random_tariff_2025_mm_dd.dfw: Random Tariff Wars

#1: CaseMode := Sensitive

#2: InputMode := Word

eq (1): Demand system

#3: $pxh = \alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh$

#4: $pyh = \alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh$

#5: $pxf = \alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf$

#6: $pyf = \alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf$

Let λ be prob t=T => 1−λ prob t=0

eq (2): expected profit of x

#7: $eprofitxh = (pxh - c)\cdot xh$

#8: $eprofitxf = \lambda\cdot(pxf - c - T)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pxf - c)\cdot xf$

#9: $eprofitx = (pxh - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot(pxf - c - T)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pxf - c)\cdot xf$

eq (3): expected profit of y

#10: $eprofityf = (pyf - c)\cdot yf$

#11: $eprofityh = \lambda\cdot(pyh - c - T)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pyh - c)\cdot yh$

#12: $eprofity = (pyf - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot(pyh - c - T)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pyh - c)\cdot yh$

Derivation of (4) and Appendix A

#13: $eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c - T)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf -$

$\gamma \cdot yf) - c) \cdot xf$

#14: $\frac{d}{d\ xf}$ (eprofitx = $((\alpha - \beta \cdot xh - \gamma \cdot yh) - c) \cdot xh + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c - T) \cdot xf + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha -$

$\beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c) \cdot xf)$

#15: $$0 = - T \cdot \lambda - c - 2 \cdot xf \cdot \beta - yf \cdot \gamma + \alpha$$

#16: $\frac{d}{d\ xh}$ (eprofitx = $((\alpha - \beta \cdot xh - \gamma \cdot yh) - c) \cdot xh + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c - T) \cdot xf + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha -$

$\beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c) \cdot xf)$

#17: $$0 = -c - 2 \cdot xh \cdot \beta - yh \cdot \gamma + \alpha$$

#18: eprofity = $((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xf - \beta \cdot yf) - c) \cdot yf + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c - T) \cdot yh + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh -$

$\beta \cdot yh) - c) \cdot yh$

#19: $\frac{d}{d\ yf}$ (eprofity = $((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xf - \beta \cdot yf) - c) \cdot yf + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c - T) \cdot yh + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha -$

$\gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c) \cdot yh)$

#20: $$0 = -c - xf \cdot \gamma - 2 \cdot yf \cdot \beta + \alpha$$

#21: $\frac{d}{d\ yh}$ (eprofity = $((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xf - \beta \cdot yf) - c) \cdot yf + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c - T) \cdot yh + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha -$

$\gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh)$

#22: $$0 = - T\cdot\lambda - c - xh\cdot\gamma - 2\cdot yh\cdot\beta + \alpha$$

#23: $\text{SOLVE}([0 = - T\cdot\lambda - c - 2\cdot xf\cdot\beta - yf\cdot\gamma + \alpha,\ 0 = -c - 2\cdot xh\cdot\beta - yh\cdot\gamma + \alpha,\ 0 = -c - xf\cdot\gamma - 2\cdot yf\cdot\beta + \alpha,$
$0 = - T\cdot\lambda - c - xh\cdot\gamma - 2\cdot yh\cdot\beta + \alpha], [xf, xh, yf, yh])$

eq (4) sales levels

#24: $$\left[xf = \frac{2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\gamma^2 - 4\cdot\beta^2} \wedge xh = \frac{T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2} \wedge yf = \frac{T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2} \wedge yh = \frac{2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\gamma^2 - 4\cdot\beta^2}\right]$$

xf = yh > 0 if

#25: $2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) < 0$

#26: $\text{SOLVE}(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) < 0, T)$

#27: $$\text{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda < 0, T > \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right) \vee \text{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda > 0, T < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right)$$

Assumption 3

#28: $$T < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}$$

soc in Appendix A

#29: $\frac{d}{d\ xf}\frac{d}{d\ xf}(eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c - T)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf)$

#30: $0 > - 2\cdot\beta$

#31: $\frac{d}{d\ xh}\frac{d}{d\ xh}(eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c - T)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf)$

#32: $0 > - 2\cdot\beta$

#33: $\frac{d}{d\ xh}\frac{d}{d\ xf}(eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c - T)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf)$

#34: $0 = 0$

#35: $\frac{d}{d\ yf}\frac{d}{d\ yf}(eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf) - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c - T)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh)$

