



Security Council

Distr.: General
2 November 2023

Original: English

Letter dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [2675 \(2023\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) on 18 September 2023 and was considered by the Committee on 1 November 2023.

We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)

Summary

During the reporting period, regional and international factors have reinforced the pacification efforts in Yemen. The agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia signed in March 2023 under the auspices of China, the Houthi-Saudi Arabia talks mediated by Oman, the prisoners exchange deal between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, and the growing engagement of China in Middle East affairs have generated positive momentum in the region.

The conflict in Yemen has been at a low level of intensity since December 2022, which some analysts described as an “informal truce”. However, provocative and confrontational content disseminated by media platforms affiliated with the Houthis and with the Government of Yemen increased during the reporting period, hampering the momentum of the talks. In particular, the Houthis issued numerous statements recently, threatening the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen that they would resume hostilities, should their demands not be met.

The Presidential Leadership Council has been experiencing a phase of significant internal conflicts. These structural challenges affected its ability to provide basic public services, and hence it was fiercely criticized by the Yemeni people. The cohesion of the Presidential Leadership Council would be at stake if these issues persisted, and military confrontations among the forces affiliated with its members might erupt.

The Houthis continue to refuse to engage in any direct talks with the Government of Yemen. They persist with their demands, such as the payment of salaries, including for military and security personnel, the increase of flights to and from Sana'a, and a major share from the oil revenue. They also displayed their military capabilities in several parades and exercises to exert more pressure on the Coalition and on the Government of Yemen.

Military operations between the Houthis and pro-government forces continued on the front lines, with clashes, shelling and attacks with uncrewed aerial vehicles leading to civilian casualties and the destruction of property. A large percentage of conflicts is between armed groups not associated with the Houthis. Tribal conflict among tribes, and between tribes and armed groups, is reported in both government- and Houthi-controlled areas.

Until April 2023, most incidents attributed to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had been directed against Southern Transitional Council-affiliated armed forces in Abyan. Subsequently, a large part of the attacks shifted to Shabwah.

Three maritime security incidents have been reported since December 2022, one involving a bulk carrier and two involving yachts. Tension is growing in the Red Sea, with the Houthis establishing a naval presence on Kamaran Island, off Hudaydah. At the same time, the Yemeni Coast Guard has bases on Red Sea islands close to Hudaydah, resulting in potential risks for ships and small craft transiting Yemeni territorial waters. On 11 August 2023, a major environmental disaster was averted when the transfer of 1.1 million barrels of oil from the FSO *Safer* to the *Yemen* (previously *Nautica*) was completed. Issues pertaining to the ownership of the oil, the ship *Yemen*, and the sale proceeds of the *Safer* remain.

With regard to the targeted arms embargo, the Panel notes large-scale violations involving military material, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, waterborne improvised explosive devices and hundreds of 4x4 vehicles converted for carrying various weapon systems that were displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a in September 2022.

From November 2022 to June 2023, 254 uncrewed aerial vehicles, 100 engines for uncrewed aerial vehicles, nearly 5 tons of explosive precursor chemicals, 2 diver propulsion vehicles and various pieces of military equipment were intercepted by the Government of Yemen. Between December 2022 and January 2023, several thousand assault rifles, a large quantity of ammunition, and electro-optical surveillance system and medium-range ballistic missile components were seized in international waters.

All these seizures of material, corroborated by statements made by several Houthi officials, show that the Houthis are drastically reinforcing their land and naval military capabilities, including under water, as well as their arsenal of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles, in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

Parties to the conflict in Yemen continue to perpetrate violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Panel documented many cases involving, *inter alia*, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, torture and other forms of ill-treatment or punishment, including against migrants, recruitment and use of children, and sexual and gender-based violence. Most violations investigated by the Panel were attributed to the Houthis, who continue to recruit and use children, particularly in the context of the summer camps, at alarming proportions. The introduction of new changes in the school curricula, with content focused on hatred, violence and military indoctrination, is deeply disturbing.

The stricter enforcement of the *mahram* (male guardian) by the Houthis is hindering the access of women and girls to basic health-care services, including reproductive health. Freedom of expression is restricted in Yemen. Journalists, human rights activists and civil society activists are harassed and subjected to ill-treatment by multiple parties to the conflict. They are often detained for prolonged periods, including incommunicado detention, for denouncing cases of corruption, extortion or broader human rights abuses.

Landmines, commonly located in close proximity to civilian buildings such as houses, schools and mosques, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war continue to be major threats for the civilian population, especially children.

Online conflict-related gender-based violence, such as harassment and defamation against women activists, including those in the diaspora, particularly by the Houthis, was also reported. Lastly, some parties to the conflict continue to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The reports received on the diversion of humanitarian funding and relief items by the Houthis are particularly concerning.

On the economic front, a full-scale economic war has replaced the full-scale military war. The economic issues plaguing Yemen are now closely intertwined with the broader political and military situation. Yemen is divided into two distinct currency, trading and economic zones. The Houthis appear to have deployed a calibrated set of coercive economic measures relating to sea, land and air sectors to incapacitate the Government of Yemen and prevent it from functioning as a Government. Attacks on maritime assets, the ban on crude oil exports, the diversion of international trade from Aden to Hudaydah, the blockage of roads, the ban on key domestic trade such as cooking gas, and the latest freezing of funds of the national airline, Yemenia, are a few such indicators of the Houthis' strategy. The continuing prohibition on certain series of banknotes issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,

the possible use of counterfeit currency notes and passports, and the ongoing regulatory clashes between the two central banks threaten the monetary and economic stability of Yemen.

Following the attacks on the Dabbah oil terminal, the Government of Yemen is losing about \$1.2 billion in revenue per year. The shift in imports from Aden to Hudaydah resulted in a massive loss of revenue of YRs 637.36 billion for the Government of Yemen during the period from April 2022 to June 2023 and a consequential gain for the Houthis. The total loss of revenue from the ban on the purchase of cooking gas from the Government of Yemen is estimated at YRs 64 billion annually. With the new mechanism for collection of revenues at land customs points, implemented in March 2023, the Houthis have started treating government-controlled areas as a foreign territory for customs purposes, effectively dividing Yemen into two countries.

The continuing deterioration of the economic situation in the government-controlled areas, including high rates of inflation, depreciation of the Yemeni rial, which crossed the 1,400 mark in July 2023, and the poor public service delivery system, especially for electricity, resulted in civil unrest in several cities. Yemen has witnessed a resurgence of a political movement demanding self-determination for the south. Despite economic issues being a key theme in political and diplomatic dialogues over the past few months, failure to find common ground over them has stalled the peace talks.

However, given the involvement of regional and international actors, it is less likely that the Houthis will engage in another full-scale war, despite the threatening statements. Rather, they would continue their calculated escalatory policies and might increase attacks on several fronts to solve the issue of payment of salaries. Overall, however, they would commit to the framework of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. The adoption of a multiphase plan that takes into account the contextual variables is essential. At this stage, reaching a formal ceasefire should be the priority. Hence, it would be significant to agree on adopting incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures on less contentious issues to realize the goal.

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution [2675 \(2023\)](#), covers the period from 1 December 2022 to 31 August 2023¹ and includes information pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), as well as updated findings from some of the cases investigated in the framework of the Panel's final report of 21 February 2023 ([S/2023/130](#)).

2. The Panel adopted the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions ([S/2006/997](#)). It placed emphasis on adherence to standards relating to transparency, objectivity and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent verifiable sources, and providing the opportunity to reply.² The Panel also maintained cooperation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution [1526 \(2004\)](#) and also worked closely with the Panel of Experts on Somalia established pursuant to resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#).

3. The mandate of the Panel was extended on 15 February 2023 by the Security Council in its resolution [2675 \(2023\)](#) until 15 December 2023. Of the five members of the Panel appointed by the Secretary-General (see [S/2023/235](#) and [S/2023/518](#)), the contracts of the finance expert and the armed groups expert commenced on 29 March 2023, and the contract of the international humanitarian law expert, the arms expert and the regional affairs expert commenced on 3 April, 22 April and 24 July 2023, respectively.

4. In 2023, Panel members travelled to Djibouti, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yemen (Aden, Dabbah and Mukalla).³ The Panel conducted physical and virtual inspections of material, including components of missiles and ammunitions seized by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and from the debris at the blast sites. The Panel held in-person meetings and engaged remotely with multiple interlocutors and also met with the President of the Presidential Leadership Council and the Prime Minister and other representatives of the Government of Yemen.

5. The Panel sent 74 official letters, of which 64 letters were addressed to 24 Member States and 10 to organizations, entities and companies, to which 35 replies were still pending as at 31 August 2023 (see annex 3).

II. Developments affecting peace, security and stability in Yemen

6. The conflict in Yemen has been at a low level of intensity since December 2022, which some analysts described as an “informal truce”. The proactive approach of the international community to finding a permanent solution to the conflict in Yemen has provided the space for diplomatic efforts at the regional and bilateral levels to take place. In addition, the prisoners exchange that took place in April 2023 represented an important element in the de-escalation process between some of the belligerent parties, especially given that prominent figures were among the released detainees (see para. 134). However, provocative and confrontational content disseminated by

¹ The period covered in the final report of the Panel ([S/2023/130](#)) ended on 30 November 2022; hence, the present final report covers the period from 1 December 2022 to 31 August 2023. The last date for consideration of Member State responses to the Panel's questions for the present report was 31 August 2023.

² Additional information on the Panel's methodology and the opportunity to reply is provided in annex 1.

³ All major locations in Yemen are spelled in accordance with the United Nations geographic information system map in annex 2.

Houthi- and government-affiliated media platforms continued to have a negative impact on the momentum of talks. Under pressure from internal instability and strikes, the Houthis issued numerous statements recently, threatening the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen that they would resume hostilities, should their demands not be met.⁴ Disagreements over controversial issues continued, and the talks with Saudi Arabia have stalled. All efforts should be made by the relevant stakeholders to prevent the situation from deteriorating and reverting to military confrontations.

7. The ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law perpetrated by parties to the conflict have resulted in an environment of normalized violence where impunity prevails. Civilians, including women and children, continue to bear the brunt of the protracted conflict and are subjected to all forms of violence and abuse. Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children, arbitrary detention and systematic torture are among the major threats to peace and security in Yemen. The Panel believes that, without a strong accountability and justice system in the country, the prospects of attaining sustainable peace are very limited.

Regional and international dynamics

8. Regional and international factors contributed to an extended truce-like situation in Yemen. For example, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement under the auspices of China resulted in an agreement in March 2023. In addition, the initiation of direct talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Sana'a, under the auspices of Oman, paved the way for concrete talks, which may result in reaching a peace agreement. This new Saudi approach to reaching a negotiated settlement of the Yemeni conflict was perceived as a sign of goodwill and was praised by various regional actors. Some analysts interpreted the new strategy as a reflection of the Saudi determination to halt military confrontations to focus on its 2030 development strategy.

9. Meanwhile, the prisoners exchange between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America in August 2023 and the release of frozen Iranian assets undoubtedly created a positive regional environment. This important development, which followed an increase of the American military presence in the region, could be strengthened by other complementary measures. The increasing economic engagement of China in the Middle East has created a new bond between China, Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This would encourage China to play a role in stabilizing the Saudi-Iranian relationship.⁵

Developments within the Government of Yemen

10. The Presidential Leadership Council has been facing many challenges and criticism. The divergent political views and aspirations of its members affected its unity and performance. The four committees that were formed following the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council, namely legal, economic, security and military, and reconciliation, could not achieve any tangible progress in the tasks assigned to them.⁶ Most importantly, the military committee was unable to unify different armed forces under one command.

11. Tensions increased between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Southern Transitional Council. The joining of two pro-government Presidential Leadership Council members to the Southern Transitional Council gave a numerical

⁴ See <https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/260759>; بلا-رواتب-منذ-8-سنوات-معاناة-معلمی/<https://www.aljazeera.net/news/humanrights/2023/8/20/>.

⁵ In December 2022, China signed 35 agreements with Saudi Arabia during the visit of its President, Xi Jinping, to Riyadh (see <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2213196/amp>).

⁶ See <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/20500>.

advantage to the latter and enhanced its influence towards the establishment of an independent State in the south. In addition, the Southern Transitional Council appointed a prominent figure from Hadramawt, Saleh Alquaiti, as a special adviser in an attempt to obtain the support of the oil-rich governorate.⁷

12. This growing influence of the Southern Transitional Council was countered by the establishment in June 2023 of the Hadramawt National Council, which will act as a representative body of the governorate under the authority of the Presidential Leadership Council.⁸ Similarly, the establishment of the National Shield Forces in January 2023 under the President of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, was aimed at balancing the dominant role of the Southern Transitional Council in Aden Governorate. This could lead to more conflicts and potential military confrontations among members of the Presidential Leadership Council. For example, recently, media reported that the forces of Amaliqah Brigades, headed by a member of the Presidential Leadership Council, besieged the office of the Prime Minister in Aden.⁹ The Panel was not able to independently verify the veracity of this incident.

13. These factors led to fragmentations within the Presidential Leadership Council, which had a negative impact on its ability to perform its tasks, especially those related to improving the living standards of the Yemeni people and reforming the State's institutions. Despite external financial support, the Government of Yemen is struggling to provide public services and to manage the economic crisis. In addition, the prolonged absence of government ministers and other senior officials from the country affected the credibility and performance of the Government of Yemen. This compelled the President of the Presidential Leadership Council to issue a circular ordering all ministers and governors to return to their workplaces in Yemen by 6 August 2023. The circular warned that failure to comply with this directive would result in legal measures against those officials (see annex 4).

14. The economic issues had never assumed as much political and military significance as they have since December 2022, dividing the country into two distinct and asymmetrical economic and political zones.

Houthi's position

15. The Houthis continue to refuse to engage in any kind of dialogue with the Government of Yemen and preferred to hold direct talks with Saudi Arabia. As the Houthis are empowered by their military edge over the Government of Yemen, their demands for agreeing to any peace proposals have always been, primarily, based on economic considerations. These include the lifting of the restrictions imposed on the Hudaydah port, payment of salaries, including for military and security personnel, and obtaining a major share from the oil revenue. They also wish to engage Saudi Arabia in the negotiations as a party to the conflict and consequently ask Saudi Arabia to pay for, inter alia, the costs of reconstruction and compensations.

16. Under pressure from the strikes of employees in different sectors to demand payment of their salaries, Houthi leaders have been issuing threatening statements as a bargaining chip to enhance their leverage in the ongoing talks, especially regarding the issue of salaries. The Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEI.004) warned the Coalition in August 2023, "The current situation cannot continue as it is. The Saudis will not get away with leaving our people besieged and suffering, and our country destroyed."¹⁰ In addition, the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, warned the Coalition, "We are ready, in order to provide salaries for all

⁷ See <https://channel16.dryadglobal.com/the-growing-battle-for-south-yemen>.

⁸ See <https://www.independentarabia.com/node/465951/>.

⁹ See <https://www.independentarabia.com/node/484726/>.

¹⁰ See <https://althawrah.ye/archives/822474>.

employees of the Republic of Yemen, to engage in a military escalation to extract this salary.”¹¹

17. In order to secure more concessions, the Houthis have also been conducting several military parades and live-fire exercises to display their power. The Panel is particularly concerned by the volume and the nature of the military material displayed by the Houthis.

18. In late June 2023, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Defence, Major General Muhammad Nasser al-Atifi, addressed the fighters of the Fourth Military Region stationed in the Ta’izz axis, “We tell the enemies that any march, military parades, or manoeuvres are not for media consumption, but we are preparing the professional fighter capable of accomplishing any combat missions and in the most difficult situations”. He also said, “We are preparing to liberate Yemen against the aggression and whoever occupies Yemeni lands, whether the Emiratis or Saudis or those behind them, or those who fight with them, and we are not against the Yemenis at all.”¹²

19. On the military front, operations between the Houthis and pro-government forces continued on all front lines, with the escalation of clashes and shelling from time to time. Confrontations between armed groups and between armed groups and tribal factions are reported in both Houthi- and government-controlled areas. While attacks by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) against the Houthis have ceased, the majority of their attacks are currently directed against Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces.

Prospective outlook

20. The Panel believes that resolving the intractable Yemeni conflict is a long-drawn-out process and that a comprehensive peaceful settlement may be unattainable in the near future. This could be attributed to many factors, among which are the military and economic disparity between the Houthis and the Government of Yemen. However, reaching agreements on a few less controversial issues should be encouraged and complemented by other confidence-building measures to sustain and expand the current détente.

21. Given the involvement of regional and international actors, it is less likely that the Houthis will engage in another full-scale war, despite threatening statements. Rather, they would continue their calculated escalatory policies and might increase attacks on several fronts to solve the issue of salaries. Overall, however, they would commit to the framework of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. In this regard, some analysts question the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to influence Houthi decisions, as the Houthis enjoy relative economic independence and do not completely rely on Iranian aid.

22. The Panel believes that the Houthis will attempt to capitalize on the current situation and push different parties to recognize them as a legitimate entity. Some analysts believe that acknowledging the Houthis as a legitimate entity and granting them disproportionate concessions may isolate other Yemeni parties and put them in a vulnerable position. It is therefore crucial to include the political views and address the interests of all parties in any future agreement.

23. In the given circumstances, it may be in the best interest of all parties to agree on a formal ceasefire and resolve the pending issues, including those related to the payments of salaries, resumption of oil exports by the Government of Yemen, and resource allocations.

¹¹ See <https://www.26sep.net/index.php/local/63077-2023-08-30-18-49-56>.

¹² See <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235300/>.

24. To that end, it is essential to avoid any deadlock in the current talks, which would mean reverting to military confrontations and more civilian casualties.

25. The Panel believes that it is important for the relevant stakeholders to adopt a multiphase plan that takes into account the contextual variables. At this stage, reaching a formal ceasefire should be the priority. Hence, it would be significant to agree on adopting incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures on less contentious issues to realize the goal.

III. Activities of armed groups that threaten peace, security and stability

26. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), as reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), the Panel continued to investigate individuals and entities associated with armed groups who may be engaging in or providing support to acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen.

27. During the reporting period, no cross-border attacks by the Houthis against any Member State or attacks on ports, oil terminals or tankers in government-controlled areas were documented. However, the impact of the attacks on oil facilities in 2022 continues to be felt (see para. 167). No Coalition air strikes have been reported since the onset of the truce on 2 April 2022.

A. Houthi-controlled area of Jawf Governorate

28. Tension exists between the Houthis and several tribes against the backdrop of attempts by the Houthis to subjugate the tribesmen by force and confiscate their property. At the end of January 2023, Bani Nawf tribesmen in Sayl, Hazm district, kidnapped a Houthi leader and his companions to exert pressure on the Houthis to release a tribesman detained by them a few months before. This resulted in the outbreak of armed clashes between Houthi forces and Bani Nawf tribesmen.

29. In July 2023, violent clashes led to the death of several Houthi members, including the commander of the Maraqiz front. The Houthis brought in large enforcements and cut off roads to Sayl, which escalated the tension further. The Houthis demanded that 11 tribesmen be surrendered, but 10 of them fled to the government-controlled area and only 1 person turned himself in.¹³

B. Conflict on the front lines


30. Military operations between the Houthis and pro-government forces continued on the front lines, with clashes, artillery shelling and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks leading to civilian casualties and the destruction of property. The Houthis held military parades and live-fire exercises in Ibb, Dhamar, Bayda', Jawf, Ma'rib and Sa'dah. These events are often accompanied by rhetoric on the readiness to resume military operations (see annex 5).

31. In July 2023, the Armed Forces of the Government of Yemen reported a military build-up of forces on the front lines, especially on the Ma'rib-Shabwah-Bayda' area, including advanced weapon systems and special units. According to these sources,

¹³ See <https://alsahil.net/news28013.html>; <https://al-ain.com/article/houthi-yemen-new>; <https://al-ain.com/article/al-jawf-tribes-al-houthi-harsh-lesson>; <https://khabaragency.net/news193837.html>; <https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/93944>.

the Houthis have been clearing their own minefields, suggesting the preparation for an offensive.

Map 1
Armed conflict on the Ma'rib-Shabwah-Bayda' front lines




Source: Panel of Experts and <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/yemen-areas-of-control> and <https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/global-oil-gas-features-database>.

Ma'rib

32. The conflict in Ma'rib is multidimensional and complex. Shelling, clashes and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks between the Houthis and pro-government forces concentrated on the west of Harib district, south of the city of Ma'rib, and in the vicinity of Umm Rish military camp in Jubah district (see figure I). Clashes were also reported among armed groups and government forces and tribes. In addition, Ma'rib is one of the most unexploded ordnance- and landmine-contaminated governorates, which results in high civilian casualties.

Figure I
Satellite photo showing damage to buildings in Umm Rish military camp in Jubah




Source: Panel of Experts.

33. On 1 and 2 December 2022, violent clashes and artillery shelling were reported around the Balaq mountain range and the Akd front to the south of Ma’rib city (see figure II) between the government forces, backed by loyal tribes, and the Houthis.¹⁴ Reportedly, the Houthis took control of some positions on the front. Similar attacks were reported in March and April in the same areas; on 11 April 2023, clashes were also reported along the Kasara and Raghwan fronts west of Ma’rib city.¹⁵

¹⁴ See <https://yemnews.net/index.php/news/2022-12-02-00-30-14>; <https://acleddata.com/2022/12/07/regional-overview-middle-east-26-november-2-december-2022/>; <https://sputnikarabic.ae/20221202/>.

¹⁵ Panel’s analysis of incident data.

Figure II
Satellite photo of new trenches south of Ma'rib city



Source: Panel of Experts.

34. Armed clashes between the Houthis and the Amaliqah Brigades erupted in waves on the western fronts of Harib district¹⁶ between March and July 2023. In March, heavy fighting was reported around Jabal al-Yahmum, Jabal Jandalah and Jabal Buwarah, resulting in the Houthis capturing Jabal Buwarah, a strategic high ground overlooking Harib city. The Saba axis forces and the Amaliqah Brigades claimed to have regained control of these areas.¹⁷

Shabwah front

35. An escalation of fighting was reported along the border areas between Bayda' and Shabwah between Houthi forces and the Amaliqah Brigades and the Shabwah Defence Forces.¹⁸

¹⁶ See <https://almawqeapost.net/news/84013>.

¹⁷ See <https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2023/20001>; Panel's analysis of incidents.

¹⁸ See <https://www.khabaragency.net/news182111.html>.

36. In late February 2023, the Shabwah Defence Forces reportedly foiled an attack launched by the Houthis on their positions in the Aqabat Umm Quwwah area in Merkhah al-Ulya district.¹⁹ Reports indicated that Houthi forces gained control of Jabal al-Khashibah as well as some areas west of Wadi Markhah in the district after clashes with the Amaliyah Brigades on 26 March 2023. Government reports indicated that the Shabwah Defence Forces repelled Houthi attacks in these positions after receiving reinforcements from Ataq.²⁰

37. Clashes between Houthi forces and the Amaliyah Brigades and the Shabwah Defence Forces were reported on the Makhdarah front in Ayn district on 25 February and 10 March 2023.²¹

Hudaydah

38. Shelling and clashes continued in Hudaydah between the Houthis and the Joint Forces on the West Coast.²² In Tuhyata' and Hays districts in Hudaydah Governorate, government forces accused the Houthis of shelling residential areas and farms, causing civilian casualties,²³ and digging trenches and tunnels²⁴ to the sea. Explosion of landmines and unexploded ordnance remains high in these two districts. Houthi media accused government forces of shelling and conducting uncrewed aerial vehicle strikes in Jabaliyah and Hays.²⁵

Ta'izz

39. In October 2022, Brigadier General Tariq Saleh and the Governor of Ta'izz, Nabil Shamsan, inaugurated the implementation of the Al-Kadaha-Al-Bireen Road project, named "breaking the siege" of Ta'izz, which connects the cities of Mukha and Ta'izz. Since then, five attacks have been recorded on this road. Three of the attacks took place on 25 March 2023: against the convoy of the Ta'izz Governor; against the convoy of the Minister of Defence of the Government of Yemen, Mohsen al-Da'eri; and an uncrewed aerial vehicle strike on a government checkpoint, resulting in the death of two soldiers. On 4 May 2023, the Houthi forces reportedly attacked the equipment of a company involved in the construction of the road.²⁶ Lastly, on 7 May 2023, the former police chief of the Jabal Habashi district of Ta'izz, Colonel Tawfiq al-Waqar Jabari, was reportedly killed in a targeted uncrewed aerial vehicle attack (see annex 6). The Panel believes it likely that the aim of the Houthis is to prevent rapid military reinforcements and movement to the Kadaha front, as the road passes near the front lines and will also provide access to other front lines west of Ta'izz.

40. On 21 July 2023, the head of the Ta'izz office of the World Food Programme, Moayad Hameidi, was shot and killed²⁷ by two masked men riding a motorbike in Turbah, Ta'izz city. Investigations by the relevant authorities are ongoing.

41. Two similar assassinations perpetrated by masked men on motorcycles were recorded in Ta'izz Governorate in July 2023.²⁸ On 5 July, a leading member of the Islah party, Sheikh Ali Mohammed al-Haisi, was killed in the port city of Mocha while

¹⁹ See <https://al-oмана.net/m/details.php?id=195320>.

²⁰ See <https://english.news.cn/20230327/4cd306abf5524b8fa3dbb2e53ece2c47/c.html>; <https://almawqeapost.net/news/84004>; <http://en.adenpress.news/news/37480>.

²¹ See <https://www.khabaragency.net/news183439.html>.

²² See <https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2023>.

²³ See <https://www.2dec.net/news57958.html>; <https://newsyemen.news/new/90239>.

²⁴ See <https://www.2dec.net/news58378.html>.

²⁵ See <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/579162>.

²⁶ Government of Yemen sources.

²⁷ See <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-statement-death-staff-member-yemen>.

²⁸ See https://twitter.com/AhmedAl_haj/status/1683228200669700099.

travelling in his vehicle.²⁹ A Yemeni officer of the Special Security Forces, Salah al-Omrani, was killed on 10 July by armed motorcyclists near his house in Ta’izz city.³⁰

Abyan

42. Clashes and shelling between Houthis and Southern Resistance Forces were sporadically reported. Houthi forces tried to infiltrate locations in the Aqabat al-Tharah front along the border of the southern Mukayras district of Bayda’ and the northern Lawdar district of Abyan. Clashes were also reported between the Houthis and Abyan axis forces on the Aqabat Halhal front.

Conflict between armed groups

43. A large number of protests and conflicts in the governorates are between armed groups not associated with the Houthis. Conflict often occurs when these armed groups are not from the local population to which they are deployed.

44. In January 2023, the establishment of the National Shield Forces was formalized by the Presidential Leadership Council (see para. 12).³¹ The National Shield Forces are intended to be the reserve force of the President of the Presidential Leadership Council and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Rashad al-Alimi. Since then, they established a base in Aden³² and Lahij and replaced the 141st Infantry Brigade at the Wadi‘ah border crossing with Saudi Arabia in Hadramawt in May 2023.³³ On 27 April 2023, Al-Alimi established the Joint Operations Authority under the Minister of Defence.³⁴ The Authority is tasked with coordinating operations of various pro-government armed forces. Preventing factionalism among armed groups and to unite groups under a joint command remains a challenge.³⁵

45. Divergence of political interests between the Islah-affiliated First Military Region and the Hadrami Elite Forces, affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council in Hadramawt, led to community protests mobilized by opposing parties in Say‘un, Tarim and Qatan between 7 December 2022 and 13 January 2023. On 7 July, a shooting incident occurred at the Southern Transitional Council anniversary rally for “Homeland Day” in Say‘un, resulting in injuries to five people. Similar rallies were held in Mukalla, Qatan, Shihir, Tarim and Ghayl Ba Wazir.³⁶

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

46. AQAP maintains a strong presence in Abyan and Shabwah Governorates. Their operation, “Arrows of the truth”, continued into the current reporting period and grew in intensity in the governorates.³⁷ AQAP uses well-planned hit-and-run tactics against government forces and the Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces, operating in small groups, namely the Security Belt Forces, the Support and Backup Brigades

²⁹ See <https://english.news.cn/20230706/8dfd5bb97f7441b1a1b80943c6fb7093/c.html>; <https://twitter.com/suhailchannel/status/1676650702536318996>; <https://twitter.com/AdnanOdainy/status/1676657647167086603>; <https://twitter.com/RightsRadar/status/1676670372496789506>.

³⁰ See <https://arabic.news.cn/20230711/499a51646d3f4c84b5bc865038dde81a/c.html>.

³¹ See <https://sabanew.net/story/ar/94441?fbclid=IwAR0AjtFAi0xWkYu2ZiJXLJJVMLST8TSxULcSYoFdYuG3z7BZuqgQ7Okdg5g>.

³² Government of Yemen source.

³³ See <https://www.mei.edu/publications/changing-dynamics-reshape-power-networks-yemens-two-hadramawts>.

³⁴ See <https://www.sabanew.net/story/en/97208>.

³⁵ See <https://presidentialalimi.net/news588.html>; <https://sanaacenter.org>.

³⁶ See <https://south24.net/news/newse.php?nid=3434>; <https://twitter.com/Adelalhasanii/status/1677319129093619716>.

³⁷ See S/2023/95.

and the Shabwah Defence Forces. They make use of the mountainous areas, such as those around Wadi Amran, as cover. From December 2022 to April 2023, around 80 per cent of the incidents were reported in Abyan, followed by Shabwah and Ma’rib. However, since May 2023, a geographical shift in incidents has been observed, with half of the incidents currently in Shabwah. In Abyan, Mudiyah district faced most of the attacks launched by AQAP. These attacks are centred in Wadi Amran and nearby Baqirah, where government and Security Belt Forces counter-terrorism operations are also focused. Mahfad district and, to a lesser extent, Lawdar district also recorded incidents. On 10 May 2023, the Security Belt Forces launched a large-scale counter-terrorism operation in Mahfad district.³⁸ AQAP also maintains a presence in Hadramawt and Bayda’.

47. The Security Belt Forces were targeted in the majority of attacks by AQAP until the end of April 2023, but the Support and Backup Brigades and the Shabwah Defence Forces were also targeted. In May 2023, when a large percentage of attacks moved to Shabwah, the Shabwah Defence Forces became the main target. Focused intelligence led to uncrewed aerial vehicle and improvised explosive device attacks targeting commanders travelling in military vehicles.

48. On 16 May 2023, AQAP reportedly claimed an attack on the Shabwah Defence Forces with an uncrewed aerial vehicle using a 40-mm high-explosive grenade³⁹ and provided photo documentation from the on-board camera. AQAP does not often use uncrewed aerial vehicles in attacks. The first such attack was reported in April 2022.⁴⁰ Since then, AQAP has launched at least six such attacks, all on the Shabwah Defence Forces at Musayni‘ah in Sa‘id district in Shabwah. Reports indicate that AQAP members were redeployed to this area in May 2023.⁴¹ For example, on 24 May 2023, AQAP claimed to have injured the commander of the First Shabwah Defence Forces Brigade, Major Ahmed Mohsen al-Sulaimani. He was targeted, using an improvised explosive device, for a second time while on his way to the hospital in a military vehicle. AQAP regularly attacks wounded combatants, often while they are being transported in ambulances (see para. 115).⁴²

³⁸ See <https://en.adenpress.news/news/41703>.

³⁹ The Panel was not able to identify the grenade owing to the quality of the pictures.

⁴⁰ See <https://ent.siteintellgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/aqap-claims-weaponized-uav-strikes-on-shabwa-defense-forces-provides-photo-documentation.html>; <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1659486182613434369>.

⁴¹ Yemen Data Project; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (YEM80475), see <https://acleddata.com>.

⁴² See <https://ent.siteintellgroup.com>.

Figure III

Photo of an uncrewed aerial vehicle attack on Shabwah Defence Forces position on 16 May 2023 as claimed by AQAP

**40mm HE grenade**

Source: Analysis by the Panel of Experts based on information available at
<https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/>.

49. On 18 February 2023, AQAP announced a successful prisoners exchange for two of its members held by the Houthis.⁴³ The following day, the head of the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners' Affairs, Abdulqader al-Murtada, confirmed the prisoners exchange with three Houthi prisoners on the Shabwah front line.⁴⁴

50. On 3 June 2023, AQAP submitted a proof-of-life video for the Department of Safety and Security Field Coordination Officer in Aden, Akm Sufiul Anam, a Bangladeshi national, who was kidnapped on 11 February 2022 in Abyan with four national staff members.⁴⁵ The hostages were released on 11 August 2023.⁴⁶

⁴³ See <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/>.

⁴⁴ See <https://twitter.com/abdulqadermordt/status/1627357127625920512>.

⁴⁵ See <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/>.

⁴⁶ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139667>.

FSO *Safer*

51. On 9 March 2023, the United Nations Development Programme announced that it had entered into an agreement with Euronav⁴⁷ to purchase a very large crude carrier for \$55 million with the capacity to transfer crude oil from the FSO *Safer*. The VLCC *Nautica* was procured for the purpose.⁴⁸

52. The United Nations Development Programme contracted SMIT Salvage⁴⁹ to safely remove the oil and prepare the FSO *Safer* for towing to a green salvage yard. The Panel was informed that the total budget for the emergency phase of the project was \$121.2 million. The funding gap, for the salvage phase, stands at \$21.8 million.⁵⁰

53. On 25 July 2023, both the offshore support vessel *Ndeavor*, chosen for the purpose of salvage, and the *Nautica* (renamed *Yemen*) were at the location of the *Safer*, 4.8 nautical miles north of Hudaydah, and the ship-to-ship transfer of crude oil began. On 11 August 2023, the transfer of the 1.1 million barrels of oil from the FSO *Safer* to the *Yemen* was completed.⁵¹

54. While this averted a major environmental disaster, the issues pertaining to the ownership of the oil and of the *Yemen*, as well as of the sale proceeds of the *Safer*, remain unresolved.

IV. Maritime security

55. A total of three maritime security incidents involving vessels occurred off the coast of Yemen in territorial waters. In late August 2023, Mahdi al-Mashat threatened two companies that own the liquefied petroleum gas tankers *Sanmar Regent* and *Epic Bolivar* not to load gas at Aden port.⁵² The Panel's investigations revealed that the sailing pattern of the two vessels are consistent with the threat. On 25 August, the *Sanmar Regent* turned away 18 nautical miles from Aden. On 29 August, the *Epic Bolivar* made a 180-degree turn 430 nautical miles from Aden sailing back to Duqm, Oman. According to the automatic identification system (AIS), the vessel's destination was Aden.⁵³ In 2022, the Houthis sent similar threatening messages prior to attacks on oil tankers ([S/2023/130](#), para. 24).

⁴⁷ See <https://maritime-executive.com/article/euronav-tanker-departs-for-yemen-to-replace-decaying-fso-safer>.

⁴⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/remarks-pledging-event-fso-safer-operation-co-hosted-netherlands-and-united-kingdom-enar>.

⁴⁹ See <https://boskalis.com>.


⁵⁰ See <https://stories.undp.org/all-hands-on-deck>.

⁵¹ See <https://twitter.com/beleefboskalis>.

⁵² See Al-Mashat: We warn the Marines and British forces not to go too far in Yemen. Our hand is light on the trigger | Fields (almayadeen.net).

⁵³ See <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/products/maritime-ship-tracker-ais-live-ship-data-seaweb.html>.

Map 2
Maritime security incidents



Source: Panel of Experts.

56. On 17 March 2023, the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier *Arietta* came under fire⁵⁴ from armed men on a skiff, 38 nautical miles (70 km) south of the port of Hudaydah from a distance of 1 nautical mile. The on-board security team returned fire and the skiff turned away. The vessel was not using the Maritime Security Transit Corridor,⁵⁵ as recommended, and was travelling to the east of the Hanish Islands, as the captain was not aware of the security arrangement.⁵⁶ The Panel assessed that the incident is likely not linked to piracy or to the armed conflict in Yemen (see annex 7).

57. Tension in the Red Sea is currently high, with the Houthis establishing a naval presence on Kamaran Island, off Hudaydah. The Yemeni Coast Guard also has a base on the Zubayr Island group in the Red Sea, located approximately 44 nautical miles (82 km) west-south-west off Hudaydah. This situation places international shipping, especially small pleasure craft returning to the area after the suppression of Somali piracy, at risk. On 18 April, while under way to Djibouti, the crew of the motor yacht *30 Minutes* took shelter from severe weather at an anchorage off Saba Island, which is part of the Zubayr Island group. The crew were approached by a grey coast guard boat, which fired at them, hitting the boat once, after which *30 Minutes* fled the area. According to the crew, there were no radio warnings prior to the shooting. Arriving in Eritrea, the crew were detained for a week by national authorities, after a bullet hole in the hull of the yacht caught their attention. The crew established contact with the owner of the vessel after they reached Djibouti on 27 April 2023. According to the Yemeni Coast Guard, it is a procedural requirement to make radio contact before firing on a vessel. The Panel is awaiting a detailed report from the Yemeni Coast Guard on the incident (see annex 8).

58. On 27 April 2023, the yacht *Kalizma* left the port of Salalah, Oman. The *Kalizma* sailed towards the transit corridor off the coast of Yemen, under way to Egypt. She had a crew of 10 Indian nationals on board and an armed security team consisting of 1 Greek and 2 Indian nationals. Her route brought her through the territorial waters

⁵⁴ See https://msi.nga.mil/api/publications/download?key=16920958/SFH00000/wwtts_20230405100000.pdf&type=view.

⁵⁵ Military-established corridor on which naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts.

⁵⁶ Information received from Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa.

of Yemen about 6 nautical miles off the coast of Ra's Fartak and Haswayn, Mahrah Governorate⁵⁷ (see annex 9).

Map 3
AIS track of the charter yacht *Kalizma*



Source: <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/products/maritime-ship-tracker-ais-live-ship-data-seaweb.html>.

59. On the morning of 28 April 2023, two small boats from the Yemeni Coast Guard and a boat from the Yemeni Navy were on patrol in the area.⁵⁸ The patrol boats attempted to make radio contact with the yacht through the VHF radio, but the yacht captain did not respond to repeated calls. According to the Yemeni Coast Guard, the yacht was not flying a flag at the time while in the territorial waters and had armed guards on board. The Yemeni Coast Guard fired warning shots. Believing that they were under attack by pirates, the *Kalizma*'s crew issued a distress call, reporting that they were under attack by three skiffs, to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations,⁵⁹ which subsequently issued an alert of an ongoing attack, reporting that shots had been fired.⁶⁰

60. According to the Yemeni Coast Guard, one naval officer was killed and two Coast Guard personnel injured as a result of the exchange of fire.⁶¹ One of the armed guards on the *Kalizma* was reportedly injured by a bullet. On its arrival in Djibouti, Yemeni authorities requested the local authorities to detain the vessel.

Houthi naval exercise off Kamaran Island (see annex 10)

61. On 13 April 2023, the Houthis held a naval exercise⁶² off Kamaran Island, north of Hudaydah.⁶³ Multiple types of speedboats were displayed, which were equipped with various types of weapons, such as a 107-mm multiple-launch rocket system, as well as heavy and light machine guns (see para. 67).

⁵⁷ See <https://2dec.net/news60279.html#>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ See <https://www.ukmto.org/>.

⁶⁰ See <https://maritime-executive.com/article/attack-on-yacht-near-yemen-is-possible-incident-with-coast-guard>.

⁶¹ Government of Yemen sources.

⁶² See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs>. The account associated with this video was terminated in July 2023, and the video is no longer available.

⁶³ See https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1646671367608082432.

Figure IV
Houthi naval exercise: Kamaran Island



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs>. The account associated with this video was terminated in July 2023, and the video is no longer available.

Map 4
Attack near the Balhaf liquefied natural gas terminal



Source: Panel of Experts, based on Government of Yemen sources.

62. On 5 August 2023, at 3 a.m., an explosion was heard at the Balhaf liquefied natural gas facility (see para. 167).⁶⁴ The rocket landed approximately 2.5 km away from the Balhaf liquefied natural gas terminal, where a hole of about 2 m in diameter and debris of the rocket were detected. Electrical wires, a small mobile phone without a SIM card, several wooden launching pads and small pits in the sand were found at

⁶⁴ Government of Yemen sources.

the launch site. It was estimated that the perpetrators had fired more than one rocket, some of which had not exploded.⁶⁵

63. AQAP reportedly claimed having targeted a military base in the vicinity of the Balhaf gas facility with several 122-mm rockets (Grad) on 5 August.⁶⁶ AQAP has launched attacks on Balhaf, as well as its gas pipeline and nearby military bases, in the past, including on 6 April 2021.⁶⁷

V. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo

64. Pursuant to paragraphs 14 to 17 of Security Council resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), the Panel focuses on a range of monitoring and investigative activities to identify violations of the targeted arms embargo involving the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of, individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#). Pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), the Panel focuses on the commercially available components which have been used by individuals or entities designated by the Committee to assemble uncrewed aerial vehicles, remote-controlled waterborne improvised explosive devices, and other weapon systems.

65. The Panel analysed the material displayed by the Houthis during military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a in September 2022. The Panel investigated four new cases of maritime smuggling of arms and ammunition, including one related to electro-optical surveillance system and medium-range ballistic missile components and the smuggling by land of uncrewed aerial vehicle engines and large quantities of detonators and explosive chemical precursors. The Panel also investigated two diver propulsion vehicles⁶⁸ seized by the Government of Yemen in November 2022 and analysed debris of a missile launched in 2022 by the Houthis in Dabbah.

66. The Panel notes that the Government of Yemen made 10 seizures of material reportedly meant for the Houthis, in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

A. Maritime smuggling of small arms, related ammunition, electronic devices and ballistic missile components

1. Seizures by the United States

(a) *Marwan-I* vessel

67. On 1 December 2022, the fishing trawler *Marwan-I*, carrying a significant amount of ammunition, was interdicted by the United States in the Gulf of Oman. A total of 1,080,000 rounds of 7.62x54 Rmm ammunition for light machine guns, 25,000 rounds of 12.7x99 mm for anti-materiel rifles,⁶⁹ 6,960 fuzes for 122-mm rockets (Grad)⁷⁰ and 870 boxes of PG-7 strip propellants⁷¹ were recovered. Except for the 12.7x99 mm rounds, which are still under investigation by the Panel, the markings and packaging of the seized material are consistent with those manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on the documents found on board, which were

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ See <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/>.

⁶⁷ See <https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/al-qaeda-shows-signs-of-resurgence-in-yemen-1.1200037>.

⁶⁸ Also referred to as underwater scooters, used by scuba divers and military forces.

⁶⁹ Ammunition compatible with the AM-50 anti-materiel rifle ([S/2022/50](#), paras. 62 and 65, [S/2021/79](#), para. 85).

⁷⁰ Ammunition for multiple-launch rocket systems.

⁷¹ Ammunition for RPG-7.

provided to the Panel, the vessel originated from Bandar Abbas, Islamic Republic of Iran (see annexes 11–14).

(b) Stateless dhow

68. On 6 January 2023, a stateless dhow carrying a significant quantity of weapons was interdicted by the United States in the Gulf of Oman. A total of 1,918 Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China and 198 AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in the Russian Federation were recovered (see annexes 15 and 27).

