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Chapter 2

THE ROOTS OF SEGREGATED SCHOOLING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA

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Introduction

Many different explanations have been offered for the roots of segregated schooling in South Africa. Until recently the most popular of these placed the moral and legal responsibility for separate schooling at the door of the National Party and Afrikaner ideology.[1] This approach has come under attack from different quarters. Firstly, there are those who have been concerned to show that racist attitudes were not the exclusive preserve of Afrikaners, and that English speakers have been as culpable as Afrikaans-speakers in propagating segregation in schooling.[2] From a different theoretical perspective, other writers have examined the continuities between pre- and post-apartheid education.[3] Thirdly, there are those who have attempted to periodize and link specific attitudes to social process and interests. They have tried to show that segregation in education is concomitant with conquest and colonialism in South Africa and that its segregated nature has followed fairly closely a structural-historical process.

The "form and orientation [of] the content of the struggles which occur" are seen as having been shaped by the "structural conditions of the political system and the shifting nexus between race and class."[4]

While recognizing that racist attitudes and differential schooling for black and white have been an integral part of South African history since the beginnings of settler occupation and domination of the territory, this chapter will examine the formative events in the making of contemporary apartheid education. The importance of this lies both in the relationship of segregation to economic and social inequality,[5] and in its impact, together with the wider ensemble of segregationist and apartheid practices, on social consciousness and identity. In short, the constitution of racial and ethnic subjects, of people seeing themselves primarily in racial and ethnic terms—as white, colored, Indian, Xhosa, Zulu, etc.—has in no small way been shaped by a racially structured system of education. How schooling has materially helped to naturalize an abnormal racial and ethnic consciousness is thus the second area of concern. One of the starting assumptions of this chapter is that, in order to understand the total dynamic of the system, one has to develop a form of conceptualizing South African education which does not reproduce, but exposes the historically constituted nature of education and schooling separated according to white, Indian, colored, and African.[6]

The construction of segregated and apartheid schooling structures and the constitution of racial and ethnic subjectivity has been an ambiguous process. The process of education can be reduced neither to the aims of legislators nor to the systemic requirements of the economy, which it neither simply reflects or expresses but mediates in multifaceted and contradictory ways. Thus, as events and many writers have shown, passivity has not been the most marked and consistent characteristic of scholars produced by Bantu Education; the nature of South Africa's economic and political development has required the creation of labor power with different skills, especially after the 1960s boom. Education has also been the site of the production of popular discourses which have employed non-racial categorizations such as students, democrats and members of the exploited and oppressed classes.

The Mining Revolution and School Color Bars: *1886-1924*

The foundations of segregated schooling were intimately connected with the development of a segregationist social policy linked to the rise of industrial capitalism in late nineteenth century South Africa. The mineral

discoveries of diamonds (1867) in Kimberley and gold (1886) on the Witwatersrand, the area that now encompasses Johannesburg and a cluster of surrounding towns, had set in train the differential proletarianization of both black and white rural producers. Their differential reproduction as partially and fully proletarianised workers formed the basis for the social policy that developed after the South African War (1899-1902).

The particular constraints under which the mining revolution on the Witwatersrand took place in the late nineteenth century turned racial segregation into an important component of South African capitalism. Those who have examined the roots of the development of the mining industry in South Africa have convincingly argued that the rapid centralization and concentration of mining capital which led to the monopolization of the mining sector was precipitated by: (1) the geological nature of the gold fields, which had an extremely low average grade of ore, the vast bulk of which was deep underground and thus required massive capital outlays on technology; (2) the fixed price of gold in the world market, which the mining capitalists could not easily influence; and (3) the increasing grievances expressed by the working class, particularly white workers, who demonstrated a high level of political militancy and organization.[7] The geological nature of the gold fields accelerated the abandonment of the exhausted outcrop grounds and encouraged deep-level mining, which required supplementary investment of capital and a higher degree of both mechanization and utilization of skilled labor. The price of gold or the cheapness of machinery could not be varied enough to insure a good profit. The only variable which could be successfully pressurized in order to raise the rate of profit was labor.

The desire of the mining magnates to reduce labor costs to secure a high rate of profit was concretized through a pursuit of a policy of nonemployment of whites in general unskilled work at a time when massive white proletarianization on the Witwatersrand had resulted in the so-called "poor white problem" or massive unemployment of unskilled white labor. The consequence was a rigid comprehensive racial division of labor in the gold mining industry, within which wage earners of equivalent skill were divided on racial lines into occupations with different functions, income and status.[8] An overwhelming majority of black, unskilled migrant workers worked side by side with a small but politically active, fully proletarianised section of white, skilled and semiskilled workers. While black migrant workers still preserved peasant characteristics which inhibited cohesive political consciousness, organization and class or cross-ethnic solidarity against injustices and repression in the mines, the highly proletarianized section of white workers had relatively experienced forms of political

organization.[9] White workers rapidly became an important force and an obstacle against the policies of the Chamber of Mines,[10] which attempted to reduce wages through skill fragmentation and replacement by unskilled workers.[11]

This characteristic of mine labor favored a particular development of class and social relations. It united in struggle those wage earners whose skin pigmentation happened to be white. This led to white workers' claims of rights on the grounds of color. The white workers thus practiced racial discrimination against black workers in defense of their own jobs. White workers were thus led to differentiate and define their class interests along racial lines, regarding their fellow black workers as potential competitors. They directed their grievances against black workers and demanded a privileged status. Color began to be seen as a criterion of access to rights and power through which whites occupied elite status and superordinate positions in the social division of labor. By contrast, Africans were kept at the opposite pole as a cheap labor force with no rights.

It also favored the construction of an economic and political policy predicated on maintaining black labor in a migrant condition and recognizing the fully proletarianized status of white workers. This labor structure and class relations in the mining industry resulted in the state intervening, from about 1906, in an attempt to secure preferential treatment for whites in employment outside the gold mining industry to minimize the spread of massive unemployment of unskilled white labor.[12] The legacy of color prejudices which accompanied previous colonial practices, was revitalized and formalized in the form of job color bars[13] and of economic, social and political institutions based on racial discrimination, known as segregation.[14] Thus the institutional racist barriers imposed to regulate labor relations in the mines were gradually extended to almost all spheres of economic, social and political life, including education. The ideology of segregation soon became the dominant mediating mechanism for the existing economic and social forces. It served a wide range of purposes. It addressed the needs of the mining industry and farmers demanding effective controls over migrant workers; it provided opportunities for those Africans concerned with restoring "traditional" authority, and for those coloreds anxious to protect themselves against being reduced to the status of Africans.[15] It certainly was an attractive solution for the ruling class for the problems posed by a developing capitalist economy, a modernizing state and the social dislocation caused by the war. In particular, it dealt with the rapid proletarianization of poor whites and poor blacks, with its increased possibilities of competition, conflict, miscegenation and unified class struggle.