#36: $0 > - 2\cdot\beta$

#37: $$\frac{d}{d\ yh}\frac{d}{d\ yh}(eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf) - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c - T)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh)$$

#38: $$0 > - 2\cdot\beta$$

#39: $$\frac{d}{d\ yf}\frac{d}{d\ yh}(eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf) - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c - T)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh)$$

#40: $$0 = 0$$

eq (5): equlibrium prices

#41: $$pxh = \frac{T\cdot\beta\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$$

#42: $$pyh = \frac{T\cdot\lambda\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2) + (2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$$

#43: $$pxf = \frac{T\cdot\lambda\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2) + (2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$$

#44: $$pyf = \frac{T\cdot\beta\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$$

eq (7) profits in domestic markets

#45: $$eprofitxh = \frac{\beta\cdot(T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#46: $$eprofityf = \frac{\beta\cdot(T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

eq (8) profits in export markets

#47: $$eprofitxf = \frac{\beta\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#48: $$eprofityh = \frac{\beta\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

Result 2, Appendix B

The condition of this result

#49: $T > \dfrac{(\alpha - c)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$

Is this consistent with Assumption 3?

#50: $\dfrac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda} - \dfrac{(\alpha - c)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$

eq (B.3)

#51: $$\frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda - 1) - \gamma)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma)}$$

> 0 if [always!]

#52: $(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda - 1) - \gamma) > 0$

#53: $\mathrm{SOLVE}((c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda - 1) - \gamma) > 0, \lambda)$

#54: $$\mathrm{IF}\left(\beta\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) < 0, \lambda < \frac{2\cdot\beta + \gamma}{2\cdot\beta}\right) \vee \mathrm{IF}\left(\beta\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) > 0, \lambda > \frac{2\cdot\beta + \gamma}{2\cdot\beta}\right)$$

#55: $\lambda < \dfrac{2\cdot\beta + \gamma}{2\cdot\beta}$

#56: $\mathrm{eprofitx} = \dfrac{\beta\cdot(T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2} + \dfrac{\beta\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$

#57: $$\text{eprofitx} = \frac{\beta\cdot(T^2\cdot\lambda^2\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2) + 2\cdot T\cdot\lambda\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2 + 2\cdot(c - \alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#58: $$\frac{d}{d\lambda}\left(\text{eprofitx} = \frac{\beta\cdot(T^2\cdot\lambda^2\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2) + 2\cdot T\cdot\lambda\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2 + 2\cdot(c - \alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}\right)$$

eq (B.1) FOC for a minimum

#59: $$0 = \frac{2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot(T\cdot\lambda\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2) + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#60: $$\frac{d}{d\lambda}\frac{d}{d\lambda}\left(\text{eprofitx} = \frac{\beta\cdot(T^2\cdot\lambda^2\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2) + 2\cdot T\cdot\lambda\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2 + 2\cdot(c - \alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}\right)$$

eq (B.2) SOC for minimum

#61: $$0 < \frac{2\cdot T^2\cdot\beta\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#62: $$\text{SOLVE}\left(0 = \frac{2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot(T\cdot\lambda\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2) + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}, \lambda\right)$$

eq (9)

#63: $$\lambda hat = \frac{(\alpha - c)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2}{T\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 + \gamma^2)} \vee T = 0 \vee \beta = 0$$

Result 3 and Appendix C:

#64: $$\frac{d}{d\lambda}\left(eprofitxh = \frac{\beta\cdot(T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}\right)$$

#65: $$0 < \frac{2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\gamma\cdot(T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#66: $$\frac{d}{d\lambda}\left(eprofitxf = \frac{\beta\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}\right)$$

eq (C.1)

#67: $$\frac{4\cdot T\cdot\beta^2\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

< 0 if [Assumption 3]

#68: $$4\cdot T\cdot\beta^2\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)) < 0$$

#69: $\text{SOLVE}(4\cdot T\cdot \beta^2\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot \beta\cdot \lambda + (c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot \beta - \gamma)) < 0, T)$

