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F. The operation of the supreme commander East against Wilna.  
1. The battles in Lithuania and Ruland until the end of August\*).  
a) The battles of the Niemen Army.  
(Maps 6 and 7, Thesis 26.)  
The July campaign against Mitau and Schaulen.  
From the month of July onwards, the battles of the Niemen Army are no longer regarded as independent actions, but rather as preparations for a future offensive against Wilna, which the supreme commander East had proposed on July 2 in Posen as an effective support for the offensive in southern Bohemia, and which also gained the approval of General von Talleyrand at a later date\*). The supreme commander East kept a constant eye on it. If this breakthrough offensive were to penetrate deeply into the enemy's position to have a full effect, then a significant threat from above would need to occur, jeopardizing the northern flank of the Russian Niemen front, while simultaneously securing against units advancing from the interior of the realm towards Dinabourg, necessitating their presence up to the Daugava. The last task also needed to be fulfilled, with maneuvers extending to the lower Dvina and splitting these lines proving effective and requiring the least amount of forces. However, from the beginning of July onward, the entire strength of the supreme commander East had to be directed into the Narwa operation, leaving only a few correspondingly limited resources available. Priorities and goals had to adjust accordingly and frequently change individually.  
The 10th Army received orders on July 2 to discontinue the preparations already initiated for the attack on Kowno\*), in order to carry out the order the next day\*), and to maintain the left flank of the officer in its previously issued position; the Niemen Army, with the 41st Infantry Division ready to intervene as new strength, was to engage the Russian 5th Army, thereby also relieving the German 10th Army and distracting the adversary's endurance from the Narwa operation.  
\*) Reference to G. 130 ff. – 2) G. 271 ff. – 3) G. 277. – 4) G. 280.

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Task and Organization of the Njemen Army.   
The Njemen Army under General of Infantry Otto von Below at that time deployed with seven infantry divisions (from five cavalry divisions) in the area north of the Njemen from the lower Dubissa to the area south of Libau over a front width of about 250 kilometers. The opposing enemy, however, seemed to be numerous. General von Below wanted to continue the attack, similar to what the Supreme Commander directed in his order of June 14, to prevent the enemy from further positions at Schauen and to confront the prominent Russian northern flank consisting of cavalry, aiming to swing against the flank and rear of the Schauen position. Accordingly, he structured his troops under the weakening of the right wing as follows:   
Support group under Lieutenant General Freiherr von Richthofen (higher cavalry commander 1 with detachment Eisebec, 36th Reserve Division, Division Besdmann, 3rd and Bavarian Cavalry Division) from Njemen to the Naktion Lake south of Schauen,   
Corp Morning (General command of the 1st Reserve Corps with Brigade Fomery) and 1st Reserve Division in the positions near Schauen,   
Northern group under General von Rausenstein (General command of the XXXIX Reserve Corps with the 78th Reserve and 41st Infantry Division) northwards subsequently behind the course of the Windau up to the north of the Pabrintskij Bivou-Durenjow,   
Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General Egon Count von Gmetto (6th and 2nd Cavalry Division) northwards subsequently,   
Group of Lieutenant General von Pappritz (Governor of Libau with the 8th Cavalry Division and troops of the fortress) at Hafenpot and south of it.   
The implementation of this structure required considerable marches; the attack could therefore only begin around July 15. The Northern group, accompanied by cavalry on its left flank, should initially march towards Mitau, the left wing of Group Pappritz.

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to advance against Białystok. As the troops from Libau participated here, a marine force was also provided as a support for the place against Białystok, furthermore, immediate support through naval forces was promised for the advance against Białystok. Due to the anticipated supply difficulties, the further construction of the railway between Memel and Białystok over the border to connect with the Libau-Schaulen line was communicated to the head of the temporary command, who estimated a construction time of six months; therefore, little was guaranteed for the next operations. They must align themselves with the Libau-Schaulen line if, in one quiet half, they remain in Russian hands, so that a field railway on Schaulen being constructed can be carried out.   
The enemy was busy, and it seemed necessary that their northern wing? was weakening the front in Poland. Northwest of Schaulen, against the designated German attack, not only was the situation unfavorable but it also suggested that the external western course would be applied in further collective attacks.   
As the attack of the Army Group Gallwitz against Narva was to begin on July 13, it was requested that the advance in Courland proceed as the Supreme Commander Ost had wished on the 14th, thus securing the desired distracting effect. On this day, the Northern Corps, with the arrival of the 41st Infantry Division north of the Muranevjeno-Mietau railway, started the attack, particularly three cavalry divisions. Over about a 30-kilometer wide front, the crossing over the Windau was forced, noted as the middle and left wing against strong cavalry and landwehr up to a 15-kilometer range forward. The reported ongoing fires in the north yielded numerous setbacks. This situation left the impression that the opponent wanted to withdraw. Conversely, on the right wing of the northern corps, the 6th Reserve Division faced only minimal resistance in advancing.   
On July 15, the territorial successes along the entire attack front, especially on the northern wing, could be expanded. The attempt to cut off portions of the enemy, however, was not as successful as it had been before. On July 16, the Russian resistance solidified. The 6th Reserve Division encountered progress only on its left wing. The 78th Reserve-

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and 41st Infantry Division fell at Alt Aus against strong enemy forces, with the decision postponed to the following day. Differences could see the cavalry commander Schmettoff sight strong Russian cavalry about thirty kilometers northwest of the place in the afternoon and bring it to the north flank of the enemy; the advanced parts of the 6th Cavalry Division were already at Dobbeln, thus already more than 30 kilometers eastnortheast of Alt Aus. Several thousand prisoners and some supplies were the spoils of the first three stages of battle. The attempt to destroy the enemy at Alt Aus on July 17 was not successful, as invisible powerful forces had pushed back to the north. There was serious combat, which required him to urgently evade east, whereby again about 4000 prisoners and some supplies became visible. In the evening, the middle road was in friendly hands south of Dobbeln. Thus, he had come within 25 kilometers north of the troops of the General Kvartir from Pappritz, just before Tudum.  
The success on the northern wing was met with a setback on the southern wing, where the attack of the Corps Morgen began on July 17. Its 1st Reserve Division made little progress, but the 6th Reserve Division was significantly reinforced by greater reinforcements, south of Elhmjan, leading to serious losses when retreating against the Windau.  
In this situation, General von Below remained committed to the plan to continue the attack against the enemy in the north on July 18, if possible to evade from Mitau, and only then did he intend to engage fully against the Chaulander enemy. Thus, the German troops reached the Russian positions by July 18, up to about twelve kilometers from Mitau to the west. By Tudum, the western edge of the large swamp area was reached at the Ala Mouth. At the coast, Windau was secured, whose harbor was protected by reinforced Russian ships. The western part of Kurland was secured, leading to the first section of the planned attack being carried out, with military spoils amounting to more than 6000 prisoners and new supplies rising.  
For the subsequent operation against the Russian main forces, General von Below issued the first directives at noon. The 6th Reserve Division was to maintain its position, that

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The corps were prepared for further attacks in the morning, while to the south of the Raftion-Ober, the southern group was to prepare for an attack on Guzdani with a front about 40 kilometers wide. The northern corps was relieved by the encircling wing of the 78th Reserve Division Shagori and the Cavalry Corps Schmetton Groß Wilzen directly. The 41st Infantry Division and the troops previously under General Lieutenant von Pappritz had not yet prepared to engage in stand-fighting; the command was given to the commander of the 8th Cavalry Division, Major General Eberhard Graf von Schmetton.  
In particular, the h i n t e r f r i s t were issues to be addressed after the events at Defstergam on July 2, through the IV. Wings (the older lines of troops) and light skirmishers from the northern side had been significantly reinforced. The Supreme Commander Aft sent an officer to Kiel for the arrangement of the Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich, who on the 19th of July had to lay out the intentions of the Niemen Army and to point out that during the ongoing battles, fleet movements in the Riga region would be desired in order to bind Russian troops across the Düna. For this, the waterways had to be surveyed and cleared of mines, which took some time.  
19th and 20th July.  
With the Niemen Army, the encircling troops acting from the north crossed the Schweden-Fluss without a fight on July 19 and established the objectives set for them, Shagori and Groß Wilzen; they were thus deep in the enemy’s flank. On the rest of the front, the day passed with preparations for the attack. When this began on July 20 with the southern group under General Lieutenant Freiberg at the planned moment, the enemy reacted by pulling back to the Dubiki eastward, but consequently started to regather close to Schaulern for the 1st and 6th Reserve Division. These two divisions were to maintain their position without pressing them, while the encircling troops were urged by General von Below to highest diligence and reached in the rear of the enemy along the main road Schaulern-Mittau. The 78th Reserve Division under Major General von Müller was still 30 kilometers march distance in the evening at Meshtchuz and thus immediately in the rear of the enemy still holding at Schaulern, the Cavalry Corps Schmetton had thus achieved a significant position.  
21st and 22nd July.  
General von B e l o w hoped to capture significant parts of the Russians stationed at Schaulern on the following day, July 21, also

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The victory of the Niemen Army at Schaulen. 461  
before – as is now to be assumed – to retreat in a more southerly direction, approximately towards Pontiewicz. He intended to close the ring around it not only from the north but also from the south. He provided for the divisions of the northern corps (6th and 78th reserve divisions) and the cavalry corps Schmettow (Egon) further action towards Schaulen and Radziwilliz; everywhere the enemy was to be attacked. The support group was to work towards Radziwilliz, while the Northern Morning was to prevent its opponent from taking the next suitable course of action and to launch a new attack on July 21.  
In the early hours of this situation, however, the Russians launched a debilitating attack to the east against the clear 78th reserve division, while they were delaying the reaction of the 76th reserve division assigned from the north towards the afternoon hours. The Morning Corps managed to bring in the abandoned Schaulen during the night, but did not advance beyond that. Thus, the 78th reserve division faced a very difficult situation and could not connect, as strong Russian forces, especially in the southern command, had been diverted eastward. They had to face the Rofait of Waicha up to north of Rosalien, prominently led by both cavalry divisions of Lieutenant General Graf von Schmettow (Egon). From the support group, the 36th reserve division, fighting under Lieutenant General Krug, reached the railway line almost halfway between Kiesyand and Schadkow; further north the Russian resistance was stronger, so that the division Bedermann significantly lagged behind the harsh cavalry division Timić from the 36th reserve division.  
The ring around the enemy was still not closed, as there was still a gap of 45 kilometers on both sides of Schadkow. The road to Poniewies was open to the enemy. But also in the north, it was hardly to be expected that the combat troops of the cavalry corps Schmettow (Egon) would be sufficient to stop a naturally unfettered Russian breakthrough. Fighting and marching under inadequate supplies and tricky ammunition replacement on frequently unused roads, in wide breadth and with severe thunderstorms, had taken a heavy toll particularly on the troops of the northern group, who had been in continuous movement for a week now. Nevertheless, the last strength had to and should be used to still attempt to achieve the requested great success.  
The army order for July 22 commanded the 1st reserve corps to move from Schaulen southeast, with the right wing along the railway line to Schadkow, to launch an attack. Both wing groups were to join against this flank and thereby effectively close the ring from Schadkow.

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The operation of the Supreme Commander Şt against Wilna.   
Meanwhile, however, the mass of the enemy had already retreated eastwards the night before and now led to what is effectively a stretch of about 30 kilometers of expansion from the north toward his positions, namely the Giestete Cavalry Corps Schmettow (Egon). In unclear terrain, finally threatened by Russian cavalry, it found itself compelled in the evening to retreat behind the fortifications towards the north. The majority of the enemy withdrew, while smaller units still retained their positions occupied by infantry divisions in the encircled areas, although the remaining forces were about 15 kilometers eventually from Schadow.   
23rd July.   
On 23rd July, the coordination of the movements was carried out in a purely frontal execution, conducted by the Russian rear, and on this day continued a distance against the east. Even though it was not possible to separate the assembled Russian troop concentrations, the coordination was nonetheless faster and more deliberate in nine days, achieving a considerable figure of 30,000 prisoners and 23 artillery pieces.   
   
At the same time, troops of Major General Gerhard Graf von Schmettow (41st Infantry, 8th Cavalry Division and Upper Lithuania) succeeded in advancing towards Mitau. Approximately 3½ Russian cavalry divisions accompanied by infantry appeared here to collide with each other.   
   
The continuation of the battles and the capture of Mitau.   
At the command of the Niemen Army before the successes against the Russian 5th Army on 23rd July, initially somewhat larger restrictions were placed than was actually the case. The report issued on 24th July began with the message: “The Russian 5th Army is completely defeated and largely shattered.” General von Below wanted to grant his troops, who were overworked from battles and marches, a short rest. He succeeded in allowing the Cavalry Corps Schmettow (Egon) to advance in the areas around Mitau, which his commanders eagerly endorsed. In this sense, it was also reported to the Supreme Commander Şt. In his war report (it refers to the 23rd July): “The result is the complete fragmentation of the Russian forces, the right side in retreat in a southeasterly direction. Thus, this operation of the Niemen Army is concluded. In all matters un-

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New Orders for the 10th and Njemen Army.   
In the battles and marches carried out, the troops have received distinctions. "Soon," reported the Commander-in-Chief Olf on this day to the Chief of the War Force. "He assessed the situation as follows": For the further execution of the operation toward Wilna, which is exclusively assigned to these forces, the Njemen Army is "too heavy; the mobilization of forces is not possible at this time." However, how can this operation, on which this aspect is dependent, be prepared? This includes: the capture of Mitau because the call can lead forces over Riga and the movements can threaten the flank, as well as preparations for the capture of Rovno. This fortress's condition is necessary both for the offensive toward Wilna, publicly based on the main road of Zichernüngsdes Nachbusses on the railway, and for any other operation at another place. Only if we have this fortress secured from Mitau and the flow lines between both locations are secured by a strongly constructed line can stronger forces from here be drawn away," that is, from Courland for deployment against Wilna.   
In the afternoon, it was ordered for the continuation of operations: The 10th Army must conclude this fortress on the west front as much as possible with its left wing at the Njemen below Rovno. - The Njemen Army moves in the same way to repulse the thrust into the Njemen below and Neiview at both bridges by Wilna. Furthermore, the Njemen Army is prepared at Niehyam on Bornarch along Janow and sends the majority of its cavalry against the Rovno-Wilna railway and forward onto Wilna.” With this arrangement, Commander-in-Chief Olf acted in full agreement with the Supreme Command, which stated the next day, while rejecting corrections for the 10th Army, that it would be of great significance for the overall operations if the Njemen Army was at least presented with strong cavalry against the Russian rear connections in the area of Wilna soon. Moreover, Commander-in-Chief Olf's order stated that the left flank of the advancing Njemen Army should be secured by troops at Poniewies, taking Mitau. Hereupon, in response to the plan of General von Below, the preliminary assignment of an additional infantry division from the main forces of the Njemen Army should not be allowed.

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The Operation of the Commander-in-Chief East against Wilna.  
July 24 and 25.  
These orders allowed for the intended route of the troops of the Niemen army not to materialize. They directed the bulk sharply southwards against the northern front of Rowno, while other parts were directed sharply northwards towards Mitau, primarily the cavalry aiming further east, especially towards Wilna. The movements were feasible for me, as long as one did not allow the defeated enemy to continue executing their own troop maneuvers. They engaged in almost uninterrupted fighting against Russian rearguards while considering the number of captured men up until July 25, operating on the right flank and beyond Niedzianza, with the center being about 15 kilometers beyond Poniewiez, that was agreed upon by the recently reunited I. Reserve Corps, with the left flank reaching Pofol at the estuary. Thus, the boundary was reached, and the supply for stronger forces could also be implemented. The opposition against the enemy was difficult, and further provision for smaller units had to be developed.  
General von Below, who moved his headquarters to Schauland on July 28, had to reorganize his troops for the tasks assigned by the Commander-in-Chief East. While the Esleb division was advancing towards the northwestern front of Rowno, the I. Reserve Corps with Brigade Sommer and the Launitzin Corps (78th Reserve Division with Division Zezmann) was to be assembled at Poniewiez to advance against the northern front of the fortress. The cavalry corps Richthofen and Schmettow (Egon) gathered visibly and explicitly from Poniewiez to assemble, moving towards the south against Wilna and to the east against Dinaburg. Against Mitau, apart from the group already deployed there, Schmettow (Eberhardt), 41st Infantry Division, Detachment Libau, 8th Cavalry Division, the 6th Reserve Division was also determined.  
On July 29, the operation against Mitau began with the assignment of the 6th Reserve Division against Bausf, to gain a foothold here. The Russian resistance was significant, leading the divisional commander, Major General Hans von Below, to decide in June to attempt a crossing further downstream. The army command provided the brigade Sommeyer as reinforcement. In the night of July 31, the operation managed to reach ten kilometers west of Bausf near Melsten. The newly deployed Russian 53rd Infantry Division still reached the north Kielm.

