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MODULE *crosslink2*

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EXTENDS *TLC*, *Naturals*, *Sequences*, *utils*

CONSTANTS *BcNodes*, *BftNodes*, *CrossLink2Nodes*

CONSTANTS *ByzBft*, *ByzCl*

CONSTANTS *Sigma*, *L*

VARIABLES *bc\_chains*, *bft\_chains*, *crosslink2\_chains*

INSTANCE *definitions*

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*Init*  $\triangleq$

$\wedge bc\_chains = [i \in 1 \dots BcNodes \mapsto \langle BcGenesisBlock \rangle]$

$\wedge bft\_chains = [i \in 1 \dots BftNodes \mapsto \langle BftGenesisBlock \rangle]$

$\wedge crosslink2\_chains = [i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes \mapsto CrossLink2GenesisBlock]$

*HonestBc*  $\triangleq$

$\exists n \in 1 \dots BcNodes :$

LET

$base \triangleq bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx]$

$bft \triangleq bft\_chains[BestBftChainIdx]$

$tip \triangleq base[Len(base)].hash$

$next \triangleq tip + 1$

$\wedge bc\_chains' = [bc\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = Append(base, [$

$context\_bft \mapsto bft[Len(bft)].hash,$

$hash \mapsto next])]$

$\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bft\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle$

*HonestBft*  $\triangleq$

$\exists n \in 1 \dots BftNodes :$

LET

$base \triangleq bft\_chains[BestBftChainIdx]$

$bc \triangleq bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx]$

$tip \triangleq base[Len(base)].hash$

$next \triangleq tip + 1$

$hdrs \triangleq PruneLasts(bc, Sigma)$

$\wedge bft\_chains' = [bft\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = Append(base, [$

$headers\_bc \mapsto hdrs,$

$hash \mapsto next])]$

$\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle$

*ByzantineBft*  $\triangleq$

$\exists n \in ByzBft :$

LET

$base \triangleq bft\_chains[BestBftChainIdx]$

$ \begin{aligned} bc &\triangleq bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx] \\ tip &\triangleq base[Len(base)].hash \\ &\text{Byzantine node can create an arbitrary faulty block within a range} \\ byz &\triangleq tip + (\text{CHOOSE } inc \in 2 \dots 10 : \text{TRUE}) \\ hdrs &\triangleq PruneLasts(bc, Sigma) \text{IN} \\ \wedge \text{ bft\_chains}' &= [\text{bft\_chains EXCEPT } ![n] = \text{Append}(base, [ \\ &\quad headers\_bc \mapsto hdrs, \\ &\quad hash \mapsto byz])] \\ &\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, crosslink2\_chains \rangle \end{aligned} $
$ \begin{aligned} \text{HonestCrosslink} &\triangleq \\ &\exists n \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes : \\ &\text{LET} \\ &\quad fin \triangleq PruneFirsts(bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx], Sigma) \\ &\quad ba \triangleq LocalBa(fin, bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx]) \\ &\text{IN} \\ &\wedge crosslink2\_chains' = [crosslink2\_chains \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = [ \\ &\quad fin \mapsto fin, \\ &\quad ba \mapsto ba]] \\ &\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, \text{bft\_chains} \rangle \\ &\vee \text{UNCHANGED } \langle bc\_chains, \text{bft\_chains}, crosslink2\_chains \rangle \end{aligned} $
$ \begin{aligned} Next &\triangleq \\ &\vee \text{HonestBc} \\ &\vee \text{HonestBft} \\ &\vee \text{HonestCrosslink} \\ &\vee \text{ByzantineBft} \end{aligned} $
$Spec \triangleq Init \wedge \Box [Next]_{\langle bc\_chains, \text{bft\_chains}, crosslink2\_chains \rangle}$
<hr/> <div style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 2px;">Type checking</div> $ \begin{aligned} BcChainsTypeCheck &\triangleq bc\_chains \in Seq(Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat])) \\ BftChainsTypeCheck &\triangleq \text{bft\_chains} \in \\ &\quad Seq(Seq([headers\_bc : Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat]), hash : Nat])) \\ CrossLink2ChainsTypeCheck &\triangleq crosslink2\_chains \in \\ &\quad Seq([fin : Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat]), ba : Seq([context\_bft : Nat, hash : Nat])]) \end{aligned} $ <hr/>
<div style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 2px;">Assumptions</div> <p>ASSUME <i>BftThresholdOK</i></p>
<div style="background-color: #f0f0f0; padding: 2px;">Lemma: Linear Prefix</div> <p>If <math>A \preceq_{\star} C</math> and <math>B \preceq_{\star} C</math> then <math>A \star_{\star} B</math>.</p>

$$\begin{aligned}
BcLinearPrefix &\triangleq \\
&\forall a, b, c \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\
&\quad \text{LET } A \triangleq bc\_chains[a] \\
&\quad \quad B \triangleq bc\_chains[b] \\
&\quad \quad C \triangleq bc\_chains[c] \\
&\text{IN } IsPrefix(A, C) \wedge IsPrefix(B, C) \Rightarrow \\
&\quad IsPrefix(A, B) \vee IsPrefix(B, A)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
BftLinearPrefix &\triangleq \\
&\forall a, b, c \in 1 \dots BftNodes : \\
&\quad \text{LET } A \triangleq bft\_chains[a] \\
&\quad \quad B \triangleq bft\_chains[b] \\
&\quad \quad C \triangleq bft\_chains[c] \\
&\text{IN } IsPrefix(A, C) \wedge IsPrefix(B, C) \Rightarrow \\
&\quad IsPrefix(A, B) \vee IsPrefix(B, A)
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Agreement on a view