#70: $$\left(\beta \neq 0 \wedge T < 0 \wedge \text{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda < 0, T < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right)\right) \vee \left(\beta \neq 0 \wedge T < 0 \wedge \text{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda > 0, T > \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right)\right) \vee \left(\beta \neq 0 \wedge T > 0 \wedge \text{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda < 0, T > \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right)\right) \vee \left(\beta \neq 0 \wedge T > 0 \wedge \text{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda > 0, T < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right)\right)$$

eq (C.2)

#71: $$T < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}$$

*** Section 4: Ad-valorem tariff wars

eq (10) profit X

#72: $eprofitxh = (pxh - c)\cdot xh$

#73: $eprofitxf = \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot pxf - c)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pxf - c)\cdot xf$

#74: $eprofitx = (pxh - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot pxf - c)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pxf - c)\cdot xf$

eq (11) profit Y

#75: $eprofityf = (pyf - c)\cdot yf$

#76: $eprofityh = \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot pyh - c)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pyh - c)\cdot yh$

#77: $eprofity = (pyf - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot pyh - c)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pyh - c)\cdot yh$

Derivations of (12) and (13) equlibrium sales and Appendix E

#78: $\text{eprofitx} = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot(\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf$

#79: $\text{eprofity} = ((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf) - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot(\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh$

eqs (D.1)

#80: $$\frac{d}{d\ xf}\left(\text{eprofitx} = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot(\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf\right)$$

#81: $$0 = (2\cdot xf\cdot\beta + yf\cdot\gamma - \alpha)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) - c$$

#82: $$\frac{d}{d\ xh}\left(\text{eprofitx} = ((\alpha - \beta\cdot xh - \gamma\cdot yh) - c)\cdot xh + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot(\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \beta\cdot xf - \gamma\cdot yf) - c)\cdot xf\right)$$

#83: $$0 = -c - 2\cdot xh\cdot\beta - yh\cdot\gamma + \alpha$$

eqs (D.2)

#84: $$\frac{d}{d\ yf}\left(\text{eprofity} = ((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf) - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot(\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \right.$$

$\gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh)$

#85: $$0 = -c - xf\cdot\gamma - 2\cdot yf\cdot\beta + \alpha$$

#86: $$\frac{d}{d\ yh}\ (eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xf - \beta\cdot yf) - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot((1 - \tau)\cdot(\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot((\alpha - \gamma\cdot xh - \beta\cdot yh) - c)\cdot yh)$$

#87: $$0 = (xh\cdot\gamma + 2\cdot yh\cdot\beta - \alpha)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) - c$$

#88: SOLVE([0 = (2·xf·β + yf·γ − α)·(λ·τ − 1) − c, 0 = −c − 2·xh·β − yh·γ + α, 0 = −c − xf·γ − 2·yf·β + α, 0 = (xh·γ + 2·yh·β − α)·(λ·τ − 1) − c], [xf, xh, yf, yh])

eqs (13) and (14)

#89: $$\left[xf = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)) + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)} \wedge xh = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)} \wedge yf = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)} \wedge yh = \right.$$

$$\left.\frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)) + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}\right]$$

xh = yf > 0 if

#90: $c\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) > 0$

#91: $\mathrm{SOLVE}(c\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) > 0, \tau)$

#92: $$\mathrm{IF}\left(2\cdot c\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + \alpha\cdot\lambda\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta) < 0, \tau < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\lambda\cdot(2\cdot c\cdot\beta + \alpha\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))}\right) \vee \mathrm{IF}\left(2\cdot c\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + \alpha\cdot\lambda\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta) > 0, \tau > \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\lambda\cdot(2\cdot c\cdot\beta + \alpha\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))}\right)$$

Assumption 4 (first term)

#93: $$\tau < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\lambda\cdot(2\cdot c\cdot\beta + \alpha\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))}$$

xf = yh > 0 if

#94: $c\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)) + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) < 0$

#95: $\mathrm{SOLVE}(c\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)) + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) < 0, \tau)$

#96: $$\mathrm{IF}\left(c\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + \alpha\cdot\lambda\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) < 0, \tau > \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{\lambda\cdot(c\cdot\gamma + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))}\right) \vee \mathrm{IF}\left(c\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + \alpha\cdot\lambda\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) > 0, \tau < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{\lambda\cdot(c\cdot\gamma + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))}\right)$$

Assumption 4 (second term)

#97: $$\tau < \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{\lambda\cdot(c\cdot\gamma + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))}$$

which one is higher?

