other beginning” (*der andere Anfang*), that is, the way we would be if we could break through into “initiating thought” (*anfängliches Denken*).⁴⁴

Olafson is therefore right that “‘man’⁴⁵ begins to function in the way that *Dasein* did when there was an acknowledged extensional equivalence between the two” (1987, p. 178). Olafson also points out that Heidegger sometimes uses the tricky phrase “humans as humans” (*Mensch als Mensch*). This seems to mean what we might describe as “da-seining humans.” In *BzP* Heidegger refers to the possibility that humans might “first be *themselves again*” (the passage from p. 317). But in §195, Heidegger says something that appears to conflict with this reading of Da-sein and humans:

Who are humans? The ones who are used by being to stand out into the lingering of the truth of being.

Thus used, humans ‘are’ only human in so far as they are grounded in Da-sein, i.e., creatively [*schaffend*] become the grounders [*Gründer*] of Da-sein. (*BzP*, p. 318)

But note that what is at issue here is not the being of humans per se, but the being of humans when they are (really, i.e., exceptionally) human. This usage is likely equivalent to the “humans as human” phraseology, and thus it probably suggests not humans as such, but rather, da-seining humans. It need not be read to conflict with my interpretation of the relation between Da-sein and humans in *BzP*.

Olafson is nonetheless wrong to suggest that when humans fall away from Da-sein, they are then mere animals (Olafson 1987, p. 282, n. 79). For even if we cannot guard the truth of being, we still understand entities in terms of their being, just as *Being and Time* argued. (For this reason, in §201 of *BzP* Heidegger characterizes humans who have fallen away from Da-sein as inauthentic and, thereby, attempts to assimilate his views here to the outlines of his account of authenticity and inauthenticity in *Being and Time*. Whether this assimilation is viable is less interesting than what it presupposes: that humans who have fallen away from Da-sein are deficient da-seiners, not mere animals.) Thus, in the age of nihilism we are

⁴⁴ In *BzP*, §176, p. 300, Heidegger implausibly tries to read this view back into *Being and Time*.

⁴⁵ “*Mensch*,” which I am translating by some variant of “human.”

more than mere animals, but are not worthy of Da-sein.⁴⁶ Da-sein is a way of being that we achieve, insofar as we think the truth of being.

In what way does Da-sein “ground” the truth of being?

To fathom [*er-gründen*] the ground of the truth of being and thus to fathom being itself: to let this ground (obtaining) *be* the ground through the steadiness of Da-sein. Accordingly, the fathoming becomes the grounding of Da-sein as the fathoming of the ground: the truth of being. (*BzP*, p. 307)

The idea seems to be that when we fathom the truth of being, that is, when it becomes available to us in initiating thought, we let the truth of being be the ground of Da-sein. In other words, when we fathom the truth of being, we find our ground, our foothold, in the truth of being. We attain to Da-sein, when the truth of being becomes available to us, and in such a condition, we have pulled ourselves into a new way of being, a way of being whose essence, or ground, or foundation is precisely the availability of the truth of being. This would be to live manifestly in the midst of the truth of being. In writing that Da-sein grounds the truth of being, Heidegger does not mean to suggest that a da-seining entity, or even Da-sein as a way of being, is the metaphysical ground or explanation of the truth of being. Instead, he tries to reread “to ground” as “to fathom” by way of a pun in German: *Gründung*, *Er-gründung*. Da-sein “grounds” the truth of being by fathoming it, and in doing so, it grounds or centers or locates itself manifestly in the truth of being.⁴⁷ Thus, “With the grounding of Da-sein all relations to entities are transformed, and the truth of being is first [zuvor] experienced” (*BzP*, p. 322).

All of this adds up to a different picture of the relation between “the entities we ourselves in each case are,” our sort of being, and being or the

⁴⁶ Olafson gets into this trouble, because he too closely associates being with truth in *Being and Time*, and this prevents him from rigorously enough distinguishing between them in the later works. This is another ill consequence of what I called, in the Introduction, the “dogmatically idealistic” reading of being in *Being and Time*.