In this view, the new political strategy articulated by Milner's reconstructionist government was to ensure the reproduction of migrant and fully proletarianized labor along racially defined lines. Through education, white workers and youth were to be politically and ideologically incorporated into a white state to absorb and mute rising social and cultural conflicts. This process initiated in the late nineteenth century reached a decisive point during the reconstruction period (1902-1924) with the institutionalization of racially differentiated educational structures, schooling and socialization processes. It thus appears that segregation and segregated schooling were no mere extensions of the discriminatory attitudes and practices of the past—Theophilus Sheptone's notions of "separate development," the selective Cape liberal tradition and colonial discriminatory practices. This segregation was an integral part of the complex process by which industrial capitalism developed in the specific circumstances of South Africa; its origins are bound up with the interrelated processes of state formation and the formation of proletarian classes determined by changes in the mode of production.[16]

As well as being related to the imperatives of mining and the particular character of social relations on the Witwatersrand, segregationist social policies, Marks and Trepido have pointed out, should also be related "to Milner's particular world-view . . . [and] to the far wider set of assumptions held by the British rulers of South Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century and their interaction with local conditions."[17] Shepstone's theory of "separate development"[18] and the Cape policy of "selective segregation" crystallized in Milner's discourse of white supremacy were reformulated in the report of the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) released in February 1905 which proposed many aspects of the policy of segregation.[19] Though not advocating total segregation of land areas, SANAC suggested racially exclusive occupation of land areas, separate political representation of blacks and whites, and advocated a policy of gradual and "assisted evolution" for Africans in a way which could not merge too closely into European life.[20] Sanctioning the principle of racial separation of schools and a system of state-aided mission schools, SANAC not only prescribed an inferior schooling system based on manual labor but also recommended that Africans receiving educational facilities should contribute towards the cost of them by payment of fees or local rates.[21] Compulsory education was not recommended nor was it considered advisable.[22] In 1908, the Transvaal Indigency Commission urged protection of white labor from black competition in the labor market.[23]

The introduction of free primary education just after the war was expected to create the bases of a white racial identity by Anglicizing

Afrikaner children, most of them concentrated in military camps.[24] Legislation such as the First Education Ordinance of 1903 for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony entrenched the principle of preferential treatment for white education in the statute books, establishing a state-controlled schooling system for whites. More significant moves towards a policy of comprehensive segregation were introduced in 1905-1908 with the promulgation of the Cape 1905 School Board Act, Smuts' Education Act of 1907 in the Transvaal and Hertzog's School Act of 1908 in the OFS, making provision for compulsory education for white children and institutionalizing racial separation in education. With these measures white children were placed on a fundamentally different footing from that of either colored or African children.[25] Africans were denied the right to free and compulsory education on the grounds that they were still unfit for it. Coloreds were only granted the right to free education.

Free compulsory education had profound effects on consciousness and was part of the various strategies adopted by the ruling class for containing the activities of the white working class, and for building a racial identity between white labor and capital.[26] Thus, state intervention in the reconstruction of white schooling can be interpreted as a response to the "heightened conflict between white labor and capital on the Witwatersrand and the need to reproduce white labor in such a way that it saw its interests as nonantagonistic to those of capital," thus minimizing the danger of crossracial proletarian insurgency. This strategy was expanded and consolidated after the proclamation of the Union of South Africa.

By the 1920s, the ideas of "scientific racism," social Darwinism and eugenics, which constituted the theoretical bases of late nineteenth-century segregationist ideology, were reformulated to accommodate the concept of culture reconstituted by the new academic discipline of social anthropology. The revised concept rejected assimilation as anticultural development; yet it permitted "racial upliftment" and ethnocultural identity.[27] As a consequence education aims and structures had to be redefined according to ethnic and cultural diversity. The North American concept of "adapted education" gained momentum.[28] The accompanying ideological shifts were reflected by severe criticisms of mission education. The most common criticism charged mission education for attempting to raise Africans "on the shoulders of the white man in a non-African environment" and for educating them to participate in an economic and social life from which they were barred.[29] It was maintained that African education should be considered as far as possible from the point of view of the African's "own possibilities, needs and aspirations."[30] To put it another way, African education had to adjust and conform to the social

and economic roles reserved for Africans.[31] Culture became part of the legitimizing ideology for segregated schooling. The curricula were revised accordingly. African education came to be seen as definitely *sui generis* and treated differently in its administration, inspection and funding.[32]

The opening of the South African Native College at Fort Hare in 1916 laid down the bases for segregation of higher education. This meant that the black elite was to be gradually accommodated through institutions created in the reserves while increasingly repressed in the urban areas.

Thus in the course of the two first decades of the twentieth century, the education system throughout the Union was divided into four separate, hierarchically different schooling systems: white education, Indian education, colored education and native education. White children had been drawn into a form of mass schooling but black children had not yet been fully incorporated, a feature which reflects the segregationist strategy which dictated educational development in South Africa. Blacks were not only compulsorily submitted to an inferior form of education designed to fit them into subordinate positions in the racially structured division of labor and to make them conform to the developing forms of domination; they also had to pay for it.[33]

Secondary Industry and Education: Class Restructuring and Race Polarization, *1924-1945*

During the 1930s South Africa began to undergo its second industrial revolution. Until the 1930s the mining industry had dominated the economy, securing the government's cooperation in protecting its interests for a controlled migrant labor force. Schooling of blacks played little part in the reproduction of such a labor force and hence in the concerns of government. After the 1924 Nationalist-Labor Pact government—a coalition of the National Party which represented the interests of white farmers and the Labor Party representing the largely English-speaking urban industrial workers—came to power with its "civilized" (i.e. white) labor policy, several measures were enacted to enable the allocation of unemployed whites and the white working classes to privileged, supervisory places in the racial division of labor.[34] Through an improved system of state schooling and Juvenile Employment Bureaus, "poor white" youth were gradually plucked from their marginal position in the economy and society. Even though the mining industry "long remained the jewel in the South African industrial crown,"[35] manufacturing industry and agricultural

interests increasingly began to play a part in the South African political economy.

Despite changes in government which first brought a Nationalist-Labor Pact government to power, then saw a Nationalist victory in 1929 and finally a 1933 coalition between Hertzog's Nationalists and Smuts's South African Party which was decisively defeated by the Nationalist Party in 1949, overall state policy in education towards black and white followed the pattern of racial segregation established in the first two decades of the twentieth century. A solid infrastructure of state schools and a bureaucracy for white children was built, while the refrain of "adapted education" provided the rationale for segregated schooling for blacks largely under a voluntary, mission control.

The 1924 Pact government's "civilized labor policy," which ensured preferential treatment for whites in the labor market, and the Stallardite doctrine of 1922 which held that Africans were "temporary sojourners" in urban areas provided for a social policy which effectively excluded Africans from membership of civil society through its conception of differential social rights of racial groups.[36] In this view the rights of Africans in urban areas were linked only to the labor services they performed. The result was the creation in children's legislation of the child as a white subject. The 1937 Children's Protection Act, hailed then as South Africa's Children's Charter, excluded those of color from its definition of what a child liable to rights were. In practice it also meant that social relations were largely regulated by repression for blacks and by ideology for whites. The state sought to reconstitute and stabilize the white working class family through direct state regulation of civil society, while such coercive measures as pass laws, the courts, prisons and slum clearances were used to ensure not only control over, but also maintenance of, a migrant labor population.[37]

The racial division of labor was reinforced through statutory mechanisms using education to disqualify blacks from skilled work. Facilities were expanded for training and employing skilled white labor, while restrictions were imposed on the entry of colored and African youth to skilled trades. Legislation such as the Juveniles Act (1921) which provided for labour bureaus for unemployed white youth and the Apprenticeship Act (1922) which set an educational qualification of Standard VI as requirement for admittance to apprenticeship, prevented many African youths from becoming apprentices, and, in the case of coloreds, displaced them from skilled trades.[38]

With the help of massive state grants and subsidies, manufacturing industry was stimulated and capitalist agriculture developed such that, by the advent of the Second World War, it constituted powerful rival interests

seeking state support for its particular labor concerns. The increasing impoverishment of the reserves as a consequence of successive assaults on African peasants, and the Depression of 1929-1932 had produced a substantial urban proletariat by the early 1930s. Their numbers were augmented by younger men and women leaving white farms. The development or neglect of African schooling remained firmly attached to the continuing conflict in the ruling class over whether Africans were to be "temporary sojourners" without any rights in the cities or not. At the same time, segregation was entrenched through a legislative program set in motion in earlier decades. But even as the Carnegie Commission of Inquiry into Poor Whites in South Africa, reporting in 1932, recommended a variety of relief, welfare and educational measures to change the social and economic position of "poor whites," there was the slow, dawning recognition among a new, liberal stratum of white educators that the question of "poor blacks" was to be an issue of "far greater dimensions" [39] than that of the "poor white."

