

Simple Methods for Confirming IDS/IPS Alerts

#### Introduction

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- Currently Employed at Sourcefire, Inc.
  - Tier I Technical Support Engineer
- Typical work day for a Tier 1
  - Hardware questions
  - Configuration questions
  - False positive analysis





## IDS/IPS Alerts

- Big Three
  - Snort
  - Suricata
  - Bro IDS
- IDS/IPS systems generate alerts based on:
  - Signatures
  - Network Anomalies
- We will be dealing mostly with signature based events today





#### A Trend

- More data is being analyzed
- More events are being generated
- What do we do with all of these events?

10 Mbps 100 Mbps 500 Mbps 1 Gbps 10 Gbps 40 Gbps






## **Current Incident Handling Process**

- Preparation
- Detection and Notification
- Investigation And Qualification
- Communication
- Containment and Recovery
- Lessons Learned





# **Existing Techniques**








#### The Current Method

- Step 1: Verify Rule Context
  - Rule Header
  - Content Matches
- Step 2: Verify Endpoints
  - Who's talking
- Step 3: Verify Conversation
  - What's being said gets technical
- Step 4: Verify Operational Context
  - How does this type of attack affect my network deployment? – also gets technical





## A Happy Example



```
Frame 1: 586 bytes on wire (4688 bits), 586 bytes captured (4688 bits)
D Ethernet II, Src: Portwell 3d:4c:91 (00:90:fb:3d:4c:91), Dst: Intel e9:9b:6c (00:04:23:e9:9b:6c)
D 802.10 Virtual LAN, PRI: 0, CFI: 0, ID: 2111
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.110.98.250 (10.110.98.250), Dst: 10.7.33.71 (10.7.33.71)
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: sabams (2760), Dst Port: http-alt (8080), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 528
D Hypertext Transfer Protocol
0000 00 04 23 e9 9b 6c 00 90 fb 3d 4c 91 81 00 08 3f
                                                        ..#..l.. .=L....?
0010 08 00 45 00 02 38 c6 0d 40 00 74 06 a5 fc 0a 6e
                                                        ..E..8.. @.t....n
     62 fa 0a 07 21 47 0a c8 1f 90 8b 50 a7 44 d5 b4
                                                       b...!G.. ...P.D..
0030 4c aa 50 18 fc 00 38 49 00 00 47 45 54 20 68 74
                                                       L.P...8I ..GET ht
    74 70 3a 2f 2f 76 6f 74 65 2e 66 6c 69 70 73 6e
                                                       tp://vot e.flipsn
     61 63 6b 2e 63 6f 6d 2f
                             69 6e 64 65 78 2e 70 68
                                                       ack.com/ index.ph
    70 3f 61 63 74 69 6f 6e 3d 73 74 61 74 75 73 26
                                                       p?action =status&
     63 6f 6c 6c 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 3d 66 75 6b 35 65
                                                       collecti on=fuk5e
     74 7a 62 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 41 63
                                                       tzb HTTP /1.1..Ac
     63 65 70 74 3a 20 2a 2f 2a 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70
                                                       cept: */ *..Accep
    74 2d 4c 61 6e 67 75 61 67 65 3a 20 65 6e 2d 41
                                                       t-Langua ge: en-A
00b0 55 0d 0a 52 65 66 65 72 65 72 3a 20 68 74 74 70
                                                       U..Refer er: http
     3a 2f 2f 66 69 6c 65 73 2e 66 6c 69 70 73 6e 61
                                                       ://files .flipsna
00d0 63 6b 2e 6e 65 74 2f 74 65 6d 70 6c 61 74 65 73
                                                       ck.net/t emplates
    2f 73 77 66 2f 39 33 36 30 38 62 30 65 65 62 61
                                                       /swf/936 08b0eeba
    39 38 38 39 61 37 34 38 32 34 66 62 63 35 33 62
                                                       9889a748 24fbc53b
     35 38 74 33 38 0d 0a 78 2d 66 6c 61 73 68 2d 76
                                                       58t38..x -flash-v
0110 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3a 20 31 30 2c 31 2c 35 33 2c
                                                       ersion: 10,1,53,
0120 36 34 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70 74 2d 45 6e 63 6f 64
                                                       64..Acce pt-Encod
     69 6e 67 3a 20 67 7a 69
                             70 2c 20 64 65 66 6c 61
                                                       ing: gzi p. defla
0140 74 65 0d 0a 55 73 65 72 2d 41 67 65 6e 74 3a 20
                                                       te..User - Agent:
    4d 6f 7a 69 6c 6c 6l 2f 34 2e 30 20 28 63 6f 6d
                                                       Mozilla/ 4.0 (com
     70 61 74 69 62 6c 65 3b 20 4d 53 49 45 20 36 2e
                                                       patible; MSIE 6.
     30 3b 20 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 4e 54 20 35 2e
                                                       0; Windo ws NT 5.
    31 3b 20 53 56 31 3b 20 2e 4e 45 54 20 43 4c 52
                                                       1: SV1: .NET CLR
M File: "/Users/gserrao/Downloads/request 135... Packets: 3 Displayed: 3 Marked: 0 Load time: 0:00.124
                                                                                                                                             Profile: Default
```