An execution of  $\Pi$  has Agreement on the view  $V : Node \times Time \rightarrow \star chain$  iff for all times  $t, u$  and all  $\Pi$  nodes  $i, j$  (potentially the same) such that  $i$  is honest at time  $t$  and  $j$  is honest at time  $u$ , we have  $V_i^t \star V_j^u$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BcViewAgreement &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bc\_chains[i], bc\_chains[j]) \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bc\_chains[j], bc\_chains[i])
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
BftViewAgreement &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in HonestBftNodes : \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bft\_chains[i], bft\_chains[j]) \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(bft\_chains[j], bft\_chains[i])
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Final agreement

An execution of  $\Pi_{\star bft}$  has Final Agreement iff for all *bftvalid* blocks  $C$  in honest view at time  $t$  and  $C'$  in honest view at time  $t'$ , we have  $bftlastfinal(C) \star_{bft} bftlastfinal(C')$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BftFinalAgreement &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in HonestBftNodes : \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(BftLastFinal(i), BftLastFinal(j)) \\
&\quad \vee IsPrefix(BftLastFinal(j), BftLastFinal(i))
\end{aligned}$$

Definition: Prefix Consistency

An execution of  $\Pi_{\star bc}$  has Prefix Consistency at confirmation depth  $\sigma$ , iff for all times  $t \leq u$  and all nodes  $i, j$  (potentially the same) such that  $i$  is honest at time  $t$  and  $j$  is honest at time  $u$ , we have that  $ch_i^t \upharpoonright_{\star bc}^\sigma \preceq_{\star bc} ch_j^u$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
BcPrefixConsistency &\triangleq \\
&\forall i, j \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\
&\quad Len(bc\_chains[i]) \leq Len(bc\_chains[j]) \Rightarrow
\end{aligned}$$

$$IsPrefix(PruneFirsts(bc\_chains[i], Sigma), bc\_chains[j])$$

Definition: Prefix Agreement

An execution of  $\Pi_{\star bc}$  has Prefix Agreement at confirmation depth  $\sigma$  iff it has Agreement on the view  $(i, t) \mapsto ch_i^t \upharpoonright_{\star bc}^\sigma$ .

$$\begin{aligned} BcPrefixAgreement &\triangleq \\ \forall i \in 1 \dots BcNodes : \\ &IsPrefix(PruneFirsts(bc\_chains[i], Sigma), bc\_chains[i]) \end{aligned}$$

Definition: \*-linear

A function  $S : I \rightarrow \star block$  is \*-linear iff for every  $t, u \in I$  where  $t \leq u$  we have  $S(t) \preceq_\star S(u)$

$$BcLinear(T, U) \triangleq IsPrefix(T, U)$$

Definition: Local finalization linearity

Node  $i$  has Local finalization linearity up to time  $t$  iff the time series of  $\star bc$ -blocks  $fin_i^{r \leq t}$  is  $\star bc$ -linear.

$$\begin{aligned} LocalFinalizationLinearity &\triangleq \Box[ \\ \forall i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes : \\ &BcLinear(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, crosslink2\_chains'[i].fin)]_{crosslink2\_chains} \end{aligned}$$

Lemma: Local fin-depth

In any execution of Crosslink 2, for any node  $i$  that is honest at time  $t$ , there exists a time  $r \leq t$  such that  $fin_i \preceq ch_i^r \upharpoonright_{\star bc}^\sigma$

$$\begin{aligned} LocalFinDepth &\triangleq \\ \forall i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes : \\ &IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, bc\_chains[BestBcChainIdx]) \end{aligned}$$

Definition: Assured Finality

An execution of Crosslink 2 has Assured Finality iff for all times  $t, u$  and all nodes  $i, j$  (potentially the same) such that  $i$  is honest at time  $t$  and  $j$  is honest at time  $u$ , we have  $fin_i^t \not\preceq_{bc} fin_j^u$ .

$$\begin{aligned} AssuredFinality &\triangleq \\ \forall i, j \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes : \\ &\vee IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, crosslink2\_chains[j].fin) \\ &\vee IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[j].fin, crosslink2\_chains[i].fin) \end{aligned}$$

Theorem: Ledger prefix property

For any node  $i$  that is honest at time  $t$ , and any confirmation depth  $\mu$ ,  $fin_i^t \preceq (ba_\mu)_i^t$

$$\begin{aligned} LedgerPrefixProperty &\triangleq \\ \forall i \in 1 \dots CrossLink2Nodes : \\ &IsPrefix(crosslink2\_chains[i].fin, crosslink2\_chains[i].ba) \end{aligned}$$