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Njemen Army. Capture of Mitau. 465  
on Riga zurid. For August 1st, the 6th Reserve Division and the 8th Cavalry Division were assigned on both sides of the Aa to Mitau. However, the enemy did not react for Horrannommen, but had already begun to evacuate the city during the night, into which the 41st Infantry Division was to move in the afternoon. The colors were set on fire, and the Aa bridge was destroyed. In the pursuit, General Graf Schmettau allowed his troops on August 2nd to follow the half of Riga; a total of 2000 prisoners were taken. Thus, the commander personally emerging in Mitau, at the Aa to transition to defense. For this, the 6th Reserve Division, Brigade Homeyer, and the Libau unit were designated, while the 41st Infantry Division and the 8th Cavalry Division were prepared for departure to the south.  
With the capture of Mitau, a starting point was gained for the left wing of the army towards the coast. Additionally, the almost newly constructed swamp and railway area of the Aa mouth provided a secure connection. The developed coast, like with the conquest of the western part of Courland, was thus taken, but lay next to the side of the Riga construction alongside the artillery of the trufer warships. Soon, the main German troops were shelled from the sea. Landings were also possible, but could not take on any significant scope, as long as the Russian land forces were bound by the attack of the Central Powers.  
With the main forces of the Njemen Army, the situation had changed compared to what was expected after the conclusion of the fighting on July 25. The enemy showed surprising consideration and fell on July 30 near Ruptschi between the two cavalry corps Richthofen and Schmettau (Egon) forward, which on the following day directed their movements towards Mitau, while simultaneously attacking Dünaburg. The proposal of General von Morgen to support the cavalry in the air had not received the approval of the General from Below, since the corps was to intimidate south towards Konovo and the enemy seemed only weak in the Oftin. However, as the hostile Unde defended itself on August 1, the army leader decided nonetheless to initially direct whole efforts towards Stein. He did not only commit the cavalry corps, but also the corps Auenstein, between the two cavalry groups, for an attack. About 30 kilometers east of Poniemyes, fighting began on August 2 across a wide front. Despite the strong deployment of enemy forces, the enemy did not relinquish their positions until the

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After August 3, further resistance encountered in the course of this day’s pursuit. The Supreme Commander East had designated the line Dnipfrich at the Svyentia-Kriewitz on the Niemen as the boundary for the pursuit. Moreover, the army had already transferred the 4th Cavalry Division1) from the 10th Army on July 31, which, having crossed the Niemen below Kowno, was particularly assigned to the Ebed unit against the northern front from Rosken. Now on the left wing, the 8th Cavalry Division was advancing from midnight; however, the division assembled from troops of the 10th Army (designated as Division Bednarn1)) was supposed to engage with this army.   
In combat, the Russians succeeded on August 4 and 5 in pushing from position to position and reaching the line Dnipfrich – Swiat. This resulted in subsequent difficulties in supply; also, the troops noted that the offensive was hindered by the inferiority of the delivered ammunition. Conversely, the enemy seemed to bring forth new forces along the entire front. Reports available on August 5 indicated stronger Russian troop movements over Grodno towards Wilna and temporarily expanded the overview that the enemy was now preparing a surrounding maneuver against both Niemen armies; in the north, news of new enemy actions around Friedrichstadt and Riga was reported. As a result, the Russians appeared overwhelmingly superior. The two cavalry corps were witnessing further undertakings against Wilna and Dünaburg, at least as visible as the army's support in the encirclement of Kowno. The cavalry corps Richard from Mitz fell at Wilna2) outmatched by superior Russian forces and had to be withdrawn towards Kowno on August 7. General von Below prepared a new counterattack.   
It increasingly became apparent what value the enemy placed on maintaining his position on the left wing of the lower Dvina. The further his front was extended in Poland, the more forces he obtained free for the reinforcement of troops north of the Niemen. Air units reported a significant transport movement from the south to Wilna, where extensive fortifications were also being established. The Supreme Commander East noted from Captain von Waldow on August 7:   
1) Parts had already dealt with the Niemen army earlier (p. 457).   
2) p. 121.   
3) Communication from Colonel Waldow from summer 1931 to the Reichsarchiv.

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Defensive task for the Njemen Army.  
"Outwardly, the Njemen naturally recognized the danger of Russia long ago, and it is moving, as it can, towards Wilna, Dünaburg, and Riga. Hopefully, it will succeed soon, if Gallwitz progresses well, to draw forces from there." In light of these circumstances, the supreme commander decided to reorganize the tasks of the 10th and Njemen Armies. The encirclement of Rovno was to fall solely to the 10th Army. Instead of Division Benndamm, however, only the Eberhardt detachment from the Njemen Army crossed over to take part in the encirclement of the 4th Cavalry Division, thus leaving this division free for other use within the Njemen Army. It was stated in the order that it was "necessary to secure the left flank of the enemy against a decisive opposing thrust from the lower Dvina. The assertion of Miatus and the seized hostile territory is important."  
In accordance with the new task, General von Below visibly took the I. Reserve Corps along with the 78th Reserve Division into the region and north of Russia, where a position for sustainable defense was to be established. The relocation southward brought the cavalry corps Richtoffen, Division Benndamm, and the 4th Cavalry Division, which initially joined the Wilna bend from Janow on the left flank of the 10th Army (1st Cavalry Division). In the north, the 41st Infantry Division advanced, while the I. Reserve Corps and the Cavalry Corps Schmettoff (Goni) were engaged, and the 8th Cavalry Division was commissioned on its left flank. All these movements were to be completed by around August 13, but occurred amid varying circumstances and frequently during battles against the advancing enemy.  
To relieve the Russian pressure as soon as possible, General von Below ordered the right wing of the I. Reserve Corps to attack again on August 14. The 78th and 1st Reserve Divisions advanced northwards into the enemy's positions and aimed for success. On August 15, the pursuit was continued in accordance with a directive from the supreme commander with a reduction of the connecting troops to the right and left as far forward as possible, although I suspect that no significant advance was made beyond the Swieneta-Niemen line, reached on August 5. Nevertheless, two German divisions overall managed to push the enemy back about 15 kilometers along a front of about 60 kilometers, capturing only about 3000 prisoners in total. The forces available for the continuation of the attack were insufficient. As their reinforcement was still not in sight, the supreme-

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The operation of the Supreme Commander Hft against Wilna. Since mid-August, in connection with earlier positions of the I. Reserve troops on both sides of Russia, a series of rear works emerged, stretching northward over the Birštonas Lake and the lower Niemen to the Aa.  
To protect the left flank, it would have been prudent to drive off the Russian ships located in the Riga Bay, including the 30.5-gun armed battleship "Slawa"; however, this was not absolutely necessary! Therefore, in light of the difficulties of the allocation, the command on land set such a clamp on the fleet direction. Cooperation with the own naval forces was only to be reconsidered in that case, if the attack on Riga-Dünamünde was to be continued. Although on a rare occasion, the High Command had considered this possible, it was still a long way off. The Supreme Commander of the offensive, Grand Duke Heinrich Prince of Prussia, was informed since July 19 that, according to the deployment of the Supreme Commander Hft, the regiments in Riga and Dünamünde posed an opportunity; if necessary, a flank attack was desirable for the troops prescribed to advance over the cliffs. Trustworthy General von Tafelbau had already indicated at that time that the fleet could forgo support before or in the Riga Sea (which seemed completely reasonable to me), so the Grand Admiral coordinated temporary reinforcements from parts of the High Seas Fleet from the North Sea. When the hope for an early advance of the army against Riga dwindled, while about half of the German fleet was in the Baltic Sea, he decided to make use of this opportunity at least for an advance into the Riga Bay. If no outlet existed to hold there without a break and without simultaneous action of the army, he hoped nonetheless to damage and confuse the enemy. However, the internal operation encountered such difficulties when overcoming the mine barriers in the Irben Strait on August 8 that the commanding Vice Admiral Schmidt initially gave up. On August 18, it was taken up anew. After several days of effort, a breach was worked upon; light forces advanced on August 20 across the bay towards Pernau, others against the northern access to the bay, the Moonsund. Some Russian cannons fell victim to the German attack. In the Moonsund, laying mines or inflicting crucial damage on the Russians was believed to be not feasible.

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Naval advance in the Riga bays.  
Measures of the Russians¹).  
Soon after the attacks of General von Below had eased in mid-June, the Russians began to "clear" the area west of Riga and this important city itself. They took away a large part of the numerous Jewish population and got rid of everything that was important for the conduct of the war, especially the machines of the Riga factories²). At the same time, they strengthened themselves through the requisition of vital parts of the main transport lines, due to their military forces. Only the infantry divisions³) were stationed at the end of June in the Nien fortress of Rodno, Slita, and Grodno, two or two and a half further subdivisions at different fronts⁴). Thus, General Plevne⁵), as of July 14, had the new German attack with about 7½ infantry and five cavalry divisions⁶). Of these, three infantry divisions (XIX and ½ III Corps) were found in the area of Odrjam—Rakow Lake of the German 6th Reserve Division and the 1½ divisions starting Corps Morgen against further v.l. that infantry division (½ III and XXXVII Corps) continued to be active in the region of Betgola. On the wings, the two divisions of the VII Siberian Corps, which stood as reserve in Mitau and Riga, had previously fought on the Güdweis front and were ultimately not preventing capability.  
General Plevne initially had the duty to assist the German operations against Mitau from the flank, but he gave that up again, as it became impossible to gather the necessary forces from the widely dispersed front in time. Then, on July 16, the few combat-capable parts of the VII Siberian Corps, which had been hastily gathered from Mitau and Riga, collapsed unexpectedly due to the surrounding German forces.  
¹) Conclusion on C. 131 f. – See also S. 441 f.  
²) Romanoff-Kurroll, p. 321 f.  
³) 63, 68, and 72. fib. division.  
⁴) S. 56. Division according to Stübden, 3rd turb. Brig. to the north of Poland.  
⁵) S. 458.

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The operation of the supreme commander against Wilna.   
could not decide, specifically also to extend the right wing of the XIX Corps further, which still held northwest of Schaulien; he ordered several for this wing to counterattack. The 1st Caucasian Rifle Brigade, the only reserve available that was not clearly defined, carried it out on July 17 and pushed back the northern flank of the German 6th Reserve Division! After this success, General Plehwe let the Schaulien front, despite the continuing rapid advances of the Germans in the direction of Mitau, remain firm in both of the following positions. As he felt compelled on July 19 to withdraw the right wing, the XIX Corps, he retained the execution of the movement until the night of July 21. But already on June 20, the German 78th Reserve Division was deep in the region of the Russian XIX Corps at Melzskoge, while the remaining support group broke through at the Dufitu. Nevertheless, General Plehwe, with insistence, did not want to believe in the impending danger yet at this stage. However, he moved his headquarters from Riga to Poniewiez behind the support point. He determined on the way there to order the evacuation of Schaulien and the general retreat on July 21, to continue to hold a position west of Poniewiez while the German forces rolling towards Mitau from there would hit the flank. However, this plan also quickly proved to be untenable. By the time of the left wing on July 25 from the attacking friendly forces was already struck, the XXXVII Corps in large disorder retreated.   
In general, the July operations in Courland and Lithuania belong to the interesting events of the year 1915. In an area that offered room for operational maneuvers, it sought vigorous and aggressive leadership from both friendly and Russian sides to prescribe the law to the opponent. The German general had a generally correct judgment about the situation and prospects; however, as is occasionally stated in a Russian account, “on the German side there was greater maneuverability and greater amounts of ammunition.” On the Russian side, one was not informed about the strength and distribution of German forces elsewhere, as it seems, especially by agents, who, in the first instance, had primarily been engaged in less than favorable work in the occupied territories of their own country. This may have contributed to General Plehwe's faith, even in a difficult situation.

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who did not want to look to victory yet. It is precisely through this that the superior operational ability and the higher fighting strength of the Germans have been able to achieve relatively greater successes in these battles than everywhere where the enemy acted with more caution and but ultimately faced hopeless dangers. The German side of the ongoing battles up to July 24 alone accounts for 27,000 prisoners, 40 machine guns, and 25 guns. Against this stood around 5,000 own losses.  
According to Russian assessments, the continuation of the German attack on the situation on July 25 was conducted on the basis of the remaining Russian forces; their retreat shaped the Russians, who, according to their estimated time, had lost at least 30,000 men by July 14, not through reconnaissance and crisis but soon after recover, ideally to be attacked, while counting for more than 6,000 men captured by August 20.  
Due to the ongoing misery north of the Neman, one was in Petersburg in “Turk,” the Duma acted instinctively and protective; the Russian supreme command was restless. The supreme commander of the Northwest Front, General Alexejev, had assessed the danger high so far, the German strike forces remained low in number. However, having been drawn here also in the breakthrough between the 5th and 10th armies in the realm of possibility. The double task, protecting the way to Petersburg of a right line of troops, was nevertheless focused on the 5th army — if further retreat should be necessary, a position in the advance beyond the small fortress of Dinaburg. For the fulfillment of the reported relationships, the forces in the northern areas of the Neman were, on the whole, through the reporting of sections of the 10th army by early August fulfilled 10½ infantry and 9½ cavalry divisions, so that by the 7 infantry and 6½ cavalry divisions of the general from Below, they were called the balance. Soon after mid-month, steps had been taken to initiate the formation of a new 12th army near Riga. The German naval operation in the Gulf of Riga had raised concerns.

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
h) The Attack of the 10th Army on Rowno\*).  
Maps 6 and 7, Series 27.  
The Supreme Commander East and the 10th Army have been engaged since June in considering the attack against the large fortress Rowno, the first northern bulwark of the Russian Niemen Front, which simultaneously blocked the only functioning and capable railway line from Königsberg to Wilna). To prepare for a vigorous assault over Wilna within the ruins of the Russian forces fighting in Poland. In June, the 10th Army\*) had already repositioned closer to the fortress, having approached the great Niemen from below. On June 20, the Supreme Commander East expedited the effort to have the necessary troops and supplies ready by early July, as the 2nd of July appeared in Poland). At this time, the 10th Army, under Generaloberst von Eichhorn, with a reorganization of the previously mixed units, consisted of seven infantry and two cavalry divisions\*) over a 60-kilometer stretch with its right wing west of Augustow and its left at the Niemen south of Rowno, where the Niemen Army joined west of the Dubisa Mouth.

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A venture of the 76th Reserve Division against Biale Bloto on July 6, which took 500 prisoners, had only strategic importance. On July 7, the Supreme Commander East ordered the resumption of preparations for the offensive against Rowno; the next available unit should be considered for the attack. In the meantime, to divert attention from the offensive beginning on July 13 by the Army Group on this front and the two subsequent days, a series of smaller operations took place, in which the attack by General Major Brorius, leading the 77th Reserve Division, captured 300 prisoners on July 15, northeast of Tuwal. When Generaloberst von Eichhorn gained the impression that the enemy was withdrawing forces – especially the 27th Infantry Division, previously placed into Kalwaria – he resolved, despite the extremely difficult ammunition situation, to attempt the operation once again with high urgency. The operation was supposed to serve as preparation for the upcoming attack against Rowno and to take place over the fortress via the Seja, if possible, even along the Niemen banks, and to be extended further back. The Supreme Commander East ordered as special provisions for this purpose 3,000 rounds of heavy field howitzer ammunition to be made available. After thorough preparations led by General Listmann, the 79th Reserve Division under General Major Bözi broke through the Russian positions early on July 21 and secured the stretch up to the southern edge of the Rowno forest, capturing 1,300 prisoners and extending the riverbank of the Seja approximately one kilometer wide to the northwest of Penmy. Given the apparently weakened positions and the Russian holdings on the right side, it was confirmed that the continuation of the attack would encounter limited success. Meanwhile, the 16th Landwehr Division and cavalry were engaged north of Rowno and had thus established a closing position in the area between the Seja and the Niemen below the fortress, which reached only about 16 kilometers from the center of the city. After the simultaneous significant successes of the Niemen Army, the Supreme Commander East ordered on July 23 the closest possible encirclement of the fortress on the western front by the 10th and on the northwestern front by the Niemen Army. Since the case of the Waren-Plätze Pulaf and Rowno was about to be resolved, he marked the time for the great offensive over the Niemen towards Wilna.

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On July 24, the First Chief of Staff of the 10th Army, Major Keller, was informed by Chief of Staff Ludendorff in Bohemia about the following intentions: As soon as conditions would permit, the army would be reinforced by two six infantry divisions to cross the Niemen under the guidance of Ronovo at the fortress and advance southeast. The Niemen army would accompany and cover this plan in a defensive manner. To advance against Ronovo with the infantry now to the extent that the heavy field howitzers could assume their fire positions should now be decided upon. However, reinforcement was only to be expected with a single preserved brigade. The idea, even now in these days, to divert the existing completed divisions entirely or partially against Ronovo was advised against; it wanted to first throw strong forces at the Niemen when "certain signs of the enemy's assembly and actions would be recognizable." On July 23, it established a 42 cm battery, and on July 24 stated again that a rectification for the 10th Army was not possible, and in the following days also connected the execution of heavy Turkish-Hungarian batteries; it therefore intended to free noticeably heavy batteries, which had clear shooting times, but only had small amounts of ammunition and could not be brought into position with force, but only on rails. Extensive track constructions were thus necessary for the artillery march.  
On July 27, the Supreme Commander East had to report that no reinforcements could be expected according to those set on July 24. Although Generaloberst von Eichhorn raised serious concerns about the too small attack forces, he had to try to cope with what he had. Nonetheless, there were five batteries of heavy artillery in prospect.  
The fortress Ronovo lies at the confluence of the Niemen and Wilna. It was already protected in peacetime by a city wall and a fortification belt of approximately eight to nine kilometers in diameter, according to known standards – as far as one knew – from the war recently.

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10th Army. Preparation of the attack against Rowno. 475  
had been rebuilt and reinforced. A further four to five kilometers of advanced dark fortifications had been in the process of development at that time. In keeping with these extensive permanent works for defense, built up over nearly twelve months of war and reinforced by forward positions, they were regarded as particularly resilient. The attack plan prepared by the General Staff in peacetime recommends attacking the southern front, which is divided by the decisive Fejta into two halves. For artillery movements and ammunition supply, only the Königsberger railway was available. Forces alone were sufficient to engage the northern narrow encirclement of the place and about two corps, around 400 guns, of which about 250 heavier ones, including two heavy batteries, were considered necessary. What the 10th Army had to include against the significantly expanded fortress had not been approached even once to meet these demands. Above all, the attack had to be made solely against the western half of the southern front. The forces were not sufficient to move forward on the visible Fejta foot, so the fortress was visibly reinforced over nearly 150 kilometers of front breadth by surviving 10th Army elements. There, hardly any of the northern forces could be freed for an attack on the fortress.  
When Colonel General von Eichhorn then, on July 31, laid down the fortifications of the Niemen Army, the 4th Cavalry Division also had to be deployed, which was to scare off the fortress in the northern Niemen sector; he found on August 2 that his chief of staff, Colonel Hell, after lists, was urgently requesting reinforcements again. "In view of the inferior provision of the fortress of Rowno," Colonel Hell stated, "and with apparently very inadequate artillery equipment, Command 10 was convinced that even just one further infantry division could achieve the rapid capture of the fortress." The commander-in-chief shared this view; however, he could only state, "since the Niemen Army is currently in combat and may not detach forces from the Varenta front on orders from the highest command," more precisely, that the Army should be given a Landwehr brigade for it, if possible. Colonel Hell wanted to ensure that the 76th Reserve Division, currently standing by the front, would be freed for the attack on the command. Subsequently, the Army received the 6th Landwehr Brigade from the 8th and a Landstorm regiment in the following days.

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from the 9th Army as well as additional heavy and strong artillery; furthermore, the division Bednamin should soon be assigned to the Niemen army). Further presentations were thought by the Supreme Commander East to be able to deliver shortly from the 9th Army. He also emphasized to the Supreme Army Command on August 3 the importance of securing ammunition; the fortification maintained only weak fire, and a rapid success was still possible here; however, he wanted to let the command attack without any further reinforcements. He requested an allocation of the necessary ammunition for heavy artillery and heavy howitzers, for which there was particularly high demand.  
The order in the attack section between Jeja and the lower reaches of the Niemen was given to the general command of the XXXX Reserve Division. The enemy had shown here, as the aerial reconnaissance indicated, the standing works of the older fortress line (Fort III, II and with the adjacent batteries 3 and 2) foreseen two defensive lines, the foremost about two kilometers from the city of Jena. Particularly secure was the area directly at the Jeja on the elevated terrain of Goldow. This was to be secured first by General Staff Eilmann, who was to engage the batteries 3 and 1 and then bring up Fort II. Troops were available to him, especially the brigade Jenser and the Landwehr brigade, as well as the 79th Reserve Division at his disposal on the left of the railroad. Reinforcement with heavy artillery was to be organized to bring about the definitive positions of the enemy. On July 29, it was successful to take up the enemy’s advanced positions on both sides of the railway; about 1200 prisoners were captured in the process. On August 6, the 9th Landwehr Brigade and the 79th Reserve Division were to move their troops up to the line of Duga-Gasjewitz, thus preparing the necessary observation points for the artillery for their fire execution. On August 7, Generalober moved with the operations staff over to Kosalova Ruda, immediately behind the attack section. The following day the artillery was to open fire.  
In the meantime, the Niemen Army had advanced further north; the 10th Army had now also come to encircle the fortress north of the Niemen and to secure against the Wilna sector up to Janow. However, only about one brigade strong unit from the Niemen Army could be made available for offensive action, but not the division.

