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**NEW YORK UNIVERSITY**

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**Education**

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2019-2025 (expected)  
Thesis Title: *Essays in microeconomic theory and experimental economics*  
MRes in Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2018-2019  
MSc in Economics, Barcelona School of Economics, 2017-2018  
BSc in Finance, University of Macedonia, Greece, 2013-2017

**References**

Professor Erik Madsen  
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Professor Xavier Vives  
21 Av. de Pearson, Room U-301  
Barcelona, Spain 08034  
+34 93-602-4082 (office)  
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**Teaching and Research Fields**

Primary field: Microeconomic Theory

Secondary field: Experimental Economics

**Teaching Experience**

Summer, 2024  
Spring, 2022  
Spring, 2021

Fall, 2020  
Winter, 2018-2019  
Fall, 2018  
Fall, 2018

Math Bootcamp (MA in Economics), NYU, Instructor  
Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini  
Microeconomics II (PhD), NYU, TA for David Pearce and  
Ennio Stacchetti  
Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Laurent Mathevet  
Mathematics II, UPF, TA for Xavier Taixés  
Mathematics I, UPF, TA for Xavier Taixés  
Financial Mathematics, UPF, TA for Roland Umlauf

**Research Experience**

Summer 2021

NYU, Research Assistant for Laurent Mathevet

March 2018-August 2019

IESE Business School, Research Assistant for Xavier Vives

### **Honors, Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants**

2024-2025	Dissertation fellowship, Department of Economics, NYU
2022-2025	Co-PI, NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant SES-2146695, “Regret in Games: When It Is Not (Only) Your Fault” (PI: Guillaume Fréchette)
2022	Best third-year paper award (shared), Department of Economics, NYU
2019-2024	MacCracken Fellowship, NYU
2018-2019	Graduate studies scholarship, UPF
2017-2018	Graduate studies scholarship, George & Victoria Karelia Foundation

### **Publications**

Vives, X., & Vravosinos, O. (2024). Strategic complementarity in games. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 103005.

### **Research Papers**

*Bidimensional screening with substitutable attributes* (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: An agent (she) has a bidimensional type consisting of her (hard) evidence and talent, both valued by the principal (he). He decides whether to reward the agent by asking her for evidence and a cheap talk message about her talent and then possibly testing her at a cost. The test score is increasing in evidence and talent. When the test score is less sensitive to talent than talent is valuable to the principal, the agent has incentives to hide evidence to influence how the principal interprets her test score. The optimal mechanism makes two types of errors, both favoring high- over low-evidence agents: (i) it rewards some unworthy (i.e., whom the principal would prefer not to reward) high-evidence agents without testing them, only asking them for evidence, and (ii) among agents who do not have enough evidence to get rewarded without a test, it rewards (after testing) some unworthy high-evidence agents while rejecting some worthy low-evidence ones.

*Free entry in a Cournot market with overlapping ownership* (with Xavier Vives). Forthcoming at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

Abstract: We examine the effects of overlapping ownership among existing firms deciding whether to enter a product market. We show that in most cases—and especially when overlapping ownership is already widespread, an increase in the extent of overlapping ownership will harm welfare by softening product market competition, reducing entry, thereby (in contrast to standard results) inducing insufficient entry, and magnifying the negative impact of an increase of entry costs on entry. Overlapping ownership can mostly be beneficial only under substantial increasing returns to scale, in which case industry consolidation (induced by overlapping ownership) leads to sizable cost efficiencies.

*Regret, blame, and division of responsibility in games*

Abstract: Although a powerful emotion affecting behavior, our understanding of regret in strategic interactions is limited. I argue that because responsibility is central in the experience of regret but also divided among players in games, people experience regret differently in games than in individual decision-making. I provide experimental evidence that, indeed, a player  $i$ 's regret (for not best-responding) is mitigated through blame put on another player  $j$  for not playing—when available—a Pareto-improving (compared to  $j$ 's actual action) best-response to player  $i$ 's action. Remarkably, the tendency to blame elicited (through survey responses) in certain games predicts behavior in vastly

different games.

*A Nash-in-Nash model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common Ownership*

**Abstract:** This paper proposes a model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common ownership. Each firm's conduct results from Nash bargaining (NB) among shareholders and firms play a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains. NB encompasses a rich class of models of corporate control under common ownership, including the current canonical model due to O'Brien and Salop (2000, OS), which has however important deficiencies. A specification of NB overcomes these deficiencies and yields theoretical results and policy implications that contradict those derived under OS. I use Nash-in-Nash to study the competitive effects of changes in corporate control providing a rationale for a policy proposal requiring institutional investors to be passive.

**Research In Progress**

*Strategic underdisclosure and the value of jammed signals in evidence games: theory and experiment*

*Bargaining game design*

**Pre-PhD publications**

Panagiotidis, T., Stengos, T., & Vravosinos, O. (2020). A principal component-guided sparse regression approach for the determination of bitcoin returns. *Journal of Risk and Financial Management*, 13(2), 33.

Vravosinos, O., & Konstantinou, K. (2019). Asymmetric Social Distance Effects in the Ultimatum Game. *Review of Behavioral Economics*, 6(2), 159-192.

Panagiotidis, T., Stengos, T., & Vravosinos, O. (2019). The effects of markets, uncertainty and search intensity on bitcoin returns. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 63, 220-242.

Panagiotidis, T., Stengos, T., & Vravosinos, O. (2018). On the determinants of bitcoin returns: A LASSO approach. *Finance Research Letters*, 27, 235-240.

**Talks**

2024: 35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

2023: 2023 North-American Economic Science Association Conference, University of Crete, Student Workshop in Experimental Economics Techniques 2023 (SWEET 2023)

2022: 20th annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC 2022), 16th Annual Competition and Regulation Summer School and Conference (CRESSE 2022), New Research in Economic Theory (NRET) Fest 2022, 2022 North-American Economic Science Association Conference

**Refereeing**

RAND Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Empirical Economics, Economic Change and Restructuring