⁴⁷ Does the following passage from §194 conflict with the interpretation I am offering: “But [Da-sein's and humans'] belongingness to being only lingers, because being in its uniqueness needs [*braucht*] Da-sein and humans, who are grounded in Dasein and ground it” (*BzP*, p. 317)? Now, “*braucht*,” which I have translated “needs,” could mean instead “uses,” in which case Heidegger would only be saying that being uses Da-sein and humans. But that really does not sit well with the tenor of §194 (and other passages as well). So in what way can we understand being as *needing* Da-sein and the da-seiners (us), without compromising the antimetaphysical idea that nothing grounds or explains the truth of being, that the truth of being does not depend on anything? By construing Heidegger to mean only that being needs Da-sein in order to be manifest, in order to make itself available, in order to be grounded or fathomed.

truth of being than is found in *Being and Time*. The ontological idealism of *Being and Time* has given way to an antimetaphysical understanding of the clearing as the space in which being, and hence entities, can stand out as what they are. This clearing is not available to us. Nihilism, the forgetfulness of being, the self-concealing makeup of the truth of being, obscures the truth of being from us. But Heidegger holds out the possibility that we might achieve “another beginning,” a beginning analogous in some ways to what he takes to be the basic event of early Greek thought: an experience of the truth of being. When (and if) we achieve this new beginning, we shall fathom the truth of being and thereby ground ourselves in authentic Da-sein, a new way of leading our lives in the manifestation of the truth of being. What such a new way of life would look like is hard to say; Heidegger gives us only the scantiest clues. And it is not strictly relevant to my concerns here to explore that question. It is crucial, rather, to see that by the time he wrote *Contributions*, despite what might on first reading appear to be idealistic or even metaphysical passages, Heidegger has abandoned the ontological idealism of *Being and Time*.

The failure of Heidegger’s early argument for ontological idealism does not entail by any means the radical, quasi-mystical position I have ascribed to him. Why move from a failed, quasi-Kantian, ontological idealism to the quasi-mysticism of the later thought? Well, what would the alternative be? To return to a temperate realism about being? As we saw, such a realism about being remains subjectivistic in a broader sense, in a way objectionable to Heidegger by the late 1930s, when he composed *Contributions*. Such an ontological realism, just like the failed ontological idealism of *Being and Time*, requires that we claim to understand the obtaining of being. Heidegger’s objections to such a claim belong to the “mystical dimension” of his later thought prominent in, for example, *What Is Called Thinking?* (*Was heißt denken?* 1951–2), “Releasement” (“*Gelassenheit*,” 1955), and *The Principle of Reason* (*Der Satz vom Grund*, 1955–6), and ably developed by Caputo (1986b) and Bruns (1989). My purpose here is not to defend this quasi-mysticism, but rather simply to put it into play with what we have learned about Heidegger’s ontological idealism. Narrowly, it is important to see in what way precisely Heidegger is not, in his later thought, an ontological idealist. Recognizing this allows us to be comfortable with a logical consequence of the argument of this study: Heidegger’s ontological idealism rests upon his temporal idealism, a temporal idealism that cannot persist into the later thought, because its foundation, the theory of originary temporality, belongs exclusively to *Being and Time* (and the lectures immediately associated with it).

The focus of my interest in these later texts is to show that Heidegger takes the subjectivism of *Being and Time* as the principal failing of his early philosophy of being. This subjectivism can be understood as in the first instance ontological idealism, and, in the final account, a belief in the intelligibility or explicability of the truth of being. His reasons for judging the ontological idealism of *Being and Time* to be undesirable need not remain the same from 1927 to 1940 or 1953. We have no contemporaneous account from Heidegger about why he retracted his early philosophy of being. By the time Heidegger tells us that *Being and Time's* philosophy of being is too subjectivistic, his thought has been pulled toward the mysticism discussed by Caputo and Bruns. There is little to no trace of the mysticism in *Being and Time*, and thus, it is unlikely that he saw through his ontological idealism from a mystical perspective in 1927. It is more likely, though it cannot be proven exegetically, that Heidegger recognized an argumentative failure within the early philosophy of being: his philosophy of time could not support his ontological idealism. And this recognition took him into uncharted territory.

