
How can we utilize verifiable credentials, self-sovereign identity and open source hyperledger technologies for a lifelong learning.

Özgül Küçük Computer Engineering Department İstanbul Bilgi University 28/09/21 In this project we will propose of a sytware architecture which implements blockchain technology as a secure and expirint solution to keep, verify and digitialize certificates/records within a university, i.e. Bilgi University.

Ly this talk contains unjinished work on this project.



1 = * avoid creation of take credential from a legal institute. 2 = * your qualifications can be attached to your identity	OR
qualifications your from identifies create can you - verigiable credentials  Lackaims)	
(3) < * verigication can/should involve the vource  Lyis all stakeholders have digital idea	


(mtary etc,...)

Verified with cryptography, decentralized identity



Digitialize, secure and improve espiciency of academic records keeping, enable lighting learning.

```
credutials cryptographically
                                                collecting credentials
signed by: teachers,
                                          [ verifiable credentials data model 1.0]
 administrator(s), holders
                                       [https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/]
[signature schemes]
                                      → who are you? [self_sovereign identity (SSI)]
          bunale credentials
                                            Ls zero-knowledge progs
            jor degree
         Lligelong learning]
                         How does the user/university/teacher
                               manage all these? [wallets, blockhain and open source hyperledgers]
```



with

self-sovereign identity

holders have the control over their identities

(ollect signed credentials

prenent proofs of chaims

Indy, Ursa and Aries


Ly systems

without the intermediary inner components duign inner components duign self-sovereign identity is implemented through decentralized identifiers (NINS) -> a uniquem

> as sytware projects

resource locator

hyperledger identity projects INDY, URSA and ARIES implements decentralized identity (SSI) and verifiable credentials (VI-data model)



#### How does a DID works?

a public DID [ og a verifiable credential issuer]

holder Of A Credential


presents the public DID of [trusts the issuer] the issuer (literally to anyone)

-> should be written on

a public blockchain [which is costly]

intended to use


hu n. 190211 a private DID dou not have by a small specific group to be > could be used in a Written permissioned blockchain [in academy] on the blockchain hyperledger Aries > defines a mechanism for sharing and using private pairwise DIDs



reference: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-datamodel credential graph

Regionce:

https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/Hellins




Verification of the verifier verificable presentation by the verifier

#### Design Patterns

- \* blockchain based self-sovereign identity
- \* smart contracts and blockchain applications
- \* smart contracts and security patterns
- - \* Checks-Effects-Interaction
  - \* Emergency Stop
  - \* Speed Bump
  - \* Rate Limit
    - \* Balance Limit

- \* key management
- \* DID management
- \* credential design
  - \* Token
- \* Authorization
- \* Oracle \* Moth \* Fork Check
- \* Randomness
- \* Poll
- \* Time Constraint
- \* Termination



DID Management Patterns gj-chain USET identity identifier TDDOT on-chain smart contract gychain storage -> may not be secure

example: Sourin uses Sourin

protocol for registration, update, revolution,
revocation,

# identifier Registry

→ I some other design patterns,

not relevant (multiple registration,

blockchain & sough media account

pair,...)

### Credential Design Patterns

# 1 Selective Content Generation

\* Atomic credentials,

Ly multiple credentials

[each conteining one identity signed individually]

\* selective disdosure signatures

A general credential

L) with special signature schemen — information

(such as Camerisch-Lysyanshaya)

## Credential Design Patterns

\* Hashed values: A general credential L) of multiple attributes each hashed with a dispret nonce a verifier can validate only those with the actual hash values. \* Zero-knowledge progs: A holder can prove that a credential is within certain values.

#### Time - Constrained Access

holder

L share a link to the credential

ration only certain

period of time

## DIOs and verigiable credentials

ARIES \_\_\_\_\_\_ implementation [issuers, holders/provers, verifiers] --- secure, point-to-point messaging between agents & participants Wallets are digital Wallets have secure storage

have secure storage


communicate with each other


following Aries protocols

under Linux Foundation hyperledger grameworks Indy (decentralized identity) (shared cryptography library) aries (peer to peer interactions) Implements verifiable credentials model, DIDs, agents, zero\_knowledge progs, selective disclosure


#### Objectives :

- \* Students manage /own their education process
  [similar to SSI principles, in the context of higher education]
- \* Enable to create/follow course (bundles) from diggerent organizations, to obtain a degree.
- \* Transforming course credentials to a verifiable architecture
- \* Using smart contracts, improving verificible credentials data model, leveraging SSI for identity management, opensource hyperledger technologies.
- privacy and security: public key cryp., zero-knowledge proofs, protocol security data security, securing smart contracts.





Notes [ ]19m a learner(s) perspective]
* teacher Nodes — may be from dijkrent  universities write to the ledger of  their university or
* learny Nodes send obtained credentials a government ledger
to Authorized Nodes
by their enrolled
independant learners: universities
keep a copy of earned credutiels,
write to a public ledge,
[could be a ledger hosted by the government]



#### Rejerences

- Design Patterns jor Blockchain-based Selj-Sovereign Identity
  4. Liu, H.M. Paik, X. Xu and Q. Lu
- 2 Smart Contracts: Security Patterns in the Ethereum Ecosystem and Solidity M. Wöhrer and U. Zdun
- 131 An Emprical Analysis of smart contracts: platforms, applications and design patterns,
  M. Bartoletti and L. Pompianu

smart contract security

Issues related to GDPR (general data protection regulation of the EU)

+ other issues related to security and privacy