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10th Army. The Attack against Rovno.   
Bedmann and the previously assigned 4th Cavalry Division will be supported. The 10th Army itself had more help for the new task, as well as the 1st Cavalry Division available for northern purposes, simultaneously as preparation for further operations, for which a significant cavalry force was to be provided for the advance on Bilina. It was also necessary to fulfill the Upper Army Command¹'s request regarding the deployment of troops for the 12th of August. The Upper Army Command granted only 24,000 instead of 36,000 rounds of the requested heavy field ammunition, which means only the requirement for about four shooting days².   
On August 8th, the difficult march of the heavy and light artillery in the treeless terrain was largely conducted. After adventurous difficulties, firing began around midday from about 120 barrels. The Russians responded vigorously, as was anticipated. Under the protection of the destruction fire directed against the enemy's artillery positions and values, the 79th Reserve Division under Major General Böbb gradually advanced between the railway and the Dnieper, capturing at the evening of the 9th and during the night of the 10th of August the positions from Golubow and the northern notable positions, until they faced equally severe Russian responses. Clearly, the 9th Landwehr Brigade engaged in the Jefsa section. The fights of the two days brought in a total of over 2000 prisoners, 16 machine guns, and four pieces of artillery.   
Generaloberst von Eichhorn had already anticipated that the opening of fire against Rovno would visibly bring movement to the fortress for the enemy³. This strike came on August 11th about 40 kilometers southwest of the attack front after thorough artillery preparation south of Marjampol over the Dadina and again this was clearly for the purpose of relieving the attack on Rovno during the subsequent nights. However, it was countered by the now previously extended northern wing of the XXI Corps, 31st Infantry Division under Lieutenant General von Zerwer, which reported being cut off. At the same time, visible Russian destructions rolled towards Rovno, whose connection until now consisted only of Landwehr, reserve, and border troops, totaling probably 15 to 20 battalions, had; four new infantry regiments from August 7th, 1915.

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should now have arrived. It also seemed that the enemy had very ample ammunition available, while the attacker had to contend with his rather scanty supplies. Colonel General von Eichhorn stated on August 12: "Every flank protection seems impossible, as the enemy can constantly bring personnel and material to his reinforcement." The fire of the entire artillery, which constantly dissolves reinforcements, must be executed as quickly as possible. The unified 76th Reserve Division was deployed to the left of the 79th, as France was advancing, beginning with the 115th Infantry Division behind the attacking troops. General Lißmann, who had also taken over command of the section north of Niemen in the meantime (see above), views it as important to flank the necessary lines from there. The use of certain flak batteries depended on the deployment of forces previously brought to the Dubiki foothold, which could again be utilized on August 13 at Altonitski between the Nieviatz and Dubiki footholds.  
In the meantime, a total of 162 pieces (of which more than a third were heavy and heavy artillery) stood against the indicated front, Fort III – Fort II was available. When the counterattack took place on August 27, including from 30.5 cm guns, business was being conducted. According to reports from aircraft, the forts III and II were formed due to the artilleries reserve requirements; some batteries in the intervening field were surrendered, however still in full active duty. On August 14, the troops themselves were convinced that they could take Forts III and II with reinforcements from two fresh infantry regiments; they were assigned from the 115th Infantry Division.  
On August 15, progress was good on the border between the 79th and 76th Reserve Divisions; about 1800 prisoners were made. Conversely, the unexpected tenacity of the Russian resistance showed new difficulties for the right wing of the attacking troops. Similarly, actions on the left wing proceeded slowly, as the department of heavy artillery was also limited, so as to flank the Russian remnants opposing them from the north over the Niemen. Colonel General von Eichhorn instructed the newly allocated 3rd Reserve Division by the Eastern commander across the Niemen at Altonitski against Wilna north of Rovno.  
On August 16, a remote conversation took place between the army.   
1) From the 8th Army (p. 357).

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10th Army. The Attack on Kowno.   
The High Command and the General Command Lignman determined that a temporary effect against Forts III and II should be carried out, under the leadership of the General of Foot Artillery, General Command Schabel, who had joined the Army. General Lignman intended to begin the assault attack between 11° and 12° noon, if the divisions had not already started by themselves. Continuous fire from the meanwhile 208 guns and 10 heavy artillery pieces, through aerial and ground observation well directed, shattered the engagement of the Russian positions and troops completely. General Lignman ordered the attack. On the afternoon of the 2nd, troops of the 79th Reserve and 115th Infantry Division broke through the Russian positions between Forts III and II and took both Forts in its vicinity, while the infantry of the 76th Reserve Division stormed Fort I at 6 pm. On the evening of the 2nd of August, the entire line of the standing positions between Jesija and Niemen was in decisive hands; more than 4000 prisoners and 52 pieces of artillery, 30 of which were captured in combat, were reported as booty.   
The attack was to be continued on the 17th August against the city wall and over the passed Pjensen, the fire heavier and heavier against the positions and flanks of the rights of Jesija and the Niemen River, Forts IV to IX, were to be targeted; the railway connections were not arranged in time. Above all, however, was at this point in the north the 3rd Reserve Division alongside the subordinate division of Kleber in the offensive against the Wilia. On the other hand, considerations for Russian attack actions on the Jesija front were initiated by the conclusions of the 115th Infantry Division in the rear of the right flank of the attack as a reserve.   
On the evening of the 10th, a radio report from the commander of Kowno, General Grigoriens, indicated the size of the earlier successes; it stated: “We have advanced behind the Niemen. Reports are unclear. Telecommunication connection to Wilna lost. The front is open. Expect directives.” General Lignman now only gave the brief instruction: “On to the Niemen and across!”   
During the night of August 17th, numerous openings indicated that the Russians were destroying ammunition, supplies, and defensive structures. Despite the tension of the last days, the German infantry advanced against the Niemen at daybreak, while its scheduled time was set for around 10 am. The enemy had mentioned the bridge but did not initiate any

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August 18.  
serious resistance more. Under the protection of the artillery, which had advanced further, the infantry of the 79th and 76th Reserve Division succeeded in securing the right bank of the river and taking the city itself. By evening, the Petersburg and Fort VII of the Northern Front had been reached. The 115th Infantry Division had crossed the Sejla and secured Fort IV.  
On the night of August 18 and on this day, the discussion of the fortifications line was completed; the last to fall was the visible Fort V, which was located on the Niemen, whereas to the south the enemy held the Sejla section. The troops of General Lisman were in the line Fort V – Gwierla section, while from the northwest the advance units of the 3rd Reserve Division had crossed the Wilna and reached Normalov. The 1st Cavalry Division was before Janow. The enemy had moved to the east.  
With Kowno, the strongest focal point of the Russian Northwestern Front had fallen. 53,000 shells had been fired by the German heavy artillery against it, including 1,000 from the heaviest field artillery. More than 20,000 prisoners and over 1,300 guns, including about 350 heavy ones, were counted overall, alongside 100 machine guns, 20,000 rifles, 810,000 artillery shells, large quantities of naval equipment, and supply materials. Restoration of bridges and railroads began immediately.  
The Russians attached special importance to the great and extensively fortified Kowno. While the northern 5th Army had the independent task of covering the routes towards Riga and Petersburg, the fortress formed the northern closure of the Russian Army. However, it had been placed under the 10th Army in the beginning, but as an independent unit, it was subjected on June 5 to the commander of the Northwestern Front. In a directive from August 17, which could no longer influence the events, the highest army leadership explicitly stated that everything must be done to hold Kowno; should it come to this, the fortress should be encircled; in this case, timely payment must be demonstrated. Its strength had changed several times; in the last days before the capture, it was at its largest with about three previous divisions from the Landwehr.

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10th Army. The Capture of Rowno.   
The measures of these troops, along with their artillery, were timely enjoyed. Due to the significant delays that the German attack suffered from the gradual arrival of the necessary forces, one did not expect a swift end from the Russian side. When the German attack finally began in full force on August 16, it was already too late to salvage the unwelcome business. The established German troops had completely overcome their impression. The railway junction was hardly damaged, and the particularly high functional capacity remained intact.  
For the Russian High Command, the rapid fall of the fortress was completely unexpected. Rowno was supposed to hold, according to the opinion of the Chief of Staff of the Russian field army, General Januschewitsch, since it was not specifically complained of; the timidity of Commander General Grigoriew bore sole blame. He had already left the fortress on August 17 and was sentenced to severe punishment by the military court for his conduct. Moreover, according to General Danilow's view, the fall of the fortress meant one of the most severe blows of the last war period, both in moral terms and with respect to its influence on the ongoing situation of their armies.   
The great success was communicated by General Ludendorff: “With lesser means, his fortress has been attacked. But the troops that were supposed to do so were invigorated by the fresh spirit of their leaders. – They brilliantly fulfilled the task set for them.”   
c) The Plan of the 10th Army up to August 31.   
Maps 6 and 7, Size 28.   
With the High Command in the East, the idea took shape again to continue operations in the Niemen area in mid-August. The objective was to break through the northern wing of the Russian front in order to meet the retreating masses from Poland, passing through Vilna and Minsk. For this, as General Ludendorff later wrote,

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the opponent, who before the 10th and Niemen armies stood in connected positions, but northeast of Kowno only on the leftmost front, was broken through, that is, on one side over Wilna towards the south and Gülden, on the other side against the Duna towards the northeast and north would be thrown back, to unite the cavalry divisions for the way to Nami-Podol. "But the question remained," wrote General Ludendorff further, "whether the operation could still be advantageous due to the Russians' significant retreat towards the east. It was clear that every day, which was postponed, made it less effective. I expect that we should not start with a stop over Alta-Dram and thus begin. I expect this, because all similar attempts at flanking had failed in the past summer to achieve their goal. Thus, I remained in my thoughts about the great operation, since it could still yield a greater success. We were also forced here to act in the Ling. The breakthrough itself had to take place at the 10th army. This was necessary, having the right flank also supported by further reinforcements from the 8th and 12th army against the enemy north of the Rodino knolls, the left against the Russians on the Duna with further forces being secured, where the rail conditions were quite favorable. The securing had to fall to the Niemen army, which was to advance against the lower Duna while executing further cavalry maneuvers could facilitate the railway utilization flexibly. They had already been gathered since the beginning of August at the flanks of the Niemen army.   
Troops were to be assigned primarily to the 10th army. The supreme commander Off had in this regard drawn lines from the pursuing front in Poland. With regard to the ongoing situation, the supreme command could, however, make only limited hopes in this respect. For the successful execution of the operation, it was necessary to consider the expected additional requirements for supplies, as was clearly shown by the Narwa campaign above. These preparations had to go hand in hand with significant reinforcements of troops, since the more they were increased, and the deeper and faster the stop had to be enforced, in order to become operationally effective, the more the need for railway lines and transport means for supplies would have to increase. Accordingly, they spoke of the connections being suspended in the direction of the preparations.

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On 18 August, when Kovno was taken and Nowogrodek was right before its fall, the question of the further attack of the 10th Army was discussed. The Commander-in-Chief East reported on that day to the Supreme Army Command that he intended to send out the deployment troops from Nowogrodek in order to make the offensive over the Niemen downstream from Grodno possible. Half of the 83rd Landwehr Division would be assigned to the 12th Army. Should the Supreme Army Command be in a position to additionally redirect further forces for an offensive from Kovno towards Wilna, then he would, provided a far-reaching success was promised. The answer from General von Tallenhayn received on the same day was: “No objections exist against the withdrawal of the deployment troops from Nowogrodek towards the 10th Army after the fall of the fortress. The planned offensive over the Niemen below Grodno and from Kovno to Wilna fully corresponds to the intentions of the Supreme Army Command. A reinforcement of the Kovno group from my resources is possible, but experience will show that a decision can be made in the coming days. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that a continuation of the offensive in the center and into old Russia cannot be considered here. The operations of the shock troops in Poland will not be carried out significantly beyond the general front-time operation. These groups will presumably have to also yield considerable forces for other battlefield scenes.” In this regard, the efforts outlined by the Supreme Army Command seemed rather low, and it was also questionable whether it would later be possible to expect reinforcements on a larger scale, which meant for the Commander-in-Chief East, after prior arrangements, a late restructuring. The Chief of the General Staff of the field army has now finally consented to the execution of the long-planned and well-prepared offensive of the left army wing. On 19 August, the Commander-in-Chief East issued the following attack order: ... the 12th and 8th Army commence the attack ... the 10th Army attacks with the left wing towards Wilna, surrounding and pushing back the Russians along the left side of Drusfiniti. The right wing remains initially in August and then later advances along the highway.

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Augustow–Grodno north of the Bobr in front of the 4th Cavalry Division is assigned to the 10th Army, right after the fall of Nowogrodek, which is expected today or tomorrow, three landwehr divisions? - “The 10th Army is generally tasked with covering the flank of the army against the line Gwiazdany–Riga. It must first carry out the planned attack while securing communications.” Depending on this outcome, the further task will be defined.  
The 10th Army under Generaloberst von Eichhorn has until now deployed around ten infantry divisions and one cavalry division, while the right flank is at the northern front near Rybnod, and the rest in further deployment from Rajgros via Augustow and Kalvarij have been visibly convoyed. Here the enemy stood on more than 120 kilometers of front still in fine old positions, which had been built up for months west of the Niemen. They were located in the south in the direction of Grodno about 55 kilometers, in the north, where they leaned on the Heißa section, only about 15 kilometers from the river, here at the Strana inlet in a sharp angle from the north into the surrounding area. After reasonable hopes were founded here to gain space on the right bank, in these parts of the stream northward, to force the enemy at least to vacate their position at the Jesia, in further progress still on the task of the entire southern and northern parts of the Niemen section important to the river at the Strana mouth and the fortress Grodno.  
Generaloberst von Eichhorn, however, had, in accordance with the guidelines set by the Chief of General Staff of the Supreme Commander, already ordered, immediately after the capture of Rovno on August 18 in the evening, to continue the attack with the mission of the fortress on both sides of the Niemen, to further break the still publicly held Russian front. Notably, the enemy began already on the night of August 19 to engage in significant parts of this front.

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Advance of the 10th Army on Wilna. 485  
to retreat. Only at the southern flank near Raigrod – Augustow and in the north at the Sejfa section did it remain. Where it had retreated, the German troops followed; in some places they were temporarily held up by rear guards. But already on August 19, the XXI Corps positioned itself west and north of Sejny before new enemy positions. The push from the north was to bring about a decision, as Generaloberst von Eichhorn wanted, here likewise as at the remaining front, to avoid reinforced attacks.  
On August 20, the advancing units from Ronovo, north of the Niemen, encountered more serious resistance from the Litsmann Group; the enemy attempted to maintain a northerly line leading to Wilna in the extension of its Sejfa front. However, the advancing German left wing, the 76th and 3rd Reserve Division, forced him to retreat; the 1st Cavalry Division reached Janow on the Wilia, where the rejoining 4th Cavalry Division attached itself. During the night of August 21, the enemy also abandoned resistance at the Sejfa section and soon it became clear that he was retreating across the entire front from north of Augustow to Janow.  
While initially on the right, northern Niemen bank, the Stab group Litsmann (79, 76th Reserve, 115th Infantry, 3rd Reserve Division) moved with the left wing in the direction of Janow along the Wilia towards the south and thus toward Wilna, the XXI Corps on the left of the Niemen was gradually gathering northward in its advance against the river sector Olita-Premy. Its 31st Infantry Division under Generalleutnant von Berner reached the river bend of Premy as early as August 22; the right wing of the Litsmann Group reached the Strawa that day and is difficult. Here, however, the enemy maintained stubborn resistance and reinforced his position with reinforcements, the 56th and 65th Divisions from South Poland and Galicia, even to strong counterattacks. In the following days, the left wing of the Litsmann Group continued its attack vigorously; the 115th Infantry Division captured more than 1200 prisoners. Thus, the enemy was forced to retreat on August 24 from the Strawa sector and then, in light of the growing German pressure, which was now sharply directed south from Rodnovo, to abandon the summer stronghold north of the bend of Premy. In the process, all attempts by the 31st Infantry Division to advance from this escape route failed before the Russian positions, which blocked their flight position. The active strength of the XXI Corps was in command of

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
August 24-25.  
To bring effect, Generaloberst von Eichhorn now marched along the western Niemen bank towards the north, so that it can gain the bank regarding Prend.  
Meanwhile, the enemy at this bank extended further out against the group Litzmann. On the foremost northern wing, the 4th and 1st Cavalry Divisions alongside the Esche detachment are under considerable activity of the higher cavalry commander 6, Generalleutnant von Garnier, who on August 24 took Wilna with northern connection to the adjacent Wilkomierz standing southern wing of the Niemen Army).  
On August 25, the cavalry corps Garnier was set towards the right Wilna bank against Wilna, where the brisk resistance seemed difficult to approach. General Litzmann stated that it was also intended for his three northern divisions to lead the Wilna, also encircling from the north against Wilna. Generaloberst von Eichhorn, having relocated his headquarters from August 23 to Rovno, abandoned this plan because it posed a second opportunity for forces facing the Wilna in combat to suffer severe weakening. "Visible operations around Wilna with united strength under the direction of the northern flank north of Wilna" must, in the opinion of the army's high command, lead to a quicker and more secure advancement. "It was also noted that the availability of further forces for an advance north of Wilna may have offered hope for timely submissions before the jurisdictional enemy main forces." It was decided: "The encircling wing remains south of Wilna."  
August 26.  
On August 26, the group Litzmann approached the area near Troki Nowe, where it encountered strong resistance about 30 kilometers west of Wilna. To the northwest of Wilna, the cavalry corps Garnier had to advance to the same height but had to hold its 4th Cavalry Division almost continuously to secure the widely spread open flank to the northeast, where the adjacent 3rd Cavalry Division of the Niemen Army took over Wilkomierz this day. To the right of the Litzmann group, the XXI Army Corps under Generalleutnant von Hutier had its main forces.

