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Evaluation in the art-historical research article

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Abstract

This paper attempts to isolate some of the aspects in which the evaluative language most typical of research articles produced within the discipline of art history differs from the evaluation prevalent in academic discourse in other fields. Working mainly within the framework of Systemic-Functional Grammar, it tests two of the models employed by linguists in the current discussion of evaluation and academic discourse [Swales 1990 on Introduction sections and Hunston 1993 on reporting verbs [Swales, J. M. (1990). *Genre analysis. English in academic and research settings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hunston, S. (1993). Professional conflict. Disagreement in academic discourse. In M. Baker et al. (Eds.). *Text and technology. In honour of John Sinclair*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Benjamins, 115–134]], on three texts, taken from recent issues of specialized journals. It concludes that art-historical description seems to find its "experiential signature" [Matthiessen, C. (1995). *Lexicogrammatical cartography: English systems*. Tokyo: International Language Sciences Publishers. p. 360] in the alternation and logicosemantic interdependence of material and relational process types, and that a peculiarity of art-historical discourse, considered from the point of view of the social or interactive construction of knowledge, seems to be a form of non-propositional report or projection of interpretative evaluations, typically through the use of a mental or verbal process verb followed by the preposition *as*.

Keywords: Art history; Disciplinary writing; Evaluation; Introduction section; Reporting verbs; Research article

1. Introduction

Evaluation has been broadly defined as the expression in text of the writer's or speaker's opinion or judgement. Two main aspects have been identified, under the headings of *modality* and *affect*, the first expressing opinion relating to the truth-value and certainty of propositions and the second expressing the affective judgement of entities. It has been pointed out that different kinds of discourse prioritize

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different kinds of evaluation. Academic research articles, in so far as they are concerned to build knowledge claims, have been associated with the modality or "certainty parameter", affect with genres that mainly apply the "good-bad parameter" in order "to assess the worth of something, such as restaurant reviews or character references" (Hunston & Thompson, 2000: 3–6, 20, 24). Art-historical research articles challenge the epistemological assumption underlying this dual characterization of evaluation, namely that evaluation is always extrinsic to the construction of knowledge as such, in so far as it is either (as modality) limited to negotiating the acceptance or rejection of propositions by the discourse community, or (as affect) exclusively engaged in the praise or criticism of entities. Art-historical research articles, on the contrary, are concerned to build knowledge claims whose *propositional content* is crucially realized through a mode of description of specific entities (works of art), which, in so far as it is not simply informative and entails subjective judgement, must legitimately be included within the category of evaluation. Thus, whereas, when considered in relation to academic discourse, evaluation has mainly been understood in pragmatic or interpersonal terms, art-historical writing suggests that evaluative language may also participate directly in the construction of ideational meaning. In this kind of text, propositions themselves have a crucial evaluating function, and entities (works of art) are evaluated with a view to characterizing or defining their identity or meaning.

This paper attempts to isolate some of the aspects in which the evaluative language most typical of research articles produced within the discipline of art history differs from the evaluation prevalent in academic discourse in other fields. Working mainly within the framework of Systemic-Functional Grammar, it does so by testing two of the models employed by linguists in the current discussion of evaluation and academic discourse (Swales 1990 on Introduction sections and Hunston 1993 on reporting verbs), on three texts, taken from recent issues of specialized journals (see Appendix A for details).

2. Art history and art criticism

The only criterion applied in the selection of the three texts examined was that they should focus on particular works of art. This was in order to highlight an aspect of writing in this field which seems crucial to defining the 'prototypical' core of the genre and discipline (Swales, 1990: 49–52), and requires some preliminary consideration.

If it is "art history's concern with historic retrieval" which "primarily sanctions it as an academic activity" (Kemal & Gaskell, 1991: 1) and allows it to associate itself intermittently with a broad 'family' of historical disciplines, such retrieval is essentially distinguished from comparable activity in adjacent fields by its commitment to the aesthetic appraisal (in the present) of the semantically complex historical objects with which it is concerned, namely artefacts produced (in the past) as works of art. Such reception is 'inscribed' in the ontogenetic structure of artworks: the meanings they instantiate must be actuated through subjective appraisal. If those meanings are

to become the object of discourse, moreover, they must be verbally translated or reconstituted. Such discourse is therefore essentially *critical*—expositive and interpretative—at the same time as, if not before, it is historical.

The art historian Michael Baxandall professes a "candid and deliberate yoking of history with criticism" (Baxandall, 1985: 136), for two reasons. The first is that the explanation of art, for instance in historical terms, necessarily entails its consideration "under some verbal description or specification": "Every evolved explanation of a picture includes or implies an elaborate description of that picture" (Baxandall, 1985: 1). The second reason is that the "specific interest of the visual arts is visual" (Baxandall, 1979: 455; 1991: 67) and, consequently, the "historical information ... laid out" by the specialist is only useful if it prompts "other people to a sharper sense" of that specifically visual interest. In insisting that "the test of usefulness is public", furthermore, Baxandall likens the accountability of art historians to the situation of the scientist, "who must make public not only his results but also his procedure in getting them: the point is that the experiment must be repeatable and open to testing by other people". The art-historian, he suggests, "reports an aesthetico-historical experiment and its results", whose success or failure depends on the degree to which it is repeatable by others (Baxandall, 1985: 137). The analogy, however, is inappropriate, as Baxandall's own argument makes clear. If art history is crucially "committed to being good criticism", and if "good criticism" entails successful "verbal description or specification", one thing that significantly differentiates the "aesthetico-historical" experiment from the scientific is precisely that it is *not* reported but actually *conducted* in the writing. In so far as it is a verbal experiment in interpretation, moreover, art-historical discourse is *evaluative* in a sense not fully accommodated by current discussion of the concept.