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All works by these authors are referred to by abbreviations.

Heidegger: For Heidegger's works, after each text I provide a reference to an English translation (or in the case of the Nietzsche lectures, which I do not translate myself, the German original).

BZ *Der Begriff der Zeit*. [1924] Ed. Helmut Tietjen. Tübingen: Max Niemayer, 1989.

The Concept of Time. Trans. William McNeill. Bilingual edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992.

EM *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. 3d ed. [1935] Tübingen: Max Niemayer, 1966.
An Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.

EN "European Nihilism." [1940] In *Nietzsche*, vol. 4, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank Capuzzi. New York: Harper and Row, 1982, pp. 3–196.
"Europäischer Nihilismus." In *Nietzsche*, vol. 2. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961, pp. 31–256.

EP "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens." In *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Tübingen: Max Niemayer, 1969, pp. 61–80
"The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," trans. Joan Stambaugh. In *On Time and Being*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 55–73.

GBM *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*. [1929–30]
Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 29/30. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.

- GFP* *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik."* [1937–38] Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 45. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984.
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- GP* *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. [1927] Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 24. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.
- Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- HJB* *Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel: 1920–1963*. Ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990.
- KPM* *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. [1929] Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 3. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
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- LFR* “Letter to Father Richardson.” In William J. Richardson, S. J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. viii–xxii.
- LFW* *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. [1925–6] Ed. Walter Biemel. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 21. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.
- MAL* *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. [1928] Ed. Klaus Held. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 26. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
- The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- MDI* *Die Metaphysik des Deutschen Idealismus*. [1941] Ed. Günter Seibold. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 49. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
- NDHB* “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being.” [1944–6] In *Nietzsche*, vol. 4, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank Capuzzi. New York: Harper and Row, 1982, pp. 199–250.
- “*Die Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*.” In *Nietzsche*, vol. 2. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1961, 335–98.
- OTL* “*Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*.” In *Identität und Differenz*. Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1957, pp. 35–73.
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- PGZB* *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes*. [1925] Ed. Petra Jaeger. *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 20. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.
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- PS* “*Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag ‘Zeit und Sein.’*” In *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Tübingen: Max Niemayer, 1969, pp. 27–60.

- "Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture 'Time and Being'." Trans. Joan Stambaugh. In *On Time and Being*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 25–54.
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- On the Way to Language*. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- VWG** "Vom Wesen des Grundes." [1929] In *Wegmarken*, 2d ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978, pp. 123–73.
- The Essence of Reasons*. Trans. Terrence Malick. Bilingual edition. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.
- ZBGW** "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft." [1915] In *Frühe Schriften*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1972, pp. 355–75.
- ZS** "Zeit und Sein." In *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Tübingen: Max Niemayer, 1969, pp. 1–25.
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- CW4** *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. [1966] Trans. John Barnett Brough. In *Collected Works*, ed. Rudolf Bernet, vol. 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991.
- EJ** *Experience and Judgment*. [1939] Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
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- IP** *The Idea of Phenomenology*. [1907] Trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

Kant

- CPR** *Critique of Pure Reason*. [1781 and 1787] Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929.
- KPC** *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–99*. Trans. Arnulf Zweig. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- PAM** *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. [1783] Trans. Paul Carus and revised by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977.

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When my translation of a German term diverges from Macquarrie and Robinson's, or when it is helpful to be able to look up the English equivalent of one of Heidegger's technical terms, I have included the German with the English equivalent following an equals sign. When references to that concept are found under a different heading in the Index, I also added a cross-reference.

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