The financing and provision of African and colored education was such that few attained Standard VI.[40] They attended mission schools increasingly dependent on shrinking state subsidies. Under the 1922 Financial Relations Fourth Extension Act, expenditure on African education was pegged at R340,000. Through the Natives Taxation and Development Act no. 41 of 1925 a special account was established to finance African education out of a general fund plenished through African taxation. Through Act 46 of 1925, schooling for colored children was financed differently. The state would pay educational subsidies to the provincial administrations on the basis of the average attendance of pupils. Both provisions for Africans and coloreds were revamped in 1945 when more liberal state provision was made.

The immediate consequence of such miserly spending was the birth of many children who grew into youthful maturity in an urban context without any schooling. Although the number of Africans of schoolgoing age in the Transvaal more than doubled between 1917 and 1927, for example, from 21,421 to 47,632, only 16% were in school in 1936.[41] There were facilities for less than a quarter of the population. On the Witwatersrand alone, the number of African children under fifteen increased fivefold between 1921 and 1936, from some 16,000 to nearly 80,000, with little corresponding increase in state spending on schooling. During this period very few Africans reached secondary school. In 1920, 1.4% of African students at school were in post-primary classes. By 1939, 2.24% were in these classes.[42] Those who did reach secondary school trained as teachers. Teacher training was thus often synonymous with

secondary schooling. By contrast, this period saw the professionalization of teacher training for whites and its location in post-matriculation colleges or university education departments.

As a result of differential financial provision, systematic statistics began to be compiled on the basis of the color of a school's children from the mid-1920s.[43] The construct of colored education came into being alongside that of native education, each being reproduced now not only through structures, but also through a distinct, material knowledge which at the same time helped to constitute its subjects as separate and different both from whites and each other.

Education for whites was overhauled to incorporate white children in the social and ideological universe of a broad white South Africanism within white supremacy[44] and mission schools staggered from the one financial crisis to the next, encapsulating but a tiny fraction of the black schoolgoing population. New demands, meanwhile, began to be made by both white liberals and the products of mission schooling who, in different ways, addressed themselves to the question of African and colored welfare and educational facilities in the 1930s and 1940s. Among these, the participants in the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives were probably the most important. They were stimulated by the growth and militance of an African proletariat on the Witwatersrand, especially during the Depression years 1929-1932.

Although there was a decline in effective, national, black political activity during this period, the specter of revolution raised by the work of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party (CP), haunted the liberal white missionaries and social workers organized by and around the Joint Councils of the South African Institute of Race Relations.[45] Films, libraries and debating societies were formed to "moralize the leisure time of blacks"[46] and moderate African opinion. By 1939, "thousands of children, without effective parental guidance in this rapidly changing transition period, and without the discipline that even poor schools offer"[47] were urgently preoccupying some governmental, municipal and welfare agencies.[48] In 1938 a Native Juvenile Delinquency Conference held in Johannesburg under the auspices of the South African Institute of Race Relations and the Johannesburg City Council urged the setting up of local committees and a Central Board of Bantu Education, Juvenile Affairs and Social Welfare. The problem, as Ray Phillips perceived it, was primarily one "of making South Africa safe for differences."[49] This could be achieved through recognizing the permanence of and stabilizing the urban African working-class family. Such a strategy would involve improved housing, provision of free and compulsory schooling for the large numbers of children falling prey to delinquency, removal of restrictions on acquisition of skills by Africans and adequate wages.

At the same time, new tensions and fractures in Afrikaner nationalism had emerged. Fuelled by frustrations at its exclusion from economic power, an urban Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, comprised by the 1930s mainly of teachers, priests and academics, assiduously set about organizing a political base through its vanguard, the Broederbond.[50] Although its overriding aim was the transformation of the economic position of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie, a great deal of ideological work had to be done to detach Afrikaner workers and "poor whites" from potential class rather than ethnic allegiances. This work was partly achieved through the ideological redefinition of Afrikanerdom as a homogenous organic unity and through cultural organization. By 1937, almost 300 cultural bodies, church councils, youth and students' associations, and charitable, scientific and educational groups affiliated with the Broederbond.[51] Christian-National ideology, which identified the nation as the primary social unit, nations being distinguished from each other by "culture," was a vital constituent in the formulation of a new Christian-National educational policy. In terms of this policy, Afrikaners had a divinely allotted task to "guide" Africans to national (ethnic) identity. Wider Nationalist policy, as reflected in the Sauer Commission of Inquiry (1948), embodied the view that the reserves and the migrant labor system should remain the basis of social and political policy. It formed the basis of conflict with liberal perspectives.

Many writers have shown that at the base of this conflict between repressionist/segregationists and assimilationist/integrationists lay a concern with the adequate distribution of labor, and conflicts between the demands for labor between agriculture and mining and manufacturing. While the former two sectors relied overwhelmingly on migrant labor, South Africa's burgeoning manufacturing industry sought a stable, permanent workforce. The victory of the Nationalist Party at the polls in 1948 signified the ascendancy, yet again, of Stallardite urban and social policy which had been muted by a reformist rhetoric in the state in the 1930s and during the war years.[52]

The Rise of Mass Schooling for Africans, *1945-1976*

Educational policy between 1945 and 1976 should be related to both economic and political changes during this period. South Africa's

departure from the gold standard in 1933 resulted in a considerable boom in gold production which, in turn, generated the revenue and favorable market for an accelerated secondary industrialization during and after the Second World War. Import substitution and the equipping of the allied forces during the war along with substantial direct foreign investment thereafter ensured sustained industrial growth. By 1943, the manufacturing sector, which had earlier exceeded agriculture in the contribution to the gross national product, finally overstepped mining as well. This solid economic basis together with the ability of the Nationalist alliance to override internal struggles and dictate a pragmatic policy produced conditions for the successful transition from a small-scale competitive capitalism to a large-scale monopoly capitalism from the 1950s. What is of particular interest is that unlike the pre-World War II monopoly conditions, monopolies in the late 1950s were no longer limited to small pockets in mining and finance dominated by conditions of small-scale competitive capital. They constituted the dominant feature of the South African economy in agriculture, mining, commerce and industry.[53]

The accession of the National Party to political power in 1948 also introduced significant changes. Its social policy involved a renewed, overt commitment to white supremacy as defined in the *Race Relations Policy of the National Party*, a policy document published in 1947 which called for a program of "separate development" or apartheid. A national system of labor bureaus, introduced to monitor and control the supply and distribution of African labor, placed increasingly severe constraints on Africans' freedom of movement and occupational choice. The Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Immorality Act and others, institutionalized a far more rigid and thoroughgoing system of racial domination than existed to date. Several enactments were made to bring the education system close to this policy. These were: the Bantu Education Act of 1953, the Extension of University Education Act of 1959, the Coloured Persons Education Act of 1963, Indian Education Act of 1965 and the National Education Act of 1967.

Underlying this legislation was the principle of Christian National Education whereby people of different ethnic and cultural groups should have different education and schooling systems. It was summarized by Coetzee in 1948 in the following words: "We as Calvinistic Afrikaners will have our CNE schools: Anglicans, Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Jews, liberalists and atheists will have their own schools."[54] Separate schools with mother-tongue as the medium of instruction were justified on religious, psychological-educational and national-cultural grounds for the maintenance of Afrikaner identity.