2. Seizure by France

69. On 15 January 2023, a stateless dhow carrying a significant quantity of weapons and ammunition was interdicted by France in the Gulf of Oman. A total of 2,999 Type 56-1 and 100 AKS20U rifles, 50 light machine guns⁷² and 201 associated barrels with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Romania (see annexes 16–23 and 27), 23 Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missiles⁷³ ([S/2023/130](#), para. 56, [S/2021/79](#), para. 84 and annex 13, [S/2020/326](#), para. 52, and [S/2018/594](#), paras. 115 and 116 and annex 42) with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 578,400 ammunition of calibre 7.62x54 Rmm, also with markings and packaging similar to those manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, were interdicted (see annex 23).⁷⁴

3. Analysis of seized Type 56-1 and AKS20U rifles

70. The Panel notes that, since December 2017,⁷⁵ 22,152 Type 56-1 assault rifles have been seized, mostly at sea (see annexes 24–26).

71. A total of 1,406 Type 56-1 assault rifles bearing serial numbers belonging to the same batch as those seized in early 2023 have been reported by the Panel of Experts on Somalia, as seized at sea on 20 December 2021 by the United States ([S/2023/130](#), para. 42, and [S/2022/754](#), para. 104).

72. The Panel notes that the serial numbers of the 298 AKS20U rifles seized are part of the same batch (see annex 28).

73. The Panel has not received responses from China and the Russian Federation regarding the chain of custody of the seized weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that it did not produce this material.

4. Seizure by the United Kingdom

74. On 25 February 2023, a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran and travelling at high speed in international waters was interdicted by the United Kingdom in the Gulf of Oman. According to the United Kingdom, the crew was of

⁷² The Panel notes that light machine guns with similar technical characteristics and markings have been recorded many times in seizures since 2018 ([S/2022/50](#), para. 65 and annexes 19 and 20, figures 19.7, 20.6 and 20.7).

⁷³ The Panel notes that anti-tank guided missiles with similar characteristics and markings have been recorded several times in seizures ([S/2023/130](#), para. 56, [S/2021/79](#), para. 84 and annex 13, figure 13.1, and [S/2020/326](#), para. 52 and annex 20, figures 20.1 and 20.2).

⁷⁴ Headstamps and lot numbers marked on the battle packs indicate that most of the 7.62x54 Rmm ammunition was produced in 2006.

⁷⁵ Since December 2017, 30,830 small arms and light weapons have been seized, mostly at sea (see annex 27).

Iranian nationality. Seven Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missiles, including four with a thermobaric warhead (see annex 29), and components of an electro-optical surveillance system⁷⁶ and of a medium-range ballistic missile (an inertial navigation system, 6 nose cones and 16 jet vanes) were recovered.⁷⁷ All this material presents technical characteristics similar to that manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

75. The Panel has documented similar inertial navigation systems found in: (a) the debris of the Borkan-2H⁷⁸ launched on 25 March and 11 April 2018 against Saudi Arabia; (b) the debris of the Borkan-3⁷⁹ launched on 17 January 2022 against the United Arab Emirates; and (c) the debris of one of the Iranian Qiam ([S/2018/594](#), para. 90) launched on 8 January 2020⁸⁰ against a United States base located in Erbil, northern Iraq (see annexes 30–37). The last was claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁸¹

76. The technical characteristics of the components seized by the United Kingdom are similar to those of the Rezvan medium-range ballistic missile, which belongs to the Qiam series produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.⁸²

5. Seizures by the Government of Yemen

(a) Electric detonators and detonating cord

77. On 13 August 2020, 40,000 electric detonators and 100 reels of detonating cord⁸³ were reportedly seized by the Amaliqah Brigades on the coast, close to Ra's al-Arah, Lahij Governorate, where they were being offloaded from an unidentified boat. A sticker affixed on a crate shows the consignee as Wahah Trading Company, located in Djibouti⁸⁴ (see annex 38). The Panel is investigating the case to identify the producer of these items and their final destination.

78. According to a Panel source, similar detonating cords manufactured in June 2020 were observed in the black market in Houthi-controlled areas in December 2021.

(b) Non-electric detonators

79. On 24 April 2021, a truck transporting 1.5 million non-electric detonators was reportedly intercepted by the Amaliqah Brigades in Ta'izz Governorate (see annex 39).

80. The marking visible on one of the crates indicates 27 February 2021 as the date of manufacture and Gulf Oil Corporation Limited,⁸⁵ a company registered in India, as the producer.⁸⁶ On a sticker affixed to the crate, Wahah Trading Company is mentioned as the consignee (see para. 77).

81. The Panel observed that, between 9 March and 25 October 2021, Wahah Trading Company received four other shipments for a total of 225 tons of chemical products

⁷⁶ Also designated EOSS-I-103.

⁷⁷ The components seized are sufficient for at least four medium-range ballistic missiles.

⁷⁸ The characteristics of Borkan-2H are similar to those of Qiam-1, produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁷⁹ The characteristics of Borkan-3 are similar to those of Qiam-2, produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

⁸⁰ This attack was part of the military operation code named Operation Martyr Soleimani, conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (see <https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2988080/>).

⁸¹ See <https://www.memri.org/tv/general-hajizadeh-irgac-aerospace-missile-attack-us-iraq-beginning-revenge-casualties-arab-countries-expel-region-else>.

⁸² See <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2022/09/22/Iran-unveils-new-medium-range-ballistic-missile-during-Parade-State-TV->.

⁸³ Each reel is made of 250 m of detonating cord.

⁸⁴ Wahah Trading Company does not have a website and has virtually no online presence.

⁸⁵ Detonating cords exported by Gulf Oil Corporation Limited were documented by Conflict Armament Research in 2015 (see <https://www.conflictarm.com/reports/weapons-of-the-islamic-state/>).

⁸⁶ The Panel is currently examining the elements provided by India in its response.

identified as potential components for the preparation of explosives and/or missile propellant. The Panel is investigating if this material has been transferred to the Houthis in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

82. Djibouti did not respond to the request of the Panel to provide information on Wahah Trading Company.

83. The Panel notes that non-electric detonators with similar characteristics are largely used by the Houthis in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices and landmines of various models. According to Panel sources, there are reportedly more than 2.5 million improvised explosive devices and anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines that have been planted by the Houthis,⁸⁷ mainly on the front lines. The Panel was not able to independently verify these data. Nevertheless, considering an average of 5 kg of explosive chemical material required to manufacture one device planted by the Houthis, the Panel estimates that around 12,500 tons of such explosive chemical material would have been acquired by the Houthis in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

84. According to an analyst specializing in landmines, a large number of those planted by the Houthis since 2018 were manufactured locally by them.

(c) Explosive precursor chemicals

85. Based on the investigation report shared by the Security Belt Forces, nearly 5 tons of chemical products, namely aluminium powder, iron oxide powder, rice glue powder and phenolic resin, as well machine gun spare parts, drones, optics and machinery suspected to be used in the production of weapons, were seized by the Security Belt Forces in Aden on 17 and 22 February 2023 in the Burayqah district of Aden, after they were imported from a Chinese company through Aden's container port. The material was being transported in two shipping containers and arrangements were made for the consignment to be collected in Aden by three drivers from north Yemen.⁸⁸ According to the Security Belt Forces, the material was destined to the Houthis (see annexes 40 and 41).

86. The Panel noted that this shipment of aluminium powder was described as "flower gum" by the exporter, which raises the likelihood that this consignment was most probably imported for illicit purposes. Finely powdered aluminium can be used as a precursor for homemade explosives, and the Houthis are known to have utilized ammonium nitrate aluminium explosives and aluminium chlorates explosives in their improvised devices. In addition, aluminium powder can be mixed with ammonium perchlorate to produce a powerful rocket fuel. The Panel documented an attempt to smuggle ammonium perchlorate into Yemen, which was interdicted in the Gulf of Oman on 7 November 2022 ([S/2023/130](#), para. 48). The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

(d) Two diver propulsion vehicles

87. In November 2022, two diver propulsion vehicles with markings consistent with those manufactured by Bonex GmbH, a company located in Germany, and those of model Constellation HP,⁸⁹ were found in Ataq by the Coalition forces, shortly after a failed uncrewed aerial vehicle attack by the Houthis on the oil port of Qanah,

⁸⁷ Some of the anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines were seized by the Houthis in 2014–2015 from the stockpiles of the Government of Yemen.

⁸⁸ After the seizure of the materials and detention of the drivers, text messages from the owner of the importing company were found on a mobile phone belonging to one driver, asking if the aluminium powder was cleared by customs as "flower gum", as described in the export invoice.

⁸⁹ Presented by the producer as military material (see <http://www.military-dpv.de>).

Shabwah Governorate ([S/2023/130](#), paras. 23 and 24 and annex 6) (see annex 42). Following the seizure, the material was reportedly destroyed at the request of the Government of Yemen.

88. According to a source, diver propulsion vehicles operated by the Houthis' naval commando unit were reported in the region of Hudaydah.

89. The Panel notes that the documented diver propulsion vehicles are similar to those exhibited in early March 2023 during a military display held in the region of Arvand Kenar, Khuzestan Province, Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 43).

90. Bonex did not respond to the Panel's request, and German authorities requested that the Panel give more time to investigate this matter.

(e) One hundred uncrewed aerial vehicle engines

91. On 31 December 2022, a truck entering Yemen through the Shahn border crossing from Oman was intercepted by Yemeni customs. According to Yemeni authorities, the truck was in violation of the legal entry regulations and the driver failed to provide the required documents for the shipment. The driver managed to escape. The importer, who was questioned by Yemeni customs, claimed that the truck was carrying a shipment of clothes.

92. According to documents available to the Panel, the shipment contained 100 DLE 170 uncrewed aerial vehicle engines ([S/2023/130](#), annex 5, figure 5.26, [S/2021/79](#), annex 12, figure 12.3, [S/2020/326](#), para. 62, and [S/2019/83](#), para. 85 and annex 12) with similar characteristics to those manufactured in China (see annexes 44–47).⁹⁰

93. The Panel observes that DLE 170 engines have been mounted on the Samad-3 attack uncrewed aerial vehicle ([S/2023/130](#), annex 5, figure 5.26) operated by the Houthis. Considering the number of drone engines seized, it cannot be ruled out that the Houthis are reinforcing their uncrewed aerial vehicle attack capabilities.

(f) Various material (see annexes 48–50)

94. In August 2023, the Security Belt Forces informed the Panel that they recently seized a shipment of 30 pistols in Aden.

95. The Yemeni customs authorities informed the Panel that, on 12 March 2023, they seized 54 uncrewed aerial vehicles at the Shahn border crossing. On 22 March 2023, at the Shahn border post, 2,990 tactical belts were seized. Furthermore, on 21 May 2023, 5,175 pistol holsters, 1,232 pairs of tactical gloves and 498 night vision binoculars were seized at the same border crossing. They also informed the Panel that a shipment of 40 pistol boxes with the Glock GmbH factory logo of an unspecified model was seized on 23 June 2023 at the Shahn border crossing.

96. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel of the seizure in February 2023, in Aden Governorate, of 200 drones equipped with surveillance cameras, 4 anti-tank guided missile launching posts and 15 associated missiles, as well as 200 oxygen cylinders for scuba divers and naval communication equipment.

97. On 31 August 2023, the Houthi commander of the Coastal Defence Brigade allegedly stated that the Houthis had developed their naval capabilities during the truce.⁹¹

⁹⁰ The model of these engines is similar to one of the models of Samad uncrewed aerial vehicles used by the Houthis ([S/2023/130](#), annex 5, figure 5.26, [S/2021/79](#), annex 12, figure 12.3, [S/2020/326](#), para. 64, and [S/2019/83](#), para. 87).

⁹¹ See <https://twitter.com/ZiadAlyama6259/status/1697312341426049229>.

98. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis are the end user of this material. The response of the Government of Yemen to the Panel's requests for information and inspection of the seized material remains pending.

B. Documented missile attacks and uncrewed aerial vehicle reconnaissance on government-controlled areas

Quds-2 cruise missile launched on Dabbah oil terminal

99. On 21 November 2022, the oil terminal of Dabbah, Hadramawt Governorate, was attacked by a cruise missile ([S/2023/130](#), para. 37, figure III and annex 9). This attack was later claimed by the Houthis (see annexes 51–53).

100. The Panel inspected the debris on 25 June 2023. The technical characteristics and markings are consistent with the Quds cruise missile⁹² documented by the Panel after the following attacks: on 14 September 2019 ([S/2020/326](#), para. 54 and annex 14); on 23 November 2020 on the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) petroleum distribution facilities in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia ([S/2022/50](#), annex 16); on 17 January 2022 on the Abu Dhabi international airport and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company fuel depot, United Arab Emirates ([S/2023/130](#), para. 17 and annex 5, figures 5.11–5.19); and on 28 January 2022 on a skiff seized by the United Kingdom reportedly moving at a very high speed from the Iranian coastline in the direction of Oman.

C. Large-scale display of military material by the Houthis

101. The Panel notes that, on 1 and 22 September 2022, the Houthis conducted large-scale military parades in Hudaydah⁹³ and Sana'a⁹⁴ ([S/2023/130](#), annex 10).

102. According to the Government of Yemen, there were about 25,000 uniformed participants in these parades. It also observed that some of the material on display included ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, electro-optical surveillance systems and small arms and light weapons that were not in the possession of the Armed Forces of the Government of Yemen prior to 2015. Of the 63 items being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo,⁹⁵ only 12 have been previously documented (see annexes 54–74).

103. The Panel is investigating the capacity of the Houthis to develop, test, produce or reassemble, and operate the sophisticated materials displayed during the parades.

D. Black market

104. The Panel notes that various models of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence system and anti-tank guided missiles, are reportedly offered for sale in the black market, especially in the Houthi-controlled cities of Sana'a and Sa'dah ([S/2015/125](#), paras. 148 and 149).

105. In the material reportedly offered for sale, the Panel finds Type 56-1 and AKS20U rifles (see paras. 68–73) with serial numbers consistent with those seized at

⁹² Three models of this cruise missile have been successively developed: Quds 1, 2 and 3.

⁹³ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>.

⁹⁴ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4>.

⁹⁵ Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEI.004) reportedly stated during the 1 September 2022 parade: “Our blessed army is true to its homeland, and work is under way on further developing the army” (see <https://english.almanar.com.lb/1680318>).

sea (see annexes 75 and 76). The Panel believes that there are other transfers of weapons that have not been interdicted by any of the relevant authorities, which reached Houthi-controlled areas.

106. The Panel considers that the unregulated sales of small arms and light weapons contribute to their proliferation in the subregion, which can undermine peace, security and stability in Yemen and beyond. Moreover, the nature of specific material such as man-portable air defence systems could generate the interest of armed groups, including terrorist groups, and consequently it presents a threat to civil aviation security. The Panel's investigation is ongoing.

Pistols belonging to the same batch documented in Yemen and Somalia

107. The Panel notes that CF98-9 pistols with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China are also offered for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.⁹⁶ The Panel observes that pistols with the same batch number have been documented by the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Panel of Experts on Somalia. For example, the Panel of Experts on Somalia documented the pistols used by the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin (Al-Shabaab) (SOe.001) in an assassination attempt in August 2019 ([S/2019/858](#), annex 2.6, figure 6), belonging to the same batch as and bearing a serial number separated by 18 digits from another pistol documented by the Panel of Experts on Yemen (see annex 77). Five other CF98-9 pistols with serial numbers consistent with those mentioned above were also documented by researchers in Somalia in 2021. The Panel of Experts on Yemen believes the existence of a closely coordinated smuggling network that operates between Yemen and Somalia, receiving weapons from a common source.

Smuggling of G3 assault rifles retrofitted in Yemen into Sudan

108. The Panel observes that, since June 2023, multiple sources have been reporting about the presence in the hands of the Rapid Support Forces⁹⁷ of G3, which are being retrofitted in Houthi-controlled areas, since mid-April 2023 (see annex 78). These are reportedly being used in the ongoing armed conflict in the Sudan. The Panel believes the existence of a closely coordinated smuggling network that operates between Yemen and the Sudan.

VI. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law

109. Pursuant to paragraphs 9, 17, 18 and 21 of Security Council resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), read together with paragraph 19 of resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) and paragraph 6 of resolution [2511 \(2020\)](#), the Panel continued to investigate violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in Yemen, including obstructions to the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

110. Civilians, including children, continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing conflict and are exposed to major threats such as the widespread presence of explosive remnants of war, particularly landmines, strikes against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the unregulated proliferation of weapons. Most violations investigated by the Panel during the reporting period are attributed to the Houthis.

⁹⁶ In July 2023, the price of a CF98-9 pistol was around \$1,600 in Sana'a, which is about four to five times the average cost of this weapon in the regular market.

⁹⁷ Paramilitary force operating in the Sudan (see [S/2023/325](#)).

A. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure

111. Parties to the conflict continued to perpetrate indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects in violation of international humanitarian law.

112. Incidents investigated by the Panel include attacks that caused damage to civilian infrastructure and had an adverse impact on the daily life of people living in Yemen and on their access to basic services.

113. Despite the decrease in violence in several locations on the front lines since the truce agreement in April 2022, the number of civilian casualties remained high, owing notably to an increase in the casualties caused by explosive remnants of war.

1. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects

114. The Panel investigated numerous attacks allegedly perpetrated by various parties to the conflict. According to data accessed by the Panel, from December 2022 to 31 August 2023, there were 1,436 civilian casualties, of whom 253 were children, and 341 attacks on civilian infrastructure,⁹⁸ mainly residential buildings and vehicles. Sa‘dah Governorate saw the highest number of recorded civilian casualties each reporting month, except for July 2023, when most casualties were documented in Ta’izz Governorate.⁹⁹

115. Among the various incidents, there appears to be an increasing trend in targeting ambulances, including military ambulances, primarily by AQAP.

Figure V

AQAP attack on an ambulance on 5 May 2023 in Abyan Governorate that reportedly resulted in the death of the driver



Source: <https://adnlng.info/news/213825/>.

2. Civilian casualties from landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance

116. Civilians in Yemen continue to be exposed to threats related to landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance, which have caused many civilian casualties, particularly children. July 2023 saw the highest number of recorded child casualties as a result of explosive remnants of war (23, of whom 9 died) since the beginning of the year.¹⁰⁰

117. Between 1 December 2022 and 31 August 2023, incidents involving explosive remnants of war, including landmines and unexploded ordnance, resulted in 417

⁹⁸ With an impact on 1,116 units.

⁹⁹ See <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

civilian casualties, including 140 deaths and 277 injuries. Hudaydah, Jawf, Ma'rib and Ta'izz Governorates were among the most affected. For example, on 25 July an unexploded ordnance in Wadi Abidah, in Ma'rib district, exploded, killing a man, his wife, his mother, and five children. Two more children were injured in the blast.¹⁰¹

118. The Panel received reports on various locations in which mines and improvised explosive devices were concealed in rural villages to target returning populations after the Houthis left those areas. Typically, the Houthis position anti-personnel mines in and around schools, mosques, houses, including under mattresses, wells, and other water sources.

3. Attacks on vulnerable groups, including religious minorities and migrants

119. The Panel investigated cases of indiscriminate attacks perpetrated against minority groups. For example, on 25 May 2023, in Sana'a, Houthi forces abducted 17 people belonging to the Baha'i community, including 5 women, who were holding a meeting to elect their national governing body.¹⁰² The raid was videorecorded by one of the participants connected via Zoom.¹⁰³ Eleven of them are still detained, including two women.¹⁰⁴

120. Migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Yemen, particularly women and children, face systematic violations of their rights. The Panel received credible reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including rape, especially against Ethiopian migrants, perpetrated by smuggling gangs allegedly connected to some parties to the conflict. According to data shared with the Panel by the International Organization for Migration and government sources, there are an estimated 200,000 migrants in Yemen, including asylum-seekers and refugees, mostly Ethiopian (89 per cent) and Somali (see annex 79).¹⁰⁵

B. Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance

121. All parties to the conflict have arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared men, women and children, primarily for their perceived association with opposing parties, for counter-terrorism purposes, or for ransom. Civilians subjected to detention and enforced disappearance include, but are not limited to, human rights and civil society activists, national and international staff working for local and international organizations, and journalists. In some instances, the missing or detained men are often the sole breadwinners in their families and are perceived by their communities as regular Yemeni citizens with no political or military affiliation.

122. Panel investigations revealed that, in some cases where disappeared men were believed to be dead, their wives remarried and their inheritance was distributed among the descendants, so when the men were released, they had nothing left. This made their dreadful situation deteriorate further, leading some of them to commit suicide.

123. The Panel has also received reports of Houthi and government prisons' staff preventing detainees from obtaining the humanitarian relief items provided to them by the relevant aid agencies. Instead, prison staff reportedly kept the goods for themselves.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² See <https://www.bic.org/news/armed-houthis-attack-peaceful-bahai-gathering-arresting-least-17-fresh-crackdown>.

¹⁰³ See <https://twitter.com/BahaiBIC/status/1661762453577822210>.

¹⁰⁴ See <https://twitter.com/AmnestyMENA/status/1697897155598422468>.

¹⁰⁵ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-quarterly-migration-overview-january-march-2023>.

1. Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

124. The Panel investigated several cases of men, women and children detained or forcibly disappeared who have been and continue to be subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

125. Based on the evidence gathered by the Panel, including medical reports, Houthi-held prisoners are subjected to systematic psychological and physical torture, including the denial of medical intervention to cure the injuries caused by the torture inflicted, which for some prisoners resulted in permanent disabilities and death. The Panel documented cases of torture perpetrated by the Houthis in various official and unofficial detention facilities, including in the prison located in the central security camp in Sana'a, also known as Exchange House prison, and operated by the head of the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners' Affairs, Abdulqader Al-Murtada (see annex 80).

126. Women are held by the Houthis for various conflict-related reasons, including for their perceived affiliation with opposing parties to the conflict, their political affiliation, their involvement in civil society organizations or human rights activism, or for so-called “indecent acts”. Among them, two known Yemeni models¹⁰⁶ were arbitrarily detained in February 2021 and sentenced in November of the same year to five years in prison.¹⁰⁷ Women held by the Houthis are subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including by the Zaynabiyat.¹⁰⁸ Women in detention are also sexually assaulted, in some cases subjected to virginity tests, and are often prevented from gaining access to essential goods, including feminine hygiene products. In August 2023, the Houthis referred the human rights activist Fatima al-Arouli, detained since August 2022, to their specialized criminal court.¹⁰⁹

127. The rulings delivered by the Houthi specialized criminal court, or other Houthi courts, are perceived as fatwas, so they carry judicial as well as religious weight which can have major long-term implications in the life of the people convicted, particularly concerning their safety once they are released.

128. Based on the reports received by the Panel, the Houthis are also detaining children as young as 13 years old. Some of them are considered “ethical cases” and are accused of “indecent acts” for their alleged homosexual orientation. Other children detained are considered “political cases”, often for their or their families’ lack of compliance with Houthi ideology or regulations (see para. 142). These children share the same cells as adult prisoners. The Panel received credible reports that boys held in Al-Shahid Al-Ahmar police station in Sana'a are systematically subjected to rape.

129. The Panel received multiple reports of torture and ill-treatment against prisoners held by the Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces. The journalist Ahmed Maher ([S/2023/130](#), para. 108) is still detained in Bi'r Ahmad prison, reportedly subjected to torture and ill-treatment (see annex 81). The Panel also gathered credible evidence that Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces are systematically torturing men in official and secret prisons, including in Waddah (وضاح) secret prison in Aden Governorate, which reportedly resulted in the death of men whose whereabouts were and still are unknown.

¹⁰⁶ Intisar al-Hammadi and Yousra al-Nashiri.

¹⁰⁷ See <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/30/yemen-houthis-subject-model-unfair-trial>. Al-Nashiri was released in May 2023 reportedly to undertake medical treatments.

¹⁰⁸ Female police wing of the Houthis.

¹⁰⁹ See <https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/16907987028629920>.

130. The Panel also received reports of torture and ill-treatment against prisoners held by government-affiliated forces, including against women detained in the political security prison in Ma’rib, mainly for their perceived association with the Houthis. Upon her release, Samira Marsh (see para. 134), who reportedly belongs to the Muhamasheen minority,¹¹⁰ denounced the torture to which she was reportedly subjected while held in detention for about five years. The National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights¹¹¹ is investigating these allegations.

131. AQAP continues to abduct and forcibly disappear Yemenis and foreigners and to deprive them of their liberty. In August 2023, four national staff and one international staff of the Department of Safety and Security were released after 18 months in captivity by the group (see para. 50), reportedly in terrible conditions. The whereabouts of most AQAP detainees remain unknown.

2. Release of detainees in the framework of the Stockholm Agreement

132. During the reporting period, the third round of prisoners exchange took place in the framework of the Stockholm Agreement.¹¹²

133. In March 2023, the Coalition and the Houthis agreed to release 887 prisoners during a three-day period.¹¹³ From 14 to 16 April 2023, the Coalition released 706 prisoners in exchange for 181 released by the Houthis. Among the prisoners released by the Houthis, there reportedly were 16 Saudi and three Sudanese soldiers, while the remainder were primarily civilians, who were treated as prisoners of war.

134. Only one woman, who was detained for her alleged association with the Houthis and her involvement in mobilizing other women to join the de facto authority, was among the released prisoners (see para. 130). Several high-profile detainees were released by the Houthis, including the brother of the former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and the son of Tariq Saleh. The four journalists detained by the de facto authority since June 2015 and sentenced to death by Houthi-appointed Judge Mohamed Mufleh in the Houthi specialized criminal court in October 2020¹¹⁴ were also included in the exchange following extensive negotiations that lasted years.¹¹⁵

C. Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence

135. The Panel documented cases of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by parties to the conflict in Yemen, including cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence against men, women and children, which remained severely underreported, owing mainly to the stigma associated with these violations. The Panel received reports of sexual violence against men and women in detention facilities, primarily as a means of torture and attributed mostly to the Houthis. Several cases of sexual violence perpetrated against young boys in detention facilities or police stations by the Houthis were also reported to the Panel (see paras. 128 and 145). Rape is also systematically perpetrated by trafficking gangs affiliated with some parties to the conflict against migrants, including asylum-seekers and refugees mainly from the Horn of Africa (see annex 79).

¹¹⁰ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/2022-yemen-muhamasheen-community-profile-survey-conducted-muhamasheen-populations-irg-controlled-areas-yemen-2022>.

¹¹¹ See https://www.nciye.org/en/?page_id=105.

¹¹² See S/2018/1134 and Security Council resolution 2451 (2018).

¹¹³ See <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-parties-agree-release-hundreds-conflict-related-detainees>.

¹¹⁴ S/2021/79, annex 27.

¹¹⁵ S/2022/50, annex 34, S/2021/79, annex 34, and S/2019/83, para. 153.

136. The Panel gathered evidence on the challenges that women and girls are facing as a result of the conflict, including the establishment or enforcement of ad hoc regulations or measures imposed by some of the parties to the conflict.

137. The Panel received numerous reports of women prevented from travelling in Houthi-controlled areas, including to receive medical treatment abroad, in the absence of a *mahram*.¹¹⁶ In some situations, despite having the required alternative certifications signed by their *mahram* or relevant sheikh in accordance with current regulations, women and girls were still not allowed to travel. In some instances, in the absence of adult male guardians, women must travel with the closest male relatives, including very young boys. Women human rights activists, or those with a perceived affiliation to an opposing political party, are detained by the Houthis for long periods and often forced to pay a fine or sign documents pledging adherence to the newly imposed restrictions.

138. The humanitarian operations conducted by the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations in Yemen have been severely hampered by the Houthi-enforced *mahram* regulations. This resulted in a change in the terms of reference of female staff, who are now dedicated mainly to office work (see para. 148).

139. The *mahram* requirement is strictly enforced in Houthi-controlled areas, and particularly in the Governorates of Amran, Hajjah, Hudaydah and Sa‘dah. Nevertheless, it has reportedly become an anecdotal requirement for travels in some particularly conservative areas under government control, specifically in Abyan and Lahij Governorates.

140. Another increasing trend is the gender segregation and other limitative measures imposed by the Houthis in public spaces, including in universities (see annex 82). The Sana'a University Faculty of Mass Communication was among the first targeted, through the circular issued by the Houthi-affiliated University Student Forum in July 2023, which announced that male and female students would attend classes during separate days of the week (see annex 83). The Panel believes that these directives, together with others targeting younger students, are part of a broader conflict-related campaign that is severely undermining women and girls in Yemen.

141. The Panel gathered numerous pieces of evidence of the use of public defamation, usually involving allegations of prostitution, against Yemeni women, including diaspora women. Women currently or previously engaged in politics, civil society organizations or human rights activism also receive personal threats, including death threats, and threats against their family members. This type of violence, which includes online harassment through social media, has a severe negative impact on these women, particularly given the conservative nature of Yemeni society (see annex 84). Most of these cases were attributed to the Houthis.

D. Violations of children’s rights

142. The Panel documented a broad spectrum of conflict-related violations of children’s rights perpetrated by parties to the conflict, which are particularly concerning, given the indelible impact of these violations on the future Yemeni generations. In particular, the changes in the education curriculum recently undertaken and the systematic campaign of indoctrination to ensure the population’s adherence to the Houthi ideology¹¹⁷ are fuelling an environment founded on hatred,

¹¹⁶ On *mahram* in Yemen, see also AL OTH 124/2022 (<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27718>) and the reply of Yemen (<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=37376>).

¹¹⁷ See also S/2023/130, paras. 95–98, S/2022/50, paras. 42, 43 and 123 and annex 10, and S/2020/326, para. 120.

violence and discrimination, with a core military component, all of which are severely undermining peace, security and stability in Yemen (see annex 85).

Figure VI

Young girl holding a baby girl wearing a headband saying, “Who loves you is a believer, and who hates you is a hypocrite”, with the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”, during a religious festivity in Hajjah Governorate



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235831/>.

Recruitment and use of children

143. The Panel verified an increasing trend in children being subjected to military propaganda and training, particularly in the context of the summer camps, which in 2023 reportedly involved more than 1 million Yemeni children living in Houthi-controlled areas.¹¹⁸ While positive steps were allegedly taken by the Houthis upon the signature of an action plan with the United Nations in April 2022 to end and prevent this violation, the evidence gathered shows the opposite trend.¹¹⁹

144. The summer camps in Houthi-controlled areas took place between May and June 2023 in nine governorates¹²⁰ under three modalities: (a) open summer camps, for boys and girls between 6 and 12 years old;¹²¹ (b) model summer camps, for boys and girls between 6 and 17 years old;¹²² and (c) closed (residential) summer camps, where boys between 13 and 17 years old spend between 30 and 45 days without returning home. Only teachers are allowed to gain access to the residential centres, where military training is reportedly taking place. The Panel documented that children as young as 10 years old are exposed to military training. The Houthis are also giving monetary incentives to promote a higher attendance rate in the summer camps, by waiving the registration fees for the next school year (see annex 86).

145. Children are often recruited through coercion and threats to their families. Credible reports received by the Panel indicate that families living in Houthi-controlled areas that refuse to send their children to join Houthi forces or that are openly not aligned with Houthi ideology are subjected to retribution. These include the removal of the family from the lists of beneficiaries entitled to humanitarian assistance, and the abduction and detention of the concerned children, who are subjected to various forms of ill-treatment, including sexual violence (see para. 135). In other cases, children are forcibly taken to the closed summer camps and subsequently sent to the front lines.

¹¹⁸ The Houthis claimed that more than 700,000 children attended the summer camps in 2022, while in 2023 they were aiming to enrol 1.5 million children (see https://www.saba.ye/ar/news/3236884.htm?file_id=1).

¹¹⁹ Including Houthi-owned media platforms.

¹²⁰ Sa‘dah, Amran, Raymah, Hajjah, Ibb, Dali‘, Ma’rib, Bayda’ and Jawf.

¹²¹ From first to seventh grade of primary school.

¹²² Primary and secondary school.

E. Obstruction of delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance

146. The humanitarian situation in Yemen is extremely dire as a result of more than eight years of protracted conflict. The humanitarian response continues to be severely underfunded, depriving thousands of people of vital humanitarian assistance.

147. There has been a notable increase in disinformation against humanitarian workers, which further hampered their operations. The ongoing spread of unfounded rumours on the effectiveness of vaccines, and various operational impediments, continued in Houthi-controlled areas. This had a negative impact on children's timely access to vaccines for preventable diseases such as poliomyelitis, measles, tetanus and diphtheria.¹²³

148. *Mahram*-related movement restrictions on female national staff have severely affected their ability to deliver the necessary services for women and girls, especially reproductive health services (see para. 137). These limitations are also affecting male humanitarian workers as a result of delays at checkpoints or other bureaucratic impediments.

149. The limited flights to and from Sana'a airport hindered people living in Houthi-controlled areas from receiving medical treatment abroad.

150. Funding shortages are having an adverse impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In particular, the recent decision of the World Food Programme to initially interrupt the malnutrition prevention activities as of August 2023, and the subsequent decision to further cut its funding,¹²⁴ is of major concern as people in Yemen, especially children in severe acute malnutrition state, are fully relying on international humanitarian aid for their survival.

151. Interference in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and obstructions imposed by some parties to the conflict continue. The Panel received some reports of delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance caused by bureaucratic hurdles imposed by the Government of Yemen, as well as multiple reports on the collection of illegal fees¹²⁵ from convoys transporting humanitarian items at checkpoints by the Houthis and other armed groups. Prolonged delays imposed by the Houthis in the delivery of humanitarian goods reportedly resulted in the delivery of expired food and medicines to the population.

152. The Panel received multiple reports of diversion of humanitarian funding and relief items being sold, including in detention facilities, by the Houthis, as well as the removal of beneficiaries from the lists of beneficiaries by the de facto authority due to opposing political affiliations or to their refusal to abide by imposed regulations.

¹²³ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-bulletin-7-june-2023-enar>.

¹²⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/wfp-facing-critical-funding-shortage-yemen-threatening-vital-food-assistance>.

¹²⁵ S/2023/130, para. 60.

VII. Economic and financial issues

A. Economic issues posing a potential threat to peace, security and stability

1. Overview

153. The economic issues plaguing Yemen are now so closely intertwined with the broader political and conflict situation that they can no longer be seen as being “economic” in nature alone; rather, they are issues posing a grave threat to the peace, security and stability of Yemen. The continuing conflict and the fragmented macro- and microeconomic policy responses by authorities have aggravated the already fragile economic situation. Despite economic issues being a key theme in political and diplomatic dialogues over the past few months, failure to find a common ground stalled the peace talks.

154. The continuing deterioration of the economic situation in the government-controlled areas, including high rates of inflation, depreciation of the Yemeni rial, and poor public service delivery, especially for electricity, has been exploited by political parties in the south. Economic issues have consequently assumed political dimensions, resulting in civil unrest in several cities. These issues also sharply divided the north and the south, leading to a resurgence of a political movement demanding equity, fair play and justice for individuals residing in government-controlled areas. The separatist and secessionist tendencies seem to be innate in these political outbursts, influenced by the learnings from the past and the desire to achieve self-determination for the south.

155. These contentious, unresolved economic concerns threaten not only the ongoing peace process but also the unity and integrity of Yemen.

2. Economic war

156. The Houthis appear to have deployed a calibrated set of coercive economic measures to incapacitate the Government of Yemen and prevent it from functioning as a Government. The Minister of Foreign and Expatriates Affairs of the Government of Yemen stated that the Houthis aimed to use “hunger as a weapon in their aggression”.¹²⁶

(a) Fragmentation of the banking and financial system

157. The takeover of the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a meant that the Houthis had access to massive deposits in the Central Bank and complete control over the banking sector. This triggered the establishment of a parallel central bank in Aden by the Government of Yemen. Over the years, in order for each to assert its authority over the other, the two adverse regulatory regimes have often issued contradictory directions with punitive implications for non-compliance (see annexes 87–89). This administrative bifurcation poses a major challenge to the economic stability of Yemen.

Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank – Aden

158. On 19 May 2021, the Houthis issued circular No. 70 (2021) directing exchange companies and institutions not to deal with the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank, operating in government-controlled areas (see annex 90). Subsequently, the Houthi-affiliated Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation issued circular No. 2084 warning

¹²⁶ See <https://twitter.com/BinmubarakAhmed/status/1681646871285047296>.

international organizations and others not to deal with banks and exchange companies not authorized by the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana'a, including the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit bank, if they were to operate in Houthi-controlled areas without hurdles (*ibid.*).

159. The Panel received information from the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, and the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank that the latter had participated in the tender (request for proposal No. 100-14489) announced by the Social Fund for Development to provide emergency cash transfer services to low-income group families residing in government-controlled areas. However, the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank informed the Panel that, despite satisfying all the conditions of the request for proposal, it was declared ineligible and was prevented from participating in this humanitarian project on the grounds of its inclusion in the list of entities "sanctioned by the donor". It contends that this denial of the tender was Houthi retribution against it for moving its head office to Aden in 2019 (see figure VII).

Figure VII
Reply of the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank to the letter of rejection




Source: Confidential.

Prohibition of currency

160. The Houthis challenged the monetary policy of the Government of Yemen by announcing the new series of currency notes issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, as counterfeit and prohibiting its circulation ([S/2022/50](#), annex 26, paras. 10–12). This resulted in massive differences in exchange rates, uncontrollable inflation, and the weakening of the Yemeni rial in government-controlled areas (see figure VIII).

Figure VIII
Volatility of exchange rates and the impact of the ban on the Yemeni rial against the United States dollar



Source: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099133503092351195/p177826097b31a0fb0b6140bd8c642ba315>.

Prohibition of interest on banking and commercial transactions

161. In March 2023, the Houthis adopted a law on the prohibition of usurious transactions, which prohibited the payment of interest on deposits, treasury bills, government bonds and similar instruments or commercial transactions.

162. Yemen has been divided into two distinct currency, trading and economic zones (see annex 91).

(b) Control over international trade, customs and taxation

163. The Houthis exercised control over international trade and collected customs duties and other taxes at ports under their control. They resorted to double taxation, as customs duty was paid on the goods when imported through ports under the Government of Yemen. On 8 August 2023, the Houthis issued a circular on a “mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points”, assessing the customs duty rate at 50 per cent of the total customs value for all goods arriving at land customs points through land or sea crossings of “occupied areas” (see annex 92). The Houthis thus treat government-controlled areas as foreign territories for customs purposes and have effectively divided Yemen into two countries.

(c) Depriving the Government of Yemen of its revenue earnings

164. In addition, the Houthis have been denying the Government of Yemen of any opportunity to collect revenue.

Oil sector

165. This sector was the worst affected by the conflict (see annex 93). Before the conflict, oil revenues were estimated at \$7.9 billion. In 2014, Yemen produced about 167,000 barrels per day, but between 2020 and 2022, production decreased to 50,000–60,000.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ See <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099050923091537357/pdf/P17826203eb7ac0030b5540af4456d0dd7c.pdf>.

Attacks on Dabbah oil terminal

166. The non-renewal of the truce in October 2022 was followed by attacks on the Dabbah oil terminal. This resulted in the cessation of production and export of crude oil from the 14 Masilah, 10 East Shabwah, 51 East Hajar, 53 East Sir‘ and 9 Malik sectors.¹²⁸ Every year, the Government of Yemen is losing about \$1.2 billion in revenue.¹²⁹ Total crude oil revenue in 2021 was \$993 million, and in 2022 (up to November) \$980 million. Considering the cost of repairs and replacement of equipment and facilities at the Dabbah oil terminal, the loss of the Government of Yemen would total about \$2 billion.¹³⁰ The Government of Yemen is thus deprived of its major source of foreign exchange, critical for importing essential food items and fuel for the generation of electricity. Moreover, this has undermined the ability of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, to intervene and arrest the decline of the Yemeni rial.¹³¹

Attacks near Yemen liquefied natural gas project in Balhaf

167. The Yemen liquefied natural gas project in Balhaf was the country’s largest ever industrial investment, totalling about \$4.5 billion, with the aim of exporting 6.7 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually for at least 20 years. However, owing to the conflict, in 2015 its operations were halted.¹³² The pipeline feeding the gas terminal was reportedly targeted several times by AQAP.¹³³ On 5 August 2023, rockets were reportedly fired towards the military base near the Yemen liquefied natural gas site (see para. 62). According to the company, “as a consequence of the current security situation, Yemen LNG remains in force majeure and the plant remains in a preservation mode”.¹³⁴

International trade: diverting imports from Aden to Hudaydah

168. In April 2022, import of fuel and other fuel derivatives was allowed through Hudaydah port. From 7 February 2023, the Houthis secured permission to import all types of goods, excluding the prohibited cargo, through their ports. With the increase in imports through Hudaydah, the Houthis earned about \$4 million from maritime services from January to July 2023. This is projected to rise to \$7 million by December 2023.¹³⁵

169. The Panel received information that those importing goods through the port of Aden are being forced by the Houthis to sign an undertaking that they would import through the port of Hudaydah, failing which punitive action would be taken against them. The traders were warned that, from the date of the message, no goods that have been shipped through the port of Aden would be allowed to enter Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthis recommend a specific international shipping company, Saba, by Mahir and Saddam al-Sharafi, to the traders, who would ship any container from anywhere in the world to Hudaydah at the same price as shipments to Aden (see annex 94).

¹²⁸ Government of Yemen sources.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, sources.

¹³² See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_LNG.

¹³³ See <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-emirates-idUSKBN1AJ2UW>.

¹³⁴ See <https://www.yemenlng.com/ws/en/home.aspx>.

¹³⁵ Government of Yemen sources.

170. This shift in imports from Aden to Hudaydah resulted in a massive loss of revenue of YRs 637.36 billion for the Government of Yemen from April 2022 to June 2023,¹³⁶ with a consequential gain for the Houthis.

Domestic trade between North and South: prohibition on purchase of cooking gas and other items from government-controlled areas

171. In March 2023, the Houthis stopped buying cooking gas from the Government of Yemen, which constituted about 60 per cent of cooking gas produced in Ma'rib. Trucks from government-controlled areas carrying cement, steel, wood and clinkers were not allowed to enter Houthi areas. The Houthis started importing all these items through Hudaydah and Ra's Isa ports, thereby making them less dependent on the Government of Yemen for these supplies. In contrast to the import of 52,819.4 tons of liquefied petroleum gas in 2022, the import sharply rose to 234,649.7 tons up to July 2023, an increase of 444 per cent over 2022.¹³⁷ The imports from April to July 2023 alone amounted to 216,072.6 tons, or 92 per cent of the total imports up to July 2023.¹³⁸

172. The quantity of production, which was about 60–70 trailers per day, has decreased to 25–40 trailers per day. Cooking gas sold to Houthi-controlled areas during the first quarter of 2023 amounted to 70,367.38 tons, which decreased to 38,380.65 tons in the second quarter, a reduction of 31,986.73 tons (45 per cent) and a revenue loss of YRs 7.8 billion. The total loss of revenue is estimated by the Government of Yemen at YRs 64 billion annually.¹³⁹

(d) Blockage of main roads

173. The conflict has taken a major toll on the main arterial roads and bridges, which have been extensively damaged. Restrictions and illegal collection of fees on the main inter-governorate roads by the Houthis and at the checkpoints by various armed groups in government-controlled areas have severely affected the movement of goods and persons, further restricting domestic trade. The siege of Ta'izz doubled the transportation costs of basic goods.¹⁴⁰ The worst hit are the main highways connecting the major cities in the north and south, namely the N1 route (connecting Ta'izz, Ibb, Dhamar and Sana'a with Aden). The Houthis have blocked the 6 km-long road between Ta'izz and Hawban, a major economic centre, forcing people to detour 100 km. Not only does it take many days to transport goods from Aden to Ta'izz on the alternate 128 km-long Aden-Rahidah route, but the cost of transportation also nearly doubles, becoming highly prohibitive. Similarly, since the 160 km-long important commercial road connecting Sana'a with Ma'rib has been closed for security reasons, individuals travel an additional 400 km through Bayda'. Others also travel along treacherous desert routes through Ma'rib and Jawf.