3. Evaluation and explanation

Take, for example, the following proposition (referring to William Holman Hunt's painting *The Scapegoat*):

(1) there is perhaps no more powerful image of creature helplessness in the history of art (A: 95)

This clearly features both modal and affective evaluation. The adverb *perhaps* signals epistemic discretion on the part of the writer in advancing this statement. Two grammatical aspects typical of affective evaluation, on the other hand, are the use of the "attitudinal" or non-defining adjective (Halliday, 1994: 184) *powerful*, and grading (Hunston & Thompson, 2000: 21, 92). Together these yield the comparative expression *more powerful* (itself negatively modalized by means of the determiner *no*), which signals affective assessment of the entity encoded as *an image of creature helplessness*. The subjectivity of this assessment is highlighted by the marked (existential) clause structure (Hunston & Thompson, 2000, 21), which allows an emphatically

exclusive alternative (*no more powerful*) to the superlative (*very powerful* or *the most powerful*). The affective judgement of the entity in question may well seem the point of this proposition, taken in isolation. And an analysis that privileged the strictly affective view of entity evaluation might parse the clause as in Fig. 1, which uses categories proposed by Hunston and Sinclair (2000: 74–101) in a study of the local grammar of evaluation focusing on evaluative adjectives:

The problem with such an analysis would be that it treated as simple and intrinsically non-evaluative (because *evaluated*) the logically and grammatically complex noun group *image of creature helplessness*, which is not in fact the thing evaluated but a characterization or evaluative representation of that thing, the thing itself being the referentially implied *Scapegoat*. This is clear from the combination of indefinite reference, the generic noun *image* and the implicitly affective semantic content of the modifying prepositional phrase *of creature helplessness*. The proposition in fact encodes (at least) two, stratified evaluations of the painting. The evaluation of *The Scapegoat*-as-image generates the modified noun group *image of creature helplessness*, while the evaluation of *The Scapegoat*-as-image-of-creature-helplessness generates the further modification of this noun group, producing *no more powerful image of creature helplessness*. The affective assessment expressed by means of the comparative adjective group entails, but is logically dependent on, the evaluation expressed by means of the noun group *image of creature helplessness*. And this difference of logical status is an index of a difference in semantic function. Affect is implied in the logically primary evaluation, but there helps connote the subject of the artistic representation, through the restrictive qualification of the class-name *image*, an experiential or representational role which the explicitly attitudinal *no more powerful* cannot perform. For the attitudinal epithet *powerful* is a means of the subcategorization of *image* which does not redefine the class which this denotes, but selects within the class.

If the clause is restored to its immediate context (Ex. 2), we can see how it is the implicit affect of the noun group *image of creature helplessness*, rather than the explicit affect of the assessment *no more powerful* which is central to the writer's purpose, in so far as it is capable of being redirected as a characterization of the picture. The writer's purpose is indeed to explain rather than merely to praise the picture. We can also see how the implicitly affective characterization *image of creature helplessness* is itself 'explained' or validated through textual preparation and elaboration, and thus rendered operative as a means of explanation:

			Hinge	***Evaluative category***	***Thing evaluated***	Restriction on evaluation
there	link verb		negative	comparative adjective group	noun group	prepositional phrase
there	is	perhaps	no	more powerful	image of creature helplessness	in the history of modern art

Fig. 1. Ex. 1 analysed adopting criteria proposed in Hunston and Sinclair (2000).

(2) [1] His [Hunt's] animal **represented** the ancient goat driven from the temple on the Day of Atonement, bearing the sins of the community. [2] Marked by the imprint of the bloodied priestly hand on its head, the expiring goat, its eyeballs rolling in its head, its parched tongue drooping, stands shakily on the saline slime [of the Dead Sea], hopelessly abandoned in the inhospitable environment, where its tragic lot is **presaged** by the skeletal remains of other ill-fated creatures that preceded it. [3] There is perhaps no more powerful image of creature helplessness in the history of art, a representation of the last sickly remnant of a species on the verge of extinction. [4] For Hunt the goat's doom further **prognosticated** the fading of Judaism and the beginning of a New Dispensation: the glimpse of the moon in the upper left may have been dictated by a typological link with the Passion of Christ (Saint Augustine compared the moon to the Old Testament, since both depended for illumination on borrowed light). [5] The elaborate frame Hunt designed for the picture further conjoins Old and New Testament imagery: the bottom horizontal bar shows a seven-branched menorah breaking up the title words into "The Scape" and "Goat," while the complementary seven stars of the top bar **represent** the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost - yet another typological link between Old and New Testaments. [6] On the left upright a dove with olive branch, alluding to the Noah story, is enclosed in a trefoil **representing** the Holy Trinity, and on the right, in a cruciform shape, is a pansy, or heartsease, traditionally the flower of the Trinity. [7] Finally, on top and bottom horizontals are the texts from Isaiah and Leviticus traditionally exploited as typological stratagems to link Old Testament prophecy and law with the advent of the Messiah. [8] It would seem that Hunt wished to take the historic Jewish sacrificial rite and transform it into a Christian martyrdom, making the goat a surrogate Christ. (A: 95, my emphases)

The noun group *image of creature helplessness* cohesively (logically and semantically) encapsulates the (implicitly) affective characterizations of the image encoded in S2. These focus on the physical aspect of the animal represented and of the landscape in which the artist has placed it. In particular, they concentrate on the 'action' imputed to the depicted goat. These elements are welded together, by means of a dense concentration of hypotactic and mainly non-finite expanding clauses and multiple appositional units, into a form of compacted narrative, realized as a simultaneity of material processes grammatically dependent on the verb *stands*, whose marked present tense, a characteristic of pictorial description, indicates both the presentness of the image to writer and reader as an object of perception and understanding and also the state of fictive permanence peculiar to represented action. These characterizations are emotively qualified through the use of adjectives (including *ing*- and *ed*-participles), adverbs and nouns expressing what Martin (2000: 155) defines as implicated or inscribed affect: *bloodied*, *expiring*, *parched*, *drooping*, *shakily*, *slime*, *hopelessly abandoned*, *inhospitable*, *tragic*, *skeletal*, *ill-fated*. They in

turn substantiate the assertion made in S1, which informs the reader of the historical significance of the scapegoat ritual and at the same time advances a provisional claim regarding the artist's intention in depicting the goat (as is signalled by the past tense). In Systemic-Functional terms the process realized in the dominant clause of this sentence is relational (of the identifying kind), which is the type of process used to construe the quality, meaning and identity of entities. This is the process type implicated in S3 also, whose existential clause suggests the relational clauses *The Scapegoat is the most powerful image of creature helplessness* etc. or *The Scapegoat is an image of creature helplessness*. This (implicitly) shared experiential configuration is endorsed by a further strand of lexical cohesion, regarding semiosis, which is initiated by *represented* in S1, then taken up by *imprint* and *presaged* in the next sentence and by *image* in S3. This lexical motif is further reiterated in S4 (*prognosticated*), 5 (*represent* and *imagery*) and 6 (*representing* and, metaphorically, *alluding to*) and thereby points up the semantic burden of the whole paragraph, which constitutes a complex and somewhat oblique argument regarding the significance of this painting. This argument arrives at the claim made in S8 via alternate representations of what the painting (or some one of its constituent parts, fictive or real) 'does' and what it 'is', which progressively enhance or 'explain' one another and at clause level produce concentrations of material processes interspersed with relational (indicated in bold).