It has been argued in previous sections that the foundations of these developments were established in the first two decades of the twentieth century. This does not mean, however, that they were simply the next stage in a systematic and cumulative process, in which each step built on the successes of the last. Nor were they a complete departure from the previous segregationist policies. Rather, they were more a response to pressures and problems of the historical moment and reflected an attempt to remedy what was perceived to be the errors of the previous policies, e.g. the inability of missionary education to address the issue of the social reproduction of the black urban working class.[55]

Similarly, the construction of apartheid did not follow a wholly linear, pre-planned and monolithic route without costs.[56] Firstly, as Dan O'Meara has demonstrated, the National Party was brought to power by an Afrikaner nationalist class alliance comprising "Transvaal, Cape and Orange Free State farmers, specific categories of white labor, and the Afrikaner petty-bourgeoisie" which had thrown its weight behind a single, hegemonic conception of apartheid.[57] Though united by their commitment to white supremacy, these class divisions underlay competing conceptions of apartheid. Some viewed "total segregation" as compatible with "economic integration" and vice versa. Secondly, the sorts of policies deriving from them, the degree of efficacy with which these policies were implemented, and how and why these policies changed after 1959 suggest that a degree of unevenness and contradictory policy practices dominated the process.

Bantu Education has been interpreted as the South African form of mass schooling for blacks imposed as a response to the labor and social crisis brought about by the process of secondary industrialization and the rise of monopoly capitalism.[58] This model can clearly not be grafted onto South African history and realities in a simple way. In the first place, South Africa's system of schooling was not introduced in this way at the same time for black and white. The emergence of the school as a form of social control took place in a historically staggered and segregated way. White children were drawn into a form of mass schooling in the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War and the ensuing three decades. To date black children have not yet been fully incorporated. In the second place, the impact of the specific form of industrialization in South Africa on the black family has been characterized not by the creation of a universal family-form, the nuclear family, but by the creation of a system of migrancy and the break-up of families. Even in urban areas, the settled and stabilized nuclear working-class black family has consistently been more an element of desire within the discourse of liberal capital than a reality. The conditions for survival of the black family as constituted in the reformist

fantasy have simply not existed in South African townships. Thirdly, if the connection between industrialization and segregated schooling is a direct one, then the introduction of universal, albeit segregated schooling, ought to have been simultaneous. And if the advent of Bantu Education as a form of mass schooling was contemporaneous with the growth of monopoly capital and industry, then the question of why it was not introduced earlier still remains unanswered. The mining industry, which dominated the South African social formation in the first third of the twentieth century, was a monopoly industry from its early beginnings—or later during the 1960s, when monopoly capital consolidated its hold on the South African economy. Further state control was extended over African youth after the advent of the National Party to power, but this was not equivalent to the introduction of mass schooling in South Africa, which has not yet been achieved.

Verwoerd quite explicitly outlined the aims of Bantu Education in his 1953 speeches to Parliament. Bantu Education would restructure the conditions of social reproduction of the black working class and create conditions for stabilizing a black urban underclass of semi-skilled laborers. Thus, in the 1955-1960 years, the state concentrated its efforts on three main areas: (1) stabilization of the urban proletariat; (2) production of a semiskilled workforce; and (3) the prevention of juvenile delinquency and political militancy among urban working-class youth.[59]

After 1959 Bantu Education would also provide a means of ideological incorporation in the bantustans and ensure the hegemony of the ruling class by entrenching a sense of national consciousness based on ethnicity and the illusion of self-determination. For this purpose, the National Education Policy Act of 1967 reiterated that education in schools should have a Christian and National character and have the mother tongue as the medium of instruction.

This last aspect characterized state education policy in the 1962-1971 period. Hyslop has distinguished five main ways in which this policy was carried out in practice: (1) the blocking of secondary school expansion in urban areas; (2) the use of education as a form of influx control preventing families without urban rights from attending schools in the urban areas; (3) the strangling of technical training in the urban areas; (4) [illegible]eland-based teacher and professional training; and (5) exclusion of the [illegible] of funds from private business by schools.[60] Thus in the urban areas there was a clear emphasis on the lower primary school level, whereas higher primary and secondary schools could only be established where community-based school boards paid half the cost.[61] For example, by 1971 it was estimated that there was an average of only one school for every 80,000 urban African families.[62]

From its inception, Bantu Education was confronted with opposition from missionaries, teachers, parents and relatively politicized sections of the youth. Of particular importance were the educational struggles organized by the ANC in the 1955-1956 period on the East Rand and townships nearer Johannesburg and Eastern Cape. Thousands of pupils stayed away from school while parents involved in the African Education Movement created cultural clubs or alternative educational facilities catering for the boycotting pupils. The absence of autonomous youth or student movements, the lack of resources and funding, state harassment and problems of organization and tactics on the side of the ANC led to the collapse of the movement in 1956.[63] In contrast to later periods of resistance in education, students and youth did not form an important organizational constituency, whereas teachers and parents did. Education itself was seen as important, but not a central site of struggle during the mass political campaigns of the 1950s.[64]

In the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, both the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were banned. A new phase of struggle was entered, even as the conditions were created for a stupendous economic boom. When the boom of the 1960s came to an end in 1968, industry rapidly came to feel the consequences of the prevailing educational order. The "economic liberalism" articulated by academics in the early sixties received wide support in industry, influential liberal institutions and the English-speaking press. Emphasis was placed on the needs of the economy for skilled labor, liberalization in educational provision and expansion of black education. The arguments formulated within this movement were based on the assumption that: ". . . the demands of the economy . . . are stronger than the color bar."[65] By the early 1970s, the consolidation of Afrikaner monopoly capital and the recognition of the state's failure to address the needs of the industry led to a split within the National Party between the *verligte* (enlightened) and *verkrampte* (narrow-minded) ranks. The *verkrampte* wing (representing conservative intellectuals, the lower-middle and working classes and northern agriculture) advocated policies based on the concepts of classical apartheid. *Verligtes* (comprising the urban middle class, business interests and Cape agriculture) were for a greater accommodation of state policy to the needs of capital without a significant shift from the concept of grand apartheid. From 1972, the balance of forces favoring the *verligtes* gave way to significant shifts in state education policy. This resulted in a considerable expansion of numbers allowed into urban secondary schools, but with only limited expansion in

funding. As a consequence, classes in the early seventies were chronically overcrowded, and the double-shift system was standard practice.

The late 1960s also saw the emergence of the black consciousness movement among black South Africans in urban secondary schools and the new tertiary institutions established to foster an elite imbued with ethnic consciousness to serve the bantustan apparatus. By drawing the mass of urban youth into a common, oppressive educational and social structure, Bantu Education provided a shared experience which unified black urban youth into a relatively cohesive force.[66] At the political level this assumed the form of a black consciousness movement. The black consciousness movement was rooted in the increasing alienation of black youth from the prevailing political, economic and social structure and the attempts to inculcate conformist modes of behavior, passivity, and psychological and racial inferiority through various agencies of social control particularly Bantu Education. The need for blacks to reject liberal white tutelage, the assertion of black cultural identity, psychological liberation from notions of inferiority and unity of all blacks including coloreds and Indians were among its objectives. Although limited in its base to schools and universities, the black consciousness movement was vital in constituting those defined by the state as colored, Indian and African as "black." In the early to mid-1970s this was an important unifying ideology, although contradictions in it, as well as the re-emergence of older traditions of nonracial resistance which became hegemonic after 1976, led to its partial decline and redefinition in the 1980s.

Organic Crisis and Schooling, *1976-1986*

1976 was a "turning point when South Africa did not turn,"[67] "the whirlwind before the storm" which "has not struck yet, but few doubt . . . will."[68] Attempts by capital and the state to dam the tide were initially a spectacular failure. Wave upon wave of revolt broke through the walls of containment, engulfing South Africa between September 1984 and 1986 in a storm whose rage has temporarily been dissipated, but which is not yet over. But while the imagery of nature in revolt was useful in representing the force and impact of resistance during this period, it should not obscure the social and historically constituted nature of the forces locked in combat. In the elemental metaphor, there is only the ebb and flow of the blind tide; in social and historical analysis, there are concepts of power, agency, consciousness, structure, struggle and change. The key questions

for this period are thus: what changed? for whom did it change? and how did it change?[69]

The structural crisis that showed its first signs between 1973 and 1976 in a declining growth rate and recession which had begun to bear down heavily upon the black working class, manifestly began to change the balance of internal social forces after the mid-1970s. During the 1960s, the South African economy had surged forward. Black opposition had been crushed, and foreign investment flowed into the country at a price yet to be exacted by a strutting business sector and a preening ruling National Party. The consequent monopolization of the South African economy had the contradictory effect of both accelerating the rate of inflation and a rise in the number of unemployed and of improving the bargaining position of an industrial working class now concentrated in larger numbers at the point of production. As inflation began to bite in the early 1970s, this working class began to flex its muscle in the 1973 strikes in the coastal city of Durban which also augured the rebirth of a militant organized working class, and ultimately heralded the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985.