¹³⁶ Ibid.


¹³⁷ Based on United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism data.

¹³⁸ Based on United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism data.

¹³⁹ Government of Yemen sources.

¹⁴⁰ See <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099050923091537357/pdf/P17826203eb7ac0030b5540af4456d0dd7c.pdf>.

Map 5
Blocked roads in Yemen



Source: Government of Yemen.

B. Financial resources of designated individuals and their networks

174. Individuals designated under the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), those acting on their behalf or at their direction, and the entities owned or controlled by them continue to receive, own or control, directly or indirectly, funds, other financial assets, and economic resources. Flush with funds, the Houthis have become economically superior, there being a reversal in the economic power balance in the past few months in favour of the Houthis. The impact of the financial sanctions on these individuals has been limited.

Printing of currency notes, financial stamps and passports

175. The Panel received several allegations of printing and use of counterfeit currencies by the Houthis to meet its funding requirements. For example, on 28 August 2023, the Embassy of Yemen in Beijing received a request from a banknote paper company in China enquiring about one Yemeni national who reportedly approached them regarding printing of banknotes, financial stamps and passports. The Panel received copies of the relevant documents, including the passport of the concerned person and a letter dated 26 March 2023 from the Director General of the Department of Passport and Citizenship of the Ministry of the Interior of Yemen requesting that purchase of security paper and ink be facilitated. The Panel's investigations revealed that the person did not represent the Government of Yemen and that his passport, shown to have been issued on 19 March 2023, had not been issued by the Government of Yemen.

176. The Panel does not rule out the possibility of the issuance of the aforesaid passport by the Houthi-appointed authority and the use of counterfeit currencies and passports in Yemen in the past.¹⁴¹ The Panel is investigating this matter.

¹⁴¹ [S/2018/594](#), paras. 142–144 and annex 53, [S/2019/83](#), para. 125, and [S/2020/50](#), paras. 90 and 91.

Figure IX
English translation of the letter from the Ambassador of Yemen to China to Banknote Paper Co.

Embassy of the Republic of Yemen Beijing
 No.: 116/08/20

To [REDACTED]

The Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Beijing presents its compliments to your company and has the honor to inform that based on the information received during your call on the morning of 28th Aug.2023, our Embassy confirmed that [REDACTED] holding the passport [REDACTED] who is currently dealing business with your company, does not represent the legitimate government of the Republic of Yemen and cannot deal with such sensitive and important business.

The Embassy request your company does not engage in business cooperation with the above-mentioned personnel, and do not cooperate with any person who have not been confirmed and approved by our Embassy in the future, our Embassy would be much appreciated.

The Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Beijing avails itself of this opportunity to renew to your esteemed company the assurances of its highest consideration.

Fax: 010-65327997; 010-65322315
 Tel: 010-65321558

Embassy of the Republic of Yemen to China
 Beijing,
 28 August, 2023

Source: Confidential.

Taxes and fees

177. The Houthis continue to collect illegal fees, zakat and *khums* (one-fifth) tax, indulge in black market operations, and resort to double taxation, extortion and confiscation of funds in the bank accounts and other assets of individuals and entities opposed to them to sustain their war efforts ([S/2023/130](#), paras. 72–86 and annexes 22–26).

178. On 9 July 2023, while celebrating the Shia holiday *Eid al-Ghadir* in Sa‘dah, as part of the activities during the day, women collected money to be sent to the combatants on the front lines.

Figure X
Women in Sa‘dah collecting money during a religious festivity



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/>.


Income from the fuel sector

179. The Houthis have been generating significant revenue from the fuel sector. With the increase in imports of fuel through the Hudaydah port, the Houthis have now been receiving significant customs revenue from this sector.

Freezing of accounts of Yemenia (Yemen Airways) and others

180. The Panel received information that, on 8 March 2023, the Houthis froze funds in the three bank accounts of Yemenia in Sana'a, amounting to \$80 million. With the additional funds that got credited to the airline's bank accounts in Sana'a and the release of some funds, an amount of \$78 million stood frozen as at 5 August 2023. The airline is also prohibited from using spare parts lying in its Sana'a maintenance hangar. The main objective was to compel Yemenia to increase the number of weekly flights between Sana'a and Amman from three to six and to fly hajj pilgrims to Jeddah. Yemenia operated 6 flights to Amman in July, 5 outbound flights to Jeddah in June and 12 inbound flights from Jeddah and Medina to Sana'a in July 2023. However, since funds were not released by the Houthis, Yemenia reduced the number of Amman flights to three per week. The Government of Yemen has ownership rights to 51 per cent of the airline,¹⁴² which could be another reason for the Houthis to target its civil aviation sector. The freezing of funds has affected the daily operations of the airline and delayed the purchase of new aircraft. This also has an impact on any plans for increasing air service from Sana'a to more destinations abroad, including for humanitarian purposes.


Figure XI
Letter dated 5 August 2023 from Yemenia



Source: Government of Yemen.

¹⁴² See <https://yemenia.com/about>.

Figure XII
Number of passengers facilitated by Yemenia



Source: Government of Yemen.

181. The Houthis have also reportedly confiscated the assets of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sana'a. The Panel is currently investigating these matters.

Smuggling and trafficking of drugs, cultural objects and other items

182. The Panel received information about increasing incidents of smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs in Yemen and seizures of consignments by authorities in Yemen and interceptions of dhows carrying consignments of narcotics drugs by international naval forces. Between 2016 and 2021, the land area for growing khat (*Catha edulis*), a mild stimulant widely consumed across Yemen, increased by over 40 per cent.¹⁴³ The Panel is currently investigating the reported involvement of the Houthis in increasing khat production and in the trafficking and smuggling of drugs to generate funds for its military activities.

183. The conflict in Yemen has left a great deal of the country's heritage infrastructure in ruins. The Panel is currently investigating the scope of the destruction of heritage sites and the smuggling of antiques and antiquities.

C. Economic issues in government-controlled areas

Electricity crisis in Aden

184. From May to August 2023, electricity outages in Aden reportedly continued for over 15 hours per day owing to shortages of fuel for power plants. The Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, informed the Panel that the Saudi oil grant of \$170 million was used between November 2022 and March 2023 and that thereafter the Government of

¹⁴³ See <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099050923091537357/pdf/P17826203eb7ac0030b5540af4456d0dd7c.pdf>.

Yemen pays for the fuel. Protests and civil unrest were reported in many areas under government control against deteriorating public services, with the Government of Yemen being accused of inability to address these issues (see annex 95).

185. In June 2023, to draw the attention of the Government of Yemen to these problems, the Governor of Aden announced that customs and tax revenues collected from the port of Aden and the Aden Free Zone would not be deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. On 12 June, the employees of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, were prevented from moving money from the ports to the vaults of the Central Bank.¹⁴⁴ However, the matter was resolved, and on 19 June 2023, money was deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden.

D. Inspection of cargo


186. The vessels going to the Houthi-controlled ports were subject to inspection by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti in accordance with resolution 2216 (2015) and by the Coalition, a joint exercise of the evaluation and humanitarian operations cell and the Government of Yemen, in the Coalition holding area. Since February 2023, all types of restrictions on the import of goods, except prohibited goods, through the Red Sea ports, including inspections by the Coalition in the Coalition holding area, have been suspended.

187. The inspection system of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, however, continues as before, although it has to handle more vessels now, especially container vessels. In contrast to cargo being imported in 265 containers in August 2020, the number of containers at the end of July 2023 reached 3,511, with an increase in the weight of cargo from 5,939 tons to 109,829 tons, registering a record growth of 1,325 per cent and 1,849 per cent in the number of containers and weight of cargo, respectively.

Growth in container cargo imported through Houthi-controlled ports, 2020–2023

<i>Month</i>	<i>Number of containers discharged</i>	<i>Total weight of cargo discharged (tons)</i>
August 2020	265	5 939.64
November 2020	545	12 234.11
December 2020	594	12 936.24
March 2021	721	16 304.00
July 2021	342	7 599.52
October 2021	571	12 566.01
April 2023	1 125	28 752.98
May 2023	184	4 379.35
June 2023	2 074	50 994.16
July 2023	3 511	109 829.01
Total	9 932	261 535.02

¹⁴⁴ Central Bank of Yemen, Aden.



Source: United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism.

188. As regards inspection by the Coalition, in March 2023, in order to accelerate the movement of cargo and to support the peace process and the talks, the evaluation and humanitarian operations cell had allowed vessels from Jizan and Jeddah ports in Saudi Arabia to go directly to Hudaydah port. The Panel learned that this has been withdrawn and that the Coalition and government officials carry out inspections in Djibouti alongside the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism and also subject some containers to screening.

189. The effectiveness of the inspection system in ensuring compliance with resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#) assumes importance, given the significant increase in the number of vessels and types of cargo. The United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism is reportedly facing severe funding and human resource constraints. As a result, the Mechanism could not share critical information with the Panel for its investigations and analysis. A robust, risk-based and automated cargo profiling-cum-inspection system helps in facilitating clearance of bona fide humanitarian and commercial cargo and targeting smuggling of prohibited goods.

E. Monitoring of asset freeze and travel ban measures

190. The Panel continues to monitor the implementation by Member States of the asset freeze and travel ban measures imposed in paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), respectively, in relation to the designated individuals.

VIII. Recommendations

191. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

- (a) Encourage parties to the conflict and other relevant stakeholders, including international mediators, to include in the peace process measures that would:
 - (i) Help to stabilize the current informal truce and prevent any reversion to military confrontation, with the aim of paving the way to a formal ceasefire;
 - (ii) Formulate and implement incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures, such as the release of children recruited and used by parties to the conflict and the release of conflict-related detainees, to be able to address complex issues such as payment of salaries, lifting of the siege on Ta'izz, and allowing the Government of Yemen to export oil;
 - (iii) Ensure the participation of the Government of Yemen and all other Yemeni stakeholders;

(iv) Develop a common vision for the unity of Yemen encompassing an appropriate political and administrative set-up;

(v) Include transitional justice elements for the protection of children, and preserve freedom of expression;

(b) Condemn in the strongest terms all attacks targeted against civilians and civilian infrastructure, which are prohibited under international humanitarian law, and reaffirm the need for the parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law;

(c) Consider establishing a monitoring unit within the relevant United Nations entity to closely monitor violations of the targeted arms embargo and to reinforce the capacity of the Government of Yemen to counter the illicit flow of arms, ammunition and related material;

(d) Call upon the Government of Yemen and the Coalition to establish a joint mechanism for collecting debris of weapons, including uncrewed aerial vehicles used by the Houthis or AQAP in their attacks, and the material seized and ensuring proper documentation, forensic analysis and storage while maintaining the chain of custody;

(e) Call upon the parties to the conflict to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of landmines and remove existing landmines from civilian areas under their control and encourage Member States to enhance their support for humanitarian demining efforts in Yemen, including through the provision of specialists, equipment and adequate funding, with appropriate safeguards to prevent any misuse;

(f) Call upon Member States to support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Maritime Crime Programme to enhance the capacity of the Yemeni Coast Guard to interdict smuggling of weapons, drugs and other contraband items, rescue and recovery of migrants and others, as well as search and rescue of vessels in distress, including Yemeni fishing vessels;

(g) Call upon relevant United Nations entities and regional government authorities to strengthen the existing coordination mechanisms to monitor and address the issues associated with the smuggling and trafficking of human beings from the Horn of Africa to Yemen by entities connected with parties to the conflict;

(h) Call upon all parties to the conflict to immediately end torture and other forms of ill-treatment and inhuman or degrading punishment against prisoners and end the arbitrary detention of civilians for their perceived affiliation with opposing parties to the conflict, ensuring due process and a fair trial;

(i) Call upon all parties to ensure freedom of expression and freedom of the media, not subjecting journalists, human rights activists and civil society activists to arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment;

(j) Call upon all parties to the conflict to immediately end the unlawful practice of enforced disappearance and inform relevant family members of the abductees' whereabouts and reasons for detention;

(k) Encourage the Government of Yemen to become party to the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance;

(l) Call upon all parties to the conflict to prioritize the release of children, women, elderly and critically ill detainees in the context of the exchange of prisoners conducted in the framework of the Stockholm Agreement;

(m) Call upon the Houthis to comply with its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, particularly the Convention on

the Rights of the Child, ratified by Yemen in 1991, and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, to which Yemen acceded in 2007, in:

(i) Immediately ending the recruitment and use of children below 18 years old, including the ongoing military indoctrination in the summer camps;

(ii) Stopping the revision of Yemeni national education material, which violates the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the content of the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and to work in partnership with the relevant United Nations entities to ensure that school textbooks fully reflect the principles of non-discrimination and promote peace, tolerance, equality and respect for other civilizations;

(n) Call upon all parties to fulfil their obligation to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for all people in need and, in this context, call upon the Houthis to lift the *mahram* requirement for female aid workers to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, including basic health care and reproductive health services to women and girls, and not to prevent necessary movements of those seeking medical assistance abroad and of those who are the breadwinners in their families;

(o) Call upon the donor community to put in place a robust mechanism to ensure that the people in need receive the humanitarian assistance to which they are entitled, and prevent any diversion of humanitarian funding, as well as food and core relief items;

(p) Encourage Member States to enhance their support to the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights of Yemen and call upon parties to the conflict to collaborate with the Commission;

(q) Establish an independent international accountability mechanism for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in Yemen and provide redress and support to the victims and their families, including families of those who have been killed as a result of such violations;

(r) Consider encouraging parties to the conflict and international mediators to urgently set up an economic committee comprising representatives from all the stakeholders to prepare a framework for solving the contentious economic issues within a specified time frame;

(s) Call upon the Houthis to refrain from, arbitrarily and with the use of force, confiscating lands, buildings and other properties of individuals and entities, without following due process of law, and express its intention to impose sanctions on those who undertake such acts;

(t) Call upon the Houthis to take measures to channel the revenue of the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa to the Central Bank of Yemen as a contribution to the payment of salaries in the Governorate of Hudaydah and throughout Yemen, in accordance with the Stockholm Agreement.

192. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider:

(a) Encouraging Member States to increase the allocation of humanitarian funding for Yemen;

(b) Issuing a press release condemning the torture and ill-treatment against prisoners held by parties to the conflict and calling upon them to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law;

- (c) Inviting the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights to brief the Committee on its operations and on the findings of its investigations;
- (d) Strengthening the existing cargo profiling and inspection system with a robust, risk-based and automated system that would help in facilitating clearance of bona fide humanitarian and commercial cargo and targeting smuggling of prohibited goods.

**Annexes to the Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)**

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Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions, and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity¹⁴⁵ in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.

2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:

- (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
- (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

¹⁴⁵ Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.

Appendix B Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, ([S/2006/997](#)), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).
2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:
 - (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
 - (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
 - (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;
 - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
 - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
 - a) In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
 - b) The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
 - (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
 - (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
 - (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
 - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;

- (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
 - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
 - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
 - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
 - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
 - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
 - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
 - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
 - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
 - (x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings;
 - (xi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as *prima facie* evidence of torture;
 - (xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
 - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
 - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
 - (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

- (e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk pose by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:
- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
 - (ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;
 - (iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.
- (f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.
- (g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel’s sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.
- (h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.
3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map



Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 31 August 2023)

Table 3.1

Correspondence with Member States

<i>Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 31 August 2023</i>
Austria	1		1
Belgium	1		1
Brazil	1		1
Bulgaria	2		1
China	5	5	
Czechia	1		1
Djibouti	4	1	
Eritrea	1	1	
France	2		
India	4		
Germany	2		1
Iran	4	3	
Italy	1		1
Japan	1		
Oman	3	2	
Rumania	1	1	
Russia	1	1	
Saudi Arabia	5	1	
Serbia	1		1
Turkiye	1		1
United Arab Emirates	3	2	1
United Kingdom	2		
United States	4		2
Yemen	13	9	
Total	64	26	12

Table 3.2

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by entity</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 31 August 2023</i>
Sana'a-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs	7	7	
Total	7	7	

Table 3.3

Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities

<i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i>	<i>Number of letters sent by the Panel</i>	<i>Number of unanswered letters by commercial company</i>	<i>Number of letters where the deadline is after 31 August 2023</i>
Bonex	1	1	
Toyota	1		
Harvard University	1	1	
Total	3	2	

Annex 4 Letter dated 1 August 2023 from the President of PLC to the Prime Minister



Source: Confidential

Appendix A

English translation of Letter dated 1 August 2023 from the President of PLC to the Prime Minister

Republic of Yemen

Office of the Presidency of the Republic

1 August 2023

Subject: Circular

With regard to the aforementioned subject, minister, governors, deputy ministers, under-secretaries and the heads of executive agencies are hereby notified that they must abide by the following:

1. Starting on 6 August 2023, they must be present in their places work in the capital and in the governorates. Whosoever violates this instruction will be subject to legal measures. Those who have been tasked with official duties on the basis of a written authorization from a competent authority are exempt from this instruction.
2. All authorizations to expend sums from the State budget or the budgets of agencies are revoked. Expenditure authority is restricted to those who are legally authorized, ministers or their deputies, governors or their deputies, heads of agency or their deputies and representatives of the Ministry of Finance within the agencies.
3. In exceptional and justified cases, such authorization may be granted, with the approval of the Prime Minister, for a period not exceeding two weeks to the directors of the facility who are not consultants.
4. Decisions previously taken by the Presidential Leadership Council with regard to high-level appointments that were made by other than the legally mandated authority must be implemented faithfully.
5. The Central Bank must be informed regarding the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4. No requests for expenditure that are contrary thereto must be accepted.
6. The results must be reported to us one week from today's date. The Civil Service Ministry and the Central Audit and Accounting Organization must monitor implementation of the present circular.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Yahya Muhammad **al-Sha‘bi**

Director, Office of the Presidency of the Republic

cc: Members of the Presidential Leadership Council

His Excellency Maeen Abdulmalek Saeed

Prime Minister


Annex 5: Houthi Parades and Exercises

Background

1. The Houthis held five military parades and four military exercises in Ibb, Dhamar, Al-Bayda', Jawf, Ma'rib and Sa'dah.

Map 5

Houthi Parades and Military Exercises



Source: Panel

2. On 12 March 2023 the General Police Training Centre in Dhamar had a graduation parade for new trainees which reportedly included a thousand police personnel.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/591332>

Figure 5.1

12 March 2023: General Police Training Centre Parade in Dhamar

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/591242/1-1911>

3. On 8 May 2023, the Houthis' 4th Military Region, held a live-fire exercise in Al-Bayda in an area of 100 square km. According to sources, the aim of the exercise was to raise combat readiness.¹⁴⁷

4. In June 2023, thousands of soldiers from the 4th Military Region moved on foot from Dhamar to Ibb Governorate.¹⁴⁸

Figure 5.2

Houthi march from Dhamar to Ibb Governorate in June 2023

Source: <https://twitter.com/Aldanmarki/status/1670609712415481859>

5. On 22 June 2023, about 7,000 Houthi combatants from the 4th Military Region reportedly took part in a parade held in Ibb¹⁴⁹.

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/232714>.

¹⁴⁸ <https://twitter.com/Aldanmarki/status/1670609712415481859>; <https://www.sada-alsahel.net/news/116593>; <https://www.khabaragency.net/news192439.html>; https://twitter.com/Osamah_hshyshi/status/1670600453858508800

¹⁴⁹ https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1672246269442441220; <https://twitter.com/MMY1444/status/1671948461728563238>; <https://twitter.com/ShahidAlmasirah/status/1671951644639068171>.

Figure 5.3

4th Military Region parade on 22 June 2023

Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1672246269442441220

6. On 10 July, the 3rd Military Region held a live-fire exercise in the Serwah district of Ma’rib province. An Mi-17 helicopter was also displayed at the exercise. Several senior Houthi military leaders attended the event.¹⁵⁰

7. On 6 August, the Houthis held a graduation parade for the Republican Guard and Special Forces in the central military region in Ma’rib Governorate using live-fire. During the event, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Defence, Major-General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi, stated that the graduation of these forces represents a strong tributary to strengthening the military capabilities of Yemen, keeping pace with the requirements of the current situation, mostly dedicated to preparation and constant readiness to face all challenges. He indicated that the Houthi leadership and its forces are in the stage of de-escalation, and are ready for peace, while at the same time keeping the military option open. He stated that the Houthis are capable of imposing new rules of engagement with their enemy.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3250999.htm>;
<https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/93530>;
<https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1678884923300626433>.

¹⁵¹ <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3256299.htm>.

Figure 5.4

Houthi parachuters during the Houthi graduation ceremony



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1688292932955013121


8. On the same day, Mahdi al-Mashat, the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, announced that Gen. Ahmed Al-Hamzi ([YEi.012](#)), the commander of the Houthi Air Force and Air Defence Forces died from a previously sustained wound.¹⁵² According to a source, many died and were injured during a missile misfire incident at the parade in Ma'rib that day and that the commander's death was connected to the incident.

¹⁵² <https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1688163442417336320>; <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2350571/middle-east>; <https://www.sabanew.net/story/ar/100099>.

Annex 6: Attacks on Al-Kadaha Road, Ta'izz

Map 6

Attack on the convoy of Governor Nabil Shamsan on 25 March 2023



Source: Panel

1. On Sunday, 25 March 2023, at 7:20am the convoy of Ta'izz Governor Nabil Shamsan departed from the city of Al-Mukha. They were planning to join the convoy of the Minister of Defence in the Al-Kadaha area. They were travelling in an armoured Land Cruiser with distinctive plates via the Al-Mukha-Al-Kadaha road to Ta'izz city. When the convoy reached the Uqmah area in the Mawza', district, the Governor's car was attacked by either a missile or explosive-laden UAV which caused serious damage to the vehicle. The GoY claimed that it was a missile attack, and that the missile was launched from a location under the control of the Houthis in Jabal Al-Urf very close to the area they were travelling (map 6). After disembarking from the car, the Governor was ambushed and fired-on with mortar and machine gun fire. The Governor was evacuated via footpaths and wadis to an area out of gunfire range. He was taken to the December 2 Hospital in Al-Mukha for medical examination. This was one of three attacks recorded on the day.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ GoY source.

Figure 6.1.

Damage to the car due to the attack of Ta'izz Governor Nabil Shamsan



Source: GoY

2. On the same day, the convoy of the GoY Minister of Defence, Mohsen Al-Da'eri and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz's was attacked on the Al-Mukha-Al-Waziyah road. The Minister of Defence continued his travel to Mayoun Island in the Bab-el-Mandab strait, located 70km south of Al-Mukha, for a field visit. No casualties were reported during the first two incidents.¹⁵⁴


3. The third incident on the same day was a UAV strike targeting a GoY military checkpoint on the same road, killing two soldiers.

4. On 4 May, the Houthis targeted the construction and asphalting equipment of the company involved in tarring the road with UAVs, damaging bulldozer and crawler excavator, and injured three workers on the project.

¹⁵⁴ GoY source (Minister of Defence Mohsen al-Da'eri).

Figure 6.2.

Attack against construction workers and equipment that took place on the road between Al-Kadaha and Ta'izz on 5 May 2023



Source: GoY

5. On 7 May, the vehicle in which Colonel Tawfiq Al-Waqar Jabari, former police chief of the Jabal Habashi district of Ta'izz, was targeted in a UAV attack on the Al-Kadaha-Ta'izz road between the areas of Al-Barh and Al-Kadaha. The Colonel was killed and two of his escorts were injured.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ <https://republicanyemen.net/archives/33334>

Annex 7: Maritime Security Incident involving the Bulk Carrier, *Arietta*

Background

1. On 17 March 2023, the Liberian-flagged Bulk Carrier, *Arietta* (IMO 9446403¹⁵⁶), came under fire from armed men in a skiff, 38 nautical miles (70 kilometres) south of the port of Hudaydah. The attackers did not approach but fired at the vessel from a distance of one nautical mile (nm). The onboard security team returned fire and the skiff turned away. The vessel was not using the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC), as recommended, and was travelling to the east of the Hanish Islands as the captain was not aware of the security arrangement. The Panel assessed that the incident likely is not linked to piracy nor the armed conflict in Yemen.

Chart 7

AIS¹⁵⁷ track of the Bulk Carrier, *Arietta*




Source: <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/products/maritime-ship-tracker-ais-live-ship-data-seaweb.html>

¹⁵⁶ The International Maritime Organization (IMO) ship identification number scheme was introduced in 1987 through the adoption of resolution A.600(15), as a measure aimed at enhancing maritime safety, and pollution prevention and to facilitate the prevention of maritime fraud. It aimed at assigning a permanent number to each ship for identification purposes.

¹⁵⁷ Automatic identification systems (AIS) transponders are designed to be capable of providing position, identification, and other information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically.

Figure 7

Damage to the Bulk Carrier, Arietta

Source: Confidential

Annex 8: Maritime Security Incident involving the Motor yacht *30 Minutes*


Background

1. On 17 April 2023, the crew of motor yacht, *30 minutes* (MMSI 262064900¹⁵⁸) underway to Djibouti left Jizan commercial port in KSA.¹⁵⁹ They had a crew of three Russian and one Egyptian nationals. On 21 April 2023, the Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (JMRCC) received calls from the Russian Search and Rescue Centre and the agent of the Russian owner, that the owner lost contact with the yacht on 19 April 2023.¹⁶⁰

2. According to the crew, they left Jizan port and spent the night off a small island in KSA territorial waters. On 18 April, at around 4:00-5:00pm, while underway to Djibouti, the crew took shelter from heavy weather at an anchorage off Saba Island, a volcanic island in the Red Sea and part of the Zubair Island group in Yemeni territorial waters. The island is located approximately 44 nm (82km) WSW off Hudaydah. While they were there, they were approached by a grey coast guard type boat approximately 10m long with a weapon mounted on the front. They were shot at and hit once by a 12.7mm round. They were not sure if the shots came from the coast guard vessel or the land. They fled the area. According to them there were no radio warning prior to the shooting.¹⁶¹

Chart 8

Location of the Incident according to Crew



Source: crew of yacht *30 minutes*

3. When the yacht reached Eritrean waters on 19 April, the crew and the yacht were detained by Eritrean authorities in Assab, after a bullet hole in the hull of the yacht caught the

¹⁵⁸ Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSIs) are nine-digit numbers used to uniquely identify a ship or a coast radio station.

¹⁵⁹ Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (JMRCC), KSA.

¹⁶⁰ KSA source.


¹⁶¹ Interview and correspondence with crew of yacht, *30 minutes*.

authority's attention. According to the crew, they were told by the Eritrean authorities that the Russian embassy would be contacted to verify their identities, and that the authorities would investigate whether the bullet hole was caused by an attack and identify those responsible. They were treated well by Eritrean authorities and were allowed to leave after a week.

4. The crew reached Djibouti on 27 April. According to the JMRCC, they received confirmation from both the owner and the Head of the Consular Section of the Russian Federation in KSA on 27 April that the yacht had arrived in Djibouti and that the crew was safe. In addition, the Jeddah Maritime Information Sharing Centre (JMISC) received a message from the Djibouti Navy via the MERCURY Maritime Security Community Information Exchange Platform informing them that the yacht had arrived in Djibouti on 27 April.¹⁶²

Figure 8.

Damage to the yacht 30 minutes



Source: Red Sea Up-down yachting service.

5. The Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) has a station at the Zubair Islands. It is the procedure of YCG to first make radio contact before firing. The Panel is awaiting a detailed report from the YCG on the incident.

¹⁶² KSA source.

Annex 9: Maritime Security Incident involving the Yacht, *Kalizma*

Background

1. On 27 April 2023, the 117-year-old, 165-foot yacht *Kalizma* (IMO 2869864) left the port of Salalah, Oman where the yacht spent five hours. The *Kalizma* sailed towards the transit corridor off the coast of Yemen in the Gulf of Aden, underway to Egypt. She had a crew of ten Indian nationals onboard and an armed security team consisting of one Greek and two Indian nationals. Her route brought her through the territorial waters of Yemen about six nm off the coast of Ras Fartak and Hasween, Al Mahra Governorate, Yemen.¹⁶³ On the morning of 28 April 2023, two small boats from the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) and a boat from the Yemeni Navy were on patrol in the area. The YCG established radio communication instructing the vessel to stop and fired warning shots at the yacht when they did not comply. Believing that they were under attack by pirates, the *Kalizma*'s crew issued a distress call, reporting that they were under attack by three skiffs each with three to four people onboard, to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations (UKMTO), which is responsible to provide maritime security information in the region. UKMTO issued an alert about an ongoing attack reporting that shots had been fired.¹⁶⁴

2. According to the YCG, one naval officer was killed and two coast guard personnel were injured as a result of the exchange of fire. One of the armed guards on the *Kalizma* was reportedly injured by a bullet. The *Kalizma* reached Djibouti, and the Yemeni authorities requested the local authorities to detain the vessel.

Figure 9.1.

The 117-year-old, 165-foot yacht *Kalizma* in Djibouti Port




Source: Red Sea Up-down yachting service.

¹⁶³ <https://2dec.net/news60279.html#>.

¹⁶⁴ <https://maritime-executive.com/article/attack-on-yacht-near-yemen-is-possible-incident-with-coast-guard>.

Chart 9

AIS¹⁶⁵ track of the Kalizma

Source: <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/products/maritime-ship-tracker-ais-live-ship-data-seaweb.html>.

¹⁶⁵ Automatic identification systems (AIS) transponders are designed to be capable of providing position, identification, and other information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically.

Figure 9.2.

Damage to the *Kalizma*



Source: Red Sea Up-down yachting service

Annex 10: Houthi naval exercise off Kamaran Island, Hudaydah

Background

1. On 13 April 2023, the Houthis held a naval exercise¹⁶⁶ off Kamaran Island north of Hudaydah.¹⁶⁷ Multiple types of speed boats were displayed, which were equipped with various types of weapons such as 107mm Multiple Launchers Rocket System (MLRS) as well as heavy and light machine guns. Naval forces present in this event were equipped with assault rifles that have not been documented by the Panel before. The same assault rifles were observed by the Panel during the military parade that took place on 22 September 2022 in Sana'a.

Figure 10

Houthi Speed Boats and Forces, Kamaran Island



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs>¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs>.

¹⁶⁷ https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1646671367608082432.

¹⁶⁸ YouTube account associated with this video has been terminated. Images available at https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1646671367608082432.

Annex 11: 7.62x54Rmm ammunition with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the *Marwan-1* vessel

Quantity: 1,080,000 rounds

Figure 11.1.
Sample of headstamps



7.62x54_06_1	7.62x54_06_55	Double stamping ¹⁶⁹
7.62x54_06_72	7.62x54_06_78	37

15 different headstamps illustrating a production in 2006: “06_1”, “06_54”, “06_55”, “06_56”, “06_72”, “06_73”, “06_74_”, “06_75”, “06_76”, “06_77”, “06_78”, “06_82”, “06_87”, “06_88”, and “06_89”.

Source: US

Figure 11.2.
Battlepack each containing 200 rounds of 7.62x54Rmm ammunition with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran (here from lot “06_54” (2006)).



Source: US

¹⁶⁹ Such double stamping indicate a malfunction during the production.

Annex 12: 12.7x99mm ammunition seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the *Marwan-1* vessel

Quantity: 25,000 rounds

Figure 12.1.

Lateral view of five rounds in their plastic package



Six different lot number documented: "06_2016", "04_2017", "18_2017", "20_2017", "22_2017" and "28_2017".

Source: US

Figure 12.2.

Close-up of the markings present on the cartridges



Markings: (upper line) "12.7x99" "SNIPER" (lower line) "28_2017"

Source: US

Figure 12.3.

Box for five rounds



Markings observed: (upper line) (5 PCS) "12.7x99mm" "APH-W Sniper" (lower line) Lot "00" Date "2017" (2017 as the year of production)

Source: US

Annex 13: M122-K fuze with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the *Marwan-I* vessel

Quantity: 6,960 fuzes

Figure 13.1.
Proximity fuze “M122-K”, Lot No: “01”, Date: “2010”



Four different lot numbers documented: “01_2010”, “02_2010”, “04_2010” and “05_2010”.

Source: US

Figure 13.2.
Logistic container containing the fuze



Source: US

Figure 13.3.

Description of the M122-K proximity fuze published by Mindex, an entity reportedly affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of Iran

The screenshot shows a webpage for the M122-K Proximity Fuze. At the top left is the logo of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the center, the text "M122-K Proximity Fuze" is displayed above a blue horizontal bar. To the right is a small graphic of a target with a bullseye. Below the title, there are two sections: "DESCRIPTION" and "FEATURES". Under "DESCRIPTION", it says: "It is used in warhead of 122mm standard M122-K rocket." Under "FEATURES", it says: "More area of destruction: Destruction area in proximity is three times more than impact fuze. Desirable performance of proximity fuze happens in targets where impact performance is very low like in ground covered by snow, soft ground, marsh, salt marsh, and on the water." There is also a section titled "SAFETIES" which states: "Safety in transportation, storage, and firing according to: • S&A manual switch • Primary electronic delay of 1.5 sec • Selectable electronic delay in proximity function • Using wind turbo generator". To the right of the text, there is a photograph of the M122-K proximity fuze, showing its metallic construction and a small switch labeled "Udet Schaltung".


Source: https://mindexcenter.ir/sites/default/files/2021-01/chapter%206-11%2898%29_357.pdf

Annex 14: Strip propellant for PG7 seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the *Marwan-I* vessel

Quantity: 870 boxes

Figure 14.1.

Carton box, Lot No: "01/2018" (year of production 2018)



Source: US

Annex 15: Stateless dhow interdicted by the US on 6 January 2023

Figure 15.1.
Display of the seized material



Source: <https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2023-01-10/navy-middle-east-seize-8712588.html>.

Figure 15.2.
Seized Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26 (quantity: 1,918)



Source: US

Figure 15.3.
Seized AKS20U compact assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia (quantity: 198)



Source: US

Annex 16: Stateless dhow interdicted by France on 15 January 2023

Figure 16.1.

Close-up of the factory markings on one of the seized Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26 (quantity: 2,999)



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 16.2.

Seized AKS20U compact assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia (quantity: 100)



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Table : Seized T-80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran.

Figure 17.1.



Serial number: "15KN200059"

Figures 17.2. (left) and 17.3. (right)



Serial number: "0059" (last four digits of the complete serial number)

Figures 17.4. (left) and 17.5. (right)



Transport handle of a T-80 machinegun presenting the marking of the Iranian Defence Industry Organisation, Military branch (DIOMIL) arsenal

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Similar marking observed on G3 assault rifle (Figure 17.6.) and TD9 “Tondar” submachine gun (Figures 17.7. and 17.8.) manufactured in Iran		
Figure 17.6.	Figure 17.7.	Figure 17.8.
		
Source: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)	Source: CAR	Source: Armament Research Service (ARES)

Similar “dot marking” ¹⁷⁰ observed on Hoshdar sniper rifle (Figure XX.9.) and AM-50 AMR (Figure XX.10.) with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran	
Figure 17.9.	Figure 17.10.
	
Source: https://i.postimg.cc/1X4M12JV/ka9.png ¹⁷¹	Source: S/2022/50, figure 19.10.

Serial numbers of the documented T80 LGM

Material seized by the US on 6 May 2021

2400404	2400405	2500121	2500123	2500124	2500143	2500144	2500154	2500159	2500160
2500162	2500181	2500182	2500186	2500215	2500216	2500261	2500262	2500263	2500264
2500265	2500266	2500271	2500272	2500278	2500279	2500287	2500288	2500293	2500294
2500299	2500300	2500319	2500323	2500335	2500357	2500369	2500371	2500394	2500398
2500406	2500407	2500409	2500425	2500426	2500455	2500464	2500501	2500502	2500655
2500657	2500658	2500667	2500668	2500683	2500684	2500685	2500686	2500688	2500689
2500690	2500691	2500692	2500701	2500703	2600013	2600014	2600015	2600016	2600018
2600041	2600042	2600043	2600044	2600059	2600061	2600062	2600063	2600064	2600075
2600076	2600149	2600150	2600153	2600154	2600169	2600170	2600191	2600192	2600195
2600196	2600199	2600200	2600205	2600206	2600213	2600214	2600283	2600284	2600289
2600290	2600303	2600304	2600744	2600745	2600746	2600747	2600776	2600777	2600783
2600785	2600836	2600865	2600870	2600886	2600887	2600888	2600904	2600906	2600907
2600908	2600910	2600911	2600914	2600915	2600916	2600917	2600918	2600919	2600920
2600921	2600922	2600923	2601067	2601078	2601083	2601111	2601112	2601113	2601113
2601114	2601123	2601124	2601125	2601128	2601129	2601147	2601148	2601151	2601154
2601156	2601179	2601182	2601186	2601210	2601219	2601220	2601241	2601242	2601249
2601264	2601275	2601279	2601292						

¹⁷⁰ The number of dots on each digit of the serial numbers documented is the same, which indicates the same factory process.

¹⁷¹ Extracted from <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2019/09/list-of-iranian-arms-and-equipment.html>

Annex 18: Seized M80 LMG with markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26

Figure 18.1.



Figures 18.2. (left) and 18.3. (right)

 State Factory 26 marking Serial number “16-CN_09080”	 Serial number “500789”
---	--

Serial numbers of the documented M80 LGM¹⁷²

Material seized by the US on 6 May 2023 is displayed in purple

Material seized by France on 15 January 2023 is displayed in blue

Material documented in Somalia by CAR in January 2022 is displayed in grey

Material seized by the US on 10 February 2021 is displayed in green

Material seized by the KSA on 24 June 2020 is displayed in yellow

Material reportedly for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled area is displayed in red

400805	401702	500789	502974	504942	511326
325240					
330517					
16-CN 07478	16-CN 07737	16-CN 08057	16-CN 08198	16-CN 08311	16-CN 08384
16-CN 08563	16-CN 08588	16-CN 08632	16-CN 08742	16-CN 08780	16-CN 08916
16-CN 08925	16-CN 08943	16-CN 08984	16-CN 09080	16-CN 09128	16-CN 09290
16-CN 09435	16-CN 09468	16-CN 09546	16-CN 09552	16-CN 09593	16-CN 09615
16-CN 09676	16-CN 09833	16-CN 10263	16-CN 11033		
17-CN 00009	17-CN 00085	17-CN 00242	17-CN 00444	17-CN 00490	17-CN 00542
17-CN 00617	17-CN-00724	17 CN 00756	17-CN 00786	17-CN 00872	17-CN 00925

¹⁷² The table illustrates that M80 LMGs which have been seized or have been observed multiple times between June 2020 and May 2023 belong to same batches.

17-CN 00962	17-CN 00965	17-CN 01002	17-CN 01105	17-CN 01233	17-CN 01285
17-CN 01292	17-CN 01581	17-CN 02415	17-CN 02569	17-CN 02905	17-CN 03564
17-CN 03741	17-CN 03786	17-CN 07055	17-CN 24547		

Seized M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26 documented in Somalia

Figure 18.4.



State Factory 26 marking
Serial number “17-CN_03564”
Documented in January 2022 in the black market in Somalia¹⁷³

Source: CAR

Figure 18.5. (left) and 18.6. (right)



State Factory 26 marking
Serial number “17-CN_07055” (left) and “17-CN_24547” (right)
Documented in January 2023 in the black market in Somalia

Source: CAR

The serial numbers “17-CN_03564” and “17-CN_07055” are consistent with the serial numbers of the material seized by France on 15 January 2023 (para. 69 and annex 18).

¹⁷³ This serial number is consistent with those from M80 LMG seized on 6 January 2023 (annex 18).

Annex 19: Seized PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Bulgaria

Figures 19.1. (up) and 19.2. (down)



Serial number “ИМ_27_036”

Figure 19.3.



Serial number “BA_25_293”

Figure 19.4.



Serial number “BE_24_244”

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Material seized by France on 15 January 2023 is displayed in blue

Material reportedly for sale in the black market in Houthi-controlled area is displayed in red

Serial numbers of the seized PKM

AE 25 201	BA 27 293	ВД 27 336	BE 24 244	KO 26 520	KT 27 274	NH 25 421	ИМ 27 036
	BA 26 472	ВД 27 310					
	BA 50 450						

Annex 20: Seized PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Romania

Figure 20.1.



Figure 20.2.



Serial number "U-1426", year of production 1987

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Material seized by France on 15 January 2023 is displayed in blue

Material reportedly for sale in the black market in Houthi-controlled area is displayed in red

U-1426
V-2752
V-3192

Annex 21: Seized PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Hungary

Figure 21.1.



Figure 21.2.



Figure 21.3.



GN753

Source: US


Annex 22: Seized Dehlavieh ATGMs with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran (quantity: 23)

Figure 22.1.




All the missiles documented belongs to the “lot 149” with markings indicating a production in 2021.

Figure 22.2.



Serial N° 04

Figure 22.3.



Serial N° 05

Figure 22.4.



Serial N° 11

Figure 22.5.



Serial N° 13

Figure 22.6.



Serial N° 16

Figure 22.7.



Serial N° 19

Figure 22.8.



Serial N° 22

Figure 22.9.




Serial N° 25

Figure 22.10.



Serial N° 33

Figure 22.11.



Serial N° 40

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Annex 23: Seized battlepack each containing 200 rounds of 7.62x54Rmm with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran (quantity: 578,400 rounds)

Figure 23.1.



Battlepack Lot No. 14/2002 (year of production 2002)

Figures 23.2. (left) and XX.3. (right)



Battlepack Lot No. 17/2006 (year of production 2006)
Headstamp: 7.62x54_06_17

Figures 23.4. (left) and 23.5. (right)



Battlepack Lot No. 43/2006 (year of production 2006)
Headstamp: 7.62x54_06_43

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Annex 24: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26 seized since August 2018 are consistent with the same batch.

Serial numbers of batch 16-CN

These Type 56-1 show the serial numbers in sequential order, which suggests that the rifles were procured from a national stockpile, rather than from different non-state sources.



