

The existential nature of man is the reason why man can represent beings as such, and why he can be conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes ... existence as the *essentia* of man. ... [C]onsciousness does not itself create the openness of beings, nor is it consciousness that makes it possible for man to stand open for beings. Whither and whence and in what free dimension could the intentionality of consciousness move if [being-in-the-world] were not the essence of man in the first place?

(Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," in Existentialism: from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Ed., Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 214-215.)

An existent mere physical thing (such as a hammer) is given... in the synthesis of passive experience...beforehand to "spiritual" activities, which begin with active grasping."

Cartesian Meditations, p. 78. (Also footnote, Stanbush. p. 91 "All this is intended as a critique of Husserl."

The problem, is to get the structure of an entire belief system to bear on individual occasions of belief fixation. We have, to put it bluntly, no computational formalisms that show us how to do this, and we have no idea how such formalisms might be developed. ... If someone --a Dreyfus, for example-- were to ask us why we should even suppose that the digital computer is a plausible mechanism for the simulation of global cognitive processes, the answering silence would be deafening.

Jerry A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, /MIT Press, 1983, 128-129.

And why could my simulated robot handle it? Because it was using the world as its own model. It never referred to an internal description of the world that would quickly get out of date if anything in the real world moved.

Rodney A. Brooks, Flesh and Machines: How Robots Will Change Us, Vintage Books (2002), 168.

[A] Heideggerian cognitive science is ... emerging right now, in the laboratories and offices around the world where embodied-embedded thinking is under active investigation and development.

Michael Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World, 285.