#98: $$\frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\lambda\cdot(2\cdot c\cdot\beta + \alpha\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))} - \frac{(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta)}{\lambda\cdot(c\cdot\gamma + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))}$$

#99: $$\frac{c\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{\lambda\cdot(2\cdot c\cdot\beta + \alpha\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta))\cdot(c\cdot\gamma + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))}$$

#100: $$pxh = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) - \beta\cdot\gamma + \gamma^2\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)) + \alpha\cdot\beta\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}$$

#101: $$pyh = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2 + \beta\cdot\gamma\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau) - \gamma^2) + \alpha\cdot\beta\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)}$$

#102: $$pxf = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2 + \beta\cdot\gamma\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau) - \gamma^2) + \alpha\cdot\beta\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)}{(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)}$$

#103: $$pyf = \frac{c\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) - \beta\cdot\gamma + \gamma^2\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)) + \alpha\cdot\beta\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)}$$

eqs (14): equilibrium expected domestic profits

#104: $$eprofitxh = \frac{\beta\cdot(c\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)^2}$$

#105: $$eprofityf = \frac{\beta\cdot(c\cdot(2\cdot\beta\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1) + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma))^2}{(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)^2}$$

eqs (15): equilibrium expected export profits

#106: $$eprofitxf = \frac{\beta\cdot(c\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)) + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1))^2}{(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

#107: $$eprofityh = \frac{\beta\cdot(c\cdot(2\cdot\beta + \gamma\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1)) + \alpha\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(\lambda\cdot\tau - 1))^2}{(1 - \lambda\cdot\tau)\cdot(4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2)^2}$$

*** Section 5: Unilateral tariff with no retaliation

eq (16) profit of X

#108: $eprofitx = (pxh - c)\cdot xh + (pxf - c)\cdot xf$

eq (17) profit of Y

#109: $eprofity = (pyf - c)\cdot yf + \lambda\cdot(pyh - c - T)\cdot yh + (1 - \lambda)\cdot(pyh - c)\cdot yh$

Appendix E

#110: $eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xh - \gamma \cdot yh) - c) \cdot xh + ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c) \cdot xf$

#111: $eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xf - \beta \cdot yf) - c) \cdot yf + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c - T) \cdot yh + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c) \cdot yh$

eqs (E.1)

#112: $\frac{d}{d\ xf} (eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xh - \gamma \cdot yh) - c) \cdot xh + ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c) \cdot xf)$

#113: $0 = -c - 2 \cdot xf \cdot \beta - yf \cdot \gamma + \alpha$

#114: $\frac{d}{d\ xh} (eprofitx = ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xh - \gamma \cdot yh) - c) \cdot xh + ((\alpha - \beta \cdot xf - \gamma \cdot yf) - c) \cdot xf)$

#115: $0 = -c - 2 \cdot xh \cdot \beta - yh \cdot \gamma + \alpha$

eqs (E.2)

#116: $\frac{d}{d\ yf} (eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xf - \beta \cdot yf) - c) \cdot yf + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c - T) \cdot yh + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c) \cdot yh)$

#117: $0 = -c - xf \cdot \gamma - 2 \cdot yf \cdot \beta + \alpha$

#118: $\frac{d}{d\ yh} (eprofity = ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xf - \beta \cdot yf) - c) \cdot yf + \lambda \cdot ((\alpha - \gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c - T) \cdot yh + (1 - \lambda) \cdot ((\alpha -$

$\gamma \cdot xh - \beta \cdot yh) - c) \cdot yh)$

#119: $$0 = - T \cdot \lambda - c - xh \cdot \gamma - 2 \cdot yh \cdot \beta + \alpha$$

eq (18) eql sales under no retaliation

#120: SOLVE([0 = −c − 2·xf·β − yf·γ + α, 0 = −c − 2·xh·β − yh·γ + α, 0 = −c − xf·γ − 2·yf·β + α, 0 = − T·λ − c − xh·γ − 2·yh·β + α], [xf, xh, yf, yh])