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Legend

Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 20 December 2021 and reported by the Panel of Experts on Somalia
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia between 2019 and 2022 by CAR

61000005	61000009	61000079	61000103	61000125	61000127	61000170	61000192	61000246	61000249	61000258	61000261
61000263	61000281	61000286	61000312	61000319	61000320	61000322	61000329	61000377	61000408	61000430	61000448
61000459	61000512	61000523	61000532	61000535	61000536	61000559	61000643	61001171	61001180	61001206	61001209
61001559	61001660	61001681	61001694	61001797	61001920	61001925	61002030	61002064	61002081	61002144	61002149
61002169	61002185	61002196	61002268	61002284	61002374	61002460	61002515	61002537	61002540	61002552	61002574
61002625	61002640	61002716	61002763	61002776	61002809	61002812	61002843	61002867	61002884	61002888	61002894
61002962	61002992	61002995	61003111	61003120	61003203	61003234	61003282	61003312	61003321	61003430	61003431
61003439	61003454	61003455	61003463	61003467	61003537	61003631	61003668	61003687	61003735	61003736	61003802
61003807	61003819	61003854	61003877	61003891	61003907	61003927	61003948	61003990	61004003	61004056	61004062
61004076	61004081	61004089	61004110	61004111	61004113	61004170	61004174	61004176	61004213	61004235	61004267
61004368	61004373	61004377	61004386	61004407	61004413	61004467	61004507	61004541	61004586	61004595	61004609
61004620	61004638	61004647	61004658	61004689	61004712	61004723	61004724	61004725	61004729	61004751	61004754
61004767	61004808	61004817	61004824	61004849	61004851	61004855	61004864	61004867	61004874	61004889	61004914
61004915	61004917	61004942	61004950	61004951	61004956	61004960	61004964	61004966	61004968	61004969	61004974
61004976	61004986	61004989	61004994	61004998	61005010	61005014	61005015	61005063	61005074	61005085	61005109
61005130	61005147	61005178	61005179	61005200	61005210	61005222	61005239	61005244	61005251	61005308	61005309
61005310	61005331	61005341	61005343	61005344	61005356	61005377	61005380	61005381	61005387	61005403	61005407
61005427	61005432	61005457	61005463	61005487	61005489	61005490	61005506	61005514	61005516	61005520	61005528
61005532	61005556	61005565	61005566	61005588	61005589	61005598	61005599	61005607	61005608	61005614	61005644
61005648	61005665	61005666	61005685	61005686	61005695	61005696	61005698	61005699	61005711	61005719	61005741
61005767	61005775	61005777	61005780	61005798	61005799	61005803	61005811	61005821	61005826	61005838	61005849
61005863	61005866	61005887	61005891	61005899	61005943	61005944	61005947	61005948	61005977	61005978	61005988
61006015	61006033	61006045	61006058	61006071	61006073	61006100	61006159	61006172	61006174	61006178	61006179

61006207	61006215	61006220	61006237	61006239	61006241	61006273	61006274	61006282	61006295	61006306	61006317
61006331	61006338	61006345	61006346	61006352	61006366	61006372	61006410	61006420	61006433	61006438	61006440
61006450	61006460	61006491	61006497	61006509	61006515	61006527	61006531	61006586	61006588	61006592	61006593
61006606	61006614	61006629	61006630	61006634	61006681	61006700	61006705	61006722	61006733	61006744	61006782
61006787	61006799	61006821	61006859	61006866	61006873	61006876	61006912	61006918	61006927	61006930	61007044
61007091	61007123	61007125	61007224	61007348	61007392	61007399	61007425	61007427	61007446	61007460	61007494
61007548	61007558	61007598	61007611	61007613	61007698	61007702	61007739	61007741	61007768	61007819	61007828
61007852	61007866	61007900	61007927	61007935	61007936	61008065	61008125	61008166	61008170	61008209	61008245
61008338	61008369	61008372	61008398	61008402	61008414	61008459	61008490	61008570	61008634	61008639	61008644
61008656	61008709	61008710	61008749	61008833	61008943	61008946	61008953	61008970	61008996	61008997	61009037
61009148	61009169	61009170	61009179	61009182	61009195	61009217	61009219	61009220	61009239	61009270	61009282
61009286	61009321	61009337	61009352	61009370	61009374	61009451	61009455	61009475	61009487	61009492	61009496
61009513	61009518	61009520	61009556	61009570	61009603	61009604	61009628	61009643	61009650	61009653	61009654
61009679	61009716	61009756	61009768	61009773	61009809	61009832	61009841	61009907	61009937	61009952	61009953
61009978	61009991	61010021	61010026	61010027	61010028	61010048	61010065	61010066	61010070	61010079	61010081
61010089	61010097	61010105	61010107	61010138	61010176	61010230	61010233	61010235	61010253	61010262	61010271
61010273	61010275	61010282	61010285	61010293	61010297	61010306	61010308	61010311	61010313	61010317	61010318
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61010431	61010437	61010451	61010453	61010470	61010486	61010499	61010501	61010502	61010509	61010523	61010538
61010563	61010565	61010588	61010589	61010593	61010610	61010619	61010646	61010647	61010693	61010707	61010716
61010722	61010743	61010774	61010786	61010794	61010795	61010820	61010838	61010850	61010858	61010863	61010887
61010891	61010906	61010913	61010918	61010927	61010934	61010942	61010944	61010956	61010961	61010966	61010967
61011027	61011029	61011124	61011141	61011171	61011181	61011184	61011247	61011283	61011293	61011295	61011316
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61011589	61011595	61011609	61011615	61011616	61011646	61011673	61011680	61011700	61011737	61011764	61011768
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61012873	61012879	61012930	61013032	61013050	61013058	61013076	61013084	61013091	61013149	61013157	61013170
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61013863	61013865	61013886	61013888	61013889	61013891	61013893	61013901	61013902	61013967	61013973	61013976
61013978	61013983	61013985	61013986	61013997	61013999	61014005	61014007	61014009	61014012	61014024	61014030
61014033	61014048	61014058	61014069	61014084	61014085	61014095	61014098	61014104	61014118	61014132	61014146
61014154	61014164	61014165	61014181	61014210	61014257	61014282	61014283	61014288	61014291	61014321	61014331
61014337	61014348	61014357	61014361	61014372	61014394	61014399	61014417	61014433	61014435	61014438	61014464
61014474	61014477	61014479	61014481	61014487	61014488	61014490	61014491	61014499	61014513	61014550	61014554
61014581	61014602	61014604	61014617	61014618	61014627	61014628	61014642	61014653	61014674	61014688	61014723
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61014947	61014958	61014959	61014970	61014997	61015010	61015034	61015041	61015044	61015046	61015055	61015061
61015073	61015107	61015131	61015132	61015137	61015149	61015150	61015153	61015155	61015163	61015164	61015168
61015177	61015179	61015199	61015206	61015207	61015215	61015268	61015271	61015280	61015281	61015299	61015310

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61015564	61015568	61015602	61015605	61015606	61015615	61015616	61015620	61015621	61015629	61015630	61015646
61015676	61015678	61015691	61015701	61015713	61015720	61015743	61015744	61015756	61015761	61015762	61015768
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61016459	61016496	61016500	61016506	61016514	61016516	61016519	61016533	61016535	61016557	61016570	61016585
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61016692	61016742	61016756	61016779	61016784	61016794	61016801	61016814	61016842	61016850	61016852	61016880
61016881	61016910	61016923	61016930	61016961	61016985	61017013	61017020	61017039	61017044	61017092	61017108
61017109	61017122	61017138	61017166	61017171	61017185	61017197	61017206	61017208	61017210	61017224	61017226
61017234	61017236	61017256	61017259	61017291	61017307	61017319	61017325	61017361	61017404	61017426	61017430
61017433	61017467	61017470	61017477	61017484	61017495	61017505	61017516	61017533	61017534	61017569	61017582
61017588	61017640	61017658	61017668	61017706	61017771	61017788	61017798	61017820	61017840	61017857	61017938
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61018166	61018191	61018219	61018224	61018225	61018226	61018227	61018229	61018230	61018231	61018240	61018266
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61019302	61019303	61019307	61019322	61019360	61019363	61019412	61019425	61019441	61019462	61019489	61019492
61019504	61019542	61019558	61019561	61019583	61019584	61019585	61019642	61019702	61019712	61019739	61019742
61019778	61019779	61019782	61019809	61019812	61019818	61019820	61019821	61019868	61019872	61019885	61019900
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61020456	61020471	61020505	61020506	61020515	61020522	61020523	61020530	61020555	61020583	61020589	61020602
61020612	61020655	61020671	61020715	61020740	61020762	61020796	61020845	61020861	61020862	61020863	61020869
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61022051	61022061	61022080	61022086	61022099	61022102	61022141	61022156	61022167	61022199	61022217	61022227
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61022712	61022716	61022726	61022730	61022748	61022776	61022814	61022845	61022847	61022850	61022854	61022915
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61023331	61023333	61023337	61023348	61023352	61023372	61023380	61023398	61023422	61023425	61023442	61023463
61023473	61023477	61023487	61023611	61023619	61023623	61023645	61023677	61023695	61023732	61023831	61023845
61023869	61023871	61023872	61023873	61023890	61023895	61023956	61023968	61024032	61024043	61024084	61024148
61024190	61024214	61024295	61024335	61024391	61024392	61024393	61024432	61024460	61024473	61024510	61024524

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61024909	61025060	61025069	61025078	61025105	61025137	61025199	61025256	61025267	61025286	61025403	61025446
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61025975	61025992	61025996	61026003	61026036	61026114	61026119	61026120	61026167	61026187	61026207	61026233
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61099578	61099579	61099580	61099586	61099588	61099591	61099608	61099614	61099615	61099618	61099640	61099641
61099647	61099648	61099653	61099662	61099665	61099667	61099668	61099686	61099688	61099696	61099713	61099739
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61100332	61100355	61100361	61100371	61100375	61100393	61100430	61100432	61100437	61100449	61100452	61100455
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61102375	61102377	61102402	61102417	61102429	61102460	61102466	61102476	61102482	61102483	61102490	61102499
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61103567	61103568	61103587	61103601	61103605	61103609	61103612	61103613	61103615	61103629	61103630	61103631
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61104246	61104253	61104259	61104265	61104287	61104304	61104305	61104312	61104317	61104321	61104332	61104333
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61105572	61105575	61105590	61105593	61105599	61105613	61105658	61105668	61105672	61105684	61105694	61105711
61105713	61105719	61105725	61105731	61105734	61105736	61105737	61105745	61105746	61105773	61105774	61105778
61105781	61105788	61105793	61105796	61105803	61105825	61105866	61105869	61105880	61105885	61105890	61105896
61105897	61105909	61105913	61105920	61105939	61105972	61105976	61105990	61105995	61105997	61105998	61106000
61106002	61106020	61106065	61106075	61106097	61106101	61106103	61106117	61106132	61106160	61106177	61106181
61106185	61106199	61106205	61106223	61106225	61106233	61106241	61106246	61106311	61106318	61106324	61106326
61106352	61106360	61106368	61106372	61106377	61106402	61106410	61106414	61106430	61106440	61106447	61106475
61106490	61106491	61106493	61106502	61106514	61106515	61106517	61106520	61106526	61106534	61106549	61106577
61106581	61106602	61106654	61106660	61106665	61106666	61106668	61106669	61106680	61106708	61106715	61106726
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61107464	61107470	61107471	61107494	61107497	61107498	61107540	61107574	61107582	61107585	61107590	61107591
61107607	61107608	61107611	61107613	61107614	61107618	61107619	61107622	61107625	61107626	61107637	61107646
61107652	61107654	61107656	61107714	61107718	61107722	61107726	61107802	61107809	61107810	61107820	61107836
61107852	61107855	61107856	61107871	61107882	61107887	61107893	61107903	61107920	61107932	61107937	61107992
61108070	61108133	61108134	61108145	61108165	61108173	61108174	61108242	61108249	61108250	61108252	61108258
61108443	61108454	61108461	61108476	61108491	61108500	61108528	61108583	61108593	61108594	61108599	61108643
61108658	61108673	61108756	61108790	61108794	61108795	61108801	61108821	61108825	61108864	61108873	61108879
61108940	61108964	61108965	61108967	61108981	61108995	61109003	61109004	61109062	61109093	61109218	61109255
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61109426	61109472	61109579	61109590	61109591	61109621	61109630	61109761	61109770	61109869	61109880	61109906
61109989	61110044	61110053	61110068	61110121	61110124	61110235	61110239	61110244	61110253	61110277	61110279
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61110532	61110547	61110595	61110604	61110606	61110641	61110667	61110726	61110736	61110768	61110822	61110840
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61120012	61120032	61120049	61120121	61120140	61120256	61120275	61120283	61120290	61120293	61120353	61120369
61120374	61120482	61120500	61120509	61120513	61120536	61120556	61120557	61120576	61120580	61120604	61120668
61120677	61120700	61120753	61120754	61120937	61126178	61127101	61127154	61127200	61127238	61127441	61127897
61127928	61127929	61127979	61127985	61128015	61128058	61128072	61128115	61128524	61128539	61128703	61128742
61128992	61129172	61129192	61129232	61129348	61129361	61129478	61129726	61129771	61129871	61129872	61129906
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61131652	61131662	61131665	61131693	61131700	61131711	61131740	61131771	61131791	61131821	61131822	61131837
61132070	61132171	61132183	61132193	61132211	61132296	61132308	61132343	61132452	61132473	61137260	61137311
61195321	61627193										

Annex 25: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26 seized since August 2018 are consistent with a same batch.

Serial numbers of batch 17-CN

These Type 56-1 show the serial numbers in sequential order, which suggests that the rifles were procured from a national stockpile, rather than from different non-state sources.



Source: S/2019/83, figure 16.6.

Legend

Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 8 August 2018
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 20 December 2021 and reported by the Panel of Experts on Somalia
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 reportedly presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled area in 2023
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia between 2019 and 2021 by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia in 2018 by CAR

62000076	62000104	62000111	62000168	62000217	62000229	62000259	62000267	62000281	62000328	62000424	62000427
62000430	62000431	62000490	62000492	62000493	62000554	62000555	62000568	62000569	62000574	62000606	62000717
62000772	62000773	62000872	62000920	62000965	62000971	62001002	62001195	62001209	62001213	62001226	62001258
62001282	62001490	62001493	62001519	62001538	62001539	62001542	62001595	62001635	62001660	62001761	62001841
62001875	62001917	62001923	62001960	62001978	62002002	62002037	62002055	62002090	62002101	62002122	62002139
62002141	62002142	62002159	62002187	62002295	62002381	62002388	62002409	62002411	62002421	62002474	62002482
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62006302	62006318	62006442	62006515	62006609	62006613	62006692	62007186	62007209	62007459	62007560	62007604
62007618	62007633	62007652	62007851	62007864	62007914	62007941	62007969	62008032	62008051	62008211	62008220
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62009652	62009734	62009775	62009813	62009836	62009946	62009950	62009974	62010017	62010059	62010092	62010102
62010238	62010309	62010322	62010346	62010504	62010558	62010649	62010893	62010899	62011016	62011094	62011121
62011154	62011164	62011176	62011236	62011255	62011313	62011339	62011349	62011392	62011445	62011508	62011518
62011850	62011860	62011862	62011887	62011888	62011890	62011934	62011939	62011961	62011987	62012005	62012056
62012079	62012088	62012115	62012130	62012170	62012244	62012245	62012259	62012283	62012285	62012353	62012389

62012432	62012436	62012448	62012500	62012589	62012609	62012675	62012678	62012702	62012878	62012879	62012908
62012925	62012962	62013028	62013056	62013061	62013141	62013194	62013226	62013229	62013238	62013279	62013294
62013336	62013354	62013391	62013421	62013440	62013472	62013476	62013540	62013586	62013643	62013735	62013744
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62014366	62014397	62014418	62014423	62014451	62014453	62014469	62014500	62014503	62014522	62014550	62014552
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62016091	62016216	62016243	62016255	62016291	62016307	62016313	62016338	62016431	62016437	62016493	62016598
62016722	62016730	62016731	62016733	62016869	62016870	62016890	62016903	62016927	62016946	62016955	62016998
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62017294	62017344	62017435	62017440	62017548	62017587	62017602	62017643	62017652	62017673	62017678	62017681
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62119352	62119354	62119362	62119370	62119381	62119488	62119501	62119591	62119645	62119655	62119693	62119712
62119821	62119825	62119874	62119951	62119984	62120060	62120071	62120072	62120111	62120123	62120183	62120274
62120316	62120326	62120355	62120356	62120388	62120463	62120478	62120489	62120523	62120525	62120545	62120572
62120774	62120782	62120819	62120851	62120871	62120879	62120900	62120922	62120929	62120945	62120962	62121010
62121030	62121050	62121089	62121292	62121340	62121343	62121360	62121470	62121489	62121557	62121560	62121628
62121668	62121693	62121704	62121756	62121757	62121774	62121802	62121851	62121866	62121890	62121901	62121906
62121933	62121960	62122012	62122065	62122100	62122137	62122139	62122148	62122170	62122178	62122185	62122209
62122215	62122220	62122227	62122236	62122290	62122336	62122338	62122391	62122392	62122397	62122470	62122512
62122524	62122567	62122675	62122722	62122813	62122870	62122874	62122908	62122954	62122958	62122965	62122988
62123208	62123237	62123302	62123314	62123328	62123329	62123335	62123354	62123400	62123454	62123517	62123532
62123536	62123581	62123585	62123672	62123674	62123694	62123723	62123738	62123834	62123848	62123971	62124006
62124017	62124022	62124125	62124139	62124307	62124544	62124685	62124974	62124976	62124985	62124991	62125014

62125093	62125282	62125283	62125327	62125336	62125337	62125357	62125456	62125469	62125471	62125503	62125588
62125625	62125691	62125779	62125818	62125887	62125999	62126045	62126338	62126410	62126597	62126603	62126757
62126890	62127209	62127300	62127387	62127422	62127530	62127605	62127614	62127628	62127791	62127835	62127983
62128039	62128055	62128063	62128074	62128096	62128218	62128243	62128320	62128325	62128329	62128367	62128431
62128455	62128462	62128489	62128499	62128555	62128569	62128590	62128636	62128724	62128760	62128847	62128856
62128872	62128912	62128939	62128971	62128984	62129010	62129019	62129024	62129032	62129038	62129054	62129083
62129086	62129087	62129101	62129123	62129134	62129225	62129239	62129246	62129258	62129265	62129282	62129304
62129321	62129333	62129341	62129351	62129361	62129368	62129379	62129381	62129407	62129418	62129419	62129438
62129460	62129475	62129477	62129585	62129601	62129614	62129626	62129632	62129635	62129676	62129706	62129755
62129775	62129788	62129810	62129881	62129900	62129919	62129941	62129944	62129949	62129952	62129972	62129980
62130011	62130018	62130078	62130100	62130117	62130132	62130171	62130179	62130191	62130227	62130228	62130231
62130245	62130256	62130276	62130282	62130283	62130320	62130351	62130372	62130396	62130421	62130428	62130438
62130455	62130470	62130514	62130675	62130678	62130692	62130700	62130711	62130716	62130806	62130840	62130860
62130873	62130917	62130943	62130978	62131119	62131156	62131213	62131260	62131327	62131337	62131349	62131364
62131408	62131418	62131434	62131459	62131513	62131542	62131730	62131794	62131964	62131981	62132244	62132494
62132572	62132599	62132860	62133004	62133140	62133406	62133666	62133850	62133857	62133867	62135349	62135350
62135532	62138948										

Annex 26: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26 seized since August 2018 are consistent with a same batch.

Serial numbers of serial 18-CN

These Type 56-1 show the serial numbers in sequential order, which suggests that the rifles were procured from a national stockpile, rather than from different non-state sources.



Source: S/2019/83, figure 16.7

Legend

Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 28 August 2018
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized in Aden in December 2018
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia between 2019 and 2021 by GI-TOC
Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia in 2018 by CAR

63000005	63000026	63000033	63000052	63000058	63000060	63000061	63000082	63000098	63000121	63000123	63000127
63000140	63000144	63000152	63000163	63000182	63000184	63000188	63000196	63000209	63000211	63000225	63000238
63000246	63000265	63000276	63000277	63000288	63000294	63000299	63000321	63000328	63000340	63000348	63000361
63000362	63000373	63000384	63000387	63000391	63000393	63000408	63000417	63000420	63000421	63000428	63000438
63000441	63000452	63000466	63000484	63000503	63000521	63000524	63000527	63000536	63000542	63000559	63000567
63000568	63000574	63000577	63000582	63000596	63000597	63000600	63000617	63000620	63000639	63000644	63000723
63000771	63000796	63000824	63000894	63000905	63000908	63000919	63000922	63000962	63000967	63000995	63001003
63001013	63001028	63001054	63001082	63001089	63001101	63001107	63001117	63001133	63001139	63001143	63001151
63001159	63001161	63001171	63001174	63001175	63001207	63001233	63001234	63001241	63001243	63001245	63001255
63001258	63001266	63001267	63001268	63001269	63001315	63001321	63001330	63001343	63001357	63001376	63001383
63001403	63001409	63001413	63001420	63001422	63001428	63001441	63001442	63001445	63001452	63001454	63001464
63001468	63001480	63001505	63001516	63001544	63001546	63001567	63001578	63001608	63001609	63001614	63001651
63001683	63001713	63001717	63001725	63001728	63001732	63001734	63001743	63001746	63001751	63001752	63001753
63001754	63001762	63001765	63001770	63001775	63001786	63001815	63001823	63001841	63001844	63001851	63001852
63001855	63001867	63001868	63001873	63001874	63001891	63001895	63001903	63001910	63001914	63001921	63001925
63001934	63001939	63001940	63001949	63001956	63001959	63001970	63001971	63001976	63001979	63001989	63001996
63001998	63002004	63002010	63002016	63002018	63002024	63002048	63002058	63002064	63002067	63002073	63002078
63002087	63002106	63002110	63002115	63002117	63002131	63002145	63002146	63002148	63002164	63002172	63002180
63002182	63002194	63002205	63002206	63002217	63002239	63002251	63002253	63002258	63002263	63002269	63002288
63002290	63002295	63002309	63002310	63002319	63002337	63002343	63002390	63002405	63002411	63002414	63002415
63002455	63002460	63002464	63002470	63002471	63002503	63002508	63002517	63002521	63002552	63002564	63002578
63002592	63002635	63002645	63002655	63002660	63002665	63002670	63002674	63002675	63002676	63002678	63002694

63002703	63002721	63002758	63002780	63002786	63002788	63002789	63002806	63002848	63002854	63002867	63002875
63002884	63002896	63002900	63002909	63002911	63002913	63002915	63002923	63002934	63002936	63002953	63002955
63002977	63002979	63002981	63003002	63003008	63003040	63003053	63003063	63003064	63003079	63003089	63003095
63003103	63003105	63003107	63003109	63003111	63003123	63003168	63003174	63003177	63003179	63003195	63003197
63003198	63003202	63003205	63003237	63003239	63003243	63003244	63003245	63003255	63003262	63003265	63003277
63003291	63003294	63003295	63003297	63003333	63003339	63003347	63003383	63003413	63003456	63003480	63003482
63003484	63003495	63003498	63003506	63003512	63003526	63003538	63003545	63003558	63003567	63003580	63003590
63003600	63003627	63003629	63003633	63003635	63003640	63003722	63003725	63003732	63003742	63003781	63003785
63003825	63003870	63003871	63003873	63003903	63003914	63003957	63003966	63003972	63003976	63003982	63003984
63003989	63003990	63004009	63004014	63004051	63004061	63004103	63004132	63004158	63004187	63004192	63004235
63004236	63004248	63004278	63004288	63004299	63004304	63004335	63004337	63004346	63004390	63004394	63004402
63004406	63004434	63004435	63004442	63004450	63004458	63004465	63004492	63004496	63004502	63004505	63004507
63004509	63004514	63004515	63004519	63004520	63004521	63004525	63004527	63004530	63004533	63004536	63004549
63004559	63004572	63004573	63004577	63004588	63004597	63004599	63004605	63004606	63004610	63004624	63004631
63004638	63004645	63004646	63004648	63004651	63004660	63004667	63004668	63004670	63004676	63004683	63004685
63004695	63004697	63004704	63004712	63004723	63004731	63004754	63004774	63004775	63004778	63004782	63004859
63004874	63004890	63004897	63004924	63004938	63004946	63004947	63004953	63004954	63004955	63004956	63004965
63004971	63004973	63004977	63004979	63004981	63004984	63004997	63005003	63005005	63005007	63005016	63005019
63005037	63005040	63005059	63005090	63005099	63005103	63005110	63005124	63005134	63005138	63005140	63005141
63005144	63005149	63005151	63005155	63005156	63005165	63005181	63005188	63005210	63005227	63005243	63005263
63005335	63005347	63005372	63005380	63005383	63005385	63005400	63005401	63005403	63005404	63005412	63005435
63005448	63005453	63005458	63005469	63005491	63005493	63005495	63005496	63005503	63005504	63005507	63005514
63005520	63005532	63005535	63005538	63005545	63005549	63005550	63005564	63005567	63005568	63005572	63005576
63005578	63005581	63005584	63005589	63005600	63005602	63005607	63005611	63005636	63005637	63005641	63005642
63005649	63005651	63005658	63005671	63005678	63005681	63005688	63005725	63005730	63005731	63005733	63005741
63005743	63005788	63005792	63005794	63005802	63005808	63005810	63005817	63005818	63005819	63005824	63005827
63005851	63005853	63005881	63005891	63005895	63005909	63005910	63005931	63005961	63005969	63005980	63005988
63006003	63006012	63006020	63006027	63006037	63006068	63006073	63006100	63006104	63006127	63006140	63006143
63006145	63006151	63006152	63006154	63006160	63006178	63006192	63006202	63006227	63006254	63006256	63006266
63006269	63006273	63006282	63006289	63006294	63006296	63006318	63006321	63006339	63006349	63006352	63006357
63006359	63006360	63006368	63006373	63006374	63006375	63006385	63006419	63006447	63006451	63006461	63006465
63006482	63006484	63006494	63006501	63006510	63006512	63006514	63006520	63006525	63006540	63006550	63006570
63006572	63006578	63006586	63006588	63006592	63006600	63006608	63006614	63006621	63006636	63006655	63006657
63006664	63006665	63006675	63006677	63006679	63006683	63006685	63006687	63006692	63006693	63006701	63006706
63006773	63006790	63006791	63006796	63006797	63006800	63006804	63006810	63006811	63006813	63006834	63006836
63006840	63006842	63006869	63006878	63006923	63006933	63006938	63006949	63006963	63006971	63006998	63007002
63007004	63007045	63007087	63007089	63007097	63007114	63007118	63007127	63007129	63007154	63007176	63007182
63007191	63007202	63007230	63007236	63007250	63007254	63007260	63007264	63007280	63007283	63007315	63007323
63007326	63007327	63007382	63007394	63007398	63007413	63007418	63007420	63007434	63007438	63007447	63007464
63007475	63007485	63007497	63007506	63007508	63007528	63007540	63007556	63007558	63007570	63007607	63007609
63007613	63007617	63007623	63007658	63007678	63007705	63007708	63007721	63007729	63007739	63007741	63007794
63007800	63007802	63007812	63007813	63007815	63007816	63007820	63007828	63007833	63007836	63007848	63007849
63007893	63007895	63007897	63007912	63007921	63007924	63007931	63007932	63007946	63007948	63007954	63007956
63007968	63007980	63007998	63008000	63008004	63008017	63008028	63008029	63008036	63008038	63008042	63008044

63008050	63008089	63008090	63008091	63008114	63008128	63008131	63008133	63008144	63008166	63008172	63008174
63008184	63008186	63008200	63008206	63008222	63008238	63008295	63008316	63008319	63008333	63008382	63008401
63008409	63008411	63008416	63008417	63008424	63008425	63008429	63008458	63008460	63008470	63008478	63008520
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63008710	63008714	63008734	63008736	63008756	63008766	63008773	63008780	63008792	63008796	63008803	63008804
63008806	63008808	63008810	63008817	63008820	63008821	63008823	63008830	63008869	63008893	63008894	63008897
63008955	63008960	63008971	63008975	63008979	63008984	63008986	63009024	63009028	63009032	63009034	63009036
63009040	63009042	63009054	63009064	63009066	63009068	63009085	63009095	63009096	63009097	63009098	63009102
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63009225	63009227	63009232	63009234	63009250	63009264	63009266	63009274	63009276	63009278	63009294	63009304
63009305	63009310	63009319	63009322	63009324	63009328	63009336	63009354	63009362	63009366	63009378	63009382
63009392	63009393	63009394	63009397	63009426	63009437	63009450	63009458	63009470	63009475	63009481	63009499
63009516	63009554	63009579	63009595	63009598	63009614	63009641	63009648	63009663	63009687	63009689	63009691
63009695	63009713	63009730	63009738	63009745	63009747	63009781	63009813	63009825	63009845	63009851	63009895
63009919	63009921	63009927	63009929	63009935	63009949	63009953	63009968	63009971	63009972	63009986	63009987
63009994	63009996	63009999	63010010	63010014	63010016	63010030	63010070	63010128	63010142	63010150	63010153
63010159	63010187	63010192	63010209	63010211	63010221	63010250	63010261	63010270	63010290	63010306	63010323
63010340	63010353	63010360	63010361	63010363	63010367	63010368	63010421	63010443	63010445	63010447	63010467
63010504	63010510	63010526	63010533	63010555	63010561	63010566	63010580	63010582	63010595	63010617	63010627
63010638	63010642	63010645	63010663	63010673	63010743	63010775	63010777	63010805	63010827	63010831	63010839
63010849	63010861	63010867	63010877	63010889	63010891	63010901	63010903	63010910	63010913	63010927	63010929
63010934	63010935	63010936	63010945	63010947	63010951	63010955	63010984	63010998	63011007	63011013	63011017
63011021	63011029	63011046	63011054	63011065	63011069	63011070	63011073	63011082	63011086	63011098	63011103
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63011305	63011311	63011313	63011331	63011332	63011338	63011339	63011342	63011360	63011372	63011383	63011399
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63011884	63011885	63011898	63011906	63011910	63011932	63011938	63011950	63011969	63011990	63011994	63012008
63012016	63012026	63012058	63012061	63012063	63012066	63012079	63012087	63012096	63012098	63012122	63012123
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63013571	63013590	63013592	63013595	63013607	63013615	63013623	63013624	63013647	63013672	63013677	63013699
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63014051	63014053	63014055	63014058	63014087	63014092	63014101	63014105	63014129	63014163	63014180	63014197
63014205	63014207	63014215	63014221	63014226	63014231	63014240	63014243	63014261	63014263	63014278	63014290
63014327	63014337	63014344	63014350	63014357	63014373	63014378	63014382	63014395	63014412	63014417	63014419
63014442	63014509	63014518	63014524	63014542	63014546	63014557	63014563	63014567	63014571	63014575	63014580

63014594	63014609	63014612	63014625	63014631	63014635	63014638	63014649	63014652	63014654	63014658	63014659
63014664	63014670	63014680	63014688	63014697	63014704	63014762	63014764	63014796	63014797	63014824	63014829
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63014941	63014945	63014947	63014960	63014962	63014964	63014996	63015047	63015065	63015069	63015108	63015128
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63015200	63015201	63015205	63015207	63015209	63015213	63015219	63015237	63015239	63015247	63015248	63015251
63015254	63015255	63015256	63015259	63015260	63015275	63015279	63015291	63015302	63015305	63015312	63015318
63015336	63015358	63015360	63015368	63015372	63015380	63015382	63015386	63015388	63015408	63015409	63015410
63015414	63015419	63015420	63015426	63015432	63015436	63015444	63015450	63015452	63015461	63015464	63015466
63015478	63015483	63015490	63015526	63015528	63015530	63015535	63015549	63015554	63015563	63015620	63015641
63015642	63015643	63015645	63015647	63015666	63015670	63015682	63015687	63015697	63015702	63015719	63015723
63015731	63015735	63015737	63015771	63015778	63015779	63015787	63015792	63015795	63015797	63015802	63015850
63015853	63015866	63015874	63015889	63015904	63015922	63015926	63016047	63016056	63016063	63016071	63016124
63016155	63016157	63016174	63016183	63016189	63016207	63016225	63016241	63016251	63016271	63016277	63016279
63016307	63016322	63016328	63016369	63016370	63016371	63016380	63016382	63016394	63016444	63016458	63016460
63016464	63016486	63016490	63016514	63016520	63016522	63016523	63016535	63016541	63016543	63016548	63016553
63016562	63016566	63016568	63016570	63016576	63016603	63016605	63016636	63016638	63016668	63016687	63016690
63016728	63016739	63016740	63016751	63016763	63016765	63016782	63016797	63016799	63016801	63016815	63016833
63016845	63016852	63016855	63016908	63016932	63016972	63016987	63017029	63017044	63017054	63017058	63017064
63017072	63017078	63017081	63017086	63017092	63017098	63017100	63017103	63017112	63017128	63017133	63017141
63017151	63017232	63017284	63017302	63017314	63017322	63017332	63017338	63017342	63017344	63017370	63017372
63017396	63017398	63017410	63017438	63017446	63017476	63017484	63017486	63017492	63017496	63017502	63017506
63017508	63017524	63017548	63017554	63017574	63017580	63017608	63017612	63017619	63017630	63017632	63017651
63017672	63017676	63017681	63017685	63017691	63017695	63017699	63017721	63017723	63017725	63017731	63017741
63017757	63017763	63017796	63017798	63017800	63017804	63017808	63017810	63017812	63017832	63017879	63017885
63017917	63017920	63017936	63017950	63017972	63017974	63017978	63018019	63018029	63018033	63018073	63018074
63018083	63018087	63018091	63018093	63018115	63018123	63018132	63018144	63018159	63018164	63018170	63018172
63018173	63018174	63018188	63018192	63018196	63018200	63018218	63018235	63018298	63018305	63018357	63018375
63018379	63018385	63018393	63018395	63018400	63018409	63018411	63018521	63018535	63018549	63018567	63018569
63018585	63018587	63018601	63018609	63018619	63018623	63018631	63018655	63018659	63018809	63018811	63018821
63018897	63018935	63018946	63018949	63018962	63018970	63018982	63018984	63018986	63019012	63019013	63019015
63019017	63019019	63019042	63019064	63019072	63019080	63019082	63019084	63019086	63019122	63019134	63019142
63019162	63019164	63019166	63019170	63019184	63019200	63019204	63019222	63019226	63019232	63019240	63019248
63019252	63019268	63019274	63019284	63019290	63019292	63019298	63019360	63019386	63019398	63019410	63019462
63019479	63019494	63019496	63019524	63019535	63019564	63019574	63019578	63019581	63019598	63019605	63019688
63019692	63019697	63019730	63019731	63019733	63019743	63019759	63019765	63019789	63019823	63019867	63019881
63019883	63019887	63019906	63019912	63019921	63019929	63019971	63019973	63019977	63019979	63019984	63019994
63019997	63020003	63020005	63020007	63020008	63020011	63020013	63020028	63020039	63020045	63020066	63020127
63020170	63020172	63020174	63020219	63020229	63020239	63020248	63020252	63020256	63020258	63020264	63020266
63020272	63020295	63020342	63020388	63020392	63020396	63020438	63020445	63020449	63020457	63020466	63020470
63020472	63020476	63020478	63020482	63020484	63020486	63020544	63020546	63020551	63020554	63020557	63020559
63020563	63020564	63020565	63020573	63020575	63020658	63020664	63020672	63020708	63020724	63020725	63020730
63020731	63020732	63020736	63020739	63020742	63020752	63020770	63020822	63020921	63020970	63020977	63020981
63020991	63021054	63021064	63021140	63021145	63021154	63021173	63021179	63021195	63021202	63021205	63021239

63021274	63021284	63021287	63021293	63021294	63021295	63021300	63021301	63021311	63021406	63021432	63021452
63021514	63021518	63021538	63021606	63021611	63021651	63021663	63021691	63021692	63021719	63021735	63021743
63021749	63021754	63021762	63021774	63021782	63021783	63021787	63021790	63021792	63021799	63021986	63021990
63022058	63022062	63022064	63022066	63022146	63022210	63022212	63022216	63022220	63022222	63022226	63022230
63022298	63022394	63022396	63022402	63022416	63022448	63022492	63022510	63022526	63022824	63022826	63022836
63022996	63022998	63023002	63023014	63023028	63023044	63023062	63023064	63023076	63023082	63023170	63023320
63025370	63027343	63027714	63029500	63030235	63031908	63032665	63033424	63033623	63033853	63033943	63034063
63034189	63034279	63034307	63034361	63034519	63035684	63035768	63035796	63035955	63035974	63035979	63035983
63036263	63036282	63036289	63036434	63036440	63036452	63036472	63036953	63036957	63036961	63037098	63037329
63037525	63037729	63037765	63037995	63037999	63038193	63038913	63038917	63038991	63039035	63039039	63039041
63039192	63039295	63039372	63039391	63039468	63039476	63039502	63039559	63039622	63039653	63039805	63039863
63040007	63040039	63040047	63040063	63040167	63040307	63040394	63040407	63040419	63040429	63040489	63040497
63040503	63040515	63040519	63040544	63040653	63040675	63040711	63040717	63040747	63040787	63040822	63040864
63040953	63041019	63041086	63041208	63041226	63041250	63041337	63041356	63041410	63041411	63041424	63041436
63041438	63041454	63041455	63041464	63041489	63041507	63041515	63041519	63041531	63041688	63041690	63041699
63041719	63041746	63041753	63041757	63041788	63041799	63041883	63041907	63041909	63041915	63041927	63041937
63041964	63041977	63042019	63042022	63042052	63042060	63042127	63042195	63042228	63042247	63042293	63042298
63042303	63042308	63042312	63042315	63042318	63042330	63042349	63042381	63042383	63042393	63042395	63042409
63042435	63042458	63042461	63042463	63042495	63042522	63042525	63042569	63042605	63042661	63042663	63042673
63042679	63042705	63042709	63042715	63042719	63042731	63042735	63042751	63042755	63042799	63042811	63042813
63042817	63042821	63042835	63042839	63042858	63042869	63042876	63042884	63042896	63042903	63042945	63042953
63042955	63042961	63042969	63042971	63042989	63042991	63043006	63043025	63043047	63043048	63043055	63043070
63043074	63043076	63043078	63043084	63043109	63043111	63043119	63043133	63043135	63043144	63043151	63043157
63043197	63043209	63043221	63043249	63043252	63043267	63043273	63043276	63043323	63043325	63043357	63043367
63043390	63043428	63043457	63043459	63043466	63043475	63043493	63043513	63043534	63043535	63043571	63043572
63043592	63043595	63043604	63043627	63043631	63043632	63043633	63043642	63043650	63043677	63043688	63043690
63043692	63043696	63043701	63043720	63043724	63043727	63043729	63043732	63043790	63043807	63043828	63043831
63043838	63043841	63043849	63043851	63043858	63043859	63043899	63043918	63043937	63043938	63043944	63043958
63043968	63044037	63044038	63044054	63044078	63044086	63044088	63044130	63044136	63044156	63044190	63044194
63044196	63044200	63044204	63044231	63044242	63044270	63044271	63044273	63044304	63044307	63044309	63044338
63044355	63044360	63044361	63044363	63044378	63044418	63044436	63044471	63044476	63044479	63044481	63044484
63044487	63044488	63044490	63044500	63044506	63044533	63044537	63044543	63044544	63044545	63044547	63044576
63044581	63044598	63044602	63044608	63044611	63044612	63044614	63044620	63044621	63044624	63044628	63044630
63044632	63044633	63044638	63044648	63044653	63044669	63044670	63044674	63044678	63044680	63044684	63044712
63044713	63044715	63044719	63044729	63044736	63044750	63044762	63044777	63044781	63044786	63044790	63044794
63044802	63044804	63044813	63044815	63044819	63044822	63044841	63044842	63044850	63044878	63044880	63044884
63044898	63044912	63044918	63044928	63044942	63044956	63044986	63044996	63045004	63045008	63045016	63045020
63045029	63045042	63045050	63045058	63045060	63045075	63045080	63045154	63045160	63045172	63045173	63045192
63045217	63045238	63045240	63045254	63045260	63045276	63045279	63045280	63045283	63045288	63045304	63045339
63045340	63045353	63045354	63045356	63045362	63045368	63045372	63045383	63045384	63045387	63045411	63045420
63045458	63045464	63045468	63045469	63045476	63045498	63045538	63045545	63045561	63045562	63045567	63045575
63045577	63045579	63045583	63045587	63045589	63045592	63045593	63045608	63045634	63045636	63045647	63045678
63045702	63045706	63045714	63045719	63045724	63045726	63045773	63045796	63045821	63045848	63045860	63045934
63045950	63045954	63045956	63045964	63045968	63045996	63046008	63046014	63046020	63046022	63046028	63046034

63046054	63046094	63046102	63046134	63046154	63046158	63046166	63046224	63046246	63046262	63046264	63046278
63046287	63046292	63046300	63046307	63046324	63046329	63046374	63046386	63046498	63046556	63046576	63046684
63046690	63046902	63046908	63046980	63046990	63046998	63047004	63047008	63047050	63047098	63047132	63047136
63047164	63047236	63047242	63047268	63047270	63047274	63047302	63047314	63047400	63047404	63047410	63047424
63047442	63047444	63047454	63047460	63047468	63047470	63047474	63047478	63047502	63047520	63047532	63047628
63047638	63047664	63047668	63047682	63047738	63047826	63047842	63047848	63047854	63047856	63047858	63047864
63047874	63047908	63047942	63047968	63047980	63047995	63048110	63048114	63048118	63048124	63048306	63048324
63048338	63048340	63048498	63048606	63048638	63048674	63048719	63048772	63050942	63056702	63057434	63062977
63069739	63072304	63084645	63088360	63090647	63098435						

Annex 27: Seized SALW

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China.