Between 1976 and 1986 South Africa began to pay the price of prosperity based on the 1960s importation of high capital goods and technology and a highly controlled black population. The economy staggered from a boom between 1979 to 1981 based on the unpredictable gold price, to a radical slump in 1982 as a balance of payments deficit combined with the effects of massive state overspending to produce growing indebtedness and a rise in the inflation rate. A short miniboom between mid-1983 and early 1984 did not prevent a further plunge precipitated by the falling world price of gold and low volume of traditional exports. Between July 1984 and mid-1985, the inflation rate shot up from 12% to over 16%.[70] By 1986, in contrast with the high summer of confidence of the 1960s, South Africa was shuddering in the grip of what looked like a long, chilly winter: for a combination of reasons, foreign capital was being withdrawn on a significant scale, few new investments were made, and an exceedingly low rand was crippling economic growth. The economy seemed set on a steep and drastic course of decline; the mask of bravado now worn by its managers often slipped to reveal panic and desperation.

Integral to the shift of forces inside the country were also the changing regional profile, changing state economic and political strategies and deepening organization of national-democratic forces. The first bricks in the wall of regional white supremacy were knocked out when the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Popular Movement for

the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power in Mozambique and Angola respectively in 1975. The next bastion to crumble was Zimbabwe in 1980, followed shortly thereafter by increasing pressure on the South African government for a settlement in Namibia. Despite the South African defeat in Angola in 1975, and the spectacular display of internal opposition in 1976, morale was still high.

In the late 1970s, the South African state, in which the military and big capital were now well represented, embarked on what it considered to be an ambitious programme of reform to contain the multilayered economic, political and ideological crisis. While a clear economic strategy in the form of a monetarist "austerity package" did not emerge until 1984, a political strategy of co-option of key middle sectors within the black community was encouraged in mainly urban centers in the areas of labor, health, welfare, housing and education.[71] Limited concessions were to be made available to bantustan officials, teachers, and small businessmen; two additional, separate Houses were created in the new tricameral Parliament for Indian and colored representatives in 1983/4. Opposition was to be dealt with by revamped security legislation. The inability of these reforms to address the crisis and to effect meaningful changes, the structural violence and repression on which they rested, and the intensification of resistance around the power relationships structuring inequality in the society were ultimately the rocks on which the strategy foundered.

Reform in education reflected the overall state political strategy: the "separate but equal" ethos framed in the refurbished apartheid philosophy of "own affairs" or multi-culturalism structured state intervention in education[72] to privilege and skill some strata within the black community through increased expenditure on target areas.[73] Multinationalism or multiculturalism in education meant that whereas those classified as white, Indian and colored would have control over their own separate departments, African education would still fall under the control of the central cabinet, as would the allocation of overall resources. Increased involvement by capital, both local and foreign, in technical, vocational and other forms of private schooling introduced new differentiations in the kind of schooling available to blacks, but made little impact on the overall policy and framework within which these interventions were made. In per capita terms, however, white education still stood at the apex of educational benefit; more white children graduated from secondary and tertiary institutions than black. Black children on white farms, towns, rural areas of the bantustans and in resettlement camps continued to struggle on the scrap-heap of South African schooling,[74] while a tiny minority were given the opportunity, largely through multiracial, private church schools,

increased state and industrial training incentives and schemes, and access to relatively more "open" universities than before, to glimpse a marginally more secure economic future.

Although South Africa thus had eighteen departments and fifteen ministers of education by 1986, and had increased expenditure on black education phenomenally after 1976, these quantitative changes did not affect overall quality and control over black education.[75] Nor did it affect growing impoverishment of the poorest within all sectors of society as a consequence of the devastatingly high burdens of the cost of living, rising unemployment amongst black school-leavers, the inability of the economy to absorb more highly skilled and educated youth or discontent with a wider political system based on white supremacy.

By 1986 the reforms begun with such confidence in the late 1970s had not been abandoned and were not in complete disarray. They were, however, maintained by sheer force. Over the course of the first half of the 1980s, the balance of forces shifted so decisively in favor of oppositional forces, among whom high school students and youth comprised a substantial and powerful element, that the state was enjoined to declare that it faced a "revolutionary situation" which required a counter-revolutionary strategy.

The 1976 revolt had been a largely spontaneous uprising, but it had political repercussions far beyond its time and region. It stimulated organization inside the country, among and beyond the student constituency, and propelled many others into a search for military training outside the country's borders. Many, in all communities, politicized by 1976, began the painstaking task of grassroots organization around labor, health, community and educational issues. During the boom years of 1979-1981, despite harassment by the state, organization of students in particular was boosted by the formation of the Congress of South African Students in 1979 and the school boycotts of 1980.

Between the Soweto uprising of 1976, the Cape school boycotts of 1980 and the nationwide insurrection of 1984-1986, there were significant differences and changes in youth organization, consciousness and strategy. The revolt in 1976 was the first sign that the educational terrain was to become a more important site of struggle than it had hitherto been, and that youth were to play an important part in the re-emergence of organized opposition in the 1980s. Although the 1976 Soweto Students' Representative Council played an important part in giving direction and leadership in the course of the revolt, organization was embryonic. Several aspects of the revolt, while largely spontaneous and undeveloped then, prefigured future concerns. These included links and relations between students and

the other, different sectors involved in education, namely parents, teachers and unemployed school-leavers, as well as between students and national and working class organizations. Likewise, the revolt threw up questions about the precise relation between the struggle against Bantu Education and the system that sustained it as a whole. Although resistance in education was not new,[76] the urban terrain and the subjects—high school students—were. The students had no precedents and no collective experience of their particular form of struggle. There was no wider, internal political opposition with which to connect; independent trade unions, also, were in their infancy. The graduates of 1976 helped form these unions and organizations in the succeeding years so that when new generations of students took to revolt in the 1980s there was present a wider, conscious, internal oppositional movement spread across civic, national and union spheres; their experience also provided future generations of students with a proud tradition, invaluable lessons and a wide repertoire of strategies which included the march, the boycott, and physical combat.[77] The formation of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in 1979 represented the start of more sustained and systematic mobilization and organization in schools across the country.

The 1980 school boycotts, which also spread across the country, albeit unevenly, involved mainly high school students, but demonstrated a much-remarked upon sophistication of organization and consciousness.[78] Democratic forms of school-based organization were discussed and concretely explored; these were complemented by the enthusiastic analytical attention given to the relation of schools to the capitalist system and the role of students in the transformation of the wider political and economic system. The lessons of 1976 were consciously extrapolated and worked on. The pamphlets, newsletters and broadsheets of the time still constitute an acute and penetrating resource for political education. The concentration of the boycotts in coloured schools was important in that it signalled the potential unity-in-action of students also nationally oppressed but separated from African students.

Although the centrality of the working class to the transformation of the system of apartheid was realized intellectually, its concrete manifestation in links forged was pushed further than in 1976, but was still largely experimental, with both sides tentatively testing the possibility and nature of a student-worker alliance. As in 1976, which stimulated the formation of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee (STAC) and the Soweto Parents' Committee, steps were taken by teachers and parents to support and broaden the base of opposition. The Teachers' Action Committee (TAC), formed in Cape Town, was of short duration, but the National

Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA), formed in Johannesburg in 1980, emerged and grew dramatically as a focus for progressive teachers across the colour spectrum. New organizations, while not denying the historical makeup and geographical location of issues in terms of color, recast discussion in terms of categories of class and political struggle. These groups were able to forge a strong movement in this period which was pivotal in helping to provide a concrete vision of a nonracial South Africa.