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Advance of the 10th Army on Wiłna. 487  
now already on the southern bank of the Niemen, the area north of Dita reached, known as the western edge of the river's forests, four older forts, abandoned by the Russians and already in German hands. From these main forces of the army, a distance of 25 kilometers was kept apart, the stalled southern wing of the divisions was able to gain more space towards the floodplain of Merecz and the Augustów Forest. Overall, this advance was made across the entire army amidst ongoing battles, where the enemy displayed proportionally much artillery, including heavier.  
The Supreme Commander D had already anticipated that the Russians would gradually retreat behind the Niemen and might shift diverging forces to the north. To have more influence, being stronger had to be necessary; regarding the released forces from Nowogrodek, they were only to be counted on these days. Thus, he arrived on August 26, to elevate the pressure on the left wing of the 10th Army, ordering further reinforcement through the three divisions in the 12th by the 8th Army, after the outlook, to achieve anything larger with these forces had proven difficult, had also the army command provided no more insight into the matter. He assigned this task to the left wing under procedural group - concluding first: the 10th Army pushes under security that Grodno proceeds towards the railway line station Drany-Wiłna. The 10th Army does not move further the flank of the army. It offers over the outer wing across the tracts and their lists as far as the Strina.  
Meanwhile, the 10th Army received reinforcements from Novogrogegniew, which consisted of the General Command of the III. Reserve Corps, the 87th and 89th Infantry, and 14th Landwehr divisions, as well as some smaller reinforcements. Generaloberst von Eichhorn transferred to the General Command of the III. Reserve Corps with 2 ½ divisions of the Southern Wing (16. Landwehr, 89. Infantry Division, 6. Landwehr Brigade) the entrenchments of the fortifications in Grodno, which are now visibly focused on the Borb on Dombrow, and the left wing of the 8th Army was also involved. The previously assigned 77. Reserve Division is now arriving with the 87th Infantry.

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander Dft Against Wilna.  
Through the northern march of the 77th Reserve Division, the group of the III. Reserve Corps positioned against Grodno found itself finally separated from the rest of the army and was primarily reliant on cooperation with the 8th Army, whose 11th Landwehr Division was to advance from Domtrowo over the Bober at Lipka on August 28. An attack by the 16th Landwehr Division against the Wolhynian section west of Sopolno, which was intended to support this advance and report to the command of the III. Reserve Corps, got bogged down due to opposition from the division and failed with a loss of 500 men. Chemofien managed to carry out the transition over the Niemen, assigned to the 89th Infantry Division, northwest of Spodkine. The actions of these two divisions were rather overshadowed by superior Russian defenses on the Wolhynian section, the Augustow Canal, and the Niemen above Druślinit.  
In the meantime, the XXI. Corps under Lieutenant General von Kulet reinforced its presence on the eastern Niemen bank at Bormarich after Güben; its 42nd Infantry Division under Lieutenant General von Brekow finally broke through on August 28 against stubborn Russian resistance from Olita and thus pushed forward against the advancing 6th Landwehr Brigade and 77th Reserve Division to cross the river. The 31st Infantry Division was already approaching the Grodno-Wilna railway. Significantly tougher battles during these days faced the divisions of Group Lignman in the remote and hilly terrain from east of Strotno to the Wilna. Here the Russians managed to establish strong positions and well-developed defenses against the approach to Wilna, where their resistance was particularly fierce; new units continued to be deployed in this area and now also south of Wilna.

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Stüßstand bei der 10. Army. 489  
Apparently brought in as reinforcement from other fronts. This meant that the German flanks made no decisive progress anymore. As on August 30, additional reinforcements were announced by the High Command, Generaloberst von Eichhorn decided to direct the operation in new paths. Larger shifts were necessary. However, until the evening of August 31, public room was still gained to the south and thus the gap on the western side of the river against Grodno was reduced to 20 kilometers from Drüstiennt. At the same time, the 31st Infantry Division had approached the large railway Grodno–Bialystok to such an extent that the Zaugertreb was interrupted. Furthermore, movements and battles gradually came to a standstill on this day.  
d) Conflicts with the Supreme Army Command.   
Maps 6 and 7.  
On August 27, the Supreme Army Command issued the following fundamental order:   
- His Majesty has commanded: The army groups Prince Leopold and Maßen will announce their advance eastward along the swamp land publicly at the line Ratno (50 kilometers north of Rodno)–Kobylin–Jereziesowo, but will remain with less significantly fortified presence on all roads to the enemy. The left wing of the Maßen group and the right wing of the Leopold group are to cooperate against the rear connections of the enemy verbally, with a push against Fort Bialowieza and a further advance via Prugano-Jereziesowo in a northern direction to be ordered. Troop formations for this purpose should be organized for all cases. The Maßen group immediately begins the construction of a field position suitable for the surrounding area with the least possible forces. ... The Leopold group establishes a similar position ... around the west flank of Fort Bialowieza, either surrounding it through the fort, provided the situation is more favorable, up to the Narewa mouth in the Narew. - The Jindenburg group carries out the operations it has initiated visibly in other Narews and publicly disrupts the enemy's middle Niemen to the greatest possible extent. In doing so, contact is sought, if it is required by the overall situation, the permanent ...  
six divisions were brought in after the fall of Rovno, of which three were from West Poland, two from southern territories, one from Riga, and also not long before from Galicia the 65th D. P. - 1) Connection to E. 351. - 2) E. 363.

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
The assertion of the line from the Narew at the Narew mouth to the sea will be the responsibility. Whether the instruction at the sea occurs in the Riga harbor or at Libau remains to be determined. The construction of an appropriate position is to be initiated, with the expansion of the Niemen fortifications to begin as soon as possible... Special regulations will be issued for all maritime traffic.  
August 28.  
This order, which was issued to the Supreme Commander East on August 28, provided him with the long-term possibility of continuing the operation against the enemy's northern flank with focused forces and the greatest intensity. He was therefore immediately resolute. Contrary to the views that still seemed to be present, it was his opinion that the direction towards a position should be maintained, which later, "as soon as the general situation required it," would need to be held permanently. Also, the Army Group Prince Leopold and the Austrians regarding the Fortress of Bialowizna were necessary and the relocation could continue to Przemysl-Wolfsruhe, which found between both command areas a cutting of opinion via telephone. "It is noted with uncertainty," it says in the war diary of the Supreme Commander East, "that the hoped enterprises should be in an unfavorable position, or later should be moved into this line. Initially, the groups Leopold and Hindenburg remain in the advance. Perhaps the success of the Hindenburg army group will provide new perspectives. Since the right wing of the 12th Army was assigned from the Supreme Sea Command at Siemionowka, i.e., directed towards the northeast, the Supreme Commander East now deemed a significant command of the 10th Army possible, and it seemed unfeasible to take from the 12th Army, as it reported that it was freely moving ahead "the earliest" due to logistical difficulties, it was nonetheless impossible to make further advances at first.  
On August 29, the following army group command was issued: "A thrust of German forces to the south of Fort Bialowizna from Pruzhana towards Slonim will be carried out by the Supreme Sea Command; the 9th Army will provide through the so-called fort - 12th and 8th Armies will follow the enemy as closely as possible; the 12th Army in the advance for Swilno; Indura, until the overcoming of their logistical difficulties, can proceed as far as the advance. Preparations have been made that the large contingents may follow in large marches. The 8th Army attacks Grodno;"

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Discussions with the Supreme Command of the Army.  
Heavy artillery entering the August offensive is assigned to her. Connection on the right to the 12th Army; on the left it keeps itself extended to the August Twelfth Canal north of Sopronhe. – The 10th Army advances further towards Dramy-Wilna, possibly focusing on and north of Wilna. The Niemen Army strikes at Friedrichstadt and continues against the upper Wilna. Thus, the 10th Army is relieved of the attack on Grodno, so that it could deploy its entire force against Wilna. The order was supplemented on August 30th such that the 12th and 8th Armies were to cede the command of the 1st Army Corps along with the 2nd, 58th, 88th Infantry Regiments, 10th Landwehr, and 9th Cavalry Division to the 10th Army, thus observing somewhat more than on August 26th, and that it was to proceed with a unified approach regarding the districts (at Billetdöners). The encirclement of the enemy wing north of Wilna is of greater significance. Moreover, the 10th Army remains in the offensive, as decided on August 2nd, under the security towards Niemen as its "unified" thrust. The 16th Landwehr Division, which was previously the right wing of the 10th Army, was temporarily assigned to the 8th Army, to make preparations for soon striking against Grodno bridges over the Niemen.   
In the meantime, the Supreme Command of the Army was made aware of the different perspectives regarding the division by the units of the Army Group Prince Leopold and inquired of the commander about how the course of the allocation is generally taken into account. He responded: "If this Supreme Command intends to hold the Navenda estuary, I have no choice. In terms of position following the fall of Grodno and Wilna, only the one Navenda estuary-Wilna-Niemen-Mitau is considered. However, I cannot recommend this position, as it would be connected with a permanent pullback of the Army, should the operation, as anticipated by the Supreme Command of the Army and as urgently necessary, be continued, to strike the Russians decisively." Which line would then be considered could not yet be determined. For the right wing, the Seilinasda or Szagara section would require no more troops than the previously preferred position. "To strike the Russians decisively," General von Tallen said, not considering any of the previous options. In general, he stuck to the decision already made but also wanted to keep the Supreme Commander in mind.

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander Oft against Wilna.   
August 31.   
This should not hinder the implementation of his intentions. He answered Chief of Staff von Hindenburg on August 31: "Not to assume is that it might, in any possible way, come to a situation where an enemy could really be defeated once and for all, who is decisively determined to yield without regard to loss of land and people, as soon as he is engaged, in order that the new Russia at its disposal is available, corresponds additionally to the duty, to call upon those who are not able to decide against the commanding authority. However, as stated in the directive of August 27, even in the event of visible favorable developments in operations, unfortunately, there is not enough time to address the unconditional necessity that should intervene, also in the more distant future. Self-evidently, one should not already give away troops and munitions at the eastern theater of war, only a few troops are necessary for maintaining the shortest line in enemy territory... irrelevant. By the shortest line, the here specifically mentioned is meant, which should be held with the minimum effort of forces. After the decision about where the main operations should continue has been made regarding the East, there is no choice left. And the issuing of best land must be taken into account, if necessary, it must be purchased. Whether the Supreme Commander actually refers here to the forces commanded for troops and munitions or whether a further forward position should be established, the principle remains to enable troops faster defense along the shorter line, should it last, but not to lose the shortest line in the shaping of the situation. Any further requirement for troops and ammunition within the limits of the possible should be avoided. According to preliminary estimations, it should be assumed that subsequently up to 30% divisions might need to be given up. In both other groups, the terrain compels and drives into a shorter timeframe to confront challenges posed by transport beforehand by restrictions. "At the Narwenta estuary as the junction of the positions of the army groups Hindenburg and Prince Leopold must therefore be maintained."   
Already on the next day, on September 1, the Supreme Commander Oft received an order concerning him and the army group Prince Leopold, stating that they should also continue the offensive, especially against the road section Słonim–Zelwa, hence against the Selianal sector. Regarding the demarcation and mutual support, immediate...

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Disputes with the Supreme Army Command. 493  
to decide. On September 2, a message was sent from General von Pfalsenhayn to Colonel General von Conrad, stating at the end: "It is, if it should succeed, to push the enemy behind the line Pinsk–Baranowicze–Friedrichstadt–Riga; a lecture on the duration position could come into question there, as otherwise it would probably not require more forces than those behind the line." The Supreme Army Command based its actions on the assessment of the Supreme Commander O. H. The question of the duration position remained dependent on the results of further developments.  
The Supreme Commander O. H. then addressed the army group Maasen: Since the Supreme Army Command approved the continuation of the offensive of Army Group Prince Leopold from Glonim – Selwa, he would "expect a great success from possibly energetically pushing the left wing of the 11th Army towards Glonim." He received the response that this advance would take place on September 3. Regarding the "obligations", he reported on September 4 in response to an inquiry to the Supreme Army Command: "I anticipate something on September 8 or 9, depending on the course of the railway transport movement, to attack with the reinforced 11th Wing of the 11th Army towards and over Vilna–Wilkomir, in order to possibly allow for another advance over the 'obligations'. The None Army will not join the attack, while the 8th and 12th Army will continue the attack in the north of the Niemen, with a decrease in forces of the 9th and 11th Army still possible successes. The resistance of calling from my front has not yet been broken; it must still be dealt with."  
In the night of September 5, the Supreme Army Command replied: "Army Group Prince Leopold and parts of the Army Group Maasen will attempt, by actions in the general direction over Glonim against the enemy north of the swamp area. Whether this is impenetrable is currently questionable due to the current status of connections. If the situation in the West does not require it sooner, initially two reserve divisions will be withdrawn from the front area on September 15. It is likely that the withdrawing of the remaining forces designated for other theater of war will then occur in about a third-degree consequence."

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
Thus, clarity seemed to have emerged, and, as the Supreme Commander East had to assume, for the next objectives, there was also alignment with the Supreme Army Command. In reality, however, this was not the case. General von Falkenhayn thought differently, as he noted to the Supreme Commander East only after the conclusion of the operation in a letter dated October 8 and later in his statements after the war, not only in an explicitly defined way but also in a breakout attack, perhaps over Dvinsk with Lida, against the seemingly weak Russian center. From this, he believed, in collaboration with the army group Prince Leopold – that the consolidation of the entire hostile wing on the marshlands of Glonim – was promised. However, he had not intervened, fresh he to the Supreme Commander East, as he stated "the conviction of any other reiterated, as long as it remains within the given framework, thus the whole is not threatened to be damaged, and because his mathematical sensibility of the outcome of such an operation, which is conducted so vigorously, is permitted to slide by unobserved."  
2. The Battle at Wilna.  
a) Reorganization and fighting until September 8.  
The city of Russian resistance in the area of Troki Nowe and the prospect of substantial changes, in total a general command, the infantry divisions and a cavalry division, had the Supreme Command of 10. It was organized that was, in another respect, on the relatively rejected plan of General von - (see) to be refreshed, which had led the attack north of Wilna. On August 30, Army Chief von Eichhorn had established the formation of a strong and lively reorganization group, to "offer themselves inevitably to the backtracking enemy forces over the line from - Bolshewitz to the northeast." While the rest of the army was visibly engaging the enemy near Wilna, the reorganization group should bypass Wilna via the Wilna-Dinaburger railway. Additionally, the XXI Army Corps should be deployed as an open troop formation from the entire western region towards the thrust on the Stob wing north of Wilna, as the commanding general had proposed himself. Until the movements...

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12th, 8th and 10th Army.   
Having been carried out and the reinforcements were at hand, about a week had to pass.   
In the meantime, the enemy, who had to increasingly remove the impending danger and had gained forces through the retreat from Poland, launched fierce but extremely costly engagements in the area of Trofimow and north of the Biala with the deployment of his guard corps on September 1st and 2nd. All these attempts failed due to the resistance of the remaining Luttmann and Garnier. On September 3rd, the Russian attacks subsided.   
In the north, the Niemen Army wanted to direct its effort, which had previously been directed successfully against the lower Dünna, towards Friedichstadt, gradually extending more southwards. The extreme right wing of this army was the 3rd Cavalry Division, which took command on September 3rd at Schirwinta northwest of Schirwint alongside the northern wing of the 10th Army.   
Before the right wing of the 10th Army and further south, the Russian counteraction had diminished in the last days of August. For the pursuit movements of the 12th and 8th Armies, the order from the supreme commander dated August 29th1) formed the basis. Due to supply difficulties for this army, a necessary allowance was initially set for minimal against General Staff Chief Ludenborth from the reinforced continuation of Bonardsch, at least with parts. The ground was aimed to lie on the right wing, the next target was the Gnifloz section between the similarly named place and Indura, while the 8th Army took the direction towards the Niemen fortress Grodno, which it was to approach. Overall, the 12th Army had at its disposal 10½ divisions as of August 30, of which only four were in the front line1); the 8th Army had 5½ divisions, of which 4½ were in the front line1); for the attack on Grodno, an additional 21 heavier and heavier batteries and siege equipment were also brought up. Without much resistance to be found, the pursuit continued with both armies.

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By September 1, the foremost troops of the 12th Army had arrived and, due to the naturally strong Swilnosch section, the expected enemy resistance was absent. The 8th Army was able to overcome the Bodr swamps relatively quickly thanks to excellent leadership through pioneers and stood before Grodno on this day.  
The position of Grodno had evolved since 1913 through the advancement of a new front line, which lay about kilometers west of the city, in the expansion into a strong, newly established weapon emplacement. During the war, reinforcement works had continued. To keep the supply in flow, the position had to be taken into account. The attack was to be directed against the northwest front. Of the artillery prepared, the heaviest batteries were not yet ready; however, the artillery opened fire on September 1 against Forts III and II. Previously, the 1st Landwehr Division, designated for the south side of the position under General of Infantry von Jacob, had already failed to reach Fort IV and, after her efforts and higher self-constructions had been thrown, attempted to storm but did not achieve the objective. In the afternoon, however, a new attempt succeeded despite not insignificant enemy resistance. The Russians were positioned at one sniper port; unexpectedly fervent success compelled reflection suggesting that it signified a serious deficiency in the defense of the place. The next day confirmed this viewpoint. During light fighting against Russian repulses, the values abandoned by the enemy could be maintained; the crossing over the Niemen began. On September 3, further fierce enemy counterattacks occurred against the right flank of the forward-positioned 8th Army, but then the enemy advanced on title and Tevior. The spoils were limited to 3600 prisoners; six heavy guns, including two Japanese, were also captured. The attack seemed to have initiated the evacuation of the forward position earlier than expected, but they could no longer completely break through, as the track to Wilna was blocked by the advances of the German 10th Army. After the Russian overall front had visibly retreated from Grodno in the south as well as the north, in view of the German artillery, the emplacements were consequently called off; the experiences from Novogrojeviś and Kowno may have had an influence.

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8th Army. Capture of Grodno.  
The visibly adjacent German 12th Army had gained additional space, accompanied on the right by the naval group Prince Leopold. On September 3rd and 4th, it made seven kilometers west of Wolkowysk and east of Indura against new resistance, which it could only gain in a frontal attack very slowly in the often difficult terrain, while the 8th Army was still delayed by the Niemen crossing. By the afternoon of September 4th, however, revealed Russian reconnaissance had shown that there would be a continued retreat across the entire front between the Rakitno marshes and Grodno, starting from the southern wing, in the following night. Accordingly, on September 5th, the situation developed on the right wing of the 12th Army, as well as on its left wing. Before the 8th Army, the opponent had established a strong position 20 kilometers south of Grodno in the Niemen bend from south Stibel over the lakes of Sejzori to Drujkinisti.   
In the meantime, the overall plan for the conduct of the offensive against the northern wing of the Russian army group Machtin and Prince Leopold was possible. This was initially projected onto two divisions, it was explicitly stated that they should not start earlier, but also because of the extremely unfavorable time of year. The agreement of the highest army command for cooperation with the army groups Machtin and Prince Leopold enabled the 12th and 8th Armies to continue in the general direction towards Lida and northward, that is to the northeast, to launch an attack and, if possible, to hold this direction. This was to maintain Wilna from the south as well. The space 120 kilometers south of Wilna on a longer stretch flowing from a northeastern direction provided the Niemen with a suitable delimitation for the area of attack to the right. The 12th Army was to lead its main forces into the northwest, right bank of the river, while parts directed to the south covered the flank to the naval group Prince Leopold. In the north, the security against the Russian 5th Army and against the advancing forces from Smolensk, Petersburg, and Riga towards Dniaburg could be most effectively shaped by an attack of the Niemen Army in this direction, just as it was with the 10th Army.