#121: $$\left[xf = \frac{\alpha - c}{2 \cdot \beta + \gamma} \wedge xh = \frac{T \cdot \gamma \cdot \lambda + (c - \alpha) \cdot (\gamma - 2 \cdot \beta)}{4 \cdot \beta^2 - \gamma^2} \wedge yf = \frac{\alpha - c}{2 \cdot \beta + \gamma} \wedge yh = \frac{2 \cdot T \cdot \beta \cdot \lambda + (c - \alpha) \cdot (2 \cdot \beta - \gamma)}{\gamma^2 - 4 \cdot \beta^2}\right]$$

y > 0 if [Assumption 3]

#122: $2 \cdot T \cdot \beta \cdot \lambda + (c - \alpha) \cdot (2 \cdot \beta - \gamma) < 0$

#123: SOLVE(2·T·β·λ + (c − α)·(2·β − γ) < 0, T)

#124: $$\text{IF}\left(\beta \cdot \lambda < 0, T > \frac{(c - \alpha) \cdot (\gamma - 2 \cdot \beta)}{2 \cdot \beta \cdot \lambda}\right) \vee \text{IF}\left(\beta \cdot \lambda > 0, T < \frac{(c - \alpha) \cdot (\gamma - 2 \cdot \beta)}{2 \cdot \beta \cdot \lambda}\right)$$

#125: $$T < \frac{(c - \alpha) \cdot (\gamma - 2 \cdot \beta)}{2 \cdot \beta \cdot \lambda}$$

eq (E.3) equlibrium prices without retaliation

#126: $$pxh = \frac{T\cdot\beta\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$$

#127: $$pyh = \frac{T\cdot\lambda\cdot(2\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2) + (2\cdot\beta - \gamma)\cdot(c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta)}{4\cdot\beta^2 - \gamma^2}$$

#128: $$pxf = \frac{c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta}{2\cdot\beta + \gamma}$$

#129: $$pyf = \frac{c\cdot(\beta + \gamma) + \alpha\cdot\beta}{2\cdot\beta + \gamma}$$

eq (19) equilibrium profit of X without retaliation

#130: $$eprofitx = \frac{\beta\cdot(T^2\cdot\gamma^2\cdot\lambda^2 + 2\cdot T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(\gamma - 2\cdot\beta) + 2\cdot(c - \alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(2\cdot\beta + \gamma)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2}$$

eq (20) equilibrium profit of Y without retaliation

#131: $$eprofity = \frac{2\cdot\beta\cdot(2\cdot T^2\cdot\beta^2\cdot\lambda^2 + 2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda\cdot(c - \alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma) + (c - \alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2)}{(2\cdot\beta + \gamma)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta - \gamma)^2}$$

Result 4 and Appendix F

eq (F.1)

#132: $$\frac{d}{d\lambda}\left(\text{eprofitx} = \frac{\beta\cdot(T^2\cdot\gamma^2\cdot\lambda^2 + 2\cdot T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda\cdot(c-\alpha)\cdot(\gamma-2\cdot\beta) + 2\cdot(c-\alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma)^2)}{(2\cdot\beta+\gamma)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma)^2}\right)$$

#133: $$0 > \frac{2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\gamma\cdot(T\cdot\gamma\cdot\lambda + (c-\alpha)\cdot(\gamma-2\cdot\beta))}{(2\cdot\beta+\gamma)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma)^2}$$

eq (F.2)

#134: $$\frac{d}{d\lambda}\left(\text{eprofity} = \frac{2\cdot\beta\cdot(2\cdot T^2\cdot\beta^2\cdot\lambda^2 + 2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda\cdot(c-\alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma) + (c-\alpha)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma)^2)}{(2\cdot\beta+\gamma)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma)^2}\right)$$

#135: $$\frac{4\cdot T\cdot\beta^2\cdot(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c-\alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma))}{(2\cdot\beta+\gamma)^2\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma)^2}$$

< 0 if [Assumption 3]

#136: $2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c-\alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma) < 0$

#137: $\mathrm{SOLVE}(2\cdot T\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda + (c-\alpha)\cdot(2\cdot\beta-\gamma) < 0,\ T)$

#138: $$\mathrm{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda < 0,\ T > \frac{(c-\alpha)\cdot(\gamma-2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right) \vee \mathrm{IF}\left(\beta\cdot\lambda > 0,\ T < \frac{(c-\alpha)\cdot(\gamma-2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}\right)$$

#139: $$T < \frac{(c-\alpha)\cdot(\gamma-2\cdot\beta)}{2\cdot\beta\cdot\lambda}$$