By 1984, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and National Forum (NF) had been formed. Unity talks were in process to create COSATU. An organizational base was given to unemployed youth through the formation of youth congresses from 1983 onwards. The dominant movement was nonracial in orientation, but other student organizations like Azanian Students Movement and Azanian Youth Union, drawing on the black consciousness tradition, were also formed. Older, tertiary student organizations like the Azanian Student Organisation (AZASO), which later changed its name to the South African National Student Congress—SANSCO, and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) added weight to the growing national presence of youth. Wider layers within the educational arena were being mobilized. Middle layers of the population, like teachers, were faced with insistent and unavoidable pressures to choose sides. Small but vocal progressive teachers' organizations had sprung up in many centers. National campaigns across the country to protest against the state's constitutional proposals had widened the base of popular opposition, and directly raised questions of power and democracy in national life. The slide into ever-greater economic distress for larger numbers of people as a consequence of the economic crisis simply highlighted the yawning gap between the rhetoric of reform and the everyday reality of dispossession and powerlessness. In this context, organization, while uneven, was rapid, incorporating ever wider sectors in education and national life.

A watershed in popular and educational resistance occurred in 1984. Between 1980 and 1984, student resistance consisted of very occasional, sporadic flare-ups and was mainly concerned with educational issues. On the Witwatersrand, students protested against racist teachers, dismissals of popular teachers and police action in schools. COSAS was organizing students around demands for an end to corporal punishment, the recognition of democratically constituted Student Representative Councils (SRCs), an end to harassment of female student and release of detainees. The demand for SRCs acted as a microcosm for the broader demand for national self-determination. As Lulu Johnson, president of COSAS, noted

when it was banned, "the demand for democratic SRCs is part of the process of preparing ourselves and building a future South Africa where representation will be genuine and democratic."[79]

The year 1984 began with a boycott of a school in the small rural town of Cradock in the Cape Province. Here a teacher, Matthew Goniwe, assassinated by apartheid death squads in July 1985, was threatened with transfer to another school in another region. His students refused to see him go, and began their boycott. Also at the beginning of the year, in Atteridgeville, Pretoria, a boycott whose goal was recognition of a democratic Students' Representative Council began. In July, schools in the area were suspended for the rest of the year. Six thousand students were left on the streets with no alternative form of schooling. In the succeeding months, boycotts spread to many smaller towns in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Northern and Eastern Cape, involving more than 20,000 children in white South Africa. In August, as elections were held in colored and Indian areas for members to the new Parliament, 40,000 more students from these constituencies joined the boycotts. The number of students out of schools had risen to 630,000 by August. The education time-bomb was beginning to explode. As the state tried to raise rents in the Vaal townships around the Reef, estimated to be the most expensive place for black families to live in South Africa, it did explode. Students left schools *en masse* to protest with their communities. Five hundred and seventy-five African schools in the Transvaal were emptied.[80] This evoked a massive show of force by the state, and the occupation of Sharpeville and neighboring areas by the South African Defense Force (SADF) which, in turn, triggered a historic, massively successful stay-away on the Rand called for by a strong worker-student alliance on November 4, 1984.

For all sides this was a turning point. What followed for the next two years was one of the most intense, sustained mass revolts yet seen in South Africa. It combined both spontaneous and organized forms of resistance. Its geographical spread was far wider than the 1976 rebellion or the 1980 boycotts, involving not only those in cities and large towns, but also those trapped in the smaller *dorps* of the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal and Cape Province, some with a history of resistance, some with none. Student struggles now merged with national ones. The state responded with brute force. A state of emergency was declared in the middle of 1985. Unlike 1976, when the SADF left the attack on youth to the South African police, the SADF now entered and patrolled the townships. Casspirs (tank-like armoured military vehicles used to quash anti-apartheid popular resistance) roamed the townships and occupied school grounds. Schooling took place at gunpoint. COSAS was banned, children were detained, beaten and shot

in township after township.[81] State violence against children, while not new, assumed frightening dimensions. Schooling in education ceased, while a new schooling in violence began. Vigilantes, conservative and criminal elements within townships, informers and agents provocateur, all capitalized on a volatile situation, diverting attention from the economic and political roots of the revolt and allowing for its representation by the South African media in the ideological terms of "black on black violence" and "student hooliganism."

The violence against children and the inadequate state response to the students' demands, gave birth in 1985 to new popular organizations. These drew on a leadership more seasoned than students in political struggle. On the one hand, wider sectors within the educational arena were organized. In Cape Town, the intensification of military intervention in schools in 1985 produced not only the Western Cape Teachers Union (WECTU), which lasted until the end of 1988 when it, too, was banned, but greater parent involvement in the students' struggle. On the other hand, united action between parents, students and teachers was presaged in the formation of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC). Just as peoples' courts challenged the official system of distribution and regulation of justice, so the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee (SPCC, an affiliate of the UDF), later to become the NECC, took on the task, abrogated by the state, of ensuring that children and students be educated in an appropriate context and manner. Through it, Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs) were to widen the base of democratic control in the schools. Instead of merely critiquing the system of Bantu Education (1976), or of relying on inexperienced students and teachers hard-pressed by other issues to run "awareness classes" (1980), it began to build the basis for a new, national curriculum and content through its Peoples Education Commissions and subject committees in English and history.

Whereas the hallmark of the 1976 fightback was its spontaneous anger, and that of the 1980 boycotts the theoretical advances they generated, the striking feature of the 1984-86 period was the development of firm and concrete links between student, national and working class organizations. The Soweto-sparked student actions were a powerful indictment of apartheid education policy and prefigured in many respects what was to come. The 1980 boycotts reflected the growing maturity of the student body and pointed the way to Peoples Education, while 1984-86 was the mass explosion of several decades of anger, sparked by worsening economic conditions and false political promises. It represented also the culmination of a decade of intense and rapid mobilization, politicization and organization. Although conflicts within the opposition existed, and

even though mobilization in some cases took precedence over simultaneous organization such that it was unevenly developed, the educational map of South Africa had been transformed with the space of a mere ten years. Political struggle in the field of education was a vital component in shifting the balance of forces to the side of the oppressed in such a dramatic fashion that new strategies have had to be devised by the state to defend its interests.

Conclusion

The roots of segregated schooling lie in the particular form of industrialization and the nature of the state developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. To a large extent the social policy to which education and schooling was related was predicated on maintaining a black migrant work force and a stabilized white working class. Schooling was to ensure the reproduction of this labor structure along racially defined lines. Through education, white workers and youth were politically and ideologically incorporated into a white state to absorb and mute rising social and cultural conflicts between white labor and capital. Thus, in the course of the first two decades of the twentieth century, education became fragmented along racial lines into four schooling systems for whites, Indians, coloreds and Africans respectively. The curricula, control and funding of schooling was also restructured according to the perceived "racial, economic and social differences" between whites and blacks.

This pattern of development was consolidated in the succeeding four decades through a process in which white schools were developed and black schools neglected. Government commitment to a "white labor policy" in the 1920s ensured preferential treatment for white education while the concept of "adapted education" provided the rationale for segregated schooling for blacks based more on cultural than color differences and anthropological rather than biological grounds. Within the state, conflict developed over social policy between those seeking to secure a migrant-labor based political economy and those who sought the stabilization of the black working class through adequate wages, housing, education. Amongst the latter liberal reformists, the proposal for state control of African Education through a Board of Bantu Education was mooted in the 1930s. The liberal reformism of the 1930s and early 1940s was swept aside by the victory of the National Party in 1948. Education policy was now structured by a social and political policy which anticipated

the development of labor power differentially developed as migrant and urban, and whose rights were articulated within the bantustan framework. The advent of African mass schooling in the form of Bantu Education was to a large extent related to this process. Bantu Education would restructure the conditions of social reproduction of the black working class, create conditions for stabilizing a class of black semi-skilled workers, entrench color consciousness, and construct national consciousness on the basis of ethnicity. Segregated tertiary education would also provide a means of ideological incorporation in the bantustans of an elite to staff its apparatus.