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
2,999	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69
1,918	Seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023	Para. 68
2,556	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 64
3,752	Seized on sea by the US on 11 February 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 62
1,298	Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020	S/2021/79 , para. 86
3,002	Seized on sea by the KSA on 17 April 2020	S/2021/79 , para. 86
178	Seized in Aden, Yemen on 10 December 2018	S/2020/326 , para. 61
2,521	Seized on sea by the US on 28 August 2018	S/2019/83 , paras. 95-96
2,522	Seized on sea by the US on 25 June 2018	S/2021/79 , table 2

20,746	Total
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Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China reported by the Panel of experts on Somalia. These Type 56-1 assault rifles are bearing serial numbers consistent with a same batch as those documented in this report

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
1,406	Seized on sea by the US on 20 December 2021	S/2022/754 , para. 104

Assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
1,998	Seized on sea by France on 20 March 2016	S/2018/193 , tables 2-3

1,998	Total
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Assault rifles of non-specified model and origin

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
1,500	Seized on sea by the US on 28 March 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2
1,989 ¹⁷⁴	Seized on sea by Australia on 27 February 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2 and annex 35

3,489	Total
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AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia bearing serial numbers consistent with the same batch

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
198	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69
100	Seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023	Para. 68

298	Total
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¹⁷⁴ Including Type 56, SA-93 and AIM assault rifles.

AKSU compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
35	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 65
35 Total		

Type 85 sniper rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
100	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 64
100 Total		

Hoshdar sniper rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
64	Seized on sea by France on 20 March 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2
64 Total		

AM-50 AMR with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
52	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 64
50	Seized on sea on 10 February 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 62
50	Seizure on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020	S/2021/79 , table 2
9	Seizure on sea by the KSA on 17 April 2020	S/2021/79 , table 2
161 Total		

M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
31	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69
19	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 64
49	Seized on 17 April 2020	S/2021/79 ,
385	Seized on 24 June 2020	S/2021/79 , para. 86
484 Total		

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
164	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 64
1	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69
165 Total		

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Bulgaria

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
8	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69
6	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 62

14	Total
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PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Romania

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
1	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69

1	Total
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PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Hungary

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
1	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69

1	Total
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PKM LMG of non-specified model and origin

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
385	Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020	S/2021/79 , table 2
49	Seized on sea by the KSA on 17 June 2020	S/2021/79 , table 2
49	Seized on sea by Australia on 27 February 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2

483	Total
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Type 73 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Democratic People's of Korea (DPRK)

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
6	Seized on sea by France on 20 March 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2

6	Total
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HMG of non-specified model and origin

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
82	Seized on sea on 10 February 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 62
60	Seizure on sea by the KSA on 17 April 2020	S/2021/79 , table 2
21	Seizure on sea by the US on 28 March 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2

163	Total
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RPG-7 with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
90	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 62
194	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 62
200	Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020	S/2021/79 , annex 14
48	Seized in Aden, Yemen on 10 December 2018	S/2020/326 , para. 61
100	Seized on sea by Australia on 27 February 2016	S/2018/193 , tables 2-3
632	Total	

RPG-7 of non-specified origin

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
200	Seizure on sea by the US on 28 March 2016	S/2018/193 , table 2
200	Total	

RPG-29 (or a copy of it) of non-specified origin¹⁷⁵

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
9	Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020	S/2021/79 , table 2
9	Total	

Dehlavieh missile with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in the Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
23	Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023	Para. 69
7	Seized on sea by the UK on 23 February 2023	Para. 74
52	Seized on land by GoY on 10 March 2022	S/2023/130 , para. 56
20	Seized on sea by the KSA on 20 June 2020	S/2021/79 , annex 14
150	Seized on sea on the 09 February 2020	S/2021/79 , para. 84
21	Seized on sea by the US on 25 November 2019	S/2020/326 , para. 52
Unknown	Seized on sea by France on 6 March 2016	S/2018/594 , paras. 115-116
9	Seized on sea on 20 March 2016	S/2017/91 , table 4
1	Seized on land on 29 November 2015	S/2017/91 , table 4
253	Total	

Toophan missile with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
56	Seized on sea by Australia on 25 September 2015	S/2018/192 , para. 82
56	Total	

¹⁷⁵ The Panel could not identify the origin of these RPG-29. However, the Panel notes that RPG-29 rocket launchers are produced in Iran as *Ghadir*. <https://www.ifmat.org/10/08/iranian-small-arms-manufacturing-is-bigger-than-you-think/>

9M111 and 9M113 missiles

Quantity	Seizure	Reference
50	Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021	S/2022/50 , para. 65
19	Seized on sea on 25 September 2015	S/2018/192 , annex 12

69	Total
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Summary of the material seized

Quantity	Type of material
27,972	Assault rifles and compact assault rifles
325	Sniper and AMR
1,151	LMG
163	HMG
841	RPG
378	ATGM

30,830	Grand total
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Annex 28: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia seized in January 2023 are consistent with a same batch

Legend

Material seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023
Material seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023

21 300027	21 300033	21 300062	21 300067	21 300072	21 300076	21 300079	21 300082	21 300085	21 300090
21 300092	21 300094	21 300110	21 300111	21 300118	21 300124	21 300162	21 300173	21 300176	21 300179
21 300184	21 300187	21 300188	21 300193	21 300196	21 300205	21 300213	21 300214	21 300223	21 300232
21 300236	21 300237	21 300251	21 300254	21 300255	21 300256	21 300260	21 300266	21 300268	21 300269
21 300276	21 300278	21 300282	21 300291	21 300299	21 300303	21 300305	21 300317	21 300319	21 300330
21 300332	21 300336	21 300338	21 300340	21 300346	21 300347	21 300359	21 300386	21 300387	21 300390
21 300391	21 300393	21 300398	21 300402	21 300405	21 300409	21 300420	21 300424	21 300431	21 300437
21 300440	21 300450	21 300452	21 300467	21 300473	21 300484	21 300507	21 300513	21 300515	21 300516
21 300518	21 300523	21 300546	21 300547	21 300551	21 300552	21 300562	21 300567	21 300572	21 300578
21 300579	21 300582	21 300585	21 300589	21 300596	21 300598	21 300599	21 300601	21 300603	21 300607
21 300609	21 300610	21 300611	21 300618	21 300623	21 300626	21 300629	21 300632	21 300633	21 300636
21 300638	21 300640	21 300643	21 300651	21 300661	21 300667	21 300662	21 300671	21 300675	21 300679
21 300682	21 300687	21 300688	21 300690	21 300691	21 300695	21 300698	21 300699	21 300700	21 300706
21 300707	21 300708	21 300709	21 300713	21 300723	21 300728	21 300739	21 300744	21 300748	21 300753
21 300761	21 300762	21 300763	21 300764	21 300766	21 300771	21 300773	21 300776	21 300780	21 300786
21 300787	21 300791	21 300797	21 300801	21 300803	21 300805	21 300806	21 300807	21 300810	21 300812
21 300814	21 300816	21 300820	21 300822	21 300826	21 300830	21 300831	21 300836	21 300839	21 300843
21 300844	21 300845	21 300846	21 300847	21 300853	21 300863	21 300864	21 300870	21 300873	21 300885
21 300890	21 300897	21 300898	21 300891	21 300895	21 300896	21 300905	21 300914	21 300918	21 300921
21 300924	21 300926	21 300931	21 300933	21 300936	21 300937	21 300938	21 300939	21 300941	21 300947
21 300950	21 300952	21 300954	21 300956	21 300957	21 300960	21 300961	21 300969	21 300970	21 300972
21 300974	21 300975	21 300977	21 300978	21 300981	21 300982	21 300984	21 300985	21 300991	21 300992
21 301005	21 301016	21 301019	21 301020	21 301024	21 301027	21 301028	21 301053	21 301062	21 301064
21 301066	21 301067	21 301068	21 301069	21 301070	21 301075	21 301078	21 301080	21 301085	21 301086
21 301087	21 301088	21 301090	21 301093	21 301098	21 301105	21 301107	21 301108	21 301110	21 301111
21 301114	21 301119	21 301123	21 301127	21 301128	21 301129	21 301133	21 301135	21 301136	21 301141
21 301143	21 301146	21 301149	21 301151	21 301152	21 301154	21 301160	21 301162	21 301166	21 301168
21 301170	21 301172	21 301173	21 301174	21 301176	21 301177	21 301179	21 301181	21 301218	21 301221
21 301227	21 301236	21 301248	21 301250	21 301251	21 301254	21 301261	21 301262	21 301265	21 301271
21 301284	21 301294	21 301316	21 302353						

Annex 29: Smuggling vessel interdicted by the UK on 25 February 2023

Figure 29.1.

Display of the material taken after the seizure

1. Dehlavieh ATGMs (quantity: 7)¹⁷⁶
2. Electronic component (main body) of an EOSS
3. Nose tips for ballistic missiles
4. Jet vanes for ballistic missiles
5. Components of a military satellite antenna



Source: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/royal-navy-ship-seizes-weapons-transiting-in-the-gulf>.

Figure 29.2.


Close-up of the electronic component (main body) of an EOSS with similar characteristics of the EOSS-I-103 produced by Iran. This material presents similar characteristics to the EOSS Sadiq presented on 22 September 2022 during the parade held by the Houthis in Sana'a (Figure 63.1.)



¹⁷⁶ The red strip on the four Dehlavieh missiles on the left indicates that they are a thermobaric variant. Thermobaric munitions are those munitions that, by design, produce more heat and overpressure than conventional explosives by exploding a vapor in the blast zone. They predominantly affects the pulmonary, cardiovascular, auditory, gastrointestinal, and central nervous systems. <https://jmvh.org/article/munitions-thermobaric-munitions-and-their-medical-effects/>

Figure 29.3.

Description of the EOSS-I-103 published by Mindex, an entity reportedly affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of Iran



The screenshot shows a webpage for the EOSS-I-103 system. At the top left is the Iranian crest. In the center, the text "EOSS-I-103" and "Passive Electro Optical Surveillance System" is displayed above a blue decorative bar. To the right is a circular icon with a target symbol. Below the title, a descriptive paragraph states: "The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder." A section titled "SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS" contains a bulleted list of features:

- Day imaging (TV camera with 110x zooming and variable focal length from 10 to 1100 mm)
- Night imaging (Cooled IR camera with lenses from 240 mm to 1020 mm focal length -as optional)
- Passive (Radiation less if LRF is not used)
- Determining Target azimuth and elevation on time (Feedback of absolute encoder with 0.003° accuracy)
- Enhanced image quality (SUPERVIEW, RQUILIZE and DDE image processing algorithms)
- Stabilization (Removing image fluttering to 25% of image dimensions)
- Moving targets recognition and tracking

On the right side of the page, there is a photograph of the EOSS-I-103 system mounted on a tripod. The main body of the system is highlighted with a red box.

Source:

https://mindexcenter.ir/sites/default/files/2021-01/chapter%206-11%2896%29_355.pdf

Figure 29.4.


EOSS-I-103 mounted on a tripod. The main body is underlined in red.



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1631292646957150213/photo/1>

Annex 30: Comparison between Inertial Navigation System (INS) seized by the UK and those from Borkan-2H and Borkan-3 which have been launched against KSA in 2018 and UAE in 2022 and those from Qiam series manufactured by Iran

Figure 30.1.
Schematic drawing of the Borkan ballistic missile



Source: Confidential

Figures 30.2. (left), 30.3. (centre), 30.4. (right)
INS seized by the UK



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 30.5. (left) and 30.6. (right)
INS of the Borkan-2H vs. the housing of the Borkan-3



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Annex 31: Comparison between INS seized by the UK and those from Qiam-2 manufactured by Iran

The INS of the Borkan-2H, Borkan-3 and Qiam-2 manufactured by Iran are presenting some differences in markings, but the composition, shape and dimensions are all similar

Figure 31.1. (left)
INS seized by the UK

Figure 31.2. (right)
INS of a Qiam-2 manufactured by Iran and displayed during an exhibition held in 2019 in Tehran





Figure 31.3. (left)
INS of a Borkan-2H ballistic missile operated by the Houthis seized by the UK

Figure 31.4. (right)
INS of a Qiam-2 manufactured in Iran and displayed during an exhibition held in Tehran




Source of Figure 31.1.: UK

Source of Figures 31.2. and 31.4.: <https://vladimirkrym.livejournal.com/4967815.html>

Source of Figure 31.3.: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 31.5. (left)
INS seized by the UK

Figure 31.6. (right)
Qiam-2 INS debris from Iranian attack on US base in Iraq in January 2020




Source of Figure 31.5.: UK

Source of Figure 31.6.: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Annex 32: Comparison between Initial Measurement Unit (IMU) seized by the UK and those from Borkan-2H and Borkan-3 ballistic missile and which have been launched against KSA in 2018 and UAE in 2022

Figure 32.1.

PCB of the IMU seized by the UK and close-up of the DC-DC converter¹⁷⁷



Serial number on the DC-DC converter: “ZUW25_2415” and “ZUS25_2405”

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 32.2. (left) and 32.3. (right)

PCB of the IMU of the Borkan-2H vs. the PCB of the IMU of the Borkan-3 and close-up of their respective DC-DC converters



Serial number on the DC-DC converters: “ZUS25_2405” and “ZUW25_2415”


Source: Confidential

¹⁷⁷ Similar converters are presented in [S/2019/83](#), annex 13.

Annex 33: Analysis of the navigation antenna seized by the UK

Figures 33.1. (left), 33.2. (right up), 33.3. (right down)

Q.A stickers with marking “6000 Q.A” observed on the navigation antenna seized by the UK



Observed marking: ... 6000 Q.A

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 33.4. (left) and 33.5. (right)

Similar Q.A stickers with marking “6000 Q.A” observed on a debris of a Borkan-2H launched against the KSA in 2018



Source: Confidential

Figure 33.6

Different type of Q.A sticker with marking “QA 6000” observed on a debris of a Qiam-2 launched by Iran against a US base in Erbil, Iraq, on 8 January 2020 (para. 75).



- Clearly the same [type of] quality control sticker;
- Note the absence of a dot (.) after the letter A of “Q.A” (such markings are often seen on technical components of weapons systems manufactured in Iran);
- “6000” very likely stands for “Department 6000” also known as Shahid Varamini Industries¹⁷⁸, of the Iranian Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG), is the entity responsible for the liquid-propellant ballistic missile programme ([S/2018/594](#), table A.36.1, serial 2) is responsible for the guidance & control systems.

¹⁷⁸ <https://wwwiranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-varamini-industries> & <https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/new-project.htm>

Annex 34: Comparison between the nose tip seized by the UK and those from a Rezvan MRBM manufactured in Iran

Figure 34.1.

Nose tips of a Rezvan ballistic missile seized by the UK*Source:* Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 34.2.

Nose tip of a Rezvan ballistic missile manufactured in Iran*Source:* <https://wwwiranintl.com/en/202209226922>

Annex 35: Comparison between the jet vanes seized by the UK and those from a Qiam serie MRBM manufactured in Iran

Figure 35.1.
Jet vanes of Rezvan ballistic missile seized by the UK



Source: UK

Figures 35.2. (up) and 35.3. (down)
Jet vanes of Qiam ballistic missile manufactured in Iran



Source:
<https://www.mizanonline.ir/fa/news/146282/>



Source: <https://twitter.com/FieldMarshalPSO/status/1091390204370399233/photo/1>

Annex 36: Marking patterns

Similarity in the marking patterns made with the following sequence: “three letters / dot / one letter / three digits” as observed on the Borkan-2H nose tips with the marking patterns on Borkan-2H and Borkan-3-used by the Houthis and Qiam MRBM series manufactured in Iran.

Figure 36.1.

Borkan-2H nose tips seized by the UK



Marking pattern on the Borkan-2H nose tips: “CGU.Z035”, “QVU.Z014” and “VHU.Z003”

Figures 36.2. (left) and 36.3. (right)

Marking pattern on borkan-2H debris (INS) from Houthi attack on Riyadh, KSA on 2018



“ZHU.D193”

Figure 36.4.

Marking pattern on burkan-3 debris (pressure switch) from Houthi attack on Riyadh, KSA on 10 September 2020



“RIU.D142”

Figure 36.5.

Marking pattern on burkan-3 debris (pressure switch) from Houthi attack on Dammam, KSA on 7 March 2021



“PDU.L070”

Source of figures 36.1.-36.5.: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 36.6. and 36.7.

Marking pattern on jet vanes of a Qiam MRBM displayed in Iran



“QWU.D241”

Source: <https://twitter.com/FieldMarshalPSO/status/1091390204370399233>

Figures 36.8. (left), 36.9. (center) and 36.10. (down).

Marking pattern on Qiam-2 debris from Iranian attack on US base in Iraq in January 2020



“TEU.D012”



“SZU.D121”



“SZU.D056”

Source pictures 36.8.-36.10.: US

Annex 37: First public display of a Rezvan MRBM (Iran, September 2022, at the annual parade of the armed forces)

Figure 37.1.

First public display of a Rezvan MRBM



Source: <https://wwwiranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/iran-solidifies-missile-support-houthis>

Annex 38: Seized electric detonators of the same origin

Figures 38.1 (up). 38.2. (close-up)
Material seized on 13 August 2020 in Lahij Governorate



CONSIGNEE:
WAHAH TRADING COMPANY
14 RUE DE ATHENS
REPUBLIC DE DJIBOUTI

Source: Confidential

Figure 38.3.

Similar DCord manufactured in June 2020 have been observed in the black market in December 2021



Source: Confidential

Annex 39: Seized non-electric detonators of the same origin

Figure 39.1.

Wooden crates reporting the name of the producer and consignee containing non-electric detonators seized on 24 April 2021 by the Coalition (quantity: 1.5 million)



CONSIGNEE:
WAHAB TRADING COMPANY
14 RUE DE ATHENS
REPUBLIC DE DJIBOUTI

(similar address to the one presented on figure 38.2)

Source: Confidential

Figure 39.2.

Close-up of the seized non-electric detonators packed in a carton



Source: Confidential

Annex 40: Seizure of explosive precursors chemical by GoY

Figure 40.1.

Page 1 of the SBF statement

التاريخ : 6/4/2023 اليوم : الخميس المرجع : _____	<p>قوّات الحزام الأمني العاصمة عدن ادارة الشؤون القانونية</p>												
الموضوع / نتائج محاضر جمع الاستدلالات الأولية.													
في قضية : شحنة المواد الخام المضبوطة عدد (40) برميل + عدد (119) كيس.													
<u>رقم الأحالة / القضية :</u> (س / ع / د 624/6). <u>مكان الضبط :</u> مدينة اتعاء / مخازن العثماني خلف وطن مول الدرين / المنصورة. <u>جهة الضبط :</u> حزام عدن / قطاع البريقة. <u>تاريخ الضبط :</u> 17/2/2023م / تاريخ 26/2/2023م. <u>تاريخ الأحالة إليها :</u> 16/3/2023م. <u>المحتجزين على ذمة القضية :</u> _____													
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">الاسم</th> <th style="text-align: center;">الصفة</th> <th style="text-align: center;">تاريخ الضبط</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">محمد حسين احمد الحيدري 43 عام.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">مسؤول عن شحن المواد من الصين..</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2023/2/28</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">عثمان محمد سعيد عبدالله النجاشي 36 عام</td> <td style="text-align: center;">مخلص جمركي لشحنة المواد و وسيط نقل وشريك أعمال تجارية مع المتهم الاول</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2023/2/26</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">أحمد عبد الله علي العداد 32</td> <td style="text-align: center;">مالك مخازن مكتب الاسطورة للنقل وسيط نقل المواد من عدن إلى صنعاء.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2023/2/17</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		الاسم	الصفة	تاريخ الضبط	محمد حسين احمد الحيدري 43 عام.	مسؤول عن شحن المواد من الصين..	2023/2/28	عثمان محمد سعيد عبدالله النجاشي 36 عام	مخلص جمركي لشحنة المواد و وسيط نقل وشريك أعمال تجارية مع المتهم الاول	2023/2/26	أحمد عبد الله علي العداد 32	مالك مخازن مكتب الاسطورة للنقل وسيط نقل المواد من عدن إلى صنعاء.	2023/2/17
الاسم	الصفة	تاريخ الضبط											
محمد حسين احمد الحيدري 43 عام.	مسؤول عن شحن المواد من الصين..	2023/2/28											
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أحمد عبد الله علي العداد 32	مالك مخازن مكتب الاسطورة للنقل وسيط نقل المواد من عدن إلى صنعاء.	2023/2/17											
<u>مواصفات المادة المضبوطة :</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • وصف العبوات : أربعون عبوة (برميل خشبي) سعة 25 كيلو تحمل استيرك علامة (alkafa) مقلقة بحزام حديدي + 80 كيس) سعة 50 كيلو + 39 كيس حجم صغير + 1 كرتون يحتوي على عدد 10 باكت مواد صلبة . • وصف المحتوى (المادة) : مادة البراميل خام طحينة ناعمة الملمس لون رمادي يميل للسوداء شبيهة بالباروت، وعینة ثانية بنفس المواصفات يميل لونها إلى البيج + عینة ثالثة ذات لون رمادي + قطع صلبة سداسية الشكل رمادية اللون . 													
<u>الشخص الأولى لعينة من محتوى البراميل :</u> مادة سريعة الاشتعال مصحوبة بفرقة ووهج تتفاعل مع الماء عند صبها على المادة أثناء اشعالها. <u>الشخص المعتملي للمادة (تقدير الخبر) :</u> تمت موافقتنا في تاريخ 30/3/2023م (بعد أسبوع من المعاشرة) برسمية من إدارة الأدلة الجنائية / عدن تحمل مرجع رقم (1/52/45/4/10/2023) وذلك ردًا عن رسالتنا الموجهة إليهم في تاريخ 22/3/2023م بشأن فحص العينات المرسلة إليهم ، جاء في نصها ما يشهده التبرير عن عدم فحص العينة لعدم وجود إمكانيات الفحص (وفق نص الرسالة).													
التصنيف القانوني للوقائع													
<u>أولاً: واقعة النقل والحيازة للمواد المتفجرة:</u> في يوم الجمعة الموافق 17/2/2023م باشرت قوات الحزام الأمني / قطاع البريقية عملية الرصد والتتبع لمعلومات وردت عن شحنة مواد خام مشبوهة تم إدخالها للعاصمة عدن بغرض نقلها إلى مناطق سيطرة الحوثي تحديدًا العاصمة صنعاء، وفي حوالي الساعة الثامنة مساءً بعد عملية رصد تم بدء تنفيذ المهام الضابطية بتقتيش مخازن مكتب الاسطورة للنقل الواقعة في مدينة انماء خلف محطة بندر عدن وتم على إثرها ضبط عدد 40 برميل تحتوي على مواد خام مشبوهة وضبط المتهم احمد العداد في حالة الحياة والتغذية للمواد. وفي تاريخ 26/2/2023م تم ضبط المتهم عثمان محمد سعيد بجانب مخازن العثماني / الدرين / خلف وطن مول، بعد التأكد من عملية نقله للمواد المضبوطة من الجمرك عبر قاطرة فولفو من مكتب النقل إلى مخازن العثماني ومن ثم عملية نقلها ...													

Figure 40.2.
Page 2 of the SBF statement

التاريخ : 2023/4/6 اليوم : الخميس المرجع :		قوى الحزام الأمني العاصمة عدن ادارة الشؤون القانونية
<p>الثانية إلى مخازن مكتب الأسطورة للنقل بوسيلة نقل سيارة نوع هيلوكس، وفي نفس التاريخ تم نزول قوة ضبطية إلى مخازن العثماني بعد اعتراف (عثمان) بتخزين وحيازة شحنة مواد خام أخرى وتم ضبط عدد 120 كيس من المادة.</p> <p>وفي تاريخ 2023/2/28 تم ضبط المتهم محمد حسين أحمد حيدر بجانب مخازن العثماني بعد عملية رصد وتتبع لعودته من الصين وبعد ثبوت شراكة في عملية الشحن والاندماج للبضائع المضبوطة.</p> <p>ثانياً : واقعة الإدخال الجمركي:</p> <p>من خلال عملية التتبع لمصدر دخول الشحنة إلى العاصمة عدن تبين في محاضر جمع الأدلة الأولية دخولها عبر منفذ جمرك المنفذة الحرة / عدن في تاريخ 2022/11/20 ضمن حمولةحاوية رقم (173) وفق بيانات الدخول التالية :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • رقم البيان الجمركي : (C31658) • رقم بوليصة الشحن : (NGJH 21027200) • بلد المنشأ : CHINA • ميناء الشحن : CHIWAN • المرسل / المصدر : SUIFENHE • الشركة الناقلة : KOTA NASRAT • تسمية حمولةحاوية وفق البيان الجمركي : قوارير فارغة. • تسمية دخول المادة المتفجرة وفق فاتورة قائمة الشحن : تحت مسمى (FLOWER GUM) • الترجمة الحرافية : صمغ الزهرة. • التسمية المتدوالة : غراء سيرامييك. <p>الظروف المرافقة لدخول الشحنة في جمرك المنفذة الحرة/ عدن :-</p> <p>تبين وجود بلاغ سابق (من احد الشركاء بسبب خلاف حسب الاعترافات) عن دخول حاويتين الى جمرك المنفذة الحرة / عدن برقم (173) ورقم (935) باسم المستورد ياسر عبدالسلام للتجارة تحمل قطع غيار أسلحة _ ومكان خراطة اسلحة _ وطائرات مسيرة _ ونواذير ليلية.</p> <p>الإجراءات الضبطي المتخذ في الحرم الجمركي:</p> <p>وفق محاضر المعاينة رقم (05562) ورقم (05562) التي باشرتها الضابطة الجمركية في الحرم الجمركي :-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. تم إخضاع حمولةحاويات للتقيش وتم ضبط ضمن حمولتها شحنة طائرات مسيرة ونواذير وقطع غيار اسلحة ومكان يشتبه بكونها لخراطة اسلحة (وهذا يرجحه إدخال قطع غيار لمكونات سلاح الرشاش). 2. تم فرض غرامات مالية عن جريمة الإدخال، ومصادرة الشحنة الممنوعة المبلغ عنها، وخروج الحاوية رقم (935) بباقي حمولتها في تاريخ 16/2/2020 م بما فيها عدد 120 كيس من المواد الخام التي تم ضبطها في مخازن العثماني وخروج الحاوية رقم (173) بباقي حمولتها في 1/1/2023 م بما فيها عدد 40 برميل من المواد الخام التي تم ضبطها. 3. عدم اتخاذ أي إجراءات ضبطية وقانونية حيال الأشخاص المتورطين مباشرة في الجريمة. <p>ومن خلال البيانات والواقع آنفه الذكر فإننا أمام ثبوت أفعال مادية مكونة لجريمة تهريب جمركي غير ضروري أو بالأصل (تهريب أمني)، تمثل في إدخال مواد عسكرية ومواد متفجرة خلافاً لأحكام التقييد والمنع والحرس، بغرض إيصالها إلى مناطق سيطرة العدو محارب، وفي ظل وضع يشهد حروب وصراعات مسلحة واختلالات امنية وأطراف صراع تستهدف الأمن والاستقرار والسكينة في المحافظات المحررة، مع توافق عنصر العلم وقدسية الدخول لمواد متفجرة ممنوعة في الأفعال التالية :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • العلم قبل وأثناء عملية الشحن. • العلم قبل وأثناء عملية التخلص. • العلم أثناء عملية التقيش والمعاينة والإفراج عن الشحنة من حدود السلطات الجمركية. 		

Figure 40.3.
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<p>التاريخ : 2023/4/6 م اليوم : الخميس المرجع : -----</p>		قوى الحزام الأمني العاصمة عدن ادارة الشؤون القانونية
<p>ثالثاً : واقعة التعاون مع عدو (الغرض من الدخال) :</p> <p>تمت عملية ضبط المواد في مرحلة الحياة وعملية التخزين، ما قبل عملية النقل إلى وجهتها الأخيرة ، في المخازن التابعة لمكتب الاسطورة للنقل في حيازة المتهم احمد العمار وسيط نقل الشحنة الى مناطق سيطرة الحوثي/ صنعاء لشخص يدعى عبدالملك العصيمي، بعد الاتفاق على عملية واجور النقل، (وهي نفس الوجهة وتنفس الفرض من إدخال شحنة الطيران والنوافير وقطع غير السلاح الرشاش، مع اختلاف المستلمين).</p> <p>وذلك أفعال مادية مكونة جريمة التواطئ والتعاون مع عدو محارب بدخول مواد متفجرة كانت تسير فيها إرادة الجناة نحو اكتسال نتيجتها وتحقق خطراها وضررها لولا تدخل أسباب وموانع أخرى (لا دخل لإرادة الجناه فيها) حالت دون تحقق إيصالها إلى مناطق سيطرة مليشيات الحوثي، وجماعات الإرهاب التي تستهدف المحافظات الجنوبية المحررة بكل وسائلها وادواتها.</p> <p>رابعاً : الأفعال المنسوبة لكل من المحتجزين على ذمة القضية :-</p> <p>1- ثبوت التالي :-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ثبوت فعل النقل والتخزين والحياة لمواد متفجرة محظورة. • ثبوت الأفعال المادية المكونة لجريمة التهريب الجمركي (غير الضريبي) متمثل بشحن وتخلص وإدخال مواد خام متفجرة بالإضافة الى نواظير عسكرية وطائرات مسيرة وقطع غير سلاح إلى البلد عبر منفذ المنطقة الحرة /عدن خلافاً لآحكام المنع والخطر. • ثبوت الأفعال المكونة لجريمة الشروع بدخول مواد منوعة ذات استخدامات عسكرية بغرض إيصالها الى مناطق سيطرة عدو محارب. <p>وذلك بحق كل من :-</p> <p style="text-align: right;">المتهم / محمد حسين الحيدري. والمتهم / عثمان محمد سعيد عبدالله.</p> <p>باشخاصهم وصفاتهم وتمثيلهم للوسائل والوسائل التي تم استخدامها في الجريمة.</p> <p>2- ثبوت التالي :-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • فعل التخزين والتلمس بالحياة لمواد متفجرة منوعة. • ثبوت حالة الشروع بعملية نقل مواد متفجرة منوعة إلى مناطق سيطرة الحوثي. • عدم ثبوت خنصر القصد والعلم بمحاربة وتخزين ونقل مواد متفجرة منوعة. <p>وذلك بحق المتهم / أحمد عبدالله علي العمار.</p> <p>خامساً : نطاق المسؤولية الجزائية :</p> <p>تقوم المسؤولية الجنائية في الجرائم الجمركية على توسيع دائرة المسؤولين، فتمتد المسؤولية الى كل شخص اتصل بالمواد المهرية اتصالاً مادياً وبسط سلطاته عليها (كان شخص طبيعى أو اعتبارى) ولو لفترة قصيرة ، او شارك فى أي عمل من أعمال التواطئ أو التسهيل في ارتكابها أو أعمال المنع في ضبطها، ولذلك فهي تشمل :-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. المالك ووسطاء الشراء والشحن والاستيراد ووسطاء النقل والحاائز لها تحت اي صفة، والمالك او المدير او المستأجر للمخزن الذي ضبطت فيه. 2. المختصين الجمركيين باعتبارهم مسؤولين بصورة كاملة عن المخالفات وجرائم التهريب التي يرتكبها مستخدمو هم المفوضون من قبلهم. 3. الأشخاص الاعتبارية (الشركة الشاحنة والمستوردة ووسائط النقل الخارجي ووسائط النقل الداخلي ، ووسائط التخزين). <p style="text-align: center;">... ينتهي ...</p>		

Figure 40.4.

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التاريخ : 6/4/2023 اليوم : الخميس المرجع : -----	<p>قوى الحزام الأمني العاصمة عدن ادارة الشؤون القانونية</p>
<p>4. موظفو السلطات الجمركية وتحكمها حالات :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • الأولى : المسئولية الجزائية المباشرة مع ثبوت العلم. • الثانية : المسئولية التقصيرية بثبوت الإهمال والتقصير والامتياز عن أداء الواجب الوظيفي، في ظل وجود شحنة تقع في دائرة الاشتباه من حيث وجود بلاغ مسبق ومن حيث وجهتها إلى مناطق سيطرة الحوثيين ومن حيث وجود اختلاف (يمكن للموظف العادي ملاحظته بمجرد المعاينة النظرية) بين خصائص مادة متقدمة تحمل صفات شبّهة البالروت وبين خصائص مادة الغراء التي دخلت المادة تحت اسمها. <p>بمدادساً : الأدلة والإثباتات المتوفرة:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. الأدلة المادية : متمثلة في المواد المضبوطة، ومحاضر الضبط والتوثيق للعملية الضبطية. 2. بيانات ومعلومات الواقع الجمركي، وبوليصات الشحن وفواتير سعر الشحن للمادة. 3. لاقرارات والاعترافات في محاضر استجواب المتهمين. 4. الأدلة المادية التي تم استخراجها وتوثيقها (مرفقه ضمن الملف) والتي تؤكد في محتواها ما يلي :- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • تأكيد عملية الشحن عن عملية الشحن وبما يثبت توفر العلم بكوئها مواد خام منوعة. • تلغيم الحاويات بشحنة طيران سير وقطع غير أسلحة وبرودة الألمنيوم مع العلم بكوئها مواد منوعة من الأدخال. • عملية الاتفاق على شحن المواد بسعر (1400) دولار للتسبي بي ام ، بينما السعر المعتمد والمعارف عليه هو (500 دولار) فقط للبضائع المرضخة. • ما يثبت توافر العلم أثناء عملية التفتيش في الجمرك بأن المواد المفوج عنها هي مواد متقدمة منوعة. • ما يثبت دخول عدد ثلاثة أنواع من المواد المنوعة تقدر بحوالي 3طن منها الإريكون برميل تضمها فاتورة شحن واحدة مرسلة لوسقط شراء المواد في الصين ومرسلة لمالك البضاعة عبدالمطلب الصوصي، موضحاً فيها إجمالي وزن المواد (5,645 سي بي اي) بما فيها الإريكون برميل، وموضاً بها إجمالي سعر الشحن (7916) دولار. للتسبي بي ام حساب سعر شحن (1400) دولار. للتسبي بي ام وبفارق أكثر من (900) دولار عن البضاعة المصدرة (بالإضافة إلى تأكيد هذه المعادلة باعترافات محاضر الاستجواب). • محادثات ورسائل واتفاقات وأقرارات بين المرسل والمخلص تشير إلى عملية التخلص الجمركي بطريقه المقاطعة بمبلغ 5000 دولار عن كل حاوية دون فتح أو تفتيش، وعملية تقاسم الغرامات الجمركية بحصول مصلحة الجمارك على 40% واعضاء اللجنة 20% وخزينة الدولة 40%. • تأكيد الاعتياد على جرائم إدخال لحاويات ملغمة ببضائع منوعة (ولم يتبعى إلا إدخال الدبابات حسب ما ورد في المقاطع الصوتية والمراسلات نصاً وحرفاً). • رسائل واعترافات باستخدام مذكرة باسم محلات دعاية وإعلان ومذكرة باسم المؤسسة العسكرية (منها لواء الصعاليك/ تعز، ودائرة التسليح العسكري / تعز) لللأرجاع عن شحنات منوعة. • محادثات بين المتهمين تتبه من ضرورة تغيير بيانات الحاويات التي كانت قادمة أثناء عملية التفتيش للحاوية (173) والحاوية (935). • اعترافات بعملية التغيير التي تمت في بيانات الحاويات التي كانت قادمة وتغييرها باسم المستورد محمد فضل الدبيسي واسم المخلص الجمركي ياسر الدبيسي والتي تم وصولها في 23/2/2023م وتخلصها وتحميلها وافراغ حمولتها في مخازن الحيدري الجديدة في المدحارة. • صور للمادة المضبوطة أثناء عملية الشحن والتحميل في الصين، وأثناء عملية النقل من الجمرك إلى المخازن. • ما يثبت الغرض من إدخال المواد المتقدمة والممنوعة ، المتمثل في إيصالها إلى مناطق سيطرة الحوثيين. • إفادة تقرير الأدلة عن عدم وجود امكانيات الفحص، يزيد من احتمالية خطر المادة واستخداماتها العسكرية ،لكون جميع المواد الخام المصدرة يمكن فحصها بامكانيات سهلة ومتاحة. • صورة لنقارير عن مشاريع إيران السرية واستخداماتها لمادة سحق الألمنيوم في الصناعات الصاروخية. 	

Figure 40.5.
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الاسم	العنوان	صفة الورود
ياسر عبدالسلام احمد حيدر	نشاط تجاري / تعز	صاحب السجل التجاري المستخدم للأستيراد مقابل خمسون الف ريال عن كل حاوية.
عباس الجدادي	الصين	وسيط شراء المواد المضبوطة من الصين.
عبدالملك العصيمي	صنعاء _ حراز	صاحب شحنة المواد المتفرجة
محمد حاجب الشيباني	تعز / التربية	صاحب شحنة المكان ومستنم شحنة التوازي
سلطان حاجب الشيباني	الصين	وسيط شراء شحنة التوازي العسكري، ومكان خراطة الاسلحه.
صفوان حاجب الملقب صفوان مناع.	تعز / التربية وضابط في لواء الصعاليك	صاحب شحنة التوازي و تاجر سلاح في التربية وشقق سلطان محمد.
صدام الداعري	صنعاء	صاحب شحنة الطائرات
علي محمد عليان المرانى	صنعاء - ذمار	صاحب شحنة قطع غير السلاح.
محمد الهمة الجدادي	صنعاء	والد عباس الجدادي وسيط لاستلام شحنة المكان وايصالها إلى صنعاء.
كمال الحيدري	مخازن في عدن	مستقبل بضاعة في عدن
صادق علي سعيد	عدن	محاسب محمد حسين الحيدري
احمد حسين الحيدري	عدن المعدارة	اخو محمد الحيدري ومسؤول مخازن في المعدارة
مخازن التاجر بكيل	مخازن في عدن	المتفق على نقل شحنة المكان اليها
خالد محمد درويش	عدن	امين مخازن الحيدري التي نقلت إليها المواد
احمد عبد الرحيم عده	عدن	امين مخازن الحيدري .
محمد فضل الدباعي	كريتر شارع أروى عمارة الحبيشي	المستلم الجديد لشحنة الحاويات القادمة التي تم تغيير بياناتها والتي كانت باسم ياسر عبدالسلام.
ياسر علي سعيد الدباعي	كريتر شارع أروى عمارة الحبيشي	المخلص الجديد لشحنة الحاويات التي تم تغيير بيانتها التي كان مسؤولاً عن تخليصها عثمان.

Figure 40.6.
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ال تاريخ : 6/4/2023	 قوى الحزام الأمني العاصمة عدن ادارة الشؤون القانونية	
3- اسماء أشخاص اعتبارية و محلات و وسائط تخزين و نقل.		
الاسم	المقر	صفة الورود
شركة العيدري والثلاثاء للشحن والتخلص الجمركي.	ضمن فروع / فرع عن المدارسة، ومكتب شحن في الصين	المسؤولة عن شحن المواد المصبوطة.
شركة الياسر	تعز	الشركة المملوكة للياسر عبد السلام الذي تم استخدام اسمه لإرسال البضاعة.
مخازن العثماني	المتصورة الدرين خلف وطن مول.	مكان ضبط المواد عدد 120 كيس، ومكان نقل المواد 40 برميل إلى مخازن الاسطورة
مخازن مكتب الأسطورة للنقل	عدن/ انماء	مخازن ضبط المواد عدد 40 برميل
لواء الصعاليك	تعز	مذكرة باسم اللواء لتسهيل الأفراج عن التواطئين الليبيين (حسب الأقوال في محاضر الاستجواب).
دائرة التسلح العسكري.	تعز	مذكرة حول مكان الخراطة تفيد بأنها مصربحة (حسب الأقوال في محاضر الاستجواب).
شركة سباء للملاحة لصاحبها محمد مطلوب عاطف.	المعلاء بجاتب مصانع إخوان ثابت.	صاحب شحنة السيارات الممنوعة (إسياخ قفل الحاويات) عدد ٤٠ كرتون في كل كرتون ٢٥٠
قطارة فولفو راس ابيض سطحة	تم تأجيرها من مكتب النقل	وسيلة نقل المواد من الميناء الى مخازن العثماني.
مخازن العيدري.	المدحارة الجديدة جانب مخازن ابو ايمان	مكان افراغ حمولة الحاويات التي تم تغيير بياتتها.
مكتب الدبيعي للتخلص	كويت شارع اروى عمارة الحبيشي	مخلص شحنة الحاويات التي تم تغيير بياتتها.
المرفقات :		
1. مرفق رقم (1) عدد 24 ورقة يضم الاحالة / افاده قطاع البريقة/ ايداع المتهمين/ صور محاضر تفتيش الحاويات في الجمرك. 2. مرفق رقم (2) عدد 9 ورق يضم البيان الجمركي وقائمة تعينه الشحن. 3. مرفق رقم (3) عدد 45 ورقة يضم محاضر ضبط الاكياس ومحاضر ضبط واستجواب المتهم عثمان محمد سعيد النجاشي. 4. مرفق رقم (4) عدد 28 ورقة يضم محاضر ضبط البراميل ومحاضر ضبط واستجواب المتهم احمد سعيد النجاشي. 5. مرفق رقم (5) عدد 24 ورقة يضم مذكرة اذن النيابة الجزائية بتقييم الجوالات، ومحاضر نزول معاينة المواد بحضور عضو النيابة الجزائية عبدالله صبور وسكرتير التحقيق فيصل عبدالحافظ. 6. مرفق رقم (6) عدد 4 ورق يضم مذكرة اذن النيابة الجزائية بتقييم الجوالات، ومحاضر نزول معاينة المواد بحضور عضو النيابة الجزائية عبدالله صبور وسكرتير التحقيق فيصل عبدالحافظ. 7. مرفق رقم (7) أدلة مباشرة مستخرجة ومتبوعة عدد (22 صورة) تضم صور مراسلات ومحادثات ومستندات. 8. مرفق رقم (8) يضم فلشة حوم (8) جيجا لون (احمر) تحمل محتوى تم إفراغه من جوالات المتهم محمد حسين حيدر والمتهم عثمان محمد سعيد عبارة عن مقاطع فيديو مصورة وصور لمراسلات ووثائق ومقاطع صوتية.		
 عارف لبرق (١٤٧٦)		

Appendix A**Unofficial translation of relevant elements of the document referred to in annex 40****Security Belt Forces****The capital, Aden****Department of Legal Affairs**

The second to the warehouses of the Al-Ostora office for transportation by a means of transporting a Hilux type car, and on the same date, a seizure force was sent to the Al-Othmani warehouses after (Othman) confessed to storing and possessing a shipment of other raw materials, and 120 bags of the material were seized. On 28/2/2023, the accused, Muhammad Hussein Ahmed Haidar, was arrested next to Al-Othmani's stores, after a process of monitoring and tracking his return from China, and after proving his participation in the process of shipping and entering the seized goods.

Second: the customs entry incident

Through the process of tracking the source, the entry of the shipment to the capital, Aden, it was shown in the preliminary inference collection records that it had entered through the customs port Free Zone / Aden on 11/20/2022 AD with in the load of container No. 173 according to the following entry data:

- Customs declaration number: C31658
- Manifest No.: NR16720221026 Country of Origin: CHINA
- Bill of lading number: 21027200 NGJH
- Shipping port: CHIWAN
- The carrier company: KOTA NASRAT
- Source sender: SUIFENHE
- Labeling the container load according to the customs declaration: empty bottles. . Designation of the entry of the explosive substance according to the bill of lading: under the name (FLOWER GUM), literal translation: flower glue, common nomenclature: ceramic glue.

Circumstances accompanying the entry of the shipment into the customs of the Aden Free Zone:

It was found that there was a prior communication (from one of the partners due to a dispute, according to the confessions, about the entry of two containers to the customs of the free zone / Aden with No. 173 and No. 935 in the name of the importer Yasser Abdel Salam for Trade, carrying spare parts for weapons and turning machines for weapons, drones and night vision material.

Seizure action taken in the customs base:

According to the inspection minutes No. 8/0559 and No. 0562/10 conducted by the customs police at the customs base:

1. The container load was subjected to inspection, and a shipment of drones, binoculars, weapon spare parts and machines suspected of being used to lathe weapons was seized.
2. Financial fines were imposed for the crime of entry and confiscation of the reported prohibited shipments, and the exit of container No. 935 with the rest of its cargo on 16/12/2022 AD, including 120 bags of raw materials that were seized in Al-Othmani's warehouses, and the exit of container No. 173 with the rest of its cargo on 1/1/2023 AD, including 40 barrels of raw materials which was seized.
3. Not taking any seizure and legal measures against the persons directly involved in the crime.

Through the aforementioned data and facts, we are facing evidence of material acts constituting a crime of non-tax customs evasion, or rather (security smuggling), which is represented in the introduction of military materials and explosive materials in violation of the provisions of restriction, prevention and restriction, with the aim of delivering them to areas under the control of a belligerent enemy, and in light of a situation witnessing wars and armed conflicts, security instabilities, and parties to the conflict targeting security, stability, and tranquility in the liberated governorates, with the availability of the element of knowledge and the intent to introduce explosive materials.

The following actions are prohibited:

Knowledge before and during the shipping process.

Knowledge before and during the clearance process

Knowledge during the process of inspection, inspection and release of the shipment from the borders of the customs authorities.

Third: The incident of cooperation with the enemy (the purpose of entry):

The process of seizing the materials took place at the stage of possession and the storage process before the transfer process to its final destination, in the warehouses of the Al-Ostora Office for Transport in the possession of the accused Ahmed Al-Imad, the mediator of transporting the shipment to the Houthi-controlled areas / Sana'a for a person named Abdul-Malik Al-Osaimi, after agreeing on the transportation process and fees, (which is the same destination and the same purpose as entering the airline shipment sights and machine gun parts, with different recipients).

These are material acts constituting the crime of complicity and cooperation with a belligerent enemy by introducing explosive materials in which the will of the perpetrators was moving towards the completion of its result and the realization of its danger and damage had it not been for the intervention of other reasons and barriers that have nothing to do with the will of the perpetrators that prevented its delivery to the areas of control of the Houthi militia, and terrorist groups that target the southern governorates. Liberated by all means and tools.