The whole paragraph offers a vivid illustration of the close interdependence of description and explanation posited by Baxandall as an essential characteristic of art-historical discourse. The explanation is (experimentally) conducted by the writer through a "guided act of inspection" (Baxandall, 1979: 456; 1991: 68) of the painting (or of the accompanying photographic reproduction). In terms of Hallidayan cohesion, the reader's attention is exophorically and endophorically directed to particular features and visual aspects of the painting, including its frame, verbally presented in the light of, and as evidence for, the interpretation-in-progress.

Another grammatical index of the explanatory drive of the paragraph is not only the general privileging of expansion over projection as a mode of linking clauses, but in particular the fairly intensive use of the 'glossing' relation of elaboration. This occurs explicitly and also implicitly, by means of elliptical taxis, as for instance in the verbless clause in S6 (*traditionally ... Trinity*), and also in the quasi-appositional units appended to SS3 and 5 (*a representation ... extinction*; *yet another ... New Testaments*).

The progressive requalification of (some aspect or aspects of) the work of art by means of the experiential patterning and logico-semantic interlinking of clauses illustrated in Ex. 2 is not limited to this passage or to text A, but is also a feature of equivalent passages of descriptive focus in texts B and C (Exs 3-5).

(3) [1] The trimming of the sheet at the right has obscured the subject of the drawing, but enough survives to allow the scene to be identified without doubt. [2] The man at the centre holds up his forearm to the hideous old woman on the right, who gestures with her right hand towards where his right hand would be; she glances across at the crone on the left, who cackles

with glee as she reaches under the man's sleeve. [3] This is a subject familiar from Caravaggesque paintings of the early seventeenth century: the surrounding figures are Gypsies, and the woman on the right reads the palm of the man at the centre while her accomplice steals his purse. (B: 27)

(4) [1] René Magritte formulated this perceptive analysis of light [refers to epigraph] in 1938 when he interpreted his painting *La lumière des coincidences* of 1933 (Dallas Museum of Fine Arts). [2] 'It seems that the object illuminated itself gives life to light' [quotes epigraph] may illuminate as well Adolph Menzel's *Studio Wall* (1872, plate 25; Hamburger Kunsthalle), which like Magritte's painting, centrally displays a female torso lit by artificial light. [3] As in Magritte's Surrealist exercise, the vibrant animation of the dead object in the darkness of night—a tantalizing female torso, a fragment of the human body—produces an effect of confusion and disquiet in the viewer similar to the visual power of a trompe l'oeil painting. (C: 206)

(5) [1] The artist's tools hang from the antlers of a deer: scissors, a pair of compasses, a horseshoe, and some loosely arranged thread. [2] A second compass hangs just below the male torso and seems to grip the wrist of the open hand. [3] The shaft of light that flickers across the wall brightly illuminates the palm of the hand, yet privileges the female torso over the other objects remaining in shadow or darkness. [4] This intricate arrangement with its carefully staged lighting is certainly not the casual depiction of a segment of Menzel's studio, nor is it an impressionistic painting exercise. [5] Rather, this configuration seems to be a very personal ideogram signifying emotional and aesthetic concerns. [6] As such, it collapses the biographical with the artistic in a highly complex and hermetically encoded image, a picture that Menzel apparently considered his best painting. (C: 209-10)

Again as in Ex. 2, the reorientation of affect and the pulling of description towards definition and explanation is underlined at the lexical level, where items semantically related to the idea of meaning and the activity of interpretation are numerous (e.g. *subject*, *identify*, *connotation*, *explain*, *significance*, *intention*, *perceptive*, *analysis*, *illuminate*, *signify*, *encode*, *image*, *ideogram* etc.).

4. Description and argument in the introduction section

The interpenetration of interpretative description and argument in this kind of discourse may be observed in a broader context, as an aspect of the writers' global rhetorical strategies, by considering the crucial role played by the descriptive passages given as Exs 3–5 in the opening sections of the three articles. This may best be gauged by examining these sections in the light of the revised CARS (*Create a Research Space*) model for research article Introductions presented in Swales 1990 (Fig. 2).

Of the three texts, only A, the longest and most elaborate, is formally divided into sections. The introductory character of the first of these sections is indirectly signalled, not only by its comparative brevity (11 paragraphs, as opposed to the 28 and 14 paragraphs of the second and third sections respectively), but also by the fact that, unlike the others, it carries no title. However, though formally distinct from the rest of the article, the opening section of A, like the opening paragraphs of C and (to a lesser extent) B are not clearly distinguished from what follows from a rhetorical point of view. Explicit markers of moves and steps, such as those enumerated by Swales in his analyses of the Introductions of mainly scientific articles, are relatively few and far between, unpredictably located and, in the case of A and C especially, extensively interspersed with narrative and descriptive material which is not essentially different from that found elsewhere in the articles. The reason for this seems to be that these texts do not fit the mould of the 'standard' research article, whose experimental bias imposes a rigorous rhetorical distinction between *presenting* and *reporting* the research conducted by the writer. As was suggested earlier, the art-historical researcher is not concerned to report an experiment but to demonstrate, through the amassing and matching of evidence of different kinds, the validity of a particular interpretation of a given work of art. Rather than presenting the research as such (the research activity which preceded the writing of the article rarely emerges into the text, except very occasionally in the footnotes), the opening section of the art-historical article must above all establish the terms of the interpretation or reading of the work which it wishes to argue. And this can only be done by following the essentially comparative and necessarily narrative (historical) and descriptive (critical) procedures which characterize the article as a whole. Above all, it is fun-