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The operation of the supreme commander H. against Wilna.  
September 6.  
The supreme commander H. outlined his intentions on September 6 in the following army group order: “I am pleased to strike the calls again, decisively, before he takes over the western Beresina and Wilna.” The 12th Army was to throw its opponent with a weaker right wing into the battlefield of Jelviana and Gascara, while at the same time launching a major assault on him. The 8th Army was to cross the northern Niemen bank. This army initially had to break the Russian resistance at Stibel. Subsequently, the directions of attack of the 12th and 8th armies already extended over the Giedlida teeth to the northeast. The 8th Army held the 75th Infantry Division, the 12th Army soon had the 4th Carabiniers and the 37th Infantry Division at its disposal for the 10th Army. The command stated further: “The 10th Army attacks on September 9 with its left wing. Thereby, the higher cavalry commander 6 with the 1st and 9th Cavalry Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division from the Niemen army is to attack from the opposite side towards Wilno, focusing on Kustisch-Ljanz. The army has to take into account, to make use of further differing forces on its left wing.” “The 9th Army, the 3rd Army determined that the 88th Infantry Division and two mortar batteries should now be handed over, should publicly continue the attack from Striebitschat with its main goal on the Azdaman division, also advancing in the direction of Ljanz.  
By September 8, the 12th Army, which was also hindered by serious supply difficulties, had reached the Selwinah section near Selwa and northwards in connection with the naval group Prince Leopold. On its left wing, the corps of Plisidin was crossing over the Niemen southwest of Stibel. It went over to the 8th Army, which had not yet been able to take this place due to heavy Russian counterattack and had also remained at Jeszior and Druszkieti.

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Battle near Wilna. Preparation for encirclement.  
In the 10th Army, the preparations for the encirclement attack were essentially completed. Behind the front of the Ligtmann and Garnier groups, eight infantry divisions were ready, along with two cavalry divisions forming the outer left wing, extending north of Wilkomierz. For September 9, Generaloberst von Eichhorn ordered the start of the massive attack on Wilna, assuming that the enemy was now facing his front with about five divisions (north of the Wila) and nine divisions south of it in defense. He estimated the enemy's 20 divisions in the north at the line of Schirwindt while, northward, the Wilkomierz-Dünaburg route was established but at this time, cavalry was not present. Generaloberst von Eichhorn himself proposed an attack with a total of 17½ infantry and two cavalry divisions, meaning he was significantly outnumbered compared to the attacking enemy. He expected that the 8th Army would advance on the left wing along the Meraczanka towards the northeast. From the 10th Army, the Carlowitz group with four divisions and the Ligtmann group with 5½ divisions were to strike, with 1½ divisions positioned north of the Wila meeting the enemy, while further north the Suttier group with five infantry divisions and the Eben group with one infantry division and one cavalry division were to provide a thrust. This had to coincide with a right wheel maneuver against the enemy’s forward position held by the 115th Infantry Division as the pivot point. Thus, only the four infantry divisions of the outer left wing were to initiate action early on September 9, while the others were to follow in due course. The strong cavalry corps of Garnier was to take precautions along with the division from Bedmann of the Njemen Army, and then advance north of the area of Malatity to cover the left flank, ready to facilitate the advance of the left wing of the Eben group through overflanking action.

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander Hf against Wilna.  
h) The Attack up to September 14.  
Map 6, Positions 28 and 29  
On September 9, movements of attack began on the northern flank of the 10th Army. They led to fighting in an area that, in a wide radius around Wilna, especially in the vicinity of the convoluted Wilia course, features hills and valleys in abundant numbers, is largely wooded, and is therefore difficult to overview.  
The shooting blinds of the outer left army wing and the cavalry corps initiated the attack and, north of Schirwinty, Russian cavalry advanced to provide support over a distance of up to 20 kilometers. The northern wing of the German cavalry was able to approach to Hajatn about 15 kilometers; the Hutter group had been united and was thus still formed. On September 10, the forward movement of the Immuflugs continued as planned without major battles. The Eben group reached the area south of the lakes of Malaitin in the north and the marshy area of the Schirwinta Lake in the south. It thus retained its significant physical Dornarßchichtung and was to continue on with the left wing aground in the Zahnbereich Syjudina legally proceeding from Sinenjan. In addition to it, the left wing of the Hutter group (77th Reserve and 42nd Infantry Division) was brought up, while in this case the Soviets were pushed southeast against the Russian Kolonel assembly, whose southern wing was undermined by the 115th Infantry Division under Generalmajor von Kleist, who had been prompted to follow up to Wilna, still in the old line, 1½ divisions (detachment Gebeck and 14th Landwehr Division) of the Pisman group, so that the Schirwinta Lake and Wilna were positioned with a battle front of about 25 kilometers wide with 4½ divisions. Thus, near Wilna, three divisions (Jenter Division and 31st Infantry Division of the Hutter group and 76th Reserve Division of the Pisman group) were still available for deployment, with the 75th Reserve Division on the move towards Bülklemierz.  
On September 11, additional divisions were deployed for the attack between Wilna and the Schirwinta Lake, having also achieved significant progress in difficult terrain. They were now fighting on a width of 27 kilometers with 6½ German divisions as assumed, against at least as many Russians. Only the Jenter division had been withdrawn to the left to ultimately use the Schirwinta Lake in the continually expanding area.

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Battle of Wiłna. Flank Attack of the 10th Army. 501  
To facilitate the group led by Eben in establishing the Russian position from the north and thus counteracting the frontal attack. Meanwhile, General von Eben hardly faced any battles in the western march while reaching the lakes north of Dubnít. He thereby approached the Schemjdan section and the large railway line Wiłna – Schemjan – Dünaburg, aiming to encompass it with his three infantry divisions in an ever-widening front. Additionally, the later cavalry divisions (4th division and cavalry troop Garnier with 1st, 3rd, and 9th divisions) spread from the Malatyrier lakes to the Dünaburger Straße north of Klažyn over an area of about 45 kilometers, while the Niemen army had moved against Dünaburg itself (to the attachment of the Bormarch).  
Meanwhile, the high command received the impression that the enemy was withdrawing troops from the front visible south of Wiłna, apparently two corps (III., Ibirisch and XXVI.), and was reallocating on the northern wing of his Wiłna group, possibly in the area around Schemjan. The army apparently still had the toughest task ahead. However, it became increasingly apparent that it still focused on the previous Wiłna and Schwirwinta lakes, where the enemy troops were densely concentrated in the northern area, especially east of Wiłna, where only relatively weak forces were advancing in new territory. General von Eben had significant concerns about the further march leading to the collapse of the remaining army. The general staff of the army, Colonel Hell, also outlined an eventual border conversation on that day, despite the continuous advancement of the Bormarch, about “the extensive flanking maneuver over Liwud and then entering across Grib to Lotwi,” which lay about seven kilometers south of Nujuna.  
Colonel Obersthebsfaber also occupied himself with these questions. In his war diary, it states on September 11: “The northern flank of the 10th Army is advancing well; its flanking maneuver demands a full success. Currently, inquiries for the most capable references behind this wing are ongoing.” Danger felt like a common opinion, since the Niemen army was primarily advancing against Dünaburg and thus exerted strong influence. However, on the southern flank of the overall attack lay the 12th army at Selvonita and northward, and, above all, the 8th army northeast of Grodno, reporting conditions for new enemy opposition. A title was assigned for September 9 from the corps of Plütin and Frommel2) of the 8th Army with alternating success reported to be difficult.  
1) p. 535. – 2) counted as the III. fib. corps. 3) S. R. R. 3 with the troops of the preceding corps Hollen (p. 495).

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September 11. The 37th Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Freiherr von Sollen had to bear the main burden of the battle. Since the right flank of the 10th Army was also not experiencing a decrease in Russian opposition, the commander of the 10th Army committed to a ruthless breakthrough against the left flank of this Army, pursuing significant success. In the efforts to extend the begun operation into a truly decisive one, he turned to the Supreme Army Command to be able to complete it in fourteen days from the Xth Army corps, which, as exercises, was ready for reinforcement to the west at Zailvost. As a force, he offered up to two divisions of the 12th Army, which could arrive at Zailvost within a few days. When the 12th Army reported in the evening of that day that it had succeeded in establishing a firm foothold at the southern point of Zeilin’ianta and had learned from aerial reconnaissance and Russian radio signals that the opponent, in front of the 8th Army, would likely retreat, the Commander-in-Chief viewed the effect of the encompassing movement of the 10th Army and repeated his request to the Supreme Army Command for favor: "I promise to achieve great success from this, to throw the opponent into the swamp and ultimately Wilna. If the Russian wants to save his army, he must try to bind Dinaburg to the left flank of the 10th Army in flank and rear. Against these forces, I need a solid position of this wing, which would naturally achieve the appropriate engagement of the Xth Army Corps at Rovno."  
September 12. The Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army (was unable to comply with this request, as the danger of a new major breakthrough attempt by the enemy at the front had significantly increased). He emphasized that the Supreme Army Command did not close itself off from the mentioned reasons. Nevertheless, the general situation was influenced so unfavorably by the experienced measures that His Majesty could not decide on it. The corps, as it could only be monitored from Rovno with 12 to 14 days notice, would necessarily not be available before the end of the month in the area. As long as this would continue, operations here in the East with the previously utilized forces could unfortunately not be continued." Independently of this telegram exchange, the assembly of the Supreme Court of War was scheduled for September 16 at the 10th Army in Rovno.

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Battle near Wiela. Continuation of the Encirclement Movement.  
Commander Licht relied on his own forces; however, the enemy seemed to retreat in the meantime from the extremely weak northern flank of the Niemen Army (a new army command was supposed to be established northeast of Riga). This should not disturb the unilateral operation. Even if the Niemen Army wanted to remain on the offensive with its right wing, Commander Licht considered it despite the 12th Army to deploy the 3rd Infantry Division, drawn from the 12th Army, at the Niemen Army instead of the 10th Army. This division was instructed either to march backward with the main force to hold the enemy and bind them, countering forces for encirclement, or to shift forces backward to make the pressure of encirclement more sustainable.  
Before the 8th Army, the enemy had ordered the already initiated retreat during the night, which continued throughout September 12. The 10th Army made a foot march. In the meantime, the enemy held northwest of Wila and the Schwirinta Lake, the continuation of the cursed efforts of the groups Lisztmann and Jutier resulted in all the jurisdictions of the calls. However, it succeeded to sum up the impact of the Schwirinta Lake, so the front corresponded to reality; the attack of the Jutier group fell, however, repeatedly frontal on new enemy positions, while the encircling group continued to advance eastward unavoidably.  
On a 36-kilometer-wide front, their infantry divisions crossed the Dinaburg Bay in the evening and were located with the left wing at Szenjanz, 65 kilometers south of Schwirinta Lake. East of Szenjanz, four cavalry divisions took advantage of the ever-widening area for their open flank. The enemy felt completely overwhelmed by the appearance of German troops deeply in his territories; nothing indicated preparation for defense. Aircraft reported that, in Besthand, 18 kilometers northwest of Wila, troops had been unloaded; it was assumed that they had originally been destined for Szenjanz, but the way had already been blocked. Furthermore, multiple Russian cavalry divisions were to gather northwest of Szenjanz, at Wisthy.  
To fully exploit the unsuitable condition of the situation, the encircling wing was in focus. The size of the army was, however, in a solid frontal combat before the conclusion of intercepting enemy forces. Under such circumstances, it could now span 25 kilometers wide, just from the division of...

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September 13.  
On September 13, the two right wing divisions of the corps Gen. were deployed from the south against the Willa south of Wilna, and the frontal attacks of the Lutier and Eben groups were continued; at the same time, however, forces were withdrawn from them to support Group Eben. The naval corps moved with the division southeast toward the Simut and Narocz Lake, reaching 15 kilometers beyond the Gemainszyn moving into the south, exposing border fortifications to interrupt the route from Simonlef via Polda to Molodcze. On the other hand, the division Bednamar was withdrawn to support the Niemen army's advance to Einburg to the north, and the 9th cavalry division had to monitor the open northern flank of the encirclement field near the lakes of Polscha.  
The continuation of the frontal attacks did not yield any decisive results against the seven-holding enemy on that day. However, in the south, the retreat of the Russians before the 8th army had manifested itself, spreading to the right on the front of the 12th army and to the left almost across the entire front of the Carolus group. This was in pursuit of the advance and, having converted the previously southeast-directed front at Lejpuny into a pivot, established a line of interaction with Group Eben that subsequently led to a double encirclement of the Russians holding the northwest of Wilna.  
September 14.  
On September 14, the right wing of the army, fighting against Russian rear guards, established its line of interaction in conjunction with the movements of the 8th army to such an extent that it approached both the right and left of the front toward the northwest near the Werlka section from Lejpuny over Troki. North-west of Wilna, however, the enemy still stood. Northwest of Wilna, the substantial attack was continued with lesser forces, while additional units drifted further east to strengthen the expected decisive battles in the encirclement field. The 42nd infantry division, which was the first to be withdrawn, was already positioned on that day between the Zenter division and the 10th Landwehr division of Group Eben, thus in the middle of the northern front, and achieved progress in the direction.

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Battle near Wilna. Continuation of the Supply Movement. 505  
on the Wilna arc of Niemenczyn. On the outer wing of the supply movement, the last infantry division of Group Eben, the 2nd Infantry Division, under commander, Lieutenant General von Talt, had wanted to continue the advance, remaining on the right bank of the Wilna River, in the direction towards Smorgon, but had already engaged against the river at the point they reached at Medinisch. From here to the area south of the Schwirinta Lake, there were almost 70 kilometers of front with nearly 75 Referee divisions present. However, six German infantry divisions were also on the enemy's flank and in the rear, from there to the northwest of Wilna, still not on a width of 30 kilometers, where there were still as many divisions, of which one had already been drawn to reinforce there. The three cavalry divisions of General von Garnier could approach the city of Smorgon to within 15 kilometers, parts of them found themselves south to Narocz Lake. 60 kilometers from them was the 9th Cavalry Division now at Sivenjany, while another 90 kilometers further north, the Niemen Army had reached very close to the outer positions of Dinaburg.  
Aircraft reported secure landings at Smorgon and transports of troops from Wilna to Molodeczno. Generaloberst von Eichhorn knew that in the Wilna sector, the Russian general army was at stake, along with its corps. The main troops from Korsz were also collecting more closely according to the established escape routes. The whole 10th Army hoped for a complete success. 41). They wanted to keep the Russian masses, totaling up to 15 divisions, still further through constant holding and pushing back into retreat, while cavalry was to be given in the rear. At 4 in the afternoon, Generaloberst von Eichhorn gave the cavalry troops commanded by Garnier the order via radio: Enemy, visible and tangible in Wilna, is being encircled. Blocking exits between Gwir Lake and Berzogna Stümpfen is crucial. Reinforcements towards Pida-Molodeczna-Polost and Wilna-Molodeczna are essential. The army is moving continually to the left. 2nd Infantry Division is to move from Midgalski towards Scholy. Corresponding instructions were given to the other parts of the army.  
In this situation, the Commander-in-Chief East intervened. He was satisfied with the previous course of the enemy's attack. The

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September 14.   
The exposure of the area between the 10th and German armies had already prompted him to order the latter to relieve the Bavarian cavalry division to Dutsch, from where the 9th cavalry division had been withdrawn south; in the afternoon he additionally demanded protection for the 10th army against Russian forces that might advance via Wishty. Regarding the situation here, it is noted in his war diary on September 14: "Also at the 10th army, the Supreme Commander East intervenes. The right wing is again confronted with strongly fortified enemy positions, further north unchanged. West and north fronts are not engaging vigorously." "The enemy has a free hand to direct its stronger forces stationed at Wilna against the impending encirclement," he asked for the shorter way. Furthermore, the first insight from intercepted radio messages indicates that a now assembled Russian 2nd army (XXVII, IV, first, XIV, XXXVI corps, and a cavalry division) was to be transferred from the center of the hostile forces towards Modloczezu—Smorgon, and he intended to bring his operations, as Lieutenant General Auerbach communicated in a phone report to the chief of staff, Colonel Hell, at the most opportune moment, before the new Russian army could manifest itself. Further results with the 10th army with "highest urgency"— as the phone conversation in the war diary of the 10th army continues to be noted— should remain high, in order to avert the danger from, likewise increased hostile forces against flanks and rear of the 10th army. Future withdrawal of various forces of the army from the currently gained open semi-circle for a concentrated attack on Wilna was deemed inappropriate. Lieutenant Colonel of the 2nd Infantry Division from the reached objectives in immediate western direction should have the assigned attack. In contrast, Lieutenant Colonel Hell opined that a decisive success could be achieved if the enemy's possible closure of the ring was removed, and that further shifts of forces to the left seemed advisable, as an immediate.

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The situation from the East is not present at this time. Furthermore, it is highly probable that the railway lines Moldiceano-Polozf and Moldoceano-Biina will be destroyed on September 15 due to this situation that arose. Additionally, it would be important to note that the strong rifle salvo will provide significant security for the army to advance on favorable terrain. “These positions,” it states in the directive, have not been taken seriously; it was mentioned that Colonel had opened, that the Supreme Command in the East demanded the divisions to concentrate attacks by September 16 at the latest, and added that telephone orders would hardly be issued by then.”  
This decisive command of the Supreme Commander East read: “I expect that the army will attack on its entire front by September 16 at the latest, as a later timing could only change our situation to our disadvantage.”  
The 12th and 8th Armies were to participate. They requested, following the Jeverization of Prince Leopold on September 14, the weather of particularly broad and shrinking Szacara-Wolbsäuftis in its relatively small parts, as well as reaching a line from the Szacara estuary in the northeastern region via the Niemen, which would connect west of Rabun to the southern area of the 10th Army. The Russians seemed to have settled in a completely new position. Behind their front, it had to be noted that Moldoceano troop arrangements were not being observed, while efforts were made to advance through bombardments by planes and battle ships. The Supreme Commander East directed the 12th Army to exert strong pressure on the northern Niemen line in the northwestern direction and likewise to encircle the 10th Army.”  
The 8th Army was noted: “I expect that tomorrow, on September 15, the troops of Plitšov will vigorously gain ground toward Lida.” This should restrict the enemy from Wilna also from the southwest.  
c) The concentrated attack and the pursuit from September 15 to 19. Maps 6 and 7, Stages 28 and 29.  
For the 10th Army, the 15th of September served for the preparation of the 15th, with a number already set for the general attack on the 16th. According to the specific directives of the Supreme Command East, Lieutenant General von Eichhorn was obliged to revoke the previously issued orders and drive his troops sharply against Wilna.