Fourth: the actions attributed to each of the detainees in the case:

Evidence of the following:

Evidence of the act of transporting, storing and possessing prohibited explosive materials. Evidence of material acts constituting the crime of customs evasion (non-tax) represented by shipping, clearance and entry of explosive raw materials in addition to military binoculars, drones and weapon spare parts to the country through the Aden Free Zone port, contrary to the provisions of prohibition and prohibition. Evidence of the acts constituting the crime of attempting to bring in prohibited materials with military uses for the purpose of delivering them to areas controlled by the enemy.

This is against:

The accused / Muhammad Hussein Al-Haidari and the accused / Othman Muhammad Saeed Abdullah with their persons, characteristics, and their representation of the means and means that were used in the crime.

2. Evidence of the following:

The act of storing and being in possession of prohibited explosive materials

Proof of the initiation of the process of transporting prohibited explosive materials to Houthi-controlled areas. Failure to prove the element of intent and knowledge of the possession, storage and transportation of prohibited explosive materials. This is against the accused / Ahmed Abdullah Ali Al-Emad.

Fifth: The scope of criminal responsibility:

Criminal responsibility in customs crimes is based on expanding the circle of officials, so the responsibility extends to every person who came into contact with the smuggled materials physically and extended his authority over them (whether he was a natural or legal person), even for a short period, or participated in any of the activities of the warehouse in which they were seized. . authorized by them. storage).

Complicity or facilitation in its commission or acts of prevention in seizing it, and therefore it includes:

1. Owners, purchase, shipping and import brokers, transport brokers, and the possessor under any capacity, and the owner, manager, or tenant

2. Customs brokers, as they are fully responsible for violations and smuggling crimes committed by their employees.

3. Legal persons (the trucking and importing company, the means of external transport, the means of internal transport, and the means of storing).

4. the employees of the customs authorities are governed by two cases:

The first: direct penal responsibility with proven knowledge.

The second: tort liability by proving negligence, negligence, and refraining from performing one's duty, in light of the presence of a shipment that falls within the scope of suspicion in terms of the existence of a prior notification and in terms of its destination to the Houthi-controlled areas, and in terms of the existence of a difference (that an ordinary employee can notice by simply examining the theoretical characteristics of an explosive material characteristics and the properties of the glue that entered the material under its name).

Sixth: Available evidence and evidence:

1. Physical evidence: represented in the seized materials, seizure records and documentation of the seizure process.
2. Data and information of customs papers, bills of lading and invoices for the shipping price of the material.
3. Acknowledgments and confessions in the minutes of interrogation of the accused.
4. The physical evidence extracted and documented (attached within the file, which confirms the following in its content):
 - Confirmation of the agreement process in China regarding the shipping process, which proves the availability of knowledge that they are prohibited raw materials. . Mining containers with drone cargo, weapon spare parts, and aluminum powder, knowing that they are prohibited materials. . The process of agreeing to ship materials at a price of (1,400) dollars per CBM, while the usual price and acquaintance with it is (500) dollars only for licensed goods.
 - Evidence of the availability of knowledge during the inspection process at the customs that the released materials are prohibited explosive materials.
 - Evidence of the entry of three types of prohibited materials estimated at about 3 tons, of which the forty barrels are included in one bill of lading sent to the mediator for the purchase of materials in China and sent to the owner of the goods Abdul Malik Al-Osaimi, indicating the total weight of the materials (5,645) CBM, including the forty barrels, and clarifying In which the total shipping price is (7,916 dollars) from calculating the shipping price (1,400) dollars per CP. M and a difference of more than (900) dollars from the declared goods (in addition to confirming this equation with the confessions of the interrogation records).
 - Conversations, letters, agreements and acknowledgments between the sender and the clearing agent refer to the process of customs clearance in a boycott manner in the amount of 5,000 dollars for each container without opening or inspection, and the process of sharing the customs fine with the customs authority obtaining a 40%, committee members 20%, state treasury 40%.
 - Confirmation of getting used to the crimes of entering containers rigged with prohibited goods, and there was nothing left but to enter the tanks, according to what was stated in audio clips and correspondence in text and letters).
 - Letters and confessions using notes in the name of propaganda and advertising shops and notes in the name of the military establishment (including Brigades of Sa'leek of Taiz, and the Department of Military Armament / Taiz for the release of prohibited shipments.
 - Conversations between the accused warning of the need to change the data of the containers that were coming during the inspection of the container 173 and Al-Hayyah 935.
 - Confessions of the change process that took place in the data of the containers that were coming and changed them in the name of the importer, Muhammad Fadl Al-Dubai, and the name of the customs broker, Yasser Al-Dubai, which arrived on 23/2/2023 AD, and cleared, loaded, and unloaded its cargo in New Al-Haidary stores in Al-Mambara.
 - Pictures of the seized material during the shipping and loading process in China, and during the transportation process from customs to warehouses
 - Evidence of the purpose of bringing in explosive and prohibited materials, which is to deliver them to Houthi-controlled areas.
 - Evidence reporting a lack of testing capabilities increases the possibility of the substance's hazardous uses for military purposes as the declared raw materials can be checked with simple and available capabilities.
 - Image of reports on Iran's secret projects and its use of aluminum powder in the missile industry.

Date: 4/6/2023 AD		
Today: Thursday	Ref:	
	Security Belt Forces, the capital, Aden, Department of Legal Affairs	
2 Names of merchants, owners of goods, importers, brokers, workers...etc		
characteristic of roses	the address	the name
The owner of the commercial registry used for importation, for fifty thousand riyals for each container.	Taiz business	Yasser Abdel Salam Ahmed Hader
An intermediary to purchase seized items from China.	China	Abbas Al-Jedadi
The owner of the shipment of explosive materials	Sanaa _ Haraz	Abdul Malik Al-Osaimi
The owner of the shipment of reserves and the recipient of the shipment of	Taiz soil	Muhammad Hajib Al-Shabani
binoculars, the mediator of the purchase of the shipment of military binoculars, and turning machines for	China	Sultan Hajib Al Shaibani
weapons, the owner of the shipment of binoculars, an arms dealer in the soil, and the brother of Sultan and	Taiz / Al-Turbah and an office in the Al-Sa'at Brigade,	Safwan Hajib, nicknamed Safwan Manna
owner	Sana'a	Saddam Daari
Owner of a shipment of weapon parts.	Sana'a - Dhamar	Ali Muhammad Alian Al-Marani
Abbas Al-Jedadi's father and an intermediary to receive the shipment of machines and deliver them to Sana'a.	Sana'a	Muhammad al-Hibah al-Jedadi
The future of goods in Aden	stores in Aden	Kamal Al-Haidari
Accountant Muhammad Hussein Al-Haidari	Aden	Sadeq Ali Saeed
Brother of Mohammed Al-Haidari and responsible stores in Almoudra	Managed Eden	Ahmed Hussein Al-Haidari
The agreement to transfer the shipment of machinery to it	stores in Aden	Merchant stores Bakil
Secretary of Al-Haidari stores to which the materials were transferred	Aden	Khaldy Muhammad Darwish
Storekeeper Al-Haidari.	Aden	Ahmed Abdul Raqib Abdo
The new recipient of the upcoming container shipment whose data has been changed, which was in the name of Yasser Abdel Salam.	Criter Arwi Street Abyssinian Building	Muhammad Fadi Al-Dubai
The new discharger of the container shipment whose data has been changed, which Othman was responsible for clearing	Crater, Arwa Street, Al-Hubaishi Building	Yasser Ali Saeed Al-Dubai

Date: 4/6/2023 AD		
Day: Thursday		
Ref:		
Security Belt Forces, the capital, Aden, Department of Legal Affairs		
3 Names of legal persons, shops, and means of storage and transportation.		
characteristic of roads	destination	the name
Responsible for shipping the seized items.	Within the managed branches / branch of Aden, and shipping office in China	Al-Haldan and Al-Thalaya Company for Shipping and Customs Clearance.
The company owned by Yasser Abdil Salam, whose name was used to send the goods.	Taiz	Al-Yaser Company
The place where 120 bags of materials were seized, and the place where 40 barrels of material were transported to the Ottoman stores.	Mansoura Aldrin behind Watan Mall.	Ottoman stores
Material control stores number 40 barrels.	Eden is developing	Legend office stores for transportation
A memorandum in the name of the MACO Element to facilitate the release of the right vehicles. (according to what was said in the interrogation records)	Taiz	Tramps Brigade
A memorandum about lathe machines stating that they are authorized (according to what was said in the interrogation records)	Jeddah	Department of Military Armament
The owner of the shipment of prohibited items (container lock breakers) 40 cartons in each carton 250.	Al-Mazra'a next to Thabet Brothers Factories.	Saba Navigation Company for its owner, Mohamed Atef, is wanted
A means of transporting materials from the port to the Ottoman stores.	It was rented from the transport office	Volvo locomotive white head flat
The place of unloading the containers whose data has been changed.	Al-Medara Al-Jadida, next to Abu Ayman stores	Al-Haidari stores,
Container shipment discharger whose data has been changed.	Crater, Arwa Street, Al-Hubaishi Building	Al-Ghali office for clearance
attachments		
1 Attachment No. (1) of 24 sheets containing the referral / statement of the drugs sector / the deposit of the accused with copies of the container inspection reports at the customs.		
2 Attachment No. (2) of 9 sheets containing the customs declaration and the shipping packing list.		
3 Attachment No. (3) of 48 sheets containing the arrest and interrogation of the accused, Mohammed Hussein Hader.		
4 Attachment No. (4), 28 sheets, containing the minutes of seizing the bags and the minutes of the arrest and interrogation of the accused, Othman Muhammad Saied Al-Dhubhani.		
5 Attachment No. (5), 24 sheets, including the minutes of seizing the barrels and the minutes of the interrogation of the accused, Ahmed Abdullah Al-imad.		
6 Attachment No. (6) of 4 papers containing a memorandum of the Criminal Prosecutor's permission to search mobile phones and a record of the inspection of the materials in the presence of the member of the Prosecution		
The criminal court, Abdullah Lassour, and the investigative secretary, Faisal Abdul Hafez		
7 Attachment No. (7) direct evidence extracted and printed, number (22) photos, including photos of correspondence, conversations and documents.		
8 Attachment No. (8) includes a flash drive of (8) gigabytes, red color) that carries content that was emptied from the phones of the accused, Muhammad Hussein		
Hader, and the accused, Othman Muhammad Saied, which is video clips, pictures of correspondence, documents, and audio clips		
		

Annex 41: Documents related to the seizure of explosive precursors chemical

Figure 41.1.
Export invoice

绥芬河市凯莱经贸有限责任公司
SUIFENHE KAILAI ECONOMIC & TRADE CO.,LTD.
EXPORT INVOICE

Source: Confidential

Figure 41.2.
Picture of aluminium powder in drums



Source: Confidential

Figure 41.3.
Picture of iron oxide powder in bags



Source: Confidential

Figure 41.4.
Photo of one of the bags of rice glue powder



Source: Confidential

Figure 41.5.
Picture of one of the bags of phenolic resin



Source: Confidential

Figure 41.6.

Photo of a Houthi explosive charge, likely using phenolic resin to form the fragmentation plate



Source: Confidential

Annex 42: Seizure by the Coalition forces of two DPVs with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured by Bonex GmbH, a company registered in Germany

Figure 42.1.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP model



Source: Confidential

Figure 42.2.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP model



Source: https://shop.tezhongzhuangbei.com/gycp_date_63563_514684.html

Annex 43: DPV with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured by Bonex GmbH displayed in Iran in early March 2023

Figure 43.1.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP displayed in Iran



Source: <http://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Bonex-DPV.html>

Figure 43.2.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP displayed in Iran



Source: <http://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Bonex-DPV.html>

Figures 43.3. (left) and 43.4. (right)
DPV Bonex Constellation HP displayed in Iran



Source: <http://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Bonex-DPV.html>

Annex 44: Seizure by the Yemeni customs on 31 December 2022 at Shahn border crossing of DLE-170 UAV engines with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China

Figure 44.1.
Four of the seized UAV engines



Source: Yemeni customs

Figure 44.2.
Serial number on one of the engines: "TG00637"



Source: Yemeni customs

Figure 44.3.
Serial number on one of the engines: "TG00591"

 South24 | English
 @South24E

"South24 Center" obtained pictures that local sources reported of drone engines and communications equipment seized in a commercial truck in Al-Mahra governorate. "South24" tried to verify these photos from the security authorities without a response



Source: <https://twitter.com/South24E/status/1617160080423620611>

Figure 44.4.

One of the crates seized by GoY containing four DLE-170 UAV engines



Source: Yemeni customs

Annex 45: Samad-3 UAV equipped with an engine with similar characteristics to the DLE-170 presented by the Houthis during an exhibition held in Sana'a in March 2021

Figure 45.1.
Some of the Samad-3 UAVs



Source: <https://twitter.com/amirheydari1373/status/1370322989397463040/photo/1>

Annex 46: DLE-170 UAV engines documented in the debris of Samad-3 UAVs

Figure 46.1.

Samad-3 that was shot-down in August 2019 by the GoY, the DLE-170 engine is visible



Source: <https://sp.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=1958280>

Figure 46.2.

Debris of a Samad-3 found in the KSA, the DLE-170 engine is visible



Source: https://twitter.com/awes_spad/status/1579403997928394753/photo/1

Annex 47: DLE-170 UAV engine of the Samad-3 shot down in February 2022 in Al-Dafrah, UAE

Figure 47.1.
DLE-170 UAV engine



Source: [S/2023/130](#), figure 5.26.

Annex 48: Material seized by the Yemeni customs

Figure 48.1.



Figure 48.2.



اسم الجمرك	جمرك شحن
تاريخ الضبط	23/4/2023
نوع الضبطية	50 جهاز اتصال لاسلكي نوع موتورولا
20 جهاز اتصال لاسلكي نوع mobile radio	
10 جهاز اتصال لاسلكي نوع mobile radio خاص بالأطقم	
الإمارات - اليمن	خط السير



اسم الجمرك	شحن
التاريخ	23/4/2023
الضبطية	80 جهاز لاسلكي
الإمارات - اليمن	خط السير



اسم الجمرك	شحن
التاريخ	2023/6/23
الضبطية	40 حقيبة مسدس كلوك
عمان - اليمن	خط السير

Source: GoY

Appendix A**Translation of the document referred to in annex 48.1.**

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
YEMEN CUSTOMS



الجمهوريه اليمنيه
وزارة المالية
جمرك اليمن

	Customs Name	Duty Free Area Customs
	Date of Seizure	12/3/2023
	Type of Seizure	54 drones (UAVs)

	Customs Name	Duty Free Area Customs
	Date of Seizure	22/3/2023
	Type of Seizure	2,990 Military belts

	Customs Name	Duty Free Area Customs
	Date of Seizure	21/5/2023
	Type of Seizure	5,175 Pistol Holster 1,232 Military Gloves 498 Military Night Vision Telescope

Translation of the document referred to in annex 48.2.

	Customs Name	Shipping Customs
	Date of Seizure	23/4/2023
	Type of Seizure	50 Motorola Wireless handheld transceiver devices 20 Wireless handheld Transceiver devices (Brand: Mobile Radio) 10 Wireless handheld transceiver devices for crews (Brand: Mobile Radio)
	Route	United Arab Emirates- Yemen

	Customs Name	Shipping
	Date of Seizure	23/4/2023
	Type of Seizure	80 wireless handheld transceiver devices.
	Route	United Arab Emirates- Yemen

	Customs Name	Shipping
	Date of Seizure	23/6/2023
	Type of Seizure	40 Glock pistol cases

Annex 49: Tactical belt

Figures 49.1. (left) and 49.2. (right)

Houthi forces wearing a tactical belt during a parade held in Ma'rib in August 2023



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3256299.htm>

Comparison between the material observed during the parade conducted by the Houthis in Ma'rib Governorate early August 2023 and the material seized by the GoY on 22 March 2023.

Figure 3



Close-up of a tactical belt observed during a parade held by the Houthis in Ma'rib in August 2023

Figure 4



Tactical belts seized by GoY on 22 March 2023

Source: GoY

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3256299.htm>

Annex 50: Reinforcement of the Houthi naval capabilities

Figure 50.1.

Tweet dated 31 August 2023 on a statement allegedly made by the Houthi Commander of the Coastal Defense Brigade



Source: <https://twitter.com/ZiadAlyama6259/status/1697312341426049229>

Annex 51: Analysis of the debris of the cruise missile launched by the Houthis against Al-Dhabba oil terminal


Figures 51.1. (up) and 51.2. (down)

Point of impact of the cruise missile on the Single Point Mooring (SPM) buoy




Source: Confidential

Figure 51.3.
Schematic drawing of the Quds-2 cruise missile



Source: Confidential

Material inspected by the Panel	Comparison with material previously documented
<p>Figure 51.4. Marking on the cruise missile airframe</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.5. Quds-2 displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022</p>  <p>Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU¹⁷⁹</p>
<p>Figure 51.6. One of the three control surfaces (number I)</p>  <p>Source: Panel of experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.7. Rear end section of a cruise missile displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022</p>  <p>Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU</p>

¹⁷⁹ Pictures shown in figures 51.5. and 51.7. have been extracted from videos released by Houthi media. The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos are no longer available.

Figures 51.8 (up) and 51.9. (down).
Rear end section



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.10.
Rear end section of a cruise missile crashed in the desert near Abqaiq,
KSA ([S/2020/326](#), annex 14.9).



Source: KSA

Figures 51.11. (left) and 51.12. (right).
Access hatch



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.13.
Access hatch in rear end section of a cruise missile used by Houthis in
September 2019 ARAMCO attacks in the KSA




Source: Confidential


Figure 51.14.

Figure 51.15.

<p>Airframe part (with Roman number III marking)</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Close up of the airframe part (with Roman number II marking) displayed by the Houthis in Sana'a in March 2021</p>  <p>Source: https://postimg.cc/2LhDDcQK</p>
<p>Figure 51.16. Part of one of the three actuator systems and control surface connector (top view)</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.17. Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022</p> 
<p>Figure 51.18. Part of one of the three actuator systems (front side view)</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>

	Figures 51.22. (up) and 51.23 (down)
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<p>Figures 51.19. (up), 51.20. (centre) and 51.21. (down) Part of one of the three actuator systems (housing of servo motor) with serial number starting with “211”</p>    <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022 (housing of servo motor highlighted)</p>   <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.24. Marking of one of the three actuator systems</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.25. Marking on actuator system seized by the UK in 2022</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
Figure 51.26.	Figure 51.27.

<p>Marking of one of the three actuator systems</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Marking on actuator system seized by the UK in 2022</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.28. Part of the actuator systems #3 (housing of servo motor) with “test ok / Act 3” sticker</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.29. “test ok / Act 1” found on actuator system seized by the UK in 2022</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.30. Electronic cable of actuator system #2</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.31. Electronic cable of actuator system #3 of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA</p>  <p>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>

<p>Figures 51.32. (up) and 51.33. (down) Battery box front plate</p>	<p>Figure 51.34. (up) and 51.35. (down) Battery boxes seized by the UK in 2022</p>
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Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.36.
Electronic components of battery box (attached to side plate)



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.37.




Source: Panel of experts on Yemen

Figure 51.38.



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.39.
Battery box seized by the UK in 2022




Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.40.

Figure 51.41.


Electronic circuit board (ECB) of battery box

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Battery box seized by the UK in 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.42. (up) and 51.43. (down)
(inside)
Part of battery box



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.44.
Battery box seized by the UK in 2022



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.45. (up) and 51.46. (down)
Interface box front plate



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.47.
Interface box front plate found among the debris of a cruise missile used in a Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi airport, UAE, in January 2022



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.48.
Broken jet engine suspension bracket



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.49.
Jet engine suspension bracket of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.50.
Jet engine component



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.51.
Jet engine part of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA. Serial number in the format “100XXXX” (100 followed by five digits)



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.52. (up) and 51.53. (down)
AMISCO solenoid coil (part of jet engine ignition system)¹⁸⁰



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.54. (up) and 51.55. (down)
AMISCO solenoid coils seized by the UK in 2022



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

¹⁸⁰ S/2021/79, annex 20 and S/2020/326, figures 16.3. and 16.4.

<p>Figures 51.56. (up) and 51.57. (down) NCR fuel/oil hose</p>  <p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.58. NCR fuel/oil hose of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA</p>  <p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.59. Jet engine component with serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits)</p>  <p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p>Figure 51.61. Serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits) on a jet engine seized by the UK in 2022</p>  <p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.60. Jet engine component with serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits)</p>  <p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	

<p>Figure 51.62. Part of one of the three actuator systems (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker</p>  <p><i>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</i></p>	<p>Figure 51.63. Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022 (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker</p>  <p><i>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</i></p>
<p>Figure 51.64. Part of one of the three actuator systems (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker</p>  <p><i>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</i></p>	<p>Figure 51.65. Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022 (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker</p>  <p><i>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</i></p>
<p>Figure 51.66. Battery box front plate with “QC pass” sticker</p>  <p><i>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</i></p>	<p>Figure 51.67. Battery box seized by UK in 2022 with “QC Pass” sticker</p>  <p><i>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</i></p>

<p>Figure 51.68. Part of one of the three actuator systems (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker. The Panel observes that there is an unusual space between the two “s” in the word “pass”</p> 	<p>Figure 51.69. Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022 (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker. The Panel observes that there is an unusual space between the two “s” in the word “pass”</p> 
<p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.70.</p>	<p>Figure 51.71.</p>
<p>Connectors at the bottom plate of a battery box (including “QC Pass” sticker)</p>	<p>Battery box seized by the UK in 2022 with “QC Pass” sticker</p>
	
<p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>
<p>Figure 51.72.</p>	<p>Figure 51.73.</p>
<p>Connector with “QC p...” sticker</p>	<p>Connector with “QC p...” sticker found among the debris of a cruise missile attack by the Houthis on Mussafah industrial district, UAE, in January 2022</p>
	
<p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>	<p><i>Source:</i> Panel of Experts on Yemen</p>

Figure 51.74.
**Close-up of a battery box part
“E.L... / INSP.../A...” sticker**



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.75.
**“E.L.C.P / INSPECTED / ACC” sticker on
electronic box seized by the UK in 2022**



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.76.
**Close-up of battery box part
“GH... 0359” sticker**



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.77.
**“INSPECTED / ACC / GH02/3A0742” sticker on
electronic box seized by the UK in 2022**



Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Annex 52: Statement by the Houthi Armed Forces' spokesman and Director of the Moral Guidance Department of the Armed Forces that the previous attacks on Aramco bulk plant located in Jeddah, KSA¹⁸¹ and Jizan port, KSA¹⁸², have been conducted with Quds-2 cruise missiles.



The statement of the armed forces regarding the 3rd Siege-Breaking operation.

*Spokesman of Yemeni Armed Forces
Yahya Sare'e*

- 1- In response to the siege and aggression as well as in continuation of the special large-scale military operation, 2nd Siege Breaking operation,
- 2- The Armed Forces launched the 3rd Siege Breaking operation, which targeted Aramco in Jeddah and vital targets in Jizan with a batch of Quds2 ballistic and winged missiles, the operation successfully achieved its objectives.
- 3-The armed forces renew their warning to the Saudi enemy that they have already begun to launch concentrated strikes according to the bank of targets for breaking the siege, as they promised in the previous statement
- 4-The armed forces, by trusting in Allah, will not hesitate to expand the bank of goals during the next stage.

*Long live Yemen, free, dear, and independent
Victory is for Yemen and for all the free people.*

*Sana'a, 17 Sha'ban 1443 AH
Corresponding to March 20, 2022 AD*

Source: https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1505637253653139466

¹⁸¹ [S/2022/50](#), annex 16. On Figure 16.3., the debris of a Quds-2 cruise missile are documented by the Panel in the aftermath of the attacks conducted on the Aramco bulk plant.

¹⁸² The Panel documented that the attack on Jizan port was conducted by an UAV and not, as claimed by the Houthi Armed Forces' spokesman by a Quds-2 cruise missile ([S/2022/50](#), annex 14).

Annex 53: Quds-2 cruise missile

The Panel observes that in April 2022 a mock of a Quds-2 cruise missile was displayed in Tehran, Iran. The Panel notes that this mock was bearing a similar identification number to the one visible on the Quds-2 cruise missile displayed by the Houthis during in March 2021 in Sana'a.

Figure 53.1.

Mock of a Quds-2 cruise missile displayed in April 2022 in Tehran



"Tehran, Apr. 29 (MNA) – Some missiles of the Resistance axis were exhibited on the sidelines of the Quds Day march in Tehran.

The 'Qassim' missile of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movements, the 'Fateh-110' missile of the Lebanese Resistance movement Hezbollah and the 'Quds-2' missile are among the missiles which were displayed on Friday on the sidelines of the International Quds Day rallies in Tehran.

Earlier in the day, Iran's latest ballistic missiles "Kheiber-Shekan" and "Emad-3" were also unveiled during the Quds Day march. 'Kheiber-Shekan' is the world's longest-range tactical ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 km.


'Emad-3' long-range missile is a new generation of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles of Iran.

The International Quds Day is an annual event held on the last Friday of the Holy month of Ramadan that was initiated by the late founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran Imam Khomeini in 1979 to express support for the Palestinians and oppose Zionism and Israeli occupation.

Millions of Iranians from various provinces across the country took part in nationwide rallies to show their solidarity with the Palestinians and condemn Israel's occupation and atrocities."


Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186273/Resistance-axis-exhibits-missiles-on-Quds-Day>

Figure 53.2.
Quds-2 cruise missile displayed by the Houthis in March 2021 in Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1370009321879314438/photo/1

Figure 53.3. (left) and 53.4. (right)
Comparison of the identification numbers of the Quds-2 cruise missile displayed in Sana'a in March 2021 and the mock displayed in Tehran in April 2022



Displayed in Sana'a in March 2021



Displayed in Tehran in April 2021

Source of figure 53.3.: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1370009321879314438/photo/1

Source of figure 53.4.: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186273/Resistance-axis-exhibits-missiles-on-Quds-Day>

Annex 54: Military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

1. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rocket launchers, and UAV

1. Eight models of ballistic missiles, six models of long-range guided rockets, three models of cruise missiles, and 13 models of UAV (surveillance and/or attack)¹⁸³ which were displayed by the Houthis during the parades are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo (annexes 56-57 and 59-61).

2. Air defence

2. Four models of air defence systems which were displayed by the Houthis during the parades are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo (annex 62).

3. Surveillance and communication material

3. Two models of EOSS and high frequency communication equipment which were displayed by the Houthis during the parades are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo. The main body of one of the EOSS, designated as "Sadiq" by the Houthis shows a similar shape as one of the materials seized by the UK, referred to in para. 74 (annex 63).

4. Mobility

4. The Panel observes that during the military parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022, the Houthis displayed hundreds of Toyota Land Cruiser pickups, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo. Most of these vehicles that appear to be new have been transformed into 'technicals',¹⁸⁴ equipped with a wide range of armaments such as Heavy Machineguns (HMG), anti-aircraft canons, Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS), ATGMs, recoilless guns and MLRS (annex 65).

5. The Panel believes that such a large number of light 4x4 vehicles gives the Houthis the capacity to conduct large movements of troops in a short time and over great distances while providing them with significant firepower.

5. Maritime capability

6. During the parades, the Houthis also displayed the following materials which are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo: a) Four models of AShM (annex 71); b) Seven models of armed speed boats and/or remote controlled WBIEDs (annexes 72-73); c) Two models of large volume influence naval mines, one model of naval limpet mine, one model of naval shape charge and three models of naval contact mines (annex 74).

6. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

7. The Panel observes that during the military parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022, the Houthis displayed new assault rifles, sniper rifles and Anti-Material Rifles (AMR) (annexes 66-68). This material is being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

8. The Panel observes that similar new assault rifles have been displayed by the Houthis during their naval show of force held on April 2023 in Kamaran Island, north of Hudaydah (para. 61). The Panel notes that these assault rifles, similar to the AK-103, are allegedly manufactured locally by the Houthis¹⁸⁵ (annex 67). In addition, the Panel documented that the Houthis reportedly manufactured locally clones of AK-104 compact assault rifle (annex 68). This material is also being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

¹⁸³ The Panel observes that some UAVs initially dedicated to conduct surveillance have been transformed by the Houthis to drop bomblets or mortar bombs (annex 60).

¹⁸⁴ Weapons mounted on civilian vehicles such as 4x4, pickups, trucks, and similar.

¹⁸⁵ Two variants of these clones have been identified by the Panel. The markings indicate the year of production as 2022 and 2023.

Annex 55: Status of the material displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Previously documented by the Panel	Comments
Ballistic missile Borkhan-2	Yes	Figure 56.1. and S/2018/594 , para. 89 and figure 35.1
Ballistic missile Borkhan-3	No	Figure 56.2.
Ballistic missile Falaq	No	Figure 56.3.
Ballistic missile Hatem	No	Figure 56.4.
Ballistic missile Fateh-11	No	Figure 56.5.
Ballistic missile Al-Bahr	No	Figure 56.6.
Ballistic missile Qaher-M2	No	Figure 56.7.
Ballistic missile Moheet	No	Figure 56.8.
Guided rocket Badr-1	Yes	Figure 57.1. and S/2019/83 , para. 90
Guided rocket Badr-1P	No	Figure 57.2.
Guided rocket Badr-2	No	Figure 57.3.
Guided rocket Badr-3	No	Figure 57.4.
Guided rocket Qasim-1	No	Figure 57.5.
Guided rocket Saeer	No	Figure 57.6.
Cruise missile Quds-1	Yes	Figure 61.1. and S/2020/326 , figure 5
Cruise missile Quds-2	Yes	Figure 61.2. and S/2020/326 , footnote 47 of the para. 57
Cruise missile Quds-3	No	Figure 61.3.
AShM Al-Mandab-1	Yes	Figure 71.1. and S/2019/83 , para. 81
AShM Al-Mandab-2	Yes	Figure 71.2. and S/2019/83 , para. 81
AShM Falaq-1	Yes	Figure 71.3. and S/2023/130 , annex 10
AShM Khalij Fars "Aasif"	No	Figure 71.4.
Surface to air missile Saqr-1 "358"	Yes	Figure 62.1. and S/2023/130 , para. S/2023/130 , para. 51; S/2022/50 , para. 61;

		S/2021/79 , para. 73 and annex 13; and S/2020/326 , para. 52 and annex 20
Surface to air missile Thaqib-2	No	Figure 62.2.
Surface to air missile Mi-raj	No	Figure 62.3.
MANPADS similar to Misagh-2	No	Figure 62.4.
Surveillance UAV Mersad-1	No	Figure 59.1.
Surveillance UAV Mersad-2	No	Figure 59.2.
Attack UAV Rased	Yes	Figure 59.3. and S/2019/83 , para.83
Attack UAV Wa'aed	Yes	Figure 59.4. and S/2023/130 , para 57; S/2022/50 , para. 60
Attack UAV Shihab	No	Figure 59.5.
Attack UAV Raqib	No	Figure 59.6.
Attack UAV Rujum	No	Figure 59.12.
Attack UAV Qasef-2K	No	Figure 59.7.
Attack UAV Samad-2	Yes	Figure 59.8. and S/2019/83 , para. 84
Attack UAV Samad-3	No	Figure 59.9.
Attack UAV Khatif-1	No	Figure 59.10.
Attack UAV Khatif-2	No	Figure 59.11.
Speed boat Aasef-1	No	Figure 72.1.
Speed boat Aasef-3	No	Figure 72.2.
Speed boat Malah	No	Figure 72.3.
WBIED Tawfan-3	No	Figure 73.1.
WBIED Tawfan-2	Yes	Figure 73.2. and S/2019/83 , paras 92-94 and figure X
WBIED Tawfan-1	No	Figure 73.3.
WBIED Toufan-2	No	Figure 73.4.
Naval mine Masjur-1 AMD-1-500	No	Figure 74.1.
Naval mine Masjur-2 DM-1-2	No	Figure 74.2.
Naval mine MTA Thakib	No	Figure 74.3.
Naval mine MKA Karrar-1	No	Figure 74.7.

Naval mine HAD Aseef-4	No	Figure 74.4.
Naval mine MGA Auwais	No	Figure 74.5.
Naval mine Moujahid	No	Figure 74.6.
EFP Model 1	No	Figure 70.1.
EFP Model 2	No	Figure 70.2.
EFP Model 3	No	Figure 70.3.
EFP Model 4	No	Figure 70.4.
Directional mine	No	Figure 69.1.
AP bounding mine	No	Figure 69.2.
EOSS Sadiq	No	Figure 63.1.
EOSS Haydar	No	Figure 63.3.
High Frequency (HF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) radio manpack	No	Figure 63.3.
Light armoured vehicle Hani	No	Figure 64.1.
Armoured Land Cruiser pickup	No	Figure 64.2.
Toyota Land Cruiser pickup transformed into 'technical'	No	Figure 64.3. and annex 65

Annex 56: Ballistic missiles displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 56 to 59 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi's media¹⁸⁶

1. Hudaydah parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>
2. Sana'a parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVkjBNPTg>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVkjBNPTg>


Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Ballistic missile Borkhan-2	Figure 56.1.		2
			
Ballistic missile Borkhan-3	Figure 56.2.	-	3
			
Ballistic missile Falaq	Figure 56.3.	-	3
			
Ballistic missile Hatem	Figure 56.4.	-	3
			

¹⁸⁶ The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no-longer available.

Ballistic missile Fateh-11	Figure 56.5.		-	3
Ballistic missile Al-Bahr	Figure 56.6.		-	4
		Markings observed: ¹⁸⁷ 22, 24, 25, 27		
Ballistic missile Qaher-M2	Figure 56.7.		-	2
Ballistic missile Moheet	Figure 56.8.		-	3

¹⁸⁷ Markings on the missiles.

Annex 57: Guided rockets displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Guided rocket Badr-1P	Figure 57.1.	-	2
			
		Markings observed: 1004, 1005, 1007, 1008, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1014, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1025, 1026, 1029	
Guided rocket Badr-1	Figure 57.2.	-	6
			
		Markings observed: 707	
Guided rocket Badr-2	Figure 57.3.	-	16
			
		Markings observed: 1160, 1162, 1164, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173	

Guided rocket Badr-3	Figure 57.4.	 <p>Markings observed: 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69</p>	-	16
Guided rocket Qasim-1	Figure 57.5.		-	6
Guided rocket Saeer	Figure 57.6.	 <p>Markings observed: 501, 503, 508, 509, 510, 515, 516, 517, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 529, 530, 537</p>	-	22

Annex 58: Rocket launchers displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed		
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade	
Unguided rocket Zilzal-2	Figure 58.1.		8	-
MLRS 122mm, six tubes	Figure 58.2.		9	-
MLRS 107mm, eight tubes	Figure 58.3.		-	6

Annex 59: UAVs displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is for investigating potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Surveillance UAV Mersad-1	Figure 59.1.	-	4
Surveillance UAV Mersad-2	Figure 59.2.	-	4
Attack UAV Rased	Figure 59.3.	10	24
Attack UAV Wa'eed	Figure 59.4.	-	4

Attack UAV Shihab	Figure 59.5.		-	6
Attack UAV Raqib	Figure 59.6.		-	12
Attack UAV Qasef-2K	Figure 59.7.		-	10
Attack UAV Samad-2	Figure 59.8.		-	8
Attack UAV Samad-3	Figure 59.9.		-	6
Attack UAV Khatif-1	Figure 59.10.		-	10

Attack UAV Khatif-2	Figure 59.11.		-	10
Attack UAV Rujum	Figure 59.12.		14	10

Annex 60: Surveillance UAV transformed by the Houthis to drop bomblets or mortar bombs

<p>Figures 60.1. (left) and 60.2. (right)</p>  <p><i>Source:</i> https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1598413034912743425/photo/3</p>	<p>Bomblets carried under a DJI Mavic-3 UAV allegedly shot down by pro-PLC forces on 14 November 2022</p>
<p>Figures 60.3. (left) and 60.4. (right)</p>  <p><i>Source (for the figure 60.3.):</i> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU¹⁸⁸</p> <p><i>Source (for the figure 60.4.):</i> https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/161112652760494899 https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/161112652760494899</p>	<p>Bomblets carried under Rujum UAV displayed during the military parade held in Sana'a in September 2022.</p> <p>The bomblets appear to be of a similar model that the one displayed in figure 60.2.</p>
<p>Figures 60.5. (left) and 60.6. (right)</p>	<p>120mm mortar bomb carried</p>

¹⁸⁸ The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos are no longer available.

 	<p>under a Rujum UAV operated by the Houthis</p>
<p>Source (for the figure 60.5.): https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235942 Source (for the figure 60.6.): https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1673390105615015944/photo/2</p> <p>Figures 60.7. (left) and 60.8. (right)</p>  	<p>60mm mortar bomb carried under Rased UAV displayed during the military parade held in Sana'a in September 2022</p>

Annex 61: Cruise missiles displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 61 to 66 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi's media¹⁸⁹

1. Hudaydah parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>
2. Sana'a parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVlxjBNPTg>

Description	Picture	Number observed		
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade	
Cruise missile Quds-1	Figure 61.1.		-	5
		Markings observed: MC-79074, MC-79075		
Cruise missile Quds-2	Figure 61.2.		-	5
		Markings observed: MC-790777, MC-790778, MC-790779, MC-790781 ¹⁹⁰		
Cruise missile Quds-3	Figure 61.3.		-	3
		Markings observed: MC-2014053		

¹⁸⁹ The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.

¹⁹⁰ See S/2023/130, figure 5.13, showing the debris of a Quds-2 cruise missile indicates the marking "MC-790721", which is consistent with the markings observed on the parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022.

Annex 62: Air defence systems displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Surface to air missile Saqr-1 “358”	Figure 62.1.		- 45
Surface to air missile Thaqib-2	Figure 62.2.		- 12
Surface to air missile Mi-raj	Figure 62.3.		- 8
MANPADS similar to Misagh-2	Figure 62.4.		Several -

Annex 63: EOSS and HF/VHF radio manpacks displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
EOSS Sadiq¹⁹¹	Figure 63.1.	-	1
EOSS Haydar	Figure 63.2.	-	1
HF/VHF radio manpack	Figure 63.3. (left) 63.4. (right)	Observed	Observed

¹⁹¹ This EOSS presents similar characteristics to the EOSS-I-103 produced in Iran (annex 29, figure 29.3.).

Annex 64: Light armoured vehicles and ‘technical’ displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Light armoured vehicle Hani	Figure 64.1.	-	18
Armoured Land Cruiser pickup	Figure 64.2.	15	-
Toyota Land Cruiser pickup transformed into a ‘technical’	Figure 64.3.	Hundreds	Several

Annex 65: Variants of the Toyota Land Cruiser pickup transformed as ‘technicals’ displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

According to Toyota Motor Company, the vehicles shown appear to be Land Cruiser Single Cab Pick-up with left hand drive. This model is sold worldwide and was first manufactured in 1999 and it is still in production. Toyota informed the Panel that some of the vehicles displayed in the parades are for sale in the Middle East region given the front hood ornament, with primary destinations Saudi Arabia, Oman, and UAE.

Figure 65.1.
Mounted with DShK 12.7x108mm HMG



Figure 65.2.
Mounted with KPVT 14.5x114mm HMG



Figure 65.3.
Mounted with ZPU-2, 14.5x114mm twin-barrel HMG



Figure 65.4.
Mounted with ZU-23, 23mm twin-barrel air defence canon



Figure 65.5.

Mounted with 37mm anti-aircraft canon similar to Type 55 or a variant of it



Figure 65.6.

Mounted with 37mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft canon Type 65 or a variant of it



Figure 65.7.

Mounted with 82mm recoilless gun similar to B10 or a variant of it



Figure 65.8.

Mounted with 76mm recoilless gun similar to SPG-9 or a variant of it




Figure 65.9.
Mounted with 75mm recoilless gun similar to M20 or a variant of it



Figure 65.10.
Mounted with 106mm recoilless gun similar to M40 or a variant of it



Figure 65.11.
Mounted with 'Dehlavieh' ATGMs



Figure 65.12.
Mounted with ATGMs launching post similar to 9K111



Figure 65.13.
Mounted with ATGMs launching post similar to 9P151



Figure 65.14.
Mounted with 82mm mortar



Figure 65.15.
Mounted with 120mm mortar



Figure 65.16.
Mounted with 107mm MLRS with eight tubes



Figure 65.17.
Mounted with 122mm MLRS with six tubes



Figure 65.18.
Mounted with Zilzal-2 or Zilzal-3 rocket launcher



Annex 66: SALW displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Allegedly locally manufactured AK-103 assault rifle	Figure 66.1.		Hundreds
Hoshdar sniper rifle	Figure 66.2.		
Unidentified heavy caliber anti-material rifle	Figure 66.3.		- 1

Annex 67: AK-103 reportedly manufactured locally by the Houthis
¹⁹²

Figure 67.1.

AK-103 variant 1 with markings indicating the year of production as 2022



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1613868055326593024/photo/1>

Figure 67.2.

AK-103 variant 2 and related comment



خالد
@fighterxwar

90% of the Yemeni-made AK-103 I've seen for sale is from this guns dealer and now he got Yemeni-made AK-103 made in 2023

Price dropped from [2,600\$] in Sep 2022 to [1,700\$] now.

Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1634279349535887392/photo/4>

Figures 67.3. (left) and 67.4. (right)
Markings indicating a production in 2023



Serial number : "2023 YMN 000075"
Made by six digits



Serial number : "2023 YMN 02113282"
Made by eight digits

Source figure 67.3.: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1636029291098980352/photo/3>

Source figure 67.4.: <https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1697728634142728396/photo/2>

¹⁹² <https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1664393695037145090/photo/1>

Figures 67.5. (up), 67.6. (centre), 67.7. (down)
Display of an AK103 in 2021 in Houthi-controlled area

The Panel notes that the rifle is presented to Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, former President of the Houthi Revolutionary Council, also the cousin of Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi (YEI.004)



محمد علي الحوثي
@Moh_Alhouthi

شكراً للتصنيع الحربي على الهدية التي صنعت
باكمالها في اليمن

Translated from Arabic by Google

Thanks to Tasnee Al Harbi for the gift,
which was entirely made in Yemen

12:30 PM · Dec 20, 2021

Source: https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1472892080473083908

Annex 68: AK-104 manufactured in Houthi-controlled area

Figure 68.1.

AK-104 variant 1.

The Houthis logo “*God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam*” is visible on the box



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1651706775756840962>

Figure 68.2.

Markings indicating a production in 2022



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1651706775756840962>

Figure 68.3. (up), 68.4. (centre) and 68.5. (down)
AK-104 variant 2



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1654164726887088154>

Figure 68.6.
Markings indicating the production year as 2023




Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1649519474557571073/photo/1>

Figure 68.7.
Sale of AK-103 in Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1656569056013570048/photo/1

Figure 68.8.
Sale of AK-103 in Sana'a



Source: <https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1678426651732897799/photo/1>

Figure 68.9.
Sale of AK-104 in Sa'dah



Source: <https://twitter.com/TbyNasr/status/1678473056774135814/photo/1>

Annex 69: Landmines displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 69 and 70 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi media¹⁹³

1. Hudaydah parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>
2. Sana'a parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVlxjBNPTg>

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
AP directional mine	Figure 69.1.		35 -
AP fragmentation bounding mine	Figure 69.2.		36 -

¹⁹³ The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.