The "contradictions of Bantu Education"[82] as well as the beginnings of an extended organic political and economic crisis starting in the early seventies led to the emergence of students and youth as a powerful counter-hegemonic force. Integral to the new culture of opposition, which took different ideological forms over the next two decades, was the reconceptualization of people as national and not ethnic subjects, as belonging to a unitary South Africa and not to fragmented ethnic units. An important recent feature of this culture was the commitment to a search for constructive alternatives, as expressed in the ideal of "People's Education for People's Power" and the design of alternative curricula, textbooks and methods, to the present educational dispensation.

The state has attempted to accommodate these pressures and to re-assert its initiative through a combination of violence and reform, shifting its emphasis from the Verwoerdian formulation of apartheid education to a new version of segregated schooling in which a more technocratic and less overtly racial discourse prevails. The focus has been on the "training" of labor for industry. Paradoxically, while recognizing the need for equality in education, segregated schooling remains the framework in which equal education is expected to be reached. While the economic and political crisis deepens, in the educational arena a nation-wide alliance involving students, parents and teachers united with worker and mass organizations has been consolidated. The breakdown of apartheid education appears irreversible.

Notes

1. R. Hunt Davis, Jr., *Bantu Education and the Education of Africans in South Africa* (Athens, Ohio, 1972).

2. Ernest F. Dube, "The Relationship between Racism and Education in South Africa," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 55, No. 1, February 1985, pp. 86-100.

3. Pam Christie and Colin Collins, "Bantu Education: Apartheid Ideology and Labour Reproduction," in Peter Kallaway (ed.) *Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South Africans* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988), Third Impression, pp. 160-183; Jonathan Hyslop, "The Concepts of Reproduction and Resistance in the Sociology of Education: The Case of the Transition from 'Missionary' to 'Bantu' Education 1940-55," in *Perspectives in Education*, 9, 2, Sept. 1987, pp. 3-25.

4. Harold Wolpe, *Race, Class and the Apartheid State* (London: James Currey, 1988), pp. 55 and 75; F. Troup, *Forbidden Pastures: Education Under Apartheid* (London: IDAF, 1976/7); Frank Molteno, "An Introduction to the Study of Education for Blacks in South Africa," in Kallaway (ed.), *Apartheid and Education*.

5. An issue that is the subject of the majority of recent writings. See, for example, Peter Kallaway, *Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South Africans* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984); SACHED (ed.), *The Right to Learn* (Johannesburg, 1986).

6. Michael Cross, "A Historical Review of Education in South Africa: Towards an Assessment," *Comparative Education*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1986, p. 197.

7. See for example F. A. Johnstone, "Class Conflict and Colour Bars in the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1910-26," in *Collected Seminar Papers* (University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, October 1969-April 1970); F. A. Johnstone, *Class, Race and Gold* (London, 1976); and A. H. Jeeves, *Migrant Labour in South Africa's Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold Mines' Labour Supply, 1890-1920* (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand Press, 1985).

8. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (eds.), *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (Harlow, Burnt Mill: Longman House, 1987), p. 2.

9. Among African migrant workers, class loyalties were overdetermined by ethnic affiliations. The predominance of peasant characteristics also inhibited significant forms of political organization or militancy at the workplace. However, many white workers had not only experienced the militancy of the British working class during the nineteenth century, but had also developed a high level of class and political consciousness.

10. Founded in 1887, the Chamber of Mines became the central organization of the gold mining industry, which served to represent and secure the common interests and policies of the groups and companies in all areas, and to provide the companies with a wide range of services.

11. F. A. Johnstone, "Class Conflict and Colour Bars," op. cit., p. 116.

12. Within this line of argument are the following works: Robert Davies, "Mining Capital, The State and Unskilled White Workers in South Africa, 1901-13"; Alan Jeeves, "The Control of Migratory Labour on the South African Gold Mines in the Era of Kruger and Milner"; and Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry," all in Martin Murray (ed.), *South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Shenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1982).

13. Job color bars were protectionist measures imposed by mining companies to restrict the employability of black workers in skilled work by restricting all skilled work to whites. See F. A. Johnstone, *Class, Race and Gold* (London: University Press of America, 1976), pp. 66-77.

14. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (eds.), op. cit., p. 7. For details on cheap labor policy see Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid," *Economy and Society*, 1, 4 (November 1972), pp. 424-456.

15. Martin Legassick, "British Hegemony and the Origins of Segregation, 1901-1914," in Institute of Commonwealth Studies *Collected Seminar Papers* (University of London, February 1974); Paul Rich, "The Agrarian Counter-Revolution in the Transvaal and the Origins of Segregation, 1901-1914," in *Working Papers in Southern African Studies: Papers Presented at the ASI, African Studies Seminar*, ed. P. L. Bonner (Johannesburg, 1977).

16. For more details see John W. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 46-81; Linda Chisholm, "Class and Color in South African Youth Policy: The Witwatersrand, 1886-1910," *History of Education Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring 1987), pp. 1-27; M. Cross, "The Foundations of a Segregated Schooling System in the Transvaal 1900-24," *History of Education*, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 259-274.

17. S. Marks and S. Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," *History Workshop Journal*, 8, 1979, p. 72.

18. Theophilus Shepstone (administrator of Natal) argued that Africans were a distinct people and should be treated as such. They should be governed indirectly through their own chiefs and laws. He called this policy "separation." In the Cape Colony, Sir George Grey adopted a theory of partial assimilation and a selective franchise based on the degree of education attained.

19. C. Headlam (ed.), *The Milner Papers, South Africa 1899-1905*, Vol. 1 (London, 1933), p. 467.

20. *South African Native Affairs Commission Report, 1903-1905* (Cape Town, 1905), p. 67.

21. Ibid., p. 72.

22. Ibid., p. 71.

23. *Transvaal Indigence Commission Report, 1906-8* (Pretoria, 1908), p. 4.

24. Ibid., 69. See also the *Report of the Syndic to the Council of Education* (Witwatersrand, 4 September 1903), pp. 2-3, 10.

25. Chisholm, op. cit., p. 2.

26. L. Chisholm, "Themes in the Construction of Free Compulsory Education for the White Working Class on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1907," (University of the Witwatersrand: History Workshop, 1984), pp. 17-18.

27. Saul Dubow, "Race, Civilisation and Culture: The Elaboration of Segregationist Discourse in the Inter-War Years," in Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido (eds.), op. cit., pp. 8-9. See also Robert Davies, *Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa: An Historical Materialist Analysis of Class Formation and Class Relations*, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979).

28. R. Hunt Davis,"Charles T. Loram and the American Model for African Education in South Africa," in Kallaway (ed.) *Apartheid and Education*, pp. 108-126.

29. E. G. Malherbe (ed.), *Educational Adaptations in a Changing Society* (Pretoria, 1934), pp. 11-13.

30. Transvaal Education Department, Report of the Director of Education for the year ending 31 December 1912, p. 92.

31. TED, Report of the Director of Education for the year ending 31 December 1912, pp. 92-93.

32. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

33. Union of South Africa: Act no. 41, 1941.

34. Robert H. Davies, *Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa 1900-1960: An Historical Materialist Analysis of Class Formation and Class Relations* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979).

35. Alf Stadler, *The Political Economy of Modern South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1987), p. 45.

36. Ibid., pp. 108-110.

37. See L. Chishlom, "Reformatories and Industrial Schools in South Africa: A Study in Class, Colour and Gender, 1882-1939." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Witwatersrand, 1989, chapter five.