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The operation of the Commander-in-Chief East against Wilna.  
For the cavalry corps Garnier, the command given by the Commander-in-Chief East before the advance was not changed. During the night, the Commander-in-Chief East ordered that the 9th cavalry division, designated by General von Garnier in agreement with the 1st and 4th cavalry divisions, instead ride north again to join forces with the imperial cavalry division of the Niemen army to attack the Russian cavalry division, which was assembled at Polozk. Of the remaining three divisions of the cavalry corps, the 3rd cavalry division reached the area of Krayviche and the crossings on the 15th of September along the railway Polozk-Moldoecyno. The 1st and 4th cavalry divisions remained to advance against the troops of the Russian Wilna group. They crossed and interrupted the railway Polozk–Moldoecyno–Wilna in their northwest direction from Smorgon. During this time, the 1st cavalry division engaged in serious combat visible through Japrany, where the 4th cavalry division under Major General von Hofmann was forced to also encompass the enemy to the northwest, in the section Zupany–Soli.  
In Group C, the left wing, acting in accordance with the directives of the Commander-in-Chief East, had initially been positioned southeast of Wilna at Bormanjan. The 2nd infantry division under Lieutenant General von Salve could manage to come closer or engage in partially fierce combat until the evening along this retreat path. As a consequence, the left wing of the 58th infantry division also crossed the Wilna, along with the 10th landwehr division and behind it the group under Hütter. The 42nd infantry division retreated through Scheiman further southeast.  
Meanwhile, the enemy was west of the Scheiman bend and appeared to be moving generally on a broad front to the south. The troops of Lieutenant General von Suttier advanced without resistance for about 80 kilometers and encountered further from the Scheimana mouth westward to Niemencz near Wilna, then the front widened further to the west. The enemy appeared to have taken up strong positions again. In Group Lisztmann, just east of Wilna, the 14th landwehr division had gained some terrain, while the front stood here; the group Carl von advanced several kilometers forward to the positions held by the enemy at the breach. By the 8th and 12th armies, the combat power was no longer sufficient with extremely limited supplies to execute the set operations.

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to dissolve. They remained firmly in front of the Russian resistance. To what extent, apart from expressed troop allocations, the strength appeared in two offensive cases, the following data shows the relationships for the 12th Army²): Since July 13, it had lost about 1,800 officers and 80,000 men. 47,000 men had since been recruited as replacements, and a further 13,000, who were in the process of advancing, had faced a drop numerically in three quarters, with no battalions found anywhere under 600 men. However, further estimates were not possible regarding the exact number of experienced leaders and troops lost.  
With the 10th Army, the command for the general attack on September 16 first stipulated that the adjacent 8th Army would proceed with the left wing from Radun eastward, while the 9th Army was to stay with the wing of the attack north of the road, proceeding as a community of posts to the east. The attack of the 10th Army involved ten divisions from the army, of which seven focused on the northern bank of the Bülna, concentrating against an area, which ultimately narrowed over the entire 20 kilometers around Wilna, with the flanking troops corresponding to four divisions each. In individual commands, the emigrating Carlo I n s i t should deploy two divisions (70th brigade, 87th and 89th infantry and 16th landwehr division), from the Waffen group Zießmann with five divisions (79th reserve division, brigade Monton 3, reserve, 1st landwehr and 76th reserve division) from the northwest, the H ü t t e r group with 5½ divisions (115th infantry division, Elbed department, 77th reserve division, central division, 31st infantry, 75th reserve division) from the north, and the E b e n group with four divisions (10th landwehr, 42, 58, and 2nd infantry division) from the northeast. From the cavalry corps G a r n i e r, which had the southern flank of the army to support, two divisions should be in the rear of the enemy’s lines to disrupt the Dismanja crossing and the Moldeczan-Lida line; the 3rd cavalry division was to turn toward Moldeczan itself, where a Russian army headquarters would be set up, to interrupt the Moldeczan-Minst line and deploy demolition units against the Minst-Smolenst line. The 9th cavalry division, which without significant enemy action reached the area against Polusche and had taken command of the Baden cavalry division, could now still

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The operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
September 16.  
was brought closer again and should take over the command against the east between the Zähn Moldodeziano-Poloz and the road Siennajn-Postawy.  
The offensive movements began as per the army command but did not lead to the expected results. The group Car loni failed all attempts to cross the Werstow. South of lower Wilna, the right wing of the group Lisman had to fend off Russian counterattacks; during the crossing, the left wing and the right wing of the group Hutier gained very little ground. The enemy seemed to be artillery-wise stronger than in the previous days. The left wing of group Huiter lay firmly at the Wiliain section Niemenczyn-Schejmian mouth. The 10th Landwehr and 42nd Infantry Divisions of group C constantly fought for the river crossing, but did not get much further, just like the 58th Infantry Division. Only at the extreme left end did the 2nd Infantry Division notice the enemy pushing back a larger section; they gained over the officer Gerhardt, reducing the gap to the Cavalry Corps Gar n i e r by 15 kilometers. Both sides then maintained their positions. Consequently, the 1st Cavalry Division Gold and Supraj remained responsible for the opening of Bialystok south towards Bialyn, fixing the unfolding there in the line Supraj-Borys, also establishing the front toward the west. The army’s assigned objective was not reached here. The 3rd Cavalry Division advanced on Moldodeziano under fighting until evening towards Wilska, by 9:30 it had complied with the orders and moved more towards the south.  
In the afternoon, the Kaiser met with General von Tallenhahn at the High Command in Könn. General Luden dorff reported: "After his interest, the General von Tallenhahn asked me whether a significant attack was to be expected. I negated. The right time for a major assault had been dismissed in any case; naturally, I had to strive for success as long as possible. Everything depended on whether the call from the front could bring reinforcements to the area northeast of Wilna." While General von Tallenhahn had already left for Wilna shortly afterward.

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The climax of the battle at Wilna.  
Berlin continued, General Field Marshal von Hindenburg reported to the Kaiser about the situation and subsequently informed his armies that he had given the assurance to the Supreme Command that "the last must be given to defeat the Russians. I know that I can rely on my armies."  
On September 17, the attack was supposed to continue, but it became apparent even before that the enemy was taking the whole front of Group Lisztmann and the right wing of Group Jüter, which had been granted permission to advance towards the south up to the left wing of Group Carlowits. One rightly recognizes the impact of the now-week-long German offensive. The prospect of decisively defeating the enemy had diminished as a result, especially since he was still visibly steadfast.  
Here, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade under General Major Simon nevertheless achieved a critical success, capturing 1000 prisoners and five machine guns in an attack north of Radun.  
On the 12th and 13th, little progress was made despite some successes on the 14th of September. The 10th Army reached the general line of communication in the area around Wilna. They were still in the Köllneler Circle of the city. Above Wilna, the enemy held the south bank of Wilna. Only in the area of the Scheiman mouth and up to Brüstia was the 75th Reserve Division under Lieutenant General von Gebhards successful, along with the 10th Landwehr and 42nd Infantry Divisions, gaining further ground in the attack across the river. The 2nd Infantry Division could only slightly improve its position on the left wing.  
Thus, there still remained a wide gap at the Cavalry Corps Garnier, the situation of which became quite difficult. The 4th and 1st Cavalry Divisions faced a far superior enemy who broke through their front at Jupran, forcing strong attacks against the northern wing of the 1st Cavalry Division, compelling them to retreat eastwards. Ultimately, General von Garnier found himself compelled, in the face of simultaneous Russian pressure on the right flank and of the...

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The operation of the commander-in-chief Off against Wilna.  
September 17. New enemy forces appeared near Moldyczno, and both divisions moved to the region of Smorgon to take action.   
That the expected Russian troop transports from Mińsk towards and across Moldyczno had actually begun around September 13 was reported to the headquarters by a message received from Pleß through a reconnaissance report during the night of September 16 to 17. Shortly thereafter, the 3rd Russian division, under Generalmajor von Brummb from Bielefa, had resumed its advance and had reached the area north of Moldyczno by 9 a.m. It had been possible to regain Russian security across the Ußa sector and to disturb rail operations with artillery fire. The enemy and swamp vehicles were still connected with the further preparations against the railway facilities themselves, of which they were still about three kilometers away. In the evening, the division from Jaroslawiec described its position on the flank of the cavalry corps near Moldyczno while the 9th cavalry division advanced without encountering the enemy, moving 20 kilometers east beyond Postany.  
   
To strengthen the left wing of the army, Lieutenant General von Sultz proposed in the morning, as the units of the army increasingly converged in the pursuit of Wilna, to allow for the advance of army headquarters, parallel to the emergence of material support. The 31st infantry division and the Jenter division had already been set in motion during the day; the 115th infantry division, which had advanced quite far south in the pursuit, was to follow.   
In the army order from the afternoon of September 17, it was stated: "The enemy will avoid being engaged by presumably retreating behind." Reckless actions were prescribed for the entire army front involving various aspects of duties. The army leadership was not regulated, and under the guidelines of group Jüter, the assault units were separated. They, along with the group mentioned, were to continuously engage, focusing on the enemy's withdrawal trenches in the vicinity of Bzerzyna-Gimpe more and more. It was ordered that a lookout would be maintained against any foreign interference. The cavalry corps was to remain on the left flank.   
The commander-in-chief Off had been informed in the direction of the enemy's movements towards Wilna only in the afternoon. He ordered

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therefore: "Decisive successes in the campaign can be achieved. I expected the highest exertion of strength. The armies are advancing further: the 12th Army in its previous operations, the 8th Army with a strong left wing reaching Boronow, the 10th Army with a strong and continuing advance pursued backward toward Smorgon. The 10th Army deploys three cavalry divisions before the enemy retreat, possibly along the Wilna-Minsk line and later at the eastern Breslina\*. The routes I indicated are currently being taken. – The Niemen Army is to push forward as soon as possible with the entire Bavarian cavalry division toward Krayndzö northwest of Wilna and let its interventions follow.  
When it became apparent on the morning of September 18 that the enemy had also arrived there where the 8th and 12th Armies were positioned, the Supreme Army Command ordered "vigorous advances by the naval forces as well as by the sea armies Maloten under Prince Leopold" and also empowered both sea groups and Generaloberst von Conrad immediately. The order of the Supreme Army Command included that instructions for "the sharpest advances" had already been given.  
The right wing and the center of the 10th Army arrived on September 16, following the counteractions, well ahead; the strongly defended but no longer held city of Wilna was poorly defended. In the evening, the enemy troops were positioned about seven kilometers west of the railway station Wilna, visible and apparent from Wilna and again to the east at Zhyvyria on Wilna, where the left wing of the group met group B. They had had a harder time fighting the cavalry corps. As for the right wing of group Eben, they were adjacent to the 58th and the 2nd Infantry Division assigned attack to the south to lead the enemy’s retreat. Although it had not developed, the 58th Infantry Division under General Lieutenant von Gersdorf had only been engaged with severe enemy attacks, and also with the 2nd Infantry Division had taken somewhat of ground in the southern direction. Behind this wing was lined up as the foremost of reinforcements, the 31st Infantry Division at the princely Diminans-Eisler, having come to the height of Gerwisch from the beginning. The division Zenter not far from Michalisch had advanced twenty kilometers further, with the 77th and 115th Infantry Division being in the area north of Bystriza yet twelve kilometers further away from the wing.

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September 18.  
The Cavalry Corps had General Command Eichhorn in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Commander III. instructed to take extensive measures, not only to prevent the enemy from advancing between Wiliya and Berezyn during the night. Instead, General Garnier at Smorgon faced fierce opposition from the enemy. The 4th Cavalry Division had to deal with the unexpectedly arriving infantry without being able to intervene, while Wiliya retreated and their right wing consolidated the Zobizki to the north. To its left, the 1st Cavalry Division held Smorgon as a bridgehead fully across the river. The 3rd Cavalry Division, regarding the increasing enemy resistance, found it difficult to secure Moldawcza, as the enemy seemed to be approaching from Minuf, while further troops were also brought up from Lida. Although they only had about 50 to 100 carbines available in their infantry battalion in each brigade, they attempted to block an area 25 kilometers wide on both sides of Moldawcza towards the south. The 9th Cavalry Division, under General Major Seudult, was immediately tasked by the Army High Command to secure the Moldawcza-Poloz railway line and advance further in the direction of Minuf against the Russian retreat lines. Preparations were sharpened here as well, reaching as far as Gubkov, where a Russian infantry division was supposed to be situated; while Ramplasche was about 10 kilometers away from Mokrejiari. They also did not expect the Bavarian Cavalry Division from the Supreme Commander III. to intervene; it had been at Widiya, approximately 120 kilometers north of Moldawcza, facing the enemy, but reported the intention to ride further south the next day.  
According to the intelligence available at the Supreme Command Eichhorn in Kowno, primarily derived from Russian radio communications, the enemy appeared to be retreating with four corps1) from Wilna and southwestwardly in full retreat to the southeast. A designated group from another four corps2) sought to threaten the northern flank of this movement against Brzihz Smorgon partly in the Alwder and partly in an offensive against the German encirclement, while additionally being reinforced by two troops arriving from the direction of Lida.

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Battle near Wilna. Further troop movements to the left.  
Corps¹) attacking Smorgon and others from Minsk directed towards Molodeczno. However, west of Smorgon, there were still about eight Russian corps; their radius had to extend into the area west of Molodeczno, as the overall structure of the Russian army pointed northeast along the Narew corridor. From these circumstances, as well as the German command, considerable difficulties would arise for the enemy’s movements, providing hope that substantial parts could still be pushed forward, provided it succeeded to strengthen the own left wing in time so that it could make decisive progress to the south.  
The commander-in-chief, as well as the High Command 10, which had been in constant telephone contact with its corps, repeatedly acted with all means on pushing to the left for relocation and reinforcement of the encircling wing. On the 18th of September at 7 in the evening, General von <...> issued the directive: The enemy in front of the groups Lisman and Hüsier, who would be reported by noon today, would "according to local news" set off tomorrow at 5 a.m. The groups Lisman and Hüsier were to let the pursuit fall on the 19th of September at 4 a.m. along the Wilna–Molodeczno railway, in order to possibly relieve the congestion of the attack group unless it were to succeed in extracting forces from the group Eben and "through pressing" to bring them to the decisively essential flank; all remained left off. The 115th Infantry Division was assigned to the group Eben under the stipulation of coordinating it skilfully between the Vistula and the Dürr-Snow.  
On the 19th of September, the groups Karlowitz, Lisman, and Hüsier advanced against the withdrawing enemy and were only held back by rear guards, bridge constructions, and terrain difficulties. In the evening, they found themselves in a new enemy resistance line running from south to midday and then toward the north. And in front of the right wing of group Eben, where it was near the railway west of Solly, the enemy had vacated its position during the night. The new left wing of the group was the 31st Infantry Division, assigned to Smorgon. Overall, it succeeded, despite

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander Ott Against Wilna.  
September 19.  
partly intense enemy resistance, moving eight kilometers southwards from Pihmanta, while ultimately the influence of the 31st Infantry Division under Major General von Berthold, after great marching efforts, arrived eight kilometers north of Smorgon at the outer north wing of the cavalry corps. It was a difficult day for the three cavalry divisions that General von Garnier had on land. Before the 4th and 1st Divisions arrived at Smorgon, the 3rd at Modobeczo, on the other hand, could be closed through the right shift of this division, the enemy had broken through the Wilia at Jasiłówka, thus threatening the flank of the British positions, and the 1st Cavalry Division in Smorgon felt this influence. Measures were taken, the bridgehead had to be maintained. The division leader, Colonel von Lentz, reported he would hold until daylight, but if the 31st Infantry Division did not appear by night, he would no longer guarantee the deployment of his troops for the exit and would have to retreat. The Infantry Division did not come. The enemy under attack in front was repelled, but due to the judgment over the Wilia, this could now only be executed under losses. Colonel von Lentz, who had available the Infantry Battalions with his division, decided to conduct further sorties. Meanwhile, the 3rd Cavalry Division had already been forced to retreat from its position in front of Moldozhen and was to retreat three kilometers north behind the Wilia; their base was Wisleta.  
d) The Defense Against the Russian Counterattack and the End of the Battle. Maps 6 and 7, Classes 28 and 30.  
Despite all the demands from command and the troops, the 10th Army achieved no satisfactory results on September 19. The flanking maneuver was masked by the troop movements, but in general, it did not gain any ground forward; the cavalry corps even had to abandon terrain again. The prospects for a great success had diminished. Under pressure from the southwest and the west, following the enemy's assault, the 12th Army were not allowed to be overly regimented, as there was a lack of strength for that.  
At the Supreme Command Siegborn, the reports on the enemy had consolidated by midday to the point that they had reported at minute extent.

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Battle near Wilna. Difficult situation of the flanks. 517 The Russian 2nd Army was now approaching the flank of the German 10th Army. Urgent reinforcement of the advancing pressure was necessary under constant erosion of the flank. To maintain this, further forces should be withdrawn from the front. In addition, attention was drawn to the defense of the now present opponent by the 9th Cavalry Division, which, in this situation, without encountering the enemy, progressed riding through Sklusobrie to Pophlitsze, 70 kilometers northwest of Moldosen, reaching the Polish railway, already behind the flanking units of the infantry reinforcement. Accordingly, Generaloberst von Eichhorn directed the continuation of the attack for September 20. The 115th Infantry and 77th Reserve Division, which had reached the area west of Girn-Gese, should continue marching in a southwesterly direction, supported by the Hunter Group and two further divisions energetically ready for the pursuit near Germnijat and to the west. The attack enabled the Carlowits Group to advance about five kilometers, with the Jimohn Group now given the task hereafter. The Ghen Group was able to achieve some successes despite difficult and partly severe fighting, offering no noteworthy alteration in the situation. The heaviest position was again faced by the Cavalry Corps, which, due to the intervention of the 31st Infantry Division, was previously deployed but too late to engage the now present enemy near Smorgon on the morning of September 20. By noon, it had to bow to three days of independent resistance, retreating about three kilometers from the front due to heavy losses. Since then, the front of the Cavalry Corps Garnier in this area has fallen back about eight kilometers northwest of Vilna, with no significant engagement until it reached the fluid northeast of Jazniewice. From then on, the 3rd Cavalry Division was able to hold itself along the Wilia. Later that evening, after a march of about 60 kilometers, the Bavarian Cavalry Division arrived at Kraywice; the 9th went to Dolszyno, 15 kilometers southwest of there, so that now there was again a stronger cavalry group available on the extreme left flank. After the overall course of the past days, in which the loss of Smorgon and the jurisdictions near Moldoceno was merely a secondary aspect, the High Command Eichhorn was now of the opinion that 1) The reports indicated 350 captives and nine machine guns as loot.