Annex 70: EFP displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed		
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade	
EFP (Model 1)	Figure 70.1.		36	-
EFP (Model 2)	Figure 70.2.		24	-
EFP (Model 3)	Figure 70.3.		18	-
EFP (Model 4)	Figure 70.4.		36	-

Annex 71: AShMs displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and in Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 71 to 74 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi's media¹⁹⁴

1. Hudaydah parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>
2. Sana'a parade
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4>
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVlxjBNPTg>

Description	Picture	Number observed		
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade	
AShM Al-Mandab-1	Figure 71.1.		2	2
AShM Al-Mandab-2	Figure 71.2.		2	2
AShM Falaq-1	Figure 71.3.		2	2
AShM Khalij Fars "Aasif"	Figure 71.4.		-	2

¹⁹⁴ The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.

Annex 72: Armed speed boats displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed		
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade	
Armed speed boat Aasef-1	Figure 72.1.		-	1
Armed speed boat Aasef-3	Figure 72.2.		-	2
Armed speed boat Malah	Figure 72.3.		-	2

Annex 73: Remotely-controlled Water-borne IEDs (WBIEDs) displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Sana'a on 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Remotely-controlled WBIED Tawfan-3	Figure 73.1.	-	3
Remotely-controlled WBIED Tawfan-2	Figure 73.2.	-	2
Remotely-controlled WBIED Tawfan-1	Figure 73.3.	-	2
Remotely-controlled WBIED Toufan-2	Figure 73.4.	-	3

Annex 74: Naval mines displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana'a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Description	Picture	Number observed	
		Hudaydah parade	Sana'a parade
Influence naval mine Masjur-1 AMD-1-500	Figure 74.1.		- 2
Influence naval mine Masjur-2 DM-1-2	Figure 74.2.		- 2
Limpet naval mine MTA Thakib ¹⁹⁵	Figure 74.3.		- 15
Shape charge naval mine HAD Aseef-4	Figure 74.4.		16 -

¹⁹⁵ S/2018/594, para. 111.

Contact naval mine MGA Auwais	Figure 74.5.		18	-
Contact naval mine Moujahid	Figure 74.6.		18	-
Contact naval mine MKA Karrar-1	Figure 74.7.		18	-

Annex 75: Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics consistent with those manufactured in China reportedly documented for sale in the black market in Sana'a, Yemen

Figure 75.1.



Pictures posted on 11 May 2023

Source: <https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat/status/1656683743573147648/photo/1>

Figure 75.2.



Serial number: 62042402
Picture posted on 8 April 2023

Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1644478722496512003/photo/2>

Annex 76: AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics similar to those manufactured in Russia reportedly documented for sale in the black market in Sana'a

Figure 76.1.
AKS20U (markings on the rifle are written in Cyrillic)



CALIBRE OBSCURA
@CalibreObscura

#Yemen: I received a fresh pic from #Sanaa of a Molot AKS20Y civilian carbine, used in lieu of legit AKS-74U.

They are very inexpensive locally (Approx. \$1500 as compared to \$4000 for the legit 74U), but aren't known to be very reliable. Such guns are usually for EDC not combat.

Pictures posted on Twitter on 5 June 2023

Source: <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1665803168654000128/photo/1>

Figures 76.2. (left) and 76.3. (right)
AKS20U posted on the Twitter account of a Yemeni weapons' shop owner



Pictures posted on 3 May 2023

Source: <https://twitter.com/YemenTactical/status/1653609290790326278>

Annex 77: CF-98-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China¹⁹⁶

Sample 1

Figure 77.1.: Contact details of the shop owner in Sana'a



Figures 77.2. and 77.3.: Left view of the pistol and close-up of the factory marking and serial numbers



Serial number: "15-CN 006313"
Pictures posted on 16 August 2021

Source: <https://www.facebook.com/103455701997637/photos/pb.100070385013748.-2207520000./129080262768514/?type=3>

Sample 2

Figure 77.4.: Location in Sana'a and contact details of the shop owner



Figures 77.5. (left), 77.6. (center) and 77.7. (right: close-up of the factory marking and serial numbers)




Serial number: "15-CN 009885"
Pictures posted on 3 February 2023

¹⁹⁶ The CF-98-9 model is the commercial variant of the Chinese military QSZ-92 pistol developed in 1994.

Source: <https://twitter.com/rfatmhm97368979/status/1621493889575034884>

Sample 3

Figure 77.8.: Location in Sana'a and contact details of the shop owner



Figures 77.9. (left) and 77.10. (close-up of the factory marking and serial numbers)



Serial number: "15-CN 029430"
Pictures posted on 3 May 2023

Source: <https://twitter.com/DhiaaArms/status/1653770115689660416>

Sample 4

Figures 77.11. (left), 77.12. (right) and 77.13 (down): CF-98-9 pistol documented in the black market in Sana'a



The serial numbers of this pistol are consistent with other documented in the black market in Sana'a¹⁹⁷

Source: Confidential

¹⁹⁷ To protect the source, the serial numbers of this pistol are hidden.

CF-98-9 serial numbers

Material documented by the Panel as displayed for sale in Sana'a is shown in blue

Material documented by the Panel of Experts on Somalia as used by Al-Shabaab in an assassination attempt is shown in green

Material documented in Somalia in 2021 by “Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GTOIC)¹⁹⁸” is shown in red

Serial number
15-CN 001694
15-CN 001954
15-CN 003259
15-CN 006313
15-CN 006331
15-CN 007633
15-CN 008461
15-CN 008772
15-CN 008795
15-CN 009785
15-CN 010840
15-CN 017542
15-CN 019582
15-CN 021000
15-CN 023827
15-CN 025554
15-CN 026530
15-CN 027724
15-CN 028735
15-CN 028754
15-CN 028834
15-CN 028943
15-CN 029336
15-CN 030078
15-CN 030930
15-CN 033211

Extract from the Panel of Expert on Somalia report S/2019/858

Figure 77.14. (left) and 77.15. (right)

Figure 6: 9-mm Norinco pistol bearing serial number 15-CN 006321 recovered from the scene of an attempted Al-Shabaab assassination on 16 August 2019.



Serial number: “15-CN 006321”

¹⁹⁸ <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Price-of-civil-war-13.04-web.pdf>

CF-98-9 reportedly in the hands of Islamic State (IS) fighters, Somalia

CALIBRE OBSCURA
@CalibreObscura ...

Interesting pictures from IS in #Somalia.

Lots of T56/PK/Type 80, but the most interesting aspect is the pistols used- a Chinese CF-98, which has seen use in assassinations in the country, and what appears to be a Type 54-1 (TT33 derivative, also from China).

10:26 AM · Sep 21, 2019

Figure 77.16.



Source: <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1175325454657626114/photo/1>

Figure 77.17.



Source: <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1616817037443010560/photo/3>

Figure 77.18.



Source: https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1460306965654081539/photo/4

Annex 78: Smuggling of G3 retrofitted in Yemen into the Sudan

Figures 78.1. (up) and 78.2. (down)

Locally retrofitted G3 displayed for sale in Sana'a



Markings indicating the local retrofitting

Figure 78.3.

Location in Sana'a and contact details of the shop owner



Source: <https://twitter.com/KhaldhydrT17459/status/1685799313983582208>

Figures 78.4. (left) and 78.5. (right)

Locally retrofitted G3 displayed for sale in Sana'a



Figure 78.6.

Location in Sana'a and contact details of the shop owner



Source: <https://twitter.com/ZynAlsaydy/status/1687482395325259776/photo/1>

G3 retrofitted in Yemen displayed in Sudan as in the hands of RSF

Figure 78.7.



Source:

https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1674053735222321152

Figure 78.8.



Source:

https://twitter.com/Moh_Gamea/status/1666817457607303170

Figure 78.9.



Source:

<https://twitter.com/FaisalElsheikh/status/1674314259256188928>

Figure 78.10.



Source: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/arsenal-of-the-rapid-support-forces>

Annex 79: Brief overview of the situation of migrants in Yemen

1. The Panel has been investigating the situation of migrants in Yemen. Based on the data received by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and GoY sources, it is estimated that there are nearly 200,000 migrants in Yemen, including asylum seekers and refugees, mostly Ethiopian (89%) and Somali. More than 77,000 of them arrived as of January 2023, marking a significant increase from the previous year, which counted a total of 73,233 arrivals.
2. The vast majority of migrants in Yemen are subjected to severe ill treatment and live in extremely dire conditions. Of the 200,000, IOM estimates that some 40,000 want to be repatriated,¹⁹⁹ while about 160,000 are on the move trying to reach other Gulf countries. The summer months of June, July, and August 2023 witnessed a major spike in arrivals. Most of the migrants reaching the Yemeni shores are not aware that there is an ongoing armed conflict.
3. Once in Yemen, migrants are dependent on trafficking networks who deprive them of their liberty if they are unable to pay additional fees. They are subjected to torture and other forms of ill treatment, including sexual violence, and are forced to request money from their families. Some of them become pregnant as a result of rape, which creates a major stigma, including when they are able to return to their country of origin. Those who are able to pay, are set free and can continue their journeys upwards. Reportedly, migrants are asked to pay fees at checkpoints, which are managed by various parties to the conflict, including the STC, GoY, and the Houthis. Also, the practice reported in the communication by the group of UN independent experts to the Houthis of October 2022 is still ongoing.²⁰⁰
4. The Panel also received reports of targeted killing of migrants attempting to cross the border with the KSA, including the presence of mass graves on the Yemeni side of the border. Migrants who manage to reach Sa'dah Governorate and those who are unable to pay the requested fees to cross the KSA border, are allegedly forced to be the first ones attempting to cross, so that they would be shot first by the Saudi Border Guards. Children are reportedly most likely to be those put forward.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ IOM implements the Voluntary Humanitarian Return Programme, through which about 6,000 repatriations took place at the time of writing this report from Marib, Aden, and Sana'a since the beginning of 2023. For more information, see <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/soaring-number-migrants-distress-yemen-demands-greater-relief-efforts-0>.

²⁰⁰ “The Yemen Immigration, Passport and Nationality Authority (IPNA), which reports to the Ansar Allah movement, collaborates with traffickers to systematically direct migrants through the governorates of Al Jawf and Sa'dah. Traffickers and these authorities reportedly coordinate to extort fees of around 250 Saudi Riyal (SAR) from each migrant under the pretext of facilitating their passage to KSA. This purportedly constitutes an extremely lucrative scheme, earning the IPNA in Sa'dah and the trafficking networks an estimated \$50,000 per week.” <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27562>.

²⁰¹ For more information on violations against migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, documented by UN and non-UN human rights entities see <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27562>, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27563>, and the Human Rights Watch report released in August 2023 at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/08/21/they-fired-us-rain/saudi-arabian-mass-killings-ethiopian-migrants-yemen-saudi>.

Figures 79.1 (left) and 79.2. (right)

Smuggling boat transporting migrants from the Horn of Africa approaching the Yemeni shores on 3 August 2023 through Bab al-Mandab Strait



Source: Confidential


Annex 80: The Central Security Camp in Sana'a and the so-called Exchange House prison

1. The Central Security Camp in Sana'a includes several buildings, such as the so-called Exchange House prison, operated by the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners' Affairs under the leadership with Abdulqader Al-Murtada. The prison hosts the detainees, mostly civilians, some of whom are supposed to be included in prisoner exchange deals between the Houthi and other parties to the conflict. Some detainees have been living in this prison for years. These include political prisoners, journalists, prisoners of war from the battle of Jabara Valley of 2019, men detained on criminal charges, mentally ill detainees, and drug addicts, among others.
2. Prisoners are systematically subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by the prison's staff. Based on the multiple reports received by the Panel, various members of the prison's management were and still are torturing the prisoners, including Abdulqader Al-Murtada.
3. Some of the types of torture inflicted to the prisoners include: 1) Pointing guns at the head and pretending to shoot; 2) Making them stand for long hours and stand while spreading their legs and hitting between the thighs, including on the genitals; 3) Hitting their heads on the wall; 4) Removing chairs so that they fall on the ground and subsequently stepping on them, and dragging them; 5) Beating with metal, wooden, and electric sticks; 6) Administering electric shocks; and 7) Hanging in outdoor areas to intimidate other detainees. Prisoners are mostly denied the required medical treatment, including for injuries caused by the torture, and in some cases of emergency, the prison staff prevented medical personnel to perform surgeries, explicitly requesting the provision of antibiotics as an alternative to surgical procedures. As a result, some prisoners have permanent disabilities, and some have reportedly died.
4. The Panel also gathered evidence of extortion. Prisoners and their families are forced to pay high amounts of money to be able to make brief phone calls or to be able to meet. Often, the phone calls are allowed for the sole purpose of requesting families to transfer additional money, which will be administered by the prison's management on behalf of each prisoner. The prisoners who can pay more, are usually given a better treatment and better cells, while those who cannot pay, are subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
5. The prisoners must pay for the medicines they need while detained. For example, a box of paracetamol is reportedly sold at a price that is five times the regular local price. Based on multiple reports received by the Panel, some of the medicines purchased by the prisoners were contained in boxes with a "not for sale" label, or that were known to be medical products donated by humanitarian agencies and sold to the prisoners. Allegedly, some of the prison guards were providing these details and other information about internal affairs of the prison to the prisoners, mostly in exchange of money or qat purchased by the prisoners through their available funds controlled and managed by the prison's management.
6. Periodically, some of the prisoners are held in incommunicado detention for months. Detainees are also held in solitary confinement, in cells with no mattress, no blankets, sometimes in abandoned bathrooms converted into cells for long periods of time. Some of the cells are called "squeezers", as their size is reportedly 1 meter by 0.5 meters with no access to water and ventilation. Some of the prisoners have reportedly been held in the "squeezers" for months. During the day, through loudspeakers, detainees are forced to listen to lessons from Shia' clerics and Al-Masirah channel broadcasting, among others, lectures by Abdulmalik Al-Houthi ([YEi.004](#)), aimed to "re-educate" prisoners, a vast majority of whom are reportedly Sunni.
7. According to multiple sources, there are some 3,000 detainees currently held in the Central Security Camp. Some of these prisoners were minors at the time when they were initially

detained, some became mentally ill as a result of the severe torture inflicted, and some died under mysterious circumstances.

Figure 80.1.


Central Security Camp area in Sana'a where the so-called Exchange House prison is located



Source: Confidential

Figure 80.2.

Close-up of the prison building and surrounding buildings



Source: Confidential

Annex 81: The impact of the protracted conflict on the freedom of expression, including of the media, in Yemen

1. The protracted conflict has negatively impacted freedom of expression, including the media, in the country. Propaganda and disinformation deepened ideological and socio-political divisions across Yemen, which served to delegitimize the work of journalists fostering a climate of self-censorship. In addition, the increasingly strict enforcement, since early 2022 of *mahram* (male guardian) imposed by the Houthis in areas under their control on women's travel, has further challenged the work of female journalists.²⁰²
2. Civil society and human rights activists, journalists, and other people active on social media are primarily accused of spreading false and malicious misinformation, espionage, including for foreign entities, and disruption of public security.
3. In Yemen, there are nearly no independent media outlets, and public information is generally highly manipulated by parties to the conflict and their supporters to promulgate disinformation and misinformation that would result in increasing political leverage. Often, this results in the abduction, detention, or enforced disappearance of people engaged in the media, or online platforms.
4. During the reporting period, the Panel has investigated several cases of men and women who have been and that are currently detained or forcibly disappeared for having expressed their views online or on paper.
5. The multiple evidence gathered indicates that the Houthis use popular or relatively known figures to support their own propaganda, forcing them to sign (often blindfolded) declarations of guilt that include the spreading of false information or espionage. Another regular practice by the de facto authority, is to force the detainees, in exchange of freedom, to record videos in which they admit their responsibilities on the alleged charges. In some cases, after the video is recorded, the detainee is freed, while in other cases, the video is widely broadcasted, but the person remains in detention often for the purpose of either negotiating their release through other means. Of particular concern, the Houthis, through their specialized criminal court, have issued death sentences against the four journalists Abdelkhaliq Amran, Tawfiq Al-Mansouri, Harith Hamid, and Akram Al-Walidi.
6. The STC is also detaining, forcibly disappearing, or threatening journalists and activists who publicly criticize them and are also forced to sign or deliver confessions. Based on reports received by the Panel, the STC-affiliated forces have also abducted and forcibly disappeared many men and women who have been publicly vocal, through online videos and social media posts against their operations. Panel sources indicate that many of the abductees are held in secret detention facilities. One of the emblematic cases is the one of the journalist Ahmad Maher,²⁰³ particularly in relation to his right to a fair trial in the Specialized Criminal Court of Aden. Reportedly, since his arrest and detention by the STC-affiliated forces on 6 August 2022 until the end of February 2023 he was prevented from being brought before the court for 13 times, allegedly due to logistical impediments, partly attributed to the GoY.
7. The Panel also received reports of threats by the GoY against people who criticize its actions, including via social media and other public fora. Arrest warrants have been issued against some journalists who accused the judiciary in Ma'rib of corruption.²⁰⁴

²⁰² [2023-03-27-Freedom-of-Expression-in-Yemen-EN.pdf \(ohchr.org\)](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomofExpression/Pages/2023-03-27-Freedom-of-Expression-in-Yemen-EN.pdf).


²⁰³ S/2023/130, para. 108.

²⁰⁴ <https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/yemen-arrest-warrants-issued-against-journalists-for-investigating-alleged-corruption>.

Annex 82: Directive issued on 17 July 2023 by the Rector of Ibb University addressed to the affiliated Deans of colleges and centers for ensuring compliance of regulation on the appearance and uniform of male and female students

Figure 82.1.

Directive issued by Ibb University Rector



Source: Confidential

Appendix A

Translation of the directive issued by Ibb University Rector

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Ibb University

Ibb University

President of the
University

Office of the President of the University
Outgoing Communications Section

No.: 413 Attachments:

Date: 28 Dhu al-Hijjah A.H. 1444

Corresponding to: 16 July 2023

To: The Vice-President for Student Affairs

The Deans of Colleges and Centres

Sirs,

Subject: Standards of appearance and dress for university students

In respect of the above-mentioned subject, and having regard to the teachings of our true religion, as well as the imperative to uphold our Yemeni moral and social values and our university's values, and considering that students' appearance is something that matters to us and a reflection of their development, students in all the colleges and centres of the university must adhere to the following:

- Students must carry and clearly display their university card when they attend lectures, engage in practical studies, are in the library or engage in any activity at the university during the academic day.
- Students must maintain personal hygiene and wear clean clothes that cover the body, are not transparent or revealing, are not of extremely bright, eye-catching colours, and are not indecent. The following is strictly forbidden:

I. Males

- Male students may not enter the campus and the campuses of colleges located away from the main campus carrying a weapon of any kind. Whosoever violates this directive will be referred for investigation.
- They must not cut or style their hair in an unsuitable fashion and use light-coloured hair dyes.
- They must cut long and unclean nails.
- They must not sport tattoos, colours and piercings.
- They must not wear metal rings, earrings and chains on the neck, hands or clothing.
- They must not wear t-shirts or any inappropriate shirt that reveals the chest, or large parts of it, and the forearms.
- They must not wear tight, body-hugging trousers, trousers that sit below the waist and trousers that touch the ground.
- They must not wear any clothing that bears political, regional or sectarian slogans.

- They must not wear shoes, sportswear, shorts, tanks tops and extremely loose clothing.

II. Females

- Females must not wear tight, body-hugging or tight-waisted clothing and dresses.
- They must not wear clothing that bears decorations or political, regional, sectarian or inappropriate slogans.
- They must not sport manicures, colours or any dyes on the body and hands, as such are considered to be unclean.
- They must not have long nails and fingernail extension, which demonstrate lack of personal hygiene.
- They must not wear high heels and open shoes, which make the legs vulnerable to being pricked by contaminated needles.
- They must not wear an excessive number of accessories on their hands and legs, other than the usual accessories.
- They must not have nose piercings or use teeth decorations and coloured lenses.
- They must not use excessively bright cosmetics on the face, eyes and lips, as well as false eyelashes.

These directives shall be implemented, and implementation must be monitored on a daily basis in order to ensure compliance.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Nasr Muhammad al-Hajili

President of the University

Annex 83: Houthi's gender segregation policy: the case of the Faculty of Mass Communication of Sana'a University

1. On 17 July 2023, the Houthi-affiliated Student Forum, which reportedly replaced the Students Union of Sana'a University, published a new circular to the students of the faculty of Mass Communication.
2. According to the circular, the academic year would start on 22 July 2023 and that three days per week would be allocated for male students, namely Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, while female students would attend on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.
3. This prompted immediate reactions by students and professors who did not support this decision. Reportedly, Dr Samia Al-Aghbari, head of the journalism department of the Faculty of Mass Communication, was removed from her function because of her disagreement on this decision and was subsequently replaced with the Houthi-appointed Dr. Ali Hussein Hassan Al-Ammar.²⁰⁵

Figure 83.1.

Circular of the Houthi-affiliated Sana'a University Student Forum published on 17 July 2023



Source: Confidential

²⁰⁵ <https://twitter.com/HindAleryani/status/1686345279866359808/photo/1>.

4. The Houthi public media outlets reacted to the criticisms received on this decision. They published some articles presenting the findings of research reportedly conducted by renowned international universities such as Harvard University, alleging the devastating effects of gender mixing. Among the reported findings of the Harvard university research, a quarter of the number of female students are raped in western universities because of the policy of gender mixing.²⁰⁶ The Panel wrote to Harvard University to verify the veracity of the above-mentioned research and findings and is awaiting a response.

5. Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, Chairman of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee, publicly informed that “this decision was done in accordance with the wishes of the students, because they carry modesty, pride, and high Islamic values”.²⁰⁷ He also noted that fathers can choose if they want their daughters to study with male students, and if so, they can submit the request to the university. Multiple sources indicated that Al-Houthi is well aware that Yemeni fathers would not dare to submit such a request.

²⁰⁶ <https://althawrah.ye/archives/818419>.

²⁰⁷ https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1682753439170805760.

Annex 84: Defamation as a gender-based violence tool against Yemeni women, including diaspora women

1. The use of public defamation against Yemeni women, particularly those previously or currently involved in politics, as well as human rights activists was widely documented by the Panel during the reporting period through multiple unrelated sources and interviews with survivors.
2. In the specific context of Yemen, accusing women of being prostitutes, or performing the so-called “indecent acts”, can ruin their reputation for life creating a major stigma. This also has severe societal implications, which in some cases results in the same outcome that survivors of rape face, namely, to be disowned by their family members.
3. At the beginning of June 2023, Noura Al-Jarwi, the Director of the Coalition of Women for Peace in Yemen currently living in the UK, was subjected to public defamation through the publication of a video documentary produced by the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah TV channel, in which she is featured together with other women. The documentary aims to demonstrate that they are part, or have been forced to be part, of a “prostitution network used by the KSA in their propaganda war”. Specifically, Al-Jarwi is described as a leading figure in procuring prostitutes that would work for the Coalition, primarily to seduce their opponents. In the documentary, she is accused of recruiting other girls held in Houthi prisons to be engaged in prostitution. Al-Jarwi is a former Houthi prisoner, who was previously the undersecretary of the Houthi Minister of Youth and Sports. She is now targeted reportedly due to her active involvement in advocating the release of all women detained by the Houthis, who are mostly accused of “indecent acts” and treason. According to the information shared with the Panel, she is subjected to threats on social media, including from people reportedly affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
4. The same documentary is also featuring Samira Al-Houri,²⁰⁸ who used to be detained by the Houthis and reportedly a victim of sexual violence while in detention. She was released in 2019 and later moved to Riyadh, KSA. In April 2022, she was arrested and detained by the Saudi authorities. Upon its request, the Panel received official information that Al-Houri is currently detained on charges related to her possible affiliation with an [unspecified] terrorist group.

²⁰⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/05/yemeni-activist-samira-al-houri-revealed-houthi-sexual-abuses-detained-saudi-arabia>.

Annex 85: Houthi revision of textbooks in primary and secondary schools, including summer camps

1. The Houthis recently introduced changes in the textbooks, starting with primary education levels, in areas under their control. These changes are reflecting their ideology and political views, influenced by Shia' religious beliefs.
2. In November 2022, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Education Yahia Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi presided over the first national conference “to develop education curricula and diversification of education paths”. In his interview to Al-Masirah channel,²⁰⁹ Al-Houthi informs that the textbooks that have been used within the Yemeni education system contain multiple mistakes and inaccuracies, hence the need for an in-depth revision. The ongoing revision of the textbooks is reportedly undertaken in partnership with Yemeni and foreign specialists. According to Al-Houthi, “What is required is not an amendment, what is required is a replacement, a complete renewal [of the textbooks]”.
3. On 5 April 2023, the Head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat, used his official twitter account²¹⁰ to urgently “call on the Arab and Islamic countries to consolidate the state of enmity and discontent with the enemies of the nation, the Zionists and the Americans in their media and in the school curricula”. The same message was posted again on 20 April 2023²¹¹ and 27 June 2023.²¹²
4. During his speech at the opening of the school year in Sana'a on 22 July 2023,²¹³ Al-Mashat, informed that “the Prime Minister [Abdel Aziz bin Habtour], together with the Minister of Education [Yahia Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi], in the middle of last week, announced that the teacher's incentive will be ready, and that half of the printing of the textbook will be ready, God willing [...].”
5. The teacher's incentives referred to by Al-Mashat are the YR 30,000 that were already announced in August 2021 to be disbursed on a monthly basis to teachers starting in September of the same year.²¹⁴ The Panel was unable to independently verify whether these incentives have been paid since 2021. Nevertheless, the lack of payment of teachers' salaries since 2015 remains a major concern, which has been triggering reactions by teachers in Houthi-controlled areas, including strikes, which resulted in the replacement of teachers and other education staff with Houthi-appointed education personnel.
6. The Panel accessed some of the revised textbooks and considers the new content to be of great concern.²¹⁵ The impact in the short- and long-term of such propaganda, disinformation and misinformation can severely damage the future generations in Yemen and have major negative effects in the whole Middle East region and beyond.

²⁰⁹ The Houthi-appointed Minister of Education Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi speaks about the ongoing work on the revisions of the Yemeni school curricula <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/223870> (min. 23:18).

²¹⁰ https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1643685779628244993.

²¹¹ https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1649122766124089363.

²¹² https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/167374486886167574.

²¹³ https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1682828499105509377.

²¹⁴ <https://www.ansarullah.com/archives/453246>

²¹⁵ The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) was ratified by the Republic of Yemen in 1991. Article 29 of the Convention states that “States Parties agree that the Education of the child shall be directed to:

[...] (c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own;

(d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; [...]

7. The following are some samples from the textbooks used in Houthi-controlled areas during the summer camps held in May and June 2023, and in the school year that started in July 2023. The samples chosen are not meant to be exhaustive, but indicative of the type of changes that have been introduced by the Houthi Ministry of Education under the leadership of Yahia Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi.

Figure 85.1.

Cover pages of textbook of first level curriculum used during the summer camps held in May and June 2023. On the back cover, the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” and the message “Boycott American and Israeli goods”.



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235101>.

Figure 85.2.

Cover pages of textbook of second level curriculum used during the summer camps held in May and June 2023. On the cover page is an image of the shrine of Hussein Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi. On the back cover, the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” and the message “Boycott American and Israeli goods”.



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235101>.

Figure 85.3.

Cover of Arabic language textbook for second grade students

Source: GoY

Appendix B**Unofficial translation of the text in the cloud on the cover page of the Arabic language textbook for second grade students**

“I will seek jihad, enlightened by my book.

To make my country proud, achieving a big victory.”

Figure 85.4.

Poem “the future” included in the Arabic language textbook for second grade students



Source: GoY

Appendix C

Unofficial translation of the poem “the future” and exercise included in the Arabic language textbook for second grade students

- “1. I am a young child, I will seek a lot of knowledge
- 2. Who can tell what I will be when I become older?
- 3. Maybe I will be a doctor, or a good farmer?
- 4. Maybe I will be a novelist, or a famous journalist?
- 5. I will seek jihad, enlightened by my book.
- 6. To make my country proud, achieving a big victory.

Answer the following questions:

- 1. Why do you study?
- 2. With what will you be enlightened?
- 3. What would you like to be in the future?”

Figure 85.5.

Cover page of the textbook of Arabic language for third grade students. The picture shows a child donating to the Fund for the frontlines.



Source: GoY

Figure 85.6.

Poem in a textbook for third grade students

Source: GoY

Appendix D**Unofficial translation of the poem included in the textbook for third grade students****"We are Yemenis**

1. We are Yemenis, our high dunes did not surrender to any occupier
2. We defeated all tyrants, we forced our enemies
3. As Yemenis, we had not been inferior, and our foreheads were not humiliated
4. It is enough honour for us what the prophet said about us
5. It is enough honour for us that we brought victory to God and religion."

Figure 85.7.

“The Yemen of Heroism” in the textbook for fifth grade students

Source: Confidential

Appendix E

Translation of the poem “The Yemen of Heroism”

1. The Yemen of heroism and youth * Will remain the graveyard of the invaders
2. With its great men * Who gave their pure souls
3. Who were first in jihad * In the footsteps of the lifeboats
4. From them we learned courage * And pride and sacrifice
5. They are the followers of God who * Brought guidance and the clear proof
6. The ones who truly believe that * By God, victory is coming

By the poet Dayfallah Ahmad Salman [edited]

Figure 85.8.


Cover page of Arabic language textbook for sixth grade students



Source: Confidential

Figure 85.9.

**A poem included in the Arabic language textbook for sixth grade students, unit 12:
Our martyrs are the greatest among us**



Source: Confidential

Appendix F

Translation of “The story of Tawmar”*

Praise be to God, may He protect us from conquerors
 Hani did his duty the way it should be done
 He plunged headlong alone
 Hani’s comrades were surrounded by the enemy
 An onslaught that could only be overcome
 And another act of heroism in a war chariot
 With no armour other than faith
 The sea of fate was churning, but the youth
 Three trips did Hani make
 Remember his footprints

They who are faithful to Thee can never be conquered
 When others on the ground fell short
 Showing no hesitation in the face of danger
 They were facing destruction from all sides
 By sounding the clarion call for counterattack
 With no protection or camouflage
 A faith that was unbreakable
 Sliced through the waves like a ship
 Ammar, Miqdad and Ashtar
 And let them be your guide

*These verses are part of a long poem by Mu‘adh al-Junayd

Figure 85.10.

“The martyr Abdul Aziz Al-Rantisi” in the textbook for sixth grade students



Source: Confidential

Appendix G


Translation of “The martyr Abdulaziz Al-Rantisi”

“Who is this brave mujahid who sowed terror in the hearts of the Zionist enemies and did not let them feel comfortable and secure?

Dr. Abdulaziz bin Abdulmajid al-Rantisi was a Palestinian physician and politician and one of the founders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). He led the movement before his martyrdom. He was a scholar, poet and writer of political articles.”

Figure 85.11.

Story titled “Military manufacturing” in the textbook for sixth grade students



Source: Confidential

Appendix H


Translation of “Military manufacturing”

After Adil's family had eaten lunch, they sat and watched television. Breaking news flashed. This news report was not like other news. The family continued to watch the report with enthusiasm. Everyone became cheerful and proclaimed God's glory, rejoicing in the news.

- Ayah: What is this news that will be broadcast shortly?
- Ayman: It's the news that our drones have reached deep into enemy territory and dealt a severe blow to the coalition of brutal aggressors arrayed against our country.
- Ayah: What is meant by drone?
- Father: They are locally made aircraft that are highly autonomous because they use computer programs that allow them to collect information and monitor targets. They can process data and accurately identify and distinguish targets. They are equipped with mapping systems and accurate cameras. They carry out their tasks without the need to be in direct contact with them when flying under the control of satellite systems. Were it not for the grace God, who bestowed upon us this advanced Yemeni-made weapon, the invaders would have been able to achieve their suspect aims.
- Ayman: Are these drones effective in the face of the aggressors' enormous arsenal?
- Father: With God's help, there are many drone systems, such as Samad-3, Qasif, Rasid and others [...].

Figure 85.12.


Cover page of textbook on national education for eighth grade students. The man in the image is Hassan Abdullah Al-Mallsi, one of the Houthi leaders killed in 2016



Source: GoY

Figure 85.13.

Cover page of the Arabic language textbook for ninth grade students. The message on the flag reports: “those who love life, will live humiliated (servile)”. The implied meaning is that people should be ready to sacrifice their life for a cause



Source: Confidential

Figure 85.14.

Girls displaying a book on the “Political and cultural dimensions of the modern State” during an event for women to celebrate a Shi'a religious festivity in Hajja Governorate in July 2023



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235831>.

Annex 86: Summer camps 2023 and graduation ceremonies


1. The summer camps organized by the Houthis under the theme “Science and Jihad” and that took place between May and June 2023 reportedly saw a much higher attendance than previous years, with more than one million children reportedly enrolled. This increase is mostly attributed to the financial help that families were receiving and the threats and negative repercussions that families would be subjected to should their children not attend, including the removal from the list of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

2. Based on the evidence gathered by the Panel, children attending summer camps have been exposed to:²¹⁶

- ✓ Military training and/or military indoctrination,
- ✓ Educational activities based on textbooks that include the glorification of child combatants, discriminatory content, and a distorted narrative and interpretation of national history,
- ✓ Incitement to hatred and violence, including against Yemenis who do not support the Houthi ideology and the so-called disbelievers and traitors,
- ✓ Daily recitation (often multiple times per day) of the Houthi slogan calling for the death of the US and Israel, and curse to the Jews,
- ✓ On-site visits to cemeteries of Houthi martyrs, including child martyrs, portraying the heroic image of children who died while fighting along the Houthis.

Figure 86.1.

Copy of the announcement on a poster in the premises of a school in Sa'dah Governorate. On the upper left side, the logo “Science and Jihad”



Source: Confidential

²¹⁶ The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but it aims to give an overview of the type of activities that took place in summer camps in Houthi-controlled areas in May and June 2023.

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the announcement in the premises of a school in the Governorate of Sa'dah

“Good news – the Office of Education announces to students and parents in all directorates of the Governorate that any male/female graduate of summer schools for this year 1444 AH [2023 AD] will be exempted from registration fees in public and private schools at the beginning of the next school year in support and encouragement from the Office to them.”

Figure 86.2.

Brigadier General Yahya Saree, spokesperson for the Houthi forces, inspects the summer camp class in Al-Nahda School in Sana'a in May 2023. He was briefed on the progress of the educational process and summer programmess for the students



Source: <https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1658074100173099010/photo/1>.

Figure 86.3.

Children attending a summer camp in Amran Governorate in May 2023



Source: Confidential

Figure 86.4.

Children in a classroom attending a summer camp in Amran Governorate in May 2023. On the back cover of the textbooks, the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”



Source: Confidential

Figure 86.5.

Children in a classroom attending a summer camp in Ibb Governorate in May 2023 reciting the Houthi slogan “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”.



Source: Confidential

Figure 86.6.

Summer camp classrooms in Ma'rib Governorate in May 2023

Source: Confidential

Figure 86.7.

Summer camp daytrip held in June 2023. From the video posted on Al-Masirah channel titled “An entertaining and cultural trip for students of summer centers in Al-Jawf to Sa'dah”. Students visited various sites, including cemeteries of Houthi martyrs



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/>.

Figure 86.8.

Children reciting in front of a mock Quds-2 cruise missile during the summer camp closing ceremony in Nahda school, Al-Thawra district, Sana'a Governorate in June 2023



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235067/>.

Figure 86.9.

Group of children holding a banner with the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” during one of the summer camp activities in Hudaydah in May 2023



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3242946.htm>.

Figure 86.10.

Tweet from the director of the Office of the Spokesperson of the Houthi forces, sharing the video of a child, son of a Houthi martyr, delivering a speech in support of the Houthis during the graduation ceremony of a summer camp in the district of Nehm, in Sana'a Governorate in June 2023. In his speech, the child committed to following his father's path by fighting with the Houthis

← Tweet

 أمين أحمد حيان Ameen Hayyan 
@ameanhayan ...

شاهد كلمة أحد أبناء الشهداء في حفل التخرج من المراكز الصيفية بمديرية نهم ..
كلماته تهز الوجدان وتحبس الأنفاس وتكشف مدى الوعي الذي يتحلى به أبناءنا خريجو المراكز الصيفية.

Translated from Arabic by Google
Watch the speech of one of the sons of the martyrs at the graduation ceremony from the summer centers in the district of Nehm.



Source: <https://twitter.com/ameanhayan/status/1672322270646116356>.

Figure 86.11.

Girls reciting the Houthi slogan at a graduation ceremony in Sana'a Governorate on 24 June 2023



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235089/>

Figure 86.12.

A young girl receiving her summer camp graduation diploma in Sana'a Governorate in June 2023 next to the banner with the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235089/>.

Figure 86.13.

Art exhibition of the students' handicrafts and sculptures at the closure of a summer camp in Sana'a Governorate in June 2023



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235089/>.

Figure 86.14.

Art exhibition at the closure of a summer camp in Bani Al-Harith district in Sana'a in June 2023. In addition to the Houthi logo, this image shows the logo of the summer school campaign “Science and Jihad”.



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3248522.htm>.

Figure 86.15.

Summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana'a on 19 June 2023, which was attended by the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat. On the first row, a young child is seen carrying a fake weapon



Source: <https://twitter.com/i/status/1670889126214660096>.

Figure 86.16.

The head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat attends the summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana'a on 19 June 2023




Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/YemenPresidency2/posts/pfbid02qFgsCRiSsDNkVfmHEWDu2KuCpDPTzxPmcDAVKtMYmhkxm51NC2D2SjWTWnDdrSvCl>.

Figure 86.17.

Summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana'a on 19 June 2023, which was attended by the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat. On the walls in the background, photos of Houthi martyrs who died in the conflict, including men and children



Source: <https://twitter.com/hussein haze b/status/1672343027380019200/photo/2>.

Figure 86.18.

Summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana'a on 19 June 2023, which was attended by the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat. On the walls in the background, photos of Houthi martyrs who died in the conflict, including men and children



Source:

<https://www.facebook.com/YemenPresidency2/posts/pfbid02qFgsCRiSsDNkVfmHEWDu2KuCpDPTzxPmcDAVKtMYmhkxm51NC2D2SjWTWnDdrSvCl>.

Figure 86.19.

Summer camp conclusion celebrations held in Ma'rib Governorate on 17 June 2023. Children as seen marching and dancing on the American and Israeli flags



Source: <https://www.masirahtv.net/post/234715/>.

Annex 87: Battle for supremacy between CBY, Sana'a and CBY, Aden: Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

Houthi, acting through CBY, Sana'a, and the GoY, acting through the CBY, Aden, continue to adopt measures that further divide the financial institutions. The administrative bifurcation is compounding institutional challenges and adversely impacting the economic stability of Yemen.

a) Freezing of accounts of 12 entities by CBY, Aden

As a result of the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation by the GoY ([S/2023/130](#) para. 11 and annex 4), based on Decision No. 17 dated 1 December 2022 of the Public Prosecutor, the CBY, Aden, on 6 December 2022, froze accounts and banned dealings with 12 entities and companies, located in Houthi-controlled areas (figure 87.1). It also listed these 12 entities in the blacklist for their alleged involvement in money laundering and terrorist financing.

Figure 87.1.

Copy of Circular dated 6 December 2022 issued by CBY, Aden



Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Circular dated 6 December 2022 issued by CBY, Aden

Central bank of Yemen

Head Office, Aden

Ref. 932/CBY/

Date. 6/12/2022

Subject: Freezing accounts and prohibiting dealing with individuals and entities

With reference to the above subject and to Public Prosecution Resolution No. (17) of 2022 AD dated 1/12/2022 AD regarding the inclusion of individuals and entities in the terrorist list, and based on Article No. (17) - Paragraph (b) of Law No. (1) of 2010 AD and its amendments regarding combating Money laundering and terrorist financing, you must freeze all accounts and prohibit commercial and financial transactions with individuals and entities specified in the aforementioned decision and include them in your blacklists, these are:

1. Sam Oil Company for Trade and Oil Services (Saddam bin Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Faqih and Zaid bin Ali bin Yahya al-Sharafi).
2. Al Zahraa Company for Trade and Agencies (Nabil bin Abdullah bin Ali Al-Wazir).
3. Fuel Oil Company for importing oil derivatives (Ismail bin Ibrahim Al Wazir & Qusai bin Ibrahim Al Wazir).
4. Salam Rod Company (Zaid Bin Ali Bin Yahya Al Sharafi).
5. Abkar Oil Services Company (Abdullah bin Abkar Abdul Bari).
6. Al Faqih International Company for Trade, Import and Oil Services Ltd. (Saddam bin Ahmed bin Mohammed).
7. Oil Company (Zaid bin Ali bin Yahya Al Sharafi).
8. Abbot Trading Co., Ltd. (Ali Ahmed Daghshan).
9. Black Gold Company (Ali bin Nasser Qursha).
10. Al 'Awadi Trading Group Company (Zaid Zaid Al-'Awadi and his partners).
11. Al Hammadi Trading and Refrigeration Company Ltd. (Ali Mohammed Mukred Al Hammadi).
12. Atlantic Oil for importing oil derivatives (Ahmed Mohammed Salih Al-Baydani)

b) Countermeasures by the Houthis: Circulars issued by CBY, Sana'a

i. Five Circulars of 25 December 2022

CBY, Sana'a issued five circulars on 25 December 2022 directing the banks, traders of basic commodities, and traders dealing with wood and steel not to deal with "entities carrying out banking business without licenses from CBY- Sana'a" (figure 87.2-87.5)²¹⁷. The circulars mentioned the following banks as those which were not licensed by CBY Sana'a:

- Branches of National Bank of Yemen operating in the GoY-controlled areas
- Branches of Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank (CAC) in Aden
- Al-Qutaibi Islamic Microfinance Bank

²¹⁷ As informed by CBY, Aden to the Panel.

- Aden Microfinance Bank

The exchange companies located in the Houthi areas did not provide any data related to their activities in the areas controlled by the Houthis since the issuance of the circular that prohibits the submission of data to CBY, Aden. This has made it difficult for this central bank to exercise effective regulatory control over the exchange companies, some of which are alleged to have been involved in activities that violate the sanctions regime.

CBY, Aden had introduced a transparent system of online auction to sell foreign currencies in the market. This measure helped, to some extent, in stabilising the foreign exchange rates in GoY-controlled areas. In order to upset this auction system, CBY, Sana'a restricted the banks, operating in the areas under its control, from participating in this online auction system. The Panel was informed by CBY, Aden that, as a result of these directions by CBY, Sana'a, the weekly foreign exchange transactions that amounted to USD 30 million, have come down to a range of about USD 10-15 million per week. Only a few entities are now participating in the auctions, in contrast to about 90 entities that used to participate prior to this directive from CBY, Sana'a. The circulars stipulated the following conditions, which, in effect, weakened the operation of the online auctions:

- Traders are allowed to participate in the foreign exchange auctions held by CBY, Aden only to the extent of the amount equal to their total sales in the areas under GoY's control.
- They are not allowed to participate to cover their sales in the areas under the control of the Houthis.
- Participation in auctions must only be through the branches.²¹⁸

Despite opposition from the exchange companies, CBY, Sana'a issued Decision No. 4 of 2023, requiring these companies to deposit 25 per cent of their capital with it as guarantee (figure 87.6). This measure severely affected the liquidity as well as the operational capability of the exchange companies.²¹⁹

The effect of all these measures by CBY, Sana'a was felt in GoY-areas as the foreign exchange rates have started moving up again. Such adversarial economic policy decisions would further fragment the economic and banking system and may derail the ongoing peace process in Yemen.

²¹⁸ Branches operating in areas under the control of CBY, Aden.

²¹⁹ Information shared by the CBY, Aden with the Panel.