Move 1	Establishing a territory	
	Step 1	Claiming centrality
		and/or
	Step 2	Making topic generalizations
		and/or
	Step 3	Reviewing items of previous research
Move 2	Establishing a niche	
	Step 1A	Counter-claiming
		or
	Step 1B	Indicating a gap
		or
	Step 1C	Question-raising
		or
	Step 1D	Continuing a tradition
Move 3	Occupying the niche	
	Step 1A	Outlining purposes
		or
	Step 1B	Announcing present research
	Step 2	Announcing principal findings
	Step 3	Indicating R[esearch] A[rticle] structure

Fig. 2. CARS model for research article introductions (adapted from Swales, 1990: 141, Fig. 10).

damental that the opening section include a description or descriptions of the work capable of guiding and coordinating the interpretative demonstration.

Such descriptions figure in all three introductory sections, where they occupy tactically significant positions. C actually commences with a description (Ex. 4), while Ex. 2 occurs centrally in the first section of A, and in both B and C descriptions culminating in definitive characterizations of the works described (Exs 3 and 5) seem to terminate the opening portions.

Of the three introductory sections, that in B is the closest in structure to Swales' model and is sufficiently short (2 paragraphs including the paragraph given as Ex. 3) to be set out in full (Fig. 3):

SS1 and 2 play Move 1 indirectly by making negative topic generalizations that effectively concede territory, in the specific form of *scope for interpretation* (some ground is regained by the use of the adverbial expressions *on the whole*, *strangely* and *perhaps*). S3 establishes a niche by indicating (verbally and photographically) an exceptional case among the class of Leonardo drawings that constitutes the general topic of the article and by stating the need for explanation which thus arises. This is followed by a return to Move 1 in SS4 and 5, which offer a summary review of previous interpretations of the problem drawing and justifies them by reference to the writings of the artist. S6, lastly, challenges the validity of those former interpretations by pointing to the visual evidence manifested in the drawing itself ("something is *happening*"), whose subject is duly identified by means of the succeeding description (Section 2; Ex. 3). Section 3 (which starts "Gypsies arrived in western Europe from the Balkans in the early fifteenth century…") begins the work of amassing and matching historical and critical evidence in support of the interpretation advanced in Sections 1 and 2. Thus, the introductory section has its climax and conclusion, not in a Move 3 abstract of purpose, methods or results, as in the 'standard' Introduction-Method-Results-Discussion structure (Swales, 1990: 133–176), but in a

	Move	Step
[§1] [1] Leonardo's drawings of grotesques are, on the whole, strangely devoid of content.	1	2
[2] The mental itch that he scratched by jotting down countless profiles throughout his life is perhaps not susceptible to analysis, and while a few heads do have an ostensible subject, most seem to be mere exercises in form.		
[3] But the most elaborate of these drawings, commonly known as the Five grotesque heads (Fig. 1), demands an explanation.	2	1C?
[4] The figures have often been interpreted as various representatives of some condition, as if Leonardo were methodically assembling five specimens for the instruction of the viewer.	1	3
[5] This is not in itself unreasonable; in the outline written around 1489 of his projected treatise on anatomy, Leonardo proposed to depict examples of human emotion: 'Then represent in four scenes general conditions of man, i.e. joy, with various forms of laughter, and also represent the cause of the laughter; weeping of various types, with its cause…'		
[6] In the Five grotesque heads, however, the figures are interacting, and the character at the centre is not just being laughed at perpetually by the surrounding four – something is happening.	2	1A? 1B?
[§2] Ex. 3		

Fig. 3. B: move-step analysis of introductory section (key signals in bold).

passage of description which constitutes both the writer's central claim and the most crucial piece of evidence validating that claim.

Whereas text B is narrowly focused on the correct interpretation of the subjects of its chosen works and is concerned to amass (additional) evidence in support of that interpretation, texts A and C pursue a more tortuous path in their attempts to read paintings as (cryptic) evidence of psychological and ideological tensions ascribed to the artists and to certain broad cultural phenomena and tendencies in which they participated. As a result, the introductory sections in these articles are considerably more elaborate and complex. The terms of the interpretation which these need to establish are more numerous and various. The introductory section of text C (6 paragraphs) must be given in somewhat abbreviated form (Fig. 4):

In these six paragraphs the writer is concerned not only to position herself vis-à-vis previous interpreters of Menzel's painting and so establish a research territory and niche, but to provide a kind of topological overview of her argument, briefly indicating the main factors involved. Previous interpretations (more specifically the contrast between past and recent understanding of the work in question) are not simply the scientific pretext of this argument but an integral part of it, as the writer explicitly states (Section 2: S5), but as is also reflected in the way in which corrective or doubtful references to previous interpretations are incorporated into the detailed description initiated in Section 5 and continued in Ex. 5: their relation to details of the painting rather than to its overall significance and the lack of foregrounding make it difficult, from a rhetorical point of view, to recognize in these references an instance of Swales' Move 1 (and for this reason the relevant annotation is placed in square brackets in Fig. 4). The previous interpretations of the painting themselves entail consideration of the particular circumstances of its production (its problematic relation to a work produced by the artist in the same period) and a range of more general questions relating to the painter's biography and reputation, political history and the general history of art in the 19th and 20th centuries. The argument thus rehearsed is validated by the framing descriptions and in a sense encapsulated in the climactic (explanatory) evaluations expressed in the last two sentences of the final paragraph.

