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MODULE *crosslink2*

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EXTENDS *TLC*, *Naturals*, *Sequences*, *utils*

CONSTANTS *BcNodes*, *BftNodes*, *CrossLink2Nodes*

CONSTANTS *ByzBft*, *ByzCl*

CONSTANTS *Sigma*, *L*

VARIABLES *bc\_chains*, *bft\_chains*, *crosslink2\_chains*

INSTANCE *definitions*

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*Init*  $\triangleq$

$\wedge bc\_chains = [i \in 1 \dots BcNodes \mapsto \langle BcGenesisBlock \rangle]$   
 $\wedge bft\_chains = [i \in 1 \dots BftNodes \mapsto \langle BftGenesisBlock \rangle]$   
 $\wedge crosslink2\_chains = [i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes \mapsto CrossLink2GenesisBlock]$

*HonestBc*  $\triangleq$

$\exists n \in 1 \dots BcNodes :$   
 LET  
    $base \triangleq bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx]$   
    $bft \triangleq bft\_chains[BestBftChainIdx]$   
    $tip \triangleq base[Len(base)].hash$   
    $next \triangleq tip + 1$  IN  
 $\wedge bc\_chains' = [bc\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = Append(base, [$   
    $context\_bft \mapsto bft[Len(bft)].hash,$   
    $hash \mapsto next])]$   
 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bft\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle$

*HonestBft*  $\triangleq$

$\exists n \in 1 \dots BftNodes :$   
 LET  
    $base \triangleq bft\_chains[BestBftChainIdx]$   
    $bc \triangleq bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx]$   
    $tip \triangleq base[Len(base)].hash$   
    $next \triangleq tip + 1$   
    $hdrs \triangleq PruneLasts(bc, Sigma)$  IN  
 $\wedge bft\_chains' = [bft\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = Append(base, [$   
    $headers\_bc \mapsto hdrs,$   
    $hash \mapsto next])]$   
 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle$

*ByzantineBft*  $\triangleq$

$\exists n \in ByzBft :$   
 LET  
    $base \triangleq bft\_chains[BestBftChainIdx]$

$$\begin{aligned}
bc &\triangleq bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx] \\
tip &\triangleq base[Len(base)].hash \\
&\text{Byzantine node can create an arbitrary faulty block within a range} \\
byz &\triangleq tip + (\text{CHOOSE } inc \in 2 \dots 10 : \text{TRUE}) \\
hdrs &\triangleq PruneLasts(bc, Sigma)IN \\
\wedge bft\_chains' &= [bft\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = Append(base, [ \\
&\quad headers\_bc \mapsto hdrs, \\
&\quad hash \mapsto byz])] \\
&\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle \\
HonestCrosslink &\triangleq \\
&\exists n \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes : \\
&\quad \text{LET} \\
&\quad \quad fin \triangleq PruneFirsts(bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx], Sigma)IN \\
&\quad \quad \wedge crosslink2\_chains' = [crosslink2\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = [fin \mapsto fin]] \\
&\quad \quad \wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, bft\_chains \rangle \\
&\quad \vee \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, bft\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle \\
Next &\triangleq \\
&\vee HonestBc \\
&\vee HonestBft \\
&\vee HonestCrosslink \\
&\vee ByzantineBft \\
Spec &\triangleq Init \wedge \Box[Next]_{\langle bc\_chains, bft\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle}
\end{aligned}$$


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#### Type checking

$$\begin{aligned}
BcChainsTypeCheck &\triangleq bc\_chains \in Seq(Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat])) \\
BftChainsTypeCheck &\triangleq bft\_chains \in \\
&\quad Seq(Seq([headers\_bc : Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat]), hash : Nat])) \\
CrossLink2ChainsTypeCheck &\triangleq crosslink2\_chains \in \\
&\quad Seq([fin : Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat])])
\end{aligned}$$