## Drawbacks of the Current Method

- Limited by the amount of information available to the analyst at the time
- Time intensive
- Tedious
- Reactive approach





# Real World Example

		▼ Expression		⊕, ⊝, ⊕, [
Time	Source	Destination	1 1	Length Info
607 35.484069	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
608 35.484072	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	294 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
609 35.484087	10.8.0.4	72.21.195.15	TCP	54 50489 > http://ack/ Seq=853 Ack=117693 Win=523896 Len=0
610 35.484185	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
611 35.484280	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 (TCP segment of a reassembled PDU)
612 35.484306	10.8.0.4	72.21.195.15	TCP	54 50489 > http [ACK] Seq=853 Ack=120613 Win=524280 Len=0
613 35.484376	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
614 35.484494	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
615 35.484518	10.8.0.4	72.21.195.15	TCP	54 50489 > http [ACK] Seq=853 Ack=123533 Win=524280 Len=0
616 35.484576	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
617 35.484682	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
618 35.484684	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	294 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
619 35.484695	10.8.0.4	72.21.195.15	TCP	54 50489 > http [ACK] Seq=853 Ack=126693 Win=523896 Len=0
620 35.484794	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
621 35.484899	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	TCP	1514 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
622 35.484900	72.21.195.15	10.8.0.4	НТТР	343 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
623 35.484913	10.8.0.4	72.21.195.15	TCP	54 50489 > http [ACK] Seq=853 Ack=129902 Win=523848 Len=0
624 35.509065	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	78 50490 > netbios-ssn [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=8 TSval=425440370 TSecr=0 SACK PERM-1
625 35.512143 626 35.512168	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4 10.8.0.187	TCP TCP	74 netbios-ssn > 50490 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=11948705 TSec 66 50490 > netbios-ssn [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval=425440370 TSecr=11948705
627 35.512168	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	NBSS	00 30490 > NetUlos-Ssi (AKK) 3041 AKK=1 WIN=324280 Len=0 1594L=423440370 15eCr=11946705 138 Session request, to 10.8.0.187<20> from GSERRAD MAC<00>
628 35.520890	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	NBSS	71 Negative session response, Called name not present
629 35.520924	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	66 50490 > netbios-ssn [ACK] Seq=73 Ack=7 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval=425440370 TSecr=11948706
630 35.520999	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	00 3095 > Hetbios-ssn [FIN, ACK] Seq=73 Ack=7 Win=524280 Len=0 TSVal=425440370 TSecr=11948706
631 35.521062	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	78 50491 > netbios-ssn [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=8 TSval=425440370 TSecr=0 SACK PERM=1
632 35.522402	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	TCP	66 netbios-ssn > 50490 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=74 Win=66560 Len=0 TSval=11948706 TSecr=425440370
633 35.522752	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	TCP	74 netbios-ssn > 50491 [SyN, ACK] Sec=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM=1 TSval=11948706 TSec
634 35.522765	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	66 50491 > netbios-ssn [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval==25440370 TSecr=11948706
635 35.531185	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	NBSS	138 Session request, to 10<20> from GSERRAO MAC<00>
636 35.532248	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	NBSS	71 Negative session response, Called name not present
637 35.532348	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	66 50491 > netbios-ssn [ACK] Seq=73 Ack=7 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval=425440370 TSecr=11948707
638 35.532463	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	66 50491 > netbios-ssn [FIN, ACK] Seq=73 Ack=7 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval=425440370 TSecr=11948707
639 35.532577	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	78 50492 > netbios-ssn [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=8 TSval=425440370 TSecr=0 SACK_PERM=1
640 35.535807	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	TCP	66 netbios-ssn > 50491 [ACK] Seq=7 Ack=74 Win=66560 Len=0 TSval=11948708 TSecr=425440370
641 35.536057	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	TCP	74 netbios-ssn > 50492 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=11948708 TSec
642 35.536101	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	66 50492 > netbios-ssn [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval=425440370 TSecr=11948708
643 35.542716	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	NBSS	138 Session request, to *SMBSERVER<20> from GSERRAO_MAC<00>
644 35.543786	10.8.0.187	10.8.0.4	NBSS	71 Negative session response, Called name not present
645 35.543865	10.8.0.4	10.8.0.187	TCP	66 50492 > netbios-ssn [ACK] Seq=73 Ack=7 Win=524280 Len=0 TSval=425440370 TSecr=11948708