The introductory section in text A is too long and complex to be set out in tabular format. However, its scope and structure are somewhat similar to those of C. Its opening sentence establishes territory by specifying the specific historical and cultural context-Orientalism-in relation to which the writer intends to consider the painting of Holman Hunt and by referring to a classic study, by Edward Said, in this field and to "the Orientalist explorer-adventurer-author" paradigm which it established (Moves 1–3). The paradigm is filled out in the first three paragraphs through a series of comparisons with contemporary figures and through the use of documentary material, showing how Hunt's "imaginary Orient" was typically the literary transfiguration of "conventional racist tropes of difference and otherness". This prepares the ground for the conclusion of Section 4:

> Thus, Hunt could be cited as a clinical study of Said's central argument that in the effort to document the Orient (the other), the West came to document itself

	Move	Step
[§1] Ex. 6		
[§2] [1] [AM] painted The Studio Wall [SW] during a critical period of his private and professional life and almost simultaneously with … The Iron Rolling Mill [IRM]		
[2] Only a year after his death [SW and IRM] were linked by … Paul Meyerheim, who focused on issues of artistic practice: [quote] …	1	3
[3] This reduction of reasoning to painterly practice is in stark contrast to the intense interest that [SW] has elicited in the past two decades …	2	1B? 1D?
[4] While [IRM] became [AM's] most public statement … [SW] remained in the private sphere of the artist's work space … and only slowly drew the attention of the critics and the public.		
[5] In what follows, I shall try to illuminate in my reading of [SW] the multiple layers of meaning which have emerged to different audiences … and to locate the painting within the intricate fabric of the artist's biography and the discourses of history and modernism.	3	1A
[§3] [1] Having made his reputation with scenes of Prussian history … [AM] experienced the re-invention of himself as 'the painter of Frederick the Great' in the very years in which he decided to produce [SW and IRM] …		
[2] From at least around 1875, he was celebrated as the author of history paintings which could then conveniently be linked to the new national 'upswing' of the young Empire…		
[§4] [1] [AM's] experience as a man of dwarf-like stature and as an artist living and working in Berlin was deeply conflicted: vacillating between conformity and alienation, and between public engagement and private withdrawal, he articulated an intense sense of fragmentation in his work.		
[2] The explosion of traditional genres, the subversion of academic dogma, the artistic devices of fragmentation and irony all form – as I shall argue – a profoundly modern visual language.	3	1A
[3] … this modernity… forged a second revision of [AM] as the precursor of Impressionism circa 1905, when he died…		
[§5] [1] In The Studio Wall Menzel depicts a segment of his studio wall at night, positioning himself into the darkness below in such a way that the spectator looks up at three rows of plaster casts, which are dramatically illuminated as they hang from dark boards on a Pompeian-red wall.		
[2] On the left side, the frame of the picture abruptly cuts off three paintings so that not much more than their frames remain within our view.		
[3] The plaster casts – which have been given a multitude of identifications – come from three different spheres: nature – the dog, possibly a deer on the left, and an open left hand hanging from the lowest board on the right; art – a female torso, hollow, and most prominently displayed in the centre of the composition, has been consistently identified as the Venus of Milo, but is more likely to be the most famous statue of Venus in the ancient world, Praxiteles's Aphrodite of Knidos; or perhaps merely a cast after life; on her left side, the viewer's right, almost disappearing into the darkness, a hollow male torso that has tentatively been associated with the Laocoon.	[1	3]
[4] The centrepiece, the brilliantly lit female torso, is surrounded by death masks which have been variously identified as those of Schiller and Dante (lower left), Goethe or Richard Wagner (lower right), and possibly Schopenhauer (third from left in the upper row), or in the same third mask from the left, Menzel himself.		
[5] Whoever these individual death masks represent, they seem to symbolize the third sphere, that of intellectual life.		
[§6] Ex. 5		

Fig. 4. C: move-step analysis of introductory section.

> [Moves 1–3 & 2-1D?]. More specifically, I wish to emphasize in this paper the implicit role of the Orientalist discourse in the construction of Hunt's national, religious and creative identity [Move 3-1A].

In Section 5 the focus narrows to consider Hunt's attitude towards the Jews in particular and the painting which forms the specific topic of the article:

> For Hunt one group in particular constituted an anomaly in his travels. The Jews disoriented his Orientalism by refusing his cherished gift on behalf of a superior religious and political system. By focusing on Hunt's *The Scapegoat* and its allusions to this bumpy encounter, I hope to stir up the homogenizing waters of art historical critiques, most of which tend to omit this chapter in the history of Orientalism [Moves 3-1A & 2-1B].

The last sentence in Section 5 then anticipates the structural core of the writer's interpretation of *The Scapegoat*, namely the analogy between the historical scapegoat and the personal and ideological motivations which lead Hunt to paint it. This is followed in Section 6 by contextual information relating to the stay in the Holy Land during which Hunt painted the picture. Section 7 is the description given in Ex. 2. The succeeding paragraphs move out from the painting to take in the historical significance of the scapegoat ritual and the private biographical circumstances in which Hunt undertook the picture. Section 9 contains a further anticipation of the writer's interpretative argument:

> As I intend to show, Hunt's tracing of the scapegoat's trail had to do with traits of identification involving a personal burden of sin [Move 3-1A].

The final 3 paragraphs briefly narrate the biographical sources of this "burden of sin" and suggest that its "fantasized" resolution is reflected in the relation between two other paintings by Hunt, made immediately before and after *The Scapegoat* (*The Awakening Conscience* and *The Light of the World*).

One aspect which emerges in the application of the CARS model to all three articles is the obliquity and indeterminacy of instances of Move 2. This is perhaps not merely attributable to the fact that in the humanities generally, as Hyland (2000: 31) points out, the relative lack of linear "direction and predictability" of academic research means that writers "draw on a literature which often exhibits greater historical and topical dispersion". More specifically it seems a corollary of the complexity of aesthetic appreciation, in which not only are the interpretable modes of signification intrinsically multiple but the relation of the interpreter to those modes of signification is constantly modulated by manifold variation in cultural and individual outlook. This must mean that the relation between interpreters (past and present) is indirect and tendentially non-conflictual. Previous interpretations inevitably take a different view on the work of art and may themselves, as seen in C, become the object of analysis and interpretation.