Figure 87.2.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting dealing with four notified banks

Source: CBY, Aden

Figure 87.3.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting traders in wood and steel not to deal with four notified banks



This document is a circular issued by the Foreign Exchange Unit in CBY- Sana'a to the traders of wood and steel, entitled "entities carrying out banking business without licenses from CBY- Sana'a". The circular prevents dealing with:

- National Bank of Yemen branches in the areas of the legitimate government.
- Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank (CAC) branches in Aden.
- Al-Qutaibi Islamic Microfinance Bank.
- Aden Microfinance Bank.

نسخة مع التحية للأخوة

- الاستاذ/ المحافظ
- وزارة الصناعة والتغذية
- مصلحة الضرائب
- لفلاح الرزنة على السوق
- الادارة العامة للشئون القانونية

Source: CBY, Aden

Figure 87.4.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a to traders in wood and steel regarding foreign exchange auctions by CBY, Aden



Source: CBY, Aden

Figure 87.5.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting traders in basic commodities not to deal with four notified banks



This document is a circular issued by the Foreign Exchange Unit in CBY- Sana'a to the traders of basic commodities, entitled "entities carrying out banking business without licenses from CBY- Sana'a". The circular prevents dealing with:

- National Bank of Yemen branches in the areas of the legitimate government.
- Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank (CAC) branches in Aden.
- Al-Qutabi Islamic Microfinance Bank.
- Aden Microfinance Bank.

- نسخة مع التحية للأخوة:
 - الأستان/الصافرط
 - وزارة الصناعة والتجارة
 - مصلحة الجمارك
 - قطاع الرقابة على البنوك
 - الإدارية العامة للشؤون التجارية

Source: CBY, Aden

Figure 87.6.

Copy of Decision No. 4 issued by CBY, Sana'a



Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix B: Unofficial translation of Decision No. 4 issued by CBY, Sana'a

CBY Governor Decision No. 4 of 1444 AH regarding the Capital of Exchange Companies / institutions and the Cash Guarantees

It has been decided:

Article (1): The minimum amount of the paid-up capital for licensing exchange business shall be as follows:

	Category	Capital
1	Exchange companies operating local money transfer networks	1,250,000,000
2	Exchange companies	500,000,000
3	Exchange institutions in areas where financial services are available	100,000,000
4	Exchange institutions in areas where financial services are not available (operating in locations at least 1 km away from any bank branch, company, or licensed exchange institution)	50,000,000

Article (2): Each exchange company and institution should deposit a cash guarantee in YER in CBY equivalent to 25% of the paid-up capital indicated in article (1) of this decision as a guarantee of compliance with laws and regulatory instructions.

Article (3): Licensed exchange institutions are granted a period of eight months, starting from the date of issuance of this decision, to raise the paid-up capital to the minimum amount indicated in Article (1) of this decision.

Article (4): Licensed exchange companies and institution are given a period of 8 months, starting from the date of issuance of this decision, to deposit the cash guarantee as indicated in Article (1) of this decision.

CBY Sana'a

30/04/2023

Governor

Annex 88: Prohibition order by CBY, Sana'a on banks and exchange companies against registration with or linking to financial remittance networks and systems of CBY, Aden

On 26 January 2023, CBY, Aden issued a circular directing all exchange companies and establishments to complete the registration process with CBY, Aden and establish a link with the consolidated funds network via the link: www.unmoneye.com:8000. The entities were directed to sign the contract and register their agents with the MONEX financial transfer system by 31 January 2023. Failure to do so would result in the imposition of fines by CBY, Aden (figure 88.1).

Reacting to this move, CBY, Sana'a issued the retaliatory circular no. 5 dated 29 January 2023, prohibiting exchange companies to register with or connect to any financial remittance networks or systems with any other central bank in Yemen without obtaining permission from CBY, Sana'a (figure 88.2).

Circular dated 26 January 2023 issued by CBY, Aden

Figure 88.1

Copy of the Circular dated 26 January 2023 issued by CBY, Aden



Source: CBY, Aden

**Appendix A: Unofficial translation of the Circular dated 26 January 2023 by the CBY,
Aden**

Translated from Arabic

Central Bank of Yemen
Head Office - Aden

Banking Supervision Sector
Department of oversight of non-banking financial institutions

Date: 26 January 2023
No.:

Circular addressed to all exchange companies/establishments operating in the Republic

To: Exchange companies and establishments

Sirs,

Re: Registration and link with the consolidated funds network

In reference to the above subject: All exchange companies and establishments must complete the registration process and establish a link with the consolidated funds network in a timely fashion via the link: www.unmoneye.com: 8000. The required forms must be filled out so that a company can complete the rest of the procedures for signing contracts and registering agents with the MONEX financial transfer system by 31 January 2023. Please note that fines will be imposed on those who miss that deadline.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Mansur Abdulkarim Rajih
Director, the Banking Supervision Sector

cc:

The Deputy Governor

Figure 88.2.

Copy of the Circular No. 5 dated 29 January 2023 issued by CBY, Sana'a



Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A: Unofficial Translation of the Circular No 5 dated 29 January 2023

Translated from Arabic

Central Bank of Yemen

Head Office

Sana'a

Banking Supervision Sector

Office of the Director

Date: 7 Rajab A.H. 1444

Corresponding to: 29 January 2023

No.: *qaf-ra'* 110

Circular No. 5 (2023) concerning registration with or linking to financial remittance networks and systems

To: Exchange companies and establishments

Sirs,

It is strictly prohibited to register with or connect to any financial remittance networks or systems in the Republic of Yemen without obtaining prior approval from the Banking Supervision Sector of the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Sami Ali **al-Siyaghi**
Director, Banking Supervision Sector

cc:

- The Deputy Governor

Annex 89: Freezing of bank accounts, Dual currency system and Exchange rate of YR**Freezing of bank accounts**

The Panel has received information that CBY, Sana'a regularly sends directives to banks, with headquarters in Sana'a, to freeze and confiscate funds in the accounts of individuals and entities opposed to the Houthis. However, for fear of reprisals by the Houthis, these bank officials are reluctant to reveal the details to the Panel.

Dual currency system

The Houthis through CBY, Sana'a continue to prohibit the use of currency notes printed by CBY, Aden, declaring them as counterfeit. This has resulted in a peculiar situation in which domestic trade between the Houthi-controlled areas and the GoY-controlled areas are carried out using Saudi Riyal (SR), US Dollar and Yemeni Riyal (YR) (of the non-prohibited series)²²⁰ carrying high premia. This has hampered the free flow of goods within Yemen and has led to uncontrolled inflation in GoY-controlled areas.

Exchange rate of YR

With the increase in imports through the Hudaydah port, the difference in the exchange rate of YR between the GoY-controlled areas and the Houthi-controlled areas added a new dimension to the economic impoverishment of the GoY. The exchange rate in GoY-controlled areas has been very volatile over the years. For example, at the end of 2019, one USD was equivalent to YR 591, while at the end of 2021, it reached YR 1,700 (Table 89.1). An analysis of the exchange rates in the past eight months indicates an alarming upward trend. While in December 2022, one USD was equivalent to around YR 1,100, during the period from January to May 2023, it remained in the range of YR 1,200. However, in June 2023, the rate crossed YR 1,300, and in July it crossed 1400 raising an alarm in the political circles in the GoY areas. The exchange rate in the GoY-controlled areas, most of the time, remains almost double than in the Houthi-controlled areas. The exchange rate between the YR and the USD has been relatively stable in Houthi areas but volatile and depreciated in GoY areas, the latter linked to reduced government foreign exchange earnings from oil. The high exchange rates strain the GoY's ability to import essential goods at reasonable prices, thereby pushing the problem of food insecurity to deeply concerning levels.

The following are the monthly averages of exchange rates in Aden and Sana'a from January 2021 to July 2023.

²²⁰ See annex 26 of <https://undocs.org/en/S/2022/50>.


Table 89.1

Comparison of monthly averages of exchange rates (YR/USD) in Sana'a²²¹ and Aden from January 2021 to July 2023

<i>Year</i>	<i>Month</i>	<i>Average Exchange Rate in Sana'a</i>	<i>Average Aden Rate in</i>
<i>2021</i>	January	592	864
	February	595	868
	March	600	853
	April	596	890
	May	594	934
	June	596	946
	July	597	1005
	August	598	1024
	September	600	1184
	October	600	1354
	November	600	1617
	December	600	857
<i>2022</i>	January	602	1089
	February	603	1220
	March	605	1250
	April	563	975
	May	559	1008
	June	558	1090
	July	NA	1137.07
	August	NA	1154.47
	September	NA	1134.89
	October	NA	1146.87
	November	NA	1151.03
	December	NA	1172.48
<i>2023</i>	January	NA	1239.03
	February	NA	1243.95
	March	NA	1246.18
	April	NA	1209.11
	May	NA	1,279.40
	June	NA	1,354.99
	July	NA	1,414.47

Source: CBY, Aden

²²¹ Although CBY, Aden did not provide average exchange rate prevailing in Sana'a from July to July 2023, information received by the Panel from other sources indicated that the average exchange rate during this period mostly remained around 550.



Source: Graph prepared by the Panel based on data from CBY, Aden

Difference in the exchange rates for calculation of customs duty

Another facet of the problem is the wide variance in the exchange rates determined for the purpose of calculation of customs duties on imports. While the customs duty is calculated in Houthi-controlled ports by adopting the exchange rate of YR 250 per one USD, the rate in the GoY-controlled ports for non-essential goods was increased in January 2023 from YR 500 per one USD to YR 750 per one USD. As a result, the importers pay more customs duty for their imports through Aden and other GoY-controlled ports. With the relaxation of restrictions on imports through the Hudaydah port, the business community now prefers to import their goods through this port, as they have to pay less customs duty on imports and the bulk of their imported goods can be sold in Houthi areas, where about 80 per cent of the Yemeni citizens reside. This shift in the imports of goods from Aden to Hudaydah, on account of differential customs exchange rates, has further dented the revenue of the GoY. Since the market rates of exchange in GoY-areas are in the range of YR 1,200-1,400 per one USD, the GoY, as it is, loses revenue even after fixing the customs exchange rate at YR 750 per one USD. If the GoY reduces the customs exchange rate below YR 750, it will lose revenue, and if the GoY does not reduce the customs exchange rate, imports will shift from Aden to Hudaydah, which will result in loss of revenue. Therefore, this exchange rate war between the two areas of Yemen is affecting the economic stability of Yemen.

Annex 90: Documents relating to CAC Bank case

Figure 90.1.

Copy of Circular 70 (2021) dated 19 May 2021 issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting dealing with CAC Bank



تعيمير رقم (70) لسنة ٢٠٢١م
موجهة إلى كافة شركات ومنشآت الصرافة

المحترمون

الأخوة/ شركات ومنشآت الصرافة

بعد التحية؛؛؛

يمنع الربط أو التعامل مع خدمة " كاك حواله " أو أي خدمة تحويلات مالية تحمل اسم " كاك بنك " غير مشغلة من قبل المركز الرئيسي لـ كاك بنك (بنك التسليف التعاوني والزراعي - صنعاء).

وتقروا ثباتنا؛؛؛

سامي علي السيفي
وكيل قطاع الرقابة على البنوك

- نسخة مع التحية:**
- للأستاذ/حافظ
 - للأستاذ/نائب الحافظ
 - للأخوة/ كاك بنك المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

Source: Confidential

**Appendix A: Unofficial translation of the Circular dated 19 May 2021 issued by CBY,
Sana'a prohibiting dealing with CAC Bank**

Central Bank of Yemen

Head Office

Sana'a

Banking Supervision Sector

General Department of Foreign Exchange and Exchange Companies Affairs

No. 191

Date 19 May 2021

Circular No 70 (2021) for the year 2021 AD

Addressed to exchange companies and institutions

Linking or dealing with “CAC Hawala” service or any financial transfer service under the name of “CAC Bank” that is not operated from the main centre of CAC Bank (Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank – Sana'a) is prohibited.

Signed and Seal

Circular No. 2084

CBY, Aden informed the Panel that the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Co-operation, Sana'a issued circular no. 2084. In order to maintain the continuation of the implementation of monetary programmes, projects, and activities without any obstacles, the international organizations, and others, were directed not to deal with banks and exchange companies that are not authorised by CBY, Sana'a. This directive is implemented from 1 January 2023 (figure 90.2).

Figure 90.2.

Copy of the Circular No. 2084 issued by the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation, Sana'a



Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix B: Unofficial translation of the Circular No. 2084 issued by the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation, Sana'a

Presidency of Republic

Supreme Council

For management and coordination of Humanitarian Affairs & International Cooperation

General Secretariat

To/ Representatives of international organizations, agencies, programs and funds

Circular regarding banks that are not authorized by the CBY to deal with organizations

Based on the memorandum no. 170 / m-m dated 11/23/2022 issued by CBY – Sana'a, which includes banks and exchange companies that are not authorized to deal with agencies, funds, international / UN organizations, civil society organizations, in addition to entities that are not authorized to conduct business in general. Those banks and exchange companies are as follows:

- 1- National Bank of Yemen
- 2- Tadhamon Bank
- 3- Al-Qutaibi Islamic Bank for Microfinance – (not licensed to operate in banking business)
- 4- Cooperative and Agriculture Credit Bank – Aden branch
- 5- Al-Kuraiimi Islamic Bank
- 6- Aden Bank for Microfinance - (not licensed to operate in banking business)
- 7- Arab Bank
- 8- Saba Islamic Bank

As for exchange companies, all of them are not authorized to contract with organizations directly for the purposes of distributing humanitarian cash assistance. Exchange companies can contribute to the implementation of these works through subcontracts with banks that are authorized to deal with the organizations.

Therefore, starting from 1/1/2023, we hope that everyone will work and adhere to what was mentioned above, and not deal with unauthorized banks, as well as companies that do not have contracts with the authorized banks in dealing with agencies, funds, international / UN organizations, and civil society organizations, in order to maintain the continuation of the implementation of monetary programs, projects and activities without any obstacles.

Secretary General

Figure 90.3.

Letter rejecting CAC's proposal

Source: Confidential

Figure 90.4.

CAC's reply to Social Fund for Development



Source: Confidential

Annex 91: Law banning all types of interest

1. Despite serious opposition from the banking and trade circles, in March 2023 the Houthis adopted “The Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act”, a new law banning all types of interest on banking and commercial transactions such as deposits, loans, Letters of Credit, and Letters of Guarantee. The new law also repeals the savings deposits provisions of the Post and Postal Savings Act without suggesting alternative savings schemes or returns from such deposits that were offered by the Post Office as a non-banking institution.
2. For enforcing the provisions of this law, the following officials have been granted the status of judicial police officers pursuant to a decision of the Public Prosecutor: a) designated employees of CBY, Sana'a; b) designated employees of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Trade; c) the Minister of Finance; and d) the Minister of Industry and Trade. Under this new law, whosoever violates the provisions of articles 3, 4 and 7 shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than six months and not more than four years and fined not less than YR 100,000 and not more than YR 3 million.
3. According to various stakeholders, this new law will sharply divide the banking and commercial activities in the two areas of Yemen, and the new regime, when fully implemented, will completely ruin the economy of Yemen.²²² The banking community of Yemen strongly feels that since the new law applies to all loans and facilities that were granted before the date on which it enters into effect, this is contrary to article 104 of the Yemeni Constitution, which provides that laws cannot be applied retroactively without the approval of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. These bankers are of the opinion that the law will give rise to disputes in relation to many banking and commercial transactions, and many judicial disputes will arise between commercial banks and depositors concerning the way in which deposits are put to use. Further, there will be confrontations between the State and the government, on the one hand, and the local and foreign banks, on the other, that have invested their funds in treasury bills issued by CBY, Sana'a.
4. As per information received by the Panel, Yemen, like many other countries, finances its deficit by overdrawing up to 92 per cent of the amount from its central bank, or by raising funds through the issuance of treasury bills, or other such instruments. Since this will be prohibited under the new law, the bankers feel that it will no longer be possible to finance the ongoing general budget deficit, which amounted to approximately YR 905 billion in 2015. It is also argued that external sources of financing, such as foreign loans and deposits (without interest), will dry up, as will some categories of grants and foreign aid. The authorities would not be able to pay up the internal public debt, which as of June 2022 stood at YR 3,449 billion, and the outstanding external public debt, which amounted to USD 6.6 billion. As per the letter²²³ sent by the Yemeni bankers to the Houthis, which was seen by the Panel, the following are some of the adverse outcomes of the new law:
 - i. Bank financing, including loans and current facilities available from commercial banks in the form of loans and facilities, will cease. For example, it is estimated that such financing amounted to YR 466 billion in 2018, whereas it had reached YR 539 billion in 2013. Banks will thus suddenly lose their largest source of revenue, namely interest, which comprises up to 81 per cent of the revenue of certain Yemeni banks.
 - ii. Traditional commercial banks, which currently provide the bulk of bank financing and cover business transactions, will lose their role. Current deposits amounting to YR 3,750.7 billion, of which YR 2,271.4 billion are frozen deposits from 2016 and earlier, pose a challenge to the commercial and Islamic banks as they are unable to allow clients to

²²² <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/770/93/PDF/N2277093.pdf?OpenElement>
para 65-68 and annex 21.

²²³ Reference to ‘Central Bank’ in this letter, refers to the CBY, Sana'a.

withdraw their deposits. The following table summarizes the current balance positions of the funds deposited with Yemeni banks:

<i>Deposit/Account in YR</i>	<i>Balance (June 2022)</i>	<i>Frozen (2016 and earlier)</i>
Current (on demand)	889 billion	408.3 billion
Term deposits	874.3 billion	732.5 billion
Savings deposits	292.6 billion	215.9 billion
Deposits in foreign currencies	1632.1 billion	845.5 billion
Earmarked deposits	62.8 billion	48.9Billion

- iii. Microfinance activities which are used for supporting small businesses will stop.
- iv. It will be difficult to continue processing transactions with correspondent banks abroad.
- v. Since the returns from the foreign investment holdings of Yemeni banks (in the form of term deposits or investments in debt instruments) will be prohibited, commercial banks will be forced to convert those holding into current deposits without returns and deprive themselves of the returns generated by those holdings. The foreign investment holdings of traditional commercial banks of Yemen amounted to approximately YR 343 billion in June 2022.
- vi. Opportunities for foreign direct investment in projects will disappear.
- vii. Prohibiting payment of interest will have major repercussions in case of debts. The State, banks and the business sector have neither repaid their debts for years, nor paid the interest on those debts. The aforesaid representation of the bankers mentions the following debts:
- viii. The current debt owed to the Central Bank [Sana'a] by the government amounted to YR 5,561 billion as of June 2022.
- ix. Debt owed to the Central Bank [Sana'a] by public institutions amounted to YR 309 billion as of May 2022.
- x. Debt in the form of treasury bills and bonds owed to commercial banks by the government amounted to YR 1,787 billion as of May 2022.
- xi. Debt in the form of bank deposits owed to commercial banks by the Central Bank [Sana'a] amounted to YR 688 billion in 2021.
- xii. Debt owed to depositors by commercial banks amounts to YR 3,750 billion, including frozen deposits of approximately YR 2,271 billion prior to 2016.
- xiii. Debt in the form of existing loans owed by customers to commercial banks amounted to approximately YR 284 billion in 2022.
- xiv. The external debt of the State amounted to USD 6.6 billion in 2022.
- xv. In addition, there are debts owed by public institutions and the non-banking sector to the government, including the debts of the pension funds and the postal fund.

5. According to CBY, Aden, since the Houthis have not been paying salaries to the civil servants for several years, a large number of them relied on the interest revenue received from their deposits in the banks and post office as a source of their livelihood. CBY, Aden argues that prohibiting citizens' access to this revenue will exacerbate the humanitarian situation and increase poverty levels in Yemen. The Panel was further informed that. CBY, Sana'a never paid any interest on the treasury bills and now has converted these bills to current account deposits, as a result of which they will not be paying any interest on these deposits. (Figure 91.1)

Figure 91.1.

Treasury Bills and other deposits by the banks with CBY, Sana'a

#	Bank Name	Branch	Comparative balance statement of treasury bill, reserves and deposit balances as of 30/04/2023														
			Treasury Bills			Islamic Sukuk			Certificate of Deposit			Reserves			Deposits Balances per Bank		
			YER	YER	YER	YER	YER	YER	YER	YER	Total	YER	USD in its YER equivalent (rate 1225.5)	Total	YER	USD in its YER equivalent (rate 1225.5)	Total
1	Kuraimi Islamic Bank - Microfinance	Aden	-	\$1,000,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	28,400,508,485	301,680,013	29,158,116,484	305,964,422,897	495,941,968,064	711,308,396,461	
2	International Bank of Yemen	Aden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,836,922,914	218,812,933	2,054,915,657	325,434,814,377	779,306,788,130	1,194,741,682,507	
3	Tadhamon Bank	Aden	-	\$1,500,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	410,278,928	1,175,826,796	1,586,100,724	185,574,649,540	1,824,481,515,857	1,210,256,385,397	
4	Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrein	Aden	-	4,000,000,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,656,866,797	21,655,987	3,698,532,784	21,853,748,037	180,987,385,634	382,346,513,631	
5	Arab Bank	Aden	226,260,471,934	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,481,165	11,114,595,056	11,120,079,217	260,534,415,206	230,745,111,221	469,279,526,427	
6	National Bank of Yemen	Aden	208,500,900,000	-	\$7,000,000,000	15,511,460,000	31,456,134,000	46,967,594,000	208,716	-	123,877,537,851	213,877,740,586	213,115,829,093	347,746,586,480	560,862,415,573	-	
7	Oxydiall Microfinance	Aden	-	-	-	5,520,211,000	787,996,500	6,308,207,500	104,725,956,915	1,004,756,298	165,790,713,213	158,166,477,175	30,288,559,446	138,455,416,517	-	-	
8	Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank	Aden	33,000,000,000	-	-	5,058,455,000	3,904,816,000	8,063,381,000	8,032,386,142	1,867,133,013	30,899,517,135	347,494,580,075	538,316,985,623	885,871,545,577	-		
9	Yemen and Kuwait Bank	Sana'a	27,870,767,264	-	-	7,862,303,000	23,850,681,000	31,712,984,000	5,451,400,219	5,719,654	5,457,111,873	156,895,624,736	422,791,281,376	538,796,504,492	-		
10	Kuraimi Islamic Bank	Aden	-	10,000,000,000	-	1,195,245,000	-	1,195,245,000	199,556,229	-	199,556,229	23,632,849,386	54,714,659,567	76,348,508,913	-		
11	All Arsal Microfinance Bank	Aden	-	-	-	882,888,000	2,674,041,000	3,556,929,000	464,371,305	3,634,150,682	4,099,523,587	14,362,623,573	30,339,890,109	45,302,514,082	-		
12	Sabk Islamic Bank	Aden	-	-	-	6,390,929,000	20,669,281,000	27,040,222,000	5,281,037,718	5,648,886,257	10,099,913,995	-	259,935,053,207	-	-	-	
13	Yemen Commercial Bank	Aden	-	-	-	5,650,000,000	-	-	-	171,763,558	21,046,549	211,858,449	158,142,214,646	170,718,855,586	286,881,072,732	-	
14	Yemen-Gulf Bank (2018)	Aden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	302,890,615	37,821,344	(265,389,771)	3,676,441,962	5,981,289,750	9,657,751,652	-	
15	Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Aden	-	-	-	253,591,000	1,157,901,500	1,421,492,500	-	-	-	-	-	400,533,509,537	-	-	
16	Aden Bank for Microfinance	Aden	-	-	-	14,364,620,000	14,883,697,500	29,188,337,500	51,772,841,207	15,512,599,241	67,285,753,549	224,687,678,751	170,246,238,806	-	-	-	
17	Bir Dewali Bank for Microfinance	Aden	-	-	-	367,490,000	91,912,500	459,402,500	9,352,105,050	18,387,500	6,170,547,550	5,682,270,805	916,363,338	6,632,574,343	-		
18	Hudaymat Commercial Bank	Aden	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38,260,000,000	-	38,260,000,000	90,944,388	188,418,449	479,349,437	-	
19	Rafidain Bank	Sana'a	-	34,524,880,000	-	22,148,000	9,804,000	31,952,000	5,415,401,543	40,826,442	5,456,227,985	844,916,213	16,047,151,385	16,892,069,518	-		
20	Gulf National Bank (2018)	Sana'a	20,639,939,574	-	-	594,448,000	3,453,459,000	4,047,967,000	2,292,246,449	5,655,738,420	7,947,984,849	8,500,020,039	36,213,427,399	44,733,437,438	-		
21	United Bank (2018)	Sana'a	16,392,227,718	-	-	998,815,000	2,113,987,500	3,073,362,500	154,423,585	3,994,119,016	4,390,542,595	13,541,259,737	35,615,028,484	49,176,270,221	-		
22	Yemen Islamic Bank (2018)	Sana'a	-	-	-	712,774,000	2,772,081,000	3,484,855,000	-	528,099,310	528,099,310	8,314,349,932	25,864,789,482	34,181,158,303	-		
		Aden	-	-	-	-	-	-	(64,787,287)	77,372,494	12,585,227	-	-	-	-	-	
			1,680,155,007,634	230,024,880,000	42,050,000,000	145,875,463,000	380,798,389,500	527,673,262,500	681,153,257,767	329,180,582,807	1,010,333,858,573	2,381,515,770,895	4,693,085,086,594	7,075,200,356,384	-		

Source: CBY, Aden

Annex 92: Houthi Circular Ref. 656-110-MF dated 8 Aug 2023 regarding Mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points.

Figure 92.1.

Houthi Circular Ref. 656-110-MF dated 8 Aug 2023 regarding Mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points.



Source: Confidential

Appendix A

Translation of Houthi Circular Ref. 656-110-MF dated 8 Aug 2023 regarding Mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points.



Translated from Arabic

Ref.: 656-110-MF

Yemeni Republic

Ministry of Finance

Muharram A.H. 1445

(6 August A.D. 2023) □

Subject: Mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points

Sir,

I write in the light of the incentive mechanism that has been put in place at the port of Hudaydah for the import of goods, the purpose of which is to alleviate the burden on consumers and protect traders from the arbitrary measures that were being enacted in occupied areas.

We are mindful of the need to implement public policy and encourage and sustain imports through the port of Hudaydah, prevent the goods from spoiling, and keep to land crossings except when necessary and in accordance with the policies determined by the Supreme Economic Committee.

Accordingly, from 21 Muharram A.H. 1445 (8 August 2023), taxes and other revenue on all goods imported through land borders and at the port of Hudaydah shall be assessed at a cash rate of 100 per cent of the total customs value. The customs rate shall remain at 50 per cent of the total customs value for all goods arriving at land customs points through land or sea crossings of occupied areas.

For appropriate action.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Rashid Abbud Abu Luhum

Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for economic affairs
Ministry of Finance

Head, Customs Authority

C.c.:

H.E. the President of Supreme Political Council
H.E. the Prime Minister
The members of the Supreme Economic Committee
Head, Tax Authority

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Annex 93: Oil Sector

1. The oil sector was the worst hit by the conflict.

Ras Isa port

2. Because of the ongoing conflict, export of oil from Ras Isa port has stopped since March 2015. This port used to receive oil from several productive sectors in Ma'rib and Shabwa namely sector-18 Safer, sector S1 Dames, sector S2 Al-Uqla, sector-5 Jannah, and sector-9 Malik that is located on the west of Al-Masila and connected through the oil pipeline from SAFER to Ras-Isa's export terminal on the Red Sea.²²⁴ This pipeline suffered repeated sabotage attacks in the past.²²⁵ This has no doubt affected the economy of the country.

Attacks on Al-Dhabba oil terminal

3. After a few years of remaining in-operational due to the conflict, GoY had commenced production and export of crude oil in late 2017 from Sector 14, Al-Masila in Hadramawt Governorate with quantities not exceeding 20 percent of that of 2014. However, the non-renewal of the truce in October 2022, was followed by attacks on the port of Al-Dhabba in Hadramawt Governorate. This resulted in the cessation of production and export of crude oil from the sectors namely 14 Al-Masila, 10 East Shabwa, 51 East Al-Hajar, 53 East Sir, and 9 Malik²²⁶. The total crude oil revenue for the year 2021 amounted to USD 993 million, and up to November 2022, it amounted to USD 980 million. The GoY informed the Panel that it is losing revenue of about USD 1.2 billion per year.²²⁷ But taking into account the cost of repairs and replacement of equipment and facilities at the Al-Dhabba oil terminal, the GoY loss would amount to about USD 2 billion. The GoY is also deprived of its major source of foreign exchange, which is critical for importing essential food items and fuel for generation of electricity for the people. This has also undermined the ability of CBY, Aden to intervene to support the declining YR.²²⁸

Attacks on Yemen LNG project in Balhaf

4. In order to take advantage of its gas reserves in Ma'rib, especially from sector (18) Marib, Al-Jawf, the Yemen LNG project was launched in 2005 in Balhaf in Shabwa Governorate, on the coasts of the Gulf of Aden, 200 km south-west of Mukalla and around 400 km east of Aden. This was Yemen's largest-ever industrial investment of about USD 4.5 billion. The new Yemen LNG terminal, opened in Nov 2009, comprises a single LNG berth, two 140,000m³ storage tanks and associated re-liquefaction plant. The gas is piped via a 320 km pipeline from Ma'rib gas fields. The plan was to export 6.7 million MTs of LNG per annum for at least the next 20 years, considered a game changer for the economy of Yemen. However, due to the conflict, the Yemen LNG stopped gas production, liquefaction, and export in April 2015.²²⁹ The pipeline feeding the gas terminal has reportedly been targeted several times by AQAP.²³⁰

5. The Panel has received information that, on 5 August 2023, some rockets were reportedly fired towards the military base near the Yemen LNG site. Although no damage has been reported to the Balhaf gas terminal, such incidents compel the company to continue to close down its facility, thereby adversely impacting any chance for the revival of Yemen's economy. As per the company, "As a consequence of the current security situation, Yemen LNG remains in force majeure and the plant remains in a preservation mode."²³¹

²²⁴ GoY - Ministry of Oil.

²²⁵ <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/360391580209593452-0280022020/original/YemenUpdateDec.2019.pdf>.

²²⁶ GoY - Ministry of Oil.

²²⁷ GoY - Ministry of Finance.

²²⁸ CBY, Aden.

²²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_LNG.

²³⁰ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-emirates-idUSKBN1AJ2UW>.

²³¹ https://www.yemenlng.com/ws/en/go.aspx?c=proj_overview.

Table 93.1
Government Revenue

Year	Amount of Government Revenue (in million YRs)
2020	928.46
2021	1,455.45
2022	2,774.23
2023 (January to June)	877.49 (a proportionate loss of 509.62 million YR compared to 2022)

Source: *GoY*

Table 93.2
Import of fuel and fuel derivatives through ports under GoY

Period	Port	Number of Vessels	Gasoline (in tonnes)	Diesel (in tonnes)	Kerosene (in tonnes)	Mazout (in tonnes)
2022 (January to December)	Aden	56	443,292	622,740	13,874	40,422
2023 (January to July)	Aden	18	164,697.4	123,780.6	10,434.668	17,055.76
Proportionate Difference	Aden	(-) 14.6	(-) 93,889.6	(-) 239,484.4	(+) 2341.50	(-) 6523.74
2022 (January to December)	Mukalla	27	63,197.47	169,224.6		5,3591.5
2023 (January to July)	Mukalla	9	86,544.755	7,419.313		9,029.471
Proportionate Difference	Mukalla	(-) 6.75	(+) 49,679.56	(-) 91,295.037		(-) 22,232.23
2022 (January to December)	Nishtun		41,978.59	142,316.2		
2023 (January to July)	Nishtun	4	8,194.117	7,648.939		
Proportionate Difference	Nishtun	(-) 5.3	(-) 16,293.39	(-) 75,368.84		

Source: Table prepared by Panel based on data from GoY.

6. The exchange rates in Ma'rib and the cost of essential items have started showing upward trend compared to Aden, thereby, economically, further dividing the GoY areas.

Annex 94: Message from Houthis to the importers to shift imports to Hudaydah

Figure 94.1.

Copy of the message from Houthis to the importers to shift imports to Hudaydah

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الاخوه التجار الكرام
خلاصه الشحن الى ميناء الحديده
وحل الاشكال حول البضائع الموقه في المنافذ الرقابيه

تم الاجتماع اليوم مع وزير الصناعة والتجارة الاستاذ محمد المطهر وشخصيات من كبار المسؤولين في الدولة

وايضا حضور مدراء جميع الشركات الملاحية الاعتياديه

الموجوده في اليمن

وتم الخروج

كل الشركات الملاحية على استعداد تام لقبول اي شحنات الى ميناء الحديده لجميع السلع باستثناء السلاح -1-

وان ميناء الحديده أصبح مفتوح بالكامل حسب الاتفاق السياسي بين الدوله اليمنيه والسعويه والامم المتحده وللعلم ان هذا الاتفاق غير معن نظرا لحفظه ووجه العدو السعوي

على جميع التجار الذين لديهم قواطير موقه في المنافذ الجمركيه ولديهم شحنات في البحر ان يقوم بعمل تحويل لشحنته -2-

الى ميناء الحديده حسب النموذج المرسل وارفاق صورة البوليصه وتسليمها الى مكاتب شركات الشحن الملاحية في صناعه

التي تم الشحن عن طريقها واخذ استلام من الشركه الملاحية باسلام التحويل

ارسال صورة استلام التحويل الى المخلص والى رقم العمليات التابع لوزارة التجارة والصناعة الذي سيتم ارسالهم لكم -3-

من لديهم قواطير في الطريق بين المنافذ الرئيسيه ومتوجه الى الميناء الرقابيه يتم عمل كشف بها وارساله لوزارة التجارة -4-

والصناعه حتى لا يتم عرقلته عند وصولها

لن تدخل اي بضائع تم شحنها الى ميناء عن من بعد هذا التاريخ نهايا -5-

من لديهم مخزون في الجنوب او في المناطق خارج سيطره المجلس السياسي ويريد ادخاله الى صناعه فليبيه خيار من -6-

اثنين

الاول ان يتم عمل كشف بالمخزون وتسليمه لوزارة التجارة والصناعة

والثاني ان يبقى المخزون في مكانه الى بعد فتره حتى يتم فتح ميناء الحديده ويتم عمل حل لهذا الاشكال

اي تاجر لديه اي شحنه في العالم ويريد شحنها الى اليمن -7-

فليتواصل مع الاخوه شركات الملاحه هنا في اليمن وسيتم شحنها الى ميناء الحديده مباشره

وللعلم شركة سباء العالمية لشحن عنهم الاخوه ماهر الشرفي وصادم الشرفي

وهذه الشركه استعدت بشحن اي حاويه من اي مكان بالعالم بنفس سعر الشحن الى عنن وايضا الشركات الأخرى

على الجميع سرعة تقديم طلبات تحويل الشحنات باسرع وقت ممكن وذلك لسرعة التنسيق بين الشركات الملاحية وللعلم -8-

انه تم الاتفاق مع شركات الملاحه بان يكون يوم الخميس دوام واحتمال دوام يوم الجمعة

كل الشكر والتقدير للمسؤولين الذين تجاوبوا معنا لحل الاشكال وبنلوا جهود كبيرة وكان لهم الدور الاهم وأخص بالذكر -9-

معالي الوزير محمد شرف المطهر والاستاذ خالد

Source: Confidential

Appendix A

Translation of the message from Houthis to the importers to shift imports to Hudaydah

**Message addressed to traders concerning shipping to the port of ~~Hudaydah~~
and efforts to resolve the situation of goods held at inspection points**

A meeting took place today between the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Muhammad al-Mutahhar, senior Government officials, and managers of all the incorporated maritime companies with a presence in Yemen.

The outcomes were as follows.

1. All the maritime companies are fully prepared to accept any shipments to the port of Hudaydah of any goods except weapons. The port of Hudaydah is fully open in accordance with the political agreement among the Yemeni State, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations. That agreement remains unannounced, so that the Saudi enemy can save face.

2. All traders who have freight detained at customs crossings or have shipments at sea should redirect their shipments to the port of Hudaydah, using the form provided. A copy of the policy should be attached and transmitted to the Sana'a office of the maritime company office through which the shipment was arranged. The company should then confirm that the shipment has been redirected.

3. A copy of the redirection document should be sent to the clearance agent and to the operations number of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which will be transmitted to you. Freight will be released for those traders who have sent the redirection document.

4. Freight that is on the road between the main crossings and the inspection points will be inspected, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry will be notified so that the freight is not hindered on arrival.

5. From this date onward, no goods whatsoever that have been shipped through the port of Aden will be allowed to enter.

6. Anyone who has goods stored in the south or in an area outside the control of the Political Council and wants to bring those goods into Sana'a has two options.

The first is that the goods can be inspected, and a copy sent to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

The second is that the goods can stay where they are until the port of ~~Hudaydah~~ is opened up and the problem is resolved.

7. Any trader who has a shipment anywhere in the world and wants to ship it to Yemen should get in touch with the maritime companies here in Yemen. The goods will be shipped to Hudaydah directly. For information, the international shipping company Saba, by ~~Mahir~~ and Saddam al-Sharafti, is prepared to ship any container from anywhere in the world at the same price as shipments to Aden. The same is true of other companies.

8. Requests to redirect shipments should be submitted as soon as possible to ensure prompt coordination with shipping companies. An agreement has been reached with shipping companies that Thursday and, most likely, Friday will be work days.

9. We are grateful to the officials who worked with us to solve the problem. They made considerable efforts, and their role was decisive. In particular, we are grateful to Minister Muhammad Sharaf al-Mutahhar and to Mr. Khalid.

Figure 94.2.

Copy of the Importer's Declaration

<u>جديد تحويل سفن الحاويات إلى ميناء الحديدية</u>	« <u>تعزيز</u> »	
<p>- على جميع التجار إرسال هذه الرسالة إلى الخطوط الملاحية التي توجد معها حاويات لكي تقوم الخطوط الملاحية بمخاطبة شركة سبا لتحميل الحاويات إلى ميناء الحديدية - حيث ولديهم سفينتين جاهزة لنقلها لميناء الحديدية وبحسب التموزج أدناه .</p>		
المحترمون	للملاحة	الأخوة / شركة
		بعد التحية ، ، ،
<u>الموضوع / تحويل مسار ميناء التفريغ إلى ميناء الحديدية</u>		
<u>بدلاً عن ميناء عدن</u>		
<p>بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه ، نرجو منكم تحويل مسار الحاويات من ميناء عدن إلى ميناء الحديدية ونتعهد لكم بسداد أجور تحويل الحاويات مع فارق أجور الشحن بموجب بوليص شحن رقم () .</p>		
اسم الناجر /		
الختام /		
- صورة مع التحية لوزارة النقل - = = = لوزارة الصناعة - " " " المالية (مصلحة الجمارك) - " " " جهاز الرقابة والمراقبة		

Source: Confidential

Appendix B
Translation of the Importer's Declaration

New - redirection of container ships to the port of Hudaydah

Circular

Using the form below, all traders should send the present letter to the navigation lines with which they have containers so that those navigation lines can contact the Saba company to redirect the containers to the port of Hudaydah. [The company] has two ships ready to ship the containers to the port of Hudaydah.

To ... navigation company

Subject: Changing the port of discharge from Aden to Hudaydah

Sirs,


We would be grateful if you could redirect the containers from the port of Aden to the port of Hudaydah. We undertake to settle the fee for redirecting the containers, along with the difference in shipping fees in accordance with shipping contracts No. (...).

Trader name:

Seal:

C.c.: Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Industry
Customs Authority, Ministry of Finance
Security and Intelligence Agency

Figure 94.3.

Copy of the Undertaking by the Importers to shift imports from Aden to Hudaydah port

Source: Confidential

Appendix C

Translation of Undertaking by the Importers to shift imports from Aden to Hudaydah port

Translated from Arabic

Pledge

Our brother the honourable Director-General of the Sana'a customs and control office

Sir

We, the importer....., commercial name.....,

owner's name....., tax number.....,

Commercial Registry number....., Date / /2 AD, phone number

Do hereby undertake the following:

1. Not to assess a new customs exchange rate of 750 Yemeni riyals at ports of entry;
2. Not to raise the sales price for consumers;
3. To transfer imports via Hudaydah port and Sana'a International Airport.

With this pledge we hereby assume full responsibility. The Customs Authority reserves the right to take whatever measures we might deem appropriate in the future.

Many thanks.

Company Director

Seal

Annex 95: News reports about public demonstrations against decline in the value of YR and power outage in GoY areas

Figure 95.1.

Massive popular protests in Aden, Hadramawt and Abyan against the collapse of the currency and the electricity crisis



Source: <https://alkhabaralyemeni.net/2023/07/12/228263/>.

Figure 95.2.

Demonstrations renewed in Aden, condemning the collapse of the electricity service and the national currency, 13 July 2023



Source: <https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/93616>.

Figure 95.3.

Protests in Lahj and Hadramawt against the deterioration of electricity – 13 July 2023



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hU AwIt7CSW0>.

List of Acronyms

ADNOC	Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
AIS	Automatic Identification Signal
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
AMR	Anti-Material Rifle
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company
ARES	Armament Research Service
AShM	Anti-Ship Missile
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AT	Anti-Tank (Mine)
AP	Anti-Personnel (Mine)
CAC	Cooperative and Agriculture Credit
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CBY	Central Bank of Yemen
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHA	Coalition Holding Area
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DCord	Detonating Cord
DIOMIL	Defense Industry Organization, Military branch (Islamic Republic of Iran)
DPV	Diver Propulsion Vehicle
EHOC	Evaluation and Humanitarian Operations Cell
EFP	Explosively Formed Penetrator
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
EOSS	Electro-Optical Surveillance Systems
FSO	Floating Storage and Offloading Vessel
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GoY	Government of Yemen
GPS	Global Positioning System
HE	High Explosive (Grenade)
HEF	Hadrami Elite Forces
HF/VHF	High Frequency/Very High Frequency (radio transmitter)
HMG	Heavy Machinegun
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMO	International Maritime Organization

IMU	Initial Measurement Unit
INS	Inertial Navigation System
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRGC-QF	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Forces
IS	Islamic State
JMISC	Jeddah Maritime Information Sharing Centre
JMRCC	Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LCs	Letters of Credit
LMG	Light Machinegun
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence System
MLRS	Multiple Launcher Rocket System
MMSI	Maritime Mobile Service Identities
MoD	Minister of Defence
MR	Military Region
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSTC	Maritime Security Transit Corridor
MT	Metric Tonnes
NCIAVHR	National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
nm	Nautical Mile
NSF	National Shield Forces
OPAC	Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
OSV	Offshore Support Vessel
PCB	Printed Circuit Board
PLC	Presidential Leadership Council
PoES	Panel of Experts on Somalia
PoEY	Panel of Experts on Yemen
QC	Quality Control
RFP	Request For Proposal
RPG	Rocket-propelled Grenade
RSF	Rapid Support Forces (Sudan)
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons

SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SBF	Security Belt Forces
SDF	Shabwah Defence Forces
SESGY	Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SR	Saudi Riyal
STC	Southern Transitional Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UBGL	Under Barrel Grenade Launcher
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKMTO	United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNVIM	United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism
US	United States of America
USD	United States Dollars
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VLCC	Very Large Crude Carrier
WBIED	Water-borne improvised explosive device
WFP	World Food Programme
WSW	West-South-West
YCG	Yemeni Coast Guards
YR	Yemeni Riyal
