# ORESTIS VRAVOSINOS

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## NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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## Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2019-2025 (expected)
Thesis Title: *Essays in microeconomic theory and experimental economics*
MRes in Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2018-2019
MSc in Economics, Barcelona School of Economics, 2017-2018
BSc in Finance, University of Macedonia, Greece, 2013-2017

## References

Professor Erik Madsen
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Professor Debraj Ray
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Professor Guillaume Fréchette
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Professor Xavier Vives
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## Teaching and Research Fields

Fields: Microeconomic Theory, Experimental Economics, Industrial Organization

## Teaching Experience

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|---|---|
| Summer, 2024 | Math Bootcamp (MA in Economics), NYU, Instructor |
| Spring, 2022 | Microeconomic Analysis, NYU, TA for Viplav Saini |
| Spring, 2021 | Microeconomics II (PhD), NYU, TA for David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti |
| Fall, 2020 | Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Laurent Mathevet |
| Winter, 2018-2019 | Mathematics II, UPF, TA for Xavier Taixés |
| Fall, 2018 | Mathematics I, UPF, TA for Xavier Taixés |
| Fall, 2018 | Financial Mathematics, UPF, TA for Roland Umlauft |

## Research Experience

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| Summer 2021 | NYU, Research Assistant for Laurent Mathevet |
| March 2018-August 2019 | IESE Business School, Research Assistant for Xavier Vives |

## Honors, Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants

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| 2024-2025 | Dissertation fellowship, Department of Economics, NYU |
| 2022-2025 | Co-PI, NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant SES-2146695, "Regret in Games: When It Is Not (Only) Your Fault" (PI: Guillaume Fréchette) |
| 2022 | Best third-year paper award (shared), Department of Economics, NYU |
| 2019-2024 | MacCracken Fellowship, NYU |
| 2018-2019 | Graduate studies scholarship, UPF |
| 2017-2018 | Graduate studies scholarship, George & Victoria Karelia Foundation |

## Publications

Vives, X., & Vravosinos, O. (2025). Free entry in a Cournot market with overlapping ownership. *Forthcoming at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.*

Vives, X., & Vravosinos, O. (2024). Strategic complementarity in games. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 103005.

## Working Papers

*Multidimensional screening with substitutable attributes* (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: A principal must decide whether to accept or reject an agent. The principal can verify at a cost the value of a composite measure of the agent's training and talent. The measure does not reveal training and talent separately. The agent can present evidence of training but not of talent. Although favorable, evidence can make the principal ascribe the value of the composite measure to training, thereby negatively affecting his assessment of the agent's talent. Thus, verification may distort the agent's incentives to present evidence. Indeed, when the composite measure is less sensitive to talent than talent is valuable to the principal, a conflict arises between the two evaluation methods: (i) verification and (ii) asking for evidence. The optimal mechanism leads to three types of errors, all favoring high- over low-training agents: (i) It rejects some worthy low-training agents, while (ii) accepting some unworthy high-training ones without verification and (iii) also accepting some unworthy medium-training ones after verification.

*Regret, blame, and division of responsibility in games*

Abstract: Although a powerful emotion affecting behavior, our understanding of regret in strategic interactions is limited. I argue that because responsibility is central in the experience of regret but also divided among players in games, people experience regret differently in games than in individual decision-making. I provide experimental evidence that, indeed, a player i's regret (for not best-responding) is mitigated through blame put on another player j for not playing—when available—a Pareto-improving (compared to j's actual action) best-response to player i's action. Remarkably, the tendency to blame elicited (through survey responses) in certain games predicts behavior in vastly different games.

*A Nash-in-Nash model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common Ownership*

Abstract: This paper proposes a model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common ownership. Each firm's conduct results from Nash bargaining (NB) among shareholders and firms play a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains. NB encompasses a rich class of models of corporate control under common ownership, including the current canonical model due to O'Brien and Salop (2000, OS), which

has however important deficiencies. A specification of NB overcomes these deficiencies and yields theoretical results and policy implications that contradict those derived under OS. I use Nash-in-Nash to study the competitive effects of changes in corporate control providing a rationale for a policy proposal requiring institutional investors to be passive.

**Research In Progress**

*Strategic underdisclosure and the value of jammed signals in evidence games: theory and experiment*

*Bargaining game design*

**Pre-PhD publications**

Panagiotidis, T., Stengos, T., & Vravosinos, O. (2020). A principal component-guided sparse regression approach for the determination of bitcoin returns. *Journal of Risk and Financial Management*, *13*(2), 33.

Vravosinos, O., & Konstantinou, K. (2019). Asymmetric Social Distance Effects in the Ultimatum Game. *Review of Behavioral Economics*, *6*(2), 159-192.

Panagiotidis, T., Stengos, T., & Vravosinos, O. (2019). The effects of markets, uncertainty and search intensity on bitcoin returns. *International Review of Financial Analysis*, *63*, 220-242.

Panagiotidis, T., Stengos, T., & Vravosinos, O. (2018). On the determinants of bitcoin returns: A LASSO approach. *Finance Research Letters*, *27*, 235-240.

**Talks**

2024: 35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory
2023: 2023 North-American Economic Science Association Conference, University of Crete, Student Workshop in Experimental Economics Techniques 2023 (SWEET 2023)
2022: 20th annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC 2022), 16th Annual Competition and Regulation Summer School and Conference (CRESSE 2022), New Research in Economic Theory (NRET) Fest 2022, 2022 North-American Economic Science Association Conference

**Refereeing**

RAND Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Empirical Economics, Economic Change and Restructuring