5. Interpretative evaluation and citation

Further implications of this specific disciplinary situation for the process of knowledge construction emerge if we examine the distribution and function in texts A, B and C of the verbs—variously termed "reporting" (Thompson and Ye 1991; Hyland 2000), "attitudinal" (Hunston, 1993) and "attributing" (Hunston, 2000)—used by academic writers to cite and position themselves towards the work of their fellow researchers. The test is of particular significance in that linguistic interest in these verbs, which have been analysed as important signals of the socially interactive construction of knowledge, reflects the view of evaluation as the modalization of propositions.

The classes here tested against the art-historical texts are those proposed by Hunston (1993), since in her study they were instrumental in establishing differences in the way potentially conflicting knowledge claims are presented across a range of disciplines, both empirical and non-empirical (biochemistry, linguistics and history). As Hunston points out, her categories (see Appendix B) "owe something to Thompson and Ye's classification in making salient the issue of whose attitudes towards the epistemological status of the proposition"—those of the writer employing the verb or of the author cited, or a conflation of the two—"are implied, but they also take account of the fact that a reporting verb may make implications about the conflicting attitudes of current writer and original researcher" (Hunston, 1993: 124). After examining the distribution of these classes in six texts (two from each discipline), Hunston concluded that variation in the degree to which the interactive construction of knowledge was made explicit divided the empirical from the non-empirical articles. Verbs in classes 1–4, she argued, "imply a single judgement regarding the certainty of the following proposition", whereas verbs in classes 5–7 "involve a great deal more complex interaction of judgements" (Hunston, 1993: 125). The more "report-like" empirical articles privileged classes 1–4 and the more "argumentative" non-empirical articles classes 5–7.

As may be seen from the results obtained (Appendix B)—and as might have been expected on the basis of the passages quoted above—it proved necessary to distinguish a broader range of human subjects than that defined by the two fundamental roles of citing writer and cited author envisaged by Hunston. The reason for this is the pivotal role played in the articles' arguments by artists, principally, though not exclusively (e.g. Magritte in Ex. 4), by the artists of the works discussed. (In some classes, and in some texts, the respective painter is the 'author' most frequently cited.) Other human subjects which needed to be treated as 'authors' include historical figures (e.g. Ludovico Sforza in B) and social and religious groups ("some Christian denominations" in A; gypsies in B). Lastly, even the many more strictly defined authors cited in the texts presented a range not delimited by chronological, disciplinary or even professional boundaries. Of the 41 tokens relating to this category of human subject only 13 report the activities of contemporary art historians, 17 the activities of a miscellaneous group of former art historians, critics, reviewers and museum officials, while the remaining 11 authors include fictional characters, Talmudic sages, Victorian writers, ministers and newspaper editors, and writers in other fields, such as Freud and Baudelaire.

Verb (No. of tokens)	Text	Subject	Thing evaluated	Attribute/Value
see (as) (6)	A	Agentless passive	the Jewish people	a necessary player in the projected new spiritual and temporal order
	B	Agentless passive [from an Italian perspective]	Charles VIII	a **glorious** figure bestriding the globe
		Agentless passive	gypsies	embodiments of fortune
		Agentless passive	Leonardo, Man Tricked by Gypsies and Allegory with Wolf and Eagle	examples of Leonardo's most elaborate drawing style
		Guidoni (contemporary art-historian)	the ugliness of the second figure	[symbolizing] "the inevitable victory of time
	C	Agentless passive	The Studio Wall	an exercise
see (to have) (1)	A	Agentless passive	absorption of Judaism into Christianity	inevitable
see (to have) (1)	A	Agentless passive	goat in Scapegoat	an anthropomorphic head
identify (as) (7)	B	boat in Allegory with Wolf and Eagle	eagle in Allegory with Wolf and Eagle	Charles VIII
		Popp (art-historian, early 20th c.)	wolf in Allegory with Wolf and Eagle	the Pope
	C	Agentless passive	deathmasks in Studio Wall	of famous men Schiller and Dante etc.
		Hamann (art-critic?, early 20th c.)		Goethe and Dante
		Tschudi (museum official, early 20th c.)	plastercast in Studio Wall	Venus
		Agentless passive		Venus of Milo
read (as) (6)	C	we	Iron Rolling Mill	a triptych
		Baetschmann (contemporary art-historian)	Pygmalion myth	a sign of new self-awareness
		Scheffler (art-critic?, early 20th c.)	Studio Wall	a "**joke**"
			language of Studio Wall	a **joke**
		Copjec (contemporary art-historian)	Gradiva	"femme inspiratrice"
		Meier-Graefe (art-historian early 20th c.)	Studio Wall (both versions)	still-life scenes
perceive (as) (3)	A	Holman Hunt	Jerusalem's society	"**accursed**"
		Ruskin (art-critic 19th c.)	Holman Hunt's Light of the World	a **bizarre** presentation of the subject
		Christianity	Jewish worship	fossilized
perceive (to be) (1)	A	Holman Hunt		Annie Miller's **vulgarity**
interpret (as) (3)	B	Richter (art-historian, early 20th c.)	subject of painting by Giorgione	"a warrior and a fortune-teller"
		Agentless passive	figures in Man Tricked by Gypsies	various representatives of some condition
	C	Tschudi	plastercast in Studio Wall	Venus of Milo

Fig. 5. A, B & C: Non-propositional projections of evaluations.

Verb (No. of tokens)	Text	Subject	Thing evaluated	Attribute/Value
recognize (as)	B	Agentless passive	animal in Allegory with Wolf and Eagle	a dog
(3)	C	Gérome and Matisse (artists)	photography	a **congenial** medium to capture the artist's self-deception in the studio
		a German critic (1906)	hallucinatory effect of Studio Wall	the "**phantom**-like state of wakefulness" of the dead objects
define (as) (2)	C	Baudrillard (contemporary art-historian)	"the sign of slight vertigo"	a central element of trompe l'oeil painting
		Baudelaire (poet, 19th c.)	"the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent …"	the **singular** experience of "modernité"
describe (as)	A	Agentless passive	goat in Scapegoat	an "**excellent** portrait" of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe
(2)	B	Agentless passive	animal in Allegory with Wolf and Eagle	a bear
analyse (as) (1)	C	Bryson (contemporary art-historian)	hallucinatory effect of Studio Wall	the decentring of the viewer
character-ize (as) (1)	A		Holman Hunt's Light of the World	"a most **eccentric** and **mysterious** picture"
praise (as) (1)	A	Holman Hunt	Calman (converted Jew)	an example of the "**sincerity** of some Jewish conversion"
regard (as) (1)	A	the Apostles	the scapegoat	a symbol of the church
consider (as) (1)	C	a particular critical approach	subject of Studio Wall	a **battle** between light and shade
invent (as) (1)	C	exhibitions	Menzel	a modernist
reinvent (as) (1)	C	new nation	Menzel	the painter of Frederick the Great
reveal (to be) (refl.) (1)	C	what appears to be a portrayal of the studio wall		a sign of interior **conflict**