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September 20.   
The adversary, "relying on the relief that the reinforcements brought against the wings of the German 10th Army must provide for the continuation of resistance in opposition to Wilna," (1) remained resolute in continuing the attack along the entire front. The focus on the Russian retreat routes remained a guiding principle. Moreover, the defense against the new enemy had to be taken into account. Overall, it seemed that the Russian corps (2) were well prepared against the line Smorgon-Wilna. However, only three "Saxon" divisions, which had been exhausted and melted down during the fighting over the past few days, had so far been found on this more than 30-kilometer-wide front. To replace them, a new group S u t t e r (42nd Infantry, 77th Reserve, 115th Infantry Division, numbered 75th Reserve Division) was formed from the untouched infantry divisions, which freed the cavalry for other tasks. When the commander-in-chief was asked in the evening of the day at the operational headquarters, whether a greater outer success could be expected in the area south of Wilna in the near future, the answer was: “To enable a favorable outcome of the battle; no time span can be foreseen; the battle will likely last several more days.”   
September 21.   
On September 21, the 12th and 8th Armies were in pursuit as far as Not only for Nowogrodek and 20 kilometers beyond it, to a considerable extent undergoing a quiet constraint. The example of the 12th Army, which had been reduced to only four divisions through attacks, was taken over that day by the previous high command from the West, General of Infantry von G r a b e with Lieutenant General von Kuhl as Chief of Staff, after General von Gallwitz had been tasked with leading a new army formed against Serbia.   
In the 10th Army, the adversary vacated his positions before the groups Carlovits and Sigmann. The pursuit, having been derailed by pressure, soon came to a halt before a cohesive Russian defense front. Against the group Chern, fierce attacks were mounted, which, in some places, were carried out in dense masses, and were significantly repulsed by the enemy. North of Smorgon and from there east to Wiesiła, troops of General von S u t t e r could move into the front of the cavalry corps (3) without fighting.

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Battle near Wilna. Detailed Counter-Narrative.   
(1st, 4th, and 3rd Division) were set up, from which large parts were withdrawn. Extraordinary march routes of the withdrawing divisions had been required. The balance of the left wing consisting of the 115th Infantry Division had covered 180 kilometers in the last five days; due to the exertion and the preceding battles, the operations had significantly decreased to about 300 units. Additionally, the Bavarian and 9th Cavalry Division were set up from Krzywilce and Obolichow towards Gilden and the southwest, in order to meet the advancing enemy. Instead, they found that the Russian wing had expanded eastward with infantry up to Flaic, while the cavalry pushed even further east, making the front of the 10th Army still significantly overextended.   
In the meantime, the particularly difficult distinction of a Russian attack that had already commenced during the day was successfully made, providing evidence of Russian obstinacy. It stated in its emerging sections: “The Russian 10th Army strengthens the reserves behind the externally located right wing, energetically attacking and trying to hold the line Sawelzy–Sloboda, where it has been trying to engage along the entire remaining front… involving Dainsjam up to the Gavia-Tluis. The 2nd Army accelerates its attack on the line Sawelzy–Narva Lake.” This made it clear that the enemy was firmly holding the Niemen line visibly from Wilna to Wilno–Modlenow, facing west, while finally holding the railway against the difficulties of the German 10th Army. Given this situation, the encirclement attack could not proceed further. Chief General von Eichborn had to decide to remain on the defense against the expected further Russian attacks; he hoped in doing so to hinder his own wing enough that he could later take it back. To relieve the other front, the group Carlowsk was to launch a sharp attack northeast on September 22.   
To provide greater striking power for this frontal assault, the overall commander had already brought forward two divisions, the 4th Guard and the 37th Infantry Division, from the 12th Army to the north behind the southern wing of the 10th Army. On the other hand, he had ordered that the division not be listed, as it was presumed that at another location, free Russian forces might also be deployed from the northeast direction, over Polozk, against the friendly 10th Army. Above all, for this reason, it was regarded as

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The Operation of the Commander-in-Chief Hof against Wilna.  
September 22.  
On September 22, General von Hütter intended for the 10th Army to carry out a powerful advance through the Stumpf area under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, from the Willa section north of Smorgon to Wilna, with only one infantry division and two cavalry divisions remaining, while three infantry divisions were assigned for a comprehensive attack to operate in the Willa-Viszga line. The cavalry units under Garnier, consisting of the 4th, 9th, and Bavarian cavalry divisions, were to disrupt the enemy flank according to the directives of the Commander-in-Chief. These intentions were disturbed by Russian attacks that began early in the morning. The previously advanced German front in the Willa bend from Smorgon-Willa was now to be arranged differently so that General von Hütter brought in the 12½ infantry divisions next to the cavalry. Far from the reinforcement troops, the 115th infantry division was already falling under Russian attack near Wilna and was hit from the east, which meant that hardly any support for the left flank remained with just 12 divisions, which were also positioned about a few kilometers northwest of Wilna. Accordingly, the Russian attack had spread out so far to the east that the capacity of these forces was no longer in question. The 115th infantry division had already crossed the Willa; the three cavalry divisions under General von Garnier had only managed to achieve a 20-kilometer-wide advance, which could extend to the north of Rabun at four kilometers north of the river and only reached the Gerneße mouth again. The opponent, however, seemed to further extend to the east.  
The German attacks by the group Carlovič and the 8th Army achieved no significant successes. The groups Litzmann and Eben held their positions and were able to repel individual Russian attacks easily.

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Battle near Vilna. German offensive in defense.   
It became increasingly clear that the forces of the 10th Army were insufficient for a decisive blow on the front. The attacks from the railway points1) excluded a rapid reinforcement of this wing. However, the Supreme Commander O. I believed that the offensive could still be brought into flow by the best-arranged frontal attack according to the interests of the two availability offensives and hoped to advance to Minsk, which was not entirely excluded. The 8th Army, which had already been beyond Lida, had been instructed that morning to push northwards with all its strength towards Bogdanow, while the 10th Army was to proceed to the offensive and the main forces lying at the Dvina would habitually have to provide a march-capable division behind their right wing. When the attack took place during the day, it was anticipated that, as the 8th Army had done again, the Russians would bring their entire 2nd Army into the encirclement of the left wing. The 8th Army was very sharply attacked, and pressure was directed to Bogdanow, which had to lead to success.   
For the 10th Army, only the right wing was viable for the continuation of the attack on September 23, where the Carlovitsch group was involved through the 4th division and the 37th Infantry Division could be reinforced, while General Litzmann was assembling a task group of quite two divisions for his right wing. On the army's offensive front, General von Hutier felt that he lacked sufficient strength for his own attack; he wanted to wait for the Russians' attack behind Vilna and then push them back in contrast; thus, Generaloberst von Eichhorn agreed.   
On the morning of September 23, the enemy was in front of the 12th and 8th Armies again in retreat. But even at the 10th Army, it had cleared its entire front west of the Dismjanta; the maneuver extended the line Olzany–Buropam–Gegen west of Gold. All the more fiercely, the adversary pressed on the Vilna front. From the south in the flank, the 115th Infantry Division found itself compelled to take Wilesdorf under heavy loss of eleven guns; the expected 75th Reserve Division came too late that morning to avert the mishap. The cavalry corps had to send parts to secure against an expected enemy attack from the east from the front.

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24th September.  
On 24th September, the Supreme Commander East ordered the continuation of the attack, with the 8th Army receiving the thrust direction south of the Berezyna depression, ready for deployment towards the north. The 10th Army was to shift its forces on its left wing and prepare the bulk of the cavalry in the area of Dolsino for action in a southeastern direction. The 1st Cavalry Division was to be sent to the front of Narocz Lake for the use of the Niemen Army, in order to secure the area between Narocz and Družinava Lake in conjunction with the following 3rd Infantry Division and a Cavalry Division of this army. In executing these orders, the 8th Army and the western flank of the 10th Army came up against the most hostile enemies during the advance to Smorgon. The entire section of the 10th Army, however, found itself constrained by Russian attacks, making any shifts to the left impossible.  
On this day, the Supreme Commander East received from the Army Group Prince Leopold that their command, on orders from the Supreme Army Command, should not advance beyond the danger zone between Jarawonow and the Seretwsch for the time being. He himself had not received any corresponding orders but intended to advance towards Mińsk and requested the cooperation of the neighboring army group for this.  
25th September.  
On the next day, 25th September, as the French attack broke out in the west, the following fundamental order from the Supreme Army Command was received: “His Majesty has ordered in the appointment and amendment of the directive from 27th August”: Army Group Mańeń should ensure that the position already taken by its left wing is held as long as possible, specifically against the Dvinsit Canal. Army Group Prince Leopold is instructed to pursue only as far as the approximate line of the Dvinsit.

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The End of the Battle at Wilna.   
Canal from Teleszany—Overflow of the Wiera (Saczara—Serwetisch)—Mouth of the Berezyna into the Niemen, where it also begins to detach with the arrangement for the duration. — Army Group Hindenburg secures the area between the mouth of the Berezyna into the Niemen and the coast. In addition to the already requested units, two Army Commands and six divisions, this army group will probably later also have an Army Command and five divisions. Two divisions were likely sent to the railway in Markow in November to speed up the situation on both fronts in the West.   
This was stated on this day in the war diary of the Commander-in-Chief East: "Thus, the first impulse for the organization of the operation has been given. First, the encounter of the two moments: the help of the Supreme Army Command and its connection with the Army Group Leopold and the enemy's movement from a north-northeastern direction (at Dębinów) necessitates the chief of the general staff to promote this. Instead, this assistance will be provided by the First Chief of General Staff (Lieutenant Colonel Hofmann)." It was decided:   
"12th Army and Landwehr Division will move the enemy across the Berezyna and then only follow with Bortkowo. 12th Army provides support to the 9th Army at the mouth of the Berezyna for defense. — 8th Army remains in the attack against line Włodzim—Du binaa... 10th Army continues its attack." It should not go in general beyond the Gernoz, the right tributary of the Wilia.   
Meanwhile, the fighting at the 12th, 8th, and 10th Army continued, but no significant progress was made, except for some points that remained open. Thus, the 16th Landwehr Division of Major General Sommer lost, during the night from the 24th to the 25th of September, 17 officers and 800 men. The difficulties proved themselves with the success of heavier Russian attacks. The Cavalry Corps Garnier had to bend its wing to the ever-increasing Russian cavalry from the Wilia to Dolbino.   
Also on September 26, only local successes were achieved. On September 26.

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The Operation of the Commander-in-Chief East Against Wilna.   
26 September.   
Having submitted and further still to be submitted), there was little hope of restarting the movement along this eastern-facing section of the front. On the other hand, the left wing of the 10th Army was facing superior Russian encirclement, and the uncertainty in the direction of Polozk made it clear that without reinforcements, holding its current line for any longer was out of the question. Therefore, Generaloberst von Eichhorn decided, in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief East, to move this wing from the Wilia behind the Serviez northward.   
1) Submissions from 1 to 26 September.   
Strength at the Beginning of September   
&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp; Submitted or still to be submitted to:   
&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp; 10th A. &emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp; 11th A. &emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp;&emsp; 12th S.D.   
The different divisions   
were to remain with the O.B. St.)   
(10½ Div.)   
12th Army   
4th G. S. D.   
2nd, 26th, 35th, 36th, 38th, 54th, 86th S. D.   
50th R. D.   
1/85th Div. D.   
8th Army   
(5½ Div.)   
37th &emsp;83rd &emsp;D.   
75th R. D.   
1st, 11th Div. D.   
169th Div. Br.   
10th Army   
(17½ Div.)   
2nd, 31st, 42nd, 58th, 87th, 89th, 115th S. D.   
3rd, 76th, 77th, 79th R. D.   
10th, 14th, 16th Div. D. , ver. 6th Div. Br.   
Div. Junter, ver. Br. Monteton,   
Abt. Chefst.   
6th Army   
(8 Div.)   
41st, 88th S. D.   
1st, 6th, 36th, 78th R. D.   
Div. Bedmann, Br. homeyer,   
Abt. Libau   
Total: 41½ Div. | 13 Div.   
(The "infantry divisions" listed here with numbers from 83 to 89 did not consist of active troops.)

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The End of the Battle near Wilna.  
Thus, on September 26th, the halt of the right army wing, along with the simultaneous withdrawal of the left, ultimately ended the comprehensive offensive posture. When the armies received the order from the commander-in-chief Dit to assume a defensive position, it was a measure that was well justified by the nature of the combat.  
e) Operations of the Russians1) and Considerations.  
Maps 6 and 7, Sheets 28, 29, and 30.  
When on August 18th, Romowo, the northern section of the Russian northwest front, again showed signs of retreat, a section of the Russian general front had already been breached, as the 5th Army operating further north in Courland had taken the paths to Petersburg in both directions but was directed northward. Thus, now the right wing of the Russian main front, the 10th Army, was encircled from the north; the commander, General Rabenovitsch, independently ordered the gradual withdrawal towards the right bank of the Niemen River, which had already been developed against this direction from the German pressure. Hence, the German attack was initiated between the two Russian armies heading towards Wilna, meanwhile exposing a gap of about 100 kilometers wide and creating the conditions for a major encircling operation against the Russians who were still stationed at Wilna and Lithuania. However, a strong diversionary force to exploit this favorable opportunity was lacking.  
Thus, as the German 10th Army advanced from the west against Wilna, General Aleksejev, the commander-in-chief of the northwest front, instructed his 10th Army on the 20th and again on August 26th to maintain Wilna and the road to Minsk and to protect the flanks and rear of the four southern armies (1st, 2nd, 4th, and 3rd). General Rabenovitsch extended his right wing against the impending encirclement over Wilna to the north and could subsequently pool strong and sizeable reinforcements from units that had been assigned to him from the eastern front in Poland. However, simultaneous demands on the front in Courland depleted the forces designated for the breaching of the gap at Genszanij. In front of the 12th and 8th armies now stood the Russian 2nd and 1st armies. Of these, on August 25th, as General

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The Operation of the Commander-in-Chief Oft against Wilna.  
The next days brought the division of the Russian Northwestern Front into Northern Front and Western Front, with the gap from Gieniany indicating the Northern Front. To the left flank, the 5th Army, was to support the right of the Western Front, the 10th Army, at Wilna if possible. In Poland, freely available forces were to be assigned to the Northern Front as a new 2nd Army in the area of Gieniany. However, units that had not yet been transferred to the 10th Army involved only a single division coming in. Meanwhile, the German attacks leading at Wilna in the last days of August had prompted the ruins, whose focus in the legal field had shifted about as much northward as that which had been done by the 10th Army through reorganization. Thus, this army stood on September 8, the day of its new attack, with 15 Russian divisions facing Wilna over almost 100 kilometers of front, with the 1st and then the 10th Army opposing, while it itself in this section (without the 76th Reserve Division drifting north toward Wilna) had only seven, of which at least four were available for attack. North of Wilna, there were now 4½ divisions, including 3½ Russian divisions at the bank of the Wilna ready for attack, intended for the 10½ Bohemian divisions. This was not a large surplus of forces. The German leadership also had to ensure that the opponent would demand further reinforcements, while they themselves had hardly any noteworthy amount to obtain from the decision made by the Supreme Command, moreover they had to ensure that further forces were withdrawn. Reinforcement of the 10th Army at the expense of the Niemen army, which faced two Russian armies, was not considered manageable by Commander-in-Chief Oft. To bring this about, it was necessary to have complete clarity regarding the objective and nature of the attack. Here, the idea of an immediate vigorous victory over the enemy northwest of Wilna on one hand clashed with the desire for its operational encirclement on the other hand. To achieve both would require a

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Battle near Wilna. Russian Measures. Considerations.  
Further armies did not benefit, initially gathered behind the encirclement wing, began the attack northwest of Wilna from Bormann over the borders when Wilna commenced. As it was missing, there were two considerations, both goals to pursue simultaneously. If one wanted to operate with the currently available limited forces into the depth of the Russian flank, inserting partially through terrain gain against the opponent and then slipping away, one had to also accept the Vagins, not to weaken the attack front for the Russian enemy from Wilna too early and to carry out the thrust into the depth with a group of at least six, but preferably more infantry divisions. However, whether the opponent, who had shorter routes and good road connections, would not then also deploy troops, which he pulled from the front west of Wilna, depended primarily on the degree of surprise that was achieved. And where that was questionable, was indeed lethargic, thus paralyzed, the surrounding war with increasing distance from the track could become sufficiently prepared for continuous combat. It was therefore obvious to initially confine oneself to the tactical victory north of Wilna. In this case, it was also a question of drawing in the significantly reduced encircling forces against the flank and Rivken of the enemy. How far such a victory could then be operationally maximized remained to be seen.  
In fact, the attack that began on September 9th on the front measuring roughly 25 kilometers between Wilna and Schirwinta Lake was fixed with 6½ German divisions against 4½ Russian, while three German divisions engaged in another encirclement march. And thus followed other forces. On September 14th, the front of Wilna to the lake showed visibly 5½ German divisions to five Russian ones, from the lake to Scheiman three German against 2½ Russian divisions and similarly also visibly two against two divisions at Scheiman. There was no German superiority that could bring the decision; still, between Wilna and Schirwinta Lake, the most important forces were deployed, numerous German forces as a visible presence along the more than double length of the front of the lake. Regarding the question of why more than half of the originally assigned German northern wing divisions for encirclement flowed into the frontal request, it was once asked why, after it had happened once, this group was not immediately placed southward to participate in the battle, wrote the then First General Staff.

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The operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.   
officer of the 10th Army, Major Keller¹): “The operation became necessary to provide air for the troops facing heavy fighting in the front. The order was based primarily on maintaining the building plan and was accounted for accordingly, as the available parts from the front were withdrawn and shifted to maintain communication and strengthen the encirclement towards the east. Strong penetration by the Center Group, which was not yet ordered when the battle plan...   
Given how unfavorable the circumstances developed, the high command recognized this after the first days of fighting and has since attempted with all means to strengthen the encompassing flank by pulling units south along the front...   
Reckless disregard was shown by the Germans regarding Gneisna...   
5th Army once again called for support for the 10th at...   
the gap near Gneisna...   
Order on September 14 on the German side marking the entrance of the Supreme Commander East. Whether the actual danger was not overrated is uncertain, as the memory of the first days in Brzeziny has primarily influenced...   
The main reasons remained in obscuring...