### How to Improve

- Let's take a more proactive approach
- Increase the amount of information available to the analyst
- Increase the quality of the dissected payload
- Use automation tools
- The best methods are the most informed methods
- We need a bigger source of information






# What I'd Like to See

IP's	rDNS	Verdict
54.243.156.140 64.214.53.2 205.178.189.131 167.216.129.13 23.23.170.170 69.43.161.180 192.88.209.252 10.20.57.16	sourcefire.com sf-nat.sourcefire.com flocon.org immunet.com snort.org antivirus-online21.com cert.org <none></none>	Clean Clean Clean Clean Clean +Investigate Clean RFC 1918

http://dns-bh.sagadc.org/domains.txt

## **Information Sources**







## Information Sources, Cont.

- Common
  - http://www.malwaredomains.com
  - www.mxtoolbox.com
  - https://www.dnsstuff.com/
  - http://www.siteadvisor.com/
  - https://www.phishtank.com/
- Not so common
  - Pastebin.com
  - Twitter.com





#### **Favorite Information Source**


http://support.clean-mx.de/clean-mx/viruses

- They' ve been really tolerating my automated testing
- Easily encoded POST http requests for
  - ► IP
  - Domain





# Python!



https://xkcd.com/353/





#### The Code 1 of 3

```
from scapy.all import *
from scapy.utils import *
print "Reading PCAP(s):"
for x in range(num pcaps):
    try:
         pkts.extend(rdpcap(caps[x]))
    except Exception, e: print e
print "Collecting IPs.."
for pkt in pkts:
    if pkt.haslayer(IP):
         if not pkt[IP].src in ip list:
              ip_list.append(pkt[IP].src)
         if not pkt[IP].dst in ip list:
              ip list.append(pkt[IP].dst)
print len(ip_list), "unique IPs collected from pcap(s)"
```





#### The Code 2 of 3

```
for i in ip_list:
    if check_country:
        try:
        location = str(GEOIP.lookup(i)).split('country')[1].strip('[] \n')
    except Exception, e:
        print "country lookup failure.", e

if check_hostname:
    try:
        hostname = socket.getfqdn(i)
    except Exception, e:
        hostname = "Couldn't find hostname", e
```





#### The Code 3 of 3

```
response = urlopen('http://support.clean-mx.de/clean-mx/viruses.php')
forms = ParseResponse(response, backwards_compat=False)
form = forms[0]
try:
             br = mechanize.Browser()
             form['ip'] = i
             response = urlopen(form.click()).read()
             if not response.find('<br><div align="center"><b>For this
query is nothing recorded in our database.</b><br>') > -1:
                 reputation = "- Investigate"
             else:
                  reputation = "+ Clean"
```





## Finished Output





#### Caveats and Pitfalls

- Customers with secure networks and tight data retention policies may not be able to take full advantage
- Working with encryption
- Tuning for accuracy





## Future Development


- PCAPalyze
  - PHP web application (HTTPS) interface
  - Flask + Python back end
    - SCAPY used for extrapolating PCAP data
- Uses more sources of data
- Available for the public to use
- Works with more protocols





#### In Summation

IP's	<u>rDNS</u>	Verdict
54.243.156.140 64.214.53.2 205.178.189.131 167.216.129.13 23.23.170.170 69.43.161.180 192.88.209.252 10.20.57.16	sourcefire.com sf-nat.sourcefire.com flocon.org immunet.com snort.org antivirus-online21.com cert.org <none></none>	Clean Clean Clean Clean Clean Clean +Investigate Clean RFC 1918



```
-=Open proxy analysis=-
Got 248690 dangerous IPs.
Dangerous IPs matched: None

-=Full Analysis=-
6 IPs to check.
169.10.11.239 US 169.10.11.239 + Clean t:0.85781
72.21.81.253 US 72.21.81.253 - Investigate t:0.86674
174.143.121.210 US www.stylebistro.com + Clean t:0.53773
169.14.238.54 US 169.14.238.54 + Clean t:0.87787
169.10.22.247 US 169.10.22.247 + Clean t:0.48822
178.255.240.230 IT www.witcom.com - Investigate t:13.33818
```





# Questions