Fig. 5. *(continued)*

This extended range of participants in the process of knowledge construction renders the "report-like"/"argumentative" distinction comparatively non-pertinent here. Though verbs of classes 1–4 predominate, this does not justify assimilating these texts to Hunston's articles in biochemistry and linguistics, just as the relatively high number of 'arguing' verbs in A (allowing for the difference in length) does not make this a more 'argumentative' text than B or C, in the sense of giving a more prominent place to disagreement between the writer and other researchers in his field. Verbs have been classed according to their rhetorical function in these texts. For as Hunston herself [Hunston, 1993: 126] points out, the meaning of certain reporting verbs may change according to the disciplinary context in which they are used. Here, for instance, *note*, which Hunston classifies as an "arguing" verb, is used twice (in B) in the non-controversial sense of *observe*, which itself of course assumes a different sense in art-history as compared with the empirical sciences.

What is indisputable, however, is the prevalence in all the texts (despite the diversity of focus and concerns, and again allowing for difference in length) of verbs of subjective interpretation. Unsurprising in itself, given the essentially subjective and interpretative character of art-historical discourse, what this particular result brings to light is the extent to which the typically comparative procedures adopted by the art-historical critic, whereby features of a (verbally presented) work are progressively matched against a variety of data, involve other interpretative acts and their 'results', not all necessarily referred to the work in question (see the list of 'things evaluated' in Fig. 5). More interestingly still, the result throws up the lexicogrammatical configuration by means of which such acts are typically encoded and 'reported'.

The linchpin of this configuration is the role- or guise-indicating preposition *as*, which has the function of incorporating an Attribute (a category-identifying property, e.g. a scapegoat) or Value (a uniquely identifying property, e.g. *The Scapegoat*) into a process that is not relational but mental or verbal (Matthiessen, 1995: 275–276, 295). This realizes a peculiar form of projection, normally a logicosemantic relationship whereby one clause frames or presents another as the linguistic representation of a linguistic representation of experience (Halliday, 1994: 250). The explicitly linguistic content of a projected clause may take the form of an idea (if cited, hypotactically) or a locution (if quoted, paratactically) (Exs 6–7).

(6) Boime writes that *The Scapegoat* is the most powerful image of creature helplessness in the history of art.
(7) Boime writes, "There is no more powerful image of creature helplessness in the history of art.
(8) Boime believes/considers *The Scapegoat* to be the most powerful image ...
(9) Boime describes/defines *The Scapegoat* as the most powerful image of creature helplessness in the history of art.
(10) Boime describes *The Scapegoat* as "the most powerful image ...".

The linguistic content projected by the configuration in question is an evaluation, which would normally be realized as a relational process, either in the form of a finite nominal clause (typically a *that*-clause) (Ex. 6) or non-propositionally as a non-finite (infinitive) clause (Ex. 8). Like the other kinds of projection, the *as*-phrase may project the evaluation as idea or locution (Exs 9–10). What is distinctive about it is the non-clausal status of the projected evaluation. This has implications for the choice of projecting verb, including a range of mental and verbal process verbs which are not normally available for propositional projection or for the non-finite alternative form of non-propositional projection, as may be seen by considering the verbs listed in Fig. 5.

Some of these verbs are also used in another form of 'reported' evaluation, whereby an Attribute or Value in a relational process is 'assigned' by a participant (Halliday, 1994: 165, 171; Matthiessen, 1995: 313–318), as in the example *Menzel considered 'The Studio Wall' his best painting*, where the Assigner is Menzel and *his best painting* the Value assigned to the Token '*The Studio Wall*'. Fig. 6 lists the verbs used in this way:

No. of Tokens	Verb	Text	Subject	Thing evaluated	Attribute/ Value
1	call	A	Ruskin	Light of the World	"one of the very **noblest** works of sacred art produced in this or any other age"
5	consider	A	Holman Hunt	Awakening Conscience	the material counterpart to The Light of the World
			Agentless passive	The Scapegoat	a conceptual pendant to The Awakening Conscience
			Agentless passive	The Scapegoat	a **negative** Jewish image
		C	Menzel Agentless passive	The Studio Wall	his **best** painting an encoded artistic manifesto
1	count	A	some Christian denominations	Jews	among their most formidable antagonists
1	find	A	Holman Hunt	Middle-Eastern indolence	reminiscent of Tennyson

Fig. 6. A, B & C: Assigned evaluations.

In addition to highlighting the broad range of evaluating subjects and things evaluated (including the various aspects, located at different semantic 'levels', of the work of art) Figs. 5 and 6 offer an interesting conspectus, in the list of verbs they contain, of characterizations of the evaluative process 'reported'. These confirm the limited role of affect in the evaluation most typical of art-historical discourse. Of the 19 lexical verbs employed, only *praise* connotes affect, while the majority are mental process verbs balanced between perception (*see*, *perceive*) and cognition (*identify*, *interpret*, *regard*). Similarly, though affect (mostly evoked) is a feature of some evaluations (highlighted in bold), this is always subordinated to the classifying or identifying functions of the Attributes and Values in which it is implicated. Again, the interpretative drift of the discourse is reflected in the prevalence of nouns signifying representation, instantiation, exemplification or symbolization (*embodiment*, *example*, *sign*, *representative*, *element*, *example*, *symbol*, *sign*).

Significantly, despite the fact that propositional projection is spread over the entire range of verb classes represented in texts A, B and C, and that the non-propositional projection of evaluations (in the form of *as*-phrases or non-finite clauses) is mainly limited to class 2 (as may be seen in Appendix B), the number of tokens for verbs effecting either kind of projection is nevertheless the same, i.e. 43 out of a total of 160 tokens.