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The battle near Wilna. Russian Operations. Reflections.   
   
In retreating to a position, it is quite questionable whether this happened more due to the overall situation than from the strict frontal pressure. In any case, they could establish connections from the front and move troops to the threatened wing by rail and foot march. Thus, everything still depended on rapid success and a decisive outcome of the offensive north of Wilna.   
   
As the Russians, almost surrounded, began to withdraw near Wilna, it was up to the German command to make use of the superior encircling movement again. However, the prospects had once again darkened after a further period of combat morale and time.   
Already on September 16, the 1st and 2nd Supreme Army Command had issued directives regarding the further loss of the front of the 10th Army and to reinforce their right wing, while on the 17th they could only calm their nerves by the fact that in the German "Intervention Group," similar to Gneisenau, only cavalry, but no infantry, was set. General Cuvert, since September 2, Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front, now provides further retreat of his armies into the Michailitsch – Danzig – Nowo­grodek – Baranowicze line as necessary, and the Supreme Army Command ordered its execution.   
The 2nd Army’s entry, General Greer provided for this and the 10th Army on September 20 with the aforementioned offensive order1), which became known to the German command from a command point. The goal, the line Narocz­see – Glubocza – Gania-Fuks, was not achieved in any way. However, the Russian Supreme Army Command was advised on September 22 to mind the right wing of the 10th Army up to Smorgon. The task of the newly appointed 2nd Army remained, however, to close the line from Gneisenau and to launch attacks.   
   
The German command tried to exploit this development with its troops to salvage what was possible from the situation. In the West, parts of the enemy were to be cut off, under the assumption that all strength was focused on external efforts. Meanwhile, so much time had elapsed that the pressure of the Russian 2nd Army forced the left wing of the last two armies into defense. When Generaloberst von Cichorn ordered the encirclement attack on September 26, his 18½ infantry and five cavalry divisions ranged across 120 kilometers of broad front from Berzengski-Rnie to Dolshtin against 34 Russian infantry and six cavalry divisions.

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The operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.   
Thus, there was a double superiority, against that. The great attack of the 10th Army had not had a fully satisfactory result, having brought about approximately 25,000 prisoners in 16 days of fighting and marching, which was more than double the large own total.   
At the same time, however, the 8th and 12th Armies also gained about 150 kilometers of space towards the front due to the successes of the 10th Army. That the enemy had had 32 divisions available, and that by the end of the attack they had pulled out 15½, lessening their strength around Wilna and re-engaging in combat to the north was not to be connected, as at the same time the corresponding strength of the German Armies had also been reduced from 16.   
The left wing of the German 10th Army had broken out well beyond Wilna to the east. It was through the extreme activity of the railway troops that they had succeeded, with the resumption of full service on bridges and tunnels as early as September 22, reaching the previously destroyed tunnel from Landwarno, 15 kilometers west of Wilna, substantial distances, which Wilejka alone had covered in 120, and Dolzhin in 150 kilometers, using poor country roads. Movements and battles were taking place here in an area that, immediately after the harvest, provided considerable supplies. The rapid penetration from Denäizanj from the sources was overestimated, as no time was found for the previous fronts to implement supplies. It can be added that on this outer wing of the German attack in extensive areas, relatively weak forces were employed, which achieved their tasks more through marching than through prolonged fights, so that the ammunition needs were broken down into tolerable limits. From these adjustments, it can be completed that the troops here "never suffered from supply shortages." The enormous marching performances only occurred due to the fact that the troops were adequately supplied. The 50 to 70 strong companies were often empty once at noon and once in the evening. A part of the factory accessories that would have otherwise been necessary for the supply backup could be redirected to the ammunition site. Therefore, complaints about the supply diversifications in the 10th Army arose only late and initially from the center and were expressed by the right wing, where much was half.   
1) p. 548.   
2) Records of Lieutenant General a. D. von Cosenhausen, formerly general staff officer of the 115th S.D.

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Battle near Wilna. Reflections. 531 Similar extent was assumed as in the 8th and 12th Armies. The difficulties ended somewhat around 150 kilometers behind the front at the lateral Niemen bridges of Ditia and Grodno\*. Furthermore, the constant shifting had sufficed to assign filled columns of the original wing divisions to further extensions, so that certain frictions arose on the width of the way, which became all the greater as more divisions of the entire front got entangled in one and the same restructuring process. Thus it could ultimately happen that, for example, a regiment of the army reported that it had failed due to a complete lack of supplies. An additional extension intensified the difficulties further by interrupting traffic to Wilna for a day. As the fighting progressed in the same area, the conditions had to become increasingly difficult. On the right wing, particularly in the 8th and 12th Armies, where the enemy had planned the destruction of the lateral bridges during the retreat, the difficulties in conducting warfare showed themselves considerably far from the railway endpoints, just as much as among the placed divisions. Similar complaints recurred as in General Gallwitz's army back in August. A picture of the conditions is provided by a record in the war diary of the Plüskow Corps (General Field Marshal of the XI Army Corps), which on September 5 states: “The 54th Infantry Division received a report on the poor condition of the troops due to excessive demands and the completely inadequate supply. The post, success on auxiliary positions was lacking. The damp weather made itself felt in all forms of failure. The General Command is well aware of these entirely justified representations, and the General Command has already repeatedly urged the army to be mindful that the troops severely suffer from the failure of supplies; the undernourishment of the horses appears particularly concerning. It adds that aside from goal and potatoes from the land, which is planned to be used, nothing can be taken. The demands on the corps columns can hardly be met any longer, and yet the ready troops are not faring well enough. The army was once again reminded of these difficulties and the infinite influence they have on the operational readiness of the troops, explicitly emphasized.” The justification for such complaints was requested by the army command. 6) p. 548. 34\*

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The operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
command was also fully recognized. Effectively helping was, however, only possible if one stimulated the forward movement. This, however, could not be considered as long as there was hope for success with the 10th Army. When the Wilna operation was abandoned, the limits of possibility were reached with regard to supplies as well as the troops' capabilities: "They need to first come to a rest," wrote a staff officer of the Supreme Commander East at the time, "receive rations and boots, everything is suspended. Then the railways of the troops must follow..."  
The German troops and their leadership, according to the unanimous opinion of all significant parties involved, continued to achieve the "superhuman." The Bornarsch and combat area constantly placed high demands on man and horse due to its sensitive, partly very uneven, and densely wooded terrain, greatly complicating oversight and the coordination of weapons. The divisions fought during times that were transferred to a new army corps – against an enemy that was entrenched in predetermined positions^2). A higher and corresponding task was assigned to the cavalry, which carried out largely solid movements back and forth in front of the infantry for hundreds of kilometers and the numerically inferior Russian cavalry remained easily aligned. Breaking stronger resistance or connecting for a longer time with the advancing Russian infantry divisions had to exceed their strength. However, they also practiced what was to lead at that time with the existing personnel and equipment. "Our cavalry must take on the tactical art, the courage, and the unlimited drive of the German cavalry as an example," it stated in a directive from the Russian Northwestern Front of that time^3).  
In summary, the last great offensive of the Supreme Commander East had, apart from the term of the great city of Wilna, resulted in the enemy's overall front being pushed back by another 80 kilometers north of the Railway Line and thus behind the important railway connection of Lida-Dünaburg. The combat strength of the Russian troops was, although they had not suffered any breakthroughs in artillery, significantly weakened again. Especially, however,

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Battle of Wilna. Reflections.  
Despite all the skill displayed by the Russian command in the execution of operations individually, the retreat led to a new blow, which was all the more sensitive as it came at a time when the Tsar himself had taken command of the operations, with the resolution to put an end to the previous retreat.  
3. The struggles of the Niemen Army¹) from mid-August to the end of September.  
Maps 6 and 7, Sheets 26 and 28.  
The Niemen Army under General Ott von Below had a strength of about seven infantry and six cavalry divisions²) in mid-August. It was positioned in a line that began north of Janow, continuing to Szwienita, over the Svirj Lake to Niemen, then the route followed through Mińsk to the Gulf of Riga. Along this front, about 300 kilometers long, about nine Russian infantry and eight cavalry divisions would be opposed. General von Below had to consider the request of the outpost officer and sought to address this task as openly as possible. His inquiry whether the army was intended for an advance on Wilna or Riga was answered by the commander W. (William?) that the army was to advance on Wilna. When General von Below then suggested the draft that the enemy, who was also bothering his left wing south of the section of Peace City-Mińsk, was weakening there and consisted only of a few combat-effective troops, sections of the XXXVII. Corps and cavalry, he believed that he could have tactical successes by quickly pushing out towards this point, and decided to advance from the area of Bausf and eastward toward the north. The commander D. gave his approval in the order of August 19¹).

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The operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.  
On August 23, the operation led by the Higher Cavalry Commander 5, Lieutenant General Count Schmetto (Egon), began, in which the 41st Infantry Division and the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Cavalry Divisions and the Somberg Brigade participated. The expected main blow of the first day's attack did not materialize. The intended surprise was not delivered; the enemy gained time, evading an impending blow from the 41st Infantry Division, causing countless deficiencies in a sluggish position. During engagements, where the widely extended and impetuous right flank caused previous concerns, on August 26, “more to turn the flank of the host," and from the left army possible towards the Duna, to the right near the road to the 10th Army via the Szlota, the Friedrichstadt attack was advanced by the Schmetton Group. The repeated request of General Below as to whether after taking this city the operation against Riga should be continued or if then the assault against the enemy should be led from the southern flank of the army was decided by the Supreme Commander in the latter direction.  
After the opponent was already driven out from the Niemen bend southwest of Friedrichstadt, on August 29 a four-hour artillery preparation for the storm on Friedrichstadt was to begin; this had to be aborted as the effect against the almost fortified positions was insufficient. They wanted to threaten the Rütchers with heavy guns that had been allocated for the upcoming attack on Kowno. The transfer in this part of the front was assigned on August 31 to the Higher Cavalry Commander 1, Lieutenant General Freiherr von Richthofen, with the task of executing the orders across the Duna section of Friedrichstadt-Lennewaden and restoring rail traffic from the Dunaburg–Riga route thoroughly. Following engagements, the 8th Cavalry Division under Major General Count Schmetton (Eberhard) took the Russian bridgehead at Lennewaden on September 2, while the 41st Infantry Division under Major General Schmidt from Rudolfsdorf took Friedrichstadt on September 3. Thus, the railway line was secured. However, only artillery could be deployed beyond the river, which primarily included the route at Lennewaden.

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The Battles of the Niemen Army.   
so effective under fire that the Russians had to divert their approach over Pleßau. Moreover, the eleven-day operation resulted in around 5000 prisoners, with almost half taken on September 2 and 3, and two visibility fields acquired as loot.   
In the meantime, on the right wing of the army, the Launstein group had already pushed its lines to various points over the Sienita by the end of August. Here it formed the 3rd Cavalry Division, having retreated from the 4th to the 10th Army, and was, until September 3, in connection with the progress of the cavalry detachment of this army, advanced to the area south of Biltomierz.   
The army group command (from August 29) had not changed the mission. General von Below intended to attack the enemy, who was positioned in the middle of his army, at the I. Reserve Corps, alongside the route to Dünaburg. He aimed to achieve this by a push from the Launstein group to Lijany in the south and flanking by the Richthofen group from the north on approaches to Dünaburg. The commander had initially left this to the 10th Army and the assigned 88th Infantry Division on the right wing of the Niemen Army.   
The execution of the operation was delayed. The Richthofen group received a report for the later flanking, initially along the railway to the east, against Taborkraft. Gaining space encountered strong enemy opposition but nevertheless slowly advanced. The high command had until September 9 reports that the currently opposing Russian 5th Army had still a new Russian 12th Army from parts of the 5th and newly assigned troops in the balance. The Richthofen group, meanwhile reinforced by the 78th Reserve Division, remained initially fixed at the Pitterlen section.   
In addition, the subsequent operations of the army were under the leadership of the left flank of the one-sided German attack against Wilna on this day. Initially, on September 9, the Launstein group (now 3rd Cavalry Division, Division Behrmann followed by the 88th Infantry Division) was directly aligned with the cavalry's approach of the 10th Army for an attack on Lijany. However, it became urgent to confront the Russians along the entire front and also break the resistance in the north. General von Below sought success in this.

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also continued on the flanks, especially as Lieutenant General von Morgen believed that the forces of his I. Reserve Corps, after several weeks of inaction, were no longer sufficient for an attack on the strong enemy front.   
While on the right, the Lauentzien group under daily battles, especially the Bedmann division, continued to advance against Dünaburg and reached the area of the Allontschka Lake on September 11th, the left wing of the Schmettau group was supposed to breakthrough over the Ziemenie with the northern flank of the opponent holding before the I. Reserve Corps. This decision was maintained, even as on the same day, a stronger Russian attack on Stabstraße affected the northern flank of the assembly. - Continuation of the offensive of the right wing against Dünaburg was, under these circumstances, deemed necessary, it is stated in the war report of the Supreme Commander East. However, the success was not lacking; during the night of September 12th, the opponent remained quiet.   
On September 13th, the entire army front pursued with determination led the right wing of the Niemen Army against the positions before the small fortress Dünaburg; here, as an expanded bridgehead - already acknowledged by the aviators - stretched from Novo-Alexandrowsk to the Murg, richly 15 kilometers before the Duna. The idea of simultaneously intervening with the pushed-back opponent proved to be unfeasible; the Russians were already trying to hold the German advances firmly from Novo-Alexandrowsk. Further north, cavalry reached the edge of the Duna lowlands. Here too, the opponent held a larger bridgehead at Stabstraße, with its accessible lowland area having a depth of around seven kilometers.   
The main objectives were still primarily the capture of Dünaburg. The Supreme Commander East also placed decisive importance on driving the Russians out of this bridgehead, which, due to its railway connections, posed a persistent threat to the German northern wing. Additionally, he was occupied with the thought of gradually securing the entire left Duna bank, initially Dünaburg, then the bridgehead at Stabstraße, especially but also the immensely important large trading and industrial city of Riga for the Russian sea supply. The lack of forces ('Lack of forces') ultimately forced him to abandon the last objective.

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The Battles of the Niemen Army.  
Before Dünaburg, the Russian position, interrupted by lakes over long stretches, extended from the Wilna railway in the south to the connection with the river in the north for approximately 60 kilometers. (Five German infantry divisions) were deployed here; equal forces, as one rightly assumes, stood opposing. Following heavy losses, the northwest section of the enemy lines was subjected to flanking fire on September 17. The subsequent assault managed to break only the Bedmann division forward a significant distance, where a particularly effective artillery flank was seen over the lakes; the division captured 11,000 prisoners. The opponent subsequently abandoned the positions in the night of September 20 due to the looming new attack. The German lines could not be significantly reinforced past Novo Alexandrowsk. The attack on September 21 against the northwest section yielded only early successes, while the personnel weakened. As of September 22, the existing 88th infantry division began its assault, and from the very start of the attack, neither the strongest infantry regiments nor battalion commands fell or were wounded. The combat effectiveness of the troops dwindled ultimately.  
Meanwhile, since September 14, the Bavarian cavalry division had been removed to the south (A) to take over the immediate retreat for the 10th army) and then reinforce it. On September 22, the cavalry division, which had previously been deployed north of Dünaburg, followed on the following day under the command of General von Richtofen, along with the newly arrived 3rd infantry division and the 1st cavalry division sent by the 10th army to secure the area between the Narocz and the Drosjyat rings, was gradually pushed back by I. Reserve Corps. On the other hand, an attack against the German positions near Mitau seemed to be preparing, where under General von Pappritz only troops with a strength of 1½ infantry divisions and ½ cavalry division were stationed.

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The Operation of the Supreme Commander East against Wilna.   
September 27.   
In this situation, the army received the order from the Supreme Commander East on September 27 to assume a position.   
The Niemen Army initially faced the Russian 5th Army under General Plehwe with a strength of more than seven infantry and 9½ cavalry divisions, tasked with holding the Düna line, especially around Riga, with the fortification of Dvinsk and the defense of Dinaburg. At the end of August, the right wing of the army stationed below Jakobstadt was designated as the new 12th Army under General Gorbatowski. The number of troops deployed was reduced overall by two divisions (II. Saxon Corps) and also not increased in the subsequent formation of the "Northern Front" under General Ruzski.   
Rather, the new Northern Front had to give up two divisions again for the battle at Wilna. The reinforcements indicated here (several corps and the newly formed 2nd Army were to be reduced to the infantry) and some cavalry divisions were not provided.   
These reinforcements were gradually transferred toward the Düna, with the last arriving only towards the end of September. Therefore, a report specifying individual troop strengths from the interior of the Reich was issued as an instruction.  
Thus, the Russian Northern Front managed to hold its positions along the Düna and in the fortifications of Riga, Jakobstadt, and Düna against the repeated and skillfully conducted attacks of the numerically inferior German Army, but was not in a position to execute the offensive assigned to it since September 12 for the relief of the northeastern forces that were already engaging near Wilna.   
The railway along the Düna was under unprecedented fire, which hindered the necessary rapid troop redeployment from the right to the left flank of the army group. General Ruzski complained that his troops were insufficient for the tasks assigned to him; the reinforcements were as follows:   
1) p. 448 fr. and 469 fr.   
2) Beginning from the Russian left wing: 2nd fnml. Div.; 3½ Rad. Div.; III. corps with 1¾ Inf. Div.; XIX. corps with 2½ Inf. Div.; 4½ Rad. Div.; XXXVII. corps with 1½ Inf. and 1 Rad. Div.; VII. fnml. corps with 3 Inf. Div.; ½ Rad. Div. and several Bn. Brig.   
3) p. 451.   
4) ½ and 2 fnml. Div.   
5) ⅓ XXIII., XXVII., and ¼ XXIX. corps.   
6) p. 528.

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The number and quality leave much to be desired; one seems to assign only a third-rate significance to its front section. The official Russian account considers these complaints from the commander of the Northern Front to be exaggerated and points out that General Staff Chief, Major General Dornbush-Drujewitsch, reported on September 27 that the opposing German troops primarily consisted of supposedly 45-year-old Landsturm soldiers and only a few young soldiers; their total strength has not changed. The account therefore concludes that the Russian troops on this front demonstrated inadequate resistance, as the Germans were weak in number and their artillery lacked significant caliber.  
In a wide area and with limited forces, covering 250 kilometers of front with only eight divisions of infantry, German command and troops also did their best here, thereby providing exemplary support to the flanking operation of the 10th Army. However, this also raises the question of whether it would not have been possible to draw upon part of the Niemen Army for the flanking attack, which, given the already exceedingly weak front against the Dvina, would have required additional forces. Given the two Russian armies opposite the Dvina and the favorable rail connections offering possibilities for a rapid significant reinforcement, such an attempt would have represented a risk that was hardly justified by the overall situation.