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#### Assumptions

ASSUME *BftThresholdOK*

#### Lemma: Linear Prefix

If  $A \preceq_\star C$  and  $B \preceq_\star C$  then  $A \star_\star B$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BcLinearPrefix &\triangleq \\
&\forall a, b, c \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\
&\quad \text{LET } A \triangleq bc\_chains[a] \\
&\quad \quad B \triangleq bc\_chains[b]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
C &\triangleq bc\_chains[c] \\
\text{IN } &IsPrefix(A, C) \wedge IsPrefix(B, C) \Rightarrow \\
&IsPrefix(A, B) \vee IsPrefix(B, A)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
BftLinearPrefix &\triangleq \\
&\forall a, b, c \in 1 \dots BftNodes : \\
&\text{LET } A \triangleq bft\_chains[a] \\
&\quad B \triangleq bft\_chains[b] \\
&\quad C \triangleq bft\_chains[c] \\
\text{IN } &IsPrefix(A, C) \wedge IsPrefix(B, C) \Rightarrow \\
&IsPrefix(A, B) \vee IsPrefix(B, A)
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Agreement on a view

An execution of  $\Pi$  has Agreement on the view  $V : Node \times Time \rightarrow \star chain$  iff for all times  $t, u$  and all  $\Pi$  nodes  $i, j$  (potentially the same) such that  $i$  is honest at time  $t$  and  $j$  is honest at time  $u$ , we have  $V_i^t \star V_j^u$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BcViewAgreement &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bc\_chains[i], bc\_chains[j]) \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bc\_chains[j], bc\_chains[i])
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
BftViewAgreement &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in HonestBftNodes : \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bft\_chains[i], bft\_chains[j]) \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bft\_chains[j], bft\_chains[i])
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Final agreement

An execution of  $\Pi_{\star bft}$  has Final Agreement iff for all *bftvalid* blocks  $C$  in honest view at time  $t$  and  $C'$  in honest view at time  $t'$ , we have  $bftlastfinal(C) \star_{bft} bftlastfinal(C')$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BftFinalAgreement &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in HonestBftNodes : \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(BftLastFinal(i), BftLastFinal(j)) \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(BftLastFinal(j), BftLastFinal(i))
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Prefix Consistency

An execution of  $\Pi_{\star bc}$  has Prefix Consistency at confirmation depth  $\sigma$ , iff for all times  $t \leq u$  and all nodes  $i, j$  (potentially the same) such that  $i$  is honest at time  $t$  and  $j$  is honest at time  $u$ , we have that  $ch_i^t \upharpoonright_{\star bc}^\sigma \preceq_{\star bc} ch_j^u$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BcPrefixConsistency &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\
&\quad Len(bc\_chains[i]) \leq Len(bc\_chains[j]) \Rightarrow \\
&\quad IsPrefix(PruneFirsts(bc\_chains[i], Sigma), bc\_chains[j])
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Prefix Agreement

An execution of  $\Pi_{\star bc}$  has Prefix Agreement at confirmation depth  $\sigma$  iff it has Agreement on the view  $(i, t) \mapsto ch_i^t \upharpoonright_{\star bc}^\sigma$ .

$BcPrefixAgreement \triangleq$   
 $\forall i \in 1 \dots BcNodes :$   
 $IsPrefix(PruneFirsts(bc\_chains[i], Sigma), bc\_chains[i])$

Definition:  $\star$ -linear

A function  $S : I \rightarrow \star block$  is  $\star$ -linear iff for every  $t, u \in I$  where  $t \leq u$  we have  $S(t) \preceq_\star S(u)$   
 $BcLinear(T, U) \triangleq IsPrefix(T, U)$

Definition: Local finalization linearity

Node  $i$  has Local finalization linearity up to time  $t$  iff the time series of  $\star bc$ -blocks  $fin_i^{r \leq t}$  is  $\star bc$ -linear.

$LocalFinalizationLinearity \triangleq \Box[$   
 $\forall i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes :$   
 $BcLinear(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, crosslink2\_chains'[i].fin)]_{crosslink2\_chains}$

Lemma: Local fin-depth

In any execution of Crosslink 2, for any node  $i$  that is honest at time  $t$ , there exists a time  $r \leq t$  such that  $fin_i \preceq ch_i^r \upharpoonright_{\star bc}^\sigma$

$LocalFinDepth \triangleq$   
 $\forall i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes :$   
 $IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx])$

Definition: Assured Finality

An execution of Crosslink 2 has Assured Finality iff for all times  $t, u$  and all nodes  $i, j$  (potentially the same) such that  $i$  is honest at time  $t$  and  $j$  is honest at time  $u$ , we have  $fin_i^t \not\preceq_{bc} fin_j^u$ .

$AssuredFinality \triangleq$   
 $\forall i, j \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes :$   
 $\vee IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, crosslink2\_chains[j].fin)$   
 $\vee IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[j].fin, crosslink2\_chains[i].fin)$