6. Conclusion

I have tried to show how the nature of argument in art-historical discourse is fundamentally conditioned by the need to present visual art verbally in the text, and

how this dissociates the mode of evaluation most characteristic of this discourse from the expression of epistemic and affective attitude or stance, commonly recognized as the major manifestations of this complex phenomenon. The examination of a limited number of texts has shown that evaluation in art-historical discourse does not primarily or most typically concern the modalization of propositions or the direct expression of affect but rather the verbal characterization of a work with a view to its explanation. This verbal characterization evokes rather than inscribes affect and forms part of an interpretative process which involves its progressive comparison with a variety of (historical) data and evidence, above all with other characterizations of the same work or characterizations of other, in some sense comparable, works.

Particular findings, which now need to be tested on a broader corpus, are that art-historical description seems to find its "experiential signature" (Matthiessen, 1995: 360) in the alternation and logicosemantic interdependence of material and relational process types, and that a peculiarity of art-historical discourse, considered from the point of view of the social or interactive construction of knowledge, seems to be a form of non-propositional report or projection of interpretative evaluations, typically through the use of a mental or verbal process verb followed by the preposition *as*.

Appendix A. Texts discussed

A Boime, A. 'William Holman Hunt's *The Scapegoat*: Rite of Forgiveness/ Transference of Blame,' *The Art Bulletin* 84 (2002), 94-114 (approx. 12,900 words excluding footnotes).

B Clayton, M. 'Leonardo's *Gypsies*, and the *Wolf and the eagle*,' *Apollo* 154 (2002), 27–33 (approx. 3900 words excluding footnotes).

C Forster-Hahn, F. 'Public Concerns—Private Longings: Adolph Menzel's *Studio Wall* (1872),' *Art History* 25 (2002), 206–239 (approx. 9600 words excluding footnotes).

Appendix B. A, B & C: Tokens of "attitudinal" verbs (classes from Hunston, 1993), excluding footnotes

NB. Where a projecting conjunction/preposition or projected infinitive accompanies a verb this is indicated and tokens of e.g. *see* and *see (as)* are listed separately.

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
1. Verbs of reporting (human subject): find, observe, report. No information about attitude.	human: author	1	0	0	1: observe
	agentless passive	0	3	0	2: note 1: observe
Total		1	3	0	

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
2. Verbs of subjective interpreting (human subject): conclude, believe, suspect, interpret, suggest, characterise. Information about the attitude of the subject of the verb.	human: writer	2	0	2	1: read (as), identify, believe (that), hazard
	human: author	4	3	12	5: read (as); 3: identify (as); 2: define (as), interpret (as); 1: analyse (as), call, characterize, characterize (as), perceive (as), recognize (as), see (as)
	human: artist (principal)	9	0	1	2: consider; 1: conclude (that), find, identify (with), perceive (as), perceive (to be), praise (as), regard (as), take (it as a given that)
	human: artist (other)	0	0	1	1: recognize (as)
	human: other	2	0	0	1: count (among), believe (that)
	agentless passive	8	8	5	5: see (as); 3: consider; identify (as), 2: describe (as); 1: call, identify (with), interpret (as), recognize (as), see (to be), see (to have), suppose, understand (to stand in for)
	non-human	3	0	3	1: consider (as), hold (that), invent (as), perceive (as), reinvent (as), suggest (that)
Total		28	11	24	

(*continued on next page*)

Appendix B. (*continued*)

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
3. Verbs of objective interpreting (non-human subject): show, indicate, demonstrate, establish, characterise, suggest. Information is given about the attitude of the writer.	non-human	16	7	12	5: reveal; 3: confirm, suggest (that); 2: imply, indicate, indicate (that), point to, suggest; 1: attest to, demonstrate, designate, evidence, identify, identify (as), imply (that), point out, prove (that), refer to, reveal (self to be), show, show (that), uncover
	Agentless passive	2	1	0	2: see; 1: show
	human: artist (principal)	1	0	0	1: show
	human: artist (other)	1	0	0	1: confirm (that)
Total		20	8	12	

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
4. Verbs of arguing (human subject): note, point out. Information is given about the attitude of the writer.	human: author	3	1	1	2: point out (that); 1: point to, point out, agree (that)
	human: artist	0	0	1	1: note
	non-human	1	0	0	1: note (that)
Total		4	1	2	

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
5. Verbs of arguing (human subject): claim, argue, admit, deny, insist, acknowledge, concur, declare. A potential difference of attitude between writer and subject of verb is implied.	human: writer	0	1	1	1: argue, claim
	human: author	13	0	4	3: emphasize, claim (that); 2: argue, underscore 1: affirm, argue (that), asssert, attack, call attention to, condescend, propose (the thesis that)

(*continued on next page*)

Appendix B. (*continued*)

	human: artist (principal)	5	1	3	2: claim (to), claim (that); 1: admit (that), emphasize, emphasize (that), reason (that), stress (that)
	human: other	0	2	0	1: claim (to), claim (to be)
	non-human	4	0	0	1: contest, dispute, hold (that), stress
Total		22	4	8	

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
6. Verbs of cognition (human subject): realise, be aware, understand. When grammatically positive, information is given about the attitude of the writer. When grammatically negative, a difference of attitude between writer and subject is implied.	human: writer/reader (“we”)	0	0	2	1: know, know (whether)
	human: artist (principal)	4	0	2	2: know (that); 1: be aware of, imagine, imagine (that), know
	human: artist (other)	0	1	0	1: understand
	human: other	0	1	0	1: know (that)
	agentless passive	1	1	0	1: know (to have), see (why)
Total		5	3	4	

Class	Subject	A	B	C	Verbs (ranked by number of tokens for each subject)
7. Verbs of reaction: find significant, be struck/impressed by, convince, persuade. A potential difference of attitude between writer and original researcher is implied.	Human	0	0	0	
Total		0	0	0	

	A	B	C
Total of tokens for classes 1–4	53	23	38
Total for classes 5–7	27	7	12
Overall total	80	30	50

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