38. Gavin Lewis, *Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African "Coloured" Politics* (Cape Town and Johannesburg: David Philip, 1987).

39. E.G. Malherbe, *Never a Dull Moment: Autobiography* (Cape Town: Howard Timmons, 1981), p. 128.

40. R. Hunt Davis, Jr., "The Administration and Financing of African Education in South Africa 1910-1953," in Peter Kallaway (ed.), *Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South Africans* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988), pp. 127-138; Muriel Horrel, *The Education of the Coloured Community in South Africa 1652-1970* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1970).

41. P. A. W. Cook, *Transvaal Teacher* (1939), pp. 8-9; Deborah Gaitskell, "Upward All and Play the Game: The Girl Wayfarers' Association in the Transvaal 1925-1975," in Peter Kallaway (ed.), *Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South Africans* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988), p. 225.

42. *National Bureau of Educational and Social Research: Bulletin of Educational Statistics for the Union of South Africa, 1940*, p. ii.

43. See Lewis, *Between the Wire and the Wall*; and Horrell, *The Education of the Coloured Community in South Africa*.

44. E. B. Malherbe, *Education in South Africa*, Vol. II.

45. Ray Phillips, *The Bantu Are Coming!* (Johannesburg, 1932).

46. Tim Couzens, "'Moralising Leisure Time': The Transatlantic Connection and Black Johannesburg 1918-1936," in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, *Industrialisation and Social Change: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness 1870-1930* (London: Longman, 1982) pp. 314-337.

47. University of the Witwatersrand, Historical Papers, Ray Phillips Collection, Box No: A1444-1446 (File 1), "Phillips News, 30.7.1939."

48. See also Jonathan Hyslop, "The Concepts of Reproduction and Resistance in the Sociology of Education," pp. 3-25.

49. Ray E. Phillips, *The Bantu in the City: A Study of Cultural Adjustment on the Witwatersrand* (Lovedale Press, 1938), p. 225.

50. Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934-1948* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), Part II, pp. 59-116.

51. Ibid., p. 75.

52. See for example *Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Native Education, 1934-1937* (Welsh Report) U.G. 38-1937 and Union of South Africa, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Cape Coloured Population of the Union, 1937* U.G. 54-1937.

53. See Duncan Innes, *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa* (Monthly Review Press: New York, 1985).

54. J. C. Coetzee, "Dubbelmedium-onderwys en Tweetaligheid," *Koers*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1948), p. 44; and J. C. Coetzee, "Christian National Education," in R. Tunmer and R. K. Muir (eds.), *Some Aspects of Education in South Africa* (1968), p. 30.

55. Jonathan Hyslop, "The Concepts of Reproduction and Resistance in the Sociology of Education," pp. 3-23.

56. Deborah Posel, "The Construction of Apartheid, 1948-1961," African Studies Seminar paper presented at the University of Witwatersrand, African Studies Institute, 22 August 1988, p. 3.

57. D. O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme*, op. cit., p. 243.

58. J. Hyslop, "The Concepts of Reproduction and Resistance in the Sociology of Education," pp. 8-13.

59. See articles by Jonathan Hyslop, "State Education Policy and the Social Reproduction of the Urban African Working Class: The Case of the Southern Transvaal 1955-1976," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April 1988), pp. 446-476; and "The Concepts of Reproduction and Resistance in the Sociology of Education."

60. Jonathan Hyslop, op. cit., pp. 455-57.

61. Jonathan Hyslop, (1988) op. cit.

62. *The Star*, 26.3. 1971.

63. T. Lodge, "The Parents School Boycott, 1955," in B. Bozzoli (ed.), *Town and Countryside in the Transvaal* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), pp. 365-395; T. Lodge, "The Parents School Boycott: Eastern Cape and East Rand Townships, 1955," in P. Kallaway (ed.), *Apartheid and Education* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984), pp. 265-295; J. Hyslop, "A Preface to People's Education: Reflections on the 1955-56 School Boycotts," University of the Witwatersrand: History Workshop, 1987.

64. See, for example, Tom Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), pp. 114-139; Smangaliso Mkatshwa, Keynote Address to First National Education Crisis Committee Consultative Conference, 1985, in Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE), *People's Education: A Collection of Articles from December 1985-May 1987* (University of the Western Cape, 1988), pp. 7-17.

65. E. G. Malherbe, "Into the Seventies . . . Education and the Development of South Africa's Human Resources." Paper delivered to the 1966 National Congress of the Progressive Party of South Africa, p. 66.

66. See Mokubung Nkomo, *Student Culture and Activism in Black South African Universities* (Westport: Greenwood, 1984); Mokubung Nkomo, "The Contradictions of Bantu Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1981); Jonathan Hyslop, "State Education Policy and the Social Reproduction of the Urban African Working Class: the case of the Southern Transvaal 1955-1976," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (April 1988), p. 450; see also Steven Biko, *I Write What I Like*. A Selection of his Writings Edited with a Personal Memoir by Alfred Stubbe (London: The Bowerdean Press, 1978).

67. John Kane-Berman, *Soweto: Black Revolt White Reaction* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978).

68. Alan Brooks and Jeremy Brickhill, *Whirlwind Before the Storm: The Origins and Development of the Uprising in Soweto and the rest of South Africa from June to December 1976* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980), p. 306; see also Baruch Hirson, *Year of Fire Year of Ash: The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution* (London: Zed Press, 1979); Tom Lodge, "Children of Soweto," in *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983).

69. This chapter is thus not concerned with why youth emerged as such a powerful force. This question has been more than adequately addressed by Colin Bundy, "Schools and Revolution," in *New Society*, 10 January 1986 and Jonathan Hyslop, "State Education Policy and the Social Reproduction of the Urban African Working Class."

70. See Colin Bundy, "South Africa on the Switchback," in *New Society*, 3 January 1986; Karl van Holdt, "The Economy: Achilles Heel of the New Deal," in SARS (South African Research Service) (eds.), *South African Review 111* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986).

71. S. C. Nolutshungu, *Changing South Africa: Political Considerations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981); John Saul and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis in*

South African: Class Defense, Class Revolution (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1981); SARS (eds.) *South African Review 1: Same Foundations, New Facades?* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983).

72. See Linda Chisholm, "From Revolt to a Search for Alternatives: Broadening the Education Base," *Work in Progress*, 42, May 1986, pp. 14-19.

73. See Peter Kallaway, *Apartheid and Education: The Education of Black South Africans* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1984), Part IV, pp. 296-411.

74. See Bill Nasson, "Perspectives on Education in South Africa," in Sandra Burman and Pamela Reynolds, *Growing up in a Divided Society: The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), pp. 93-114.

75. See *Survey for Race Relations 1988* (Johannesburg: South Africa Institute for Race Relations, 1988), pp. 145-192; Roger Omond, *The Apartheid Handbook* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985).

76. See Jonathan Hyslop, "Food, Authority and Politics: Student Riots in South Africa 1945-1976," *Africa Perspective* New Series, Vol. 1, Nos. 3 and 4 (June 1987), pp. 3-41.

77. See John Kane-Berman *Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction*, and Brooks and Brickhill, *Whirlwind Before the Storm*.

78. Frank Molteno, *Students Struggle for their Schools* (Centre for African Studies: University of Cape Town, 1987); William Finnegan, *Crossing the Line* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986).

79. Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC), *Abantwana Bazabalaza: A Memorandum on Children Under Repression in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 89.

80. Colin Bundy, "Schools and Revolution," p. 52.

81. See *Children on the Frontline: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization and Warfare on Children in Southern and South Africa* (A Report for UNICEF, Geneva, 1987); Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC), *Abantwana Bazabalaza*, op. cit.; Collected Papers from Harare Conference on Detention of Children in South Africa, September 1987 (unpublished).

82. See Nkomo, "Contradictions of Bantu Education."